Explaining Imagination

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10
Consuming Fictions Part II
The Operator Claim

10.1 Introduction

Last chapter I offered an account of how fictional content, both implied and explicit, is recovered without use of *sui generis* imaginative states. This and the next chapter shift focus to our immersion in fictions—to the fact that we become emotionally involved, concerned with, “lost in,” moved by, and, well, *immersed* in compelling fictions. Explaining our immersion amounts, first and foremost, to explaining how and why we become emotionally involved in the fictions we enjoy. (At the beginning of Chapter 9, I considered the objection that immersion is something distinct from emotional involvement—that it involves “losing oneself” in the fiction in some other, more cognitive sense.) Many have thought that our being moved by fictions is due in part to our entering into *sui generis* imaginative states through which the fictional events are represented. Some then add to this picture that *sui generis* (belief-like) imaginative states combine with a second, desire-like form of imaginative state—what we can call “i-desires”—to generate fiction-related emotions. Over the next two chapters, I will argue that neither sort of imaginative state should form part of our account of immersion in fiction. We can better explain immersion by appeal to ordinary beliefs and desires about the fictions. Further, quite apart from its being *possible* that fiction consumption draws only on beliefs and desires, there are serious independent difficulties with the idea that *sui generis* imaginative states underwrite our immersion in fictions. These difficulties—which are the main topic of this chapter—disappear when we adopt a reductive approach to imagination, where the imaginings we experience in response to fiction amount to certain kinds of ordinary perceptions, judgements and desires.

10.2 The Operator Claim

In the Batman fictions, Gotham is a dangerous city, riddled with crime. Do I, myself, *believe* that Gotham is dangerous? Not exactly. Asked to name some dangerous cities, I don’t list Gotham among them. What I believe is that, in the Batman fictions, Gotham is a dangerous city. If in casual conversation I leave out
the ‘in the fiction’ operator—as asking, “What if Batman lived in Woodstock instead of Gotham?”—it is always there sotto voce. A formal account of my beliefs must make it explicit, in order to distinguish me from the person who truly believes that Gotham is a dangerous city and, for that reason, plans to avoid it on his next cross-country trip. Likewise David Lewis, in his influential account of truth in fiction, advises that we “not take our descriptions of fictional characters at face value,” but instead “regard them as abbreviations for longer sentences beginning with an operator ‘In such-and-such fiction…”’ (1978, p. 37). In his example: “if I say that [Sherlock] Holmes liked to show off”—and thereby express my belief about Holmes—“you will take it that I have asserted an abbreviated version of the true sentence ‘In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes liked to show off’” (p. 38). It is the latter “true sentence” that is actually believed. I will be arguing that the same kind of disambiguation-by-operator is required in the case of fiction-directed imaginings as well. Call this the Operator Claim (OC):

OC: when recovering fictional content from a fiction \( F \) in which \( p \) is the case, we do not simply imagine that \( p \); rather, we imagine that, in the fiction \( F', p \).

Just as we need to include an ‘in the fiction’ operator within properly characterized beliefs about fictional entities, so too must we include such an operator when properly characterizing our imaginings concerning fictions. If correct, the Operator Claim undermines the main rationale for positing sui generis imaginative states in the explanation of immersion—and indeed in explaining our enjoyment of fiction more generally. Or so I will argue.

To appreciate the OC’s importance, it will help to first map the landscape of popular positions on imaginative immersion as it now stands.

### 10.3 Mapping the Territory: Three Views

Not everyone who discovers that \( q \) is happy about it. Typically, only those who desired that \( q \) are glad at the discovery, and not those who desired that not-\( q \), or who couldn’t care less whether \( q \). Likewise, judging that \( p \) will not usually, by itself, make someone anxious; negative affect only sets in if one also desires that not-\( p \). So say the platitudes of folk psychology, and so I agree. A concrete case: Doggett & Egan are thrilled as the Red Sox batter circles the bases following his grand slam, while I watch the same events with sorrow. Why this difference in our emotions? Doggett & Egan desire that the Red Sox win, while I want their opponent, the Chicago Cubs, to prevail. Our desires themselves were not sufficient for the emotions we experienced; nor, for that matter, is belief that the Red Sox have hit a grand slam sufficient to arouse emotion in those who lack desires on the matter either way. The pairing of a cognitive with a suitably related conative state is essential.
True, not all emotional responses result from this recipe (Prinz, 2004; Robinson, 2005b). Some emotions are reflexive or “pre-cognitive” in nature. A door slammed shut by the wind may trigger fear and anxiety, without a belief/desire pair featuring in the explanation. But I don’t think that is the case, in general, with respect to our emotional immersion in fiction. The best account of that immersion, I will argue, makes much the same appeal to suitable cognitive/conative state pairs as do explanations of our immersion in ordinary (non-fictional, non-pretend) events we enjoy, such as baseball games. I am joined in this thought by many others working on fiction and immersion, including Doggett & Egan (2012), Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), Kind (2011), and Spaulding (2015). A competitor to this approach holds that our (sui generis) imaginings generate emotional responses directly, irrespective of any conative states we may or may not have with respect to the fiction. Nichols (2004b, 2006b) and Van Leeuwen (2016) defend versions of that view. I have discussed Nichols’ view elsewhere (Langland-Hassan, 2017) and will delay discussion of Van Leeuwen’s until Chapter 11.

Provided that we are committed to the idea that cognitive and conative state pairs generate emotional response to fictions (in the normal case), there remain two controversial questions with respect to the nature of such pairs. The questions, and their most common answers, can be elucidated through an example. In the HBO mini-series *The Wire*, Wallace is a sixteen-year-old caregiver to his younger siblings and cousins, and occasional drug dealer. At the end of Season One, he is murdered by his peers on the off chance that he’ll become a police informant. I felt anxiety and distress as the scene unfolded, having grown attached to Wallace. A first question we can ask about this case is: what are the specific cognitive and conative “attitudes” involved in generating the response? Are they imaginings, beliefs, desires, “i-desires” (Currie, 2010; Doggett & Egan, 2007, 2012), or something else? A second question is: what are the contents of those states? In particular, we will want to know whether the contents involve ‘in the fiction’ operators. Here are three popular approaches to answering these questions.

**The Simple View**: One set of responses, defended by both Kind (2011) and Spaulding (2015), is that the cognitive state is an *imagining* and the conative state is a *desire*, and that neither of those states involves an ‘in the fiction’ operator. So, in the example given, it might be an imagining that Wallace is dying that combines with a desire that Wallace survives that, together, serve to generate negative affect. I will call this the Simple View, following Currie (2010). The Simple View is simple insofar as it meshes with our pre-theoretical tendency to describe ourselves as wanting Wallace to survive, and as imagining that he is dying.

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1 It bears noting that, on Currie’s use of “the Simple View,” the view is limited to making a claim about other conative states involved in fiction appreciation, and not on the nature of the cognitive state. Those who defend the Simple View will, however, typically agree that the cognitive state is an imagining of some sort, and not a belief.
The Change of Attitude View: A second style of view, defended by Currie (2010), Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), and Doggett & Egan (2007, 2012), gives a different answer concerning the nature of the conative state involved. Instead of holding that a desire that Wallace survives pairs with an imagining to generate negative affect, it proposes that we should posit an imaginative analog to desires—“i-desires”—to serve as the relevant conative state. It is my i-desiring that Wallace survives, while imaging that Wallace is being shot, that generates negative affect, with i-desires and imaginings combining to generate affect in roughly the same way that ordinary beliefs and desires do. I will—again following Currie (2010)—call this the Change of Attitude View. It is so named because it proposes a change to the conative attitude we might ascribe, pre-theoretically, when considering the case. It turns out we don’t actually desire that Wallace survives; instead, we i-desire that he survives.

