

What is Said by Metaphor^{*}

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Abstract

‘What is said’ by an utterance, from a traditional truth-conditional view of language, is the uttered sentence’s conventionally encoded semantic meaning, and is distinguished from ‘what is implicated’, such as metaphor, which is understood as a type of speech in which a speaker says one thing but means another. Contextualists challenge this view of metaphor by offering three reasons to maintain that metaphor is classified within ‘what is said’: first, metaphor involves loose use; second, metaphor is assertoric; and, third, metaphor is at the level of the primary interpretation rather than the secondary one. However, Elizabeth Camp argues against these reasons. The aim of this paper is to examine her arguments and show that they are unsuccessful.

Keywords: What is said, metaphor, contextualism, Elizabeth Camp, loose use

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I. Introduction

Few of us would think of metaphor as a subject in semantics. Its deeply context-sensitive character and poetic features make it unlike the standard, fixed, conventional meanings of sentences. On the one hand, ‘what is said’ by the utterance of a sentence from a traditional view is the proposition expressed by the sentence, which depends on the meanings of the words uttered and the syntactic rules.¹ From this perspective, the metaphorical content we grasp is definitely not what is said by metaphorical sentence *per se* because its literal proposition is typically false or categorically mistaken. On the other hand, to arrive at the metaphorical content, one must change the conventional meanings of constituent words, which are typically accompanied by contextual information. Metaphor is understood as a type of speech in which the speaker says one thing but means another. What is subsumed within semantics is the literal meaning, including expression/sentence meaning and ‘what is said’ by the utterance of the sentence.

However, contextualists have argued that ‘what is said’ by a sentence should be determined in terms of what a speaker *does* in uttering that sentence, which is inevitably affected by contextual factors.² Linguistic

¹ In philosophy of language, the Gricean distinction between ‘speaker meaning’ and ‘sentence meaning’ is regarded as a robust basis to separate the territories of semantics and pragmatics. Semantics studies the meaning of sentence. What is said by an utterance of a sentence is determined by the meanings of elements of the sentence and the syntactic rules as well. While pragmatics studies what speaker means, such as illocutionary force and conversational implicature. The so-called literal meaning includes sentence meaning and what is said by the sentence, and the so-called speaker meaning includes what is implicate, irony, joke, sarcasm, and so on. Once such a separation is taken for granted, sentence meaning is definitely conventional and context-independent. Contextualists reject this tradition and provide many cases to show that what is said by a sentence is no longer contextual-independent.

² For instance, Recanati maintains that ‘it is speech acts, not sentences, which have determinate contents and are truth-evaluable: sentences themselves express a determinate content only in the context of a speech act’ (Recanati, 2004: 154). What is said by a sentence (the semantic content of a sentence) is not simply determined by the encoded convention meanings of

phenomena increasingly indicate that we use expressions to express thoughts with richer content than that determined by the conventional encoded meanings. What one intuitively knows about an utterance is different from what is analyzed by traditional semantics because various contextual factors may be needed to determine or affect what is said (Carston, 2002; Recanati, 2004). Paradigmatic cases include enrichment, loose use, and transfer. Enrichment refers to a pragmatic process in which the intuitively understood truth condition or the content of utterances in a communicative exchange is richer than that determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered. For example, ‘They got married and had children’ is actually meant to be understood as ‘They got married and *then* had children’. Loose use refers to the flexible range of the use of an expression such that the intuitively understood content of a sentence is broader than its conventional meaning. For example, the word ‘silent’ in the utterance ‘The dorm floor is silent’ is relaxed from its standard meaning and is used to mean not noisy above a contextual threshold rather than totally absent all sounds (Bezuidenhout, 2001: 168). In the case of transfer, an expression is used, through a particular relation provided by the context, to denote something which is not the formal, correct reference of the expression. For example, in the sentence ‘The ham sandwich left without paying’, the expression ‘sandwich’ denotes, through transfer, the derived property ‘ham-sandwich orderer’ rather than the literal ‘ham sandwich’. These cases demonstrate that the standard of using words may be modified or modulated in certain contexts to adequately express the speaker’s thoughts; yet traditional analyses cannot reflect this aspect. The contextual factors pervasively affect the semantic content of a sentence, and thus what is said, the semantic content of an utterance of the sentence, cannot be exhausted simply by the meanings of the constituents of the sentence and the compositional rules.

