Epistemic Reparations and the Right to Be Known

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The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995 to investigate human rights violations that took place under apartheid. The mandate of the Commission was to investigate and record gross abuses of human rights during 1960 and 1994, to offer reparation and rehabilitation to victims, and, when appropriate, to grant amnesty to perpetrators. While being interviewed by the TRC, one victim, Lucas Baba Sikwepere, recounted having been shot multiple times by an apartheid-era police officer, which led to multiple bullets being lodged in his neck and face, causing blindness and severe headaches. When the commissioner asked, “How do you feel, Baba, about coming here to tell your story?” Sikwepere responded, “I feel what has been making me sick all the time is the fact that I couldn’t tell my story. But now I—it feels like I got my sight back by coming here and telling you the story.”

Of course, Sikwepere did not literally regain his sight by testifying to the TRC; instead, he is communicating that something powerful or transformative occurred through the act of telling his story. But notice: “telling” is here being understood not only as distinctively interpersonal, but also as a success term. It is clear that Sikwepere would not have had the experience he had if he told his story with no listener or if the audience members ignored him. He didn’t want to just utter words into the void—he needed to be listened to and heard by other people. Otherwise put, Sikwepere needed to be known in order to feel “like [he] got [his] sight back.” As Daniel Philpott writes in the context of discussing truth commissions, “acknowledgment is knowledge—victims’ suffering comes to light.”
This is not an uncommon experience. The act of telling and being heard, especially after suffering gross violations or injustice, reflects a deep human desire for many. In describing his experience as a commissioner for the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, for instance, Thomas Buergenthal writes:

Many of the people who came to the Commission to tell what happened to them or to their relatives and friends had not done so before. For some, ten years or more had gone by in silence and pent-up anger. Finally, someone listened to them, and there would be a record of what they had endured. They came by the thousands, still afraid and not a little skeptical, and they talked, many for the first time. One could not listen to them without recognizing that the mere act of telling what had happened was a healing emotional release, and that they were more interested in recounting their story and being heard than in retribution.

Again, “telling” here is crucially being understood as involving uptake by other people. Indeed, what is clearly the aim in both of these cases is being heard or known by others, not the mere reporting of words. But there is another dimension to highlight: being listened to is not purely instrumental in these cases. Rather, it is an end itself. To be sure, reporting gross violations and injustices is often a means to the end of preventing these same abuses from happening to others in the future, or educating the public about atrocities, and so on. In the above passages, however, the victims in question are highlighting the need or wish to be known as independent from these other aims.

This is not unique to cases of human rights violations. Lewis “Jim” Fogle served thirty-four years for the 1976 murder and rape of a fifteen-year-old girl in Pennsylvania, Deann Katherine Long. The conviction was based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant and, in 2014, DNA testing done by the Pennsylvania Innocence Project excluded Fogle as the contributor of the male DNA found at the scene. Despite the fact that Fogle was both released from prison and exonerated in 2015, there is something else that he wants: “I want people to know the truth about my case.” Knowing the truth about his case is to know the truth about him—that he did not take the life of Long and is thus not a murderer and rapist. In other words, even after the external injustices of incarceration and wrongful conviction have been reversed, there is a further desire that Fogle has—to be known. This is a familiar reaction. When people are the subject of lies, false accusations, or wrongful judgments, we often
hear them say that they want to “set the record straight,” or “get their story out there,” or have people “know what really happened.” Even when there are no monetary, legal, or social consequences, this desire to be known often lingers.

Moreover, the desire to be known is not restricted to the intrapersonal case. The recent deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade, and other Black Americans at the hands of police violence have ignited a global reckoning with the systemic racism of America’s criminal legal system. “Say Their Names” is a common cry among those protesting America’s pernicious investment in policing, criminalization, and incarceration. This call to say the names of the victims, however, is not a call to simply utter words or to shout a refrain. It is, rather, to do something epistemic—to know the victims, to remember them, and to bear witness to them. It matters not just that we know that there are victims of police violence, but that we know them. Being known, then, is important at both the intrapersonal and interpersonal level.

In this paper, I provide the first extended discussion in the philosophical literature of the epistemic significance of this phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that I argue are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know,” I argue that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their own experiences. I show how such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible, vilified or demonized, or systematically distorted, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature, such as memorialization and education, I argue that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. I conclude by sketching an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs.

1. BEING KNOWN

Being known is a distinctively interpersonal phenomenon, as it involves the one who knows and the one who is being known. It is also factive—one cannot know what is false, and so if you are known by another, this involves the person having at least some true beliefs about you. Within
this framework, however, being known can be construed in a number of different ways.

First, you may be known in the sense of achieving popularity or fame. This notion of being known involves a lot of people knowing who you are, and may be realized along a variety of dimensions, such as by having celebrity status or in terms of the number of Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram followers you have. Second, you may be known in the sense of having intimacy. This way of being known involves others knowing who you are in a deep and meaningful way and may be determined by feeling truly understood or appreciated by another. Third, others may simply know particular facts about you, and so you may be known in the sense of being accurately represented. This sense of being known can be achieved fairly superficially by others knowing your name, occupation, favorite restaurant, and so on.

None of these seem to be exactly what is at work in the above cases. Sure, we might understand Sikwepere, the victims from El Salvador, and Fogle desiring to be known in all three of these ways: they may want fame, especially in light of how they suffered; they may want to have relationships where they are truly understood; and they may want others to know facts about their lives, such as the violence and injustice they experienced. But there seems to be something else that they desire that goes beyond all of this—namely, for the members of their communities to see or hear them and to bear witness to their injustices.

We are all powerfully aware that we are seen by others. In her discussion of reputation, Gloria Origgi writes, “[e]very social interaction brings forth an evaluative dimension of reciprocal judgement, a perception of who we are that we leave in the eyes of others. Every social interaction brings forth also a mastery of this presentation of ourselves, a consciousness of the image of ourselves we want to leave track of through our behavior.” Indeed, according to the influential “looking-glass self” theory developed by sociologist Charles Horton Cooley in 1902, our conception of self is formed as a reflection of the responses and evaluations of others in our environment. If this is true, then who we are is fundamentally shaped by how we think we appear to those around us.

Around the same time as Cooley, W. E. B. Du Bois writes in The Souls of Black Folk: “It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.” But it is crucial that Du Bois is not discussing here a universal or equally shared experience:
One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost. He does not wish to Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He wouldn’t bleach his Negro blood in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face.12

In contrast to Cooley, Du Bois argues that the racist and unjust structure of the United States forces Black Americans to see themselves through the eyes of others in a way that it does not for whites.

Relatedly, neither the benefits of being seen by others, nor the burden of doing the seeing, is equally distributed among members of our communities. James Baldwin makes this point vivid when he says, “I have spent most of my life, after all, watching white people and outwitting them, so that I might survive.”13 In a similar spirit, in discussing the work of David Roediger, Charles Mills highlights “the fundamental epistemic asymmetry between typical white views of blacks and typical black views of whites: these are not cognizers linked by a reciprocal ignorance but rather groups whose respective privilege and subordination tend to produce self-deception, bad faith, evasion, and misrepresentation, on the one hand, and more veridical perceptions, on the other hand.”14 Mills continues: “Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced to become lay anthropologists, studying the strange culture, customs, and mind-set of the ‘white tribe’ that has such frightening power over them, that in certain time periods can even determine their life or death on a whim.”15

There are, then, at least three points that emerge here. First, our selves are powerfully shaped by how we think we are seen by others and, thus, interpersonal relations are fundamental to our identities. Second, being seen or known is not an equally distributed good—those with less power are often seen or known far less than those with more. Third, the labor involved in doing the seeing and knowing is not equally shared
among members of communities, as those in relative positions of powerlessness frequently need to know those who have power in order to navigate the world around them, but those in power can often avoid this epistemic work. Let us now turn to a closer look at these phenomena of being known, and knowing, with a particular focus on their normative dimensions.

2. THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE RIGHT TO BE KNOWN

In 1997, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights issued a report addressing the impunity of perpetrators of civil and political human rights violations. In particular, the report sets forth three principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action that combats impunity: the “right to know”; the “right to justice”; and the “right to reparation.” Let’s focus here on the first of these, which is characterized as follows:

This is not simply the right of any individual victim or his nearest and dearest to know what happened, a right to the truth. The right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the future.¹⁶

The knowledge in question in this report involves the occurrence, causes, circumstances, and perpetrators of gross human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law. The right to know these facts is both individual and collective, and the bearers of these rights are victims, their families, and communities, “society,” or “a people.”

In 2005, the United Nations released an update to the principles to combat impunity in which the right to know was fleshed out in greater detail, along with the corresponding duties on the part of states or governments. According to this report, victims and their families have the “impresscriptible right to know the truth about the circumstances in which violations took place and, in the event of death or disappearance, the victims’ fate.”¹⁷ In addition, the report holds that it is an “inalienable” right of “every people” to know about the perpetration and circumstances surrounding heinous crimes. These two aspects of the report concern rights-bearers and the nature of the rights, but there are also corresponding duties of the states or governments in question. In particular, there is the “duty to preserve memory,” which involves (i) the preservation of archives and other evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and (ii) the facilitation of knowledge
of these violations, including protecting the collective memory from extinction and guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist views. Finally, there is the duty “to give effect to the right to know,” which includes ensuring an independent and effective operation of the judiciary along with access to the archives regarding human rights violations.

For my purposes in this paper, this framework is powerful not only for what it includes, but also for what it leaves out. Let’s start with the former. There are at least four features that emerge from this UN report that I want to highlight. First, possessing certain kinds of knowledge is a right that belongs to individuals and communities. This is significant, as the more common rights we hear about are moral or political, such as to life, liberty, bodily autonomy, the pursuit of happiness, property, freedom of speech, and so on. Second, and related, there can be a right to something distinctively epistemic in nature. It is quite rare for discourse on rights to focus on epistemic goods, such as knowledge, truth, evidence, and so on. One of the most frequent occurrences is in legal settings where there are laws that mandate the sharing of evidence. For instance, the Brady rule requires prosecutors to disclose with the defense materially exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession. We might say, then, that it is a right of defendants to have something epistemic—the State’s exculpatory evidence. But this is a legal right that depends on the context of the rights-bearer in question and can be repealed, modified, or restrained by other human laws. This brings us to the third feature: the UN is here talking about “inalienable” natural rights that involve not just the sharing of evidence, but the transmission of knowledge. The idea is that there are natural epistemic rights, not dependent on law, culture, or government, that cannot be repealed. Finally, these rights are connected to gross violations and injustices, often perpetrated by states, governments, or groups. In particular, those most directly impacted by the violation or injustice in question, such as the victims, family members, and communities, have the right to the corresponding knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge is specific—it regards the occurrence, causes, circumstances, and perpetrators of gross human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law.

Absent from this picture, however, is another dimension of rights and duties that is arguably just as significant as those highlighted in the UN report: the right to be known and the corresponding duty to see, hear, and bear witness—to know.

The right to know involves a knower and a proposition or propositions and thus need not be interpersonal. For instance, it can be fulfilled by
making available, even through video footage impersonally captured, certain facts or truths, with only the broader story involving other people, such as the testimony of victims and perpetrators, the judiciary, the State, archivists, and so on. In contrast, the right to be known is an overtly interpersonal phenomenon. Given that it doesn’t make sense to be known by an impersonal object, being known requires at least two persons at the most fundamental level—the knower and the one being known.

The right to know has the corresponding duty to tell. Since people have a right to know about gross human rights violations, for instance, the State has a responsibility to do things to enable the creation, preservation, and transmission of knowledge. Here there is the implicature of at least partial ignorance on the part of those most harmed. That is, victims, their families, and communities have a right to know about gross human rights violations, so the State has the duty to investigate, remember, and archive so as to uncover and make available what really happened and who was involved. Since victims, their families, and communities are typically singled out as special bearers of this right, the idea is that there are truths to which they do not have access, and it is the responsibility of the State to make sure they are informed.

The right to be known, in contrast, has the corresponding duty to hear or know. It is not just that people have a right to know what happened to victims in certain contexts; it is also that these victims themselves have a right to be seen and heard—to have their stories be given proper uptake. There is no implicature here of ignorance on the part of the victim; they do not need to be given access to truths or facts. Instead, they need to be able to be givers of knowledge, and this requires the listening of others.

Of course, when the UN talks about the right to know, there is a sense in which listening to victims and their families is included. We cannot know all of the details of what really happened regarding human rights violations without the testimony of those most impacted by the crimes. However, listening to the victims is only one way to fulfill the rights of those who are ignorant. As stated, if a complete picture of a breach of international human law could be preserved and made available without talking to a single victim, there would be no violation of rights. Otherwise put, hearing the stories of victims on the view found in these UN reports is a means to a different epistemic end—fulfilling the rights of individuals and communities to know. On my view, hearing the testimony of victims is an end itself.
What I want to suggest, then, is this: the UN’s framework for understanding the right to know can be crucially expanded to include the right to be known. As with the right to know, the right to be known can belong to individuals and to collectives or “a people.” A single victim of gross injustice might possess this right, but so, too, can a group of people, such as South Africans during apartheid. The right to be known is a distinctively epistemic right that arises out of gross violations and injustices, often perpetrated by states, governments, or groups. On my view, while this right might be connected to human rights violations, it need not be. The case of Fogle discussed at the start of this paper, for instance, is one in which he suffered a gross miscarriage of justice perpetrated by the State. I want to argue that Fogle still has the right to be known, despite it not being a paradigmatic human rights violation. Indeed, the gross violations and injustice need not be the result of State-involvement on my view in order for victims to have the right to be known. Consider the case of Larry Nassar, the USA Gymnastics national team doctor and osteopathic physician at Michigan State University who sexually abused 332 gymnasts. Even if Nassar, USA Gymnastics, and Michigan State are the primary bearers of responsibility for these gross violations—and not the State—the victims still have the right to be known.

When there is a gross violation or injustice of this sort, the wrong done to the victim, as well as the fracturing within the community, has distinctively epistemic dimensions. Let’s take a closer look at the case of Fogle: not only was he convicted of murder and incarcerated for decades, he was also denied a voice in the epistemic community. He was doubted, silenced, and forbidden from playing a credible role in his own defense. Because of this, he was not heard or listened to and, thus, he was not seen for who he is. Instead, he was falsely believed to be a liar, a rapist, and a murder. The community both failed to know who he was and believed him to be something altogether different—someone who is a pariah in the community and is alien to Fogle himself. Justice for Fogle involves not only release from prison, exoneration, and financial compensation, but also repairing his fractured relationship within the epistemic community. We need to hear him, believe him, and see him for who he truly is, not as the person presented to us by the State. We need, that is, to know him.

