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Inward internationalisation

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Abstract
Duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap, particularly amongst those populations most capable of bearing the financial burdens of fulfilling them. This motivation gap is explained, at least in part, by the structure of the state system, which facilitates group identification with fellow citizens to a greater extent than with outsiders. This structural feature of the state system gives states little incentive to further the cause of global justice. Yet, given that states are the most powerful actors on the global stage today, a more just global order is likely predicated upon the development of more just states. In light of these realities, in this paper I make the case for an approach to furthering global justice which I call inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation calls for the initially modest structural transformation of domestic states, so as to make domestic governments and their constituents increasingly sensitive to their international obligations. Inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states’ representatives. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. After outlining these functions, thereby showing the attraction of inward internationalisation, I argue for the strategic accessibility of inward internationalisation as a path to reform, by outlining the dynamics which might cause inward internationalisation to spread as a norm of governance amongst states.

Keywords Global governance; sentimental cosmopolitanism; statism; accountability; feasibility; interdependence

Introduction

Given the extent of global injustice, many of us believe that the international order needs to be transformed. In part, the need for such transformation stems from the pathologies of the state system itself. As Luke Ulaş observes, ‘states are fundamentally particularistic entities that claim the sovereign right to discriminate between members and non-members’ (Ulaş, 2017, p. 658). States’ governments, moreover, are structurally incentivised to be more sensitive to their own members’ interests than even the most urgent needs of distant others, and those who are lucky enough to be born into
a developed country gain considerably from such an arrangement. It is thus no surprise that duties to address global injustices face a large motivation gap (see e.g. Hobbs, 2021; Lenard, 2010; Long, 2009) - citizens of wealthy states have, for instance, shown themselves wholly unwilling to support global redistributive policies remotely comparable to the generous ones from which their fellow citizens benefit. In light of this, many have advocated for ‘top-down’ governance reforms which, in one way or another, try to make the global order more like a liberal-democratic state (Kuyper, 2015). At the more radical end among such proposals are those which call for something akin to a world state (see e.g. Cabrera, 2004; Marchetti, 2008); somewhat more moderate proposals still call for the democratisation of the global order as part of a multi-level system of global governance (see Archibugi, 2008; Held, 1995).

Yet, for better or worse, it is also the case that any transformation of the international order will itself have to be wrought through the agency of states, insofar as they are by far the most consequential actors on the international stage. A more just international order is therefore very likely predicated upon the development of more just states (see Slaughter, 2010; Ypi, 2008). Thus far, however, states – particularly the most powerful of them – and their citizens have shown little appetite for ceding their sovereign privileges to better realize international justice through any significant strengthening of international organisations; if anything, support for such measures seems to be waning. This raises a worry about the very accessibility of a more just international order – how do we move beyond our own unjust state-based order when such a transformation would have to be undertaken by the states in question?¹

Given such concerns, ‘bottom-up’ responses are well worth exploring. There have been some valuable contributions of this kind to the debate on cosmopolitan reform.² The literature on cosmopolitan sensitization, for instance, focuses on countering our default prioritisation of co-nationals over distant others through cultivating stronger and more helpful emotional responses to the plight of those distant others (see e.g Dobson, 2006; Hobbs, 2021; Nussbaum, 2001; Woods, 2012). And, while the literature on cosmopolitan sensitization is generally silent regarding any particular vision of how the international order should be structured, there are clear affinities between this body of work and emerging work on the ‘responsible cosmopolitan state’ (see e.g. Beardsworth et al., 2019; Brown, 2011; Slaughter, 2010; Ypi, 2008, 2012). Those who advance the idea of the responsible cosmopolitan state believe that the state is here to stay, in one form or another, but that through the cultivation of a more cosmopolitan-oriented, contestatory citizenry, it has the potential to be an agent for global, and not just domestic justice.

While I sympathise with such work, I go further in proposing a specific type of institutional reform which would serve to increase the political
accountability of states to their international stakeholders, while also enhancing cosmopolitan sensitization amongst their citizens.3 ‘Inward internationalisation’ involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice to other states within their own domestic deliberations. This serves informational, expressive, and dynamic functions. It serves an informational function by informing legislators and citizens of their decisions’ (foreseeable and actual) international impacts, as well as of how those decisions are received by international partners. It serves an expressive function by signifying the interdependence of states’ respective efforts to realise domestic justice, clarifying the moral situation between them while also symbolizing a vision of state sovereignty suited to our contemporary circumstances. It serves a dynamic function by cultivating within domestic citizenries an appreciation of their international duties, increasing the likelihood that over time states will support morally required redistributions of wealth, power, and voice, and will come to identify ever greater opportunities for positive-sum international cooperation. Inward internationalisation thus understood works with rather than against the grain of sovereignty and enhances states’ accountability towards one another, all while further sensitizing their respective populaces to their international responsibilities.

In a recent paper, Simon Caney (2016) suggests four criteria against which to evaluate institutional reform proposals; they are – rephrasing slightly – permissibility, desirability, accessibility, and stability.4 The remainder of this paper will be structured so as to show that inward internationalisation fares well on each of these four criteria. In the next section, I show that implementing inward internationalisation is a morally permissible course of action for states insofar as it enhances rather than detracts from their procedural legitimacy, and implementing it may even be a moral requirement. After that I argue that inward internationalisation plays three desirable functions – informational, expressive and dynamic – which, taken together, ought to move us considerably closer to a just international order. I refute several possible objections at this point, before moving on to questions of feasibility. I argue that inward internationalisation has the institutional resources to be stable (without thereby generating worrying path-dependence), and that it is eminently accessible from where we are today.

**Sovereign legitimacy in an interdependent world**

Would it be morally permissible for states to undergo inward internationalisation? A complete answer to this question hinges in part on what sorts of outcomes we can expect inward internationalisation to produce; let’s bracket this issue for now. Here I want to argue that, considered solely on its procedural merits, inward internationalisation is not only morally permissible, but may well be morally required. To do so, I draw on recent work in legal
theory and political philosophy to argue that the traditional Westphalian model of sovereignty – where the internal governance of a state is wholly its own business – is outdated, and that legitimate sovereign rule in an interdependent world requires consideration of non-members’ interests and accountability to non-members’ representatives. Inward internationalisation represents a way in which this more enlightened understanding of sovereignty can be instantiated institutionally.

Before doing that, it’s important to get clear on the proposed reform in question. By ‘inward internationalisation’, I refer to structural transformations of domestic states’ political spaces which serve to make those states’ international ties and resultant obligations increasingly salient within domestic political discourse. At the legislative level, inward internationalisation involves states giving a public, formal, and institutionalised voice within their own domestic deliberations to other states’ representatives. This might be done in different ways. Let me focus on one plausible form that inward internationalisation could take – not to foreclose alternatives, but simply to smooth the ensuing discussion by having something relatively concrete in mind. On this model of inward internationalisation, a state would voluntarily extend speaking rights and some limited agenda-setting rights (i.e. ability to table motions on designated days) to all other states. To allow each state to get fair value for its representation while nonetheless avoiding unwieldiness, each state would be a member of a larger group of states, and within each group opportunities to speak and table motions would be afforded on a rotating basis amongst members; thus only one representative per group could participate in an ongoing debate at any given time. Within each group states could re-arrange the order in which they get the opportunity to participate in the legislature, but these rights would not be tradeable – states could not speak during two sessions in quick succession even if a fellow group-member declined to use their own opportunity. (Representatives would of course be entitled to raise issues pertinent to states other than their own). These rights might be combined with complimentary policies designed to further raise the domestic profile of other states’ concerns, such as compelling political parties to outline a detailed plan for how they would meet their international obligations (as embodied in e.g. the Sustainable Development Goals), designated ‘international’ days where the entire parliamentary agenda would focus on international affairs, or the creation of a standing committee constituted by international representatives. But for present purposes, I’ll restrict my concern to the agenda-setting and speaking rights afforded to international representatives within the ordinary course of parliamentary affairs.