A motivation for the Change of Attitude View is that we are sometimes upset by what occurs in a fiction (as in a tragedy), even if we do not want to change the fiction to remove the upsetting feature (because we think the fiction is excellent as it is). Instead of describing us as somehow conflicted about how we want the fiction to be—both wanting Wallace to survive (because we like him) and wanting him to die (so that the fiction retains its dramatic integrity)—the Change of Attitude View proposes that we are in distinct states of desiring that the fiction remains as it is, while i-desiring that some event in the fiction does not occur. I will say more about this view and the argument just sketched in its favor below (section 10.5).

The Change of Content View: A third style of view—my own—is the Change of Content View. I again take the term from Currie. The Change of Content view, as I will understand it, bears two important differences with both the Simple View and the Change of Attitude View. First, on the Change of Content View, the conative/cognitive state pair responsible for fiction-directed affect is a belief and a desire. This contrasts with the Simple View’s claim that an imagining is (at least often) involved, and with the Change of Attitude’s thesis that an imagining and an i-desire pair are (at least often) involved. Second, on the Change of Content View, both the belief and the desire include ‘in the fiction’ operators. This again contrasts with both the Simple View and the Change of Attitude View; insofar as neither hold that ‘in the fiction’ operators typically occur within the contents of the relevant emotion-generating states. Returning to the example from The Wire, on my view—the Change of Content View—it is my belief that, in the fiction, Wallace is being shot that combines with a desire that, in the fiction, Wallace survives, that generates negative affect. The Change of Content View is so named because,

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2 On Currie’s version of the Change of Content View, the view only makes a claim about the conative state at work in generating fiction-directed affect (viz., that it is a desire with an ‘in the fiction’ operator within its content). On my version of the Change of Content View, I add that the relevant cognitive state is a belief (and not an imagining), where the belief also has an ‘in the fiction’ operator.
pre-theoretically, we may not include ‘in the fiction’ operators within the content of the attitudes we describe ourselves as taking toward fictions (even if they are always there sotto voce, as noted above). The Change of Content View is, however, consistent with a view where the states responsible for triggering our emotional responses to fiction are ordinary beliefs and desires.

I will now mount an argument for the Operator Claim that, if correct, favors the Change of Content View over both the Simple View and the Change of Attitude View. Like it or not, the operator-involving Change of Content View is the only coherent alternative for providing an explanation of fiction-directed affect, so long as we are committed to those explanations invoking suitable cognitive/conative state pairs.

10.4 To Which Fiction Do Your Desires Refer? Troubles for the Simple View

I begin by recounting an ingenious argument developed by Currie (2010)—with help from Tyler Doggett and Stacie Friend—against the Simple View, as a means to promoting his own Change of Attitude (i.e., “i-desire”) View. I will then argue that, with minor modifications, it poses an equally serious challenge to his own Change of Attitude View.

Currie imagines a fictional BBC drama—Death of a Prime Minister—the plot of which involves Margaret Thatcher being pursued by an assassin. While he does not, in reality, wish for Thatcher to be assassinated, he is, in the context of the fiction, hoping that she is assassinated. As he puts it, he is “on the side” of the film’s clever villain. As he cheers for the assassin, the Simple View would characterize him as having the desire that Thatcher dies. But, if that were really his desire, Currie observes, “it should be satisfied by her [actual] death.” And yet:

It wouldn’t be. Suppose that, while I am cheering for the play’s assassin, Mrs. Thatcher runs in pursued by someone who proceeds to murder her. That would seem to me a wholly bad thing . . . this state, which we ignorantly call a desire, is not satisfied by the death of Mrs. Thatcher, but by her death according to the fiction. (2010, p. 635)

Currie concludes that the Simple View provides a wrong account of his fiction-directed conative state, insofar as it suggests that the state should be satisfied by events that would not satisfy it.

3 Currie thanks both Doggett and Friend in the article for suggesting aspects of the argumentative strategy.
Currie’s example exploits the fact that we sometimes desire events to occur in a fiction that we do not wish to occur in reality. He would be aghast if Thatcher were actually murdered; yet he wishes the assassin to succeed in the fiction. This helps us to see that Thatcher’s actual assassination is not among the satisfaction conditions for the fiction-directed desire. This suggests that the Simple View has given the wrong account of the conative state at work. We can also create problems for the Simple View using examples where one’s fiction and reality-directed desires appear to align. Suppose that I am watching a film where terrorists storm Buckingham Palace. The film’s hero hatches a plan to drive the terrorists out. I feel anxiety as I follow along, imagining (let us suppose) that the terrorists haven’t yet been driven out of the palace. Which desire of mine pairs with this imagining to generate anxiety? On the Simple View, it should be a desire that Buckingham Palace is free of terrorists. Yet if the desire that Buckingham Palace is free of terrorists were really contributing to my anxiety, I should be able to dispel that anxiety by turning on the news and confirming that there are not, in fact, any terrorists laying siege to Buckingham Palace. But, obviously, news reports about the peaceable state of Buckingham Palace are irrelevant to my concerns. For the unsatisfied desire in question does not concern the state of Buckingham Palace itself, but, rather, the events of the fiction I am watching. I desire that, in the fiction, Buckingham Palace is free of terrorists. This is why simply assuring myself that Buckingham Palace is in fact safe does nothing to ease my mind. And it is why my negative affect subsides the very moment I judge that, in the fiction, terrorists have been driven out of Buckingham Palace. At least, so says the Change of Content View.

This is not Currie’s conclusion, however. He favors the Change of Attitude solution, which we will consider in a moment. First, a comment on the structure of these cases. One might find it suspicious that both examples make use of people and places that have counterparts in reality. It might give the appearance that the problem lies in characterizing desires when there is a real-world counterpart to some entity in a fiction, and not with the Simple View’s general claim that we needn’t include ‘in the fiction’ operators within fiction-related desires. However, the real-world counterparts merely serve to highlight a general need to disambiguate the object of one’s desires when making claims about their ability to generate affect. The need to distinguish such desires at the level of content is thrown into relief by any situation where two entities—fictional or non-fictional—share the same name.4

For example, suppose that I want Mike Mulligan to win an election where the only other candidate is Mike Jones. You find me dejected after Mike Mulligan’s

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4 By “share the same name” I mean the sense in which two people named ‘John Smith’ share the same name. More neutrally we could describe the situation as one where the names for two people or places are homonyms and homographs (i.e., the linguistic labels look and sound the same). This leaves open whether names, as such, are partly individuated by their referents.
loss. But why? I wanted Mike to win, and Mike did win. Well, the obvious answer is that the two instances of 'Mike' have different referents. A more thorough description of the desire and belief—that I wanted Mike Mulligan to win, and believe that Mike Jones won—instantly removes any appearance of a puzzle. What the Margaret Thatcher and Buckingham Palace examples highlight—though it is not obvious Currie himself recognizes it—is that there are contexts where, in order to properly disambiguate the ascription of a desire that is elicited by a fiction, the fiction itself will need to be referenced in the content of the desire (as opposed to, say, a person's last name). But this reveals that we were only abbreviating our ascription of the state when we initially omitted mention of the fiction from its content. Where conversational context removes ambiguity in the intended object of reference—as it so often does, both within and outside of our engagement with fictions—we feel comfortable leaving out from our descriptions details like last names and titles of the fictions that feature the named characters. The resulting habitual omission of relevant 'in the fiction' operators, in the case of fiction-directed desires, can make them appear altogether unnecessary and even non-existent within the desires themselves; but that is only an appearance. Change the context—by highlighting fictional and real-life individuals with the same name, or (as we’ll see below) fictional characters with the same name from different fictions—and the need for the operator is instantly felt.

