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STEERING-THRUST-POSTING PRAGMATICS

Section 1. Introduction: Steering-Thrust Pragmatics[1]   In this paper I develop a new theory of Pragmatics, formulated in a new conceptual framework. It's proposed as a better Pragmatic theory than the traditional alternatives (Grice's or new-Gricean), and has some interesting repercussions, among them:

1. Assertions are a Pragmatic category. This has considerable implications for the search for an/the epistemic norm of assertion. This conception of assertion motivates (partly) the use of a main new Pragmatic concept – Steering Thrust (explained below).

2. That there is no Pragmatic Encroachment is a natural consequence of this Pragmatics. That is, the supposedly epistemically illicit but intuitive uses of 'know' – and in particular of: I don't know that p – are naturally accounted for in this Pragmatics as conveying a strong Pragmatic content, distinct from their semantic content – they function not only as semantic operators but also as Pragmatic operators.[2]

3. What's 'presupposed', or what's in the 'Common Ground', is not explained or analyzed in current Pragmatics, and the technical notion of 'presupposition', as used in Linguistics and Philosophy of Language, is *different* from the ordinary-language concept of presupposition. I analyze the ordinary-language notion of presupposition, but I especially analyze the technical

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[2] The arguments in favor of Pragmatic Encroachment on the basis of Knowledge-action principles don't, I argue, support it; see Part III in my (2022b).

notion of 'presupposition' – in terms of, in particular, two main concepts of the new Pragmatics: Steering Thrust and Posting (see below). The technical notion of 'presupposition' rests on the Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting-without-Steering. This proposal in turn is a partial motivation for the notions of Posting and Steering Thrust. It also alludes to another main new component – a new normative system that underpins Pragmatics, which I call Conversational Etiquette, which differs entirely from the normative system Grice appealed to – of Rationality.

4. This Pragmatics highlights the hitherto improperly conceptualized phenomenon of Pragmatic Inconsistency, examples of which are Moorean sentences and the like.

5. It turns out, given the new Pragmatics, that misleading is a Pragmatic phenomenon, that can be naturally couched in the new proposed Pragmatics.

I first sketch some main concepts of the new approach to Pragmatics, so-called **Steering-Thrust-Posting-Pragmatics** – in acronym: **STPP**, certain aspects of which I have already published or posted.[3] In the next few sections I'll explain its main four components: Steering Thrust; Posting; Conversational Etiquette; and Pragmatic Stances. The conception of Pragmatic Stances presents traditional Pragmatics as engaged in (primarily) the (relatively) narrow domain of factual (implicit) messages, or epistemic, or propositional. STPP covers a much broader domain of Pragmatic phenomena of the very same sort to the ones exemplified in the domain of factual messages. It therefore claims to show that Pragmatic phenomena are much more pervasive than we have taken them to be, which also motivates why a new conceptual system is required – the Gricean one aimed at the phenomena Grice had especially in mind, which are factual implicit messages, that can express propositions. But this is not the

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[3] For more elaborate presentations of STTP, see my (2023a). I have introduced some aspects of STPP in (2018a), (2018b) and (2020).

case with various other Pragmatic Stances. Accordingly, I will not use Grice's technical term of 'implicature' since it's grounded inextricably in his Pragmatics (e.g., has propositional contents): The term 'conveyed implicit content' will do better.

I will make occasional use of the notorious DeRose's Bank example (or alternatively Cohen's airport example).[4] I'll take familiarity with it for granted (but present them in a condense form in the footnote here).[5] The phenomenon underpinning these two examples is the same. For convenience, I'll refer in this paper to DeRose's bank case in my slightly modified version: In my version, first, the second stage occurs right after the wife mentions the mortgage, and second, the husband's response in the first stage to his wife's inquiry: Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday? is merely: Yes, I do. That is, without spelling out his evidence, by contrast to DeRose's version, which includes something like his having been in the bank twice on Saturdays. Note too that this abbreviates: Yes, I do know that the bank is open on Saturday. Another perfectly acceptable version would be: Yes, it is. In this

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[4] See Stewart Cohen's Airport case in his (1987).

[5] Keith DeRose's Bank case; see his (1992). My variant of it, somewhat 'cleaned up', is succinctly as follows:

Stage I: Husband and wife are on way to their bank to deposit a check.

Husband: Look at the long line. Why won't we come back and deposit tomorrow?

Wife: Tomorrow is Saturday. Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?

Husband: Yes, I know it's open on Saturday.

End of stage I. The couple proceeds with the conversation onto **Stage II**:

Wife: You might have forgotten, but the check is for our mortgage, and the deadline for deposit is tomorrow, Saturday. We have been late paying the last two payments. If we now miss this deadline, we might/are-going-to lose our house. Now tell me: Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?

Husband: Well, in this case, why won't we deposit now./Well, given that, I don't know that it's open on Saturday; let's deposit now./Now I am not sure it's open on Saturday, so let's deposit now.

End of example. All three responses of the husband (in stage II) seem natural enough under the circumstances. We'll proceed with the 'know' version – the middle response.

version, the husband *doesn't* commit himself to *knowing* that the bank is open on Saturday but *only* to the bank's being open on Saturday – which implicitly commits him to a somewhat weaker epistemic position of his regarding it. As noted below (and expanded on my other writings in this area)[6] the use of the operator 'I know that …' as here functions as an *epistemic operator* but also as a *Pragmatic operator*: The first use conveys a *veiled*, diffuse, epistemic commitment, and the second conveys primarily an added degree of Steering Thrust.[7] What we'll need for this paper out of **STPP** are the three basic concepts – of *Steering Thrust* (which we'll explain first, below), of *Posting* and of *Pragmatic Stances*, and the underpinning norms of Conversational Etiquette -- all of which are explained below. The proposed Pragmatics is conceived of as an alternative to Grice's Pragmatics, although we'll not have the space to elaborate on an evaluative comparison between the two.[8]

Steering-Thrust-Posting-Pragmatics (STPP): An Outline

Section 2: Steering Thrust   Consider a couple of obvious **examples. First (Example 1)**, a speaker and her hearer need to go out of their hotel. The speaker looks out the window and says: It's raining. Apart from the obvious explicit factual information that her verbal act exhibits and conveys to the hearer,[9] she also conveys an **Action-Directed implicit content**, to the effect of: We need to take umbrellas. The speaker thereby *steers* her hearer towards an action (taking an umbrella).

  Second (Example 2), when they eat, the speaker says: Can you pass the salt please? Obviously, the speaker *doesn't convey* the explicit content of her verbal act – she is not

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[6] See my (2012a), (2015a), (2018b) and (2022).

[7] See below for a good deal of discussions and clarifications of the phenomenon of Steering Thrust, and my (2012a), *PhilPapers*, and my (2015a), section 5. For a more elaborate introduction of Steering Thrust, see my (2020).

[8] But see bellow, Section 4, and the chapter on Grice, Stalnaker and Lepore in my (2025).

[9] Of course, in the context. I'll occasionally omit such obvious relativizations.

asking a question and doesn't trigger or expect a response to the literal question. Rather, the implicit content she conveys is Action-Directed (for short: **AD**) – steering the hearer towards the action of passing the salt to her. The speaker *steers* her hearer towards performing the action in question which she doesn't specify explicitly. The explicit content of her verbal act is ***suppressed*** – it's not conveyed.[10]

   Third, the speaker and the hearer are in a restaurant, trying to catch the waiter's attention by raising and waving their hands. But the waiter ignores their gestures and doesn't acknowledge them. The speaker, irritated and frustrated, says: He is such a jerk! (or: What a jerk!).[11] The explicit content of her verbal act is minimal – primarily in referring to a certain individual.[12] But she *primarily* conveys (and expresses) *an attitudinal implicit content*, which is derogatory (thereby also exhibiting frustration).[13] This verbal act and abundantly many like it, barely if at all convey explicit contents (and if they do, there are *subsidiary* (or 'recessive',

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[10] Although it's use is essential in fixing the implicit content she conveys. I don't enter here the issue of whether many such idioms are 'frozen Pragmatic strings' that aren't re-processed cognitively each time but are governed by what I surmise can be called 'sub-routines'. This is plausible in this case (thereby giving role to a *'Pragmatic Dictionary'* (in a dialect)), but less so in various others which as such cannot be relegated to an ultimate 'rigid' account of Pragmatic competence (contra LePore and Watson (2015), it seems). Rather, Pragmatic competence requires, I argued and elaborated, an *embedded simulation decoding account* (see my (2018a)).

[11] I hold that the latter version is still an assertion, conveying pretty much the same implicit content (as the prior exclamation; but this point is not crucial for us here). Chris Kelp thinks otherwise (as I understand him, in an exchange during the Bled conference, 2023).

[12] That she has reference to via the indexical, or implicitly (as in 'What a jerk!' – just 'having in mind'; see my (1989)).

[13] Thereby Posting (see below) having a certain feeling, while also steering the hearer towards forming such a feeling as well, in addition to merely manifesting this feeling. Manifesting is not a Pragmatic phenomenon but is essentially indicatory. A verbal act can manifest a feature or a state – as in 'expressing it', apart from Posted it). For more on how Gibbard's unpacked 'expressing' locution is considered (and unpacked) in STPP, see my (2019).

i.e., non-*dominant*), but they do convey Steering Thrust – they steer the hearer towards an attitudinal state (which I call a Pragmatic Stance, see below – yet there are many others).[14]

Forth, consider a tourist waiting for a doctor in the waiting room. It's a hot and humid day, and, thirsty as she is, she licks her lips. Another patient waiting in the room notices her lips-licking and says, while pointing: There is water in the fridge. He thereby conveys the obvious informational explicit content (while his gesture points to the object he refers to by 'the fridge'), but he *primarily* conveys an implicit content which is AD – steering the subject towards the action of opening the fridge and fetching the water. He also thereby *posts* an *approving* attitudinal stance to the effect that this action (by the hearer) would be **appropriate** - approving the performance of the action he is thereby steered towards, where 'appropriate' is to be understood in terms of complying with the *local* normative Etiquette.[15]

These examples exhibit the phenomenon of Steering Thrust: The speaker, who generates the **verbal act**,[16] *thereby also steers her hearers/readers towards some Pragmatic state* (one or more). In our examples above, she steers towards an informational/epistemic Pragmatic stance (see below), and/or an AD Pragmatic-Stance and/or an Attitudinal Pragmatic stance. Steering Thrusts are the *main phenomenon* of Pragmatics (on this STPP perspective), whereby explicit contents and especially implicit contents are conveyed to the **verbal-act consumer** -- be it a reader, if the verbal act is written, or a hearer, if it's a speech act.[17]

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[14] They also exhibit an emotive Pragmatic Stance which is something like frustration and disappointment, but this will not concern us here, nor what 'expressing' amounts to under STPP. For elaborations, see my (2019).

[15] Governing this clinic, comparable to so many local norms of specific (and generic) work places, households, etc.

[16] My term is thus 'Verbal-Act generator', instead of 'speaker', since LSTPP (see below) is exhibited in its pure form in written texts, and 'a speaker' literally doesn't apply to written communication (although of course it can figure in *reported* speech in written communication). Accordingly I use 'verbal act' instead of 'speech act', for the same reason.

[17] Since Linguistic STPP (i.e.: **LSTPP**), which is STPP restricted to linguistic verbal-acts, is the Pragmatics I employ here, the paradigmatic cases would be written verbal acts, since such a medium

Steering Thrusts have **contents**, which are *not linguistic* but consist of, among others, specific contents suited to the type of Pragmatic Stance steered towards, e.g., informational/epistemic content (primarily propositions),[18] or action-specific for AD Pragmatic Stances, or a certain attitudinal content for attitudinal Pragmatic Stances, etc. Such contents also include a *degree* of Steering Thrust and its *polarity* – pro or con: Towards acquiring the Pragmatic Stance steered towards or towards *not* acquiring it (or not having it, if already possessed). So:

Thesis 1: The conveyed implicit content of Steering Thrust is:

    <Pragmatic-Stance-content; a degree; a polarity>,

where the Pragmatic-Stance-content varies with the Pragmatic Stance steered towards.[19]

Section 3: Pragmatic Stances   Pragmatic Stances are positions (or states) that verbal acts generators and consumers can have – they are what verbal-act generators steer the hearer towards in employing the verbal act in question.[20] They cover a certain spectrum – not only propositional or AD or attitudinal, but also emotive/feeling, attentive/focusing, ethical stances, religious stances, etc. (each type is composed of various, usually lots of, sub-types). The *type* of contents of types of Pragmatic Stances would vary with the latter type – having a certain Epistemic Position (carrying a particular information), or an attitudinal stance (which very often would be de re – about a certain individual or a certain action in the case of an AD

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doesn't involve non-linguistic modes such as intonation, facial expressions, or bodily gestures (though some non-linguistic features are employed in it, e.g., exclamation marks, and of course are very often described in it). Of course, LSTPP is applicable to utterances, but it doesn't take into account such non-linguistic ingredients that might well modulate the implicit content conveyed.

[18] I don't take a stance here regarding probabilistic information which, it has been argued, need not propositional (though I do elsewhere); see Sara Moss (2018).

[19] In general, such contents can also include a constituent regarding whether the particular Pragmatic-Stance in question is de dicto and/or de re: This is very common regarding informational/epistemic, and especially attentive/focusing, Pragmatic Stances.

[20] In so far as the hearer is concerned. But we'll shortly see that the speaker usually also Posts having such a Pragmatic Stance (or a corresponding one).

Pragmatic Stance or a certain object/place etc. (also usually de re) or a certain ethical position, etc. Since the contents of various Pragmatic-Stances are not propositions, they don't (in such cases) have Truth-Values.[21]

The Steering-Thrust conveyed by the verbal-act generator comes in *degrees* – it can be weaker or stronger. The degrees of Steering Thrusts are *distinct and different* from the degrees of the Pragmatic Stances they steer towards. (Steering Thrusts can be considered roughly as a sort of 'pressure' that the speaker exerts on the hearer by the verbal act in question – a causal thrust towards some Pragmatic Stance. Thereby Steering Thrusts have some 'oomph' (see the analogue in the case of Causation – causal impact).) Indicative forms of verbal acts can come with a certain relatively low degree of Steering Thrust when the sentential form of the verbal act is not embedded under operators such as ascriptions:[22] The 'I know that …' operator is a Steering-Thrust *enhancer* but 'I think that …' is a Steering Thrust *detractor* (lowers the degree of Steering Thrust). That saying a (simple – i.e., not embedded by an ascription operator) indicative verbal act has a certain degree of Steering Thrust can be seen by observing that the speaker can *withdraw* it without withdrawing her standing behind the content – the Pragmatic Stance she Posted having. In order to illustrate these points, it's best to consider DeRose's well-known bank case or a very similar case – Cohen's airport

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[21] Thereby ethical and other related Pragmatic Stances can be employed by cognitivists as well. The content of Informational/epistemic Pragmatic Stances, as displayed in Thesis 1 above, has a specific informational content as its own Steering-Thrust content – the content of the specific Epistemic State *steered towards* by the Steering Thrust, which may well be propositional.

[22] And is devoid of locutions that are Steering-Thrust *enhancers* (such as 'It's a fact that …; see below).

case.[23] E.g., consider the husband in Cohen's airport example[24] (asked by a couple whether the flight they are all about to board stops in Chicago) saying: It stops in Chicago – but don't rely on me (or check with an airline representative). The speaker stands behind the content he posted (we'll expand on this below) himself as having the requisite Epistemic Position for, but *retracted* its AD Steering Thrust (to the effect of: Just board the flight – nothing else is necessary).[25]

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[23] I will refer in this paper to my version of DeRose's bank example) (see his (1992) and Cohen's airport example. My version is merely slightly different, with no significant bearings to their import.
   My variant of DeRose's bank case, somewhat 'cleaned up', is succinctly as follows:
Stage I: Husband and wife are on way to their bank to deposit a check.

Husband: Look at the long line. Why won't we come back and deposit tomorrow?

Wife: Tomorrow is Saturday. Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?

Husband: Yes, I know it's open on Saturday.

   End of stage I. The couple proceeds with the conversation onto **Stage II**:

Wife: You might have forgotten, but the check is for our mortgage, and the deadline for deposit is tomorrow, Saturday. We have been late paying the last two payments. If we now miss this deadline, we might/are-going-to lose our house. Now tell me: Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?

Husband: Well, in this case, why won't we deposit now./Well, given that, I don't know that it's open on Saturday; let's deposit now./Now I am not sure it's open on Saturday, so let's deposit now.

   End of example. All three responses of the husband (in stage II) seem natural enough under the circumstances. We'll proceed with the 'know' version – the middle response.

