

TADHG Ó LAOGHAIRE

TAKING INTERDEPENDENCE SERIOUSLY: TRADE, ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR IN COVID-19

Tadhg Ó Laoghaire

University of Leeds, Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied (IDEA) Centre, Leeds, United Kingdom

Email: rtol@leeds.ac.uk

Abstract: COVID-19 knows no boundaries, but political responses to it certainly do. Much has been made about how the pandemic has revealed the Hobbesian nature of political power, but this picture of politics occludes from vision the interdependent nature of our current international order. In particular, it overlooks the fact that much of the goods, services, capital, and people that societies rely on in order to function are sourced from outside the domestic state. And, conversely, it overlooks the extent to which the policy responses taken in one state have considerable effects on the options available, and the outcomes suffered, in other jurisdictions. This paper seeks to correct this oversight, by highlighting two duties that states bear towards one another in the context of this crisis, by virtue of their participation in international trade relationships. Trade grounds duties of justice between trade partners by making them dependent upon one another in order to realize their respective duties of domestic justice. This dependence, in turn, grounds a duty of stability, and a duty of accountability. Having explained and argued for these two duties, the paper discusses the implications of taking these two duties seriously in the context of states' policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis.

Keywords: trade; international justice; dependence; COVID-19; stability; accountability; essential goods; division of labour; priority; supply chains.

CONSIDERAȚII DESPRE INTERDEPENDENȚĂ: COMERȚ, MĂRFURI ESEȚIALE ȘI DIVIZIUNEA INTERNAȚIONALĂ A MUNCII ÎN CONTEXTUL COVID-19

Rezumat: COVID-19 nu ține cont de granițe, însă răspunsurile politice la acest lucru țin. S-a vorbit mult despre modul în care pandemia a dezvăluit natura hobbesiană a puterii politice, dar această imagine a politicii ocultează natura interdependentă a ordinii noastre internaționale actuale. În special, ea trece cu vederea faptul că o mare parte din bunurile, serviciile, capitalul și persoanele pe care societățile se bazează pentru a funcționa provin din afara statului intern. Și, invers, trece cu vederea maniera în care măsurile politice adoptate de un stat au efecte considerabile asupra opțiunilor disponibile și asupra rezultatelor suferite în alte jurisdicții. Acest articol încearcă să corecteze această scăpare, evidențiind două tipuri de datorii pe care statele le poartă unele față de altele în contextul acestei crize, în virtutea participării la relațiile comerciale internaționale. Comerțul fundamentează datorii ale dreptății între partenerii comerciali, făcându-i dependenți unii de alții pentru a-și îndeplini sarcinile de justiție internă. La rândul său, această dependență întemeiază o datorie de stabilitate și o datorie de răspundere. După ce a explicat și susținut aceste două sarcini, lucrarea discută despre implicațiile asumării în serios a acestor două sarcini în contextul răspunsurilor politicii statelor la criza COVID-19.

Cuvinte-cheie: comerț; justiție internațională; dependență; COVID-19; stabilitate; responsabilitate; bunuri esențiale; diviziunea muncii; prioritate; lanțurile de aprovizionare.

1. Introduction

COVID-19 knows no boundaries, but political responses to it certainly do. Much has been made about how the pandemic has revealed the true nature of political power: that the state is about providing security, its tool is coercion, and it can use this to order its people around in pursuit of that basic goal.¹ While undoubtedly containing more than a grain of truth, what this Hobbesian picture of politics occludes from vision is the interdependent nature of our current international order. In particular, it overlooks the fact that much of the goods, services, capital, and people that societies rely on in order to function are sourced from outside the domestic state. And, conversely, it overlooks the extent to which the policy responses taken in one state have considerable effects on the options available, and the outcomes suffered, in other jurisdictions. This paper seeks to correct this oversight, by highlighting a number of duties that states bear towards one another in the context of this crisis, by virtue of their participation in international trade relationships.

