Metaphor, Truth, and Representation

Abstract: Do metaphorical sentences express facts or represent states of affairs in the world? Can a metaphorical statement tell us ‘what there is’? These questions raise the issue of whether metaphors can be used to make truth-claims; that is, whether metaphors can be regarded as assertions that can be evaluated as true or false. Some theorists on metaphor have argued for a negative answer to the above-mentioned questions. They have claimed, among others, that metaphorical utterances are non-descriptive uses of language (Blackburn 1998); truth is not the constitutive aim of metaphors (Lamarque and Olsen 1994); metaphorical sentences do not have propositional contents (Davidson 1979; Cooper 1986; Rorty 1987, 1989; Lepore and Stone 2010, 2015); metaphorical utterances are neither assertions nor expressions of beliefs (Loewen 1973, 1975; Davies 1982; Davies 1984; Blackburn, 1984). I discuss a particular view, Metaphorical Expressivism, which exploits the relationship between truth, belief and assertion, and argues for the irrelevancy of truth to metaphors on the premise that metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions and that they do not count as the expression of beliefs. The denial of the truth-evaluable nature of metaphors on this view, I argue, is a product of an unmotivated tendency to see truth and meaning in terms of the portrayal of facts and a commitment to two untenable principles: literalism and representationalism.

Keywords: metaphor, truth, assertion, Representationalism, Literalism, Expressivism

0 Introduction

Some theorists of metaphor argue that metaphorical utterances are not expressions of beliefs and that they do not count as assertions. The cornerstone on which these arguments rest is the intricate connection that the notions of belief and assertion have with the notion of truth. An assertion, when it is sincere, is an expression of a belief; an assertion aims at truth, and truth is, arguably, thought to be the constitutive norm of assertion; and hence, assertion is a bearer of truth. An area of discourse (or an utterance) is truth-apt if the utterances in that discourse count as assertions and as expression of beliefs. In the case of metaphor, one can identify a composite view that I will refer to as Metaphorical Expressivism which

1 This paper is adapted from my PhD dissertation, Understanding Assertion and Truth in Relation to Metaphor, which was submitted to the University of Cape Town in 2017.
exploits the relationship between truth, belief and assertion, and argues for the irrelevancy of truth to metaphors on the premise that metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions and they do not count as the expression of beliefs.

For the Metaphorical Expressivist, truth does not matter to metaphors. Rather, the maker of a metaphor is expressing an experience (instead of a belief), or making a suggestion or a proposal (instead of an assertion). Metaphorical Expressivism approaches the question of the truth-evaualibility of metaphors from the aims and purposes of making metaphors: the aim of making a metaphor is not to make a truth-claim but to issue an invitation for someone to see one thing as another thing. The Metaphorical Expressivist adopts a literalist and representationalist view of truth and connects that to the notion of assertion and the expression of beliefs and argues, on the one side of a coin, that metaphorors do not make claims to truth and thus they are neither assertions nor expressions of beliefs, and on the other side of the same coin, that metaphorors do not count as assertions or expressions of beliefs and hence by that fact they are not truth-evaluable.  

This paper, then, is an assessment of the Metaphorical Expressivist's exploitation of truth's connection with assertion and belief to inform its position that truth does not matter to metaphors. Rather than showing that metaphors can be assertions and expressions of beliefs, the strategy I adopt here is a critical examination of the underlying motivations for the expressivist's contentions. The overall thesis here is that the Metaphorical Expressivist's view is untenable; the untenability of the view stems from the fact that it is grounded on certain mistaken assumptions and perspectives about metaphors and assertions which motivates the thought that metaphorical utterances are neither assertions nor expressions of beliefs. By revealing and discarding these mistaken assumptions and perspectives, the paper clears a hurdle towards construing metaphors as assertions and expressions of beliefs, and by so doing, it brings the notion of truth into the appraisal of metaphors.

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2 There have been many arguments against the truth-evaualibility of metaphors in the literature: one strand of argument owes its origin and force from Davidson (1979) who argues that metaphors do not have non-literal contents that are propositional in nature; another strand of argument uses the phenomenological model of understanding metaphors — seeing as — as a basis for arguing that metaphors should not be appraised in terms of truth (for instance, Davidson 1979; Reimner 2001; Lepore and Stone 2010). However, the focus of this paper is on the main tenets and the arguments of the view I have termed Metaphorical Expressivism. So, while I admit that these other arguments and views have bearings on truth and representation with respect to metaphors, I do not discuss them here.
2 The Tenets of Metaphorical Expressivism

The very distinct tenet of the Expressivist about metaphor is that: *truth does not matter to metaphors*. And this tenet is based on the view that metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions, and they do not count as the expression of beliefs. Expressivists, in general, are opposed to minimalism about truth-aptitude, in their insistence that despite surface propositional form, certain areas of discourse or types of sentences like performatives (Austin 1962), fiction (Divers and Miller 1995), ethics (Ayer 1952; Blackburn 1984), etc., are not truth evaluable.

The expressivist contends that in such areas of discourses what matters is not the expression of beliefs but the evocation of moods and attitudes. And since such evocations of moods and attitudes are not appraised for truth, these areas of discourses have little, if not nothing, to do with truth and falsity. The Metaphorical Expressivist need not be an expressivist about other areas of discourses; she is an expressivist about metaphors insofar as she explains the refusal to attribute truth and falsity to metaphors on the basis that metaphors are not expressions of beliefs or assertions. Blackburn (1984, 1998) and Cooper (1986) are foremost Metaphorical Expressivists; other writers who espouse the views of Metaphorical Expressivism in various forms include Black (1955, 1962, 1993), Loewenberg (1975), Mack (1975), Davies (1982) and Davies (1984). Blackburn’s expressivism, for instance, extends to metaphors in his belief that the maker of a metaphor is simply endorsing the invitation to the hearer to explore comparisons. The expressivist views of these philosophers on metaphors can be simplified into three main claims: (1) metaphorical utterances *fail* as assertions; (2) metaphors do not tell how things *really* or actually are in the world. (3) metaphorical utterances are not expressions of beliefs but lead to the *acquisition* of beliefs.

