

HOW ANDROCENTRIC IS WESTERN PHILOSOPHY?

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It has by now become a regular and oft-repeated claim in feminist theory that Western philosophy is androcentric, i.e., suits men's experiences and minds more than women's, or involves discrimination against women, or is geared towards dominating them. Thus, for example, Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford write:

the practice and content of Western philosophy are male-dominated and male-biased. This statement is not directed at any one set of philosophers. It is true in general, in spite of the fact that philosophers by no means speak with a single voice, and do not even agree among themselves about what they understand philosophy to be.

And Jane Flax asserts that

philosophy reflects the fundamental division of the world according to gender and a fear and devaluation of women characteristic of patriarchal attitudes.¹

It is interesting to note that most authors fail to specify whether they take their arguments to prove that philosophy is pervasively androcentric (i.e., calling for substantial reform, complete rejection or replacement by a feminist alternative), or non-pervasively androcentric (i.e., requiring merely a renunciation of some androcentric themes from philosophical theories). The tone of most of them, however, lends itself to the feeling that they prefer the former alternative. Moreover, the literature on this subject includes hardly any critique of the notion that philosophy is androcentric. This is peculiar, since most other contemporary philosophical issues enjoy lively discussion. The androcentricity of philosophy seems to be a subject on which there is argumentation only on one side of the debate.

My aim in this paper is to take a step towards redressing this situation. I present and examine five central arguments for the androcentricity of philosophy (for variety's sake, and since only Western philosophy is discussed here, I use 'philosophy' and 'Western philosophy' interchangeably). I claim

¹ Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (eds), *Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 1-2; Jane Flax, 'Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious', in Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka (eds), *Discovering Reality* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), p. 268.

that none of them succeeds in showing that philosophy is pervasively androcentric, and only one argument succeeds in showing some philosophies to be non-pervasively androcentric. Although the discussion will be restricted to philosophy, some of its analyses will be relevant also for claims about the androcentricity of other fields, such as Western science or Western culture as a whole.

I

One argument for the androcentricity of philosophy rests on the existence of some androcentric, if not blatantly sexist, metaphors and expressions in philosophical texts. Sandra Harding, for example, claims that

Francis Bacon appealed to rape metaphors to persuade his audience that experimental method is a good thing: 'For you have but to hound nature in her wanderings and you will be able when you like to lead and drive her afterwards to the same place again. Neither ought a man to make scruple of entering and penetrating into those holes and corners when the inquisition of truth is his whole object'. Paul Feyerabend, a contemporary philosopher of science, has recommended his own analysis over competing ones by saying that 'such a development ... changes science from a stern and demanding mistress into an attractive and yielding courtesan who tries to anticipate every wish of her lover. Of course it is up to us to choose either a dragon or a pussy cat for our company. I think I do not have to explain my own preferences.'²

According to Harding (p. 44), these metaphors 'are not merely heuristic devices or literary embellishments that can be replaced by value-neutral referential terms'. They make Bacon's and Feyerabend's philosophies of science as well as philosophy of science as a whole and even science itself androcentric.

However, if metaphors are accepted as evidence for the androcentricity of theories, all the metaphors in Bacon, Feyerabend and other writings in the philosophy of science should be taken into account, including those which are not androcentric. Moreover, contrary to Harding's claim, Bacon's and Feyerabend's metaphors *are* in fact 'heuristic devices or literary embellishments that can be replaced'. Bacon's metaphor could easily be replaced (to rely on Harding's own wording in an earlier work) by 'Have your experiments controlled in order to make the results of research replicable'.³ His metaphor could also easily be replaced by others that carry

² Sandra Harding, *Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives* (Cornell UP, 1991), p. 43.

³ Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Cornell UP, 1986), p. 116: 'It might not be immediately obvious to the modern reader that this is Bacon's way of explaining the necessity of aggressive and controlled experiments in order to make the results of research replicable!'.

connotations of, e.g., respectful obedience ('Learn nature's distinct ways and laws so that you can repeat them according to her disposition'), or justice ('Do complete justice to nature'). The same is true for Feyerabend or any other writer. Androcentric metaphors and expressions in philosophical texts, then, are not in themselves sufficient argument to show that the philosophies discussed in these texts are androcentric. Of course, androcentric phraseology should be pointed out and criticized. However, it should be distinguished from androcentricity in the philosophical theories themselves, for which the phraseology is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition.

