

Mengzi's Reception of Two All-Out Externality Statements on *Yi* 義

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Abstract In *Mengzi* (*Mencius*) 6A4, Gaozi states that “*yi* 義 is external, not internal.” In 6A5, Meng Jizi says of *yi* that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Their defenses are met with Mengzi's resistance. What does he perceive and resist in these statements? Focusing on several key passages in the eponymous text, I compare six promising interpretations. 6A4 and a relevant part of 2A2 can be rendered comparably sensible under each of the six. However, what Gaozi says in 6A1 clearly is evidence to Mengzi that, of the six views, Gaozi *holds* three although he does not *convey* them in his statement. As for Meng Jizi's statement, in its defense he invokes a special occasion where one is required to act one way even though one would feel a different way. Mengzi's response has been traditionally interpreted as boiling down to a dissenting opinion about empirical psychology, that the agent on that special occasion would in fact feel the same way as they ought to act. But on a more charitable reading, the point Mengzi makes is conceptual: Though the satisfaction of *yi* may not require that the feeling and the act align perfectly in this case, cases where the alignment obtains are conceptually prior. This not only refutes Meng Jizi's statement but also enables a more elegant explanation of why the *Mengzi* rightly has no record of Mengzi affirming that *yi* is internal. I conclude that 6A5 itself uniquely favors one interpretation, as far as Meng Jizi's position is concerned: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yi*.

Keywords: Pre-Qin Confucian virtue ethics, Moral psychology, “Propriety/Righteousness/Rightness,” Meng Jizi and Gongduzi, *Jing* 敬 “Reverence/Respect”

§ 1 Introduction

§ 1.1 Topic

In the compiled work named after him, MENG Ke (Mengzi, Mencius) defends his vision of the Way against, among others, GAOzi and MENG Jizi. Some of the most distinctive and nuanced aspects of Meng Ke's view with respect to virtues, their cultivation, and their relationship with human nature, are formulated in his reaction to his rivals. His conversations with Gaozi in 6A4 and the one between Gongduzi and Meng Jizi in 6A5, in which Meng Ke intervenes, are some of the most interactive debates in the *Mengzi*. The main topic of both conversations is *yi* 義 (often translated as “propriety,” “righteousness,”

or “rightness”). In the *Mengzi*, this character, “*yi*,” functions sometimes as a noun (e.g. in 1A1.3), sometimes like an adjective (e.g. in 1A1.5). Either way, “*yi*” can be used to signify a certain way for a person to be. Often, as it seems to do in 6A4, “*yi*” signifies such a way of being through characterizing a person’s action or attitude. Furthermore, the cultivated state of *yi* in a person is on the list of what one might call “the four cardinal virtues” for Meng Ke, alongside *rén* 仁 (“humaneness,” “benevolence”), *lǐ* 禮 (“ritual propriety”), and *zhì* 智 (“wisdom”). Meng Ke believes – as he does regarding the other three virtues – that all human beings are endowed with a disposition that is the incipient version of *yi* and it belongs to human nature to become fully *yi* (2A6, 6A6). Thus, *yi* is important for Meng Ke. In 6A4, Gaozi states that “*yi* is external, not internal.” In 6A5, someone called Meng Jizi advances a similar statement, which could be translated as saying of *yi* that “...it is on the external, not from the internal.” Call each of these statements, insofar as each affirms externality and denies internality of “*yi*,” an all-out externality statement. Each figure defends an all-out externality statement, and both defenses are met with Meng Ke’s resistance.

Of *yi*, in 6A4 Meng Ke asks Gaozi explicitly about only its alleged externality, not its alleged non-internality. And when he responds to Gaozi’s arguments (with rhetorical questions), Meng Ke alludes to the view he questions only in terms of “external.” In 2A2, the only other passage where Gaozi’s position on *yi* is at all explicitly described in terms of externality or non-internality, Meng Ke speaks of it only in terms of externality, and he speaks of this position critically. But the aspect of Gaozi’s position that Meng Ke seems to resist and actually question may be what Gaozi would call *yi*’s being “not internal,” and it is unclear, in the way Gaozi uses the terms, whether either “x is not internal” or “x is external” entails the other, or whether it is logically possible for one thing to be both “external” and “internal,” or to be neither.