2.1 Claim I: Metaphorical Utterances Fail as Assertions

According to Loewenberg (1975),

It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an utterance to be a metaphor that, if taken as an assertion and interpreted literally, it is false. If the hearer concludes that the utterance *fails as an assertion*, what, if any, positive conclusion is he entitled to? What speech-act is being performed if not that of assertion? (Loewenberg 1975: 334)

An assertion, for Loewenberg, literally makes a truth claim, but a metaphorical utterance, when considered as an assertion, makes a false claim. However, a metaphor-maker does not intend to make a false claim and thus metaphorical utterances cannot be taken to be assertions. A metaphorical utterance fails the test of being an assertion, and signals that it be construed as a non-assertoric speech act. In other words, a metaphorical utterance only appears to be an assertion by purporting to make a truth-claim, but interpreted literally, it does not make a truth-claim, and since the making of truth-claims is the hallmark of an assertion, metaphorical utterances do not count as assertions. Implicit in Loewenberg’s view, as I will examine later, is the assumption that assertion properly belongs to literal utterances, and that for metaphorical utterances to be counted as assertions, they have to be interpreted or construed literally. Loewenberg answers her own question at the end of the quote above in the one below:

In concluding that such an utterance fails as an assertion, the hearer identifies it as metaphorical. He judges that the speaker was not making a truth claim about the referents of the words in the sentence he uttered but rather a proposal about a way to view, understand, etc., those referents... The speaker does not assert this view because he knows that it does not represent what – actually and literally – is the case and he expects his hearers to know this. However, his utterance is not merely an expression, a blurring out, of his feelings, nor is he indifferent to his effect on hearers. The speaker is implicitly proposing that his hearer adopt the view expressed by the sentence he uttered. (Loewenberg 1975: 335)

The making of metaphors, for Loewenberg, belongs to the speech act of proposals where a speaker proposes to a hearer to view the terms of the metaphor in a certain way. What is significant about Loewenberg’s view here is the fact that the proposal to view the referents of the metaphor in a certain way is premised on the fact that metaphors *fail as assertions*. Her explanation is grounded on the view that truth is the aim of making an assertion, and the fact that the speaker knows that the metaphoric utterance would be false shows that she was not aiming at truth, and hence the speaker was not making an assertion. Loewenberg also thinks that metaphors do not count as assertions because the claims metaphors make do not represent what is ‘actually and literally’ the case. This touches on the second claim of Metaphorical Expressivism.

2.2 Claim II: Metaphorical Claims Do Not Represent How Things Actually Are in the World

This claim is related to the first claim in the sense that a metaphorical utterance interpreted literally is false, and because it is literally false, it does not show the true state of affairs of what it claims about the world. When an utterance is construed metaphorically, the claim it makes does not tell us anything in the world; and when a metaphorical utterance is interpreted literally, it makes false claims about the world. In either case, it seems that speakers of metaphors do not aim to say what is really the case, and thus they do not purport to make assertions about the world or states of affairs. The conclusion to draw from this observation is that
metaphors are not in the business of making truth-claims about the world, and in other words, truth is not a concern when it comes to the making and appreciation of metaphors. Cooper (1986) says it succinctly here:

The notion of truth, as we normally understand it, is used to appraise utterances in terms of what they achieve. A true statement is one which successfully achieves what statements generally aim to achieve – telling how things really are. To employ the notion of truth in the appraisal of metaphor, therefore, wrongly suggests that metaphors, too, have the dominant aim of getting us to see how things actually are. (Cooper 1986: 250)

For,

The speaker of metaphor, on the other hand, is not aiming to state how things are, but at most to put us in the way of realizing how they are. (Cooper 1986: 207)

Cooper underscores the point that it will be mistaken to use the notion of truth as the currency for valuing metaphors, for metaphors do not fit the bill of representing how things actually are. Making a truth-claim is 'telling how things actually are' and this is reserved for literal utterances. Saying of metaphorical utterances that they are intended to make truth claims mischaracterizes the role of metaphor, and it suggests a misunderstanding of what it means to make a truth claim. The notion of truth at play here is a representationalist one: a claim is true if it correctly represents what is actually the case. Telling what is really or actually the case is adopting a literal mode of speech, and hence, the notion of truth here understood in terms of literal truth conditions.

The terms 'true' and 'false' are often applied to metaphors where the intent of the application is to give a heuristic for the identification or recognition of a sentence as metaphorical. For instance, Beardsley (1976) thought that recognizing a metaphor involves discerning between two senses of the predicate term of the metaphorical sentence “in one of which the sentence is false” (p. 219); Davidson (1979) thought that most metaphorical sentences are “patently false” (p. 42); and Martinich (1996) claims that “every metaphorical proposition is false” (p. 430). What these authors are pointing out is that metaphorical sentences are literally false, that is, when the metaphorical sentences are interpreted literally, they are false.

Reacting to the claim of the literal falsity of metaphors, Binkley (1974), Cohen (1975, 1976), Hills (1997) and others have given examples of metaphors like ‘no man is an island,’ ‘Moscow is a cold city,’ ‘Jesus is a carpenter’ where the metaphors are true when they are interpreted literally. Unfortunately, Cohen (1975, 1976) has dubbed these cases ‘twice-true’ metaphors suggesting that they are true on both their literal and metaphorical interpretations. I say unfortunately because the label ‘twice-true’ does not explain or give an account of the ‘second’ sense in which the metaphor is true. It merely assumes that if the utterance is literally true – the ‘first’ truth – then it is twice-true. The term ‘twice-true’ mischaracterizes or misrepresents the metaphor – all it shows is that the metaphorical utterance is true if interpreted literally. It does not follow from that the utterance itself has another truth or is true in another sense. One has to give an account of why the metaphor itself is true non-literally. Saying that the sentence ‘x is F’ is twice-true implies that there are two propositions involved – a literal and a metaphorical one – and the sentence is true on both interpretations. But whereas we understand the sense in which ‘x is F’ is true on a literal interpretation we need an account of why it is true on a metaphorical interpretation. We can entertain the possibility of ‘x is F’ being literally true but metaphorically false, or literally false but metaphorically true (once-true?), or literally false and metaphorically false (twice-false?).

The view that some metaphors are twice-true should not be understood as an endorsement of the view that metaphorical utterances are truth-apt or truth-evaluable per se. We must distinguish the use of ‘true’ and ‘false’ as identification terms from their use as evaluative predicates. In the identificational sense, metaphors are mostly literally false. That is, a way of identifying certain sentences as metaphors is to see that when they are interpreted literally they are obviously false or absurd. The case of ‘twice-true’ metaphors is to show that when interpreted literally, these sentences are true. So, the point of twice-true is to show that literal falsity or absurdity is not a universal heuristic for identifying metaphors: literal falsity is neither necessary nor sufficient for identifying linguistic expressions as metaphors. But the evaluative sense of true is about whether sentences identified as metaphors are truth-evaluable. And here, the heuristic identificational sense of twice-true is not an argument for, or in favour of, the fact that metaphors are truth-evaluable.