II

Another claim, however, discusses androcentrism not in metaphors but in philosophical theory itself. Green, and Kennedy and Mendus, for example, show how various philosophical theories incorporate androcentric themes.⁴ Kant says that women can never be citizens in the state.⁵ Likewise, Aristotle takes women to be naturally inferior to men, and hence views his ideal life as appropriate for men only. He describes the male as the active element which gives life and furnishes the form of the next generation in reproduction, whereas the female is the passive element which provides matter. Moreover, he sees the female as a deviation from, almost a depraved version of, the form of the male.⁶

Such misogynist passages are, of course, very disturbing, and show some Western philosophers to be androcentric to some extent. It remains to be examined, however, whether they are central enough to make the other views expressed in the theories, or even the theories as a whole, androcentric. Do the androcentric passages in Kant's political theory, for example, make his ethics and metaphysics androcentric as well?

Assume that by some historical accident the androcentric passages in Kant's writings have been erased. Can we still make sense of and employ his ethics, his metaphysics and the rest of his theories independently of the androcentric passages? If we can, these androcentric passages are not central to the rest of Kant's theory and views, and there is no need to reject, replace or complement them: the system is non-pervasively androcentric. I contend that this is indeed the case with Kant.

⁴ Judith M. Green, 'Aristotle on Necessary Verticality, Body Heat, and Gendered Proper Places in the *Polis*', *Hypatia*, 7 (1992), pp. 70-96; Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (eds), *Women in Western Political Philosophy* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987).

⁵ Immanuel Kant, 'On the Common Saying: "This may be true in theory, but it does not apply in practice"', in *Kant's Political Writings*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge UP, 1970), p. 78.

⁶ See, e.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* v 1134b, 1138b; *Generation of Animals* i 728a.

Likewise, can we make sense of and benefit from Aristotle's theory of the four causes, substance, the nature of movement, etc., while rejecting his androcentric views? If the answer is affirmative, as I believe it is, there is no need to replace or complement these parts of the theory, and Aristotle's androcentrism is non-pervasive. We can make sense of and benefit also from most of his other metaphysical, physical, aesthetic and moral theories, while rejecting his androcentric views.

The same is true of most other philosophical systems, and of Western philosophy as a whole. There are androcentric passages in philosophy. However, they do not make it pervasively androcentric, and it would be wrong to reject, replace or complement the whole of it because of them. To say that Aristotle's, Kant's or others' philosophies are androcentric because of such passages would be as true as to say that their philosophies (or philosophy in general) are theological because of the theological passages in them. Both Kant's and Aristotle's philosophies *are* theological to some extent, but not pervasively so (unlike, e.g., Karl Barth's). They are also secular, aesthetic, biological, and – since they also contain non-androcentric passages – non-androcentric. To see whole systems as predominantly androcentric because of such passages is to endorse a simplistic, uniform view of Western philosophy, ignoring its thematic richness and variety.

III

According to some accounts, however, androcentrism in philosophy is more implicit and pervasive than as suggested above. Genevieve Lloyd discusses the ways in which Descartes' philosophy enhanced discrimination against women. Whereas before Descartes, she argues, emotional, sensuous and imaginative capacities were taken to play a part, even if not as important a part as intellect, in the process of knowing, Descartes sees intellect as the only reliable means for attaining real knowledge. But intellect has been traditionally identified with men, and emotions and imagination with women. Thus Descartes' reliance on intellect alone encouraged even more the exclusion of women from the circles of learning, and, more generally, 'reinforced already existing distinctions between male and female roles'.⁷

Jana Thompson, on the other hand, claims that 'it is not so much the Cartesian distinction between the intellect and the passions which led to a devaluation of women and their traditional activities, but rather the distinction between *real* knowledge belonging to the "grand" disciplines, and

⁷ Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason* (London: Methuen, 1984), pp. 38–50, especially pp. 49–50.

the knowledge required for everyday life'. Cartesianism made this division 'much more decisively than did the Aristotelian account of rationality – for the Aristotelians did not attempt to make such a sharp distinction between common-sense knowledge and the knowledge possible in science and philosophy'.⁸ Thus Descartes' philosophy reinforced the discrimination against women and enhanced their image as unfit for scholarship. Similar analyses are suggested concerning other philosophers.