3. EPISTEMIC REPARATIONS

According to Margaret Urban Walker, “reparations are intentionally reparative actions in the form of goods . . . given to those wronged
by parties who acknowledge responsibility for wrongs and whose reparative actions are intended to redress those wrongs.” It is standard to divide reparations into those that offer a benefit to *individuals* and to those that offer a benefit to *collectives or communities* who have been wronged. In addition, reparations are usually understood as being either *material* or *symbolic*, involving, for instance, monetary payments, health and social services, and restitution of property, on the one hand, and public apologies and memorials, on the other. Thus, reparations involve actions made to acknowledge and redress wrongs to individuals or collectives in the form of material or symbolic goods. Martha Minow invokes the ideal of “restorative justice” to understand reparations: the goal of reparations is to repair injustice, or to “make up for” it, and to implement future changes to correct the injustice.

What are the aims of reparations? Different answers are offered to this question, none of which exclude the others, but Walker (2010) notes that they fall into three categories: legal/political, psychosocial, and moral. Legal and political aims include making victims whole, “measures that seek to reestablish the victim’s status quo ante,” such as the restoration of citizenship and liberty, the “reinstatement of job and benefits,” and the “restitution of property”; ensuring public status and recognition; and “the formation or the restoration of trust among citizens.” Second, psychosocial goals include relieving suffering, distress, anger, powerlessness, and the sense of violation experienced by victims and their family members. In the context of discussing Native American reparations, for instance, Rebecca Tsosie writes:

There is . . . an intangible, psychological component [to reparations]. At a minimum, it is important to emphasize the humanity of victim and offender, to repair social connections and instill a sense of peace rather than ongoing conflict. There is an emphasis on healing. For example, victims need to move beyond a sense of powerlessness . . . .

Finally, moral factors include recognizing and restoring the dignity of victims and reaffirming or reestablishing the moral order of a community. As Debra Satz writes:

Consider the example of reparations paid to victims of the Holocaust and their descendants. Jews who were sent to concentration camps were robbed of many goods, but this is hardly the worst of the injustices they suffered. The outright denial of their most basic
human rights, the fact that they were treated worse than animals, the cruelty and humiliation they suffered, the rapes, beatings, and forced labor—these were more serious than the theft of material goods.  

While many discussions of reparations focus on material goods, Satz is here highlighting the importance of the moral domain in which measures need to be taken to recognize not only the dignity and moral worth of victims, but also their standing and role as members of the moral community.

I want to argue, however, that there is a crucial dimension missing from the discussions of reparations: the epistemic. We are members of an epistemic community in addition to a legal/political and moral community. We are not just agents in a political and moral sense, but also an epistemic one. We have epistemic duties distinct from our legal and moral obligations. We can be wronged not only legally/politically, psychologically, and morally, but also epistemically.

There are at least two ways in which a victim of a gross violation or injustice suffers distinctively epistemic wrongs and, as a result, deserves epistemic reparations. First, there are downstream epistemic wrongs that are familiar in the epistemological literature, such as having one’s testimony systematically dismissed, ignored, rejected, or swamped. In Fogle’s case, for instance, his statements about his own innocence, and the evidence in support of this, were ignored for decades and by people at every stage of the criminal legal system, including investigators, prosecutors, juries, and judges. This is quite a common epistemic wrong suffered by members of marginalized or targeted communities, especially when they are reporting facts about their own experiences that run counter to the narrative of those in power. Having one’s testimony treated in this way then gives rise to further epistemic wrongs, such as having lower status within the community, being denied opportunities for making epistemic contributions, not having trusting relationships, and so on.

Second, and more important for our purposes, there are the immediate epistemic wrongs involved in not being known. While these wrongs have been less prevalent in epistemological discussions, they are often even more powerful than the first ones. Let’s divide these epistemic wrongs into those concerning invisibility, vilification and demonization, and systematic distortion.
In Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man*, for instance, the narrator discusses how white people “refuse to see me. . . . When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.” Invisibility is one way of not being known—if I don’t have any relevant beliefs about you because you are invisible to me, especially *as a person*, then *ipso facto* I don’t know you. There are, of course, different kinds or degrees of invisibility. **Targeted invisibility** involves knowing some facts about a person, but lacking relevant beliefs in particular domains, especially ones that are important to the person, such as *qua* co-worker, political participant, member of the moral community, and so on. **Complete invisibility** involves lacking beliefs about a person *qua* person, which is often found in cases of the dehumanization of a racial or ethnic group during times of mass genocide.

To make the kind of epistemic wrong involved in invisibility vivid, let’s compare it with testimonial injustice, where a hearer affords less credibility to a speaker than the evidence supports because of a prejudice about the speaker’s social identity. For instance, if a male scientist regards a female coworker as less reliable than the men in the lab simply because he is sexist and she is a woman, then she is the victim of testimonial injustice. But now suppose that, because of his sexism, the male scientist simply doesn’t form any beliefs at all about his female coworker’s reliability, as he takes her to lie entirely outside the realm of the scientific community. The problem here is not that she is afforded a credibility deficit, even a massive one, but that she is not regarded as the proper subject of such an evaluation in the first place. More precisely, during the peak of the Rwandan genocide, the problem wasn’t that Tutsis were regarded as less credible than the evidence dictated, but that they weren’t even credibility-bearers in the first place. Language of “cockroaches” and “snakes” is telling: we don’t call insects and reptiles untrustworthy or unreliable. The idea of evaluating them for credibility just doesn’t even arise. They are, that is, entirely erased from the epistemic community.

In addition to invisibility, not being known can involve vilification and demonization. Instead of not at all seeing someone or a particular
dimension of her, this epistemic wrong involves replacing the image of the person in question with an inaccurate and vilified or demonized version. In the case of Fogle, for instance, it is not that he was invisible to investigators, prosecutors, and the judge/jury, but that he was regarded as a liar and, thus, as a murderer and rapist of a child. He was regarded as a person, and was afforded credibility assessments, but was turned into an epistemic and moral degenerate. This sort of epistemic harm is widespread in the United States where Black Americans are systematically represented and treated as “criminals” or “thugs.” In this sense, they are not invisible at all, for it is not that they are erased from consciousness, but massively overrepresented in inaccurate and vilified ways. Image upon image of especially young Black men depicts them in handcuffs, or in the back of police cars, or behind bars. The criminalization of Black Americans, both in representation and in over-policing and over-incarcerating, is thus not only a political and moral wrong, but an epistemic one, too.