The fact that metaphors can be said to be true or false on their literal interpretation does not entail that metaphors, qua metaphors, are truth-evaluable. The act of qualifying metaphorical utterances as literally true or false is different from the act of appraising the metaphorical utterances as either true or false. The Metaphorical Expressivist will have no qualms with the view that some metaphors are literally true or false; what she contests is that the semantic notion of truth should be applicable in evaluating metaphors as metaphors. This means that we move beyond the recognitional or identificational status to the appraisal or evaluative status of our treatment of metaphors. Once we have identified a sentence as a metaphor, the Expressivist position is that that metaphorical sentence cannot be truth-apt either because it fails as an assertion or that it does not tell us something factual about the world or a combination of any of these and other reasons.
2.3 Claim III: Metaphorical Utterances Are Not Expressions of Beliefs but They Can Lead to the Acquisition of Beliefs

Metaphorical utterances are not expressions of beliefs: their makers do not intend to express beliefs, and they do not intend that their hearers will construe them as expressions of beliefs. Rather, the metaphor-maker by the use of the metaphorical expression is evincing an attitude or expressing a feeling (or opinion) towards, or about, the principal subject of the metaphorical sentence. Like the moral expressivist’s contention that a moral judgment like ‘stealing is wrong’ does not express a belief but an attitude, emotion, desire, or motivation to refrain from the act of stealing, so the metaphorical expressivist maintains that a metaphorical statement is not a simple matter of belief, but more to do with endorsement of invitations to think of things in a certain light (Blackburn, 1998: 160).

Blackburn (1984) has an interesting take on metaphors with respect to the assertion and belief of the propositional content or the literal paraphrase of a metaphor. For him, a speaker does not express a belief in the metaphorical expression and he also does not assert the content or the literal paraphrase of his metaphor. Rather, the speaker uses a metaphor as a conduit for suggesting a content – the literal paraphrase of a metaphor – to a hearer which may result in the hearer coming to believe the paraphrasable content of the metaphor. Using ‘Bert is a real gorilla’ as an example of a metaphorical utterance, he writes:

‘Bert is a real gorilla’ yields that Bert is strong, rough, and fierce. . . . Is it right to describe the speaker as having asserted falsely that Bert is a gorilla? Is it right to describe him as having asserted truly the yielded propositions, that Bert is strong and rough and fierce? . . . The speaker said that Bert is a gorilla, but did not assert it: he did not intend anyone to believe that this was the truth, and would not normally be taken to have displayed it as such. He did, on the other hand, intend people to believe that Bert is strong, rough, and fierce, and chose a reliable method of transmitting this belief, and of being taken to do so. But the method was one of reliable suggestion, and we do not allow that people accept everything that they reliably suggest, and are known to be reliably suggesting.

(Blackburn 1984: 173)

What is interesting about Blackburn’s view on metaphor is that a speaker employs a metaphor as a “reliable method” for suggesting a belief or a view to a hearer but the speaker does not assert this belief by the use of the metaphor. When a speaker utters a literal statement like ‘Bert is strong’ he will be asserting the proposition that Bert is strong and he will be expressing his belief in that proposition. However, when a speaker utters the metaphor ‘Bert is a gorilla’, he will not be asserting the literal proposition that Bert is a gorilla, nor will he be expressing his belief in that proposition. But he will also not be asserting the paraphrasable content of the metaphor that Bert is strong. If he were to assert the paraphrasable content or the proposition that Bert is strong then one could evaluate the metaphor for truth vicariously via the truth-evaluation of the paraphrasable content. So, the questions of truth and assertion that could be raised in connection with metaphors do not arise in both directions – that is, the questions do not arise with respect to the metaphors themselves and their interpretations.

The view that the metaphor-maker does not express a belief by his metaphor has also been advanced by Davies (1984). For him, although the metaphor-maker does not express a belief by means of his metaphor, the metaphor can lead to the acquisition of beliefs on the part of the hearer. A metaphorical utterance can be regarded as a belief-inducing catalyst, that is, something that can cause one to form (true) beliefs about the subjects of the metaphor or about the insights one might be directed to experience. So, on his view, we have a metaphorical utterance that is itself not belief-produced or a substitute for any belief (on the part of the maker), but a belief-causing agent or phenomenon (to its hearer). He rejects the attempt to transfer the propositional content of the belief the metaphor leads one to possess to the metaphor itself. According to him:

[t]he appreciation of metaphor can and does lead to the acquisition of beliefs, but the propositional content of those beliefs is not stated anywhere and, in particular, it is not stated, not even indirectly, in the metaphors. The appreciation of metaphor provides the occasion for the acquisition of such beliefs, but metaphors are not bearers of the propositional content of those beliefs. (Davies 1984: 298)

His argument is that the beliefs acquired by the hearer are not stated directly in, or indirectly by the metaphor itself. As an expression of an experience, the evaluation of metaphor for truth, for Davies, is beside the point:

Because the metaphor is not used to assert a belief, its truth-value ceases to be important. An expression of an experience is more like a sophisticated exclamation – such as “How lovely” – than it is like a statement. (Davies 1984: 298)

The three claims and the views expressed by the authors discussed above illustrate both the positive and negative views of Metaphorical Expressivism. On the negative side, the expressivist chronicles certain failings of metaphors: metaphors fail as assertions, metaphors are not expressions of beliefs, metaphors do not state how things really are. By their not making claims that such-and-such is the case, metaphors fail to be assertions; by their inability to tell or state how things really are, they fail as utterances that are truth-apt; and in virtue of the fact that they neither express the beliefs of their makers nor state directly or indirectly the beliefs their hearers are led to form, they are not the sort of things that can be determined to be either true or false. On the positive side, metaphors are expressions of experiences
and emotions of their makers; they are proposals and suggestions their makers put across to effect certain emotions and beliefs in their hearers.

In denying that metaphors are assertions, a number of theorists, including some of those mentioned above, have adopted some descriptions in explaining the assertion-like nature of metaphors: Mack (1975) speaks of metaphors 'masquerading' as assertions; Walton (1990, 1993), Turbayne (1962), and Hills (1997) regard metaphors as examples of 'make-believe' involved in the business of pretense. Others, like Loewenberg (1975), Davies (1982), and Blackburn (1984) have resorted to the distinction between 'asserting that p' and 'saying that p' claiming that while a metaphor merely says that so-and-so, it does not assert that so-and-so. "An assertion makes a truth claim," writes Loewenberg, but "saying something" is much looser: it may even indicate nothing more than making a significant (i.e., meaningful) utterance" (p. 332). In this sense, she adds, "all metaphorical utterances 'say something'" because "they can all be given some interpretation" and also because they are all "purposeful utterances" (p. 332). Davies (1984) agrees with Loewenberg that a metaphorical sentence is used to "perform a saying, but not an assertion" (p. 79). He reasons in accord with Davidson (1978) that "in sincere assertion one aims at the truth; and, of course, metaphorical statements are apt to be (literally) false. But it does not follow that the metaphor producer says nothing at all: what he says is just what the sentence literally means" (p. 79). And in distinguishing the experience of seeing from believing a proposition, Davies (1982) contends that in uttering a metaphor, "the speaker aims at that which stands to see the world a certain way as truth stands to believing the world to be a certain way" (p. 79).3