[24] The airport example is similar to the bank case. In it, a coupe at the airport approaches a passenger on a flight to NYC, asking: Do you know that the flight makes a stop-over in Chicago? The passenger responds: Yes, I do/Yes, it does. Thereby the passenger steers them towards his epistemic position. The couple: Deplaning in Chicago is very important to us; so let's ask again: Do you know it does? Passenger: Well, in this case I don't – why won't you ask an airline official.
[25] He also retracts the informational/epistemic Steering-Thrust, but not his Posting having that informational/epistemic stance (see below, Section 5, where Posting is introduced). But consider his saying:
   I know that the plane stops in Chicago – but don't rely on me.
If he is in an epistemic position to say 'I know' as he does here, then of course what he says here is Sayable by him epistemically, but also Overall (viz., Pragmatically – with all operative norms taken into account): He is not Pragmatically Inconsistent since by the second conjunct he *retracts* the Steering-Thrust of the first conjunct – but not his having Posted having that epistemic position. (Notice that this is not a case of Posting-Without-Steering – see above, Sections 5 and 14) since he

Speakers employ *different* degrees of strength of Steering Thrust, and there are various *locutions and idioms* that *add a degree of Steering Thrust* to the verbal act. E.g. **(Example 3)**, the operators 'I know that p' or 'I am sure that p' add a degree of Steering Thrust, and similarly for operators such as 'It's true that …' or 'It's a fact that …'. Such operators as the first two therefore usually play a *double role* – both epistemic[26] and Pragmatic, although in certain cases *only* epistemic and in others *only* Pragmatic, in which case the epistemic content is *suppressed*: The most noteworthy case of this latter sort is their use in instances of so-called Pragmatic Encroachment. What is a (significant) corollary of STPP is that it becomes clear, once we are familiar with STPP and especially with the phenomenon of Steering Thrust

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steers while Posting and *then* cancels just the steering. And he is in the epistemic position to Post having the informative/epistemic explicit content of the first conjunct.

But if this is a case of a leeway (see above, Section 9), i.e., when the speaker isn't in an *epistemic* position to say he knows but his 'I know' functions primarily (predominantly) Pragmatically (i.e., as action-directed – steering the hearer towards an action, rather than epistemically), the speaker is not warranted in saying that conjunction (where he retracts in the second conjunct): he still Posts having the epistemic position he has steered towards, but he is not epistemically warranted in so Posting it: He doesn't have that epistemic position. Saying a Moorean sentence is Pragmatically Inconsistent – by saying 'p' the speaker steers towards a certain Pragmatic Stance, but then he immediately retracts, and thus steers *away* from it: Steering in opposite/incompatible directions amounts to Pragmatic Inconsistency. But in the above case he intuitively is not Pragmatically Inconsistent, since in the second conjunct ('ask somebody else') he *retracts* his prior Steering Thrust (although not his having Posted it) – he is not Pragmatically Inconsistent. (I.e., although by the first conjunct he steers towards the action in question, by the second conjunct he steers away from it; see my (2012b) "Pragmatic Inconsistencies"). But in the leeway version, since he doesn't take himself to literally know it, what he says is not epistemically Sayable by him (viz., he is not in an epistemic position to say it) and it's no longer backed-up by a dominant Pragmatic Action-Directed Steering-Thrust (which has been retracted).

It could be also, in such a case, that he retracts *both* the Action-Directed Steering Thrust *and* the epistemic Steering-Thrust. The verbal act is ambiguous regarding whether he does or doesn't retract the epistemic Steering Thrust. In that context, there is no question that he retracts the action-directed Steering Thrust. But thereby he doesn't eliminate his Posting: He continues to Post his epistemic position which has been generated by his Steering-Thrust but which has been retracted. His position then is that of taking a passive attitude towards whether his audience believes it or not. The former case would fit better if he is mildly offended by the challenge to what he has said. But 'I know that …' is a Pragmatic operator that *increases* the Steering Thrust. Thus so long as the speaker uses 'know' as in the version above, he continues to stand behind his epistemic Steering Thrust. The difference between the two cases could be more transparent if he drops 'know'.

[26] The epistemic content of 'I am sure that p' conveys epistemic confidence.

(and recognize its plausibility – at least), and once the Pragmatic role and Steering Thrust of such locutions are taken into account, is that *there is no phenomenon such as Pragmatic Encroachment*:[27] The use of the 'I know' and especially 'I don't know' operators involves also, and sometimes primarily, *modulating the degree of steering thrust and its polarity*, and in some cases of the use of the latter it involves *suppressing* the epistemic function of the operator, i.e.: In such cases, the verbal act with such an operator (such as: Now I don't know that p) *doesn't* convey any (or hardly any) informational/epistemic Steering-Thrust – almost only Pragmatic Steering Thrust (e.g., as in AD verbal-acts, such as: I now don't know that the bank is open on Saturday – as in the 2nd stage of the familiar Bank case dialogue).[28] The *explicit* (i.e., largely *semantic*) content is not conveyed, and the speaker can be entirely consistent and candid even when he *does* know that the bank is open on Saturday (e.g., if he went there recently on two Saturdays). It's unfortunate that epistemologists have paid little attention if any to the prevalent use of such operators as partly or exclusively Pragmatic as well. But since the notion of Steering Thrust has not been around till recently, it's understandable why researchers, who intuitive noticed a *decline* when the stakes became high, associated it with an epistemic decline – a lower epistemic position rather than a decline in prior Steering Thrust (actual or potential) towards performing a certain action via associated Verbal Acts the use of which (in the setext) *steer* towards them. The main phenomenon is the *retraction of steering thrust* (regarding the action under consideration)

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[27] More precisely: That the cases that have been traditionally taken to exemplify Pragmatic Encroachment, exemplify no such phenomenon – but rather than the puzzling intuitions they generate are due to *other* Pragmatic phenomena – such as *retracting* one's degree of Steering Thrust, rather than lowering one's epistemic position. The phenomenon is inherently Pragmatic, NOT epistemic. For more elaboration, see below, and in particular my (2020) and (2022), and also my (2012a) and (2015a).

What I present here (succinctly) is how the puzzle that gave rise to Pragmatic Encroachment dissipates, in view of the new Pragmatics, STPP, leaving no significant motivations to 'distort' the traditional semantics of 'know' (i.e., which is not stakes-sensitive).

[28] The example is DeRose's; but see note 4.

rather than the shift downwards of the pertinent epistemic position.[29] [30]

For instance, the riddle involving the redundancy of 'true' in verbal acts that don't *mention* another mental act but use 'It's true that p' as an operator that governs a sentential form (e.g.:

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[29] See, in particular, proponents of Pragmatic Encroachment (or the like) such as DeRose, Stanley, and McGrath. As noted, at the time, with no familiarity of the underpinning Pragmatics of such phenomena such as STPP and the main Pragmatic phenomenon of Steering Thrust, researchers in the field, searching for what can is the palpable phenomenon of retraction, wondered what it is a retraction *of*. Having available to them only the pertinent notion of epistemic position, and approaching the puzzles from an epistemic perspective, the most natural available candidate for what was retracted was the actor/speaker epistemic position. Such a conclusion forced a major ramification of what knowledge depends on – such as Pragmatic factors, which has not been in the cards at all.

That the absence of familiarity with what underpins the dynamics of a certain phenomenon leads astray towards settling on another candidate can be, quite crudely, compared to Religious explanations vs. Physical ones. If the ancients encounter a spreading disease, they had no familiarity of say bacteria to explain it naturally, and thus resorted to super-natural explanation, such as the hand of God, and presumably within a relationship of duties and their neglect or violation. The actual phenomena, as accounted for by STPP, is that, once aware that the stakes are high, the speaker doesn't shift downwards her epistemic position but rather her *sayability* of what she has said before: With different norms, what she has said before is no longer sayable now. This is a cognitive process of realizing the impact of the rise in stakes on the now *preferred actions* and accordingly how one *steers* towards them (linguistically), which is the *standard* way in which we steer towards acting. This thus gives rise to the realization that the seeming retraction that can be indeed associated with the speaker/actor is NOT of his pertinent epistemic position but rather of his *degree of steering thrust* towards the action that is no longer preferred (though it used to be). But without awareness of STPP and the underpinning phenomenon of Steering Thrust as affecting what one *does* say and what is *appropriate* for one to say in such cases, theoreticians were left with little choice but to settle on the indeed very present phenomenon of the actor's epistemic position. Compare my 'amateur' diagnosis of this phenomenon to may account of why researchers have focused on an Epistemic Norm of Assertion rather than realizing that assertion was not driven by epistemological pressures but rather by Pragmatic pressures, and that the underpinning phenomenon for Assertion is a rise in Steering Thrust. These two can be considered as my two major motivations for realizing the phenomenon of Steering Thrust.

[30] So, put succinctly, my rejection of Pragmatic Encroachment is as follows (insofar as out subject-matter in this paper is concerned):

The so-called 'phenomenon' of Pragmatic Encroachment is a *pseudo-phenomenon*: That there is no Pragmatic Encroachment is a natural consequence of (at least the plausibility of) the new Pragmatics STPP: That is, once STPP is accepted (or considered at least plausible), the motivation for Epistemic Contextualism, SSI (Stanley), Shifty Epistemology (Fantl & McGrath) etc. becomes *otiose*, since it rests primarily on the puzzling case; but such cases become not puzzling at all in view of STPP. In view of that, and given the – now unnecessary – considerable cost of these theories (such as in 'distorting' the natural, traditional conception of Knowledge as interest/stakes-independent), one's natural conclusion should be that there is no Pragmatic Encroachment of 'know' and its kin.

It's true that snow is white – recall Example 3 above): The semantic content in saying 'Snow is white' is not different from that of 'It's true that the snow is white'. The resolution of this puzzle is: *Semantically* the addition of the operator is *entirely redundant*, but it serves a *double role* -- as a semantic operator but usually also as a *stronger pragmatic operator* (i.e., with stronger and dominant Pragmatic Steering-Thrust): Its Pragmatic function is *to add a degree of steering thrust to the verbal act* (in comparison with its use without such an operator). Hence adding 'It's true that …' operator is *semantically redundant but not Pragmatically redundant: Pragmatically* it can *very useful* in modulating the degree of Steering Thrust.[31] Accordingly, there is no Pragmatic Encroachment in such paradigmatic examples, and accordingly the so-called Pragmatic Encroachment 'phenomenon' is a pseudo-Pragmatic-Encroachment phenomenon.

Section 4: Conversational Etiquette vs. Gricean Pragmatics   The Norms that underpin the Gricean Pragmatics with the central role of Gricean Implicatures in it are norms of Rationality, underpinning the rationale of the Gricean maxims designed for Rational Cooperative conversational-participants pursuing a Common Goal (acronym: **RCCG**). On the STPP approach resorted to in this paper, the norms governing Pragmatics are of a *different type* – norms of Conversational Etiquette (rather than mere Rationality), with normative obligations of the consumer and primarily the generator of the verbal act(s). The verbal-act generator (a speaker, if in an oral conversation or presentation) is obligated to so plan her verbal acts so as not to prompt her verbal-act consumer(s) to interrupt her *Conversational Flow*, which is a main target of the Conversational Etiquette. The norms of

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[31] Recall our discussion of this example above – Example 3. See especially my (2022) for a more detailed presentation of my Pragmatic approach (i.e., involving STPP) applied to such cases and more generally to so-called Pragmatic-Encroachment. The term, in my view, mis-describes a Pragmatic phenomenon, which is naturally understood in terms of STPP. An appropriate term, given my perspective, would be: *Pseudo Pragmatic-Encroachment.*

Conversational Etiquette consist first and foremost of a broadly construed Norm of Sincerity, covering a normative commitment by the speaker to *have* the Pragmatic Stance she steers her hearer towards acquiring. They also cover, among others, that the verbal-act generator *approves*[32] of the verbal-act consumer's performing the act he is steered towards (by the speaker), or of his acquiring the attitudinal, or some other Pragmatic Stance, that he is steered towards acquiring by the verbal act in question.

   The norms of Conversational Etiquette, other than the broad Norm-type of Sincerity, are pertinent primarily to cases of so-called 'presuppositions' on which I will not be elaborated here (but we'll get a glimpse below).[33] Their domain of applicability is much broader than that of the Gricean maxims since the conversational participants aren't limited to being Rational, Cooperative and with a Common Goal[34] -- I'll abbreviate these requirements as: **RCGG** -- as the Gricean maxims require, and *centrally* so – Gricean implicatures can be inferred *on the basis* of his maxims, which rely on such features.[35] And indeed lots of

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[32] This is a Norm of Approval, which I take to belong to the broad construal of the Norm of Sincerity.
[33] For a more detailed presentation, see my (2023b).
[34] Presumably, in addition to, usually, the (trivial) goal of communicating – at least being understood (usually mutually) in a conversation. But sometimes not even that – a speaker may say something, expecting to be understood but not expecting or caring for a response, and thus without caring about mutual understanding. Or sometimes speaking without an audience at all – a 'lone' speaker, like Demosthenes and the young Biden, who practiced speech on their own due to their stuttering, including practicing oratory (Demosthenes). Or Hamlet, speaking to himself.
[35] An empirical point I argue for is that the Pragmatic phenomena of implicit content that Grice's maxims capture are only a part of the whole domain of such implicit contents, covered by the Pragmatics I present here -- STPP. If so, then Grice's maxims fail to capture the much fuller range of such implicit contents (only a part of which are co-present with his implicatures – only the propositional, binding ones). If a different substantive conception of Pragmatics, such as the one presented here, does a lot better in terms of the domain of phenomena it covers – covering also implicit contents which don't belong to the Gricean realm of Rationality-cum-Cooperation-and-Common-Goal, *or* implicit contents which don't fall within his propositional conception of implicit contents, which is much too restrictive, in my view – then this is a strike in favor of the account of Pragmatics presented here, in particular in comparison with the Gricean Pragmatics.
   This is a separate issue than the relation between Grice's aim at the speaker's communicative intentions and my focus on 'objective' conveyed implicit contents. Even if the two overlap in most common cases, they diverge, I argue, in less common ones, which is enough in order to buttress my

conversations, which exhibit *the entire spectrum of pragmatic phenomena*, extending much

beyond the above Gricean domain (including the sub-domain of border-line cases) and

exhibiting very much *the same* Pragmatic features, don't fall within these delineations

designed with the Gricean maxims in mind, and yet display Pragmatic exchanges that

therefore the Gricean Pragmatics doesn't cover -- but STPP does (Neo-Gricean accounts fall

under this characterization as well).[36]

   The scope of implicit contents that STPP covers goes well beyond the Gricean scope even

regardless of the domain of applicability of the Gricean maxims (delineated by the

requirements of Rationality and Cooperation towards Common Goals). This is best reflected

in the rich domain of Pragmatic Stances in STPP which is absent in the Gricean framework:

STPP covers implicit contents such as Action-Directed ones, attitudinal ones (which sub-

divide into many sub-types), emotive ones (steering towards an emotion), feelings (steering

towards having certain feelings), attending (steering towards attending to or focusing on

features, areas, inputs, etc.), and various others. As such, implicit contents towards certain

Pragmatic Stances need not be propositional – e.g., attitudinal implicit contents, or emotive,

or feelings. A verbal act such as 'What a jerk!' need not express a proposition. But Gricean

implicatures are propositions. Implicit contents, according to STPP, are Steering Thrusts,

having polarity – for or against, e.g., an action, an attitude, etc. – a degree (of Steering

Thrust), and a content, where there are different types of contents for different Pragmatic

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view of there being an 'objective' phenomenon of conveyed implicit contents *everywhere* – they might *overlap* with speaker's intentions in the large domain of common cases but are not identical with them. For me this is an important distinction, but it is orthogonal to the separate ways by which these two approaches conceptualize Pragmatics – in particular the wide realm of Pragmatic Stances in STPP, by contrast to merely propositional implicatures, and by the very different normative constraints that the two approaches identify – Conversational Etiquette in STPP vis RCCG for Grice, in addition to the different domains to which they are applicable.

[36] For a sample of Neo-Gricean accounts, see, e.g., Bach (2006), Harnish (2005), Davis (forthcoming), and Korta and Perry (2019).

Stances: They could be particular attitudes, or certain feelings, or particular actions, or what to focus on, etc. A central – but only one among many – is the informational/epistemic Pragmatic Stance, whose contents may well be taken to be propositions. But implicit contents cover a lot more than propositional contents. This is a major gap between the Gricean conception and that of STPP.

In addition, in view of this new Pragmatics STPP, it is natural to consider as Pragmatic Stances also ethical and religious stances: Ethical Stances, on this conception, are steered towards by ethical Verbal-Acts: Specific ethical-stances are the contents of ethical Steering-Thrusts; and similarly for religious verbal acts. Such contents are not propositions, and thus don't have Truth-Values. The main point is that various implicit contents are ethical or religious. By saying 'This mountain is holy', the speaker steers you towards a religious stance, with a positive polarity, which can have varying degrees (of Steering Thrusts) – the speaker *doesn't* steer you towards an 'ethical attitude' or an 'ethical emotion': Such stances are not emotions or attitudes.