Similarly, in 6A5, when Meng Ke’s associate Gongduzi, after the former’s guidance, challenges Meng Jizi’s position on *yi*, Gongduzi also alludes to the view he questions only in terms of “external,” and this is the sole instance in the *Mengzi* somebody other than Meng Jizi himself ever alludes to his position explicitly in terms of externality or non-internality. But the aspect of Meng Jizi’s position that Gongduzi and Meng Ke seem to resist may be what Meng Jizi would call *yi*’s being “not from the internal,” and it is unclear, in the way Meng Jizi uses the terms, whether either “x is not from the internal” or “x is on the external” entails the other, or whether it is logically possible for one thing to be both “on the external” and “from the internal,” or to be neither.

In order to get at the substance of Meng Ke’s thinking without unnecessarily lingering or making hasty commitments on the above complications, I make the following choices in the delineation of my topic. First, to circumvent the uncertainty about the logical relationship between “(on the) external” and “not (from the) internal,” I frame the object of my

interpretation as what Meng Ke resists that he perceives in *each all-out externality statement*, rather than what he resists that he perceives in *each externality statement* and *each non-internality statement*. Second, to circumvent the uncertainty on whether Meng Ke interprets each figure's all-out externality statement the same way as each figure means by it, I frame the object of my interpretation as whatever *Meng Ke resists that he perceives* in each all-out externality statement, rather than *what Gaozi and Meng Jizi each express* in their statements. The *Mengzi* is more reliable for investigating what Meng Ke takes these figures to mean than investigating what these figures themselves mean. For in the *Mengzi*, although what Gaozi and Meng Jizi themselves are reported to say (all of which Meng Ke seems aware of) straightforwardly bears on both topics, the remaining available information that is relevant (e.g., what Meng Ke says to either figure, what he says about either, and what he is aware of that others say about either) is more direct evidence for the former topic than they are for the latter. So, let the primary topic be, What view(s) does Meng Ke resist that he takes Gaozi and Meng Jizi each to express in their all-out externality statements? Secondary topic: What other related views does Meng Ke take these figures to hold?

We will compare six promising interpretations, six views about $yì$ that could be conveyed within an all-out externality statement that have been suggested in the scholarship and can make reasonable sense of 6A4. (I am unaware of any interpretation that can make reasonable sense of 6A5 but not of 6A4.) By way of this comparison, we will consider several key passages at length.

§ 1.2 Method and Roadmap

6A4 and 2A2 are the only passages in the *Mengzi* where a position on $yì$ is attributed to Gaozi explicitly in terms of externality or non-internality. Further, 6A1 contains things attributed to Gaozi that have implications on what he appears to think about $yì$ or could appear to convey in his all-out externality statement. As for Meng Jizi, 6A5 is the only passage where an all-out statement is ascribed to him, and nothing anywhere else is attributed to him that seems to have implications for what he appears to think about $yì$ or on what he could appear to convey in the statement. Interestingly, however, Meng Ke himself in 7A3 uses “external” in a way similar to some of the promising interpretations of Gaozi's statement, and in 4A10 and 6A11 he espouses views that could be condensely expressed as “*rén* is internal; $yì$ is external.” We will first go over in § 2 the received text of 6A4 (along with my punctuation and English translation) and, in § 3, the six promising interpretations – promising because they can each make reasonable sense of 6A4. After a brief review (§ 4.1) of how 6A4 could be explained reasonably under each of the six candidates, we will next (§ 4.2) turn to the passage in 2A2 where an externality position is

again attributed to Gaozi and, in § 4.3, consider the relevant implications that 6A1 has about Gaozi's apparent thought and language use. The investigation about Meng Jizi's all-out externality statement in 6A5 will take place in § 5. Finally, § 6 will take into account Meng Ke's own view and language use in the aforementioned passages.