The paper will proceed in three sections. In the section two, I will argue that international trade (henceforth, simply 'trade') generates dependence between states as trade partners, and this dependence grounds duties of justice between states. In the section three, I will explain why, over and above any duties that they owe one another concerning the distribution of income gains from trade, trade partners also owe one another stability and accountability in the management of their trade relationships. In section four, I will explore what these duties entail in the context of states' response to COVID. Specifically, I will suggest that states act unjustly when they fail to play their role in the international division of labour by imposing restrictions on trade in essential supplies, and that states' stimulus packages ought to include compensation and assistance towards international trade partners. Moreover, while states' decisions regarding how they sequence the easing and tightening of lockdown orders inevitably requires political judgement, this judgement must take into account

the interests and needs of trade partners who are affected by the pace and timing of such decisions.

2. States as Trade Partners

While it could be analysed as a series of individual economic exchanges, trade is best thought of as a state-based practice. States are the upholders and the subjects of trade law, and they ultimately determine the conditions on which foreign economic actors can access their markets. Looking at trade as a state-based practice is not only more consistent with the theoretical justifications for trade (i.e. it produces gains for each *state*, even if it creates winners and losers at the individual level), but it also makes better sense of how those gains come about. Most of the gains from liberalising trade don't come from unlocking exchanges that would not otherwise have been made; rather, the gains are largely a product of the economic restructuring that takes place on the level of the national economy as a whole.² As a result, in this paper, I will talk about trade as a state-based practice, where the duties and claims of trade justice are held by and against states.

Of course, even if trade is a state-based practice, it is also true that we care about states, and about how they are treated, for instrumental reasons; states' moral significance ultimately derives from our concern with what they do for, and do to, individuals. From the perspective of justice, states are the agents most capable of ensuring the conditions of justice within a territory, and are responsible for doing so. From such a perspective, then, realizing justice should be the state's core goal. Where states have claims of justice against one another, these will often, if not always, be grounded ultimately in the weightiness of their own duties to discharge domestic justice.

While states within the international order are the primary agents responsible for discharging justice within their own territory, when states participate in trade, trade partners' behaviour and policies alter the extent to which a state is capable of discharging such duties. Where a trade partner imposes new tariffs, or undercuts

competitors through subsidising its own exports, or imposes export restrictions, this has the potential to disrupt a state's plans, for example by reducing the tax take, or putting additional strains on the social safety net. In other words, trade generates dependence between states. Agent A depends upon agent B to the extent that B plays an integral role in how A will, or plans to, realize their core goals.³ The degree of dependence present within a relationship will be a function of two things: how substitutable B's role is within A's planning, and how important the goal in question is. We can say that B is integral to A when B's role is impossible or prohibitively costly to substitute, and where A's core goals or functionings are at stake. In the case of states in trade, then, we can say that they are dependent upon trade partners when those trade partners are a necessary part of a state's plans to realize justice.⁴

There are a number of different ways in which a state might depend upon trade in this sense. Here, I will focus on two. First, a state may depend upon trade in order to secure goods or services that are necessary for a state's (justice-oriented) functionings or goals. Basic foodstuffs, essential construction materials, energy sources, and many other such tradeable goods come under this heading. The second, related way in which a state can depend upon trade is where trade constitutes a significant portion of the state's economic activity, whether through imports or exports. Where a state depends heavily upon tourism, or coffee, the fact that these are non-essential goods is less significant than the fact that significant disruptions to these sectors could nonetheless cause severe hardship within the state. Insofar as many people's livelihoods, and thus their ability to provide for themselves and their families are dependent upon the continuation of favourable economic conditions in these sectors, the state is dependent upon this trade.

The COVID crisis has brought to the fore both sorts of interstate dependence mentioned above. First, as the increasingly fraught scramble over medical supplies has illustrated, many states are highly reliant upon imports for the provision of the resources needed to provide adequate healthcare for their citizens. This dependence is particularly stark in the case of Latin American and African countries,

who are almost entirely reliant upon imports for their access to the relevant medical supplies.⁵ Second, and what will likely become increasingly evident as the public health crisis bleeds into an economic crisis, is the degree of interdependence caused not necessarily by the nature of the goods traded, but by the sheer intensity of international trade. As states initiate lockdowns, and restrict the activities of non-essential business, this is sending reverberations throughout long and complex global supply chains.⁶ Markets across the world are, resultantly, suffering serious supply shocks and demand shocks. This could undermine states' ability to ensure even minimally adequate conditions for their citizenry.