So on this view, ethical and religious verbal-acts don't have explicit contents – they *only* have implicit contents: The language of ethical and religious discourse is not explicit, and ethical and religious verbal acts don't have distinct semantics. The sentential structure of such Verbal Acts would have contents which are only propositional *schemata* – not propositions but rather having a slot for an item which is not semantic. Accordingly, the resulting conveyed content is not propositional and is primarily implicit, steering towards an ethical/religious Pragmatic-Stance. This should be analogous to the case of attitudinal verbal-acts: Their primary (dominant) conveyed content is implicit, steering towards an attitudinal Pragmatic Stance. Thus, suppose I haven't so far recognized that there are holy places. Now I have been taken to the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, and it struck me that this is a holy place (recall the biblical Jacob in his ladder tree, saying: …). What changed is that now I

recognize that there are holy places – that there are things that are holy. Of course, my attitude regarding that has also changed, but at bottom it's a change of recognition – I realized that there are religious features and I thereby adopted a *religious Stance* – not just a new 'attitude'. When I now say, 'The Temple Mount is holy', I steer my hearer towards a religious Stance, which is not itself an attitude or a feeling – over and above any associated attitudes.

However, to the extent that this position regarding the Pragmatic character of ethical and religious verbal acts is controversial, it's not central to the Pragmatics under consideration here – STPP: One may accept it, as an additional domain of STPP, or not accept it, leaving the rest of STPP intact. I hope you'd find the consideration of ethical/religious Stances Pragmatic Stances appealing but even if you don't, hopefully you might well consider it as a potential use/application of this Pragmatics in new directions, which I of course can't elaborate on here.

In addition, the outputs of Gricean Pragmatics are the pertinent speaker's conversational/communicative (or other) intentions, whereas STPP doesn't deal with speaker's intentions at all: It aims at unpacking the *conveyed implicit contents* of verbal acts -- their Pragmatic outputs to which the speaker is *committed.* Of course, in practice what we are often after are the speaker's intentions. In most cases the implicit contents coincide with pertinent speaker's communicative intention. But, I claim, they are not identical: When one moves outside the main common cases, they split apart: It becomes clear that the implicit contents are distinct from the speaker's intentions, which thereby indicates that they are distinct everywhere, even if often coincide. Thus, when a speaker mis-speaks, but the setext doesn't sanction his so mis-speaking, what she then conveys can differ, sometimes widely, from what she (at least accordingly to what she might say in retrospect) 'had in mind' as

conveying. Sometimes the speaker's claim that she has mis-spoken is not credible, as when, when speaking, she lacked a certain information, e.g.: Suppose a new boss is due to come to the office today. An employee enters the building with a revolving door behind an unfamiliar man who fails to hold it for her despite a heavy rain outside. After she struggles with the door and her umbrella, she says to him: Thank you so much for holding the door![37] Her friend leans to her and says: This is the new boss! The employee, figuring out she is in trouble, says: I meant: Thank you very much for holding the door – now with a non-ironic intonation. But, in the setext, retracting her conveyed implicit content (of a rebuking attitudinal Steering Thrust) is not credible.

Now here, the actual conveyed implicit message (i.e., with the implicit content) is the same as the one the speaker 'had in mind' (at the time of speaking). But suppose, in the very same case, the speaker aimed at using the *non-ironic* intonation since she didn't want to get in trouble with a stranger she didn't recognize, but mis-spoke (or rather, 'mis-intoned') and employed the ironic intonation. We now set the *facts* as such that what she 'had in mind' is not to sound ironic, even though *in fact* she sounded ironic, and given the circumstances, her plea that she 'mis-intoned' would hardly be credible. In such a case, her conveyed implicit message is *different* than the implicit message she aimed at conveying. She might well in fact *aimed* at conveying one implicit content, but *in fact* conveyed another. The first belongs to the realm of what the speaker 'had in mind' when speaking, or, in Grice's terminology, the speaker's 'communicative intentions', whereas the latter belongs to the *actual conveyed implicit content.* And as clear from this example, the two *may split apart*, as in many cases of apropos, mis-speaking, insincere denials (as above), etc. Suppose (to modify an actual case) that Biden says: The president of Mexico talked to me yesterday and told me he was quite upset about the situation in the border. But the setext, before and after, points clearly to the

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[37] With the special intonation that *must* accompany ironic implicit messages.

President of Egypt (he is the one who called, and the president at the time talked about the migration in the Southern border). Then what he conveyed can be construed as at least ambiguous. But suppose this verbal act of his was made out of context – he was in the middle of speaking about the relationship with Russia. Then what he *in fact conveyed* is one thing, though what he 'had in mind' might well be another. And similarly with implicit contents carried by such explicit verbal acts: Suppose, to modify the example a bit, that the President said: The President of Mexico again took my time in speaking about the border situation. He thereby conveys an implicit attitudinal content of impatience and rebuke. But who about? In such a case, the actual conveyed implicit content is about the President of Mexico, *regardless* of which president the president had in mind.

This is just an instance of when the conveyed implicit content and what the speaker 'had in mind' can differ, and even split apart. Even stronger examples can be provided, e.g., with betting situations, when the gambler tells the bookie: I think the brown horse will win, but later complained that he mis-spoke – he had in mind the white horse, or just expressed an opinion – not an instruction, etc. But that the conveyed implicit content and what the speaker 'had in mind' when conveying it can split apart is, I hold, considerable evidence that the two types of messages are *distinct* – and sometimes split apart, and therefore are distinct even when they coincide – don't split apart. And therefore the business of Pragmatics is to aim at the *actual conveyed implicit contents, whether or not they are the ones the speaker 'intended' to convey (or 'had in mind' when speaking).*

Thus, obviously the setext usually contains a good deal of psychological information. But the setext is *only* the *pertinent joint information that the conversational participants have during the conversation, with the degree that they have them* (see more on that below).[38]

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[38] Compare Stalnaker's 'Common Ground'; see below.

Thus, the Setext supports psychological inferences of a certain sort *only* as based on the *shared* information the conversational participants have (at the time): It *doesn't* support information that we, the *assessors* of such a conversation, or listeners who are not conversational participants, have (at the time, or later), let alone *the pertinent actual facts* (which of course need not be included in neither of the above in many cases). Thus, the *actual conveyed* implicit content depends *only* on that joint pertinent psychological information, not on what the speaker *in fact* had in mind or intended to say (or communicate). *Pragmatics doesn't deal with the actual world: Its horizon is limited to the shared pertinent information by the conversational participant,* which comprises the bulk of the setext. This is therefore a major point where STPP and Gricean Pragmatics (as pursued also by Stalnaker) part ways – in terms of what are the *goods* that the Pragmatics is to provide – what facts of the matter it reveals: speaker's intentions or actually conveyed implicit contents.

  So Inferring the actual 'communicative intentions' of the speaker is, I submit, is a Pragmatic *psychological* enterprise, not Linguistic, whereas Pragmatics, as I conceive it here, is a Linguistic Practice, which I try to theoretically account for by STPP.[39] [40] However, I don't

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[39] For more details about differences of STPP from the Gricean Pragmatics, see my (2018a); for more on Conversational Etiquette, see my (manuscript 2).

[40] The Pragmatic domain of STPP covers a few implicit messages conveyed by a single verbal act – and considers it to be a *standard case*. It also covers discourses where the speaker is *not committed* to a specific conveyed content -- although we can be more specific about the *extent to which* she is committed to: In various cases falling under Sarcasm, Metaphors, Irony, Hints, Innuendos etc., the speaker often *blurs* her commitment to or between implicit contents that her verbal act can give rise to. Yet in many such cases there is a Pragmatic fact-of-the matter as to what the conveyed content was – whether or not the speaker failed in conveying what she had in mind, even when the speaker can resort to face-saving deniability. The same holds when politicians speak out of both sides of their mouth (or whistle-blow). These are various cases where, regardless of whether the speaker had in mind a *different* content that she failed to convey (or had different 'communicative intentions'), *in fact* the content conveyed by her verbal act is determined. This is another type of case illustrating that the Pragmatic *facts* – i.e., here, the implicit content conveyed – can be unequivocal and thus distinct from what the speaker 'intended to convey'. This distinction serves the case for arguing that, strictly speaking, Pragmatic phenomena engage the conveyed implicit contents or the ones Posted, but not directly speaker's communicative intentions or what she had in mind when communicating: Although the latter are usually what we are after, practically, Pragmatics as I view it deals *only* with the domain

have the space to elaborate on this point, and it's not central to STPP, since in most cases the communicative intention does exhibit the conveyed implicit content.[41] However, the bottom line is that the *domain of phenomena* that the Gricean Pragmatics and STPP are after are *different*, with the latter extending beyond the former. Yet this is *not* a central point of the proposed Pragmatics I aim to press here, and can be ignored by those who disagree with its thrust without undermining the worth of the proposed Pragmatics -- STPP.

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of conveyed or Posted implicit contents, just as Semantics deals with the domain of explicit content of a verbal act, and not with the semantic intention of speaker, even though this is similarly our main practical interest. STPP is extendable to and pretty much covers the above phenomena and various Pragmatic features of them just as well, but this domain is outside our focus in this paper.

So on my approach, STPP yields as outputs implicit contents that are determined by the verbal act in its setext, and accordingly doesn't cover, as output, what the speaker has *intended* to convey via her verbal act *at the time* of its use, although the two coincide in most common cases, again in analogy to the distinct phenomena of the semantic content of what the speaker/writer 'had in mind' or 'intended to convey' in what she said or wrote (in a context) vs. the explicit content of her verbal act (in the context): Again, the two very often coincide, but are distinct –and they need not be the same. But I want to emphasize that this is not a central point in my substantive account, and might be put aside in case of disagreement, since it is primarily manifested in uncommon cases where the conveyed implicit content clearly is disentangled, come apart, from the speaker's communicative extensions; here I rely on note 35 above.

Yet it's crucial to my conception of Pragmatics that the mechanism of the determination of conveyed or Posted implicit contents *doesn't* invoke any feature of reality other than what's in the 'joint pertinent mental states' of the conversational participants and the setext, where the setext is *largely* what *supervenes* on the joint pertinent mental state of the conversational participants except for 'anchors' to reality, such as references to objects (which pertain to more than the joint mental states of the conversational participants). So even though STPP might, and usually does, allude to features that the Conversational Participants have *jointly* associated with the speaker *previously*, and specifically to such mental states of hers that they *share* regarding her pertinent prior Pragmatic Stances such as what she believed, her attitudes, her feelings etc. – so long as they belong to the *shared* context, *regardless* of whether correct or not: This is a purely inter-subjective domain of shared phenomena of the conversational participants (although with anchors to reality, as mentioned above). Pragmatic facts of the matter involving conveyed or Posted implicit contents are determined, on my approach, *solely* by the perspective of the conversational participants (including the speaker) that are *shared* (plus anchors such as referential anchors).

[41] I expand on this difference elsewhere; see my (2022a).

Let me also add a refinement of the vague notion of so-called 'context'. In STPP what's needed is, first, the conversational context[42] as well as the (physical) **setup** – a 'chunk'[43] of the world.[44] I will use the term '**SETEXT**' for the combination of a conversational context together with its Setup.[45]

Section 5: Posting and Posting without Steering

The last topic we need to present and clarify in order to have the minimally requisite components for employing STPP is the notion of *Posting*, already employed above. When *verbal-act generators* (e.g., speakers) steer *verbal-act recipients* (e.g., audiences) towards some Pragmatic Stances, they *commit* themselves usually[46] to having the same Pragmatic Stances that they steer their

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[42] I.e., of course, primarily the physical conversation as it unfolds and flows along (spoken or written), in the context, but also including pertinent shared-mental-states of the conversational participants. They are sometimes required for settling issues such as which action they 'have in mind' or what the topic of the conversation is, or their shared representation of features of the speaker on the basis of which (though not exclusively) they can figure out what he is aiming at, etc. So a conversational context, as I see it, supervenes on the actual conversation in question plus the (pertinent portions of) shared mental states of the conversational participants at the time. It's necessary also to add that the objective element of what speakers refer to (by singular terms by which they refer) *doesn't* usually supervene only on the conversational mental states of the conversational participants at the time even with the conversational context and the physical setup (*at the time*). (To that extent, contents – implicit or explicit, and thus semantics and Pragmatics, are not purely 'Markovian', since Reference isn't. There is thus such an added component which is not purely chancy in my otherwise entirely chancy theories of (token) Causation and of Counterfactuals; for Causation, see, e.g., my (2002); for Counterfactuals, see my (1986) and (2015b).) For more on such aspects of Reference from my perspective, see my (1993). Elsewhere I unpack what the 'topic of the conversation' is as well as 'what the speaker has in mind' in terms of other constituents in this Pragmatics (and sometimes of Reference); see note 42 below; for more, see my (2022a).

[43] Or often two or more chunks, connected by thin 'sausages', as would be the case when the conversation is conducted over the phone, or in a conference call.

[44] As noted above, I take conversational content to supervene on the pertinent portions of the shared mental states of the Conversational participants (pertinent to how the conversation might be construed, at the time) plus what I call 'referential tails' (or 'anchors'): The latter involve causal chain(s) of the speaker's token use of the singular term in question and various features associated with them that determine (in the context) the Referent in question – which doesn't supervene usually merely on the mental states of the conversational participants at the time of the conversation.

[45] Hence the term 'setext' – **SET**up plus Con**TEXT**.

[46] Though not always, e.g., when rebuking, or when a male steers a female towards female-suited manners.

verbal-act recipients towards, and to the same degree (of that Pragmatic Stance). Mind you: the degree of Steering Thrust is *distinct* from the degree of the Pragmatic Stance steered towards: A speaker can *strongly* steer a hearer (e.g., by raising one's voice, by or employing *Steering-Thrust-increasers* such as the operators 'I know that …', 'I am sure that …', and others) towards, e.g., a weak degree of Epistemic Position (such as merely warranted Believing: One can firmly say, 'I believe that God exists', where by 'firmly' the narrator specifies the degree of Steering-Thrust of the verbal-act of the speaker (as high), but the speaker conveys (and Posts) Steering-Thrust towards a weak epistemic position by employing the affix 'I believe'). Verbal-act generators thus Post Pragmatic Stances they are *committed* to having by the norms of Conversational Etiquette: These are *derivative postings – postings that bind the speaker via the norms of conversation etiquette* (especially the broad form of the Sincerity Norm).[47] Posting is a feature in STPP of *a derivative commitment by the speaker* in view of her verbal act and *in view of the Sincerity Norm* (broadly construed). For a verbal-act generator to Post having a certain Pragmatic Stance (with a certain Pragmatic-Stance-content, to a certain degree, with Polarity, i.e., being *pro* or *con* towards having/acquiring the Pragmatic Stance she steers her audience/hearer towards) is to display it *publicly*. But her so posting is *not* an action of hers – it amounts to *just* committing to having a certain Pragmatic Stance via the Sincerity Norm (broadly construed, in view of the verbal act in question). Note that Posting is not self-presenting, since the latter conveys Steering Thrust towards the Pragmatic Stance of attending to what's self-presented – paying attention to it.

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[47] They might be committed to these or other Pragmatic Stances by *other* types of norms, e.g., logical norms, ethical norms, local norms, etc., but such commitments don't count as Posting. And of course, different norms in the setext may overlap in what they commit to – which may well include committing via Posting.