§ 2 *Mengzi* 6A4, punctuated and translated

Below on the left is the received text of *Mengzi* 6A4. I punctuate it with the traditional, general-purpose dot, 。, which functions like the period sometimes but not always. On the right is my translation. In the translation, where a segment's enumeration is followed by a colon and a Roman numeral (e.g. 2.b.2:i), this means that some Chinese characters in the translated segment might merit emendation, can be punctuated differently, or can be rendered into a different part of speech, resulting in a different rendition and translation. See (Shun 1997, 94-98) for the list of nearly all grammatically possible alternatives wherever such ambiguity exists. I present what I take to be the most plausible renditions.

(1) 告子曰。食色性也。仁內也。非外也。義外也。非內也。	(1) Gaozi said, “<The appetite for> food and <the appetite for> beauty are nature. <i>Rén</i> is internal, not external. <i>Yì</i> is external, not internal.”
(2.a) 孟子曰。何以謂仁內義外也。	(2.a) Mengzi said, “By what do you say, ‘ <i>rén</i> is internal’ and ‘ <i>yì</i> is external’?”
(2.b.1) 曰。彼長而我長之。	(2.b.1) <Gaozi> said, “Others being senior, I treat them as being senior.
(2.b.2) 非有長於我也。	(2.b.2:i) It is not that they get their being senior from me.
(2.b.3) 猶彼白而我白之。	(2.b.3) This is like how, others being white, I treat them as being white:
(2.b.4) 從其白於外也。	(2.b.4:i) I follow their being white on the external.
(2.b.5) 故謂之外也。	(2.b.5) That's why I call it external.”
(3.a) 曰。異於白(。)馬之白也。無以異於白人之白也。(3.b) 不識長馬之長也無以異於長人之長與。 ¹	(3.a:i) <Mengzi> said, “It {the example you picked for <i>yì</i> , i.e. treating others as being senior} differs from treating as being white the white

¹ The formula, “F x 之 F,” recurring in 3.a-3.b, has several nested ambiguities: If the first “F” means *treat (something) as being F*, the formula could mean either (i) *treat as being F the F ones among x* or (ii) *treat as being F x's being F*. If the first “F” means *make (something) F*, then the formula means (iii) *the F-ness that makes x F*. If the first “F” is an adjective modifying “x,” the formula means (iv) *F x's being F*. (The parenthetical punctuation, between “白” and “馬,” makes sense only for interpretations (iii) or (iv).) I adopt (i), thus

ones among horses: It {i.e. the latter: treating as being white the white ones among horses} by no means differs from treating as being white the white ones among humans. (3.b:i) <But,> I wonder, does treating as being senior the senior ones among horses by no means differ from treating as being senior the senior ones among humans?

(3.c) 且謂長者義乎。長之者義乎。

(3.c:i) Also, do you call the senior ones *yi* or the ones who treat them as being senior *yi*?

(4.a) 曰。吾弟則愛之。秦人之弟則不愛也。

(4.a) <Gaozi> said, “If it is my younger brother, I love him; if it is a Qin person’s younger brother, I don’t love.

(4.b) 是以我為[悅/說]者也。²

(4.b:i) This takes me to be the one being pleased.
OR
(4.b:ii) This takes me to be that which explains.

(4.c) 故謂之內。

(4.c) That’s why I call it internal.

(4.d) 長楚人之長。亦長吾之長。

(4.d) I treat as being senior Chu people’s senior ones. I also treat as being senior my own senior ones.

(4.e) 是以長為[悅/說]者也。³

(4.e:i) This takes the senior ones to be the ones being pleased.
OR
(4.e:ii) This takes the senior ones to be that which explains.
OR

rendering 3.a-3.b into 3.a:i-3.b:i, because this is consistent with how we must render the same formula in (4.d), which is unambiguous there.

² Our received text reads “悅,” which means *to be pleased*. It has been argued that, when the *Mengzi* was being compiled, “說” was the standard character for that meaning, but this latter character could also mean “to explain” or “explanation” instead. Hence the alternative rendition, 4.b:ii.

³ See the footnote for segment 4.b about “悅”/“說.” If the emendation to “說” is right and the meaning is *explain*, then segment 4.e means either 4.e:ii or 4.e:iii.