A third sense of not being known is powerfully captured in Audre Lorde’s discussion of the struggle that Black women face in public narratives: “It’s not that we haven’t always been here, since there was a here. It is that the letters of our names have been scrambled when they were not totally erased, and our fingerprints upon the handles of history have been called the random brushing of birds.” Lorde is here drawing our attention to a way in which Black women are not known, not through erasure or demonization, but through systematic distortion. Black women’s experiences are often misunderstood, their identities are misrepresented, and their contributions are misattributed. In her *Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America*, for instance, Melissa Harris-Perry discusses “Jezebel’s sexual lasciviousness,” “Mammy’s devotion,” and “Sapphire’s outspoken anger,” as persistent stereotypes of Black women in the United States. Even if these stereotypes are not all vilified or demonized, they reduce the rich and complex lives of Black women to a one-dimensional distortion. Of course, there is a sense in which every single one of us is distorted in the eyes of someone or other. A one-off interaction at a grocery store, for instance, can lead a cashier to falsely believe that you are a rude or impatient person when in fact you are simply having a very bad day. But clearly this is a far cry from the way in which Black women are treated in just about every corner of their lives. This is why I emphasize “systematic” in the discussion of distortion. It is not that a one-off distortion cannot inflict an epistemic wrong on another; rather, it is that the depth and widespread occurrence of systematic distortion prevents those who are victimized from being properly recognized as members of the epistemic community.
To appreciate at a deeper level how not being known in one of these three ways wrongs a person epistemically, let’s return to some of the thoughts at the start of this paper. Recall Cooley’s claim that how we think we are seen by others shapes who we in fact are. Even if we don’t accept this “looking-glass self” theory in its entirety, regarding ourselves as invisible, demonized, or systematically distorted by other members of our community will very likely have a metaphysical impact on who we in fact become. If, for instance, I think that those in my community regard me as worthless, I may embrace it or overcompensate for it. Cooley’s view is a sociological one about the way our identifies are in fact formed, but Hilde Lindemann (2016) argues that there are powerful moral connections between narratives that others have about us and our own identities. She writes:

We are initiated into personhood through interactions with other persons, and we simultaneously develop and maintain personal identities through interactions with others who hold us in our identities. This holding can be done well or badly. Done well, it supports an individual in the creation and maintenance of a personal identity that allows her to flourish personally and in her interactions with others. Done badly, we hold people in invidious, destructive narratives. Some such narratives identify the social group to which someone belongs as socially and morally inferior, and in that way the stories uphold abusive power relations between “us” and “them.”

Lindemann’s notion of holding is instructive here: when we hold others well—in accurate and healthy narratives—we allow the development of their personal identities and the formation of flourishing relationships. When we hold others badly—in inaccurate and harmful narratives—we stunt the creation of their personal identities and either prevent positive relationships or promote violating and abusive ones. Given this, we are normatively called upon to not only avoid having destructive narratives about others, but also to have healthy ones. Indeed, on Cooley’s and Lindemann’s views, failure to do so can literally create a reality that reflects the invisible, vilified and demonized, or systematically distorted narratives we have about others, as the identities of victims will be shaped by our beliefs about them.

Moreover, being known is an epistemic good, and doing the knowing is epistemic labor. When these goods and labor are distributed within communities in massively unequal ways, epistemic wrongs are inflicted. This is particularly powerful as a comparative phenomenon: when
whites are generally seen and heard and known, and Black people are not, then whites have positions within the epistemic community that are illegitimately denied to Black people. When Black people have to do so much seeing and hearing and knowing in order to navigate spaces that were designed by whites for whites, they are unfairly burdened with epistemic labor that whites can avoid.

It is important to also note that these epistemic wrongs can be intergenerational. Just as descendants may inherit wealth or property, they may also inherit an erased, vilified, or distorted history. In Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustice, Janna Thompson writes:

> when a nation is dispossessed, this is not only a great evil to existing members; it harms their successors, robbing them of the inheritance to which they are entitled, and by so doing disrupts their ability to carry on their common life. Nothing but the return of their national territory counts as appropriate reparation for this wrong.43

Thompson is here talking about the inheritance of land, but we can extend her thoughts to the realm of the epistemic. Descendants of Black Americans, for instance, inherit not just the material consequences of slavery and Jim Crow, but also the epistemic ones. They are given a history replete with erasure, vilification, and distortion, one where Black Americans are either absent from the narrative, criminalized and presented as dangerous and violent, or misrepresented as sexually lascivious, angry, and so on. But even at the individual level, the intergenerational impact of the failure to be known can be powerful. Without knowing Fogle, for instance, his children and grandchildren are handed a public story in which their father and grandfather is a murderer and rapist. No matter how many times he personally tells them the truth, the public would have a vilified and demonized picture of him that would be preserved in the history of their family and community.

Just as victims of gross violations and injustice inherit an erased, demonized, or distorted history, so, too, are benefits that result from them—and the corresponding responsibility—intergenerational. As Ta-Nehisi Coates writes:

> One cannot escape the question [of reparations] by hand-waving at the past, disavowing the acts of one’s ancestors, nor by citing a recent date of ancestral
immigration. The last slaveholder has been dead for a very long time. The last soldier to endure Valley Forge has been dead much longer. To proudly claim the veteran and disown the slaveholder is patriotism à la carte. A nation outlives its generations.44

Those who profit from the oppression and abuse of others pass down the privilege, power, and benefits that result from the relevant institutions and acts to their descendants. For instance, Black Americans descend from a history of slavery, Jim Crow, convict leasing, and mass incarceration, but so, too, do white Americans inherit a legacy of white supremacy. We cannot embrace and celebrate some parts of our past while disavowing and distancing ourselves from others. In this way, America needs to reckon with the full scope of its history and we, as Americans, need to acknowledge and address our roles within this inherited past.

At this point, we have seen that when victims of gross violations or injustices are not known in one of three senses—in terms of invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion—there is the infliction of epistemic wrongs on some people by others, thereby resulting in a fracturing within the epistemic community. I now want to show that this is where epistemic reparations are needed.45

Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the nature of these reparations, let me highlight the role of the epistemic in this framework. I have argued that the right to know, the duty to hear or know, and the wrongs that result from the failure to fulfill this right all include distinctively epistemic dimensions. Of course, this doesn’t mean that there cannot be other normative dimensions that are relevant, such as legal, political, moral, and so on. Instead, it is to say that the epistemic plays an ineliminable role in the overall normative picture. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the good in question is knowledge, and so the right to be known is the right for an epistemic good. If an argument were made that one has a right to dignity, and dignity is a moral good, then morality is a crucial part of the normative story. Here is another way to make this point: Suppose that I stole an extremely valuable work of art from you. The force of the wrongness of my action might be moral, but the aesthetic properties are still a crucial part of the normative story. I cannot, that is, fully capture the wrong done to you without including the aesthetic value of your loss. The same is true of the epistemic features at work here. Even if the force of the right or the duty were purely moral, the fact that the good in question is epistemic is still a critical feature of the normative picture. However, the epistemic
also plays a role in terms of the right and the duty to know, and so this is where the second point comes in. As I mentioned earlier, in cases of gross violation or injustice, there are distinctively epistemic fractures that occur within the epistemic community. Being invisible in whole or in part, being vilified or demonized, or being systematically distorted erases or banishes people from the epistemic community. They are denied the status of epistemic personhood and, in so doing, they are prevented from fully exercising their epistemic agency. They cannot engage in the giving and receiving of knowledge, including about their own identities, and they cannot enter into trusting relationships.

In cases of gross violations or injustices that involve not being known due to invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion, distinctively epistemic reparations are needed. On my view, reparations are epistemic when the goods and the wrongs in question are epistemic. More precisely,

Epistemic Reparations are intentionally reparative actions in the form of epistemic goods given to those epistemically wronged by parties who acknowledge these wrongs and whose reparative actions are intended to redress them.