Accordingly, in regard to metaphor, contextualists further maintain the location of metaphor in ‘what is said’ by proposing reasons as following:

expressions and the compositional rules, as minimalists suggest; rather, the so-called semantic content has been saturated by pragmatic or contextual factors.

(i) Metaphor involves loose use because the key words in metaphor take on a new contextually determined meaning such that the entire sentence expresses the metaphorical content rather than the literal content. For instance, in the sentence ‘the ATM swallowed my credit card’, the word ‘swallow’ has been loosened to be applied to a machine, which has no mouth (Recanati, 2004: 26). Since cases of loose use belong to ‘what is said’, metaphor also belongs to ‘what is said’.

(ii) The utterer of a metaphor *intends* to offer content, and the audience regards the metaphorical content as what the speaker *asserts* with commitment. In particular, the content offered by a metaphorical utterance is ‘something with which it makes sense to agree or disagree *in the ordinary truth-directed way*’ (Guttenplan, 2005: 15, emphasis added). Just like other speech acts, metaphor can be challenged, contradicted, or assented to, and its truth is thus rightly regarded as the *responsibility* of their utterers.

(iii) Unlike irony or implicature, which are derived from the literal content of the sentence through secondary interpretation, the metaphorical content is obtained at the *primary* interpretation level; that is, metaphor is interpreted “without going through a two-step procedure involving the prior computation of the ‘literal’ meaning of the utterance (whatever that may be) and a secondary inference to the actual meaning” (Recanati, 2001: 271). Anne Bezuidenhout (2001: 160) also claims that we do not access metaphor by first rejecting the literal interpretation of a sentence; rather, we proceed directly to the metaphorical content.

If these arguments are successful, the territory of semantics, and even the intension of semantics, will be changed. In this paper, I examine Elizabeth Camp’s challenges (2006, 2008) to these three arguments. Camp directly demonstrates the point of the debate by presenting similar situations concerning speech acts to rebut the generality of the pragmatic concern. This paper aims to show that her challenges are not successful.

II. The Debate #1: Loose Use or Not?

Camp rejects metaphor as tantamount to loose use because in metaphorical utterances, interpreters understand that there is a *disjoint stage* that separates literal interpretation from metaphorical interpretation,

whereas there is no such stage in loose use cases. For the same sentence uttered in different contexts or situations, language users *recognize* that in some of these contexts, one should interpret the sentence in a metaphorical way, whereas in other contexts, it should be interpreted literally. For example, ‘Bush is a cowboy’ could be interpreted literally, if the conversation were at a high school reunion party where the subject of conversation was people’s occupations. Yet, it could also be a metaphorical utterance if a person were asked about Bush’s performance as a leader. If there is no such *disjoint stage*, only one type of interpretation is adopted. However, language users know the difference between the two *types* of interpretation and exercise this knowledge in everyday conversation. Contrarily, in any cases of loose use, there is no such need for a *disjoint stage*; simply broadening the application of the words would do. Therefore, metaphor is not included in loose use (Camp, 2008).

Let us first clarify Camp’s argument in the following way:

- i) Loose use broadens the application of words.
- ii) Loose use does not involve recognizing the difference between a literal interpretation and a non-literal one.
- iii) Metaphor involves recognizing the difference between a literal interpretation and a metaphorical one, the *disjoint stage*.

Therefore, metaphor is not an instance of loose use.

The problem first manifests in (ii). Indeed, loose use does not involve in recognizing the difference between types of interpretation, but this is because it is a pragmatic interpretation process to modulate the meanings of expressions, *sub-propositional expressions*. The recognition of different types of interpretation, on the other hand, occurs at a *higher, propositional level*. Different directions or policies of interpretation may cause the turning of the meaning of expressions, such as loose use or enrichment, and then generate different semantic content of the sentence at stake. I suggest the problem in (ii) is a category-mistake. Let me first give some cases about transforming the interpreting direction, and then depicts its different concern from that of loose use.

(i)

A: Did you fight with Sam?

B: Come on! Not a fight! Just a pull and drag.

A: Okay...so, did the drag hurt you?

The first case (i) shows that the evaluation of the use of words concerns not only whether they are true or false but also different associations with the words (in this case, 'fight') that may evoke different attitudes or produce different effects for the hearer. Different evaluation makes the speaker change the words in the question.