I’ll now build on these points to argue that ‘in the fiction’ operators are needed whether it is desires or i-desires that are active in fiction-appreciation, and so extend Currie’s argument to the Change of Attitude View as well.

10.5 Troubles with I-desires

First, a few words on the nature of i-desires. I-desires are said to correspond to actual desires in roughly the way that sui generis “belief-like” imaginings are thought to correspond to ordinary beliefs. Currie & Ravenscroft (2002) and Doggett & Egan (2012) motivate i-desires—and their place within the Change of Attitude View—over both the Simple View and Change of Content View in part by appeal to their ability to solve a puzzle concerning the enjoyment of tragedies. Watching Romeo and Juliet, it seems we really want the couple to survive and are upset by their tragic suicides; on the other hand, most of us don’t wish for Romeo and Juliet to be any different than it is—in particular, we don’t wish for it to be rewritten so that it is no longer a tragedy. But this seems to suggest that we are

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5 Currie grants that his example is unusual in its appeal to characters based on actual people, but says, “I don’t believe this affects the arguments’ generality.” “It would be odd to claim,” he explains, “that, when fictions concern real things it is i-desires which are in play, but that in the case of fictions involving non-existents, real desires take over.” However, my argument will be that the right conclusion is that it is both when fictions concern real things and when they involve non-existents that ‘in the fiction’ operators are needed—and that i-desires are not in play in either case.
somehow conflicted about how we want the fiction to be. Arguably, if we really want Romeo and Juliet to survive, then we should also want the fiction to be rewritten accordingly. And yet, few among us will advocate amending Shakespeare’s work. (Much the same sort of example, keyed to *The Sopranos*, occurs in Doggett & Egan (2012).) Currie and Doggett & Egan’s proposed exit from this impasse is to hold that we don’t really desire that Romeo and Juliet survive; instead, we bear a desire-like imaginative attitude of *i*-desire to the proposition that they survive. And just as there is no conflict between imagining that *p* and believing that not-*p*, so too, they propose, is there no conflict between desiring that Romeo and Juliet perish (in line with the tragedy as it is) while *i*-desiring that they survive. We no longer have to say—implausibly, by their lights—that we have conflicting desires about how the fiction ought to unfold.6

What, exactly, is the difference between regular desires and *i*-desires, such that an *i*-desire that *p* and a desire that not-*p* will not conflict with each other? Currie gives us the following “test” for distinguishing the two:

(SC) A putative desire, A, is an *i*-desire and not really a desire if A has satisfaction conditions, a canonical statement of which makes reference to a fiction which is not also the object of A. (2010, p. 635)

The key idea here is that, while an *i*-desire has satisfaction conditions related to what happens in *Romeo and Juliet*, the fiction itself “is not also the object of” the *i*-desire. Essentially, Currie seeks to split the difference between the Simple View and the add-an-operator (“Change of Content”) approach by stipulating that the

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6 Granting Currie & Ravenscroft and Doggett & Egan’s points that we would not change the fictions in question even if we could, there is still a strong case to be made that we are nevertheless conflicted about how the fictions proceed. This is indeed the view I take on the matter. We want *Romeo and Juliet* to continue in existence as the excellent tragedy that it is, sure; but part of us also wants it to be different—we really do desire that, in the fiction, Romeo and Juliet live happily ever after. It is this conflict in desires that characterizes the experience of tragedy in fiction—as proposed by Nichols (2004b) and Weinberg & Meskin (2006a).

Obviously, this reply will be unsatisfactory to Doggett & Egan and Currie & Ravenscroft, who are adamant that we experience no such conflict about the course of tragedies. In light of this standoff, the best we can do, I suggest, is to reflect on how common it is to have desires that are at odds with one’s strongest, most settled preferences. Amy Kind offers a vivid example:

Consider a mother whose only child is a senior in high school. She wants her son to go away to university and she firmly believes that certain experiences can be achieved only if he does. Simultaneously, she fears having an empty nest, and thus she also wants her son to stay home and attend a local institution. Does this make her irrational? Surely not. Rather, it seems like a perfectly ordinary case of conflicting desires. (Kind, 2011, p. 429)

Questions of rationality aside, this mother quite plausibly has conflicting desires, despite being settled on the view that her son should go away to university. Given the opportunity to change his enrollment back to a local institution, she would not act on it any more than she would recommend rewriting *Romeo and Juliet*. And yet, as she looks around his room—at the old soccer trophies, the photos, the vacation souvenirs—she has a powerful desire that she knows she will not, and cannot act upon: to have him at home; to see him as a little boy again; to keep him from growing up. And why shouldn’t she? Growing up is a kind of tragedy. She is conflicted, resigned as she may be to the proper course of events. A good fiction can generate much the same kind of conflict within our desires.
satisfaction conditions of i-desires pertain to what occurs in the fiction (in line with the operator approach), while holding that the content of the state makes no mention of the fiction (in accordance with the Simple View). So, for instance, the state that contributes to feelings of despair when Romeo dies is an i-desire, the content of which is that Romeo survives. This (putatively) makes “Romeo himself” the object of the desire, and not the fiction *Romeo and Juliet*. Just as regular desires pair with regular beliefs to generate affect, defenders of i-desires hold that i-desires pair with belief-like imaginings to generate fiction-directed affect. In the present case, the i-desire that *Romeo survives* combines with a (belief-like) imagining that *Romeo is committing suicide* to generate negative affect. While neither state includes reference to a specific fiction within its content, Currie proposes, a canonical statement of the i-desire’s satisfaction conditions will make explicit reference to some fiction. The i-desire is satisfied if and only if, in the fiction, Romeo survives. (Similarly, the imagining that Romeo is committing suicide is “correct” or “appropriate” only if it is true, in the fiction, that Romeo is committing suicide.) Importantly, this picture avoids the problem that Currie’s *Death of a Prime Minister* creates for the Simple View. The reason that Currie’s fiction-directed desire that Margaret Thatcher is assassinated is not satisfied by an actual assassin’s killing Thatcher in the theater is that Currie’s (supposed) desire for her to be assassinated was really an i-desire. I-desires are satisfied by what is true in a particular fiction and not by what is true in reality.