3. Dependence and Duties of Trade Justice

A good deal of the trade justice literature thus far, where it does attribute duties to states *as* trade partners,⁷ has been primarily concerned with the distributive implications of trade.⁸ While these are doubtless important, taking the dependence that trade generates between states seriously means that we need to acknowledge a wider set of duties. Over and above whatever share of the gains from trade states are entitled to, here I want to suggest that trade partners have additional duties of stability and accountability towards one another. These are grounded upon trade partners' interdependence and, ultimately, upon the weightiness of states' own duties towards their respective citizenries.

3.1. Stability

When state A depends upon state B, we can say that B plays an integral role within A's plans to realize domestic justice. Where B refuses or fails to play the role that A hopes B will play, and so thwarts A's plans, this results in a shortfall in justice. The weightiness of A's duties towards its citizens entails that, in cases of this sort, B cannot act with impunity where they play such a role in A's plans to discharge justice; B has a derivative duty to act in ways consistent with A's

realization of justice. Where the realization of justice requires an agent to play a role, X, and B is currently playing role X, then B has a *duty of stability*, to ensure that B's failure to play role X does not lead to injustice.

The stability in question refers to A stably attaining a particular good or service that A needs to secure in order to realize justice. Where A needs something from B in this sense, and B does not admit of substitution, B must act in such a way as to prevent their being responsible for a shortfall in A's ability to discharge domestic justice. The duty of stability does not require, and may often rule out, stability understood as a maintenance of the status quo, with regards to e.g. the specific terms of market access, if the current status quo would itself undermine A's ability to discharge its duties. Equally, B need not continue to play its role in A's plans in perpetuity; if circumstances change, and A no longer relies on X, or else A is capable of substituting B with trade partners C, D, E, and so on, then B need not continue to play role X. And, moreover, B (on their own, or in coordination with others) can act in ways which facilitate this sort of change in circumstances. Having said that, stability will often be best ensured by maintaining the terms of a relationship; if a state is currently successfully playing an integral role in another state's plans to discharge justice, this is an argument in favour of maintaining the terms of the relationship, all other things being equal.

It might be asked *why* B has such a duty, or why B should suffer costs in order to provide stability for A. There are two reasons. First, on pragmatic grounds, there will often be shortfalls of justice internationally; in many cases, though, there will be no identifiable agent that is morally responsible for this. Given this, and given the weightiness of duties of justice, we need a way of assigning duties, even if this assignment is not ultimately grounded in moral responsibility.⁹ Where A needs something to secure justice, and B is the one who is either currently providing it or has done so in the past, and it is hard to replace B, that in itself is an argument for B to continue playing that role. The second reason is that trade dependence does not just happen. Instead, it is incentivised and facilitated, by states through their trade and domestic policies, and by a state's citizens through

their purchasing power and preferences. Thus, where B plays a role in A's plans as a result of trade dependence, B's own decisions and economic activity have contributed to this state of affairs, and thus generates a duty that their actions do not ultimately lead to a thwarting of A's plans to realize justice. Insofar as B has benefitted from the international specialisation which has made states dependent upon one another, to claim a full share of the benefits of such specialisation without being willing to bear a share of the costs of adjustment represents a failure to cooperate on fair terms.

3.2. Accountability

There will be cases where a state will not be able to discharge one duty without neglecting another. Indeed, we can expect duties owed to trade partners to come into conflict quite regularly with duties owed to domestic citizens. This is because income gains are, as Aaron James notes,¹⁰ a primary social good; states have a reason to want them, whatever else they might want. The state can use any income gains to better pursue domestic justice, but these same gains may also need to be shared internationally in order to ensure trade justice. Equally, many of the particular goods and services that a state trades internationally could be put to effective use in order to ensure domestic justice is realized; again, we can think of cases where there are food shortages, energy shortages and, pertinent to the present context, shortages of medical supplies. That duties of trade justice are owed, and particularly because they are liable to conflict with the demands of domestic justice, generates a further duty owed to trade partners, the duty of accountability. This requires three things of a state: giving an account to, being held to account by, and taking account of, a trade partner.