Yet a speaker can also Post having certain Pragmatic Stances *without* such Posting being generated by her steering an audience via the Sincerity Norm but rather as making public her commitments due to *other* operative norms alluded to by her verbal act (in the setext). E.g., a speaker can Post having the Informational/Epistemic Position of having reference by a singular term she employs even when not steering towards having/acquiring it, such as when *appropriately* using a singular term without its being an anaphora (which tracks a prior reference by her). For instance, suppose I first say, 'I build a new house on the beach. In it, I arranged …'. Here I steered the hearer towards acquiring reference by me (as a referential source) for 'my new house' by steering her towards matching my epistemic position for 'He built a new house on the beach'. Matching such an epistemic position requires matching the speaker's reference by the singular term (by acquiring it from the speaker). But now suppose I later say: After a year, a big storm destroyed the upper floor of my new beach house. Here I no longer steer my hearer towards acquiring the epistemic position of 'The speaker built a new beach house': The speaker commits by what he said (viz., here: Posts) having built a new beach house, and relies on his prior introduction of it (by steering towards it) and on the hearer already having acquired reference to the use of 'my new beach house': No new reference acquisition is called for here, since the speaker uses the singular term in a way that is appropriate (in terms of Conversational Etiquette) *only* if he previously introduced it as well as conferred his reference by it to the speaker.[48]

Or a speaker can Post having an Epistemic Position with the semantic content of certain semantic consequences of terms she employs (in the setext) without previously having steered a hearer towards having acquired that Epistemic Position - the pertinent Informational Stance. For instance, following the last example, the speaker can say: After a year, a storm

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[48] When the hearer has not been previously introduced to this news (of my having built a new beach house).

swept my new beach property. The speaker here Post having a property on the beach whereas she hasn't use previously 'My property on the beach before' (and thus without steering the hearer towards acquiring reference to it or towards the epistemic position of 'The speaker has a property on the beach'. But a semantic consequence of 'I have a new house on the beach' is: I have a new property on the beach; and accordingly, the speaker can use the latter (which contains a semantic -consequence description) to *anaphorically* refer to the original expression (of which it is a semantic consequence) where he introduced having reference by 'my new house on the beach', expecting that the hearer would match this epistemic state of having reference by that expression (to the speaker's reference by it), and accordingly relying, in the following portion of the conversation, on her previously having acquired reference by 'The speaker's new house on the beach'[49] and infer herself that these two expressions are co-referential, without the speaker needing to steer her towards it. Or posting an attitude without previously steering towards having/acquiring it. For instance, by a verbal act such as saying 'John stopped smoking', the speaker is *thereby* committed to her being also in (at least) an appropriate corresponding epistemic position with the content 'John used to smoke'.[50] I consider such semantic commitments as being Posted, as here, *if* it's natural to consider the speaker as 'making public' the non-dominant content (here – John stopped smoking) which is therefore only posted (but without a corresponding Steering Thrust). The speaker of course also derivatively posts her informational stance regarding the 'main' content, i.e., the content of the most *dominant* Steering Thrust (or of a 'part' of it – here, viz.: John doesn't smoke) occupying a so-to-speak 'center stage', but also makes public the non-dominant content (viz.,

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[49] I ignore here the transition via natural 'updating' of persons and times, such as in the switch from the speaker's use of 'my new house on the beach' to the hearer's matching to 'the speaker's new house on the each' (or if she matches 'my' by employing a name of the speaker).

[50] I.e., the same epistemic position as the original sentence (viz.: John stopped smoking).

that John used to smoke), occupying a rear-stage.[51] But the sentence 'John ate almost all of the apples' commits its verbal-act-generator (e.g., the speaker, in a setext) to there being apples there that John didn't eat, and thus the speaker *doesn't thereby post* herself as having such an Epistemic Position, since the speaker might be warranted in saying what she did even when she hasn't been aware that there were apples there that John didn't eat – she doesn't Post having the latter epistemic position.[52] So more generally, the speaker need not Post having semantic consequences of what she says if the latter are outside her realm of (implicit) awareness – as if in her 'back stage'.[53]

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[51] I thus resist an alternative construal as a conjunction but only with two distinct informational/epistemic Steering Thrusts, with one being dominant: The implicit content of 'John used to smoke' isn't conveyed – no such corresponding Steering Thrust.

[52] See also the next footnote: Recall that Posting is only what Conversational Etiquette commits the speaker in view of what she said. The main pertinent component of Conversational Etiquette here is the Sincerity Norm, and Sincerity doesn't commit the speaker of 'John ate almost all the apples' to 'John didn't eat all the apples', even though Semantic Closer does commit her.

   Note that the same 'capping' of semantic of logical consequence holds in an analogous way to epistemic logic: Does John know, given that he knows that there were apples there, that there are fruits there, even though the latter didn't occur to him? Obviously, knowledge ascriptions aren't closed under logical consequence, and it's hard to delineate what consequences are 'extendable' logically in knowledge ascriptions, if any.

[53] So in the example above, when the speaker says 'There is water in the fridge', she doesn't post her informational stance that there is water (on earth) even though she is of course committed to it (let alone more radical anti-skeptical consequences), since the broad Sincerity Norm (and more generally, Conversational Etiquette) doesn't commit her to it. Therefore one can view Skeptical arguments as *illicit Pragmatic inferences,* which *don't* commit the speaker *Pragmatically* to the consequences *even if* there is such a *semantic implication, where Pragmatic commitment* is posting (i.e., commitment conferred via the application of norms of Conversational Etiquette to the conveyed implicit content by the speaker's verbal-act (in the setext)). *A priori* implicit tenets commit the speaker but she needn't be in a position to justify them in order to (epistemically) appropriately holding them. So if the skeptic challenges, after she says the above: How do you know that there is an external world to begin with?, her appropriate response would be: I don't have to justify *our* a priori tenets. They are *structural commitments* in our normative system. They function as *fundamental epistemic norms,* which as such function as *committing rules of inference* in our conceptual scheme, or alternatively as *axioms* (which are in principle defeasible, at least in many cases, even if not practically, and even if not accurate, and are worth adhering to in their present form in *our* case (compare what used to be conceived of as Euclidian Geometry, with an a priori status, vs. Riemannian Geometry). Thus, 'factual' comes in degrees: A priori tenets are not, strictly speaking, factual (i.e., empirical), but consequences of empirical premises via them become empirical (to a varying degree). In fact, when we consider 'empirical' facts, we have in mind, under this conception, ones that have a sufficient empirical content.

Another way of conceptualizing this phenomenon is to consider 'John stopped smoking' as a *suppressed conjunction* – as a shortcut to a conjunction with a *suppressed conjunct* insofar as its Steering Thrust is concerned: In a regular conjunction, each conjunct can be considered as contributing its own Steering Thrust. But in a conjunction with a suppressed conjunct the Steering Thrust of the latter is *muted* – its content is 'immediately' semantically committed to, and thus posted,[54] but without Steering Thrust (compare to the case of retracted Steering Thrust in: p, but don't rely on me).[55] But 'John ate most of the cookies' is not a suppressed conjunction, with 'most' abbreviating something like 'more than half but not all', since the speaker isn't semantically committed to 'but not all' (although she is Pragmatically

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The point of these comments is to position Posting vs. non-Posting commitments in discussions of skepticism, and in particular vis-à-vis anti-Skeptical commitments – not to defend a view regarding Skepticism (even if I hold it).

[54] It's posted since if the speaker didn't have the requisite epistemic position to this effect he would be misleading, and he is expected to have some awareness of it: It's Pragmatic content which is posted but not conveyed.

I use this term for the fuzzy relation of gradable semantic consequences -- in terms of the 'immediacy' or 'obviousness' of the consequences.

[55] I consider the content of such a suppressed conjunct as semi-explicit. A speaker who says: John stopped smoking, but I don't think he used to smoke' is semantically inconsistent. I consider the phenomenon of suppressed conjuncts to belong to *meta-semantics,* which is not part of Pragmatics, as I see it. I also take it that a speaker who says a 'hidden' conjunction – i.e., with a suppressed conjunct, is expected to be aware (to some degree, even if small) of the suppressed conjunct. It's tempting to say that he conveyed *semi-explicitly* that John used to smoke – i.e., the content of the suppressed conjunct. Again, this is meta-semantics – not Pragmatics.

committed to it – she posts the requisite epistemic position involving 'but not all', but without steering towards it).[56] [57]

In general, accordingly, a speaker needn't, and usually doesn't, post any semantic consequence of what she says – regardless of whether she has awareness of her thereby so committing herself. In the above two cases (of reference and of the smoking case), she is committed by semantic norms.[58] But the cases where the speaker **posts** her commitments are governed by norms of Conversational Etiquette, including certain norms of Dynamic Conversational Etiquette (that we haven't specified so far): semantic consequences usually are logical/semantic commitments that needn't be covered by the Sincerity Norm (which is,

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[56] That is: One can be *Pragmatically committed* even when one isn't semantically committed – that is, in a particular Setext, given a certain information in the Setext (i.e., in the shared joint Pragmatic Stances of the conversational participants at the time): In our case, it would be information in the setext to the effect that the speaker, e.g., *saw* John eating all the cookies – not merely saw him eating most of them but without seeing whether he continued to eat them all. But here, the Sincerity Norm requires that the speaker who can't tell whether John ate all the cookies would say instead 'John ate at least most of the cookies' – otherwise he would be misleading, and furthermore, the speaker can be expected to be aware that John didn't eat all of them. So the speaker who uses just 'most' posts having the epistemic position of being aware (say) that John didn't it all of them. Yet it might be plausible to consider it in *certain setexts* as a '*hedged (suppressed) commitment' in the setext* to a *meta*-epistemic position of something like 'probably not all', while the speaker steers towards (and posts) the epistemic position of (something like) 'He ate more than half the cookies'.

[57] Note too that 'anymore' in 'John doesn't smoke anymore' functions as a *meta-linguistic cue* for a *suppressed conjunction* which is *generated* in a systematic way (presumably by something like a syntactic/semantic algorithm), which is: John used to smoke but hasn't (for a while). The pattern is: The schema '*x* doesn't *F* anymore' is a space-holder for the suppressed/compressed conjunction (an implicit conjunction): John used to smoke but he doesn't (now, and for some while). 'Anymore' here is a *temporal cue* for the suppressed conjunct, *modifying* the temporal duration of the second conjunct (viz.: John doesn't smoke) so that it pertains to the close past. It is therefore a *meta-linguistic temporal modifier* that stands for the suppressed conjunct that *rules out* that John has also smoked a short while ago (or that he'll smoke again soon; more specifically, at least not in the very near future): The conveyed informational content in the suppressed conjunct commits to a state that pertains (at least) to the present tense *plus* some previous temporal interval.

[58] The norms of Conversational Etiquette don't include logical/semantic norms, and thus Posting doesn't cover logical/semantic commitments as it doesn't any commitments by other operative norms that don't belong to the Broad Sincerity Norm (see more below about the latter, e.g., note 60). I include, even if for convenience, logical norms under semantic norms (logic can be viewed as the semantics of logical operators).

roughly, the pertinent norm in (non-Dynamic) Conversational Etiquette). When sanctioned by

these latter norms (i.e., of Dynamic Conversational Etiquette), the speaker is entitled to

perform the verbal act of what I call **Posting Without Steering**. But in various other cases

Posting without Steering is *impermissible*, and is a Pragmatic violation – violation of norms

of Dynamic Conversational Etiquette, which govern when Posting Without Steering is

permissible and when it's not.[59]

Section 6: Posting-Without-Steering, Presuppositions and 'presuppositions'

As an aside, let me call attention to a pertinent important Pragmatic phenomenon, though I

will not expand on it here. In particular, **so-called 'presuppositions'** (i.e., as the term has

been used in Linguistics and Philosophy of Language) carry Posting-Without-Steering, which

in some setexts are appropriate but in others constitute Pragmatic *violations*.[60] This way of

conceptualizing so-called 'presuppositions' is an important topic but it's not the topic of this

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[59] I expand on such norms somewhat below. I call them 'Dynamic' since they govern a temporal interval prior to and including the verbal act under consideration and not just a 'snapshot' of the verbal act alone and its setext at the time, and in that sense aren't 'static': They cover potential developments and consequences of this or that verbal action candidate of the speaker, as in particular warranted anticipations of the dispositions of audiences to respond and act (e.g., interrupt). In particular, they require that the speaker anticipates certain reactions of the audience to what she plans on saying (and alternatives thereof) and in view of that choose what and how to say it in a way that doesn't violate norms of Conversational Etiquette – and specifically, the conversational goal of Conversational Flow; see more on it e.g. in the beginning of Section 4 and a couple of paragraphs after Thesis 2. As one example of adding meta-linguistic clauses in order to avoid interruptions and maintain conversational flow, which require anticipating potential reactions of the audience (here – to being surprised), consider the initial clause: 'Contrary to what you might think, …'

[60] The general rule of Conversational Etiquette is that the speaker must post *only* when one, at the same time, steers (and such posting is conferred via such a norm). But in other cases, a speaker might post without steering – and without violating the above norm: There are certain cases of this sort which Dynamic Conversational Etiquette specifies, and are important also in that they mirror the phenomenon of what in traditional Philosophical Logic and in Linguistics is considered 'presuppositions' – see below some comments on presuppositions; but this will not be expanded on to a considerable extent in this paper. Setexts also specify the verbal-act generators (e.g., speakers).

Such Pragmatic violations are different than Stalnaker's 'presupposition failures' – see his (1970), (1973), (1974).

paper.[61] But note that so-called 'presuppositions', as I used the term in scare quotes, are *very different*[62] from the notion of presuppositions in ordinary language.[63] I expand greatly on the topic of so-called presuppositions in Philosophical Logic and Linguistic below (Part III). It is a very important topic in Pragmatics in general and as a target for application in STPP in particular. The phenomenon I take for them to pertain to motivate a good deal of the conceptual framework of this Pragmatics – in particular, partly (only partly, though, since I take it to be Supervene on the STPP phenomenon of *posting without steering*. I briefly introduce this large topic in Part III below. Below, in the part on Assertion, it will become clear why I take the phenomenon underpinning much of what has crystalized in the

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[62] As I very briefly explain below, presuppositions in ordinary language and what's covered in the technical use of 'presuppositions' in Philosophical Logic and Linguistics are very different: The latter, I argue, is largely the Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting-without-Steering (such as Posting having an adequate epistemic position involving having reference by a certain term), whereas the former have to do with *propositional contents* that the speaker is committed to but is not currently aware that he now relies on such a commitment, and where the challenger challenges the adequacy of such a prior propositional commitment – the presupposition.

[63] Elsewhere I argue that coining this Pragmatic term (technically) was ill-conceived – it does not capture the ordinary-language sense of presuppositions, but conveys the misleading impression that it's a familiar Pragmatic phenomenon. But it has not been familiar (though it's common): As the usage of the technical term became more prevalent, the ordinary-language term and the new technical terms have split, semantically. Both indeed capture genuine Pragmatic phenomena, but the technical term carried a misleading piggy-back familiarity. It became much less technical one Stalnaker provided his characterization of it in terms of his 'Common Ground'. But for Stalnaker, again, 'Common Ground' is not fully defined. On my view, 'presuppositions' and 'Common Ground' both point to a family of genuine Pragmatic phenomena, but are *very different* from each other, the latter being much richer than Stalnaker has conceived, and are both *fully characterizable* in terms of the terminology of STPP: This is a *strong strike,* in my view, in favor of STPP over and above the Gricean Pragmatics – even with the Stalnakerian 'second-floor'. The terminological characterization of 'presuppositions' *illuminates* it in STPP in a way that Stalnaker's limited Pragmatics cannot (e.g., due to an almost generate breadths of Pragmatic Stances and of Conversational Etiquette – both central type-phenomena in Pragmatics unfamiliar to Stalnaker. 'Common Ground' was often introduced in terms of what's being 'taken for granted'. I argue that this is plain false, and that the notion of 'being taken for granted' does have an adequate characterization within STTP; see my (2023b). From my perspective, 'presupposition' wasn't conceptualized due to a lack of familiarity with basic features and concepts crucial for Pragmatics and specifically for STPP, such as those of Steering, Posting, Pragmatic Stances, Posting and Conversational Etiquette that I introduced briefly above and comment on above and below; see again, among others, my (2023b).

Philosophical tradition over the past 25 years or so under the heading of 'assertion' is primarily a *pragmatic* phenomenon inherently involving Steering: This phenomenon of so-called asserting is primarily the verbal act of *raising* the degree of Steering Thrust. (Of course, there are important epistemic features associated with it, but *primarily* with asserting as steering towards the *informational/epistemic stance*); see below, Part II.

Roughly and very briefly, on my view, presuppositions as used in ordinary language are *propositional* contents that are taken to be relied on by the discussion under consideration but where such a reliance hasn't been examined or noticed and where the speaker calls it into question – thereby calling for re-examining it *evidentially*. This points to a *pragmatic verbal-act* of *presupposing*, limited primarily to steering towards epistemic Pragmatic Stance, and alluding to propositional content that plays a certain inferential role in tenets held by the conversational participants.