3 These terms, 'saying,' 'asserting,' 'expressing,' and 'stating' that are used in discussions on propositions and assertions have varied interpretations and usages in the literature. I incur no substantive commitment to any one of them, and in the discussions here, they could be used interchangeable.

is to be understood as literal. But this assumption, I shall show below, is wrong. The half that is true about Claim II is that indeed metaphorical sentences do not state what is actually or really the case; but it does not follow from this observation that metaphors do not make truth-claims. The assumption at play in Claim II is that truth is to be understood in representational terms, that is, what is true is what represents or corresponds to states of affairs as they are. The problem here is that truth is understood in terms of literal truth-conditions and hence the view that metaphors do not meet this requirement of a representational literal truth-condition is untenable. The half that is true about Claim III is that the beliefs of speakers are often not stated directly in, or indirectly by, their metaphorical utterances; however, this observation is not peculiar to, or distinctive of, metaphorical utterances. A speaker can utter a literal sentence to cause his audience to acquire certain beliefs, probably the belief she holds, but her literal utterance need not express that belief for it to be an utterance that can be appraised for truth.4 The requirement for a metaphorical utterance to 'directly' express a belief or be a direct expression of a speaker's belief is an illegitimate one: if an utterance identified as a metaphor directly expresses a literal content or a belief that is unintended by its speaker then we cannot require the utterance to directly express a non-literal content or a speaker's belief.

Another half that is true about Claim III is that in making a metaphor, a speaker may be conveying a particular experience to his audience. But the half that is false here is the view that this evocation or conveyance of experience implies that the speaker is not expressing or asserting a belief. The cases of religious metaphors, for instance, blur the distinction between uttering a sentence to evince an experience and uttering a sentence to express or assert a belief. That is: religious practitioners use metaphors not only to convey their experiences but also to express their beliefs in the deities they worship. Consider Christian metaphors such as 'God is light,' 'The Lord is my shepherd,' 'God is love,' 'Christians are the salt of the earth,' 'The Lord is my rock and my refuge.' According to Meier et al (2007: 699),

"communication about the divine, however, is often done through metaphors that invoke physical characteristics... For example, God is referred to as 'the light of the world'... a 'father,...' whereas the Devil is referred to as the 'prince of darkness'... or as a 'serpent.' These metaphors are thought to exist because they allow people to communicate about what they cannot see, hear, taste, touch, or smell."

4 An example is a scenario that Searle (1969) describes of an American soldier captured by Italian troops and the soldier wanted the troops to believe that he is a German soldier and so he says that "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?"
They also write that "because we are sensory based creatures, we often use sense- 
ror-based metaphors to describe abstract concepts (i.e., concepts that do not have 
a concrete physicalistic basis)" (Meier et al. 2007: 700).

Two important points from their views are that one, religious practitioners talk 
about divine deities using metaphors, and two, religious practitioners use their 
metaphors to communicate things to others. Soksicke (1985) takes a stronger 
point of view, insisting that it is "not only possible but necessary that in our stam- 
mering after a transcendent God we must speak, for the most part, metaphorically 
or not at all" (p. 140). If religious practitioners talk about and express their beliefs 
in, and experiences with, divine beings by means of metaphors, then it seems 
plausible to suggest that the metaphors they employ are media for expressing those 
beliefs. This is why it is also possible to teach moral and religious lessons through 
the use of metaphors. The believer who employs a metaphor is not only attempting 
to cause his hearers to acquire certain beliefs, he is also expressing his belief; he 
is communicating his belief to his audience through his metaphorical utterances.

What motivates and informs the view that a metaphorical utterance fails as an 
assertion as posited in Claim I? Why should one suppose that a metaphorical 
utterance does not state what is actually the case, as posited in Claim II? Both 
Claims I and II reveal a tendency or commitment to two principles: literalism and 
representationalism. Literalism is an affirmation that sentences do not have any 
meaning, content or truth, other than their literal meanings, literal contents and 
literal truths. Hence, evaluating metaphorical sentences for truth, or considering 

5 Davidson's account of metaphor is typically a literalist one in this sense. Davidson's 
main claim (as he himself calls the 'thesis' of his paper) is that "metaphor means what 
the words, in their most literal interpretation mean, and nothing more" (1979: 30). 
Davidson's literalism acknowledges a distinction between the literal and metaphorical 
uses of language but claims that sentences can only have ordinary literal meaning and 
truth and that a distinction between 'the literal and the metaphorical does not entail 
that metaphorical sentences have 'special' meaning and truth in addition to their lit- 
eral senses and truth. What metaphors mean, and what their truth values are, are 
different from their assessment from a literal point of view. From his commitment 
to compositionality also, Davidson is of the view that the meaning of a sentence is deter- 
mined from the meanings of the individual words that compose it. If a metaphor can 
only be explained by appealing to the literal meanings of the words that compose it 
then for Davidson "sentences in which metaphors occur are true or false in a normal, 
literal way, for if the words in them don't have special meanings, sentences don't have 
special truth" (1979: 39). Combining his views on literalism and compositionality, 
Davidson's claim is that the words of a metaphorical sentence have no special mean- 
ings other than their ordinary literal meanings and hence the sentences they compose

6 I use the notion of 'representationalism' in this distinctive sense as the capacity of a 
sentence to represent or correspond to the world or states of affairs.

7 A paradigmatic example is Davidson. Davidson rejects both a correspondence theory 
of truth and a representational model for understanding truth. But Davidson's misgivings 
about the correspondence theory of truth is more to do with the notion of 'cor- 
respondence' than it is with the fact that truth depends on how the world is. He says 
in this place that: "correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture 
the thought that truth depends on how the world is, and this should be enough to discredit 
most epistemic and pragmatic theories" (2005: 16). It is important to point out that the 
issue about representation or correspondence to facts in the discussion of metaphor 
is not necessarily about whether the correspondence theory is an adequate theory 
of truth. Indeed, the Metaphorical Expressivist need not hold any particular view about 
thoughts of truth. If, in an important sense, depends on how the world is, then 
the Expressivist's contention is that metaphors are not truth-evaluable because they 
do not state how the world is.
assertion is literal and that the platitude that truth is the aim of assertion should be understood to mean that assertion aims at literal truth. The commitment to representationalism motivates Claim II – that metaphorical claims do not represent how things actually are in the world. This claim is a consequence of the more general view that there is a bifurcation between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of language and metaphor belongs to the non-descriptive uses of language. The commitment to both literalism and representationalism can further be used to provide an additional support for why metaphors should not be appraised in terms of truth: metaphor is akin to other cognitive and non-linguistic devices like symbols, models, and maps, but these non-linguistic devices are not evaluated for truth. In what follows, I shall argue that the general views that underlie Claims I and II of the Metaphorical Expressivist are untenable, and that the principles of literalism and representationalism which give expression to these views are not plausible.