(4.e:iii) This takes being senior to be that which explains.

(4.f) 故謂之外也。

(4.f) That's why I call it external."

(5.a) 曰。耆秦人之炙。無以異於耆吾炙。

(5.a) <Mengzi> said, "Relishing Qin people's roasts is by no means different from relishing my roasts.

(5.b) 夫物則亦有然者也。然則耆炙亦有外與。

(5.b) Even with respect to things, there are also such cases. So, with respect to relishing roasts, is there also being external?"

§ 3 Promising Interpretations

What does Meng Ke perceive and resist in Gaozi's statement, "yì is external, not internal"? I group six promising interpretations under four sets of topics that they bear on. Under each interpretation, I cite works that endorse, imply, or suggest either something similar or a more definite interpretative claim that entails something similar.⁴ In some cases, a work is cited under a topic just for having suggested that topic. Second, some cited works seemingly embrace multiple interpretations – sometimes by interpreting the alleged externality of yì as about one topic and its alleged non-internality as about another – while some offer interpretations that are themselves open to interpretations. Third, many cited works do not explicitly distinguish between what Gaozi himself means and what Meng Ke takes him to mean. (The present paper concerns the latter.) Fourth and last, some cited works assume that Meng Ke implicitly endorses "yì nèi" and, in some cases, head straight to interpreting what Meng means by it, even though the *Mengzi* has no record of him uttering "nèi" of "yì." (In view of the uncertainty on the logical relation between the terms "nèi" and "wài" – mentioned above – and a possible middle ground between the statements "yì nèi" and "yì

⁴ These are not the only interpretations that have been suggested by scholars. For example, LIU Xiusheng suggests that "yì wài" in 6A4 means "there is no necessary connection between a judgment of yì and the motivation to act in accordance with such a judgment" (Liu 2002, 116). The passage itself does not suggest this as something Meng Ke would likely perceive in Gaozi's all-out externality statement, for Gaozi there does not purport to identify any case in which someone who judges that they should act in a certain way is unmotivated to act accordingly. In fact, both of the examples he adduces as pertaining to yì, which feature himself treating others as being senior, indicate that he is somehow motivated to do what he judges to be yì, even though he may have some additional motivation in some cases that he does not have in others. In 6A5, Meng Jizi obtains concession from Gongduzi that a certain act is yì even in the absence of the particular attitude that Gongduzi has alleged a yì act is supposed to express, but he does not appear to expect Gongduzi to have no other motivation to perform it.

wàì” – which I will touch on later – the present paper neither rules out nor assumes that Meng Ke endorses “*yì nèi*.”)

Is yì something toward which there is a disposition in common human nature?

- Disposition_{not-natural}: In common human nature there is no disposition toward *yì*.⁵

On what basis are things that are required as pertaining to yì required?

- Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions}: Things required as pertaining to *yì* are required not at all because they fit some disposition in common human nature.⁶
- Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature}: Things required as pertaining to *yì* are required not at all because they fit something in common human nature.⁷
- Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself}: Things required as pertaining to *yì* are required not at all because they fit something in oneself.⁸

How does one recognize what satisfies yì?

- Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}: What satisfies *yì* is not something to be recognized from features of the heart/mind (i.e., recognition of what is *yì* does not derive from features of the heart/mind).⁹

What are the kinds of things that satisfy or violate yì – from where do they arise?¹⁰ To satisfy yì, must one feel a certain way?

- Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}: How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yì*.¹¹

⁵ (Dai 1982, § 21), (Legge 1895, 397), (Wilhelm 1921, 127-128), (Lau 2004, 216-7), and (Chan 2014, 157). Perhaps also (Zhu 1986, 1378), (Huang n.d., vol.2: 20.b8-a8), and (Julien 1826, 126, fn.13).

⁶ (Lai 2019, 136) and (Lau 2004, 216-7). Perhaps also (Wang n.d., no. 133), (Huang n.d., v.2: 27.a8-b1, 57.b1-5), and (Jiao n.d., re: 6A4).