(ii)

Mr. Davidson asked the class to hand in an assignment on the day of the mid-term exam instead of taking a paper exam. One student did not finish his assignment.

S: Mr. Davidson, may I hand in the assignment next Friday?

T: No problem, but you will lose some points for the delay.

S: ...(unpleasant) Why is the assignment due this week?

T: ...What?... Oh, I see!

This second case shows that S's second question is not really a question for T, such as asking for a cause or justification; rather, it is blame for T's arrangement, for example, for disturbing S's preparation for the mid-term exams that week. As long as one changes the direction of interpretation, in this case from 'asking for a reason' to 'other purpose behind', one's reaction changes.

(iii)

A: I was followed by a stranger last night. That was scary!

B: See... you should not walk alone at night, and you should dress properly, and...

A: Stop! I am not expecting you to give me a lesson but simply sympathy and solicitude.

B: ...Oh...I am sorry.

The third ostensive case hints that even in a non-implicature case, a proper response is expected and is determined by ‘what is said’ by the sentence uttered. The direction is concerned with the speaker’s intention in the utterance. There is nothing correct or incorrect with B’s first reply, simply that B misconstrues A’s utterance as stating a fact and asking for help.

(iv)

A: Why are you waiting here for the bus?

B: The stop is here, right?

A: I mean why are ‘you’ waiting here?

B: Oh! My driver is sick today!

This final case occurs frequently in everyday conversation. One must decide which part of the sentence uttered is the salient target and give adequate reply.³

We have different interpreting strategies to address all types of speech

³ There might be worry that my four examples on pp. 40-41 demonstrate the possible need to shift the direction of interpretation in conversation, but also commit the thesis (A) that “there is indeed a natural, default way to understand the sentence uttered”, which is thus inconsistent with the view of top-down interpretation process suggested by what I quote. Thanks to the referee for this reminding. The shift of direction of interpretation in the middle of discourse does not have to commit the thesis (A). The aim of the shift is to attain the semantic content of the utterance; there could be two, three, or more, shifts before one attains the semantic content of the utterance. Here is no entailment that the first interpretation must be the correct, or the natural, one. I shall also emphasize that each possible shift may still involves different modulations, thus also involves a top-down interpretation process. As I understand about the term ‘top-down interpretation process’, it means that an interpretation of a sentence is not definitely bottom-top (one needs first to determine the semantic value of each constituted words only then determine the meaning of the whole sentence); but that what an expression contributes to the semantic content of utterance may be influenced due to other constitutes assigned with different modulated content. That means, the modulation of interpretation is holistic. Different directions of interpretation will not negate the top-down interpretation process. Rather, the top-down interpretation occurs in kinds of types of interpretation, including a warning, statement, or making a wish. Indeed, the shift interpretation presupposes a pre-selected reading, yet such pre-selected reading is also a product of top-down interpretation, which is not to say it is the correct interpretation. So, the shift interpretation with a pre-selecting reading still has not to commit the thesis (A).

acts, and the so-called literal and non-literal interpretations belong to this category of interpreting strategies. It is possible that in some contexts, one may find herself misunderstanding the referent of the noun, or one may find that she should take the words much *seriously* or *lightly*. Alternatively, one may simply find that the direction of interpreting the constituent words as unfit to the context. One must recognize what type of speech act an utterance is—for example, a warning, order, statement, or wish—prior to determine the content of the sentence uttered (Austin, 1975). One must recognize the utterance as suitable for literal or non-literal interpretation and then *make sense of* the content of the sentence uttered.

Different directions of interpretation may accompany with different modulations of meanings of expressions, and one of them is loose use. For instance, ‘It rains!’ can be a warning rather than a statement because there may be only a few drops from the sky, hardly to such a degree as to be called raining. In such case, one’s grasping of this utterance has loosened the use of ‘rain’ and regards the utterance as a warning to take an umbrella rather than as to state some fact about weather. Alternatively, in ‘The governor cannot proffer better solutions and forget listening to the people’, the speaker can be interpreted as showing his complaint or making a claim, depending on the context in which the utterance is made. Yet, in either type of interpretation, the use of the word ‘listen’ is broadened from the literally physical sense to mean ‘care of’ or ‘concern with’.