3.1 Is Assertion Literal?

We recall from Loewenberg (1975) the reasoning that metaphorical utterances fail as assertions because when they are considered as assertions and ‘interpreted literally’ they are false, for assertions aim at truth; but speakers do not intend for their metaphorical utterances to be interpreted literally, and so they do not intend to make assertions with their metaphorical utterances. What underlines this reasoning is the view that what counts as an assertion is something literal, and the truth that an assertion aims at is the literal truth. And this is why a literal interpretation of a metaphor disqualifies the metaphor from being an assertion. At first glance, this reasoning is mistaken for one obvious reason. As it has been shown by Cohen (1975, 1976) and others, it is not a necessary condition for an utterance to be a metaphor that it is interpreted literally it has to be false. The cases of ‘twice-true’ metaphors, on Loewenberg’s account, will mean that such metaphors will be regarded as assertions since their literal interpretations render them literally true. And this in turn will mean that Loewenberg will have to admit that some metaphors succeed, rather than fail, to be assertions. This conclusion can only survive for a short while. What is more important is this: how should we construe the aims of speakers who employ these twice-true metaphors?

If literal truth is the aim of assertions, then one can suggest that the speaker who asserts a twice-true metaphor like ‘no man is an island’ aims at the literal truth. However, if the literal truth of the assertion of ‘no man is an island’ is the aim of the speaker, then the assertion ceases to be regarded as a metaphor. This will wrongly suggest that ‘no man is an island’ is either an assertion or a metaphor where it is an assertion when it is literally construed. It needs to be disentangled why the suggestion of the disjunction will be wrong. If we make ‘true on a literal interpretation’ the mark of an assertion, we risk considering all twice-true metaphors assertions. Most metaphors can be negated to yield being ‘true-on-a-literal-interpretation’, as for instance, ‘Juliet is not the sun’. On the other hand, if we make ‘aimed at literal truth’ the condition for assertion then there cannot be any metaphorical assertions simply because understanding utterances as metaphors presupposes some sort of overriding of their literal content. But then, this condition no longer becomes a condition for assertion but a condition for a literal assertion.

The worry that arises here is that, if the metaphorical utterance is not required to be interpreted literally, and the speaker of a metaphor does not intend her utterance to be construed or interpreted literally, then why is it required that the metaphor be aimed at literal truth to count as an assertion? The condition ‘aimed-at-literal-truth’ is apt and relevant only in light of the condition ‘true-on-a-literal-interpretation’ or when a literal construal is appropriate. One cannot provide literal conditions – in terms of aims and interpretations – and insist that metaphors meet these conditions, all the while insisting also that metaphors should not be construed literally. It will be wrong then to suggest that metaphors conversational context, but it will still be an assertion alright. In the same way, an utterance that flouts or contravenes a Gricean maxim does not imply that the utterance cannot count as an assertion. Loewenberg could admit that twice-true metaphors are assertions on the basis that they are true on their literal interpretation but insist that these are just minor and rare cases of metaphors and that since most metaphors are literally false a general account of metaphors must eschew the notion of assertion. However, this line of argument is not persuasive. Twice-true metaphors are not special cases of metaphors for by the tool of negation many literally false metaphors such as ‘life is a bed of roses’ can be turned into a twice-true metaphor ‘life is not a bed of roses’.

8 More explicitly, the underlying assumption is that it is impossible to assert anything other than the literal content of one’s utterance, and analogously, it is impossible to express a truth except with a literal interpretation.

9 Loewenberg could argue that all metaphorical utterances fail as assertions because they are either obviously false or perhaps contravene some Gricean maxims. But this argument will be flawed since the obviousness of an utterance does not mean that it cannot be an assertion even if it is a false one. In a conversation, an utterance that is obvious may not add anything to the conversational score or serve as update to the
of the participants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is presupposed” (p. 86); and that “to make an assertion is to reduce the context set in a particular way”: Bach and Harnish (1979) and Recanati (1987), following Grice have developed accounts of assertion that involve the beliefs and intentions of speakers in a communicative discourse.

The ‘commitment’ accounts of assertion take a social approach to assertion and explain assertions as involving social and epistemic commitments on the part of the speaker of an assertive sentence. For these accounts asserting that p is to be committed to the truth or belief that p, and to be responsible for providing reasons or justification for p when challenged. Notable accounts include that of Brandom (1983, 1994), Wright (1992), Searle (1969), MacFarlane (2011), Ellis (1990), Williams (2002).

Now, on these broad accounts of the nature of assertions, it is neutral to an assertion whether it is literal or metaphorical. For instance, on the commitment account whereby to make an assertion is to undertake certain commitments and to license others to draw certain inferences from the utterance made, a metaphorical utterance can constitute an assertion or be asserted in so far as the speaker undertakes certain commitments and licenses others to do so. Similarly, if the making of an assertion involves reducing or adding to the context set in a conversation, then the making of a metaphor could count as an assertion in this way. This fact that on a broader account of the nature of assertion metaphors can count as assertions is a minor point here. The main points are that: (1) a broader understanding of the nature of assertion does not rule in favour of the fact that assertion is literal; indeed, what counts as an assertion is indifferent to whether it is literal or metaphorical; (2) the relationship between truth and assertion should be couched within a broader framework of what counts as an assertion. The challenge to Loewenberg and others who favour a literalist account of assertion is that they need to ground their bias for the literal on a view of assertion rather than on a conception of meaning like Davidson's account of metaphors. For, utterances have meanings – and there can be disagreements as to whether they possess metaphorical meanings in addition to their literal meanings – but whether the making of those utterances constitute assertions should be based on a theory of what counts as an assertion and not the kind of meaning it is supposed to possess. The Expressivist proceeds from an account of meaning and uses that account to justify whether an utterance constitutes an assertion or not. The suggestion I am motivating here is that the question of what counts as an assertion

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11 Cappelen (2011) presents an alternative view that he refers to as the “No-Assertion” view where he argues that, by analogy with kissing and driving, assertion is a non-normative activity. According to him, assertion is not essentially constitutive of norms that make it unique from an ordinary notion of 'saying that', and that assertion can be 'evaluated by contextually variable norms, none of them constitutive' of the speech act of assertion.