Inward internationalisation so described may appear to some to run afoul of our traditional picture of what state sovereignty includes, and it is perhaps this fact which most plausibly calls into question the moral permissibility of
states’ implementation of inward internationalisation. I want to argue that inward internationalisation does indeed conflict with the traditional picture of sovereignty, but that this is a feature of the proposal rather than a bug. On the traditional ‘Westphalian’ model of sovereignty, how the state conducts itself internally and the decisions that it takes are its own business, which other states ought not to intervene in or obstruct. While in historical fact such a sovereign system was more often honoured in the breach than the observance, this vision of states as self-contained bodies, fully entitled to focus on their own interests to the indifference of outsiders, still exerts a powerful pull on our political consciousness. Perhaps the most notable recent illustration of this was the successful Brexit campaign, and its slogan which urged the British people to ‘Take Back Control’ - the implication being that participation in a powerful supranational entity such as the EU represented an intolerable constraint on the self-authoring powers of the British parliament. Some might well balk, then, at the idea that other states ought to be given a formal, routine role in scrutinising and challenging our own domestic policies and priorities.

It may once have been tenable to assume that the agents subjected to the state’s legislation were, by and large, the ones most affected by such legislation. Where jurisdiction and affectedness do align quite neatly, a Westphalian model of sovereignty may well be justifiable insofar as each state would have little reason to concern itself with the internal workings of any other, nor would citizens of one state have much reason to feel aggrieved that they had no say in a distant polity. But that world is far from our own. Today we are all impacted by the fluctuations of a shared international economic system, the risks posed by climate catastrophe, states’ respective responses to pandemics, and much more besides. As a result, states’ respective efforts to solve domestic problems and to realize their own political ends are deeply intertwined, whether they like it or not. In this intensely interdependent world, ‘[t]he privilege of bygone days of opting out, of retreating into splendid isolation, of adopting mercantilist policies or erecting iron curtains is no longer realistically available’ (Benvenisti, 2013, p. 295).

It is no surprise, then, that several philosophers and legal theorists have argued in recent years that the Westphalian model of sovereignty is past its sell-by date, at least from a normative perspective; consequently, calls for re-conceptualising sovereignty to better account for states’ interdependence have proliferated (see e.g. Banai, 2016; Benvenisti, 2013; Dietsch, 2011; Ronzoni, 2012). It is important to be clear on the nature of these calls. They are grounded in empirical claims regarding the ways in which global changes have conditioned states’ abilities to realize their ends independently of one another. But lurking beneath this is a moral claim – namely, that states ought to bear additional moral responsibilities with respect to how they conduct their own affairs in light of such interdependence. On the one hand, there’s
a legitimacy-based argument for this conclusion: there is something objectionable about a state implementing decisions with global import where the only deliberators who are given formal standing when debating the decisions are domestic citizens (see e.g. Goodin, 2007). On the other hand, there’s a basic justice concern: where some states have the power to promote or undermine the realization of basic human rights on a planetary scale, it is hard to maintain both that all persons are of equal moral worth and that a state is morally entitled to exercise its sovereign powers indifferently to its effects on outsiders. Given this, it seems that in a world where states affect one another’s abilities so deeply, sovereign rights are only morally defensible if they are matched by sovereign responsibilities. I’ll encapsulate the thrust all this by borrowing Dietsch’s (2011) reframing, of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, which I believe captures the above-stated motivating ideas nicely.

This reframing of sovereignty is, if anything, a little passé – at least since the UN Declaration of Human Rights, states have been thought to have such moral and legal responsibilities. Perhaps the most notable illustration of this in recent years is the emergence of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. In trade, states have long been subject to constraint and punishment within the WTO where their actions have foreseeably or actually deleterious impacts on their trade partners (see e.g. Hoekman & Mavroidis, 2016). And in a particularly suggestive example, the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee has asserted that rights to participate in environmental decision-making are held even by foreign citizens residing outside of a country in cases where they are or will be affected by that country’s environmental decisions (for an extended discussion of pertinent legal developments, see Benvenisti, 2013). Not only does inward internationalisation not involve an illegitimate incursion into states’ sovereignty, then, but it can be seen as going with the grain of emerging trends in international law, and can be seen as a state-level reform which reinforces, builds upon, and embodies this more progressive, more morally defensible understanding of sovereignty under contemporary conditions. Given all this, it is hard to see why undergoing inward internationalisation on the part of a state would not be morally permissible.

Beyond mere permissibility, there may be a moral duty for states to hold themselves accountable to one another in the way that inward internationalisation involves. In his own discussion of international justice, Risse (2012) gives two arguments for why, when one agent owes duties to another, this might in turn generate a further duty of accountability. First, there is an argument from respect: the seriousness of failing to discharge a duty of justice requires errors and failings to be accounted for, and to give this account to anyone other than the claim-holder would belittle those claim-holders. Second, there is an instrumental argument: if agents are required to give reasons for why they acted as they did, and to give account for their actions, this increases the chances that justice will be done, as ‘the prospect of
giving a justification motivates agents to do their best for fear of embarrassment or sanctioning, and makes it unlikely that the agent will simply forget. Moreover, the justification gives the relevant population more leverage to compel agents to do their duty’ (Risse, 2012, p. 338). Insofar, then, as states owe one another duties to justly manage their increased interdependence (see above), there is reason to think they may owe one another a derivative duty of accountability – one which could be fulfilled through implementing inward internationalisation.

It might seem like states could fulfil their duties of accountability simply through their participation in intergovernmental organisations; indeed, this is the context in which Risse discusses states’ duties of accountability to one another. I highly doubt, though, that participation in such organisations is sufficient to fulfil any such duty. Consider first the respect-based argument. It hardly seems respectful for us to have an extended and detailed deliberation before implementing a given piece of legislation, where its merits are evaluated primarily, if not solely, in terms of our own domestic interests – all while adversely-affected outsiders get no say and have nobody representing their morally-pressing interests. This is so even if a state must subsequently defend their policy in intergovernmental forums when they interact with international representatives of the affected outsiders. Indeed, given the ‘stickiness’ of much legislation, it would be ludicrous to think this sort of after-the-fact justificatory process would be a genuine substitute for an opportunity to participate in deliberations before legislation is implemented.