In order for a state to have a secure belief regarding whether they can depend upon a trade partner, and to act accordingly, they need to know for what reasons that trade partner acts and takes the decisions that it does, i.e. what 'inputs' have gone into making any given decision. For a state to analyse a trade partner's reasoning, it must also be the case that they have an understanding of the facts of the matter in question; this is necessary to understand the reasonableness of how

the state has weighed the urgency of the various interests at stake in a decision. In order to make their interdependence *dependable*, states in trade owe one another account-giving, of the sort which allows trade partners to determine the empirical and deliberative inputs which went into making a decision, from which they can reach an informed judgement on the reasonableness of the decision reached. Only through such accountability can states gain assurance that their international dependence will not be thwarted and taken advantage of.

Of course, giving account in this way is in itself of little value if there are no institutional channels in which claim-holders can evaluate and judge decisions and the reasoning underpinning them. Put another way, accountability requires not just that duty-bearers give an account of themselves, but that claim-holders can hold them *to account*. Without this, there is no contestability, no deliberation through which norms around the weighting of conflicting duties can gradually develop between trade partners, and there is no means through which the dependent agent can do something to ensure (or even make it more probable) that their trade partner is *dependable*. Accountability in this sense allows states to identify the relative weight that states give to fulfilling their domestic and international duties, and to challenge the acceptability or reasonableness of those weightings.¹¹

Finally, contestability and account-giving are of little value if a state is unresponsive to their trade partners' interests and challenges. Thus, states have a duty to take account of their trade partners within their decision-making. What counts as adequate consideration will depend on the issue at hand, as well as the weight of a trade partners claims. This has a number of different facets, not all of which need concern us here.¹² For present purposes it is sufficient to say that consideration requires states to internalise the demands that trade justice imposes upon them, and to be responsive to them within the domestic decision-making process.¹³ Once states become dependent upon one another through trade, failing to consider the impact that a policy decision could have upon a trade partner is to neglect their

interests, in a way which fails to show respect for their trade partner as a bearer of morally weighty duties of justice towards their citizenry.

4. Trade Justice and the Policy Response to COVID-19

I have discussed two distinct ways in which states depend upon trade (dependence on specific goods, and dependence on trade as a part of economic activity), and two sorts of duties that are generated by such dependence. The COVID crisis has shone a light on both sorts of dependence. So, what do the duties of stability and accountability imply for how states respond to COVID in the coming period?

First, with regards to the trade in certain essential goods, in the context of COVID these include ventilators, personal protective equipment, oxygen, hand sanitiser, and all those supplies which help to reduce transmission or to combat the virus. The duty of stability requires exporters of such supplies to continue to play that role, and to play that role reliably. Clearly this rules out imposing export restrictions, requisitioning those goods solely for domestic use, and raising other sorts of barriers to trade. Doing this is a way of thwarting another states' reliance on those medical goods. However, the duty of stability goes beyond this. As noted above, stability does not call for a continuation of the status quo, but rather for the dependability of a particular trade partner in playing a certain role. Insofar as certain states play a role for trade partners as suppliers of essential medical goods, then, where the demand for those goods increases and becomes more urgent, there is a corresponding duty to ramp up to meet that international demand. Insofar as states occupy the role of suppliers of medical goods within the international division of labour, then they are the states with both the capacity and the obligation to undertake this effort.

How have exporting states fared on this score? The story is mixed. On the one hand, there has certainly been an increase in production. However, this has not been accompanied by a commitment to playing the role that international partners need, but rather has been geared towards meeting domestic needs. This can be

seen from the increase in trade barriers of various kinds enacted by these states.¹⁴ This obviously thwarts dependent states' plans directly, by putting these goods out of their reach. But, even where they are able to acquire some goods, actions of this kind raise the costs of these products.¹⁵ While cost increases are to be expected given the rapid increase in demand, there is an obligation on states to do whatever they can to limit this effect, particularly given that those states that are most dependent upon trade for medical supplies are also often the poorest countries.