12 Pagin (2004) has argued that assertion is not social in this sense.
can be answered independently from a prior conception of meaning. And if this is a correct possibility, then the Metaphorical Expressivist is challenged to provide an account of assertion like the ones briefly explained above that eliminates the metaphors. As far as the main (and varied accounts) of assertion given in the literature goes, these accounts do not eliminate metaphors from being assertions in virtue of their meanings.

This second point is crucial. How could the platitude that ‘truth is the aim of assertion’ be given expression on the commitment account of assertion? In undertaking the commitment to justify and provide reasons for an assertion when challenged, the speaker thereby commits herself to the truth of her assertion. The assertion being aimed at truth is then not construed in terms of literal truth or in terms of matters of fact in the world. The aim at truth is reflected in both the logical and non-logical commitments that the speaker undertakes in endorsing and justifying his assertion. This is the way I suggest that the connection between truth and assertion be understood when it comes to metaphors. A metaphorical utterance can count as an assertion when in the making of it the speaker commits herself to its truth and becomes responsible for endorsing and justifying it when it is challenged. In this way, the speaker of the metaphor is not concerned with whether the metaphorical assertion is true (or false) on a literal interpretation or whether it was aimed at stating a literal truth. The reasons and justifications that the speaker provides for his metaphor are not intended to address the literal interpretations of the metaphor, for the challenge to a metaphor does not arise because of its literal construction.

So, the claim that metaphors fail to be assertions is unjustified. This claim assumes that an assertion is literal and the aim of an assertion is literal truth. These assumptions seem inapt in reference to twice-true metaphors; and these assumptions cannot serve as appropriate conditions for being an assertion. A broader understanding of the nature of assertion which gives expression to the view that truth is the aim of assertion reveals that metaphors can be assertions, and their speakers in asserting them, commit themselves to their truth and to their justifications and endorsements.

3.2 Descriptive and Non-Descriptive Uses of Language

“Can a metaphorical statement ever reveal how things are?” asks Max Black (1993: 38). Black prefers the linguistic locution ‘how things are’ in his question to the more familiar way of asking the same (or a similar) question under the rubric of ‘truth’ such as ‘can metaphorical statements be true?’ Black’s preference for this locution is evidenced in both his distaste for ascribing truth to metaphors and in his affirmative answer to the question he posed. He thinks that the evaluative terms, ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’, properly belong to fact-stating uses of language, and that this ascription of the semantic notion of truth to the fact-stating statements of language is intimately tied in with other semantic and epistemic concepts like ‘evidence’, ‘belief’ ‘contradiction’ and ‘knowledge’. To illustrate with one of his examples, when one hears the metaphor

(1) Nixon is an image surrounding a vacuum

it will be inappropriate to ask the following questions: “Are you perhaps lying?, ’What’s your evidence?, ’How do you know?” (Black 1993: 38). The inappropriateness of these questions is due to his view that metaphorical statements are not fact-stating, and hence, unless these are merely rhetorical questions, we cannot fathom the sense in which we could provide answers to them. Whereas one can assign truth and falsity to a fact-stating statement like ‘Nixon was a shopkeeper’ and seek to adduce evidence for such a claim, one cannot do so for the metaphor. In view of this, Black contends that it will be a “violation of philosophical grammar to assign truth or falsity to strong metaphors” (1993: 39). Nonetheless, our unbridled tenacity to say things like ‘how true’ and ‘that’s true’ in response to the metaphor in (1) above, according to Black, can be explained in terms of our recognition of the fact that the metaphor, in addition to its aesthetic effect, really does say something (p. 39).

So, despite his aversion to the assignment of truth to metaphorical statements, Black thinks that metaphors can reveal how things are.” Two questions rear their heads here: What is this something that the metaphor says? What is this how-things-are? that the metaphor is supposed to reveal? Black’s brief response13 to the first question, in reference to the metaphor in (1) is that Nixon is “indeed what he is metaphorically said to be” (p. 39). But this response is uninformative. We began with the view that (1) is a metaphor, which by Black’s characterization, is a peculiar use of language distinct from a fact-stating use of language, and yet states something. How else will it be a metaphorical statement? Presumably, what a metaphor states, then, is not a fact – it is not something we can give evidence for, it is not something we can claim to be either true or false – but to say that what a metaphor states is simply what it states begs the question.

Indeed, the notion of truth is related to other notions like justification and knowledge; it is also related to other terms like evidence and facts. And often

13 Black did not specifically pose these two questions and offer responses to them. But his remarks can be construed as offering responses to the questions I have posed.
these other notions and terms are discussed and understood in terms of truth, and vice versa. But the issue of the truth-evaluability of a statement is more of a semantic issue, and the inquiry is to do with whether certain statements or uses of language should be appraised for truth. Philosophers have been concerned with the truth-value of conditional statements, mathematico-statements, statements in the future tense, statements whose referential subjects do not exist, etc. A conditional statement can be either true or false but the ascription of a truth-value to a conditional statement is independent of whatever facts it might purport to express. Similarly, a mathematical statement is either true or false but the debate among nominalists, realists, and anti-realists about mathematical statements is to do with whether mathematical statements state facts and the nature of those facts. Fact-stating is not the determinant of the truth-value of a mathematical statement and the proofs we construct to show the validity of mathematical statements implies that such statements are true. The point is that, whether in the case of mathematics or metaphors, the stating of facts does not determine the truth-evaluability of mathematical and metaphorical statements. The relationship between fact-stating and truth-evaluability is not that the first determines the second. One who argues from the non-fact-stating status of metaphors to their truth-evaluability already assumes a realist position and casts the debate in terms of whether true statements express facts or correspond to certain facts in the world. But the question of the truth-evaluability of metaphors need not be raised solely from a realist point of view.\footnote{I concede that mathematical realists who make fact-stating the core issue of the truth-evaluability of mathematical statements will disagree with many of the things I have said in this paragraph, but their disagreements with my claims here will not take away the import of what I have attempted to articulate here.}

Black's distinction here between fact-stating statements and metaphors mimics the bifurcation thesis in the expressivist tradition between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of declarative sentences (Blackburn 1998; Price 2013). Blackburn (1998), for instance, suggests that metaphors are non-truth-evaluable because they are non-descriptive uses of language:

Fiction is an interesting example, in that the natural thing to say, at least about writing fiction (as opposed to reporting on established fictions), is that the (atomic) sentences written do not deserve to be called true or false because the author's intention is not to describe the real world, at least in terms of the names employed or the events represented as having happened. But that gives the obvious opening for the expressivist to insist that the same is true, for instance, of simple expressions of emotion or attitude, even when these have indicative form. Yet another pertinent example will be acceptance or rejection of metaphors. These are typically couched in indicative sentences, certainly governed by norms of appropriateness, found in complex embeddings, yet certainly not intended or evaluated as straightforward cases of truths or falsehoods. This is how the expressivist says it is in more controversial examples, such as commitment to conditional, moral, modal, or other claims. These may illustrate dispositions to bad movements of thought or bad attitudes. (Blackburn 1998: 159)

Blackburn contends that simple expressions of emotions or attitudes and fiction can be couched in indicative form, but they do not deserve to be called true or false because the intention of their speakers, in using them, is not to describe anything about the real world. These sentences do not have descriptive content despite their being governed by norms and their occurrence in complex embeddings. In the case of fiction, the sentences do not represent anything that has happened in the actual or real world. And in the case of metaphors, speakers do not intend to describe anything in the world when they use metaphors. Hence, if truth-evaluation is applied to descriptive uses of language then metaphors, in general, are not assessed for truth.

The distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of language may be useful to the view that there are certain kinds of expressions that are not evaluated for truth despite their apparent syntactic forms. However, the view that metaphors belong to only the non-descriptive arm of the distinction is unsatisfactory. Metaphors can be descriptive of their subjects and states of affairs in the world and speakers can intend them as such; if they can be used both descriptively and non-descriptively, then the distinction is of no significance to the case of metaphors. Let us suppose that Black's 'Nixon is an image surrounding a vacuum' is a non-descriptive use of metaphor. Consider a case of a very obvious metaphor that was used in the wake of the arrest of the Sicilian Mafia, Salvatore Riina, in 1993 as reported by Alan Cowell: "His brother Gaetano, who went to Palermo's Palace of Justice today to arrange legal help for Mr. Riina, spoke briefly to reporters. 'My brother is a gentleman,' he told them. 'You are vultures.'\footnote{Alan Cowell, "Captured Mafia Leader's Hometown Rejoices, Then Worries", The New York Times, January 17, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/17/world/captured-mafia-leader-s-hometown-rejoices-then-worries.html Accessed 13 July 2016.}" Does Gaetano intend to describe something true or false of the reporters by his use of 'you are vultures'? It appears so. The question of whether the reporters are really vultures should be understood as asking about whether, metaphorically speaking, they are vultures. This way, the issue about whether he is describing or referring to them as the animal vultures does not arise. In this example, the speaker is doing more than merely evincing an attitude or expressing an emotion — the speaker is saying...
something descriptively about the reporters and intends his audience to construe him as doing so. If this and other cases of metaphors count as descriptive uses of language where their speakers intend them as such, then metaphorical uses of language can belong to both the descriptive and non-descriptive arms of the dichotomy. And if this is the case, then the distinction is of no significance to metaphors, and as such, it cannot be used to deny the truth-valuation of metaphors.

The distinction between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of language is grounded in the intentions of speakers and so metaphors are said to be non-descriptive because their speakers do not intend to describe anything about the world. But how do we determine the intentions of speakers in using a bit of language or a metaphor? The intentions of speakers in using metaphors can be determined both by the context in which metaphors are used and the kinds of things that speakers do in using metaphors. In terms of context, metaphorical sentences appearing in works of fiction, for instance, will be used non-descriptively because the sentences in fiction do not describe things in the actual world. The kinds of things speakers do in using metaphors, however, more importantly, reveal the sort of intentions they have; that is, the intentions of speakers are made manifest in the things they do with their utterances. These things to a large extent determine the descriptive content and the truth-valuation status of their utterances. Speakers are able to use metaphors in disagreements and as premises and conclusions in arguments; they are able to provide reasons and justifications for their metaphors; they are also able to draw inferences and conclusions from their metaphors.

Consider this example from Shakespeare:

**MENENIUS**: The senators of Rome are this good belly, And you the mutinous members; for, examine Their counsels and their cares: digest things rightly Touching the weal o' the common; you shall find No public benefit which you receive But it proceeds or comes from them to you, And no way from yourselves.--What do you think, You, the great toe of this assembly? **FIRST CITIZEN**: I the great toe? why the great toe? **MENENIUS**: For that, being one o' the lowest, basest, poorest, Of this most wise rebellion, thou go'st foremost: Thou rascal, that art worst in blood to run, Lead'st first to win some vantage. -- But make you ready your stuff bats and clubs: Rome and her rats are at the point of battle; The one side must have bale. . . .

*Coriolanus, Act 1 Scene 1*

This example illustrates the kinds of commitments that speakers of metaphors bring to bear in the use of metaphors. What Menenius is doing in the second speech is to justify why the First Citizen is the great toe of the assembly. Menenius makes a claim in the first speech, his audience demands an explanation or justification for the claim, and Menenius in the second speech, explains the claim, or elaborates on the claim, or justifies the claim. This is akin to what pertains in the making of assertions. The commitment to endorse and justify a metaphorical utterance that this example illustrates give credence to the view that the speakers metaphorical utterance is a descriptive use of language. Surely, if speakers do not intend to say or describe something, if they do not intend to state that such-and-such is the case, then they will not be committed to endorsing, justifying, and withdrawing their metaphors. But because they often engage in these practices, they sometimes use metaphors both descriptively and non-descriptively.

### 3.3 Metaphor and Other Non-Linguistic Devices

The distinction between fact-stating sentences and metaphors or that between descriptive and non-descriptive uses of metaphor considered above is a paradigmatic symptom of an underlying disposition to treat specifically, the metaphorical, and more generally, the figurative, in purely instrumental terms. Metaphor is seen as a 'device' (cognitive and/or linguistic), an 'instrument' or a 'tool' within language use. Seen as a device, the relevant questions regarding the metaphorical become questions about what they are used for, what they are good for. In relation to these *instrumental*-goal-oriented questions, we develop instrumental-knowledge techniques for the proper usage of this tool called metaphor. In one vein, this instrumental perspective of metaphor leads us to focus on the effects we can achieve by the use of metaphors and the causal explanations for our using them. In another vein, couching the use of metaphors in instrumental terms enables us to compare and classify metaphors among other linguistic devices like indexicality, modality, probability; and we compare and categorize metaphors in the same boat with other declarative statements like mathematical and ethical statements. But crucially, we treat metaphors on a par with other non-linguistic devices like maps, charts, graphs and pictures. And when we are not too charitable we relegate metaphors to the order of unfamiliar noises, birdsongs, and jokes.

Once we have this instrumental mentality towards metaphor, our concern becomes what we can, and cannot, do with the device of metaphor -- or rather, what the device itself can, and cannot, do or achieve. Alas, the distinctions and the limitations of the tool are hereby drawn: Is metaphor a linguistic or a conceptual device? Is metaphor a fact-stating or a non-fact-stating linguistic device?
This instrumental perspective on metaphor often leads us to view the device of metaphor as a telescope or microscope— a mediating device. Let us call this device a metascope. The concern now becomes what can we see through this metascope? Can this device reveal ‘how things are’? Can this device make us see (and know) the area, is projected onto the map, the representational device. That is, there is a representational relation between the represented (object), the area, and the representation, the map.