But it is with regards to Risse’s instrumental argument where the advantage of inward internationalisation as a means to ensuring accountability is clearest. At a minimum, the success of the instrumental argument for accountability necessitates two conditions are met: transparency and contestation. Without transparency, the potentially aggrieved state won’t be able to accurately track the other state’s performance. Without adequate contestation, the aggrieved state won’t be able to do anything about their grievance. The absence of either nullifies the instrumental benefits of accountability procedures. Inward internationalisation would – if implemented in good faith – entail considerably more transparency and contestation than can be achieved within the sorts of international organisations we have today. With respect to transparency, because other states would become direct participants in the decision-making process, they would have a greater understanding of the inputs to a decision, as well as its motivations and its foreseen and intended effects. With respect to contestation, other states within an inwardly-internationalised state could appeal directly to (and challenge the decisions of) the governments that are taking a decision, as well as address their grievances directly to the public of another state, and its media. While the power of reputational sanctioning can surely be overstated, it is far more likely to have bite where the government faces recurrent criticism within its
own parliament than in the context of, say, a WTO meeting, meetings to which most citizens in any state are oblivious. Thus, if Risse is right that accountability works in part through the threat of reputational sanction, embarrassment, and the subsequent leverage that these possibilities afford to claim-holders, inward internationalisation may well be a necessary institutional complement to the international duties that states owe to one another.

Three functions of inward internationalisation

Whether it would be morally permissible to implement inward internationalisation will – as I noted above – partly hinge on its foreseeable effects. In particular, it is important that inward internationalisation would not produce any harmful effects – or at least that its harmful effects would be outweighed by its positive ones. Thus, in the section following this one, I will consider several foreseeable objections to inward internationalisation. Before that, however, I want to make a further positive case for inward internationalisation. I'll give several reasons for thinking that the effects of inward internationalisation would be desirable, each connected to a different function that inward internationalisation can play. Those functions are informational, expressive, and dynamic in character. I will take each of these in turn.14

Informational

Perhaps the most obvious advantage of inward internationalisation - one presaged by the Risse quote above – is informational. By granting other states a place within our domestic deliberations, we gain valuable information about the policies or issues under discussion. The clearest sort of information we glean involves the effects of our actions on others; where our policies are likely to have adverse outcomes on distant others, international representatives can alert us to this, and challenge us on whether the ends our policy is intended to further really justifies causing the relevant impacts. To see the value of this, we need only think of the many challenges which might have been raised in response to developed states’ domestic policies during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. International representatives might have challenged such states on the justness of offering booster jabs to citizens while many globally remained unvaccinated, on travel bans imposed upon their countries resulting in considerable disruption, and even on lockdowns themselves, which sent trade with other countries tumbling, ultimately worsening their development outlook considerably. In the face of such challenges, governments may well maintain that the importance of whatever domestic aims are being pursued do justify generating such international externalities. In other cases, however, when confronted with the (foreseeable or actual) international effects of their actions, governments may think twice, seek to
strike a more proportional balance between their own citizens’ interests and those of distant others, or even grant that the domestic benefits are simply not worth the international cost.

This relates to an additional informational benefit of inward internationalisation. Not only can other states’ representatives inform us of the costs and consequences of our decisions, but they can also inform us directly of how our actions are perceived internationally, and so what sort of damage or improvement we’re making to our own international standing. We are wont to take pride in our country’s successes, and often feel shame and anger for its failings. By incorporating international voices into our domestic deliberations, inward internationalisation leverages for good effect what Thomas Nagel refers to in a different context as ‘our own disposition to view ourselves, and our need to accept ourselves, from outside’ (Nagel, 1989, p. 198). By making our international standing a more central part of our domestic deliberations, these sorts of concerns should increasingly take on weight when we judge how we ought to act. (One can imagine, for instance, that most developed countries’ continual failure to meet even their modest aid commitments would come with far heavier domestic political costs if potential recipients had regular opportunities to raise and challenge our governments regarding this failure.) More generally, through an increasing awareness of our international footprint and of how we’re seen by others on its basis, domestic polities may increasingly view their own domestic decisions through a partly-international lens. The change may be modest, at least initially, but it nonetheless has the promise of sensitising us to our state’s responsibilities to outsiders.

Finally, having the perspective of many different states as inputs into our own decisions may alert us to considerations that we ourselves may have overlooked. Where, say, our government or perhaps even our entire political class is in thrall to a particular perspective, whether on market regulation, or housing policy, or penal reform, the input of other states may at least de-naturalise whatever shared assumptions our governments may be operating with. In this sense, other states’ representatives may even help us better realize our own domestic ends. Where this does occur, this in itself would enhance the perceived legitimacy of, and support for, the institutional changes involved in inward internationalisation. Taking seriously the voices of other states, then, may enrich our democratic deliberations and enhance the effectiveness of our own national decision-making.

**Expressive**

Beyond the informational function, inward internationalisation also plays an expressive function; to borrow a phrase from Pogge, it ‘clarifies the moral situation’ between states (Pogge, 2002, p. 165). It is remarkable how little the
internal configuration of domestic governance has changed in the post-war era. Specifically, despite the radical re-envisioning of states’ responsibilities inherent in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the prodigious proliferation of international and intergovernmental institutions, states have not seen fit to change their institutional configuration in light of the post-war international settlement – as if these changes had no implications for how states were to see their internal governance responsibilities and how they relate to the governance responsibilities of other states. Given this, it is no wonder that the idea of pooling state sovereignty tends to be unpopular among citizens; where people’s experience of politics is so inwardly-focused, where the terms of domestic political debate are constructed more or less entirely within the frame of national interests (with the partial exception of what we deem ‘foreign affairs’), and where the implicit assumption is that others have no rightful place in passing judgement on the decisions we make for ourselves, this will inevitably shape views on politics and domestic deliberations more generally.

And there is every reason to expect that polities left largely to converse amongst themselves – where all the relevant shared interests appealed to, all the electoral coalitions formed, all the voices asking questions of politicians are domestic – those polities will gravitate naturally enough towards a national rather than a more cosmopolitan outlook with regards to what is reasonable to require of them as states. This links to one of the more counter-intuitive findings of the social psychology literature, that where people who hold similar views to and commitments with one another engage in dialogue about an issue, their group position does not gravitate towards the middle-ground of their initial judgements, but rather drifts further to the extreme end of the views which they share (see e.g. Isenberg, 1986; Stoner, 1968; Sunstein, 2000). So, where our entire political discourse is framed in national terms, and where what our political discussants have in common are primarily their shared nationality and national interests, it stands to reason that nationalism and its related appeals will typically remain strong, and will likely have a consistent deliberative edge over cosmopolitan appeals. Put more pointedly, I would submit that the failure to accompany the changes to the international order that the post-war order wrought with a complementary set of domestic changes meant that support for further ambitious international reform – and even the maintenance of domestic support for international institutions already created – would always be in short supply.