It might be responded here that all of the above overlooks the special duties that a domestic state has towards its own citizenry; even if maintaining open trade would be better for trade partners, each state must look out primarily for its own citizens. Where, for example, ventilators are needed domestically and internationally, the domestic state has a duty to ensure that these are not exported when its own citizens are in need. However, we can grant that domestic states can often show priority to their citizenry yet reject that they can do so in instances of this sort. For a domestic state to justifiably prioritise its own citizens, it must be the case that were each state to show analogous priority to their own citizens, this would not leave any citizenry below a minimally-acceptable threshold; otherwise such prioritisation would be inconsistent with the basic moral equality of persons.¹⁶ Yet, wherever we set this minimally-adequate threshold, it is implausible that this will hold in cases where states withhold essential exports from international distribution. The dynamics of trade entail that a few states will produce and distribute the bulk of each (or most) essential goods; the gains from specialisation, coupled with economies of scale and international competition, more or less require this. Were each state to, at any given time, pull up the drawbridge and restrict trade in such goods, this would leave many states with urgent shortfalls in some goods, and some states with urgent shortfalls in more or less all essential goods. Prioritising domestic citizens, then, where this entails neglecting one's essential role within the international division of labour and exchange, is unjust. We might draw an analogy here with the obligations that professionals

take on when they occupy a particular role in society (e.g. doctor, lawyer, politician). Whereas in many areas of their lives they are entitled to show priority to their loved ones, this is not the case when they are acting within their role. Similarly, domestic states can show priority to domestic citizens, but, if they are a key exporter of a certain essential good, they cannot do so when it comes to the distribution and allocation of that good.

Turning to accountability amidst the COVID crisis, what does this require of trading states? First, and most straightforwardly, it requires states to share information about their own levels of supply and production. Only then can states evaluate and determine where there is most need for essential supplies, and work towards distributing accordingly. States should also make themselves accountable to trade partners by sharing information regarding their plans to build capacity, and regarding their plans going forward, thereby opening themselves up to international scrutiny. Moreover, in order to make this kind of account-holding effective, states should work towards instituting a set of carrots and sticks for incentivising active cooperation in this regard. In such a spirit, Adam Posen has suggested that the EU, China, and participants in the TPP11 trade agreement¹⁷ ought to commit jointly and publicly to an expansion of production, a moratorium on tariff increases, and to continue exporting to one another and to developing countries.¹⁸ Setting up such a scheme would not only enhance trade partners' trust in their continued access to essential goods, but it would also generate an implicit threat to non-cooperative states, that they may face increased tariffs and reduced trade if they fail to uphold their export obligations.

With regards to the final element of the duty of accountability, i.e. the duty to take trade partners' interests into account, the comments above suggest what this requires in the case of essential goods; it requires states to take trade partners into consideration with regards the distribution and allocation of such goods, and speaks against any sort of prioritisation of their own interests in such allocation. But here, it is also worth noting what follows from trade partners' dependence on market activity more generally. I want to conclude by discussing what this sort of dependence entails for states' duties to take trade

partners into account in their evolving responses to COVID, particularly with regards to economic stimulus, and regarding sequencing.

One thing that has been particularly noteworthy about the policy response to COVID thus far has been the sheer scale of the economic stimulus that has accompanied states' lockdown orders. The UK, for instance, produced a £350 billion stimulus package,¹⁹ while the US introduced one worth \$2 trillion,²⁰ in both cases far exceeding the bailouts produced during the most recent financial crash. There has been far less discussion, however, and almost no action, on any stimulus to those countries that are further down the supply chain, whose livelihoods are severely affected by other governments' decisions to effectively shut down their economies.²¹ While states have evidently taken into account the damage that lockdown does to the economic health of their own citizenry, the interdependence that trade generates between states means that states cannot wash their hands of the international effects of their national economic decisions. Insofar as lockdown hurts producers in other countries that depend upon access to a state's market, that state's decision to effectively shut down such trade generates a burden on their part to compensate and to provide economic support for affected countries. Such assistance is not, then, a matter of charity, but a matter of justice. Justice in trade requires states to share the costs as well as the benefits of economic integration.