Currie admits that this leaves i-desires with “odd satisfaction conditions” (p. 635). For such states can putatively be about an actual person (e.g., Margaret Thatcher)—in the sense of taking that person as their object—yet be satisfied (or not) according to how things turn out with respect to a mere fiction. Ordinarily, how things stand with the object of a conative state (viz., Margaret Thatcher herself) is the only matter relevant to judging whether that state is satisfied. We can reasonably ask: if my i-desire is really about Margaret Thatcher herself, why should what happens to a fictional character have any bearing on its satisfaction? The fate of the Thatcher character in *Death of a Prime Minister* has no causal influence over Margaret Thatcher herself, who, we are told, is the object of the desire. To simply say that this is how it is with i-desires—that they are about one thing, but satisfied by something causally unrelated to that thing—does little to diminish the puzzle.

A more decisive form of objection is available, however. For the same argument Currie runs against the Simple View can, with a few amendments, be applied to the i-desire view as well. Suppose that the BBC made multiple Margaret Thatcher-inspired fictions. *Death of a Prime Minister* is one, but there is also *A Dangerous Pearl*. Thatcher is pursued by an assassin in both. And let us suppose that I watch the first half of each film one afternoon, delaying their conclusions until the next day. When it comes to *Death of a Prime Minister*, I am rooting, with Currie, for the assassin. Yet, in *A Dangerous Pearl*, I want the Prime Minister to survive.
Troubles with i-desires

(In that film, the assassin’s motivations are less compelling.) What is the proper characterization of these putative i-desires? Working with the tools Currie allows himself, neither i-desire can make reference to the particular fiction that elicited it. So it appears I am conflicted: I i-desire that Thatcher die; and I i-desire that Thatcher not die. Both i-desires take, as their object, Thatcher herself. But, of course, it seems wrong to say that I am conflicted. This is not a case of mixed emotions, after all. I am not “of two minds” in this sort of case. (Contrast my account of tragedy, in fn. 6.) I want one thing to happen to the Thatcher character in *Death of a Prime Minister*; and, as a separate matter, I want something different to happen to the Thatcher character in *A Dangerous Pearl.* Something has gone wrong with the i-desire approach if it suggests I am in fact conflicted. For all my desires can be satisfied simultaneously, if things turn out the right way in each fiction.

We can further put pressure on the Change of Attitude View by showing how it wrongly predicts the situations in which an i-desire will be satisfied. Suppose that I have a single i-desire that Thatcher is assassinated, elicited by my viewing of *Death of a Prime Minister* (*DPM*). I have not yet viewed *A Dangerous Pearl* (*ADP*). Pausing *DPM* momentarily to make more popcorn, I stream, on my phone, the opening of *ADP*, in which she is assassinated—in the first minute, no less! (Here I mirror the feature of Currie’s example where Thatcher herself is chased into the very theater where he is enjoying *DPM* and assassinated; one remains in the context where the initial i-desire is active, while being confronted by another Thatcher-iteration.) Yet I don’t experience any sense of satisfaction, as I wasn’t rooting for that assassin. But why shouldn’t I be at least somewhat pleased, given that I (still) have an i-desire, elicited by *DPM*, that Thatcher is assassinated and, in watching the opening of *ADM*, imagine *that Thatcher is assassinated*? The answer is plain: the content of the relevant desire (or i-desire) was more specific than that Thatcher is assassinated—or even that she is assassinated in some fiction or other. It was a quite specific desire (or i-desire) that, in *Death of a Prime Minister*, Thatcher is assassinated.

Currie might respond by reminding us that i-desires have satisfaction conditions relating to the different fictions that elicit them, which are not tracked by their contents. In that case, a person might i-desire that *p* while i-desiring that

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7 For reasons explained at the end of the previous section, this case does not require there to be a real-world counterpart to the fictional character(s). A similar example is easy to generate with different iterations of James Bond in different 007 films—as explained below.

8 The dueling BBC dramas example can be levied against the Simple View as well. In that case, the problem is one’s having a desire that Thatcher is assassinated (elicited by *Death of a Prime Minister*) and a desire that Thatcher is not assassinated (elicited by *A Dangerous Pearl*). Again one is wrongly characterized as being conflicted; and again one is left without explanation for why one’s desire for Thatcher to be assassinated (elicited by *Death of a Prime Minister*) continues to generate negative affect, or feelings of suspense, even after one has imagined that Thatcher is assassinated (while watching *A Dangerous Pearl*). The clear solution to our problems here is to simply grant that the respective fictions make it into the content of our two desires. As they are desires about two different fictions, there is no cognitive conflict in having them.
not-\(p\) without being at all conflicted, just because the satisfaction conditions of each i-desire pertain to different fictions. However, one might wonder why the defender of the Simple View could not have made a similar move, appealing to differences in satisfaction conditions for regular desires with conflicting contents (e.g., the desire that Thatcher lives, and the desire that she is assassinated) to explain why Currie isn’t thrilled when Thatcher is murdered before him in the theater. More troublingly, for both the Change of Attitude and Simple Views, such differences in satisfaction conditions could make no difference to the causes and effects of the states within a person’s mind, which, we must assume, are determined entirely by a state’s content and attitude. If we cast aside that assumption and claim, to the contrary, that different satisfaction conditions can make a psychological difference, even when the difference in satisfaction conditions is not reflected in a state’s content or attitude, the explanatory value of the notions of attitude and content is undermined. A state’s content and attitude would not suffice to determine its state’s satisfaction conditions or its psychological role. A person could then potentially have two or more i-desires with the same content simultaneously, each of which played different cognitive roles. What theoretical role would the notions of content and attitude—the main explanatory posits in this debate—be playing on such a picture? Surely we will have taken a wrong turn.

A related response worth considering is that an i-desire will typically be cordoned off to, or “quarantined” within, just one imaginative project—occurring only “in the scope of” that project—while another i-desire with the same (or a conflicting) content may similarly interact only with cognitive states relating to the distinct fiction that elicited it (cf. Friend, 2003; see fn. 9). But this just leaves us with the question of how this quarantining-to-a-specific-project is accomplished. As we’ve seen in earlier chapters, the notion of a distinct cognitive (or conative) attitude is typically brought into play precisely to serve this kind of function. It is said that our imagining that \(p\) is quarantined from our belief that \(p\) precisely in virtue of the fact that we take a different attitude toward the propositions in each case (Nichols & Stich, 2000). The difference in attitude is supposed to account for the difference in functional role between the two states which nevertheless have the same content. This explanation of quarantining must be superfluous, or just mistaken, if it turns out that some i-desires are quarantined from imaginings that other i-desires are not quarantined from (The same point extends to regular desires as well, insofar as a defender of the Simple View may wish to appeal to distinct regular desires occurring only “in the scope of” different imaginative projects, in responding to the above objections.)