Lloyd and Thompson make historical claims: they maintain that Descartes' philosophy exercised actual historical influence towards the exclusion of women from the circles of learning. However, they present no historical evidence for their arguments. They do not make out historically the hypothesis that women were more involved in learning and public life before Cartesianism than after it. Nor do they show that, if women's status did change at the time Cartesianism arose, this was not the result of some unrelated economic or social changes.

Furthermore, even if it were historically demonstrated that Cartesianism exerted a negative influence on the status of women in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it would still have to be shown that it continues to do so now. Otherwise Cartesianism would be demonstrated to have been androcentric, and thus perhaps to have called for replacement or complementation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, rather than today.

But even if all this were proved, it would not make Cartesianism androcentric. The argument takes Cartesianism to be androcentric because some of its views which are not in themselves androcentric have been associated with views which are. But if that argument is accepted, so should the following: 'The theory that the earth is round gave Europeans the impetus and ability to travel and establish colonies; therefore this is a colonialist theory, and as such should be rejected'; or again 'Although women are not inferior to men, they have been considered to be such; therefore this is how they should be treated'.

We do not accept these arguments, because we think that if theories and human beings have been used or viewed wrongly, we should reject those uses or images, not the human beings or theories themselves. Moreover, we know that employing or treating something as having certain characteristics does not entail that it indeed possesses them. If we abstain from anything wrongly viewed or used, nothing acceptable would remain. Even if it were shown, therefore, that Cartesianism has been used for androcentric purposes, or has been associated with androcentric views, we should reject these uses and associations, not Cartesianism itself.

⁸ Jana Thompson, 'Women and the High Priests of Reason', *Radical Philosophy*, 39 (1983), p. 12 (italics original).

IV

According to deconstructionists such as Derrida and Cixous, however, the link between androcentrism and Western philosophy is even deeper. Both take Western philosophy to be pervaded by binary oppositions, such as reality and appearance, essence and accident, presence and absence, centre and margin, soul and body, serious and playful, literal and metaphorical, signified and signifier, transcendental and empirical, and nature and culture.⁹ The first and second terms in each of these dichotomies form a hierarchy. Reality is traditionally preferred to appearance, essence to accident, presence to absence and the central to the marginal. Moreover, there are traditional links among the first terms in each of the dichotomies. For example, what is present is taken to be real, and what is absent only to appear so. Likewise, essence is traditionally taken to be more present, central and of a higher degree of reality than accident.

Another traditional dichotomy is masculine and feminine. In this dichotomy, too, the former term is preferred to the latter, and is related to the first terms in other hierarchies, whereas the latter is presumed to be associated with the second terms. Thus Derrida calls traditional philosophy not only 'logocentric' but also 'phallogocentric', and frequently combines the two in 'phallogocentric'. Thus androcentrism, or as it is called here, phallogocentrism, is shown to be pervasively inherent in Western philosophy.¹⁰ On a closer look, however, Derrida's account is unconvincing. Derrida, who criticizes the Western philosophical urge to find sameness in everything, himself treats all Western philosophy as if it were uniform. However, some philosophies are not characterized by the hierarchical dichotomies in the way he takes them to be. It is not evident, for example, that Socrates, who said that he was wiser than others since he knew that he did not know, and ended his dialogues with *aporai*, preferred centre to margin, presence to absence or seriousness to playfulness. The same is true of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Materialists such as Leucippus, Democritus, Hobbes and Carnap did not prefer mind to matter. Parmenides, Socrates, Plato and the mediaeval philosophers did not prefer nature (understood as our more animalistic passions, instincts and drives, unmoulded by education

⁹ See my 'Early and Later Deconstruction in the Writings of Jacques Derrida', *Cardozo Law Review*, 14 (1993), pp. 1895-1909.