Inward internationalisation is a means by which states can express or ‘embody’ a more cosmopolitan outlook, and the broader sense in which we operate in an interdependent world, where our own decisions impact upon others, and the fulfilment of our goals is contingent upon the actions of myriad others. It ought to reinforce the realities of our contemporary world in our public imagination. But it also expresses a more specific idea, namely
that sovereigns are only entitled to exercise their sovereign powers when they do so in a way which is congruent with their international commitments. Sovereignty, as discussed above, involves responsibilities as well as entitlements. Where, then, we subject ourselves to the evaluation and judgement of others states when we legislate domestically, we express the idea that, in some sense, sovereigns are ‘trustees of humanity’ (Benvenisti, 2013), and cannot ride roughshod over, or be wholly indifferent to, the interests of those outside their territory. Again, this ought to sensitize citizens in inward internationalised states to their cosmopolitan responsibilities, enhancing the likelihood that they will in fact fulfil their international obligations.

**Dynamic**

These are modest changes. Indeed, in some ways inward internationalisation is a decidedly modest proposal; it does not shift the locus of decision-making power away from states, nor does it constrain the ends to which states can direct their power. Here is where I believe the third function of inward internationalisation comes into play, its ‘dynamic’ function. If inward internationalisation spreads as a norm within states, and comes to be accepted as legitimate within them, I believe it would, over time, create the conditions whereby states would be willing to pursue more dramatic reforms to the international order. If, for example, citizens become acclimatized to seeing their polity as being accountable to distant others, and seeing themselves as part of an interdependent international community rather than an isolated domestic one, they may be more willing to participate in, say, (initially modest) transfer unions, or at least donate a greater portion of their own resources to further globally-urgent causes. Alternatively, they may come to better appreciate the problems that come with humanity being divided up into two-hundred or so separate jurisdictions, and how that makes combating, say, global pandemics more difficult, and so may be more willing to support the creation of more robust international organisations who can help coordinate such challenges. More generally, the initially small form of international integration that inward internationalisation represents may acclimatize citizens to the idea of sharing political power and engaging in political deliberations with distant others, making the prospect of further integration less fearful. Finally, even if robust reform of the international order itself remains out of reach, inward internationalisation itself may be subject to ratcheting-up; while states might initially be given a voice but no vote, their powers and the weight of their voice within a state’s internal deliberations could nevertheless become enhanced over time. In this way, states’ own domestic decision-making could become increasingly sensitive to, attuned to, and even subject to the approval of international society more broadly. In this sense, inward internationalisation represents a fairly modest change,
but it puts in place conditions whereby further, more dramatic changes which are not currently accessible become increasingly accessible over time. It is in this sense which inward internationalisation can play a dynamic function (for this use of the term ‘dynamic’, see Gilabert, 2017).

Objections

As a novel institutional proposal, there is a high burden of proof which inward internationalisation must meet in order to be taken seriously. Before going any further, then, it’s worth considering a few objections that might be raised at this point. Here, I’ll consider three. First, that the sort of sensitization that inward internationalisation’s success is predicated upon is implausible. Second, that inward internationalisation entrenches dominance relations between powerful and weaker states. Third, that even if powerful states do undergo inward internationalisation, there is no reason to think this will lead them to pursue more just international policies. Let’s take these in turn.

First, defenders of a more top-down approach to international reform might criticize inward internationalisation as follows. States have systematically failed to act upon what many philosophers agree are minimal standards of international justice and, as is noted in the introduction, there are structural reasons for this; states are ultimately held accountable by and expected to serve their citizens first and foremost. At a fundamental level, inward internationalisation doesn’t change anything about this picture; decisions are still taken by politicians elected to represent domestic constituents, and those constituents will remain unlikely to object when politicians heavily prioritise their concerns when they conflict with demands of international justice. Inward internationalisation is ultimately, then, a cosmetic change which would have little substantial effect on the realisation of justice. In order to realize a more just international order, considerably more ambitious proposals are needed.

There are several elements of my response to this. Part of the challenge is to show the general plausibility of ‘sensitization’ as a means to reform. The other element is to show that sensitization may work specifically as a means to changing politicians’ and citizens’ preferences. For sceptics of the general viability of ‘cosmopolitan sensitization’, it’s worth noting that there is ample evidence to suggest that we can enhance people’s concern for distant others through sensitizing prompts. Pertinent to this particular discussion, Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013) have found that two proximal antecedents which predict people’s sense of cosmopolitan concern are their normative environment, and global awareness. ‘Normative environment’ captures the extent to which people are surrounded by, or embedded in, social environments wherein they believe that others think cosmopolitan concern is desirable or important. ‘Global awareness’ captures a person’s felt sense that they both
understand, and are interconnected with, others across the world. It should be clear that inward internationalisation both represents a significant change to our collective political environment – one which would underscore the importance of cosmopolitan concern – and would serve to enhance our sense of interconnectedness with, and awareness of, others across the world. This is precisely how the expressive and informational functions of inward internationalisation, respectively, contribute to its more long-term, dynamic promise as a reform; we can see now that its informational function amounts to enhancing our collective global awareness, and its expressive function enhances the cosmopolitanism of our normative environment. (For those who remain sceptical that cosmopolitan concern would translate into tangible effects, note that the presence of cosmopolitan concern predicts action taken for the sake of distant others; for a useful literature review, see McFarland et al., 2019).

We should also reject the tight link drawn in the objection above between politicians’ reasons for action and their domestic citizens’ preferences and interests. To be sure, politicians are highly sensitive to the concerns of their citizens – and would remain so after inward internationalisation; indeed, part of the accessibility advantage inward internationalisation has over top-down approaches to international reform is that it does not transfer governance powers upwards to bodies which might be harder to legitimate through genuinely democratic procedures. But it is also the case that, even absent inward internationalisation, politicians have a good deal of discretion in how they legislate. As a result, politicians’ decisions might be informed by, inter alia, their inability to earnestly defend a particular policy in front of their fellow parliamentarians, the unwillingness to appear callous in front of onlooking journalists, or a desire to uphold – and be seen to uphold – their country’s self-image as a force for good in the world. And, if inward internationalisation were adopted by states en masse, it is worth bearing in mind the reputational costs of systematically ignoring international representatives’ contributions; it is likely that doing so would undermine that state’s own standing when it appeals or challenges decisions in other inwardly-internationalised polities. There may, in other words, be strong material incentives for states to take challenges seriously, if only to preserve their own standing as good faith participants in other states’ political deliberations – so we can add a hard-nosed material calculation to the reasons why inward international would change politicians’ behaviour.

Equally, there is little reason to think citizens’ worldviews are so inelastic that a dramatic change to their political landscape would have no effect on how they see their state and its place in the world; indeed, the very existence of the nation state is a testament to our ability to re-envision our identities and the collectives with which we identify. Moreover, it would be hard for an advocate of top-down cosmopolitan reforms to sustain the above-suggested
line of challenge insofar as they too require citizens to reconceptualise their relation to distant others. The sort of reform process which moves us closer to a just world, after all, will inevitably be gradual and piecemeal: there is no Bastille to storm, nor can any coup simply capture the levers of international power. Insofar as cosmopolitan reform, in whatever form it takes, will inevitably involve ‘coordinated efforts across many polities and generations’ (Smith, 2013, p. 265), any proposal to reform the international order in the direction of justice has to have a story about why the domestic states we have today and their constituents would be willing to reliably cooperate over time to uphold and support such reforms. On this score, it is doubtful that subjecting citizens to powerful global institutions over which they have relatively little control is a better means of doing this than domestically institutionalising and normalising their exposure to the concerns and perspectives expressed by international representatives.