Traditional symbolic reparations often involve distinctively epistemic goods without identifying them as such. For instance, between 1972 and 1991, over 120 people, predominantly Black, were tortured under the command of notorious Chicago Police Department Commander Jon Burge. In May of 2015, Chicago became the first city in the United States to provide reparations for racially motivated police violence when the Chicago City Council unanimously passed the Reparations Ordinance. While the ordinance includes material reparations, such as a reparations fund for victims, it also crucially involves distinctively epistemic reparations. In particular, the ordinance includes a formal apology from the mayor and city council of Chicago for the torture inflicted on victims; a permanent public memorial acknowledging the torture; and inclusion of a lesson on the Burge torture cases in the Chicago Public Schools’ eighth- and tenth-grade US history curriculum.

These are specific instances of three general categories of reparations that are epistemic in nature: (1) public apologies, (2) memorialization, and (3) education. (1)–(3) are all clearly connected to our earlier discussion of the right to know. Communities and future generations have a right to know about gross violations and injustices inflicted upon them and their community members, especially those perpetrated by the State. Public
apologies, memorials of various kinds, and education aim to achieve these ends. Moreover, it is absolutely crucial that we acknowledge the distinctively epistemic dimension of theses reparations. Victims and their communities need to be made whole, not just materially, legally/politically, psychologically, and morally, but epistemically as well. They need the wrongs to be acknowledged, they need to be told the truth, they need to know what happened, and they need to have an accurate history documented and remembered, not only for themselves, but for future generations. Indeed, in many cases, other kinds of reparations are dependent on the epistemic ones. Legal reparations cannot be pursued, for instance, without the parties in question knowing the relevant facts; victims might not be able to psychologically heal without knowing the truth, and so on.

But there is a prior, and just as important, epistemic reparation—*the right to be known*. Before we can properly acknowledge and apologize, memorialize, and educate, we need to listen and bear witness. We need to know victims, not as a means to the ends of fulfilling the right of others to know, but as the end itself.

Consider this: Rahm Emanuel, who was mayor of Chicago when the Reparations Ordinance was passed, could have satisfied (1)–(3) above without ever bearing witness to the suffering of the victims themselves. He could have asked low-level staff to draft and read the apology, he could appoint an outside committee to create the memorial, and he could have Chicago Public School educators create the curriculum about the torture survivors. All of this could be accomplished with Emanuel himself, and all of his high-level staff members, never having met a Burge torture survivor or family member and knowing virtually nothing about them in general. In this way, knowing victims in the sense of bearing witness to them and their harm is an *additional* epistemic reparation that is needed in cases of gross violations and injustices. Sure, we typically cannot satisfy (1)–(3) without at least someone listening to the stories of victims and their family members. But there are at least three reasons why it is crucial that we recognize the failure to be known as an independent epistemic wrong and being known as a separate epistemic reparation. First, as I argued earlier, not being known due to invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion inflicts unique epistemic wrongs on victims, and reparative actions need to be taken to specifically redress the wrongs. If, for instance, we could apologize to, or memorialize, victims without listening to them or bearing witness to their suffering, they would still not be made epistemically whole. Second, many—perhaps even most—victims of gross violations and injustice will never receive a public apology from an official body or
be memorialized or be the subject of a school curriculum. However, bearing witness is something that can be offered to all victims to varying degrees. Third, and closely related, just as gross violations and injustices can be inflicted upon both individuals and communities so, too, can reparations be undertaken by both individuals and groups. Even when the State or an official body is not willing or able to undertake (1)–(3), we as individual members of the community can. We can all listen, center the voices of victims, provide platforms for them, share their stories on social media, and so on.

As I mentioned earlier, the right to know picks out a relationship between a person and a proposition, whereas the right to be known involves at least two persons—the person knowing and the person being known. But there is a further contrast worth highlighting. With the right to know, it doesn’t matter how the knowledge is made available, just that it is. The proposition in question can be conveyed through interviews, books, memorials, and so on. Crucially, however, there is no restriction placed on the source of the knowledge. In principle, then, the right to know about gross violations and injustices can be satisfied without ever listening to a single victim or family member of these abuses. In contrast, the right to be known needs to have what I will call a proximate source. A proximate source in the sense relevant here is a source of knowledge sufficiently close to the victim. Even more precisely, when we are coming to know a victim who has suffered a gross violation or injustice, a proximate source of this knowledge is one that is sufficiently close to this victim. If a victim is alive, for instance, then she, or her designated spokesperson, might be the proximate source. If a victim has died, such as George Floyd, then the proximate source might be his family members and friends. If a victim has been long deceased, such as a person who was enslaved in America, and there are no recorded testimonials from her, then the proximate source might be her descendants, community members, and so on. There will clearly be variety in what counts as “sufficiently close” to the victim, depending on circumstances and context, but what is crucial is that it matters not just that the person is known, but also how that person is known. More precisely, victims need be known through a proximate source.

But why? Why can’t propositions about victims simply be conveyed in any way that serves the relevant practical ends best without attention paid to the source of the knowledge?49 There are at least three reasons why proximate sources are critical in the context of epistemic reparations. First, proximate sources have epistemic power. Bryan Stevenson famously argues that justice requires “getting proximate” to people who are suffering because they understand the problems of injustice in a
direct way and thus possess a critical perspective regarding not only the ills of our society, but also their possible solutions. As he says, “In brokenness you understand something about compassion. . . . It is the broken [who] understand the way justice really needs to work. It is the broken who understand why we need mercy. It is the broken [who] can show us how we make our commitment to justice actionable.” Stevenson is here suggesting that experiences of violation and suffering often afford one with epistemic insight. If you experience incarceration firsthand, you almost certainly will have an understanding of the carceral system that I lack. This is why it is essential that, in addition to books by social scientists, lawyers, and other scholars about mass incarceration, we need to include the voices and perspective of those directly impacted. We cannot know what incarceration is like, or the effects it has on people and communities, without listening to those who are or have been incarcerated. In this way, proximate sources often have an understanding of the relevant violations and injustices that arises because of either their lived experiences or their closeness to those with these experiences.

Second, proximate sources often possess epistemic authority about themselves and their own suffering. If I know about a gross violation you suffered only because I was told about it from you, and there is a disagreement about the details, we should defer to you rather than to me. This is because you are better epistemically positioned than I am: you can answer additional questions, flesh out details, recall specific memories, recount experiences, and so on. While those close to victims, such as family members and friends, might not have the same degree of epistemic authority as the victims themselves, they almost certainly will be better positioned than strangers. Generally speaking, then, those who are closest to injustices—either the victims themselves or those most connected to them—will have epistemic authority when conveying knowledge about who they are.

Third, in addition to the epistemic power of proximate sources, there is also a question of epistemic equity. When we are urged to center the voices of those most harmed or wronged by our social institutions, this is not just a moral request; it is also an appeal to provide space within the epistemic community for those who have been systematically erased or distorted within it. Indeed, it would inflict further epistemic wrongs on those who are unjustly invisible to render them visible only by lifting up the voices of those already in positions of power or privilege. Consider, for instance, a recent symposium in the Journal of Political Philosophy devoted to the Black Lives Matter movement that failed to have a single paper authored by a philosopher of color. Attention to Black
lives, without hearing from a single Black voice, fails along a number of dimensions, at least one of which is with respect to epistemic equity. This is because epistemic equity demands the inclusion of proximate sources.