In any case, if one i-desire (or desire) is quarantined from a cognitive state while another i-desire (or desire) with the same content is not, the two conative states will ipso facto have different functional roles, despite having the same content. This will imply that we are indeed taking distinct attitudes toward the two propositions after all, insofar as attitudes are understood functionally. The price
of maintaining an operator-free account of the content of the states is that we need to posit a distinct cognitive attitude for each new fiction we enjoy. Again something has clearly gone wrong.9

In a blog response to a short version of this criticism I raised elsewhere (Langland-Hassan, 2018b), Currie (2018) proposes that Bratman’s (1992) notion of context-relative *acceptance* may help to dissolve the problem (where, again, the problem is our seeming to have conflicting i-desires elicited by distinct fictions in cases where, intuitively, we lack any conflicting conative states). While I don’t want to pin the view on Currie—it was an informal blog post, after all—it is an interesting idea worth exploring, as others may find it attractive. He offers the example of a ship’s captain who accepts that her ship is in a certain sort of danger with respect to one context, but not another. This person, he writes, “accepts P relative to one context and accepts not-P relative to another and that there is no contradiction in doing so.” This is different than cases of “irrational acceptance” where “the captain becomes so confused that she accepts P and not-P in the same context.” Currie’s idea here is that i-desires (and perhaps “ordinary” imaginings as well) may be context-relative in the manner of acceptances, and that this would dissolve the apparent conflict in imagining that p (with respect to one fiction) while simultaneously imagining that not-p with respect to another.

However, the context-relativity of any acceptance (or imagining) must find its way into the agent’s mind in some way or other. That is, there must be some psychological difference between the person who accepts P relative to context R and the person who only accepts P relative to context Q (where contexts R and Q are different)—even if both people otherwise have the same beliefs. That difference cannot be captured by appeal to the content or attitude of the state, as both accept that P. One might respond, “Well, the different contexts will reveal themselves in the different ways the acceptance that P functions in their broader cognitive economies.” However, I take it as shared ground that such functional differences are to be understood in terms of different attitudes taken toward type-identical contents—that different attitudes essentially serve to mark different characteristic functions a certain type of contentful state may have. The proposal thus suggests that the same attitude is not taken toward the content P in each case, after all. So it

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9 Stacie Friend (2003) also discusses cases where a single character is portrayed in different ways in different fictions, giving rise to correspondingly different emotional responses. She explains away the apparent conflict in the responses by holding that they “occur within the scope of different imaginings.” The question is: what determines the “scope” of an imagining, given that there can be dispositional imaginings, which Friend rightly allows (“We can say that my imaginings and feelings about Tess are dispositional: even if I am thinking about something else entirely, it would be accurate to say that I pity Tess”). Friend simply proposes that the contents of imaginings “remain attached to their sources and thus compartmentalized.” But how do imaginings remain “attached” to a specific source, if not by their contents? It cannot be the mere fact that they are imagined. This is where we need an operator relativizing the contents to a specific fiction.
appears we either have to proliferate attitudes, or adjust the contents. Turning back to the case of consuming fictions, if we go the route of proliferating attitudes, we seem headed toward holding that we adopt a different attitude toward the propositions relevant to each different fiction we enjoy. If we adjust the content, then we are returning to the solution I initially proposed of invoking distinct “in the fiction $F$” operators.

Stepping back, all of these problems were lurking the moment Currie drew a distinction between the content and the satisfaction conditions of a conative state. When he first introduced the idea of i-desires having distinct satisfaction conditions from desires with the same content, the implicit suggestion was that this functional difference was to be accounted for by the nature of the distinct attitudes taken toward the content. It was in the nature of i-desire as an attitude, one might have supposed, that i-desires have fiction-related satisfaction conditions even when their contents make no mention of a fiction. Yet, as soon as there are multiple fictions afoot, it becomes clear that a single attitude of i-desire will be too blunt an instrument to determine which fiction’s events are relevant to the satisfaction of any given i-desire.

10.6 The Life-expectancy of Fiction-directed Desires

There nevertheless remains a last response to consider on behalf of i-desires. With slight modifications, it can also be adopted by defenders of the Simple View. It could be argued that the i-desires (or, alternatively, ordinary desires) elicited by fictions are highly condition-dependent, in that we no longer harbor them when we are not actively attending to the fiction they concern. In that case, I would not retain i-desires (or desires) about the Thatcher of $\text{DPM}$ when I am engaging with $\text{ADP}$, and so would not end up with conflicting i-desires (or desires) in the case I described above.

Currie himself considers and rejects this response when assessing whether a defender of the Simple View could use it in response to his own argument. The Simple View theorist, he notes, might say of the $\text{Death of a Prime Minister}$ case that he has a long-term, stable desire that Thatcher lives, and a condition-dependent desire (while watching $\text{DPM}$) that she is assassinated. This could explain why his eagerness for Thatcher’s assassination while watching $\text{DPM}$ does not conflict with his general support of her outside of the fiction. Currie’s example of the assassin running into the very theater where he is watching $\text{DPM}$ and murdering her there aims to undermine this response. For in that case, he (arguably) remains in the very context where his condition-dependent desire (or i-desire) that she is assassinated (in $\text{DPM}$) is active; and yet, her actual assassination still does not satisfy any desire of his. This, Currie suggests, shows that even if the fiction-directed desire is condition-dependent, it is not a desire
that Thatcher is assassinated. My response can piggyback on Currie's: instead of Thatcher being chased into the theater, suppose that we simply bring an iPad into the theater where Currie is enjoying *DPM* and show him a snippet of *ADP* where Thatcher is assassinated. No desire (or i-desire) of his is thereby satisfied; and yet he is imagining that Thatcher is assassinated (in response to *ADP*) and remains in the context where he (purportedly) i-desires that she is assassinated. Moreover, there is nothing to stand in the way of one's watching both films simultaneously, on two screens. It would be far-fetched to propose that one's i-desires (or regular desires) with respect to each fiction pop in and out of existence as one looks from screen to screen. Turning momentarily to *ADP*, I may still feel anxiety, or suspense, with respect to what is occurring in *DPM*. So the relevant desires persist. Yet neither could one say that I am in some sense conflicted about what I want, just in virtue of wanting the Thatcher character to perish in one, but not the other fiction.

In any case, I see no good reason to think that our fiction-directed conative states are, in general, highly condition-dependent. There are clear cases of stable, long-lasting fiction-directed desires. Whenever I return to a mini-series I've been watching, they are there at the ready, assuring that I'm instantly engaged. We can easily generate the same sort of puzzle we have been considering with respect to such stable desires. When James Bond is played by Sean Connery, for instance, I want him to succeed in saving the world; when he is played by Timothy Dalton, I am indifferent. These are stable dispositions. I retain them in my sleep. With my Connery-related desires in mind, we can say that, right now, I want James Bond to defeat the evil masterminds. But, then, why am I indifferent as I watch the Dalton-acted *License to Kill*? Well, the desire (or i-desire) in question was not directed at *that* James Bond. Properly characterized, my stable desire is that the James Bond of *Goldfinger*, and other Sean-Connery-acted-installments, saves the world. Again the notion of fictionality—and even of a particular fiction—must enter into the content of the state.

My arguments in favor of the Change of Content View have, up to this point, focused on fiction-directed conative states: desires and i-desires. I will now move toward a broader defense of the Operator Claim (OC), by arguing that the same points extend to our fiction-related (“belief-like”) imaginings as well.

### 10.7 Imagining that, in the Fiction, *p*, and the Problem of Thatcher’s Pearls

At the beginning of this chapter, I advertised a surprising conclusion I would endeavor to reach, dubbed the *Operator Claim*:

\[ \text{OC: when recovering fictional content from a fiction } F \text{ in which } p \text{ is the case, we do not simply imagine that } p; \text{ rather, we imagine that, in the fiction } F, p. \]
We will need to include ‘in the fiction’ operators within proper ascriptions of imaginings for much the same reason they are required within ascriptions of fiction-related desires (or i-desires).