By contrast, 'presuppositions', as used in Philosophical Logic and Linguistics, are rooted in the phenomenon of Posting-without-Steering. In such a case, the speaker posts having a certain Pragmatic Stance (of whichever sort – informational, attitudinal, ethical, emotive, etc. etc. – not just epistemic) without previously having steered towards having it. Such a prior use would generate the potential of backward linkage of 'anaphorical-harking-back-to-prior-steering', and would prevent the occurrence of Posting without Steering. Posting without Steering is a Pragmatic phenomenon primarily pertaining to Dynamic Conversational Etiquette, since its norms govern when it's appropriate to Post-without-(previously)-Steering and when not. Primarily, these norms of Dynamic Conversational Etiquette are governed by the Pragmatic Goal of Conversational Flow: A speaker is entitles to Post-without-Steering as long as she is sufficiently confident[64] her Posted Pragmatic Stance would be *matched*

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[64] With evidence-based confidence.

smoothly by her audience (in particular, without surprising them, without encountering their resistance, while relying on their accepting her as an authoritative source for acquiring such Pragmatic Stances from (whether epistemic, attitudinal, emotive, etc.). A paradigmatic case of the use of 'presuppositions', and thus of Posting-without-Steering, is the case of use of a new singular term to refer without previously having introduced the object/person so referred to. It would be appropriate for a speaker to say 'My mother gave me this shirt', without having previously steered the hearer towards accepting that she has (or has had) a mother – matching such an epistemic stance can normally be expected to be smooth. Yet note that, in the standard technical use of 'presuppose' in Philosophical Logic and linguistics, the speaker has thereby 'presupposed' that she has (has had) a mother. But it would be preposterous to think that she *presupposed* it (in the natural language sense): I don't *presuppose* that I had a mother: I know I had!

But if a speaker says, without previously having used the term 'The winner of the next US presidential elections', 'I had a serious conversation yesterday with the next US president', she is prone to be interrupted by the surprised and incredulous audience: What?? You know who the next US president is?? Of course, the resistance is primarily rooted (in the case of this sort I have in mind) epistemically – how does he know who the next US president is? Such a use is *pragmatically illicit* – as a case of Posting without Steering. This topic is elaborated on greatly in the part/manuscript 'Presuppositions as Posting-without-Steering'.[65]

So:

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[65] See below, Part III.

Thesis 2: So-called 'presuppositions' are special cases of Posting -- cases of Posting-Without-Steering, where so exhibiting Pragmatic Stances is governed by Conversational Etiquette.

Back from our aside: Note too that our Pragmatic competence in understanding implicit contents employs the following: First, the crucial encoding of the conveyed implicit contents and their degrees (of Steering Thrust): as noted, conveyed by a verbal act. Usually the verbal-act generator conveys *more than one* Steering Thrust by the verbal act.[66] Second, the decoding -- deciphering -- process that determines, when idealized, what the *committed, binding* implicit content of the verbal-act generator by that verbal act has been (provided there has been one),[67] as well as (first and foremost) the explicit content (which is outside the limits of STPP and thus of our concerns here): How we decipher a string of symbols or sounds so as to yield a propositional content, which is an important Pragmatic process – but very different than STPP. (Hence there is no semantics without such an auxiliary

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[66] In the setext. Note that verbal acts conveying more than one Steering Thrust need not at all indicate an ambiguity in the use of the term – there is no ambiguity when the steerings are towards *distinct Pragmatic stances*, although there might be more than one *binding* implicit content towards the same Pragmatic Stance (but carrying different content of that Pragmatic Sense – e.g., different propositions, different specific attitudes, etc.), which belong to Pragmatic phenomenon differently conceptualized but with very considerable overlapping extensions with that of 'ambiguity'. There is a *Pragmatic Ambiguity*, roughly, if there are two (say) Steering Thrusts by the same verbal act towards the same Pragmatic Stance which are *incompatible* (taken loosely) content-wise or are *quite distinct* as contents of such a Pragmatic Stance go. Compare such Pragmatic Ambiguity of Steering Thrusts towards the same Pragmatic Stance with the important notion of Pragmatic Inconsistency (or Incongruence); see (2012b).

[67] And vis-à-vis non-binding implicit contents, if there are such, what they are and what relative *weight* (or probability) they have vis-à-vis each other, which can be seen as the *degree* of partial commitment by the speaker or, alternatively, the probability that she conveyed (and if successfully, also 'had in mind') for this content and that content. Probability for a viable candidate for an (often ambiguous) non-binding implicit content is a crucial tool, which I won't expand on in this paper, since I focus here only on binding ones, but I think of it as a natural extension of how -- along same lines as -- I do about what a binding implicit content is (and correspondingly, what the binding *explicit* content is – if there is one; sometimes there is an ambiguity), i.e., what the consensus of highly competent Pragmatic speakers (for the language and dialect at hand) would be when updated about the setext and the conversational record.

Pragmatics.) But note that a mere dictionary won't do for determining the explicit content: First, in speech Pragmatic unpacking is required in order to extract and individuate the appropriate string of words.[68] Second, a sense determination is required for all predicates, singular terms and locutions, which is a Pragmatic task. And next, reference determination is needed (which is a joint Semantic/Pragmatic task). And last, Pragmatic processing (distinct from STPP) is required in order to identify *which sense -- output semantic content --* in the semantic dictionary is linked to the term or idiom in question in the Setext.[69]

Note that Posting plays an extensive role primarily outside the realm of Posting-without-Steering cases (closer, as I advocate, to so-called 'presuppositions'), in particular due to its being conferred by the broadly construed Sincerity Norm. Thus, Posting is an integral and a fundamental feature of STPP, with the extensive range of Pragmatic Stances, Conversational Etiquette, and specifically the broad Sincerity Norm[70] at its center even apart from consideration of so-called 'presuppositions' cases: Posting constitutes in such cases a sort of a Pragmatically conferred 'shadow' of Steering Thrusts when bound by the broad Sincerity Norm, since usually Steering Thrusts confer their 'duplicate' Postings. This main feature of it -- of the implicit content of steering made public by Posting -- is *naturally extended* to cases of implicit contents made public without steering even when not conferred by the broad Sincerity Norm (and yet well-governed by Conversational Etiquette), as in cases of so-called 'presuppositions'.

Section 7: Conversational Etiquette, Presuppositions and Misleading

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[68] As well as in hand-written forms, especially in cursory writing (which would vary in complexity – starting with basically more-or-less as given, as in typed content.

[69] The explicit content, so extracted from the verbal act, is an informational content (usually a proposition) conveyed by an informational Steering Thrust.

[70] See below for more on the Broad Sincerity Norm, e.g., note 60.

The delineation of the contours of the domain of cases of so-called 'presuppositions' by the Linguistics/Philosophy-of-Language tradition thus *fails* to relate it to the full-fledged natural Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting, and specifically to recognize it as a phenomenon of Posting-without-Steering. It captures this term as primitive (even in view of Stalnaker's main contribution by his 'common ground' – see below), without realizing its essential normative profile[71] -- how it's governed by a *certain portion* of Conversational Etiquette (viz., Dynamic Conversational-Etiquette) rather than another (viz., the broad Sincerity Norm).

The broad natural Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting is the forming of a particular type of public commitment, the one governed by Conversational Etiquette, which, at its core, is conferred by the broad Sincerity Norm and then *extended to a broad non-core area subject to being regulated by other parts of Conversational Etiquette* (the Dynamic parts). It's thus a mistake, on my view, to consider so-called the 'presuppositional' phenomenon as a self-standing isolated phenomenon, by contrast to recognizing its inherently belonging to the broader Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting, covering *any* Pragmatic Stance – not merely the 'propositional' epistemic stance -- being made public *as governed by Conversational Etiquette*, and its being merely *derivative* to the core phenomenon of Posting-via-Steering.[72]

Note that normative aspect of Pragmatic Stances as governed by Conversational Etiquette is of course just one part among the vast normative obligations under other types of norms, which do not, as a rule, generate Posting. Thus, if you ask me to pass that salt and I do, I am committed, under common norms, to take reasonable care not to drop it on the floor – otherwise I violate non-negligence norms, which do not belong to Conversational Etiquette:

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[71] Even in view of Stalnaker's main contribution by his 'common ground' – see below.

[72] Rather than another (viz., the broad Sincerity Norm); see my brief explanation of it at the end of the last Section.

Under usual (for us) operative ethical norms, in passing the salt I am committed to do it non-negligibly. Note too that Gricean Pragmatics, which resorts only to the normative domain of RCCG (viz., Rational Cooperation towards Common Goals), and which doesn't appeal to Conversational Etiquette, broadly construed, entirely missed the central Pragmatic phenomenon of Posting, and accordingly, of Posting-without-Steering, and accordingly, so-called 'presuppositions'. Whereas in contemporary Linguistic and Philosophy-of-Language 'presuppositions' are being treated as a distinct part of Pragmatics (from implicatures), on STPP the two underpinning phenomena in question are closely connected: They involve implicit contents merely made public vs. (implicitly) conveyed. *Implicit contents are usually conveyed by Verbal Acts that steer (i.e., via Steering Thrusts) and are exhibited (but not conveyed) by being Posted – where Posting is derivative to the broad Sincerity Norm.* But making public a Pragmatic Stance can 'break free' from its normative generation by steering when it abides by pretty tight constraints by Dynamic Conversational Etiquette. A key normative force of Conversational Etiquette is that Posting cannot be employed 'out of the blue' – i.e., without being generated in a way that conforms to the conversational goal of Conversational Flow. It so conforms to it when generated by steering, or it can 'float freely' without concomitant steering *only* when is in the tracks of a *prior steering*, which thereby, albeit remotely, secures that the goal of Conversational Flow is being maintained.

The point of the above considerations was to make an argument that so-called 'presupposition' is not sui-generis in Pragmatics, but a sub-part of a more *general* phenomenon of Posting, which is to be made public in compliance with Conversational Etiquette, thereby *yielding* a *commitment* by the speaker (at the setext). This type of commitments – being governed by the norms of Conversational Etiquette – is unique to Pragmatics, and isn't shared with other commitments, subject to other types of norm. This is the core of Posting. Such Posting can be *normatively* (i.e., non-*causally*) generated by

Steering Thrusts, or can take place without them *only after* such prior adherence is secured (with usually some prior Steering Thrust *in accordance* with Conversational Etiquette). In part III I expand on what the Pragmatic phenomenon underpinning so-called 'presuppositions' and the analysis of presuppositions in ordinary language. In Part IV I provide an account of 'Presupposition'-Projection.

Let's focus now on the *pragmatic* phenomenon of *misleading*. First, compare the external perspective of Grice, in his maxims, as in his norm of Telling the Truth: Sincerity, by contrast, is a corresponding internal phenomenon: Believing what you say (or write -- explicitly) *and* (for non-informational stances) what you convey (implicitly, in the setext), i.e., without misleading. Your verbal act (in the setext) is sincere just in case thereby you don't *mislead* (*if* we take lying to be a form of misleading). In the latter case (a broad sense of 'mislead'), misleading has an explicit component (which is informational – misleading then covers lying): To lie is *not* to believe the explicit content of your verbal act (roughly, of what you say or write). Misleading is, roughly (in its broad sense, for the informational stance), not believing what you say/write explicitly. Whether misleading has an informational component – whether it covers lying – may well be controversial, and is *not* central to my Pragmatic conception of Misleading. (Elsewhere I argue that misleading covers the variety of Pragmatic Stances, and it's a mistake to restrict it only to propositional contents: The term, as we use it, has Pragmatic content that *extends through the variety of Pragmatic Stances*, and therefore cannot be captured by Pragmatics limited to the informational Pragmatic Stance (as is largely Grice's and Stalnaker's): It cannot be captured by such Pragmatics since its content is Pragmatic and not limited to propositional content, and accordingly not merely to epistemic stances; for more on misleading in STPP, see my (2023d).

Now Conversational Etiquette construes the normative constraints on Sincerity much more broadly than the Gricean perspective: It doesn't end with not lying – which needn't be

captured by the 'tell the truth' constraint, since a liar can end up telling the truth (if she intends to lie but is mistaken about what's true): Lying pertains to the explicit content of the verbal act, whereas misleading covers implicit contents as well, which is crucial for Sincerity, and comes in degrees (e.g., mere misleading vs. what I call 'Mislying', which is a graver violation; see my (2023d)). The Broad Sincerity Norm governs requisite *attitudes* associated with Sincerity, such as approval of actions taken (and of assuming other Pragmatic Stances, or more generally, matchings across Pragmatic Stances) in view of the speaker's Verbal Act. This is made possible first by the wealth of Pragmatic Stances that are at the core of Pragmatics, and specifically of STPP – not just epistemic, as well as by the governing normative system of Conversational Etiquette that underpins Pragmatics (as in STPP) – not the much narrower, and merely partly overlapping, Gricean conception of Rational Cooperation towards Common Goals. See e.g. the sections on Grice in my (2018a).

  Only lying is excluded by Grice's maxims (his Maxim of Quantity) but not mere misleading (which is not lying). Yet not to mislead (and especially not to mislie) are central norm of Conversational Etiquette, which hold well outside the realm of cases where the speaker and hearer cooperate towards a common goal (e.g., asking a by-passer in a new city). Misleading is a bona fide Pragmatic phenomenon, tout court, since it focuses on implicit contents. But Grice and Stalnaker to a large extent ignore misleading. They could include informational misleadings in their Pragmatics – but not misleadings via other Pragmatic Stances, which properly qualify as misleadings just as much, since their horizon is too narrow to cover other Pragmatic Stances (apart from, primarily, informational), which as such doesn't allow for the extension of appropriate norms to them.

  Thus, Grice's and Stalnaker's implicatures are propositional, and thus are (largely) limited to conveyed contents in/to the informational Pragmatic Stance. But lots of misleadings engage Pragmatic Stances that are not informational – e.g., misleading by implicitly

conveying an attitude not possessed, or a feeling/emotion not had, or an action not aimed at being taken, etc. So if the speaker says to her daughter, 'He is not one of us', she conveys at attitude of a certain degree of mis-trust and perhaps superiority (at least in appropriate Setexts). But if she doesn't have such an attitude, she misleads, even if she is literally correct (i.e., in not belong to the milieu they belong to). Or if the speaker says, 'It's time for us to take up arms', yet doesn't plan to do so himself (though is capable of doing it) or doesn't really favor such an action, he would be misleading – primarily (for our purposes here) regarding the action steered towards. This could be a case of *hypocrisy*, which can indeed be (very often) construed as misleading, though perhaps unintentionally or without awareness, in, e.g., preaching to behave in a way that the speaker doesn't: The speaker steers towards the attitude (and action) of favoring a certain type of conduct without in fact practicing it.

So Grice and Stalnaker aren't aware of the basic phenomenon of Posting, which is at the heart of the norms of Conversational Etiquette governing not to mislead, since a major form of misleading is by conveying a certain Pragmatic Stance while not having it (even if it's applicable to the speaker). The fundamental Conversational Etiquette norm of Posting while Steering aims squarely at non-misleading, which is primarily Steering towards a Pragmatic Stance while not having it (when it's applicable). Grice's and Stalnaker's Pragmatics can't adequately handle the Pragmatic phenomenon of misleadings since they don't recognize Conversational Etiquette – and Grice's RCCG norms won't suffice; since they don't recognize other Pragmatic Stances – and much of misleading pertains to non-informational Pragmatic Stances; and since they don't recognize Posting, which is at the heart of misleading: Posting a Pragmatic Stance that you don't have *is* misleading. The above I take to be a criticism of Grice's (and of Stalnaker's) Pragmatics vis-à-vis the central Pragmatic phenomenon of misleading -- highlighting its inapplicability to mis-applicability to it, by their inability to recognize its scope, due to the limited scope of their Pragmatics and conceptual tools, and the

inadequate normative system they think is reflected in Pragmatic phenomena, and accordingly the inability to characterize how normative constraints apply to the phenomenon of misleading.