I have argued that there are epistemic wrongs that result from not being known owing to invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion, and that distinctively epistemic reparations are called for in such cases. Just as we need to take political, legal, and moral measures that seek to reestablish victims’ status quo ante, such as the restoration of citizenship or the reinstatement of benefits, so, too, do we need to take epistemic measures. We need to know victims—we need to “say their names.” Indeed, it is often only through knowing victims that we can provide additional epistemic reparations, such as rendering them visible, repairing their epistemic status, providing restitution of epistemic identity, ensuring public status and recognition, memorializing, forming or restoring trust among community members, and so on.

I should note that I have focused on three ways of not being known that demand epistemic reparations when there are gross violations or injustices—invisibility, vilification and demonization, and systematic distortion. These are sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for epistemic reparations. In other words, while these ways of not being known capture some of the most widespread and prevalent ways of being epistemically wronged, I leave open the possibility that there are others that similarly demand epistemic reparations.

One objection that might be raised to the view developed here is this: some victims might not want to be known. After suffering trauma and exploitation, for instance, some people might want to move on with their lives and not be the focus of any attention at all. So how do we reconcile the right to be known with the right to privacy? By way of response, notice that, as with other rights, the right to be known can be waived. I have the right to bodily integrity and others have the duty to respect this, but I can waive this right when, for instance, I consent to get my hair cut. When I waive this right, I release my stylist from the corresponding duty to not touch me. Similarly, while victims of gross violations or injustices who have been epistemically wronged in the relevant ways have the right to be known, they can waive this right when, for instance, they prefer privacy or anonymity. In such cases, others are released from the corresponding duty to know the victims. Of course, rights are not always respected, and there are countless cases where victims have been further violated by unwanted publicity. But this is a problem with
people failing to respect the rights of others rather than with anything inherent to my view.

Let’s now turn to a closer look at the epistemology underlying the framework of epistemic reparations being defended here.

4. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

The standard view of epistemic duties includes what I call the doxastic thesis: epistemic duties concern only what we ought to believe, and thus their domain is strictly doxastic. For instance, Chase Wrenn says that “Epistemic duties are doxastic duties that are grounded in purely epistemic considerations, such as what evidence one has.” Given this, the typical strategy for arguing that there are no epistemic duties is to show that there are no propositions that we ought to believe. Wrenn makes this point clear when, in summarizing arguments against epistemic duties put forth by William Alston and Alvin Plantinga, he writes:

if it is truly one’s duty to X, one must have voluntary control over whether or not one X-es. People do not have voluntary control over whether or not they believe something. Therefore, it is never one’s duty (not) to believe something. Epistemic duties pertain to what one believes, and so there are no epistemic duties.

In a similar spirit, Mark Nelson states the plan for his (2010) paper titled “We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties” as follows: “I think that we have negative epistemic duties, but no positive epistemic duties. There are things that we ought not to believe, but there is nothing that we ought to believe, on purely epistemic grounds.”

The thesis that epistemic duties concern only what we ought to believe is so widely accepted that it is frequently presented without any direct argument on its behalf. A central assumption at work here is that the realm of action is governed by moral duties, and so any normative pressure to do something is ultimately moral rather than epistemic. Support for this can be found in the classic characterization of evidentialism from Conee and Feldman, according to which, “Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t.” Evidentialism is a paradigmatic instance of what Sarah Moss calls “time-slice epistemology,” where the core thesis of such a view is that “what is rationally permissible or
obligatory for you at some time is entirely determined by what mental states you are in at that time. This supervenience claim governs facts about the rationality of your actions, as well as the rationality of your full beliefs and your degreed belief states.” Moreover, according to Moss, there is an important connection between time-slice epistemology and the view that “all fundamental norms of rationality are temporally local.” This is clearly true of the evidentialism of Conee and Feldman, which endorses a temporally local version of epistemic duties where one’s epistemic obligations are exhausted by temporally local facts.

But this view is challenged by even some of the most ordinary epistemic demands. Consider the following: suppose that a racist claims to have epistemically justified racist beliefs on the grounds that the very limited amount of cherrypicked information he is exposed to supports them. This is because he actively insulates himself from conflicting evidence, surrounds himself with like-minded racists, carefully curates his news consumption so that it reflects his already existing views, and so on. Surely, the racist’s beliefs here are not only false but unjustified.

To develop this point in greater detail, note that it is standardly agreed across even deep epistemological differences that justification is incompatible with the presence of undefeated defeaters. The first kind is what we might call psychological defeaters, which can be either rebutting or undercutting. A psychological defeater is a doubt or belief that is had by S and indicates that S’s belief that \( p \) is either false (i.e., rebutting) or unreliably formed or sustained (i.e., undercutting). Defeaters in this sense function by virtue of being had by S, regardless of their truth-value or epistemic status. But what cases like the self-insulating racist show is that psychological defeaters aren’t enough because you cannot get off the epistemic hook by simply failing to expose yourself to evidence you should have. This would have the consequence that the person whose racism is so pernicious that he won’t even put himself in situations where his beliefs might be challenged ends up epistemically in the clear precisely because of this insulation. Here is another example: a police detective has enough evidence to justifiably believe that the innocent suspect in question is guilty of the murder, but only because he fails to follow up on leads that he knows might challenge his theory. Again, this is overtly epistemically problematic behavior.

This is why, in addition to psychological defeaters, we should grant that normative defeaters are also incompatible with justified belief. Whereas psychological defeaters are concerned with counterevidence you in fact possess, their normative counterpart focuses on counterevidence you ought to have. More precisely, a normative defeater, which can also be
either rebutting or undercutting, is a doubt or belief that S ought to have and indicates that S’s belief that p is either false (i.e., rebutting) or unreliably formed or sustained (i.e., undercutting). Defeaters in this sense function by virtue of being doubts or beliefs that S should have (whether or not S does have them). Normative defeaters fly in the face of time-slice epistemology by virtue of making epistemic justification a matter, not only of one’s mental states at a given time, but also of the mental states one should have at a time. The epistemic duties in question here go beyond the evidence that is represented in the hearer’s present psychology and thus are temporally non-local.

Now, it might be objected that the evidentialist can accommodate these sorts of cases by arguing that the subjects in fact have relevant evidence that can capture the epistemic deficiencies in question. In particular, they have evidence that there is evidence that should have been gathered, and this provides them with a defeater for the target beliefs without needing to invoke the concept of normative defeat. For instance, it might be said that the reason the racist is still on the epistemic hook in the above case is that he has evidence that there is evidence that he should have acquired; namely, despite the fact that he holds racist beliefs, he knows that there is counterevidence that he is ignoring. In this way, he has evidence that he should have more evidence concerning his views about the members of underrepresented groups.

But this response does not work when people make life choices that severely restrict the evidence in their possession and, thus, aren’t aware of all of the relevant consequences that follow from their choices. When white supremacists are surrounded by only sources that support their preferred racist views, they might be so insulated that they are unaware that there is in fact specific evidence that they have failed to gather. Of course, in a broad sense they might be aware that there is evidence “out there” that conflicts with their beliefs. But surely this isn’t sufficient for their having evidence that there is evidence that they should have since this is arguably true of each one of us. I know right now that there is evidence “out there” that conflicts with many of my beliefs, yet this by itself doesn’t prevent them from being justified. If it did, there would be very little knowledge of any kind. What we think is the problem with the racist beliefs of the white supremacists is that there is evidence they should gather, regardless of whether they are aware that it exists. When the white supremacist says, “I had no idea that there was evidence that challenged my beliefs of white supremacy,” this might mean that he lacked the higher-order evidence, but it does not render his beliefs free from normative defeat. This is why evidence that one should have
cannot be fully captured by evidence that one in fact has, even when higher-order evidence of the sort considered here is factored in.