Now, let us return to the case of metaphor and temporarily grant that we do recognize the difference between the types of interpretations, the metaphorical and literal ones.⁴ Does such recognition successfully indicate that metaphor does not involve loose use? As I try to show above, one could change the types of interpretation but also involve in modulation of meanings of expressions, such as loose use, at the same time. In Camp’s own case, ‘Bush is a cowboy’, when the context makes one to interpret metaphorically, the term ‘cowboy’ is loosen to mean the characters of being a cowboy, rather than to refer some identity. The type of interpretation and

⁴ This ‘grant’ does not imply that metaphorical interpretation is belonged to non-literal interpretations, such that the metaphorical content is non-literal one, definitely not the semantic content of the utterance.

the type of modulation belong to different categories or different levels of interpretation.⁵ So, I suggest Camp's rebut makes a category-mistake.^{6 7}

III. The Debate #2: Assertion or Not?

What is the evidence to show that metaphor has such features as assertoric force or agreeability or disagreeability? Bezuidenhout holds that the audience simply follows the speaker's thought about the metaphor by

⁵ Camp's disjoint stage argument, which is against treating metaphor as type of loose use, is mainly shown in Camp (2008). She tries to indicate that contextualist's criterion does not work for metaphor. There might be critics that in Camp (2006: 301), she gives a taxonomy in which metaphors and loose talk do have much in common, but she argues that neither belong to what is said. That means, I am guilty to trivialize Camp's argument because I neglect the other claim or premise which Camp offers to argue that metaphor does not belong to what is said: loose talk does not belong to what is said. My reply is that although Camp's taxonomy shows her intention to treat loose talk as what is implicated, it seems to me that Camp does not give direct and explicit argument on this point. (Not that much, indeed! Although Camp tries to provide a more appropriate definition of 'what is said' in the last section of this paper and, basing on this definition, to expel the content through loose use from 'what is said', she is rather conservative as to the conclusion at which she arrives.) What she mainly pushes hard in this paper is to show that, in her own words, "Metaphor does not meet the criteria offered by contextualists themselves for identifying 'what is said' by an utterance". (I would say Camp is cautiously selecting the target and avoiding the more troublesome, complex, undertaking work.) For the part that she only gives claims without direct supporting argument, I choose to focus on what she mainly pushes hard. I thank the referee for this point.

⁶ Here, one may raise the issue of whether metaphor involves loose use or transfer, which is worthy of discussion in another paper, but recognition of the distinction of types of interpretation is hardly to deny that metaphor shares features with loose use.

⁷ A possible reply may be that simply the recognition of disjoint stage, that is, the distinction between types of interpretation, can show that metaphor content is not the same as the literal meaning, and is therefore not the semantic content of the sentence, whether or not loose use is involved. This is understandable, but the question behind the issue about what is said by metaphor is just a peripheral debate about what is said by a sentence. For contextualists, when the semantic content is affected by the contextual factors, it is hard to say what is said is just the literal meaning or sentence meaning. That there are different interpretation policies is just another aspect of pragmatic interpretation, and it does not entail we should therefore maintain that sentence *per se* has its complete, independent meaning. I leave the debate to another paper, and focus on how they argue in terms of the features of speech acts, which is also Camp's focus.

echoing the words used, and that showing agreement or disagreement is the same type of act as responding to a normal declarative sentence. When one understands a metaphor, she even uses ‘say’ to report the content of metaphor (Bezuidenhout, 2001). However, Camp provides examples to show that even in indirect speech acts, there may be cases in which the audience follows indirect content by echoing the words uttered or uses ‘say’ to report what the speaker means. Agreement occurs even when the speaker speaks indirectly. For example, suppose a professor is asked whether Alice passed her exam, and the professor responds by saying,

‘I didn’t fail any students’.

Then, it is quite possible that the audience will report the professor’s utterance as

‘The professor *said* that Alice passed her exam’,

even though we agree that the reported content of the professor’s utterance should count as a mere implicature (Camp, 2006).

Indeed, the simple use of ‘say’ by the reporter cannot guarantee that the speaker intends some content to be revealed *directly* through the sentence used, nor that the hearer understands the speaker’s primary thought *directly* from the sentence uttered. We can be sure that when we use ‘say’ to report others’ utterances, we typically intend to pinpoint the real thought behind the speaker’s utterance. Yet, this careless mistake does not defeat contextualism, for what contextualists emphasize is the *responsibility of the utterer* as another aspect of metaphorical utterance. The metaphor maker commits herself to the metaphorical content, just as to any declarative sentences, whether the hearer reports by ‘say’ or not.