Section 8: Expressing, Steering confers Posting, Pragmatic dictionary and Biases

Yet often, just as we have, as competent language users, a semantic repertoire, we also have a *Pragmatic repertoire* -- a *Pragmatic Dictionary*.[73] A Pragmatic Dictionary stores the *fixed, rigid,* Pragmatic implicit content of terms or idioms (in a dialect), thereby very often enabling us to *retrieve* the implicit content without going through the decoding cognitive process, which is the heart of Pragmatic Competence, and which seems to underpin (historically) the Pragmatic Dictionary, which as such serves as recording 'Pragmatic shortcuts'. It's helpful to think of the generation of such a Pragmatic Dictionary as the result of Pragmatic deciphering in early stages of the dialect which is shared among the members of the dialectal community, where cognitively the process would seem to be analogous to computers' 'sub-routine'. For such terms, their Pragmatic understanding by-passes the complex cognitive process of Pragmatic decoding (of implicit contents) that relies on Pragmatic competence. It amounts to merely verifying that there is an entry in the 'Pragmatic Dictionary' which the dialectal community stores (in individual members, shared with other members of her linguistic community) that 'fits' the verbal act under consideration. But of course it's absurd to think that Pragmatics consists *only* of a Pragmatic Dictionary: Somehow our Pragmatic competence has developed and has been learned, alongside the generation and enrichment of Pragmatic prevalence in the language community, which would require to begin with a *generative* Pragmatic procedure – i.e., a Pragmatic *decoding* procedure, and of course require

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[73] Where the identification of the dialect requires pinpointing where and when it was employed, but it might also require pinpointing its individuation, which then would also include specifying such an era.

that various *new* Pragmatic idioms are being used and understood on an ongoing basis – some of which would end up being *frozen* and then added to the Pragmatic Dictionary.[74]

Consider: It really hurts/Ouch[75] – Posting a Feeling Pragmatic-Stance plus (very often) steering towards noticing it (where the posting could be a derivative of that steering) and often with an AD Steering-Thrust. 'Ouch' is a non-linguistic verbal act or can be also considered as an abbreviation of such a linguistic content, posting and very often conveying Steering Thrust to the same effect. Of course, it often serves to *express* pain:[76] Expressing is posting having an emotive/feeling and/or an attitudinal Pragmatic Stance (where the feeling or attitude are being expressed) *in addition to* (very often, or just) calling attention to it (by attentive Steering Thrust – steering towards attentive Pragmatic Stance of the audience) *plus* (usually) another Steering Thrust (very often Action-Directed, or ethical, etc.). That is: expressing, when via a verbal act, amounts to usually a couple of Steering Thrusts *plus* very often a *non-linguistic* vocal message (such as 'ouch', or a cry, etc., usually with a characteristic intonation, and/or a facial expression or a bodily gesture), plus, usually *manifesting* the feeling (which is just indicatory – it's not

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[74] Contrast this view of mine with, e.g., Lepore and Stone's conception of Pragmatics as consisting primarily in conventions, which seems to amount to considering it as an analogue of a semantic dictionary. But we can decipher *new* implicit contents all the time – ones that *haven't yet* been 'fixed', which requires a wide-spread use, time, and agreement by various linguistic users. Pragmatics couldn't have been generated by a long list of conventions: Pragmatic contents must have been first *generated* and *deciphered* by a process central to our Pragmatic competence, which I try to simulate in my Formal Pragmatics, which among other things would show *how the acquisition of Pragmatic repertoire is possible and what individual Pragmatic decipherments* would likely resemble (at least in terms of function). A view such as theirs ignores the essential generative aspect of Pragmatics. Compare to considering the analogous case of the Syntax of English as *merely* employing performed and recorded parsing of such a sentence by some linguist, which of course wouldn't explain the ability to decode new syntactic forms (e.g., very complex ones, and generate them – see Chomsky).

[75] I don't want to deal here with the issue of whether 'Ouch' is an abbreviation of an expression with a content that fits the constraints of Linguistic STPP, and as such as a non-literal extension to a verbal language. But a candidate is that it functions as an abbreviation of 'It hurts'.

[76] Compare Allan Gibbard on expressing, e.g., in his (1990).

Linguistic/Pragmatic/communicative).[77] When the verbal act takes place without an audience,[78] it usually amounts to just Posting plus often self-directed Steering Thrust as well as non-linguistic manifestation.[79]

   So just recall that although, as noted, there can be Posting without steering (and thus including cases of so misleading), usually Posting is a *normative derivative* of steering – as expressed by the phenomenon we elaborated above in this paper:

Thesis 3: Steering confers Posting: Steering towards having a Pragmatic Stance usually normatively

   confers Posing having it (which is derivative to the steering via Sincerity Norm -- broadly construed),

   and thus committing to having it, and to the same degree (at least) of the Pragmatic Stance.

(But not always – there are also asymmetric cases, e.g., gender inapplicability (such as a male steering a female towards looking femininely pretty), or: reprimanding - Steering towards feeling guilty – without Posting feeling guilty, but with a posted moral/ethical Pragmatic Stance of reprimanding.[80])

   Linguistic STPP deals only with Verbal Acts, thereby excluding non-verbal communication. And **Binding STPP** covers conveyed implicit contents whereby the verbal-act producer is *bound* by the conveyed implicit-content/Steering-Thrust -- excluding irony, sarcasm, metaphors, hints, innuendos, etc., which are types of Pragmatic stances with implicit

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[77] Recall that in Linguistic Pragmatics, in particular in STPP, we deal only with verbal acts with linguistic explicit contents.

[78] Or without awareness of an audience.

[79] At least on the surface, if considered as a non-linguistic place-holder for, e.g., 'It hurts'.

[80] This thus falls within the type of Steering that doesn't confer Posting the *same* Pragmatic Stance steered towards. I thank Elizabeth Camp for her comments here.

contents but usually (or very often) non-binding (and can be attitudinal, de re, etc., with the derivative posting). I construe binding implicit contents as ones where highly competent speakers *in the setext* would confidently take the speaker to have conveyed that Steering Thrust and/or Posted having the (often derivative) Pragmatic Stance (which is usually the one steered towards).[81] So overall, STPP deals with Pragmatic phenomena conceptualized as implicit contents conveyed (steered to) and/or Pragmatic Stances Posted, subject to Conversational Etiquette (first and foremost the Sincerity Norm, construed broadly, as well as other norms of Conversational Etiquette - Dynamic Norms – see below, especially governing Posting-Without-Steering). In particular, we deal here with Linguistic Binding STPP.

  Biases involve a cognitive aspect -- in the possession of biased informational states, attitudes, etc. (very often generic – towards some ensemble) as well as their manifestation in linguistic communication, which can be characterized more precisely given the Pragmatics under consideration here. The manifestation of biases in linguistic communication consists, by the lights of STPP, in *attitudinal Steering Thrusts*, with or without informational/epistemic Steering Thrusts via the same verbal act, as are slurs: The bias can be literal – manifested in the explicit content of such a verbal act, and it can be conveyed content – a biased implicit content, where the Steering Thrust involved is primarily attitudinal – steering towards and/or posting a certain attitudinal Pragmatic Stance -- with negative polarity, often de re, and very often conveyed by explicit content which can be minimal (and thus non-dominant). For instance: He is a kike – this is a slur, steering towards and posting a de re racial bias towards a particular person, which is primarily a derogatory attitudinal Steering Thrust, with some conveyed informational/epistemic Steering Thrust (de re, as well with as ethnic feature). Or, 'Can you do this work? After all you are a woman': The speaker thereby displays (via

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[81] This of course is a counterfactual formulation: the actual audience needn't be so.

posting) having a gender bias, and conveys that implicit content by steering the hearer towards acquiring or strengthening a biased attitude.

Section 9: Asserting vs. mere saying, Overall Sayability and Overall Assertibility In contemporary Philosophy (especially over the past couple of decades or so) there has been a lot of attention paid to assertions.[82] But very often, I would submit, its usage, application and extension has been considerably overrated. Very often conversational participants merely say[83] what they do, without asserting it. If they merely exchange courtesies, or conduct a small talk, or chat, or exchange pleasantries, they would mostly *say* what they do rather than assert it. Consider for instance conversational participants chatting just in order to pass the time and interact socially, e.g., while waiting for a plane in the airport, or waiting in line, etc.: they would mostly just say what they do, not assert. Thus, consider for instance a tourist in Jerusalem in a (nuclear) family tour of the old city with a hired guide. The guide: In front of us is Mount Zion. This is where King David was buried. Any questions? Tourist: Is it a historical fact that this is mount Zion and that King David was buried here? Do we know that? Do you know it? Guide: Look, this is so according to the tradition. But the guide would continue to say those things as he has, without violating any ostensible norms: This is the traditional narrative, and this is not a professional historical lecture. In response to a challenging confrontation, as above, he *retracted*, didn't say he knew what he said, and thereby *posted* as *not* being willing to stand behind 'I know that'. Is this an obvious violation of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion? No, since the setext was a *conversation*, where the guide related to the nuclear family what is typically told to tourists in such a place. Further: Did the guide *assert* what he said? Colloquially – unlike what has become common in the Philosophical jargon – No: He merely said, related what he did. When required to assess his

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[82] See the entry on it in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For instance, Goldberg (2015).

[83] I use 'merely say' for saying but not asserting.

epistemic position, the guide *declined* to classify it as knowledge – even in the common sense, colloquial setting (let alone a professional setting). And he is not here violating any norms, specifically not any epistemic norms: In fact, he *doesn't* know what he says, and he might even suspect it (though perhaps not more than that – at least let's assume that). There is therefore *no knowledge norm of saying*. And in *many*, perhaps *most*, conversational occasions (i.e., with only a couple of conversational participants, typically just two), speakers *don't assert what they say – they merely say it*.

Further: there is evidence[84] that the word 'say' is much more ancient than the word 'assert' in English. And in customary use, it seems that 'assert' is *much less often* used than 'say' – thereby indicating that *typically people say what they do* – rather than assert it. In Hebrew, for instance, there is *no* adequate translation for 'assert': The closest term if 'claimed', or 'declared'. But how often do people declare (in comparison with just say)? And it's a part of the *pragmatic content* of the ascription 'x claimed that p that the speaker *distances* herself from it: She *doesn't endorse it*, and *convey a doubting attitude*. The Pragmatic conveyed content of 'x asserts that p' is much less 'polarized': The speaker *doesn't* convey any attitude regarding the extent to which he agrees or disagree with the speaker: He *doesn't* distance himself from the epistemic position of the speaker. Therefore there is a *considerable* Pragmatic difference between 'claim' and 'assert', regarding the ascriber's attitude towards the speaker's epistemic position, and in Hebrew one *doesn't* have the option of ascribing something like 'assert' without conveying such an attitude. Since Hebrew presumably has been in use for a few millennia, it seemed it did fairly well without having a word for 'assert' – and despite the huge number of semi-judicial context in written records. Indeed, usually

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[84] In English, it seems that the word 'say' is a descendant of 'sagen' from Old High German (Wikipedia -- roughly later part of the 1st millennium AD). The word 'assert', although a derivative of Latin, appears in English only around 1600 (Merriam Webster Dictionary).

lawyers in court assert or claim rather than merely say – as is typically the case when a speaker *addresses* an *audience*. The ascriber attitude could be 'distanced' or not – but in the latter case, the asserting ascription can't be expressed in Hebrew.

If the ascriber is in a privy epistemic position vis-à-vis what the speakers say or assert, the conceptual lacuna is even more striking: Consider Solomon's trial. The Biblical narrator tells us that here is the real mother, and here is the pretending mother. They both say 'This is my child'. The narrator is in an epistemic position to say: The real mother *asserted* that this was her child. But he is in an epistemic position to say about the fake mother, but *not* about the real mother: She *claimed* that this was her child. He thereby conveys the attitude of *distancing* himself from, if not *suspecting*, what the fake mother said. He can remain neutral and say 'asserted' in this case. Of course, one can *epistemically go down* to an epistemic *common denominator* if one wants to treat them both alike: The narrator can say: Each woman claimed that that child was hers. Or: The real mother claimed it, and so did the fake mother. But in the context of the story we are aware that the narrator takes himself to know who the real mother was. That is, the implicit content conveyed usually in using 'claim' is to *distance* oneself from whether what was said is true. So if, in this example, a newcomer comes and asks the narrator, 'Who is that woman? What was going on there?', the narrator *can't* say appropriately: This woman claimed she is the real mother, and she says: Let her have it rather than cut him in half. This *could* be construed, at least to a *certain extent*, as *misleading*, since the speaker Posted that she *doesn't* take a stand vis-à-vis whether that woman told the truth. But this would be conversationally inappropriate, in terms of Conversational Etiquette, if the narrator and the visitor are in close enough relationship, since the visitor can conclude, if this was *all* he heard, that the narrator can't tell (at least for sure) who the real mother was. In order to not mislead *at all*, the narrator must *not* use 'claim', since it conveys a distancing attitude (epistemic, regarding credibility).

Or consider a local in Qalqilya in the West Bank (of the Jordan river), chatting with a visitor: Look at this family: She can't get a permit to extend their house, even though they are indigenous locals -- they have been living here for many centuries. Visitor: Are you sure? Haven't you known that more than half of the Palestinian population in the West Bank are descendants of Arab migrants into Palestine during the first half of the 20th century? In that chat, the local (in that context) didn't *claim* what he said, nor did he *assert* it: He merely said it. In order to merely say it, he wasn't required to *know* what he said. Of course, like most locals, he probably wasn't aware of the common historical claim that the visitor made, and therefore probably didn't lie. But in a context of a local like, local lore is an acceptable currency for a chat.

Or suppose the National Security Advisor, in a private session with the President, warns the president that the Israeli PM, in a forthcoming visit, is likely to try to lecture him about this or that. Would it be typical for him, in such a setting, to *assert* it to the president? No – he merely said it, remarked that this is likely, and warned the President about it. In such a case, the NSA doesn't anticipate any resistance on the part of the president – he expects *smooth matching*, and there is no audience that requires him to raise his voice. So it would be *incorrect*, or at least *inaccurate*, to say that he 'asserted' what he said. An ascriber who'd say it (of course, in a non-Philosophical context) would *convey the impression* that the NSA raised his voice, or said what he did after the president expressed doubt about what he said, etc. – which would be *misleading* (to this or that extent). Thus, in a non-philosophical context, to say that a speaker asserts what it's appropriate *only* to say that he said, is to *mislead* (to a certain extent).

The verbal act of assertion has very often been in recent Philosophy considered as having the distinctive mark of self-presenting as having a higher Epistemic Position, although without unanimity about what the requisite higher Epistemic-Position for assertion is (e.g.,

knowledge).[85] But, I submit, researchers sensed that asserting involves a higher degree of *something*, but, lacking the Pragmatic perspective of STPP, they settled for the most plausible available candidate, which is an Epistemic Position. However, once one has been familiarized with Steering Thrusts and their fundamental role in Pragmatics, one can realize that it's not a higher Epistemic-Position that is requisite and for *proper* assertion and as such a main characteristic of it.[86] Rather, an appropriate assertion requires a *higher degree of steering thrust* – not a higher Epistemic Position. This is indeed a Norm of Assertion, but it's *not* an *epistemic* Norm of assertion. Thus:

Thesis 4: Assertion is a Pragmatic category, and its main distinctive mark is that a speaker who asserts

conveys a stronger degree of Steering Thrust than a speaker who merely says the same thing.[87]

Crucial to this thesis is the underpinning distinction between mere Saying and asserting. I argue that indicative verbal acts include mere Saying and asserting (as well as expressing beliefs, etc.), and that they are *gradable*, where what the gradability is about is the *degree of steering thrust*. Mere saying is *very common*, and arguably more common than asserting. Consequently, arguably the discussions on assertion in the past couple of decades were of exaggerated importance, since the underpinning shared perspective was that speakers mostly assert (what they say).

This distinction (between mere Saying and Asserting) is important *apart* from discussions regarding (the) epistemic norm(s) of assertion. Assertions are governed by norms of Conversational Etiquette (see below), primarily involving the likelihood (actual or

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[85] See Williamson, (1996) and (2000).
[86] I discuss here assertion, not mere saying.
[87] And in the same setext, if feasible.

perceived)[88] that the speaker's Pragmatic Stance (that the hearer is steered towards), conveyed by a dominant Steering Thrust, be *matched*. Since, as I argue here, higher Steering Thrust is constitutive to asserting, norms regarding when it's appropriate to employ higher Steering Thrust govern (and are crucial for) asserting. Such Pragmatic norms are *distinct* from *epistemic* norms that apply to asserting: That asserting is governed constitutively by Pragmatic norms is orthogonal to whether it's *also* governed by epistemic norms, which I uphold. But this epistemic character of assertion is distinct from its Pragmatic character. To anticipate what I argue below, I consider mere Saying and Asserting to have epistemic thresholds, and that they abide by the *same epistemic norm of assertion* – same *epistemic threshold – only in a limited domain* (the core of which are Purely Pristine setexts). That is, both are governed by epistemic norms, and the ones governing the epistemic threshold for each *are the same* – contrary to the current common view. In particular, I conjecture that *both* mere Saying and asserting require just (subjective) awareness – in the domain where they have *stable* (fixed) *epistemic threshold* (which is limited, as I argue): This is the epistemic Norm of Assertion, for both mere saying and asserting, and it's *not* constitutive of either.[89] But beyond this domain, mere Saying and Asserting have indeed epistemic thresholds – but the latter *vary with the setextual pressures*, and are subject to *local shifts*.

   As an aside, a distinction that will be useful for us below is the following: Consider setexts as **pristine** (vis-à-vis a verbal act) when *only* (significant) epistemic pressures are operative (on it, in the setext). And accordingly, consider a setext as **purely pristine** when it's pristine but with only *aligning* (significant) epistemic pressures. Two conversational operative

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[88] This difference reflects whether the norm is conceived of internally or externally.