⁷ (Zhang n.d., re: 6A4), (Dai 1982, § 21), (Lau 2004, 216-7). Perhaps also (Jiao n.d., re: 6A4) and (Dobson 1963, 109).

⁸ (Xu 1975, 190-193) and (Mou 1985, 12-15). Perhaps also (Zhu 1986, 1379), (Cai 1984, 214), and (Chong 2002, 109).

⁹ (Xu 1975, 190-193) and (Shun 1997, 94-112). Perhaps also (Wang n.d., no. 133), (Huang n.d., v.2: 27.a8-b1, 30.a8-b8, 57.b1-5), (Julien 1826, 126, fn.13), and (Lyll 1932, 170).

¹⁰ (Cai 1984, 214, 333) and (Gassmann 2016, Vol. 1: 291-292; Vol. 2: 262-263).

¹¹ (Graham 1967, 248), (Mou 1985, 13-15), (Nivison 1996, 153), (Van Norden 2007, 287-290), and (Van Norden 2008, 145-6). Perhaps also (Zhu 1986, 1378), (Giles 1942, 92-93), and (Tang 1986, 225).

These six positions about $yì$ are compatible with each other. What's more, Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} seems to straightforwardly entail Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature} and the latter, in turn, Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions}. Disposition_{not-natural} strongly suggests Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions}, Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}, and Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}. These six thus form quite a coherent, systematic outlook about $yì$. If someone, e.g. Gaozi or Meng Jizi, subscribes to so much as Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} and Disposition_{not-natural}, it would not be surprising if they also embrace the other four positions. Which ones of these do Gaozi and Jizi appear to Meng Ke to *convey* in their all-out externality statements?

Given Meng Ke's view as presented in the *Mengzi*, it is apparent that he would be skeptical or outright opposed toward many of the above positions. For not only does he maintain that all human beings are endowed with a disposition that is the incipient version of $yì$ and it belongs to human nature to become fully $yì$, but, more specifically, he also identifies the disposition at least incipiently as “the heart/mind of shame and disdain” and thinks that for someone to become $yì$ is for this disposition inside them to become perfected. So, this incipient disposition, inborn to the human being, is their heart/mind's disposition, and in the natural course of development (one that prevails over impediments) this disposition becomes the virtue of $yì$. This aspect of Meng Ke's view is, at least *prima facie*, a reason for him to reject Disposition_{not-natural}. And since on his view the (fully) $yì$ person must have a perfected disposition in their heart/mind that, in some of its manifestations, issues in shame and disdain, Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} seems to be a claim with which he would disagree.¹² Lastly, given that the perfected disposition in the heart/mind is a reliable source for recognizing what is $yì$, Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind} would also be objectionable. It does not follow from the above considerations alone that Meng Ke in fact attributes any of these three claims to Gaozi or Meng Jizi. But *if* Meng Ke does interpret either figure to be advancing any of these three claims, we have a ready explanation of why he disagrees or resists.

§ 4 What Meng Ke perceives and resists in Gaozi's all-out externality statement

§ 4.1 Gaozi-Meng Ke 6A4 conversation

¹² Mou Zongsan's commentary on 6A4 alludes to a possible, related motivation for Meng Ke to think it a mistake to preclude feelings from the instantiation of $yì$: $yì$ is moral-rational, and behavior that satisfies $yì$ may have to arise in a reason-based feeling (Mou 1985, 15).

The best readings of 6A4 enabled by the six interpretations are not decisively worse or better than each other. I recommend (Mou 1985, 11-15) and (Shun 1997, 94-112) for clear expositions of viable readings of 6A4 based on Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} and Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}, respectively. A viable reading of 6A4 based on Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions} or Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature} can also be obtained by suitably modifying the reading in (Mou 1985, 11-15). As for Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, Bryan Van Norden has lucidly described how 6A4 can be read based on a very similar interpretation. I agree with all his major points (Van Norden 2007, 289-296), as well as how he addresses Kwong-loi Shun's reservations (299-301). In the table below, for each interpretation, I sketch the gist of arguments Gaozi might appear to Meng Ke to be conveying and the gist of the corresponding objections Meng Ke appears to raise. Note that these readings I offer sometimes differ from those offered in the secondary literature I just recommended. My reader is also advised not to expect the reconstructed arguments attributed to Gaozi to be deductively sound, since I am reconstructing how they *appear to Meng Ke*.