Such a type of commitment is differently in Camp’s view. Although she has a similar observation: “it is normally only appropriate to report speakers as having ‘said’ contents to which they have *openly and obviously* committed themselves by their utterance” (Camp, 2006: 286), the difference between contextualists and her is that she emphasizes the conditions of ‘openness’ and ‘obviousness’ from the hearer’s perspective rather than from that of the speaker. She regards a hearer’s hesitance to report a speaker

having *said* something as evidence that we cannot ascribe the commitment to the speaker. For instance, faced with such a highly poetic metaphor as ‘The hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw’ (Camp, 2006: 286), the elusiveness and allusiveness would prevent one from reporting that the poet has *said* something. Camp concludes that in this manner, the speaker’s commitment diminishes her power to make metaphor assertoric.

I do not think that Camp’s doubt works; the failure of a hearer’s interpretation is not a reason to rebut a speaker’s commitment to her own utterance. One’s hesitance to report a speaker’s utterance by metaphor may be due to other reasons. Compared to common literal cases, a student may not fully understand a teacher’s lesson in class because of the vocabulary, a lack of concentration, or misunderstanding the point. This lack of comprehension does not mean that the teacher shows no commitment to the lesson or words given. When Romeo says ‘Juliet is the sun’, he acts with a different *intention* compared to the situation of implicature, such as when one says ‘He is a punctual person’ in answering such question as whether David is good at philosophy. Any metaphor maker uses metaphor to reveal what she sees, hears, feels, and thinks when there are limited words to use for precise description. The speaker is waiting for any comment and expecting acceptance, and she may even defend the way or words she chooses. It is in this manner that the ‘responsibility for the utterance’ comes to metaphor and as well the conventional declarative sentence.⁸

IV. The Debate #3: Primary or Secondary?

The most controversial problem is how to define the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ interpretations. In Recanati’s construal,

⁸ Here, Camp attempts to raise a criterion problem for what counts as one ‘saying’ something. Yet, contextualists are concerned with the speaker’s commitment to the content of utterance rather than how to judge whether one ‘says’ something. Camp deems the hearer’s hesitance as the criterion, yet contextualists need no other criterion to rejoin; what they need to do is reclaim and clarify the nature of the assertoric speech act, in which the speaker commits to what is said by her utterance. For a metaphor-maker such as Romeo, the commitment to the metaphorical is given in the same manner as the assertoric utterance.

Secondary pragmatic processes are ‘post-propositional’. They cannot take place unless some proposition p is considered as having been expressed, for they proceed by inferentially deriving some further proposition q (the implicature) from the fact that p has been expressed.... [S]econdary pragmatic processes are conscious in the sense that normal interpreters are aware both of what is said and of what is implied and are capable of working out the inferential connection between them. (Recanati, 2004: 23)

In contrast, primary pragmatic processes are ‘pre-propositional’; there is no need for prior proposition as the input to the process. Yet, primary pragmatic processes surely are conscious, just not in the same sense as secondary pragmatic processes. As Recanati notes,

Normal interpreters need not be aware of the context-independent meanings of the expressions used, nor of the processes through which those meanings are enriched or otherwise adjusted to fit the situation of use.... They are aware only of the *output* of the primary processes involved in contextual adjustment. (Recanati, 2004: 23, my emphasis)

Based on this distinction, enrichment, loosening use, and transfer are primary pragmatic processes because they all undertake some modulation of expressions without any prior proposition as input for the inferential process. Similarly, in metaphorical utterance, language users are not consciously aware of *inference* from the first-level conventional meaning of sentence to the second level; there is no such two-step process in understanding metaphor (Recanati, 2004: 72, 76).

What makes this construal doubtful is that the feature of ‘being conscious of’ is too vague to be a definiens. As Camp suggests, it is not convincing that one is conscious of what is happening in a two-stage inferential process to determine the content of irony or implicature.⁹ Even

⁹ There may be a question regarding whether a two-stage inference may be working unconsciously, as Camp doubts, and why a disjoining stage can be ‘realized’ without difficulty, as Camp suggests above. However, I will not give further discussion about such double standard here.

the repeated use of a specific form of indirection or the explicit mention of contextual assumptions will ‘short circuit’ or ‘conventionalize’ what would otherwise be a two-step interpretive process into a single stage (Camp, 2006).