¹⁰ See, e.g., 'Choreographies: an Interview with Jacques Derrida', ed. and trans. Christie V. McDonald, *Diacritics*, 12 (1982), pp. 66-76; Hélène Cixous, 'Sorties', in Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, *The Newly Born Woman*, trans. Betsy Wing (Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 63-132.

and civilization) to culture. Moreover, not all concepts mean the same thing in all philosophies. 'Nature' has different and to some extent incompatible meanings for the Romantics, the empiricists and Aquinas. So does 'freedom' for, e.g., Mill, Eckhart and Aristotle. The same is true for other frequently used, and therefore rich and ambivalent, concepts in philosophy, such as 'power', 'reality', 'knowledge', 'goodness', 'man' and 'woman'. Women, like men, have been associated with both nature and culture, goodness and evil, desire and temperance. For this reason, Derrida can place man on the side of nature, and woman on the side of culture, whereas Cixous, with equal justification, puts woman on the side of nature, and man on that of culture. Derrida does not succeed, then, in showing that some dichotomies (e.g., masculine and feminine) are inherently linked with others (e.g., essence and accident). Nevertheless, demonstrating this point is essential to establishing that Western philosophy is indeed implicitly pervaded by androcentrism. Note also that by using Derrida's strategies one could prove that Western philosophy enhances not only androcentrism, but also, e.g., goodness and justice. Goodness and evil and justice and injustice are also traditional dichotomies, in each of which the first term has been preferred to the second.

V

Other claims for the androcentrism of philosophy revolve around its avowed unsuitability for women's experiences and minds. According to these views, because of their different life-experiences, women's minds differ from men's. Furthermore, philosophy suits the latter more than the former.¹¹ Women's minds are frequently characterized in these arguments, as in those of many male chauvinists, as non-dualistic, contextual, subjective, influenced by emotional and social concerns, and less geared towards precision and certainty. Philosophy, however, is taken to be dualistic, non-contextual, objective, universal, uninfluenced by emotions, precise and certain.

However, the portrayals in this argument both of Western philosophy and of women's rationalities are problematic. For example, Carol Gilligan and her followers have suggested a distinction in moral theory between 'justice ethics', which is supposed to be the 'regular', 'male' ethics, and 'care ethics', the feminine alternative that should complement them. Justice ethics is portrayed as procedural, universal, objective, precise, rule-oriented, non-emotional and non-contextual. Care ethics is contextual, specific, more

¹¹ See, e.g., Lorraine Code, 'Taking Subjectivity into Account', in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (eds), *Feminist Epistemologies* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 15-48.

subjective, more emotional and less oriented towards procedures, generalizations, objectivity, certainty or precision. Gilligan and her followers wish moral theory to combine the characteristics of justice ethics and care ethics, and thus become less androcentric.¹² However, not all, nor even most, Western ethical systems are justice ethics. Most of them present a mixture of justice ethics and care ethics. Thus they do not agree with what is taken to be a man's mind more than with what is taken to be a woman's. Further, there is no need to create a new care ethics that would combine with the old justice ethics, since moral theories which combine characteristics of both already exist. All the Christian mediaeval moralities, for example, include a strong element of compassion and caring for others. Utilitarianism and Rawls' theory of justice both incorporate caring for other people's well-being and a wish to eliminate suffering. Spinoza's ethics is non-procedural and emotional, although it is taken to be objective and universal. Aristotle's ethics does not incorporate much care for others, but it is mostly non-procedural (except for his discussion of practical syllogisms), and is non-universalistic, imprecise and contextual. Other 'regular' ethics created by men incorporate not only some but all or almost all of the criteria for care ethics. Such, for example, are Camus' call for immediate sympathy with all humans, Buber's I-You relations, and the teachings of Christ.

Portrayals of non-moral philosophy are equally simplistic. Not all philosophies involve pretensions or aspirations towards non-contextuality, objectivity, universality, precision and certainty (certainly no more so than many feminist philosophical discussions). But even those that do involve such aspirations frequently do not succeed in realizing them. There are not many philosophers or historians of philosophy today who believe any philosophical theory to have succeeded in being objective, certain, precise or non-contextual. Thus many philosophical systems do not in fact incorporate the supposedly androcentric characteristics which they are taken to incorporate, and there is no need to try to replace or complement them. Feminist theory, which has always been competent in distinguishing reality from ideology, should not fail to do this here as well.