First, we can find cases where doing without such operators commits one to ascribing contradictory imaginings where there are none. These mirror the dual BBC drama cases where the Simple View and Change of Attitude View wrongly ascribe conflicted desires (or i-desires) about Thatcher’s assassination. Suppose again that I am watching the two Margaret Thatcher dramas on dual screens, shifting my attention from one to the other now and then. (It is not necessary to the example that I am watching the fictions at roughly the same time, provided, as earlier argued, that fiction-related desires and imaginings are not highly condition-dependent; the present version of the argument avoids depending upon that point, however.) In *A Dangerous Pearl*, Thatcher is always wearing a pearl necklace; in *Death of a Prime Minister*, she is never wearing one. On the ordinary account of things—making no use of ‘in the fiction’ operators—we have to say that I am simultaneously imagining that Margaret Thatcher is wearing a pearl necklace (as a result of taking in *ADP*) and imagining that Margaret Thatcher is not wearing a pearl necklace (as a result of taking in *DPM*). Is this a plausible account of things?

Set aside the BBC fictions for a moment. Can I, right now, imagine that Margaret Thatcher is wearing a pearl necklace and that Margaret Thatcher is not wearing a pearl necklace? I can certainly imagine one proposition after the other: I imagine that she is wearing a necklace; then I imagine that she takes it off. The question is: can I imagine one proposition while I am still imagining the other? This may be possible. Perhaps I can imagine a kind of macro-scale quantum non-locality, wherein Thatcher’s necklace both is and is not around her neck. I will, in any case, place no barrier on imagining apparent contradictions of this sort. Yet this clearly isn’t the imaginative project I am engaged in as I watch the two BBC dramas. They are not forcing me to imagine a violation of folk physics. The more natural thing to say is that the imaginings take two different objects: *DPM*, with its events and characters; and *ADP*, with its own events and characters. I imagine that, in *A Dangerous Pearl*, Margaret Thatcher is wearing a pearl necklace; and I imagine that, in the *Death of a Prime Minister*, Margaret Thatcher is not wearing pearls. This instantly resolves the ambiguity and removes any suggestion that I am contemplating bizarre quantum phenomena. Yet this response is only possible if fiction-directed imaginings involve ‘in the fiction’ operators, just as fiction-directed beliefs and desires must.

Again one might respond that my simultaneous imaginative projects somehow remain quarantined from each other, as a means to omitting ‘in the fiction’ operators from our imaginings. One way to develop this response is to suggest that we have different imaginative dispositions with respect to each distinct fiction we enjoy. But this again recreates, within imagination itself, the need to quarantine
contents from each other that the distinct cognitive attitude of imagination was originally introduced to explain (as in Nichols & Stich (2000), and Currie & Ravenscroft (2002)). In proposing distinct sets of dispositions relevant to each fiction we enjoy, we have, in effect, posited distinct boxes corresponding to each fiction. After all, the heavy-duty theorist’s cognitive “box” is just a cognitive reification-cum-explanation of the fact that we ascribe different cognitive and behavioral dispositions with ascriptions of “imagines that $p$” than we do with ascriptions of “desires that $p$” or “believes that $p$.” Now we are likewise forced into positing distinct boxes as an explanation for the different dispositions we ascribe with “imagining that $p$ with respect to Death of a Prime Minister,” as opposed to “imagining that $p$ with respect to A Dangerous Pearl.” We have simply multiplied the stock of primitive attitudes, each of which will have a somewhat different associated functional role. Where will it end? A person can be reading several different novels over the course of a week, keeping each well enough in mind to pick it up and follow along at a moment’s notice. Such a reader has distinct “imaginative dispositions” relating to each novel. Is she exploiting a distinct cognitive box for each novel, each corresponding to a primitive, fiction-specific set of dispositions? Of course not. She simply has beliefs about what is happening in each novel that are accessed and used when engaging with each.

A second problem that results when we omit ‘in the fiction’ operators from our fiction-related imaginings is that we run into cases where we fail to experience the kind of affect we ought to, given our imaginings. Suppose that I am deeply engrossed in Death of a Prime Minister and form a strong desire that, in DPM, Thatcher is assassinated. (I am taking it as established, by earlier arguments, that such fiction-directed desires involve ‘in the fiction’ operators.) Pausing DPM momentarily, I watch the first few minutes of A Dangerous Pearl, where she is assassinated in the opening scene. On the standard view of fiction-consumption, I am now imagining that Thatcher is assassinated (in response to ADP). Yet this imagining does not generate positive affect in combination with my desire that, in Death of a Prime Minister, Thatcher is assassinated. Why not?

Well, intuitively, the imagining is not about the right fiction. What would it take for the imagining to be about the right fiction? The answer is clear: the specific fiction would need to feature in the content of the imagining. That is the only plausible way to render the imagining relevant to my desires about one, as opposed to the other, fiction—or, indeed, to any existing fiction at all. If I imagine that, in DPM, Thatcher is assassinated, this state can potentially combine with my desire that, in DPM, Thatcher is assassinated, to generate positive affect. But simply imagining that Thatcher is assassinated will not do the trick.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^{10}\) A last response to the OC worth considering mirrors the claim that our fiction-related desires are highly condition-dependent and therefore only temporary. Suppose that it is a general constraint on sui generis imaginings that we can only imagine one proposition at a time. In that case, there would
Conclusion: if our imaginings are to play a role in generating fiction-related affect, and if we are to avoid attributing contradictory imaginings where there are none, we need ‘in the fiction’ operators within our propositional, fiction-directed imaginings. Indeed, for our imaginings simply to concern one fiction, as opposed to another, relevant ‘in the fiction’ operators are required within the imaginings. This level of detail is always present in our mental states themselves, even if our ordinary verbal ascriptions of beliefs, desires, and imaginings often rely on context to provide it. Just as we might say, “The Dude hates the Eagles” in casually expressing our belief that, in *The Big Lebowski*, The Dude hates the Eagles, we may also say that we are imagining that The Dude hates the Eagles when, strictly speaking, we are imagining that, in *The Big Lebowski*, The Dude hates the Eagles. Focusing on the fact that emotional immersion requires appropriately matched cognitive and conative state pairs is simply a means for highlighting the fact that our ordinary, operator-less, ascriptions of imaginings are always elliptical for certain fuller, operator-involving contents that characterize our psychological states.

We shouldn’t be too surprised by this. After all, why would things be any different for (supposedly) belief-like and desire-like imaginings than for beliefs and desires themselves? There is a difference between believing (falsely) that Gotham is a dangerous city and believing (correctly) that, in the Batman fictions, Gotham is a dangerous city. So too there is a difference between imagining that Gotham is a dangerous city and imagining that, in the Batman fictions, Gotham is a dangerous city.

be no threat of imagining contradictory propositions in the example involving Thatcher’s pearls. For no two imaginings could remain on stage at the same time, as it were. In support of this view, it could be remarked that imaginings (unlike desires) are occurrence states, not dispositional or stored ones. When we think of other occurrence states—just as judgments, decisions, and thinkings more generally—the (roughly) one-proposition-at-a-time limit might seem to make sense. If we cannot judge or decide multiple propositions simultaneously, why think that we can imagine them?