Regarding this first query about the consciousness of the inference between layers of meaning in secondary pragmatic interpretation, it is difficult to provide proof if Camp’s requirement is the experimental evidence that the language user *is* aware of the inference between the two layers of meaning. However, this requirement for psychological evidence is not a good way to claim that language users are *never* aware of the inference in secondary interpretation, for what if some sensitive, astute users clearly notice what they are thinking? Appealing to actual psychological evidence presents many difficulties; for example, people may have no idea about the notion of inference, notion of layers of meaning, or implicature. I wonder if contextualists would agree that they are claiming something that requires the support of psychological evidence. Recanati suggests that whether a prior proposition exists as input for the derived meaning is the *main demarcation* between primary and secondary interpretations. When one is doing the interpretation with such prior proposition, it is hard to imagine that one is doing so without being conscious of what she is doing. It sounds like one might catch the laughing point of a joke without ever touching the source of that joke, which is quite unconceivable. Language users may not clearly describe the inference between two layers of meaning, but they can *recognize* when speaker’s intended/implicated meanings differ markedly from what is said by the sentence. The secondariness is ‘a feature of the interpretation of utterances, and the interpretation of utterances is something that is bound to be *available* to the language users who do the interpreting’ (Recanati, 2001: 270).

However, Camp regards this ‘availability’ as a compromise to the weaker construal that in secondary interpretation, ordinary speakers “must be aware that there is something ‘special’ about the use of words” or about the distinction and the connection between two layers of meaning. Camp believes that this is unhelpful, for this construal is compatible with what ordinary language users think about *metaphor*: they think that metaphorical speech exploits established conventional meanings to novel ends, so they

recognize that ‘it derives from a more basic, primary meaning which it presupposes’ (Recanati, 2001: 270) such that metaphor involves a two-step interpretation. Moreover, when ordinary language users are challenged to justify their interpretations of metaphorical utterances, they “feel compelled to, and are in fact able to, articulate ‘the distinction between the two layers of meaning’ and then construct a rough rational reconstruction of ‘the connection between them’” (Camp, 2006: 289). Therefore, Camp concludes that this *felt-gap* feeling about the two layers of meaning indicates that metaphor is not as primary as contextualists believe (Camp, 2008: 14-15).¹⁰ Note that this *felt-gap* feeling is different from the *disjoint stage* mentioned above; the former is an awareness of the distinction between metaphorical meaning and literal conventional meaning, whereas the latter is the pre-awareness of a proper type of interpretation. In Camp’s construal, the *felt-gap* makes metaphor secondary to the literal meaning, and the *disjoint stage* makes metaphor distinct from loose use.

Unfortunately, Camp provides a misleading suggestion here. First, when Recanati admits that metaphor ‘derives from a more basic, primary meaning which it presupposes’, the ‘primary meaning’ is not of *the sentence* per se but of *the words* that compose the sentence. There is no prior proposition generated or processed before the metaphorical meaning is grasped. Therefore, there are not two layers of meaning in the sense of secondariness; the felt-gap occurs at the level of meaning-adjustment of composed words. Furthermore, in Camp’s understanding of the *felt-gap* feeling, ‘two layers of meaning’ does not refer to the two layers of *propositions*, primary and derived, but to the paradigmatic meaning and extended meaning of words, between which the so-called rough rational reconstruction of the connection is built. In contextualists’ view, such reconstruction of connection is associative, such as loose use or enrichment, not inferential. There is thus no harm to the distinction between the primary and secondary interpretations. It is noteworthy that for contextualists, such as Recanati, in the primary pragmatic interpretation, the literal conventional and modulated meanings are on equal footing in

¹⁰ Camp (2008) notes that, for example, ‘George is a primate’ appears to be a metaphor only as long as there remains a gap between what the speaker says and what she intends to convey.

interpretation:

The literal meaning has no compositional privilege over derived meanings; they compete and it is possible for some derived meaning to be retained...while the literal interpretation is suppressed. In other words, the derived interpretation is *associatively derived* from the literal interpretation, but it is not *inferentially* derived. Inferential derivation entails computation of the literal value of the global sentence, while associative derivation is a 'local' process which does not require prior computation of the proposition literally expressed. (Recanati, 2004: 29)

Metaphor, as a type of loose use, involves in a local associative process rather than an inferential derivation.