Special attention is due to the view that Western philosophy is androcentric because it is dualistic. According to this view (which somewhat corresponds to Derrida's), philosophy is dualistic in its employment of distinctions between opposites. Moreover, it is hierarchical: one of the distinguished terms is preferred to the other. However, although it is correct to characterize Western philosophy in this way, there cannot be any type of philosophy or thinking which does not employ distinctions and hierarchies,

¹² Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Harvard UP, 1982).

and thus is not dualistic, or, as the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss calls it, binary. One cannot say, will, feel or think anything without distinguishing and preferring it, at least in some sense, to its opposite. This is true of Western, non-Western, modern, postmodern, non-feminist and feminist philosophies and thought. Feminists too distinguish between feminism and non-feminism, pro-choice and pro-life, private and public, progress and regress. They, too, hierarchize these dichotomies and prefer one term in each pair, e.g., feminism, pro-choice, progress, to the other. If dualism is taken to be a mark of androcentrism, there is no, nor could there be any, non-androcentric thought, including feminist thought. Thus it seems correct to view dualism as a mark of thinking, not of androcentrism.

The portrayal of women's minds fares no better. In Maccoby and Jacklin's careful and elaborate study on women's and men's intellectual abilities, no significant differences were found between the two.¹³ Up to now, their 1974 conclusions have not been refuted by other works carried out with comparable care and elaborateness. It may be argued that women's and men's thinking, even on metaphysics or logic, is influenced by their emotions, and hence that the emotional differences between women and men should also be taken into account. Gilligan, for example, tried to show this about ethics: she presented moral dilemmas to boys and girls, asked men and women to describe certain situations, and interviewed women who had to face decisions on abortion. Her conclusions were that girls and women indeed tend towards 'care mentality', and boys and men towards 'justice mentality'. These findings have been repeated in other studies.¹⁴ However, in all of Gilligan's studies as well as those supporting them, no strict controls were used on factors such as occupation and education (or age, marital status, extent of joint household decision-making and sex of the protagonist described in the dilemma). In studies where such strict controls were employed, however, no significant differences were found between women and men.¹⁵ This implies that the significant factors for preferring the use of care or justice ethics are, in fact, not masculinity or femininity, but education, economic class, etc. Gilligan, with Jane Attanucci, seems to accept that the determining factors for using justice or care ethics are social-economical. But Attanucci and Gilligan claim that gender categories are still significant, since women tend to earn less than men, to be less educated than

¹³ Eleanor Emmons Maccoby and Carol Nagy Jacklin, *The Psychology of Sex Differences* (Stanford UP, 1974).

¹⁴ See, e.g., James Winship Drisko, 'Personality and Gender Differences: Comparing Clinicians and Researchers', *Smith College Studies in Social Work*, 63 (1993), pp. 147–61.

¹⁵ See, e.g., Lawrence J. Walker, 'Experiential and Cognitive Sources of Moral Development in Adulthood', *Human Development*, 29 (1986), pp. 113–24; Jyotsna Vasudev, 'Sex Differences in Morality and Moral Orientation', *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 34 (1988), pp. 234–44.

men, etc.¹⁶ Nevertheless, if the determining factors for the use of care and justice ethics are economic class or education, then justice and care ethics should be seen as the ethics of certain economic classes and levels of education, not of men and women.

The same would be true for any other view which bases the differences between women's and men's mentalities on differences in their life-experiences. What would be essential for a specific mentality would be the experiences taken to produce it, rather than being a woman or a man. Since our culture is very variegated, there would always be many men who would be influenced by these forms of life-experience, and many women who would not.¹⁷ Jaggar, for example, believes that because of the exploitation they suffer, women develop a special mentality that enables them to 'develop a clearer and more trustworthy understanding of the world'.¹⁸ But there are numerous men who are exploited economically, socially and sexually, in some cases more than many women are. Thus it follows from Jaggar's views that these men would have more of the mentality she talks about than some women would. This mentality should therefore not be characterized as women's consciousness but as that of exploited people.