Is this the relation that obtains when metaphor is construed as a device? For one thing, a correct or accurate map is only correct or accurate of something, perhaps, of a particular geographical terrain. We can draw fictitious or imaginative maps, but we cannot properly speak of such maps as correct (or incorrect) or accurate (or inaccurate), though we can talk of them as representing a certain terrain even if there is no such terrain. A map is correct or accurate only in virtue of what it actually depicts; hence, the cartographer starts his drawing from the standpoint of an already perceived reality. But not necessarily so with the metaphor-maker: ‘correctness’ and ‘accuracy’ are not the stock-in-trade evaluative terms that the metaphor-maker is concerned with, and so she need not worry about what a metaphor is correct or accurate of. This is because, unlike the cartographer, she need not start her metaphor-making from the standpoint of an already perceived reality. In fact, rather than aiming to make her marks reflect or depict the object of representation, she often aims at casting the object in a new and different light. Rather than revealing or showing ‘what is there’ or ‘how things are’, the metaphor-maker can obscure ‘what is there’, and the metaphor-maker can bring to light what is unnoticed and unrevealed. The projects of the cartographer and the metaphor-maker are different, and the ‘devices’ they each use have different purposes; that of the cartographer, if she is not being deceptive, is to represent ‘what is there’ with his device, the map. The above-mentioned disanalogies between metaphors and maps are apt to show that (1) metaphors and maps may be similar in certain respects but they differ in terms of how we appraise or evaluate them; (2) the evaluation of maps in terms of their being correct or accurate of something in the world stems from their being representations, for the very nature of representations is marked by their being representations of something, but metaphorical utterances are not representations of; and because they are not representations of; they cannot be supposed to reveal things in the world.

The discussion of the disanalogies between metaphors and maps is to highlight an explanatory approach that conceives of metaphors in representational terms to argue for the conclusion that metaphors do not really represent states of affairs in the world and hence they should not be appraised for truth. When metaphor is construed as a lens or device, our attention is then directed towards a representational mode of talk; we begin to question and reflect on what a metaphor is able to make us see, and then we inquire further about whether what the metaphor enables us to see corresponds to the facts or reality itself. If we claim
that the metaphorical device reveals the facts, then we pose epistemic questions about the evidence and justification for that revelation. On this approach, once it becomes apparent that the things metaphors reveal cannot be verified or confirmed empirically, the inquirer retreats and recasts the supposed revelation in non-truth-evaluative non-epistemic terms so that the initial questions about the truth-evaluable status of metaphors either become misplaced or irrelevant.

Similarly, once the inquirer hits a rock when she construes metaphors as cognitive statements that are truth-evaluable, she reworks her theory and construes metaphors as cognitive devices like maps and models, and then cast her evaluative terms in tandem with the evaluative terms applicable to cognitive devices like maps. That is, she construes metaphors in representational terms akin to pictorial representations. The problem with this approach to understanding metaphor is not that metaphors are not in an important sense like maps and pictorial representations; the problem is not that we shouldn't understand metaphors in instrumental terms as cognitive devices; the problem rather is that we tend to understand metaphors only in instrumental terms, and then we use the instrumentality of metaphor (what it is used for, what it makes us see) as the basis for proscribing metaphors from the court of truth. A related approach is to ban metaphors from truth-making discourses and then explain the use of metaphors as part of a theory of manipulation, or the making of invitations, or the putting forth proposals. However, the understanding of metaphor in instrumental terms does not preclude our understanding of metaphors among truth-evaluable, information-conveying, and fact-stating uses of language. Metaphors can be seen as classed among cognitive devices or invitations or proposals, and be evaluated for truth. Similarly, the expressivist may be right in thinking of metaphors as the expression of experience or emotions, but thinking of metaphors in experiential terms does not precluded it from being considered as information-conveying assertions.

4 Conclusion

Metaphorical Expressivists contend that truth does not matter to metaphors because metaphorical utterances are not expressions of beliefs or assertions. The analytical strategy pursued in this paper in response to the claims of Metaphorical Expressivism is to show that these claims acquire their force from, and are grounded in, certain assumptions about assertions and metaphors. These assumptions are that assertion is literal, that metaphors are non-descriptive uses of language, and that metaphors are similar to other cognitive devices which are not appraised in terms of truth. If these assumptions hold then metaphorical utterances cannot be couched in terms of truth. I have attempted to show that these assumptions and claims are not persuasive, and that: (1) truth's connection with assertion does not imply that assertion is literal; (2) metaphors belong to both descriptive and non-descriptive uses of language, and hence the dichotomy between the two uses is not significant to show that truth does not matter to metaphors; (3) the issue of the appraisal of metaphors in terms of truth is biased against metaphorical truth when the issue is couched in representational terms.

References


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**Chance, Explanation and Interpretation**

**Abstract**: Two contrasting theses are presented: (1) Literary works generated by chance cannot be given interpretations which reflect the causal background (for instance, authorial intentions) of the work. (2) Almost all literary interpretations are set in an explanatory perspective. The two theses are not contradictory if we assume that literature generated by chance constitutes a very small part of the class of literary works. Thesis 2 does not entail the claim that interpretations explain anything, only that interpretations are fit to be integrated into causal explanations that mirror the contents of the interpretations. The key to this fitness is the concept of simplicity as used in the philosophy of science. However, it is argued that in general, interpreters of literature try to apply their readings to circumstances outside the explanatory perspective. Thus, even if literature made by chance is not considered, interpreting literature involves more than explanation.

**Keywords**: literary interpretation, chance, explanation, application, simplicity, strength, specification

**0 Introduction**

We, students of literature of all ages and levels, make efforts to produce literary interpretations and analyses worth reading. We aspire to present something that is “valid” or “right”, or at least not wide off the mark. However, more often than not, we have difficulty in clarifying what makes our reading better than some other conflicting alternative. We may argue by pointing to obvious features of the text, to well-known facts about the author and about the broader historical context of the work, but we also know that other features and other facts may be called upon to support alternative interpretations. Still, we often stick to our reading, but with no strong rational arguments. We may in the end retreat to the declaration that this is “my interpretation”, or this is an interpretation made from a certain perspective, with no strong reasons why my reading is preferable to any other reading, or why this perspective should be used rather than another one, resulting in another interpretation.

This situation seems to call for philosophical consultations: What does it mean to say a literary interpretation is valid or true or correct? However, there is no general agreement among literary scholars or philosophers of literature or