Finally, it is likely that a good deal of the politics concerning COVID will pertain to the sequencing of when and how states ease or tighten their restrictions on economic activity. The politics of this will be fraught; as many have noted, there is a delicate balancing act involved in weighing immediate public health concerns against exacerbating the economic hardship that the pandemic has already caused. The arguments above do not, and cannot, speak in favour of any one particular policy response to such issues; there are difficult judgements here, and responsible decision-making will require input from epidemiological, economic, and sociological bodies of evidence. However, what the above does imply is that such decisions should not proceed as if it were a matter of domestic politics, and domestic justice

alone. States' deliberations on such matters should be concerned with, made accountable to, and contestable by trade partners.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have done three things. I have identified how trade grounds duties of justice between trade partners, by making them dependent upon one another in order to realize their respective duties of domestic justice. Second, I have identified two sorts of duty which stem from the presence of such dependence, namely the duties of stability and accountability. Finally, I have discussed the implications of taking these two duties seriously in the context of states' policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis. States act unjustly when they restrict or constrain their production and distribution of essential medical supplies; prioritisation of domestic citizens is unjust where states play a role within the international division of labour as suppliers of such goods. States ought to share information and give account of their current supplies and production levels of all goods necessary to combat the crisis, and work in coordination with trade partners to distribute these where they are most needed. I argued that states' economic stimulus packages ought to compensate dependent trade partners for lost earnings as a result of lockdowns, and further argue that trade partners' dependence upon continued economic activity ought to be factored into any decisions concerning the sequencing of restrictions on business, movement, and activity.

Notes

¹ See e.g. David Runciman, "Coronavirus has not suspended politics – it has revealed the nature of power", *The Guardian*, March 27, 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/27/coronavirus-politics-lockdown-hobbes>

² Aaron James *Fairness in practice: a social contrast for a global economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 46-51, 186

³ We might alternatively call this a definition of strong dependence; A might depend upon B in a weak sense where B's role admits of easy substitution, or A's goal is a peripheral one. For a discussion of dependence which has heavily informed my thoughts, see Andrew Kirton, 'The Difference between Reliance and Dependence' (unpublished manuscript).

⁴ Different theories of domestic justice will give a different account of what set of duties states have towards their citizens. The paper's argument goes through on any such theory.

⁵ See e.g. Ruth Maclean and Simon Marks, "10 African Countries Have No Ventilators. That's Only Part of the Problem" *The New York Times*, April 18, 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from

<https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/africa/africa-coronavirus-ventilators.html>, The Economist, "Latin America's health systems brace for a battering", *The Economist*, April 11, 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/04/11/latin-americas-health-systems-brace-for-a-battering>

⁶ World Trade Organisation, "Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy", WTO, April 8, 2020. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm

⁷ Whatever duties states have towards one another more generally, such as negative duties e.g. not to coerce, not to inflict harm, not to impose negative externalities and so on, will also apply to their interactions in trade. Here, I focus solely on duties that are generated by the fact that states trade with one another.

⁸ See e.g. Aaron James, *Fairness in practice: a social contrast for a global economy*; Ethan B. Kapstein, *Economic justice in an unfair world: toward a level playing field* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), Oisín Suttle, *Distributive justice and world trade law: a political theory of international trade regulation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

⁹ David Miller. *National responsibility and global justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81-109.

¹⁰ Aaron James. *Fairness in practice: a social contrast for a global economy*, 167 fn.3

¹¹ Risse mentions two further arguments for why duty bearers owe an account of their actions to relevant claim-holders. First, there is an argument from respect: the seriousness of failing to discharge a duty of justice requires

errors and failings to be accounted for, and to give this account to anyone other than the claim-holder would belittle those claim-holders. Second, there is an instrumental argument: if agents are required to give reasons for why they acted as they did, and to give account for their actions, this increases the chances that justice will be done, both because it motivates the duty-bearer to do their best, and generates leverage on the part of the claim-holder in question. See Mathias Risse. *On Global Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)

¹² In short, consideration involves three things. First, consideration of a trade partner's right to self-determination; second, consideration of a trade partner's right to justice; third, recognition of the differential abilities of trade partners to realize self-determination and justice. I discuss this more in Tadhg Ó Laoghaire, *A Political Approach to Trade Justice* (unpublished manuscript).