[89] That is, *that* they are the same, and what the thresholds are, is contingent in the sense of not being constitutive: One can imagine different linguistic communities with a clear distinction between mere saying and assertion, since this distinction *inheres* in degrees of Steering Thrust, NOT in different epistemic thresholds, whereas the requisite epistemic thresholds for both be different from each other and from our threshold.

pressures are aligned (vis-à-vis a verbal act in a setext) when their *polarities* are the same –
i.e., when they both are positive (in favor of Saying/Asserting it) or negative (are against). So,
for instance, it might be that a certain verbal act in a setext be epistemically sayable (above
the respective epistemic threshold) but not ethically sayable – it's ethically inappropriate to
say it (to this or that degree). In such a case, the operative epistemic norms and operative
ethical norms are not aligned – they have opposite polarities. These notions will be useful for
us below in this section, and in particular when consider Epistemic Norms of Saying and
Epistemic Norms of Assertion.

Now let's get a better, wider perspective. Usually speakers are subject to various operative
pressures, such as instrumental pressures, epistemic pressures, ethical pressures, social
pressures, local pressures, etc. etc. Such operative pressures at a setext (a time and place, for
the verbal-act producer) are very often *for* or *against* her saying something she is considering
saying or asserting. So vis-à-vis a (putative or actual) certain verbal act of hers at the setext,
operative pressures may *align* – operate in the *same direction*: for or against making the
verbal act in question. Or else they may *conflict*: Some operative pressures being for making
it (*pro*), some against (*con*), operating in *opposite directions*. Such pressures *superimpose* and
might yield an *aligning* case,[90] yielding the *overall* operative pressure. In such a case of
alignment, this overall pressure may be *for* (say) making the assertion while being greater
than the degree of each pressure-token individually, or it may be *against* it, with all the
(significant) operative pressures being aligned against (making the verbal act in question).
But in some cases, very often, operative normative pressure may conflict vis-à-vis a
contemplated (or considered, by whoever, or not) a certain verbal act (in the setext).[91]

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[90] The operative set of token pressures therefore can be modeled as a vector space vis-à-vis a given
potential verbal act; but the superposition of the various axes *need not* be vectorial addition; see
below.
[91] The setext always includes the determination who the speaker is.

So in a given setext we may consider whether the *sum effect* of the operative pressures[92] vis-à-vis a certain verbal act on the table is *in favor* of saying it or asserting it (by the speaker), or neutral, or *against* making it. I'll call the case where they are (together) in favor a case of *overall sayability* for it (then) or *overall assertibility* for it (then), or correspondingly, *against* making it.[93] We therefore can imagine, in a given setext for a certain verbal act, the distinct operative pressures as *axes* in an *n-dimensional vector space*, which yield the (sum) *degree* of the resulting vector – which is its degree of Overall Sayability or of Overall Assertibility (which can be, say, week or high) and its *polarity* – for saying it or for making an assertion, or *against* it. Such degrees of the various operative pressures (represented as values on the corresponding axes) that yield degrees of Overall Sayability or of Overall Assertibility (for the verbal act) underpin whether the verbal act passes the *appropriate* degree of Steering Thrust of the verbal act for saying or for asserting.[94] An appropriate degree of Steering Thrust therefore *reflects* the *overall effect* of the operative normative pressures (on the verbal act, in the setext) vis-à-vis what's required in order to say it or assert it.

We are therefore in a position to consider, for a given verbal act and a setext, **the Overall Sayability function** and **Overall Assertibility function:** They determine the degrees of Overall Sayability and of Overall Assertibility for a given verbal act (in a setext). Of course, such degrees can exceed or be lower than the level *requisite* for saying it or asserting it (then), which is the *Sayability* or *Assertibility threshold* for the verbal act in the setext. Saying

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We focus here on verbal acts, but the same holds for acts in general.

[92] I focus here and elsewhere on significant operative pressures, leaving out potential refinements and precisifications.

[93] Or the opposite pressure may balance out, resulting in *no* overall pressure for or against.

[94] I don't bring to bear here considerations of mistakes on the part of the speaker regarding the degrees of the operative pressures or of the overall degree. As noted a couple of notes above, the degree of Steering Thrust for the resulting vector, i.e., the resulting degrees of Overall Sayability or Assertibility (and their polarity) is *not* in general a vectorial sum.

the verbal act (in question, then) or asserting it when the Overall Sayability or Overall

Assertibility degree (for it) is below the threshold is *inappropriate* (where 'Overall' yields:

with all operative norms concerned taken into account).[95] Of course, as competent speakers,

we gauge, even though usually without awareness,[96] whether a certain candidate verbal act is

or is not appropriate for us to make (in the setext), and we very quickly *filter out* the

inappropriate ones (so much so that they don't reach awareness, usually; of course,

occasionally we might make a mistake).[97]

Apart from the threshold for Overall Sayability or Assertibility (for a verbal act, in a

setext), there might well be thresholds for verbal-act components – requisite for being in a

position to say them or assert them.[98] But I now want to focus on the *component*-thresholds

of these functions when we consider separately their *normative bases*, in view of the

operative norms (at the setext, for the verbal act in question). Thus, there would of course be

the (say) Epistemic Sayability threshold there and then (for it), and I will below argue and

explain that it's not fixed across setext (for a given verbal act). Then there might be the AD-

Sayability threshold (there and then, for the verbal act in question), which is answerable not

to Epistemic Rationality but to Action-Rationality (e.g., colloquially, with the paradigm of

Practical Inferences, or, from a sophisticated perspective, to something like (qualitative)

Expected Utility. These are *component-arguments* of the Overall Sayability Thresholds

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[95] More precisely, it would be better to separate the functions that yield the degrees of Overall
Sayability or Overall Assertibility (of a verbal act, in a setext) and the binary functions that yield
whether saying it or asserting it is appropriate. The latter function is a function of the former function
plus the Sayability or Assertibility threshold (in the setext).

[96] Unless someone else made an inappropriate saying or assertion.

[97] Whether a mild one or a costly one, on the cognitive filtering model I propose here.

[98] That is, for simplicity, asserting a conjunction seems to require assertibility for each (there and
then). This model therefore suggests that the Overall Sayability and Overall Assertibility functions are
compositional -- i.e., that cognitively a speaker must process the Sayability of Assertibility of a
sentential or sentential-like component (which is a Syntactic issue) and assess them all progressively
in order to, once assessing the complex verbal act, be in a position to settle on Sayability/Assertibility
for the complex verbal-act.

function; that is: *given* the values of the component operative pressures for saying/asserting the verbal act *except one* (say, the epistemic component), what, in the setext, would be the requisite epistemic threshold *for it, then and there*? I will argue below that there are 'stable' values, i.e., in so-called 'Purely Pristine' setext.[99] But sufficiently high *other* normative pressures might allow for a *lower* or a *higher* local thresholds – which are the values for this component in the Overall Sayability and Overall Assertibility functions. That is, such functions yield, for a given verbal at a threshold *and* a certain operative norm, the threshold of the corresponding Pragmatic Stance (of the speaker, then and there) *requisite* for saying/asserting it *given* the values of the *other* operative pressures (on it (the verbal act), then and there). Below I will argue that such thresholds indeed *shift* with the setext (relative to the 'fixed' or 'stable' values, exemplified in phenomena such as 'Leeways' or 'Shifts').[100]

So the component-values (i.e., for each 'axal' operative pressure) of the Overall Sayability function and of the Overall Assertibility function depend on the *actual* degrees of the various individual component (axal) operative pressures, e.g., the degree of epistemic pressure requisite for saying the verbal act or for asserting it *given* the *actual* values of the degrees of operative pressures on the verbal act in question (then and there). So consider the functions of the actual values of the operative pressures on the verbal act in question (then and there), such as the degree of actual epistemic position, the degree of the actual instrumental value,[101] The value of say the epistemic component of say the Overall Sayability function *given* the *actual* values of the other conversational pressures is the epistemic *threshold* requisite for saying the verbal act (then and there); and similarly for other epistemic pressures.

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[99] In the dialect or the linguistic community (in an era).

[100] Which are *empirical data* – I am not aware of any way of us computing it.

[101] Which is an instrumental pressure, and I idealize here in considering its components to yield a bottom-line value, despite familiar commensurability problems.

So the values of the Overall Sayability/Assertibility functions thereby render comparisons feasible, e.g., that the threshold for *Epistemic Position* vis-a-vis one verbal act in one setext is higher than vis-à-vis another in another setext. Or, e.g., the degree of an instrumental pressure, or AD pressure (vis-à-vis a certain action), or attitudinal pressure, or ethical pressure, etc. So, again, apart from providing the *threshold* for each component (in a setext, for a verbal act), one can consider the Overall Sayability/Assertibility functions as providing also the *actual degree* of the separate normative pressures (for the verbal act in the setext).[102] Thus, like the Overall Sayability and Assertibility, individual operative pressures would also usually come in *degrees* and with a *polarity* – for or against saying or asserting. Let us call the pertinent degrees of such Pragmatic Stances (given the setext with it operative individual pressures) the (say) *degree of Epistemic Sayability* or *Epistemic Assertibility*, or the degree of AD Sayability or Assertibility, etc. (vis-à-vis a verbal act in a setext, as distinct from degrees of Overall Sayability or Assertibility). So there are the *actual degrees* of conversational pressures, the *thresholds* for each pressure (for Saying/asserting, then and there), and the actual *degree* of conversational pressure, where thresholds are *cutoff points* in the linear[103] values of separate conversational pressures. (We can consider such degrees as being 'polarized' – for (pro) or against (con) saying or asserting.) So such degrees of *component pressures* vis-à-vis the verbal act in question (in the setext) might be *above or below the threshold for the particular operative pressure* (for the verbal act in the setext) – which are usually *different* than the corresponding thresholds – their cutoff degrees (and polarity) of the Overall Sayability or Overall Assertibility.[104] As competent speakers, we usually gauge such

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[102] Strictly speaking, these are two distinct functions; but instead of making things complicated with different names, let's mix then together AS IF they are the same functions.

[103] As I assume them to be here, whether by some idealization or not.

[104] When feasible (for a particular operative pressure). That is, I consider here (say, epistemic) thresholds in a setext – they might vary with the setext (see below, as in twisting), whereas there might be in addition 'privileged' thresholds – as in Pristine (or Purely Pristine) setexts; see below.

degrees.[105] So in particular, when we consider Sayability or Assertibility *given* the Epistemic Position (for the verbal act by a speaker in the setext), we may accordingly consider her as having or not having **Epistemic Sayability** for it (then)[106] – i.e., having a degree of epistemic position (for it, at the setext) HIGHER than the requisite epistemic threshold (for it, then and there), and ADDITIONALLY, to what degree.[107] And similarly for **Epistemic Assertibility**.[108]

Accordingly, the degree of Steering Thrust (by the speaker,[109] for the verbal act, in the setext) may be *appropriate* (simpliciter) or inappropriate depending on the *degree* of the Overall Sayability function or of the Overall Assertibility function (for it, then – in particular, given various actual (or expected) parameters as determined by the applicable norms of Conversational Etiquette:[110] It's inappropriate to say what's not Sayable (by the speaker, then) – i.e., not Overall Sayable, in view of the operative norms and operative pressures (in the setext), and similarly for what's not Assertible.[111] In particular, if the degree of epistemic position (or epistemic standing) for a verbal act[112] is *above the epistemic threshold* then,[113]

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[105] With or without awareness (speakers wouldn't have such a conceptualization, but they might be able to gauge degrees of normative violation). In considering such degrees, I have in mind *qualitative* degrees – not a metric, but something like 10-12 qualitative degrees, which have certain empirical support.

[106] Thereby alluding to a threshold for epistemic Sayability or for epistemic Assertibility for the verbal act in the setext. That is, we thereby allude to the Epistemic Sayability or Epistemic Assertibility functions which yield degrees as well as a relative position to the threshold in that setext. This reflects the observation that such thresholds vary with the setext – and specifically, with the composition of normative pressures in it. (For clarity, one may propose two functions – one for degree, period, and one for degree relative to the threshold (plus polarity).)

[107] Where the thresholds are such degrees.

[108] And similarly for various other operative pressures.

[109] I take the speaker to be specified by the setext, so I don't need to relativize for it in an ongoing way.

[110] As explained in the section on Conversational Etiquette.

[111] I'll take into consideration as 'operative' only norms or 'pressures' (in a setext, for a speaker) whose degrees are 'significant'.

[112] By a speaker, at a setext.

[113] For it.

we may consider it as *Epistemically Sayable*; and likewise for assertion – *Epistemically Assertible*. The *degree* of Epistemic Sayability or Epistemic Assertibility of a verbal act[114] is how *distant* it is from Epistemic Sayability threshold (for the verbal act, in the setext) – that is, when it's considered in a Purely Pristine setext (see below). Such degrees are distinct and (usually) *different* from its degree of *Overall* Sayability or Overall Assertibility (i.e., when considered vis-à-vis the other operative conversational pressures in the setext). Accordingly, a verbal act might score a degree over or below its corresponding threshold – e.g., its degree of Overall-Sayability/Epistemic-Sayability might be below the corresponding thresholds for it then for Overall-Sayability/Epistemic-Sayability, and similarly for Overall-Assertibility.[115] Thus, given such conversational normative pressures and such *threshold-functions*,[116] one might consider whether there are, and if so, when and which, Epistemic Norms of Saying and Epistemic Norms of Assertion, and we'll do so below.[117]

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[114] Which, as I claim, are the same.

[115] Below I argue that the epistemic threshold for Assertibility is the same as that for Sayability: Assertibility differs from Sayability by requiring higher degree of Steering Thrust; see Thesis 13 below.

[116] That is, thresholds for Overall-Sayability/Overall-Assertibility or component thresholds (e.g., Epistemic-Sayability/Epistemic-Assertibility) for a verbal act (in a setext). Note that I take the setext to specify the speaker (who speaks, writes, or just contemplates doing it).

[117] That is: For there to be Overall-Sayability, there *must* be Epistemic-Sayability *then* (i.e., at *that* setext) for *it* (see next paragraph, this footnote). The Overall-Sayability function determines the sub-type threshold (for a verbal act, at a setext) for each component (e.g., Epistemic-Sayability) as well as its own threshold (for Overall-Sayability). It takes an empirical study to determine whether, and if so how, the threshold for Overall-Sayability varies with the setext. To find out how this Overall Sayability function looks like is of considerable importance, and it's unknown as of now.

So the idea of the overall function of the Overall Sayability function is the following. When there are non-epistemic pressures, resulting in twistings or leeways, the threshold of the Epistemic Sayability is then *modified*: It's either pushed *down*, so that a lesser epistemic position is needed *then* (even if not in s Purely Pristine setext), or *stretched*, so that a *higher* epistemic position is required (up to the point of the threshold at that text, but not above it). So in the case of the use of the Skad, e.g., in the bank case, 2nd stage, the husband may well have proper Overall Sayability of his Skad – but only so long as his epistemic position regarding p is *below* knowing-very-well. For greater details, see my (2017), section 5.

So we have introduced the notions of Overall-Sayability/Overall-Assertibility – i.e., being in a position to say/assert that p, given all the (significant) conversational operative normative pressures in the setext, and of Epistemic-Sayability/Epistemic-Assertibility – being in a position to say/assert that p *just* in view of the epistemic pressures (in the setext).[118] And likewise for Sayability/Assertibility under other specific conversational normative pressures, such as Ethical-Sayability or Ethical-Assertibility. Note that the differing degrees of different operative pressures vis-à-vis a certain verbal act (for a speaker and a setext) might render one as *dominant* and others as not dominant. (Compare the important notion above of a dominant Steering Thrust, which is measured by having a significantly higher degree than other Steering Thrusts).