There is good reason to think, then, that the requisite cosmopolitan sensitization of politicians and citizens is viable. It may still be called into question whether inward internationalisation is a good thing, all told. We might worry that if it were widely adopted, it would lead not to a more just world order, but to an exacerbation of smaller states’ domination by more powerful states. Insofar as inward internationalisation would involve smaller states extending representation in their own parliament to the very largest states, one can see how it might be a hard sell to countries who have spent decades – in some cases centuries – under the yoke of foreign oppressors.

I sympathise with the concern, but I don’t think this objection holds up to scrutiny. To be sure, powerful states may seek to wield their position in other states’ parliaments in order to compel compliance with their interests – and may do successfully. So long as there are vast discrepancies of power, wealth, and diplomatic resources in our world, we will continue to see such instances of coercive diplomacy. But there is no reason to think this would be made any worse as a result of inward internationalisation. Inward internationalisation, as I outlined it, does not give powerful states greater speaking or agenda-setting rights than other states; they would have to wait their turn in order to exercise these rights, just like any other states. In this sense, asymmetries of power are levelled out amongst the international community rather than intensified – at least formally.

More substantially, note that powerful states already have considerable access to decision-makers in weaker states, and can use all manner of arm-twisting techniques behind closed doors to influence such states. What changes under inward internationalisation is not that powerful states can interact frequently with weaker states, but rather the forum in which this can occur. The very public nature of inward internationalisation makes it highly unlikely that powerful states would wield their full arsenal of arm-twisting techniques in other states’ debating chambers, given the backlash and
resentment this may cause in the other state and amongst other international partners. Indeed, so long as inward internationalisation did successfully reform citizens’ sensibilities, such behaviour may even provoke backlash and shame amongst the powerful state’s own constituents. Inward internationalisation, then, does not obviously enhance powerful states’ influence over other states, and it may even slightly curtail such influence if powerful states’ behaviour is constrained by publicity norms and by fear of domestic outcry. In any case, even if inward internationalisation did somehow generate some additional ability for powerful states to encourage compliance amongst smaller states, the additional voice that smaller states receive within powerful states’ domestic chambers would more than outweigh this in a cost-benefit analysis.

This, however, takes us onto the third worry, which is that weaker states would not be able to wield their presence in powerful states’ parliaments to any good purpose. This objection gains its potential force from observing that, above, I have appealed to the self-interested reasons why politicians might take heed of international representatives’ views – namely, in order to ensure that their own state’s representatives gain a fair hearing in other jurisdictions. But of course, a hearing in some states’ parliaments is a far bigger prize than others. The worry, then, is that powerful states actually have no incentive to pay heed within their parliament to the interests of weaker states.

I think this is too quick. It is not only self-interest that ensures that representatives will get a hearing, nor is this the only means through which inward internationalisation produces benefits. The very fact that weak states would be granted the opportunity to ask questions which must be answered by ministers, or put forward motions which must be debated and considered, entails those weak states can at least prod governments (and e.g. onlooking journalists) into awareness of lesser-known international concerns. Where it is evident that the cost of resolving such concerns is relatively low, doing so might represent an easy policy win for a government. In time, and as the voices of international representatives are accepted as part of the national-political mood music, we can reasonably hope that how our country’s actions are viewed by international representatives will shape how a government’s performance is judged overall. Where this occurs, endeavouning to respond at least somewhat adequately to international concerns – no matter how weak the state in question – may become par for the course, in the same way as it is in the case of domestic politicians representing all manner of constituencies. If all this is too woolly for the realists amongst the readership, note that opposition leaders will often have an interest in amplifying the concerns of international representatives. Where a country is running a high trade surplus partly caused by persistently low wage growth, for instance, opposition parties concerned with raising workers’ living standards might make common
cause with international representatives whose own workforces have been greatly harmed by the first country’s policies, thereby marrying material and moral arguments for reform (on this point, see Klein & Pettis, 2020). More generally, international representatives and their grievances ought to provide opposition parties with a ready source of helpful rhetorical and substantive material with which to criticise their government. We can expect, then, that there will often be a symbiotic relationship of sorts with opposition parties, keen to identify the shortcomings of governments, and international representatives, keen to have their positions highlighted and brought front and centre of domestic debates. Given all this, there is little reason to think the powers granted to smaller states under inward internationalisation would be ineffectual.

The feasibility of inward internationalisation

So far I’ve suggested that inward internationalisation, of the sort I propose above, is a promising step which states can take which would serve both to make their own decisions more conducive to the realization of international justice, and make their own citizens more sensitive to the needs and interests of distant others. It also chimes with and reinforces an emerging and more enlightened vision of sovereignty. Finally, I have hinted that, because it focuses on partially internationalising the domestic realm, it faces less difficulties in being realized than top-down proposals which focus on domesticating the international realm – the latter sort of proposals being unlikely to gain support from powerful states who tend to guard their sovereignty jealously.

This final point, however, requires further defence; indeed, perhaps the most pressing objection to inward internationalisation is that it is not nearly so feasible as I have been supposing – if this is the case, it’s not clear that it has an advantage over top-down approaches to cosmopolitan reform. To refute this final objection, I need to show that inward internationalisation fulfils two key conditions of feasibility – namely, stability and accessibility (Cohen, 2009; Gilabert & Lawford-Smith, 2012; Gilabert, 2017). I will say a little about why we should expect inward internationalisation to be stable were it implemented, some of which has been foreshadowed above. I take the primary challenge to be to defend the proposal’s accessibility, however, so it is this to which I will devote the lion’s share of the discussion.

For a proposed institutional reform to be stable, it must be capable of enduring over time, and its endurance cannot be a mere fluke; the sort of stability we care about must come about, at least in part, as a result of the institution’s own effective operation. Stability, so understood, must come about through providing enough agents with the motivation and incentive to uphold and continue to operate within the system. Where an institutional
reform generates no such motivation for adherence or compliance, it will be unstable. I believe inward internationalisation has several features which, taken together, ought to render it stable were it widely implemented. Above I’ve noted the important role that cosmopolitan sensitization plays in ensuring that any cosmopolitan reform does not rest on shaky ground; we can see now that this is a claim regarding the stability of any given reform. If I’m right that inward internationalisation would generate a change in perspective amongst politicians and citizens with regards their states’ international obligations, this would add greatly to its stability as a reform. In addition, there are the self-interested benefits of inward-internationalisation; when other states inwardly internationalise, this gives us greater opportunities to get a hearing for our own concerns. Business leaders might be keen to ensure that, say, the US retains a voice in European parliaments, and vice versa, and NGOs might be keen to ensure that democratic countries retain and use their voice to publicly and forcefully hold unjust regimes to account. But perhaps the key feature of inward internationalisation which would render it stable is that it could leverage strong reciprocal tendencies amongst states. Reciprocity is one of the most durable and universal motivational drivers we have (see e.g. Gintis et al., 2003; Oliver, 2019), and it is no coincidence that Rawls identified it as a core motivational disposition to be leveraged for ensuring the stability of just institutions (see Rawls, 1999, pp. 433–441). If inward internationalism were adopted by countries en masse, then they would each have a symmetrical accountability relationship with one another, in which case the reputational costs of withdrawing from this web of reciprocal representation would be very high indeed. Equally, consistent good faith participation as ‘inward internationalists’ would stand to enhance states’ reputation as reliable partners. In a highly interdependent world, where many global problems require interstate cooperation, states are generally very sensitize with regards to how they are perceived by others (see Chayes & Chayes, 1995). Widespread adoption of inward internationalisation would likely raise the bar for what constituted a minimally acceptable level of commitment from a state towards its international responsibilities.