What all of this shows is that even at the most basic level of appropriate sensitivity to evidence, epistemic duties go beyond what we believe to include what we do. Normative defeat doesn’t just capture a failure to believe in accordance with the evidence; it also extends to a failure to collect, or expose ourselves to, evidence that we ought to have. The police detective who comfortably sits with his belief in the guilt of his suspect is not disregarding evidence that he has but, rather, is failing to follow up on leads. This involves actions, not beliefs. He ought to inquire into other possibilities, interview potential witnesses, pursue other suspects, consult with experts, and so on.

Once we see that epistemic duties include actions in addition to beliefs, and that we are obligated to move beyond the evidence we currently have to evidence we ought to have, we have the beginning of a framework for thinking through epistemic reparations. When victims of gross violations or injustices have been epistemically wronged through invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion, they have the epistemic right to be known for who they truly are. This, in turn, brings with it the duty for others to know the victims as an epistemic reparation, which requires doing things. For instance, knowing victims involves seeking out their stories, bearing witness to them, inquiring, listening, committing what they say to memory, and so on. It also demands that we go beyond the evidence currently in our possession to acquire evidence that we should have. This is true not only when there are leads that we should follow up on, as with the detective, but also simply as members of both a social and an epistemic community. This is one of the lessons of Gilbert Harman’s famous “newspaper case” in which Jill reads that the president has been assassinated in the newspaper but fails to see a false retraction that is televised in order to avoid a coup. Even though the president in fact was assassinated, Harman invites us to accept his verdict that Jill does not know this because, as a member of a social community, she should know about the retraction. Regardless of whether one fully agrees with Harman here, it surely is the case that there are things we are expected to know as members of the social world. It is, for instance, expected that a person who is not in highly unusual circumstances at the present moment will know about COVID-19 or that an average American knows about the murder of George Floyd. These are very current examples, but there is a seemingly endless list of such facts, including many about other people. For instance, we should know that Black Americans are the victims of racism, that the Holocaust targeted Jews, that there was a genocide in Rwanda, and so on. As
social creatures, then, we ought to know about the world we live in, including the gross violations and injustices inflicted upon members of our communities.

But surely, it may be objected, we cannot all know about all of the gross violations and injustices in the world, or even in our own communities. There are, unfortunately, too many of them, too few hours in the day, too many demands on us, and so on. Following criticisms to utilitarianism, we might call this the over-demandingness constraint—just as there is said to be a “limit to how great a sacrifice morality . . . can legitimately demand of agents,” so, too, there is a limit to how great a sacrifice epistemology can legitimately demand of agents. For instance, in the same way that it is too much to expect me to donate nearly all of my income to the poor, despite the fact that this would bring about much good, it is also too much to demand that I personally know about all of the gross violations and injustices perpetrated against those around me.

This is surely correct, and while a full discussion of this issue lies outside the scope of this paper, I will end by gesturing toward a response. Just as there are both perfect and imperfect moral duties, so, too, there can be both perfect and imperfect epistemic duties. At the heart of the notion of an imperfect duty—paradigmatically including charity, mercy, gratitude, beneficence, and the like on the moral side—is the idea that discretion and latitude are allowed in their fulfillment. Charity, for instance, might require that I donate to the poor, but it doesn’t specify to whom or how much. I may fulfill this duty by sending $200 to Oxfam every month or by sending $500 to Habitat for Humanity twice per year. Contrast this with the classic perfect duty of promise-keeping, where there is no discretion or latitude regarding how I satisfy it. If I promise to visit Rose in the hospital on Tuesday, then I have a duty to do just this. It won’t do to instead visit George in the hospital on Tuesday, or to visit Rose at home on Thursday. Indeed, this leads some to understand imperfect duties as being disjunctive in nature. Unlike my duty to keep my promise, which has the form of the duty to do act X, my duty to donate to the poor has the form of the duty to do act <X or Y or Z>. But regardless of whether imperfect duties admit of such a disjunctive explanation, the key point is that there is latitude in their satisfaction.

The sense in which each of us should know about gross violations and injustices in our communities, then, can be understood as an imperfect epistemic duty. Of course, this doesn’t mean that there aren’t some events or persons about which every member of the social world ought to know. Perhaps slavery in the United States, the Holocaust, and Nelson Mandela fall into this category. Similarly, this view is compatible
with there being some facts or persons about which every member of a particular community ought to know. For instance, perhaps every American who is socially connected ought to know about the murder of George Floyd. In this way, perfect duties can exist alongside imperfect duties in both the moral and the epistemic realms. What is crucial for our purposes, however, is that there is a seemingly endless number of gross violations and injustices across the globe and each one of us cannot be epistemically obligated to know every victim involved in each of them. But just as the imperfect duty of charity does not obligate us to monetarily contribute to every worthwhile group or organization, so, too, does the imperfect epistemic duty of knowing such victims permit latitude. To be sure, each of us needs to do our share. We each need to listen and bear witness to some who have been horribly wronged, and we need to do what we can to center and uplift their voices. And, collectively, we need to do everything in our epistemic power to ensure that no victim of atrocities is left invisible, vilified or demonized, or systematically distorted. However, the framework of imperfect epistemic duties provides space for there to be the duty to know victims of gross violation and injustices while not succumbing to worries of over-demandingness.

While there remains much work to be done here, I’ve shown that there is room for expansion within the traditional epistemological picture to accommodate the right to be known, the duty to know, and epistemic reparations. Appreciating that epistemic duties can govern actions, that we can be obligated to go beyond the evidence we currently have in our possession, and that epistemic duties can be imperfect in nature, we see that we have the theoretical resources for understanding how we are obligated to know victims of gross violations and injustices.

5. CONCLUSION

Let’s return to the voices of those who opened this paper. When Sikwepere, the victims from El Salvador, and Fogle express a desire to be known, and when those who are protesting the systemic racism of policing in America cry out to “say their names,” it is crucial that we see the true normative force at work here. These are not expressions of mere personal preferences or demands to simply utter words. Rather, these are statements of powerful and legitimate epistemic claims being made by, or on behalf of, those who have suffered serious wrongs. In this paper, I provided some first steps for understanding the nature of these claims. Those who suffer gross violations and injustices that result in invisibility, vilification and demonization, or systematic distortion have
been epistemically wronged and have the epistemic right to be known. We, in turn, owe them epistemic reparations, the most fundamental of which is to know them. It is only by listening and bearing witness—by saying their names—that we can truly begin to repair the epistemic damage done to victims in our communities who have been harmed the most.