The most significant problem with the “one-proposition-at-a-time” response is that it undermines the main rationale for invoking imagination in the primary contexts where it is thought to be required, including fiction appreciation, pretend, and conditional reasoning. Imagination is said to be the means by which we draw out inferences about what is true in a fictional world based on what is made explicit by the fiction itself. When, in *Pride and Prejudice*, Elizabeth reads that Lydia has gone to London with Wyckham, we imagine that she is devastated and concerned for her family’s future. We imagine this just because we are also imagining that Elizabeth is in Victorian England, that Lydia is unmarried, that an unmarried woman eloping can undermine an entire family’s reputation, that Elizabeth herself is unwed and hopes to find a husband, and so on. In general, what we imagine, based on our uptake of some new proposition expressed in a fiction, is determined by what else we are imagining at the same time, with respect to that fiction. Holding that we can only imagine one proposition at a time would prevent any inferential interaction among multiple imagined premises. This would render imaginings useless to the recovery of inexplicit fictional content. (Walton (1990, pp. 16–18) is one who, early on, saw clearly the need for dispositional imaginings that could account for the apparent inferential interplay among imagined propositions; see also Friend (2003)).
10.8 The OC’s Implications

It is not due to a small oversight, or an easily corrected infelicity, that views positing i-desires and *sui generis* imaginings run into the problems discussed in this chapter. In separating the satisfaction conditions of i-desires from their content, Currie must rely on the attitude component of the state to account for why it has the specific satisfaction conditions it does, relating to what is true in one fiction and not another. Likewise, in omitting ‘in the fiction’ operators from “ordinary” imaginings, others implicitly push the burden of achieving reference to a specific fiction onto the notion of an *attitude*. Normally, the work of achieving reference to one entity, as opposed to another, is reserved for the notion of *content*. Content is the right tool for the job, as we are not limited to a single content in characterizing our dealings with all different entities. We are able to reorder and recombine our many concepts so as to generate thoughts with innumerable distinct complex contents—and correspondingly distinct satisfaction or correctness conditions. The notion of an attitude, by contrast, paints in broad strokes and, ordinarily, is used to account for quite general cognitive differences, such as the distinction between a state that *guides* and one that *motivates*. Relying on the notion of an attitude—be it an imagining or i-desiring—to direct our thoughts at one versus another fiction dissolves the distinction between content and attitude itself.

The curious upshot of all this is that we have rendered *sui generis* imaginings cognitively superfluous, to the extent that we expected them to do special work either in quarantining our cognitive representation of a fictional world from our beliefs, or in making our appreciation of a fiction somehow more cognitively direct than it would be if we had to rely upon beliefs about what is true in a fiction. We now see that *sui generis* imaginings (were there such) would serve their quarantining function in just the same way as ordinary beliefs—i.e., via operators. Further, if our immersion in a fiction really were threatened by the presence of ‘in the fiction’ operators within our beliefs, drawing on imagination would stand us no better. For the same operators must be present there as well. Given that all sides should, in any case, allow that we *have* beliefs of the form “In fiction *F*, *p*,” for any fiction we can recall, we may as well let those beliefs—and the judgments in which they were formed—do the needed work in explaining our emotional responses to fiction (when paired with the relevant desires). There is no reason to call upon an additional state of imagining that, in fiction *F*, *p*, to do the same work in the same way. This point is bolstered by the fact that we already saw, in Chapter 9, that ordinary beliefs are sufficient to explain how we recover both implied and explicit content from fictions.

In the balance of this chapter I want to put this conclusion on firmer footing by addressing three independent worries one might have about the claim that beliefs and desires with ‘in the fiction’ operators serve to explain immersion. My full
positive account of immersion won’t be complete until Chapter 11, however, where I address the paradox of fiction.

10.9 Immersion in the Fiction as Such?

To be immersed in a fiction, as I have understood it, is to be deeply emotionally involved in the fiction and concerned for its characters. In earlier work, Currie (1990) finds fault with the sort of operator-laden view I propose, on the grounds that beliefs and desires with ‘in the fiction’ operators put us at too great a distance from the events of a fiction to render it compelling. He raises this objection in response to a view of Walton’s:

If we adopt Walton’s proposal, we shall have to say that the reader does not take any attitude toward the propositions of the story, but instead takes the attitude of belief toward the propositions in which the propositions of the story are embedded. And if we do say this, it will remain a puzzle as to how our engagement with the story can generate strong feeling. We tend to distance ourselves from disturbing tales by reminding ourselves that they are only make-believe; if the content of the reader’s thought is that it is make-believe that the governess is in danger, his feelings are likely to be inhibited. What makes me anxious is the thought that the governess is in danger: a thought I do not believe, but which I do make believe. (1990, p. 210)

Currie might extend this worry to my view in the following way. Returning to my earlier example from The Wire, in judging that, in the fiction, Wallace is murdered, I have reminded myself of the fictionality of the event. This judgment should cause emotional distance—not concern—as I am, in making it, reaffirming my awareness of the event’s fictionality.

There is indeed a sense in which reminding ourselves that a fiction is a mere fiction can help to diminish its emotional impact. But reminding ourselves that a fiction is “only a fiction,” in that sense, is not simply a matter of having a thought that the events it describes are fictional; it is a matter of putting the fiction into context with other, weightier matters. Suppose, by comparison, that I am immersed in a game of baseball: the Chicago Cubs are on the brink of a World Series victory. We can correctly characterize me as having thoughts involving an “in this baseball game” operator. I believe that, in this baseball game, the Cubs are only two outs away from winning; I believe that, in this baseball game, the Cubs are clinging to a one-run lead. These beliefs are partly responsible for my heightened affect. Should the Cubs end up blowing the lead and losing the series, I might try to console myself by meditating on the fact that it is “only a baseball game.” I might, for instance, turn on the news, see evidence of real tragedy, and,
Does Immersion Involve an Imaginative “Spectrum”?

Susana Schellenberg makes a somewhat different appeal to *sui generis* imaginings in the explanation of immersion. She argues that when we become immersed in a pretense or fiction, it is because we are entering into mental states that are more belief-like than they are imagination-like (2013, pp. 508–11). For Schellenberg, these belief-like states do not involve ‘in the fiction’ operators; instead, they have the same content as the imaginings one has when not immersed in a fiction. As she sees it, we only become deeply immersed in a fiction when we move from imagining its content to doing something more like believing it:

> When a good actor plays a villain, she does not simply imagine that she is a villain. She immerses herself in her role. In doing so, she arguably adopts mental representations that are to some extent imagination-like and to some extent belief-like. (2013, p. 510)

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10.10 Does Immersion Involve an Imaginative “Spectrum”?

puts the game in context, no longer feel so bad about the Cubs’ latest misadventure. In one sense, I was always aware that the event was “only” a baseball game. The fact that it was a baseball game explains why I was interested in it in the first place; I *like* baseball. But, in another sense, I can remind myself that it is *only* a game—I can put the game in broader context—as a way of emotionally distancing myself from it. This will involve more than simply judging that it is a game. It will involve actively comparing the significance of baseball games to other matters.