Inward internationalisation, then, can plausibly generate adequate sensitization to make politicians and citizens comply with the expectation of being responsive to international representatives, generates self-interested reasons for politicians to continue to uphold inward internationalisation, and creates reciprocal accountability relations which are motivationally durable. Taken together, there is every reason to think that inward internationalisation would be stable. Note, however, that it would only generate these dynamics – of cosmopolitan sensitization, political self-interest, and reciprocity-based reasons to adhere in good faith – if inward internationalisation actually worked as intended. If nobody paid attention to the voices of international
representatives, or if the whole thing turned into a mud-slinging fiasco, then there would be no reason to expect inward internationalisation to last.\textsuperscript{21} This suggests a more pessimistically-tinged virtue of inward internationalisation relative to top-down reform proposals; were it not to work as intended in any country, it would be a relatively easy policy to rescind, given that doing so would be entirely within the power of the various states. The same cannot generally be said for top-down proposals, particularly those on the more ambitious end of the scale; in this sense, inward internationalisation likely involves a less perilous path-dependence.\textsuperscript{22}

But all this still leaves the issue of accessibility. If states would be unwilling to support the creation of powerful coercive international organisations of one kind or another, they may be equally unlikely to inwardly internationalise. Indeed, even if a small handful did, we would hardly be much closer to realizing international justice if this meant that it was business as usual within the borders of most states.\textsuperscript{23} And, given that we cannot appeal to the motivational ballasts which would render inward internationalisation stable to explain how it would get off the ground in the first place, there is still something to prove with regards to its accessibility as a widespread norm. But I believe this challenge can be answered. Below I detail what I take to be a plausible path of reform, based on an initial act of norm entrepreneurship (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) and a subsequent process of norm diffusion. Essentially, a limited number of states, or even just one state, can institute inwardly-internationalist reforms, at which point the norm may spread to other partners as a result of a combination of national interest, moral commitment, reciprocity, and, over time, international pressure. I discuss what I take to be a plausible theory of how norms can diffuse amongst states, before briefly suggesting three alternative sorts of state(s) that might be viable norm entrepreneurs for a form of inward internationalisation. That there are three very different paths along which it could be supported suggests that inward internationalisation could be subject to a sort of overlapping consensus among states, even if such support from states is grounded in very different sets of motives.\textsuperscript{24} To paraphrase Jacques Maritain speaking on the emergence of human rights norms, states may thus come to agree about the merits of pursuing inward internationalisation, but perhaps on condition that no one asks them why.\textsuperscript{25}

Let’s start with a puzzle.\textsuperscript{26} There are many regimes across the world that are democratic in name only, and who have little desire to run free and fair elections. While this fact confronts us in many different forms, one of the strangest ways in which it is brought to our attention is that we quite often hear that international election monitors have deemed a certain election not to be free and fair; it was, put more bluntly, rigged. Indeed, despite the large contingent of ‘democratic-in-name-only’ governments, around 80\% of the world’s national elections are subject to international monitoring. This is
strange; if, after all, a government had no intention of running free and fair elections, it’s far from obvious why it would bother allowing independent election monitoring in the first place. This is especially puzzling given that negative monitoring reports have been linked with domestic conflict, reductions in aid received and debt relief, and general losses to international and domestic perceptions of a government’s legitimacy. How has electoral monitoring spread so widely, when it represents such a clear signal of a purportedly democratic state’s corruption, when being caught out comes with considerable costs, and when prior to 1962, there was not a single recorded case of international monitoring of sovereign states’ elections?

Working with a global dataset from 1960–2006, Susan D. Hyde (2011) proposes what I take to be a compelling (and empirically well-supported) answer. Essentially, as parties within the international order (e.g. states, investors, multilateral organisations) began to confer benefits (whether material, reputational, or otherwise) upon democracies, being able to signal one’s democratic credentials became increasingly important. Inviting election monitoring was a credible signal through which incumbent leaders could show that they were, in fact, democratic; this was particularly important for countries that were not democratic in the past, whose governments wanted to show they were serious about reform. For countries committed to democracy (Hyde calls them ‘true democrats’), the benefits of inviting election monitors may have been high, and the cost of inviting election monitors was very low, seeing as these governments had nothing to fear from the monitors’ reports. So, take-up among true democrats was large. Once inviting election monitors became a norm among true democrats, however, not inviting election monitors in itself became a telling signal to the international community that a government was not truly committed to democracy (Hyde calls such governments ‘pseudo-democrats’); if they were truly committed, after all, they would obviously invite the election monitors. Thus we can explain the above-mentioned puzzle. In effect, pseudo-democratic regimes are damned if they do, and damned if they don’t; not inviting election monitoring is just as clear a signal of their undemocratic nature as a negative report from an election monitor would be. So better to at least try and game the system by inviting the election monitors and hoping you don’t get caught.

I believe a similar set of dynamics could help spread a norm of inward internationalisation among states, even among those who have no desire to make themselves genuinely accountable to international society. The pressures that could lead to a spread of inward internationalisation would be no different to those that helped spread election monitoring as an international norm, insofar as they involve pressure to be a certain kind of state, and to ascribe to a certain theory of sovereign legitimacy, made manifest in a set of institutional forms. Over time, as states began committing to inward
internationalisation, perhaps on a reciprocal basis, the pressures on hold-out states would increase, both from international partners who would like a voice in those hold-out states’ domestic deliberations, and from domestic constituents (e.g. citizens, NGOs, businesses) who either come to see inward internationalisation as a morally-necessary response to global interdependence, or may want their state to have a voice in other states’ deliberations, or both. Over time, as inward internationalisation spreads, material benefits may begin to be conferred on inwardly-internationalised states, and withheld from hold-out states. Perhaps, after enough states enact inwardly-internationalising reforms, they may come to be seen as a requirement of any state in good international standing.  

So, here we have three reasons to think that inward internationalisation could spread amongst states: the incentive that states would have in gaining a voice within another state’s domestic debates, the demand for reciprocal treatment from states willing to themselves inwardly internationalise, and the pressures and incentives (diplomatic, reputational, material) to signal that one was a responsible sovereign. This is all to be added to any existing ideological belief that inwardly internationalising, and being duly held accountable to international representatives, is simply the right thing to do. But how does the norm gain ground in the first place? Ultimately, we need some sort of ‘norm entrepreneur’ to set the process in motion. This might seem like the trickiest issue; it’s not very clear what first-mover advantage if any there is in being the first state to inwardly internationalise.