As observed in (Shun 1997, 103), Meng Ke's question in segment 6A4.3.b (不識長馬之長也無以異於長人之長與) is relatively obscure if the topic of debate is whether anything that is in common human nature disposes humans toward *yi*. However, this problem for Disposition_{not-natural} is surmountable. For Meng Ke might ask his rhetorical question there e.g. with the implication that we are disposed to treat senior humans differently from how we tend to treat senior horses *because of* something we have in common with those senior humans that we do not share with the horses.

	(2.b)...彼長而我長之。非有長於我也。猶彼白而我白之。從其白於外也。故謂之外也。	(3.a-c)... 異於白(。)馬之白也。無以異於白人之白也。不識長馬之長也無以異於長人之長與...	(4.a-c)...吾弟則愛之。秦人之弟則不愛也。是以我為[悅/說]者也。故謂之內。	(4.d-f)長楚人之長。亦長吾之長。是以長為[悅/說]者也。故謂之外也。	(5.a-b)...耆秦人之炙。無以異於耆吾炙。夫物則亦有然者也。然則耆炙亦有外與。
Disposition <small>not-natural</small>	People's seniority, like a thing's whiteness, is not a function of my common human nature. When the occasion arises, I treat them for what they are. But I am not well-disposed toward seniors any more than I am toward white objects.	Are you disposed to respond to people's seniority the same way you are disposed to respond to a horse's seniority? (If you are in fact disposed to treat people better, then you seem to have a special disposition toward <i>human</i> seniority.)	I spontaneously love my younger brothers, and such love is apt as pertaining to <i>rén</i> .	Whereas I am well-disposed toward the senior who are my kin, I am not so disposed toward other seniors insofar as they are foreign. Yet, I show deference to them all, as I am expected to do.	Whether a roast is from home or foreign, I would relish it all the same, as I am expected to do. I may not be as well-disposed to the latter insofar as it is foreign. But we cannot conclude that there is no general disposition in my common

					human nature to relish roasts.
Grounds-of-requirement <small>not-natural-dispositions</small>	Treating-as-being-senior is a fitting response because it fits the seniority in the senior. But their being senior is not a function of their fitting something in me.	Are you required to respond to a horse's seniority the same way you are required to respond to a human's seniority? If not, then you haven't ruled out something in you from having a role in accounting for the ways you are required to treat a senior human that are not required for a senior horse.	It is apt to love my younger brothers because such love fits a disposition I have by common human nature.	I am expected to show deference to the senior even though I know and personally care about only some of them. This is <i>because</i> the senior – not I – as such are to be pleased.	The way I relish a roast is expected not to vary according to where or by whom it is made. But this expectation is correct precisely because it fits a disposition in my common human nature to relish roasts.
Grounds-of-requirement <small>not-nature</small>			It is apt to love my younger brothers because such love fits something in my common human nature.		
Grounds-of-requirement <small>not-oneself</small>			It is apt to love my younger brothers because such love fits something in me.		
Source-of-recognition <small>not-the-mind</small>	I recognize that I should treat so-and-so as being senior by detecting their seniority. But their being senior is not a function of any feature of my heart/mind.	Seniority itself <i>underdetermines</i> what response is required. One still has to determine it on some further basis.	In loving my younger brothers – with recognition that this love is apt – that which moves me or explains my recognition is something in me.	In recognizing the <i>yi</i> in treating senior people as senior, that which moves me or that which explains the recognition has to do with their seniority, which is external to me (Shun 1997, 106).	In relishing a roast, that which moves me or that which explains my relishing it has to do with qualities of the roast, but it <i>also</i> has to do with features of myself.
Satisfaction <small>feelings-don't-count</small>	Someone's seniority, like a thing's whiteness, is not a function of how I feel. The response required of me here is for reflecting how the world is, not for reflecting, projecting, or venting how <i>I</i> feel.	Seniority itself <i>underdetermines</i> what response is required. Even if this response is to accord with the world, it does not preclude some feeling from being required as part of the response.	I feel pleased in loving the persons whom I am expected as pertaining to <i>ren</i> to love.	Whether I am expected to show deference to the others doesn't vary according to where they are from. So, any deferential treatment that can be reasonably expected from me doesn't include my feeling inclined.	Whether I am expected to relish a dish does not vary according to where or by whom it is made, but it does not follow that relishing a dish involves no feeling.