The same points apply to our appreciation of fictions. We generate beliefs about what is happening *in the fiction*, which combine with our desires about what is true in the fiction to generate affect. In the case of my watching Wallace being murdered in *The Wire*, my awareness that the fiction is indeed a fiction is essential to the emotions being bearable at all. As immersed as I was in *The Wire*, I had clearly in mind that it was only a fiction; this is why I was not completely horrified. (For a stark class of examples, consider dark comedy in the vein of *Dr. Strangelove*. Our awareness that the fiction is a fiction is obviously essential to explaining the resulting affect.) That said, if the affect becomes too intense or unpleasant during our engagement with a fiction, we may try to put it into broader context, comparing it to weightier matters, as a way of distancing ourselves from it, reminding ourselves that it is “only a fiction.” Doing so will involve more than simply judging that such and such is a fiction (as though we had forgotten!). It will take an active attempt to compare the fiction’s significance to other matters.

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11 I owe this point to Maxwell Gatyas, who proposed it in conversation.
Schellenberg conceives of the situation in terms of a spectrum of cognitive boxes, with “pure” imagination on one end, pure belief on the other, and intermediate boxes between. “In nonimmersive cases of imagination,” she explains, “propositions in the pure-imagination box are in play,” whereas:

In the case of imaginative immersion, propositions from the intermediate boxes are in play. Depending on how immersed one is, propositions from boxes closer to or farther from the pure-belief box are in play. (pp. 510–11)

So, according to Schellenberg—and in contrast to theorists such as Weinberg & Meskin (2006b) and Nichols (2006b)—“pure” imagination does not trigger emotion. However, there are many intermediate states between pure imagination and pure belief that do elicit related emotions. The difference between an adult who makes a lame show of pretending to be a lion and the child who gives full-throated performance is due to a difference in the types of mental states—almost-beliefs or pure imaginative states—underlying the acts. The existence of intermediate states also serves to explain the different degrees of emotional involvement one might have with a fiction or pretense: we become more emotionally involved the more we move from merely imagining a scenario to believing it is the case. On Schellenberg’s view, these intermediate states will be sui generis semi-imaginings—cognitive states between pure imagination and pure belief. If we need intermediate cognitive states of this sort to explain immersion, we will have to give up on explaining A-imagining in more basic folk psychological terms. For not only does imagination remain sui generis on this view; there are a great many intermediate sui generis states besides.

However, the spectrum of emotional involvement and immersion that people experience when taking part in pretense and consuming fictions gives us no reason to think that ordinary beliefs and desires are not responsible at all times. The general phenomenon—being either more or less emotionally involved in a game or narrative—is common to contexts outside of pretense and fiction consumption and requires no special explanation. Consider a game of kickball. As with most sports, there is no pretending involved in playing kickball. It is just a game people play, with different levels of “immersion.” Some people get really into kickball. Others, not so much. There is a psychological difference here. But it is not one that suggests that only one group is acting from beliefs about the game, while the other is simply imagining the game. The contrast between imagining and believing is not to the point. Those immersed in kickball, and those who couldn’t care less, may indeed have more or less the same beliefs about the game. It is the nature and strength of their desires and interests with respect to kickball that makes for the difference. Similarly, Professor A and Professor B might experience quite different levels of immersion in the talk they are both attending, despite having much the same beliefs about what is being said. The reason is that the talk
10.11 Being Upset at the Fiction Itself, or Its Events?

An anonymous reviewer—the aptly-named “Reader Y”—raises an interesting objection. We can distinguish two ways of being upset by a fiction. The first is the ordinary way: something bad happens to a beloved character; we hold out hope that things will get better for him. The second is less common: we feel upset and betrayed by the fiction because something has happened that, aesthetically, is just off. We’d put our trust in the fiction—we’d invested hours of our lives in it—and now, either through bad judgment, or laziness, the writers have made the characters do something that is just, well, out of character; or they have inserted a hackneyed plot device where we thought none would occur. Again we are upset by the fiction, but it is different than the kind of upset we feel at a beloved character’s unfortunate fate.

Granting the distinction in ways of being upset, it might seem that the latter cases are those where beliefs and desires about what happens in the fiction are especially relevant; they may seem more squarely directed at the fiction qua aesthetic product. This would suggest that ordinary cases of immersion—the ones I’ve taken as my explanandum—require some other treatment.

In response, we can make sense of the distinction here even if the negative emotions in each kind of case are triggered by beliefs and desires with ‘in the fiction’ operators. In each case, we have a desire that, in the fiction, \( p \); and we are upset when we discover that, in the fiction, not-\( p \). However, in the case where we are miffed by the narrative (or its writer’s decisions), we also experience an
erosion of trust in the narrative. Not only are we upset by what has happened in the fiction; we have now lost some of our faith that the authors of the fiction will meet aesthetic standards we thought were in place. This is disappointing and irksome in its own right, in proportion to how much time and energy we’ve already invested in the fiction. We wanted to continue investing in the fiction so as to enjoy its rewards; yet now we see that the desire to enjoy its rewards will never be satisfied. In addition to our trust being violated, something we found beautiful has been corrupted. We wanted the fiction to remain of high aesthetic quality and, now, it has not. In ordinary cases of immersion, where we are upset by fictional events, there are not these extra layers of discontent.

Compare the experience of tragedy (also discussed in fn. 6). There, too, we have desires that things go differently in the fiction; yet they are counter-balanced by stronger desires that the fiction remain as it is. Where the desires for the fiction to be different strongly outweigh our desires that the fiction remain as it is—where we really do want to rewrite the fiction—we start to lose faith in the fiction’s value. We experience the added dimensions of resenting our prior attention to it, of being disappointed that future investment won’t be worthwhile, and of being saddened that something beautiful has been dented or defiled.

10.12 Summary

It is a combination of our beliefs and desires about what is happening in a fiction that accounts for the emotions we experience in response to fictions. We need not bring a sui generis notion of imagination—or of i-desire—into the picture. It remains true, at a platitudinous level, that we imagine the events of the fictions we enjoy and that our doing so is in part responsible for our immersion in the fictions. However, there are ways of understanding what those A-imaginings consist in that are compatible with reducing them to a more basic collection of mental states—beliefs and desires, in particular.

These claims find support from the Operator Claim. Even if sui generis imaginative states and i-desires were deployed in fiction-appreciation, they, too, would need to feature ‘in the fiction’ operators. At that point, such states offer no explanatory benefit to explaining immersion that aren’t also offered by beliefs and desires. Nor, as I argued in Chapter 9, need we posit sui generis imaginative states in order to explain how we recover implicit or explicit content from a fiction. If all this is correct, then beliefs and desires—and, at times, decisions—are sufficient to explain how we comprehend, cognitively develop, and emotionally respond to fiction.

There is, however, a last puzzle I still need to address. Even if you were convinced that beliefs and desires with ‘in the fiction’ operators were sufficient, in principle, to generate fiction-directed affect, you might still wonder where the
desires come from. Why bother to have full-fledged desires about what is happening in a fiction? After all, it's only a fiction! The door seems to swing open again for imagination to provide an answer. It may seem that it is only in vividly imagining the events of a fiction that we come to have the desires that, in turn, pair with certain beliefs (or the imaginings themselves) to generate related affect.

It will require another chapter—the next—to untangle the many knots in this tempting line of thought.
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300 REFERENCES


302 REFERENCES


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