On the contrary, however, I believe that there are several plausible paths by which inward internationalisation could take off, where different sets of agents would have an incentive to be norm entrepreneurs. First, and perhaps the most conventional sort of norm entrepreneur, we might think that states that are geographically close to one another, have a progressive set of ideals with respect to foreign affairs, and are committed to cooperation with one another might give one another seats within their own parliaments. They might do so to facilitate and intensify cooperation between them, and they may do so on the basis of moral considerations of the sort I’ve discussed above. Over time, other states might request similar access to representation on the basis of their own vulnerability to the actions of the enacting states, with the set of inwardly-internationalising countries thereby expanding gradually. Possible candidates for this sort of norm entrepreneurship might be the Scandinavian countries, who have a history of ongoing cooperation and close historical ties as well as an outsized level of soft power on the international stage due to principled positions they have in the past adopted in their foreign affairs (Hilson, 2008). Alternatively, the EU might be a plausible forum for inward internationalisation of this kind; inward internationalisation could be introduced as a way of bridging the gap between domestic and European politics, and enhancing people’s everyday sense of being part of a broader
European community. Perhaps the EU would be especially capable of spreading the norm of inward internationalisation beyond its own confines, given its size, wealth, and long-standing support of multilateralism and international cooperation. It is imaginable that, over time, the EU could treat inward internationalisation as a condition of membership, as well of receiving benefits such as preferential trade agreements, aid packages, and so on. Call this path to inward internationalisation ‘commitment to cooperation’.

A second form of norm entrepreneurship, perhaps closest to the election monitoring story, could involve states with poor international reputations on the path to reform seeking to enhance their standing and signal their reformist credentials to the international community. Certainly, there are other, perhaps less drastic means available to signal one’s reformism than pursuing something as ambitious as inward internationalisation. But this is precisely what would make it potent as a signal, insofar as it would dramatically underline a government’s seriousness about running their state in a responsible manner, accountable to and accepting of the standards of the international community (see Levy, 2020). It may also serve to ‘lock-in’ the reformist intentions of a government, making backsliding into non-accountable governance more difficult. While in the present it may seem unlikely that inward internationalisation would be spearheaded by governments trying simply to prove that they are no longer corrupt, self-serving, etc, this could well change if other agents in the international order were to become more selective, more generous, or both, with respect to the gains they confer on states of a certain standing. Call this path to inward internationalisation ‘reform signalling’.

Finally, a third possible form of norm entrepreneurship would involve a coalition of small or badly-off countries, keen not primarily to signal their own ‘responsible’ credentials, but rather to gain a foothold within the domestic debates of more powerful countries. Think, perhaps, of the small Pacific Island and Caribbean states, or members of the African Union, who may have urgent concerns regarding development opportunities, debt relief, or climate mitigation. On their own, and even often in coalition within international forums, such states’ voices count for little. Were inward internationalisation to gain momentum, however, they could find a voice directly within the domestic deliberations of the most powerful states, whose decisions are so consequential to the fate of these smaller or poorer states. Thus, such states could form a coalition, granting one another a voice within their respective domestic polities. Subsequently, these states could invite other states to take a seat in these domestic deliberations, on condition that this institutional change was reciprocated by the state receiving the invitation. Perhaps not all states would accept this seat, insofar as they might then feel bound to reciprocate the offer. But this is no reason for states that want to encourage inward
internationalisation not to invite all other international states to accept a seat anyway, and thus increase the pressures to reciprocate. Finally, these states, upon setting up a coalition of this sort, could try and persuade NGOs to campaign for larger and more powerful states to enact some form of inward internationalisation, and to thereby show their commitment to responsible sovereignty. By doing this, such states would be seeking to take globally consequential reform out of the hands of the most powerful states, and put it into the hands of states that are most willing to subject their behaviour to public international scrutiny. Call this third path to inward internationalisation ‘strategic coalition’.28

Commitment to cooperation, reform signalling, and strategic coalition all suggest different, non-exhaustive paths down which inward internationalisation could originate and evolve as a norm, as well as involving different sorts of states as norm entrepreneurs. If even one of these paths is viable, then inward internationalisation is strategically accessible. I suggest, however, that the very diversity of reasons and motivations that states may have for adopting some form of it suggests that inward internationalisation could be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst states.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, I’ve argued that in order to enhance our ability to meet global challenges, we ought to pursue a path to reform which I’ve called ‘inward internationalisation’, which involves states giving each other a voice within their respective domestic legislatures. I’ve argued that inward internationalisation is a permissible, desirable, stable, and accessible reform proposal, embodying a progressive reimagining of states’ sovereignty and moving the world in the direction of justice and accountability. I concluded by briefly laying out several paths along which inward internationalisation could spread as a norm amongst states. That these paths involve the spreading of a norm rather than the adoption of a complex collective governance arrangement means that inward internationalisation may well be a more viable route to cosmopolitan reform than top-down proposals. Given all this, it is a proposal worthy of further development and attention.

**Notes**

1. For the present paper, I take it as axiomatic that the international order suffers from significant shortfalls of justice, and that states have more onerous international duties than they are currently willing to fulfil; others have made such a case at length and convincingly so, so I will not retread this ground here. For
one particularly influential discussion, see Pogge (2002). I use the terms ‘global justice’ and ‘international justice’ interchangeably throughout.

2. There are many different senses in which we, or features of our world, might be ‘cosmopolitan’. In this paper I intend only to latch onto a fairly weak meaning of the term, namely that all individuals are of intrinsic value and equal moral standing, and ought to be treated in a way which reflects this equal standing (this is typically referred to as ‘moral cosmopolitanism’).

3. Another interesting bottom-up reform proposal is put forward by Shapcott (2019). Shapcott argues that states ought to adopt constitutional reforms which would constrain the state’s behaviour in relation to outsiders; he also suggests that states should grant outsiders legal personhood, and thus the standing to challenge the state in its own courts. The difference between my own and Shapcott’s proposal recapitulates a more general dispute amongst republican theorists concerning the relative value of political contestation and legal protection as means to ensuring non-domination (see Lovett, 2010; Pettit, 1997, 2012). While I place more importance on avenues for political contestation, I would nonetheless support reforms of the sort Shapcott argues for.

4. Caney talks about ‘moral legitimacy’, ‘effectiveness’, and ‘sustainability’, rather than ‘permissibility’, ‘desirability’ and ‘stability’. Talk about moral legitimacy might suggest our concern is with a state’s right or prerogative to implement a policy, whereas I’m more concerned with whether it is acceptable to do so. (This is also what Caney appears to be primarily concerned with.) Judging a proposed reform in terms of ‘effectiveness’ before the fact suggests more certainty than is warranted. ‘Sustainability’ has too many extraneous connotations and doesn’t align as neatly with the larger literature on feasibility, which I consider below.

5. I should note that the definition I give of inward internationalisation is broader and encompasses more possible reforms than is suggested by the paper’s focus on reforming domestic political chambers. Reforms to a state’s media landscape, for instance, could represent forms of inward internationalisation in the broader sense, as could programs such as the EU’s Erasmus programme, insofar as they habituate citizens to interacting with, learning from, and living with foreign citizens. I focus on the more explicitly political reforms in part for concreteness, and in part because this is the form of inward internationalisation which I believe has most chance of making substantive difference to the decision-making and deliberation of states, certainly in the short-term.