However, there are also threshold regarding when degrees of Steering Thrusts for given verbal acts under certain setexts are *appropriate* or not – which is governed by Conversational Etiquette (see above). Different degrees of operative pressures usually are *reflected* in and *give rise* to the degree of (corresponding) Steering Thrusts conveyed by the verbal act (then) – but the latter are also *normatively constrained* by them: They must be *appropriate*. Employing and *selecting* degrees of Steering Thrust for a verbal act must abide by thresholds, given the underpinning normative pressures (which are recorded by the Overall Sayability or Overall Assertibility functions, with their corresponding values/thresholds (which may be local, then)). Saying or asserting the verbal act when its degree of Overall Sayability or Overall Assertibility is below the corresponding (often local) threshold is usually *inappropriate*. Thus, in Purely Pristine setexts, the degree of Steering Thrust appropriate for saying/asserting it must not be below the *epistemic*

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[118] For a verbal act and a speaker. I allow that the Polarity and Strength of operative pressures might affect the epistemic threshold – i.e., that the epistemic-threshold-function is not a constant (for Overall Sayability, say), by contrast to the way it is in the domain of Super-Pristine setexts: Rather, it 'adjusts' and 'twisted' in cases with strong operative pressures vis-à-vis saying that p (in the setext).

sayability/Assertibility thresholds (for such setexts). Similarly, in other setexts, the degree of Steering Thrust appropriate for a certain verbal act in a certain (non-Pristine) setext must respect the (local) threshold for degree of Steering Thrust (for it, then). So Saying/asserting a verbal act in a setext must, in order to be *sayable/assertible*, respect the respective thresholds of the Overall Sayability/Assertibility functions. But in addition, the selection of the degree of Steering Thrust with which it is conveyed must also abide by thresholds of Steering Thrusts, that are determined by the norms of Conversational Etiquette. The appropriate thresholds of Steering Thrust (i.e., below/above the thresholds) in turn *reflect* the operative normative pressures (on the verbal act then) and very often varies with the degrees of sub-type pressures.[119] Thus, what governs appropriate Sayability/Assertibility (of a verbal act in a setext) are *the operative norms* (via the Overall Sayability and Overall Assertibility functions), and so do the appropriate degrees of Steering Thrusts.[120] So as noted, for a speaker to say or assert a verbal act (in a setext) and for it to be Sayable/Assertible (then), and with a degree of Steering Thrust that is or is not appropriate (for it, then) depend on the overall normative pressures and the norms of Conversational Etiquette. (This is, as noted, the case not just for Overall Sayability and Overall Assertibility and their degrees of Overall Sayability/Assertibility (visa-vis the thresholds), but *also* for Epistemic-Sayability and Epistemic-Assertibility – when only the operative *epistemic* normative pressures on the verbal act are taken into account *in the setext*.[121])

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[119] E.g., for Epistemic Sayability, Instrumental Sayability, etc.

[120] Which depend on the norms of Conversational Etiquette.

[121] Vis-à-vis the epistemic threshold for Sayability or Assertibility in the setext, reflected in the Epistemic Sayability and Epistemic Assertibility functions, i.e., functions that determine the *overall* epistemic pressure by balancing out appropriately different epistemic pressures, thereby yielding a degree of epistemic pressure, as well as whether it's above or below the epistemic threshold for it *in the setext*. The epistemic threshold for Sayability (say) of a verbal act in a setext is determined by the Overall Sayability function for it, then. I won't get further into such details in this paper.

These notions will be useful for us below when consider Epistemic Norms of Saying and Epistemic Norms of Assertion.

Section 10: Examples   Consider now a few examples to illustrate and clarify some of the points made above. As the first **example (example 3),** consider the speaker and the hearer and the verbal act in the setext: There is water in the fridge (as in the example above). The dominant normative pressures (then, for it) would be the Action-Directed pressure, thereby resulting in a dominant AD Steering-Thrust – which is *stronger* than the non-dominant epistemic/informational Steering-Thrust that the speaker conveys (to her hearer) *alongside* with the AD Steering-Thrust by the *very same* verbal act. When making that verbal act, the speaker Posts having an approving attitude towards the hearer's performing the steered-to action (due to broad Sincerity Norm).[122]

As another **example (Example 4)**, consider Williamson's train case.[123] In it, the speaker is a passenger waiting in the train station, aware that another traveler is very anxious to be sure he mounts the train to his specific destination (that comes only, say, once a day). While the other traveler is sleepy and doses off, the speaker hears a train honking from a distance at the time the traveler's train is scheduled to come, and is therefore a good candidate for being the traveler's train. Such a speaker then would be in a position to raise his voice, thereby asserting: Your train is coming! -- hoping to get the traveler's attention. He therefore has Action-Directed Assertibility for this assertion of his (then), and therefore Overall Assertibility for it, reflecting that the AD Steering-Thrust is his dominant Steering Thrust in

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[122] She very often would steer herself as well towards such an action; but this is an example where the steered-to Pragmatic Stance need not confer derivatively having the same Pragmatic Stance (here, AD) by the speaker. Rather, her AD Steering Thrust confers a corresponding though different approving Pragmatic Stance towards the hearer's performing the action she steered him towards (which is usually present, regardless of whether the Steered-Thrust towards the AD Pragmatic-Stance derivatively confers that the speaker has it).

[123] In his (2000), p. 256.

the verbal act in question. And this is so *even though* he would not have Overall Assertibility for it in a Pristine setext, which is determined only by the operative epistemic pressures – assume that his Epistemic Position for this verbal act is *insufficient* to warrant his saying what he did in a Pristine setext (as is the case in this example).[124] But the setext of this example is of course not pristine: There are non-epistemic operative pressures, and in fact, in the setext, the epistemic pressure is *below* the requisite threshold for saying it in a Pristine setext. And yet, nevertheless, the speaker has Overall Assertibility for it (then) since the *degree* of strength of the AD pressure, and accordingly the AD Steering-Thrust, are very strong, and thereby yield Overall Assertibility *despite* not having Epistemically Sayability (for the verbal act in a Pristine setext). We thus see, in this example, how the Overall Assertibility and Overall Sayability functions can make room for *leeways* – when a speaker has Overall Sayability or Overall Assertibility despite not having (say) Epistemic Sayability or Epistemic Assertibility for such a verbal act in a Pristine setext.[125] So the speaker's asserting 'Your train is coming!' is Overall Assertible (by him, in *that* setext) even though it's not Epistemically Assertible or Epistemically Sayable (by him, in Purely Pristine setexts).[126]

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[124] That is, the speaker's epistemic sayability in the train station (for the verbal act in question) would reflect a *lower* epistemic threshold than what's required in a Super-Pristine setext, reflecting that the threshold for epistemic sayability for shouting what he did *in the setext at the train station* (i.e., the epistemic threshold for Overall-Sayability of it then) is different (lower) than what it would be for the same verbal act in a Super-Pristine setext (this threshold is fixed in Super-Pristine setexts).

[125] But in the setext in question, due to the leeway, the Epistemic Assertibility of that verbal act is above the threshold for epistemic Assertibility (for it) *in the setext*, set by the Overall-Assertibility function.

[126] Of course, the 'corresponding Super-Pristine setext' for the speaker and his verbal act is very often quite natural (leaving the case and its pertinent aspects roughly as they are while removing pertinent non-epistemic pressures). But not always – as when her evidence inextricably involves a pressure on her Overall Sayability, such as when the epistemic Assertibility of her verbal act at the setext *reflects* the high pressure on her making (or not making) that verbal act but where, without such pressure, the evidence she has for her epistemic position remain intact. For instance, if her boss tells her 'As I told you before, p' – which she has forgotten and in view of that formed an epistemic position for p less than what's required for saying that p in such a setext but *without* the boss's comment, and yet, in view of it, she adjusts her degree of epistemic position for p there and then. The natural corresponding case without the authoritative (*over and above* the mere epistemic) pressure by what her boss said would

Raising one's tone of voice is normally a very good mark of making an assertion (rather than a mere saying – see also Example 8, Version 2, below). Shouting, or raising one's pitch level (which is an intonation feature), as well as usually associated stress patterns, can be primarily, and even only, motivated by lack of sufficient auditory conditions to make sure that the hearer hears and understands the speaker even in a normal tone of voice – merely say. Yet such physical features of the voice-emission pattern of what one says are the primary one that we have at our resort when speaking in order to overcome noise and other auditory deficiencies. Consequently, shouting or tone-raising is a main component that we construe as *asserting*. Of course, one can assert without voice-raising, but typically it's almost impossible to be heard without sounding asserting, even when the assertoric aspect doesn't serve any purpose (of the speaker or the conversational participants). As a result, usually shouting or raising one's tone of voice yields asserting. Of course, in written media, there isn't such an expressible correlate, and the speaker must rely on descriptions or clues of the writer, e.g.: Exclamation marks, or descriptions of the speech delivery (shouting, raising pitch, and others). The writer might decide to be explicit and say: She asserted that …, or merely saying: She shouted that … -- without interpreting the type of saying. The important

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not preserve her epistemic state, since his comment exerts *both* an epistemic pressure (as evidence) as well as an authoritative (non-epistemic) pressure for her saying that (or consenting to it). The epistemic and non-epistemic pressures are inextricably woven up here since conveyed by a single verbal act (by the boss) – there is no simple, straightforward, way of moving to the corresponding setext by 'removing' a pressure on her Sayability *without* affecting her epistemic evidence, which is required for there to be a 'corresponding' setext. I thus reserve the function that shifts from a setext to another 'corresponding' setext as one that can fix the target value by 'simply, straightforwardly' removing a pressure on the subject's Overall Sayability without thereby affecting her pertinent evidence.) That is, there is a (partial) *function* that very often yields, for a verbal act in a non-Super-Pristine setext, a 'corresponding' (usually partial) Super-Pristine setext for it, *without* some pressures that *don't* affect the speaker's pertinent epistemic position while affecting *other pressures* affecting the Sayability (say) of the Verbal Act in question in the original setext.

Below (Thesis 13) I argue that the requisite degree of Epistemic Sayability is the same as that of Epistemic Assertibility, although Overall Assertibility requires *higher* overall pressures than Overall Sayability.

distinction between mere saying, as a type of saying which covers asserting as another type, underpins the issue of what constitutes one rather than the other, specifically shouting. This issue interfaces with my thesis that asserting consists in raising the conveyed Steering Thrust (over and above what's suitable for mere saying in Purely Pristine setexts where, I assume, the auditory conditions are adequate and allow for delivering mere saying by a normal tone of voice). Therefore, most of the above discussion applies, mutatis mutandis, to how to tell degrees of Steering Thrust in inadequate auditory conditions. Note that 'emitting a higher pitch' is a physical description, whereas conveying a higher Steering-Thrust is a *communicative action* (normally), as is shouting.

In the example provided by Williamson,[127] the main point is the normative constraint of Dynamic Conversational Etiquette[128] regarding when it's appropriate[129] to assert, on which I expand elsewhere.[130] What governs the norm regarding when it's appropriate to assert (rather than merely say) is a norm about when it's appropriate to raise the speaker's Steering Thrust. Normative implications about when it's appropriate to shout are *derivative* from the thesis that asserting *amounts* to higher Steering Thrust.

Another **example (Example 5)** for such a leeway is the bank example, first stage, when the husband is ignorant of the mortgage but is concerned about the cost of waiting in line (for him) and therefore prefers to postpone the deposit. So when his wife asks, "Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?", he responds: Yes, I know that the bank is open on Saturday – which. This is indeed Overall Sayable by him then even if his evidence is (say) having been

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[127] In his (2000) – though NOT in his discussion of it.
[128] Dynamic – since it invokes prior features of the conversation (e.g., resistance) or anticipated one (such as anticipated resistance).
[129] Which comes in degrees, of course.
[130] See my (2017), Part II.

in the bank on Saturday only once. I assume once isn't enough for knowledge[131] (though twice would be), but is enough for mere Epistemic Sayability of 'p'.[132] Recall that Overall Sayability in a Purely Pristine setext, which *isn't* the setext at hand, boils down to just Epistemic Sayability (in that setext, which is an Epistemic Constant).

   Let me explain the above and add a regress to the Pragmatics of assertion, which I treat in detail only in Part II below, since I'll use 'assertion' in this section below. The husband's response is moreover also assertible, since in this verbal act he invests significant Steering Thrust due to the sense of resistance that his wife displays. Even though he has epistemic Sayability for what he says then, he doesn't have the epistemic position of epistemic sayability for knowing that (on our factual assumptions here), and thus not for saying that he knows it. But he entitled to *assert* it – thereby increasing even further the degree of Steering Thrust of his verbal act – since it then would constitute a 'leeway', whereby he would have overall Sayability (and Overall Assertibility) for the knowledge ascription at that setext – even though not in a corresponding Pristine Setext (i.e., epistemically comparable but with Low Stakes). Leeways are kinds of twists of thresholds whereby the epistemic threshold 'gives way' in view of stronger other pressures to yield Overall Sayability even when the sheer epistemic Sayability falls short of the 'base-line' level (i.e., the one in Purely-Pristine setexts).[133]

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[131] I.e., for Epistemic Sayability of 'I know …. On my Pragmatic approach to the issue of Pragmatic Encroachment, I take it that there is a fixed (within a linguistic community) epistemic threshold requisite for knowledge. Given the Pragmatics of the use of 'know', this is the epistemic threshold for saying 'I know …' in Purely-Pristine setexts, but *need not be* required for saying it in *other* setexts, since in them what counts for Overall Sayability is the threshold for it in *that setext*, which depends on *other conversational pressures* (than mere epistemic).

[132] I.e., without the affix 'I know that'.

[133] See more in my (2017) section. Thus, the Overall Sayability function and Overall Assertibility function have sub-type components where their thresholds can *shift* in particular setexts in view of stronger pressures (from other sub-type components – e.g., AD, instrumental, ethical, etc.). Such cases amount to Leeways or, more generally to Twists.

A short aside on assertibility: The husband asserts in stage one, but says at stage two.[134] He is in a position to assert it since he on that occasion faces resistance. On my view, which is a major point of departure from the standard literature, I don't consider a higher degree of epistemic position as requisite for asserting (over and above that requisite for mere saying): The epistemic threshold (more precisely: In Purely Pristine setexts and their kin, suitably extendable to other setexts) are the same. But the subject has to be in a position to convey a *stronger steering-thrust* in his verbal-act, in view of constraints of Conversational-Etiquette. Conveying a higher degree of Steering Thrust *constitutes* asserting – see my (2022, Part II).

However, if the reader is not comfortable with my separating mere sayings and assertions, at this point she perhaps can use, instead of both, the notion of *indicative sayings*, which I use as a *general category* covering both mere sayings and assertions (as well as others) (as usual, covering all Pragmatic Stances). One reason the distinction is of significance is since I use the bank example in two variations (although this might be confusing) – where the husband visited the bank previously just once, and thus is (afterwards) in a position to say 'The bank is open on Saturday' (under our assumptions above), but *not* to say (or assert) 'I know the bank is open on Saturday'. And the second version is the one where he visited the bank twice and indeed does know that and is in a position to say that he knows. The first version is useful since I use it to illustrate the phenomenon of Leeways, and the second is useful since I use it to resolve the Inconsistency Puzzle (vis-à-vis his use of the Skad in the 2nd stage). But again, apart from these applications, the reader may often not need to heed carefully the distinction between mere saying and asserting, which is primarily a Pragmatic distinction since, as I argue below, the verbal act of asserting is a Pragmatic Category (see below, Part II).

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[134] See previous note.

The husband then is in an (overall) position to assert[135] what he does (viz.: I know that it's open on Saturday) *despite* having an Epistemic Position for it which *falls short* of the requisite epistemic threshold for such a verbal act *in a Purely-Pristine* setext. But the Overall-Assertibility function *sanctions* such an assertion despite (somewhat) insufficient Epistemic Position for knowledge (by him) – thereby reflecting that the *local* epistemic threshold for Sayability is *lower* than it is in a corresponding case in a Purely-Pristine setext.[136] That is, in such a case the speaker has a *leeway* – to the effect that it's appropriate for him to say what he does *despite having a lower epistemic position* (than what would be required in a corresponding Super Pristine setext) -- of course in view of the strong AD pressure that underpins the Overall Assertibility of what he asserts in that setext. (I use 'assert' here since the husband, in that example asserts what he says.) As I argue below,[137] this difference needn't affect the requisite epistemic threshold since the core (i.e., in Purely Pristine setext and their kin) epistemic threshold for mere saying and for asserting is the same (Thesis 13).

Note that merely saying requires a minimal degree of Overall Sayability, which accordingly reflects a minimal degree of Steering Thrust being appropriate (then), and similarly for Overall Assertibility. But adding the 'I know' operator *raises* the degree of AD Steering-Thrust (by the husband in the bank case towards the action Delay-the-Deposit) – which is appropriate even though his Epistemic Position wouldn't qualify as knowledge (epistemically), i.e., wouldn't warrant his saying so in a Super Pristine setext in the same

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[135] See the comments above on assertion, and for a greater elaboration, my (2017), Part II.

[136] And further, that the speaker at this setext senses that he does faces resistance, which warrants his asserting what he does (vis-à-vis normative constraints on assertibility by Conversational Etiquette); see also previous footnote.

[137] See Part IV on Pragmatic Encroachment.

Epistemic Position (for that verbal act).[138] But the Overall Assertibility function nevertheless yields that he had Overall Assertibility for what he asserted. That is, the epistemic threshold requisite for such Assertibility in the setext is *twisted down* (see below).[139]

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[138] I thus operate vis-à-vis knowledge from a non-Pragmatic-Encroachment perspective, where the degree of Epistemic Position requisite for Knowledge is *the same* in all setexts – which is *distinct* from the Epistemic-Assertibility level requisite for Overall Assertibility in a *given* setext. Compare my Pragmatic treatment of the bank case, e.g., in my (2022).

[139] A speaker may just say it, without asserting, and have Overall Sayability (for it), with the same epistemic position. Asserting need not be conveyed by higher pitch – though usually it is.

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