Perhaps we must provide a positive explanation of *felt-gap* feelings. From Recanati's perspective, what we give to each expression is not simply conventional meaning but semantic potential that can activate an abstract schema in which there is a slot for a certain type of value. For the sake of interpretational success, the preferable semantic value of the relevant type for the expression will enter into the composition of the complete proposition. For example, in 'The city is asleep', if we ascribe to 'asleep' its conventional semantic value (thereby activating the SLEEP schema), the value of 'the city' will have to be of the relevant type (such as human or animal); we change 'the city' to something that can sleep. Meaning adjustment occurs depending on whether the conventional meaning is fully or only partially schematic for the context or situation discussed. In such an adjustment, we may often generate a feeling of 'discrepancy between the evoked schema and the sense constructed by (partially) applying the schema to the situation at hand' (Recanati, 2004: 77). This discrepancy explains why we feel that there is gap between the literal and metaphorical interpretations: we are conscious of *how far* the adjusted meaning goes from the established conventional meaning.¹¹

¹¹ This further explains why there is a disjoint stage, the different types of interpretations between metaphorical and literal. It is possible that the meaning modulation occurs and leads one far from the conventional meaning or the established meaning, but when this modulation

V. A Diagnosis of the Debates

To recap the points shown in the above examination, first, Camp's notion of the disjoint stage cannot successfully separate loose use and metaphor, for what she marks as *disjoint stage* is the difference in interpreting policies rather than different understandings between metaphor and loose use. Second, from the contextualist's perspective, the commitment argument focuses on how the speaker regards the metaphorical content rather than how the listener hears or reports the metaphor. Third, the *felt-gap* feeling results from the discrepancy from the conventional meaning to the adjusted meaning, which is not a matter of primary or secondary interpretation. Although Camp's challenges fail to undermine the contextualists' thesis that the metaphorical content is just what is said by the metaphor, it is not a triumph for the contextualists. For the aforementioned arguments focus on the features or aspects of speech acts, such as the speaker's commitment to 'what is said', the recognition of types of interpretation, the awareness of the two steps of derivation between the primary proposition and the secondary one. None of these considerations is directly about the metaphorical content itself, but concerning to the features of speech acts, the language users' cognitive states in the linguistic activities. However, as long as one has not thoroughly accepted contextualist's view on 'what is said'; that is, as long as the notion of sentence meaning is still anchored in one's thought, appeal to features of speech acts hardly hit the nail on the head. For instance, Emma Borg has claimed that although these features or factors affect the activities in linguistic exchanges, they are not genuinely linguistic, but extra-linguistic (Borg, 2004, 2006, 2010). Camp's failure does not mean the success of contextualism.

Perhaps, we need a positive account, down to the nature of the meanings of the expressions themselves to anchor the status of metaphorical content in 'what is said.' That means, if contextualists start with the semantic flexibility/sensitivity and modulation to accounting for

gradually becomes quicker or much more stable, above a certain threshold, it thus forms a type of labor in interpretation—we regard it as figurative use of language.

the pragmatic affected semantic content, the better way to anchor metaphorical content in 'what is said' is to figure out what modulations occur in metaphorical understanding. Although some of contextualists may maintain that the notion of loose use has answered this further suggestion, it does not deepen into the nature of meanings of expression to show how and why we have such loosened meanings, let alone still some others maintain that it is the notion of transfer that can account for the generation of the metaphorical content. This further work is deeper and much more sophisticated than we thought, and thus needs another paper to elucidate. Here, we could preview that the more investigation into the nature of the linguistic means, the more we realize that perhaps it is the 'association' in our grasping of the sense and connecting it with expressions that activate our interpretations. The study of semantics must consider how this association produces a complete picture of language games or activities. In addition, if the study heads towards the correct direction, metaphor is undoubtedly part of this game.

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隱喻所言*

古秀鈴**

摘要

長久以來語言哲學家或語言學家咸認為隱喻是語用學的範疇，而非語意學的範疇，隱喻所言頂多是說話者所意圖的內容，像是言外之意，但絕不會是隱喻語句要表達的內容。而脈絡主義則提出三個理由說明隱喻內容可為語句要表達的內容：隱喻是種寬鬆的語言使用、隱喻有宣稱性、隱喻是第一層權勢主要的理解內容。坎普 (2006, 2008) 對此三個理由提出反駁，本文主要工作即在論證其反駁是不成功的。

關鍵詞：所言、隱喻、脈絡主義、坎普、寬鬆使用

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