6. This might, however, be made conditional on being granted reciprocal rights in other states’ legislatures; I’ll return to this in the section on stability.

7. While not much hangs on it, I think there are good reasons to favour grouping states together on a regional basis. This is not only a relatively uncontentious way of grouping states, but it also increases the likelihood that international contributions to any given debate will represent diverse perspectives which serves valuable informational and expressive functions (see pp.7–10), and it has the advantage of grouping states together who are likely to have prior experience working together in, for instance, regional governance organisations, plurilateral trade arrangements, and the like. This ought to smooth the process of managing the rotation of speaking and agenda-setting rights.

8. This is to prevent horse-trading amongst states, insofar as better-resourced states might otherwise seek to increase their speaking rights vis-à-vis other countries.
9. These latter ideas are drawn from Caney’s excellent discussion on how domestic institutions could be reformed to mitigate harmful short-termism (Caney, 2016).

10. Drawing on Krasner’s typology, we can understand ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ as an international institutional arrangement between states based on territoriality and autonomy, under which domestic political authorities are, within their territories, treated as ‘the only arbiters of legitimate behaviour’; ‘non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states’ is the ‘basic rule of Westphalian sovereignty’ (Krasner, 1997, p. 656). This contrasts with two other senses in which we talk about sovereignty – ‘domestic sovereignty’ pertains to who has authority and effective control within a territory, while international legal sovereignty pertains to states’ legal recognition of one another and their normative powers (e.g. to enter into treaties; see Krasner, 1997).


12. It’s important to note that both these arguments have more force in the case of powerful states than for weaker ones. Hence, the argument for inward internationalisation that follows is ultimately more compelling in the case of powerful states.

13. I remain on the fence about whether this is in fact a duty, because it is at least conceivable that states’ accountability for their international footprint could be appropriately strengthened through other reforms. The duty, strictly speaking, is to set up adequate international accountability mechanisms.

14. It’s worth noting the structural similarity between inward internationalisation and recent proposals which seek to extend representation to the unborn in our present governance systems (see e.g. the contributions in Gonzalez-Ricoy & Rey, 2019; González-Ricoy & Gossers, 2016; for a useful review see). They each share the diagnosis that domestic governance institutions as currently constituted are ill-equipped to reliably and appropriately respond to the moral imperatives which they ought to observe. Equally, in both cases the solution proposed – or part of the solution anyway – is to institutionalise greater accountability to affected stakeholders through representation within domestic states’ own political deliberations. Those who are sympathetic to calls for representing the future within domestic political institutions, then, should be amenable to inward internationalisation as a policy capable of rectifying international injustice. Thanks to a helpful reviewer who suggested the value of linking the two ideas.

15. According to the OECD, in 2019 only six states (Turkey, Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, UK) met the long-standing UN target of providing 0.7% of their Gross National Income to ODA (see OECD, 2021). The UK has recently voted to scale back its ODA commitments (see The Guardian, 2021).

16. Someone might wonder why having ambassadors in a country isn’t essentially the same as inward internationalisation. Part of the response to this lies in the expressive function of inward internationalisation; it’s precisely the fact that ambassadors are a long-established and taken for granted feature of political life that they cannot now represent a change in how we should see sovereignty and our connection with interdependent others. In addition, the publicity of the role is missing with respect to ambassadors; while politicians themselves will often be met with criticism and feedback from ambassadors, the public will rarely hear these interventions, and certainly won’t consider ambassadors a core feature of their political environment, or regular players in the cut and
thrust of everyday politics. (On the importance of agents’ normative environment in enhancing cosmopolitan sensitization, see ‘Objections’ below.).

17. Whether this sort of ratcheting up would be desirable would have to be judged in large part by how effectively inward internationalisation worked in its nascent phase.

18. A more general worry is that some states will nonetheless gain considerably more than others from their representation within inwardly internationalised parliaments. I grant that this is likely, but I also believe that this will not necessarily track which states are best resourced; oftentimes, it will relate to the skill of the politicians in question. Yet this is simply a specific instance of a generalised phenomenon that some politicians will be more successful at utilising their role than others. I don’t see any grave moral concern here – certainly not one that we’re ever likely to escape.

19. I follow Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012) in thinking that feasibility claims can involve both a binary and a scalar component, depending on the nature of the constraints facing the realization of a particular proposal. Given that there is no reason to think that either top-down reform or inward internationalisation face hard constraints (they don’t e.g. violate laws of physics), my claim that bottom-up reform has a feasibility advantage implies a scalar judgement; both are feasible, but bottom-up proposals such as inward internationalisation are more feasible.

20. On why plainly unjust regimes might nevertheless inwardly internationalise, see below.

21. Note that, in light of the significance that I’ve attached to the dynamic function of inward internationalisation, the place of stability as a necessary condition of feasibility is open to question. If inward internationalisation is merely a temporary stop on the way to a just world, after all, then it doesn’t actually need to be durable, so long as it gets us to the next station. Having said that, I doubt inward internationalisation could have the salutary effects I attribute to it without lasting for a reasonable period of time, hence it seems reasonable to consider whether it has the resources to endure. For scepticism concerning the place of stability in feasibility judgements, see Wiens (2015, p.449, fn.2).

22. This is relevant when we consider worries regarding whether any given institutional reform, however attractive, ultimately closes off more promising avenues in the long run; for discussion, see e.g. Gilabert (2017).

23. Though this would very much depend on which states implemented it, and how earnestly they adhered to standards of responsiveness to international representatives.

24. Of course, that inward internationalisation is strategically accessible does not mean it is likely. Still, insofar as it requires only a small group of government officials in a single state to get it off the ground, inward internationalisation has a distinct advantage over more ambitious international reforms which must effectively convince a great many states of the merits of adoption all at once (for a similar point, see Shapcott, 2019).

25. For the relevant Maritain quote, see Moyn (2012, p. 67).


27. It’s important not to be utopian about the prospects of reform here. To be sure, the era of election monitoring has seen a dramatic increase in the number of states who hold free and fair elections (see e.g. Lührmann et al., 2018), no doubt in part attributable to the material and reputational incentives afforded to
democracies by other, richer democracies. But there are still states who continue to try and game the electoral monitoring system, as well as states who don’t even adopt the pretence of being democratic. Likewise, there would likely be states that try to adopt the façade of inward internationalism without its substance (though it’s not clear how a state would achieve this in practice), and there would doubtless be holdouts. But the broader point here is that as the norm of inward internationalisation (like election monitoring) spreads, the costs to rogue states of pursuing either strategy increase – holdouts become pariahs, and pretenders are continually susceptible to the very public undercutting of their own efforts to appear legitimate. Upon widespread adoption, then, inward internationalisation should generate a tendency (though not an inexorable one) towards compliance.

28. This path to inward internationalisation, which foregrounds weaker states’ efforts to counteract the power disadvantage they have against more powerful states, has clear affinities with Pettit’s discussion on how to reduce international domination; coalitions of this sort, he suggests are a quintessentially republican response to international domination (see Pettit, 2015).

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