Similarly, according to Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalytical theory, women develop a more unity-oriented and caring mentality, not only because of education, role models, social conventions, etc., but also because of psychological factors.¹⁹ As they grow up, boys, unlike girls, realize that they differ from their primary care-takers, their mothers, not only in personhood but also in sex. To develop their own identity they have to define themselves emotionally as against their mothers more than girls find necessary. This develops in them a more dualistic, alienated and objectivistic emotional character. Girls, who do not have to define themselves so radically against their mothers, develop a more holistic, unity-oriented, and non-objectivistic mentality. The differences reproduce themselves; having these characteristics, women are both more fit and more inclined than men to care for the children of the next generation, and thus again children's primary care-takers are women.

However, if Chodorow is right, the mentality she describes should not be seen as women's mentality, but as children-cared-for-by-parent-of-the-same-sex mentality. The theory entails that boys who are primarily cared for by

¹⁶ Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanucci, 'Much Ado About ... Knowing? Noting? Nothing?', *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 34 (1988), pp. 451, 455.

¹⁷ I have discussed this issue more elaborately in 'Should there be Separatist Feminist Epistemologies?', *The Monist*, 77 (1994), pp. 462-71.

¹⁸ Alison M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), p. 384.

¹⁹ Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Univ. of California Press, 1978).

mothers will be more alienated, objectivistic, dualistic, etc., than boys equally cared for by mothers and fathers. Boys primarily cared for by fathers, on the other hand, should be the least alienated, dualistic, etc. Girls primarily cared for by fathers should be more alienated and objectivistic than boys in such families, more than boys and girls equally parented by mothers and fathers, and more than girls primarily cared for by mothers. Girls equally parented by mothers and fathers will be more objectivistic and dualistic than girls primarily cared for by mothers. Thus the mentality Chodorow discusses should also fit men primarily cared for in childhood by men, and it would not fit women cared for in childhood equally by their fathers and mothers, or mostly by their fathers. What would be essential to this mentality would not be one's sex, but whether one was primarily cared for in childhood by a parent of the same sex. Oddly, it seems that feminists who accept Chodorow's analysis, and wish to preserve what they see as a feminine, non-androcentric mentality, should oppose the sharing of child-care between mothers and fathers, and wish only mothers to take care of their children (or rather their daughters in particular, and only fathers to take care of their sons).

Note that even if it were shown that all women's minds do not fit philosophy (or a certain philosophy), this would not be sufficient for deducing that this philosophy should be rejected or replaced by an alternative. If we think a philosophy rewarding, but not suited to a certain nurture or life-experience, we may still choose to change the nurture or life-experience rather than reject the philosophy. There was a time when, because of nurture and acculturation, women did not vote and did not, for the most part, feel competent to do so. But this did not mean that participation in the democratic process did not agree with women, or that they should have had their own way of exerting political influence, more appropriate to their nurture and experiences. Rather, it was thought that women's nurture and acculturation should change to suit participation in the democratic process. The same can be true of a philosophical activity thought to be worthy and rewarding.

VI

Only one of the arguments presented above, then, succeeds in showing that some philosophies are non-pervasively androcentric, i.e., calling for merely a renunciation of some androcentric themes. None of the arguments establishes that philosophy is pervasively androcentric, i.e., demanding substantial reform, complete rejection, or replacement by a feminist alternative.

Thus we may wish to create a philosophy that is more precise, certain, dualistic, etc., than prevalent ones, or a philosophy that is less so. The arguments examined here, however, do not show that our being women, men or feminists is relevant to this choice.

Philosophy, like culture, is so variegated, so multifaceted, that almost everything can be found in it and ascribed to it, including a degree of androcentrism. It would have been strange if among the many themes in philosophy or culture there were not also some androcentric ones. But there are also many other, worthy aspects in philosophy. Feminists have recently been very sensitive to differences between the varieties of types of feminisms and women. Similar distinctions should be made among philosophies and among parts of philosophies. Condemning philosophy as pervasively androcentric is based on a homogenizing, simplistic view, which takes all philosophy and all men to speak in one voice, and all women in another.²⁰

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