NOTES
3. Another compelling example comes from Zora Neale Hurston’s Barracoon: The Story of the Last “Black Cargo,” which was completed in 1931 but wasn’t published until 2018, decades after her death. It is a first-person narrative of Cudjo Lewis, also known as Oluale Kossola, who was the last known survivor of the middle passage. In the story, Kossola recounts his life in a West African village, his abduction by slave traders, and the profound trauma and grief he experienced at the loss of his home and family. There is a passage in the book where Hurston explains that she would like to tell Kossula’s story and he cries out, “Thankee Jesus! Somebody come ast about Cudjo! I want to tellee somebody who I is, so maybe dey go in de Affickey soil some day and callee my name and somebody dere say, ‘Yeah, I know Kossula’” (Hurston, Barracoon, p. x). In his review of Barracoon, Ismail Muhammad writes:

Kossola’s narrative is marked by a deep familiarity with violence and an irreversible sense of loneliness and loss. . . . We sense the monumental contours of his grief not only at the deaths of his wife and children but also at the gaping wound that resulted from being torn from a home to which he will never return. His utmost desire is to be known again, to exist in a community of people with whom he shares a heritage and culture. (https://slate.com/culture/2018/06/zora-neale-hurstons-barracoon-reviewed.html)

Kossola’s desire to be known is connected not only with his own identity, but also with his beloved homeland of Africa, from which he was torn. In this way, he wants to be known both as Kossola and as being African.
6. Innocence Project 2015, p. 16.
8. I am distinguishing being known from a person’s reputation, where the latter need not involve true beliefs. For instance, one might care very much about having a positive reputation, while caring very little if anyone really knows who one is. For more on reputation, see Origgi, Reputation: What It Is and Why It Matters.
10. Cooley’s view is a descriptive one, describing how our identities are in fact formed, but Lindemann (Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practice of Personal Identities) develops what might be seen as a moral counterpart, which I will discuss later in this paper.


18. See, for instance, Daughety and Reinganum, (“Evidence Suppression by Prosecutors: Violations of the Brady Rule”). Another example from the criminal legal system is “Marsy’s Law,” which involves amendments to state constitutions that protect the rights of victims of crime (https://www.marsyslaw.us). One component of Marsy’s Law declares that victims have the right “[t]o be heard, upon request, at any proceeding, including any delinquency proceeding, involving a post-arrest release decision, plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue” (Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(8)). This “right to be heard” might be understood as a legal version of the “right to be known.”


21. See, for instance, Tsosie, “Acknowledging the Past to Heal the Future: The Role of Reparations for Native Nations.”


27. Tsosie, “Acknowledging the Past to Heal the Future,” 51. See also Herman, *Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror*.


32. See Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing.

33. I develop this point in greater detail in Lackey, Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods.

34. See Tirrell, “Genocidal Language Games.” See, also, Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson, “Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences.”

35. Dotson draws on the notion of “Jane Crow” to develop an “unknowability problem” that is “characterized by a trifold structure of disappearing” involving “the occupation of negative socio-epistemic space, reduced epistemic confidence, and heightened epistemic disavowal” (“Theorizing Jane Crow, Theorizing Unknowability,” 418). Dotson’s framework provides a detailed framework for understanding the invisibility dimension of not being known at work in this paper.

36. See, for instance, Smiley and Fakunle, “From ‘Brute’ to ‘Thug:’ The Demonization and Criminalization of Unarmed Black Male Victims in America.”

37. This is not to say, of course, that Black Americans do not also suffer from erasure in the United States. See, for instance, the references in note 30.


39. Drawing on Lorde’s work, Kristie Dotson and Marita Gilbert argue that one of the ways in which “Black women have had problems maintaining a public presence in common narratives and narratives for common consumption within the US” is through “obfuscation” (“Curious Disappearances: Affectability Imbalances and Process-Based Invisibility,” 873–74). I am understanding “distortion” and “obfuscation” as identifying the same sense in which a person is not known. Dotson and Gilbert also discuss “erasure” and “blatant indifference,” both of which are versions of the phenomenon of invisibility as outlined above.

40. There are various phenomena that would fall under systematic distortion. For instance, unwarranted and systematic infantilization of a person or persons would be subsumed within this category, as would what we might call “misknowing,” where the only relevant facts known about a person or persons are those that are most injurious. A version of misknowing might happen when, for instance,
someone is in fact guilty of a crime, but we reduce her entire identity to this one action and regard her as nothing more than a “murderer,” “rapist,” and so on.

41. Lindemann, *Holding and Letting Go: The Social Practice of Personal Identities*, x. Mills makes a similar point, but focuses on how the “racing” and “norming” of people is connected to the “racing” and “norming” of spaces: “You are what you are in part because you originate from a certain kind of space, and that space has those properties in part because it is inhabited by creatures like yourself” (Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 42).

42. Carter Godwin Woodson makes a similar point, but he draws a connection from how we think we are seen by others, to how we see ourselves, to how we act. As he writes in *The Mis-Education of the Negro*: “When you determine what a man shall think you do not have to concern yourself about what he will do. If you make a man feel that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to accept an inferior status, for he will seek it himself. If you make a man think that he is justly an outcast, you do not have to order him to the back door. He will go without being told; and if there is no back door, his very nature will demand one” (84–85).


45. I should note that the national reckoning mentioned above would itself be a kind of epistemic reparation. Though Coates himself does not argue for reparations that are distinctively epistemic in nature, he gestures at this when he writes: “[r]eparations would mean the end of scarifying hot dogs on the Fourth of July while denying the facts of our heritage. Reparations would mean the end of yelling ‘patriotism’ while waving a Confederate flag. Reparations would mean a revolution of the American consciousness, a reconciling of our self-image as the great democratizer with the facts of our history.”


49. I am grateful to a question from Alex Guerrero that led to the inclusion of this material.


52. For work on epistemic authority, see Zagzebski, *Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief*, and Lackey, “Experts and Peer Disagreement.”


60. I’m focusing on justification here, but what I say can apply equally to knowledge.


62. For discussions involving what I call normative defeaters, approached in a number of different ways, see BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Epistemic Justification” and *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*; Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition*; Fricker, “The Epistemology of Testimony” and “Against Gullibility”; Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*; Burge, “Content Preservation” and “Interlocution, Perception, and Memory”; McDowell, “Knowledge by Hearsay”; Audi, “The Place of Testimony in the Fabric of Knowledge and Justification” and *Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*; Williams, *Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology*; Lackey, *Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge*; BonJour and Sosa, *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues*; Hawthorne, *Knowledge and Lotteries*; and Reed, “Epistemic Circularity Squared? Skepticism about Common Sense.” What all of these discussions have in common is simply the idea that evidence can defeat knowledge (justification) even when the subject does not form any corresponding doubts or beliefs from the evidence in question.

63. See also Goldberg, “Should Have Known.”

64. I’m grateful to Kevin McCain for pressing this objection.

65. See Harman, *Thought*.

66. See Murphy, “The Demands of Beneficence,” 268.

67. For a detailed defense of imperfect epistemic duties, see Lackey, “The Duty to Object,” “Epistemic Duties Regarding Others,” and “When Should We Disagree About Politics?” For an alternative account, see Stapleford, “Imperfect Epistemic Duties and the Justificational Fecundity of Evidence.”

68. See, e.g., Schroeder, “Imperfect Duties, Group Obligations, and Beneficence.”

69. Of course, latitude might be built directly into the content of a promise. I might, for instance, promise to Rose that someone in my family will visit her in the hospital this week, which might be fulfilled by my visiting her on Monday, or my daughter visiting her on Tuesday, and so on. But this is a separate point than latitude being tied to the fulfillment of the duty itself.

70. See, for instance, Price, *A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*. See Stocker, “Acts, Perfect Duties, and Imperfect Duties,” for an argument that virtually all duties are infinitely disjunctive, and hence this cannot adequately capture imperfect ones.
REFERENCES