¹³ For what I take to be a good account of the types of reasoning that consideration requires, in both international and domestic forums, see Richard Miller. *Globalizing justice: the ethics of poverty and power*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 72-77

¹⁴ Simon Evenett. "Sickening thy neighbour: Export restraints on medical supplies during a pandemic." *Vox*, March 19, 2020. Retrieved 23 April, 2020, from <https://voxeu.org/article/export-restraints-medical-supplies-during-pandemic>

¹⁵ Simon Evenett. "Sickening thy neighbour: Export restraints on medical supplies during a pandemic."

¹⁶ I take it to be uncontroversial that all of a state's actions must meet this minimal standard, as I know of no philosopher who defends the contrary position.

¹⁷ The eleven signatories to this trade agreement are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.

¹⁸ Adam s. Posen. "Containing the economic nationalist virus through global coordination" in Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro *Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes* (London: VoxCEPR Press, 2020), 208-209

¹⁹ Heather Stewart. 'Whatever it takes': chancellor announces £350bn aid for UK businesses." *The Guardian*, March 17, 2020. Retrieved April 23, from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/17/rishi-sunak-pledges-350bn-to-tackle-coronavirus-impact>

²⁰ BBC. “Coronavirus: Trump signs into law largest bailout in US history”. BBC, March 30, 2020. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52070718>

²¹ Ian Goldin. “Coronavirus is the biggest disaster for developing nations in our lifetime” *The Guardian*, April 21 2020. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/21/coronavirus-disaster-developing-nations-global-marshall-plan>

References

BBC. 2020. “Coronavirus: Trump signs into law largest bailout in US history”. *BBC*. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-52070718>

Evenett, Simon. 2020. “Sickening thy neighbour: Export restraints on medical supplies during a pandemic.” *VoxEU*. Retrieved 23 April, 2020, from <https://voxeu.org/article/export-restraints-medical-supplies-during-pandemic>

Goldin, Ian. 2020. “Coronavirus is the biggest disaster for developing nations in our lifetime” *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/21/coronavirus-disaster-developing-nations-global-marshall-plan>

James, Aaron. 2012. *Fairness in practice: a social contrast for a global economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Kapstein, Ethan B. 2006. *Economic justice in an unfair world: toward a level playing field* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Kirton, Andrew. 2015. *The Difference Between Reliance and Dependence*. Unpublished Manuscript.

Maclean, Ruth, and Simon Marks, 2020. “10 African Countries Have No Ventilators. That’s Only Part of the Problem” *The New York Times*. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/world/africa/africa-coronavirus-ventilators.html>

Miller, David. 2007. *National responsibility and global justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

Miller, Richard. 2010. *Globalizing justice: the ethics of poverty and power*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Posen, Adam S. 2020. "Containing the economic nationalist virus through global coordination" in Richard Baldwin and Beatrice Weder di Mauro *Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever It Takes* (London: VoxCEPR Press, 2020), 203-211

Risse, Mathias. 2012. *On Global Justice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Runciman, David. 2020. "Coronavirus has not suspended politics – it has revealed the nature of power". *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/27/coronavirus-politics-lockdown-hobbes>

Stewart, Heather. 2020. 'Whatever it takes': chancellor announces £350bn aid for UK businesses." *The Guardian*. Retrieved April 23, from <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/17/rishi-sunak-pledges-350bn-to-tackle-coronavirus-impact>

Suttle, Oisín. 2017. *Distributive justice and world trade law: a political theory of international trade regulation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

The Economist, 2020. "Latin America's health systems brace for a battering", *The Economist*. Retrieved April 24, 2020, from <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2020/04/11/latin-americas-health-systems-brace-for-a-battering>

World Trade Organisation. 2020. "Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends global economy", *WTO*. Retrieved April 23, 2020, from https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr855_e.htm