As we saw above, 6A4 begins with Gaozi saying, “<The appetite for> food and <the appetite for> beauty are nature. *Rén* is internal, not external. *Yi* is external, not internal,” and nothing

else before Meng Ke responds. Secondly, Meng Ke himself invokes the example of relishing roasts, which is about a disposition toward food. One might take either of these features of the passage to indicate that Gaozi's statements about *rén* and *yì* appear to Meng Ke to be about whether they are inside or outside of human nature.¹³ This would render $\text{Disposition}_{\text{not-natural}}$, $\text{Grounds-of-requirement}_{\text{not-natural-dispositions}}$, and $\text{Grounds-of-requirement}_{\text{not-nature}}$ more likely than the other interpretations. However, as (Van Norden 2007, 291) points out, Gaozi neither mentions *rén* when he says that the appetites for food and beauty are nature nor mentions food or beauty in his all-in internality statement about *rén*. Gaozi would be bafflingly indirect if by “internal” he means *inside nature*. (In a moment, we will also see that what Gaozi says to Meng Ke in 6A1 is a strong reason for the latter to think that human nature is not the frame of reference in Gaozi's use of “internal” and “external” here.) In any case, it may be prudent not to lean too much on the apparent juxtaposition of “nature” and the all-out internality statement in 6A4, since the former might belong to the preceding conversation in 6A3, and there might have been a pause before Gaozi brought up *rén* and *yì* to start a new conversation.

§ 4.2 *Mengzi* 2A2

Beside 6A4, 2A2 is the only other place in the *Mengzi* where a position on *yì* is attributed to Gaozi explicitly in terms of externality or non-internality. Here, Meng Ke claims that he himself excels – perhaps in comparison to Gaozi – in “nourishing vast, flowing *qi*.” As L. K. Gustin Law suggests, on Meng Ke's view, having *qi* vast and flowing through oneself involves having a psycho-physiological disposition that steadfastly follows and supports a will/resolve in oneself (Law 2020, 541-542). Specifically, this is a will/resolve in accordance with *yì*:

<p>(14) 其為氣也。配義與道。無是。餒也。(15) 是集義所生者。非義襲而取之也。行有不慊於心。則餒矣。我故曰。告子未嘗知義。以其外之也。</p>	<p>(14) As for its [i.e. the vast, flowing <i>qi</i>'s] being <i>qi</i>, it is to be matched with <i>yì</i> and the Way. Without these, it will languish. (15) This is something generated in the gathering of <i>yì</i>; it is not that <i>yì</i> reaches one and one takes it. If one's action leaves the heart/mind unsatisfied, it will languish. I therefore said that Gaozi has never had knowledge of <i>yì</i> – because he treats it as being external.</p>
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Since Meng Ke *rejects* the doctrine he references here in terms of externality, this doctrine must be part of what he perceives and resists in Gaozi's all-out externality statement – our primary topic. Now, what Meng Ke says implies two thoughts that would ideally make sense in light of how he interprets Gaozi's doctrine. One thought is that “that *yì* reaches one and

¹³ See e.g. (Lau 2004, 216). I thank Gabriel Richardson Lear for pointing out the potential relevance of the second feature.

one takes it” would be how one becomes *yì* or instantiates *yì* if *Gaozi’s doctrine were true*. The other thought is that if we endorse this doctrine in our practice, then we might omit to “gather” *yì* and we risk acting in a way that “leaves the heart/mind (*xīn* 心) unsatisfied.” I show below how these two thoughts might be explicated under each of the six interpretations. Note that, if the doctrine involves *Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}*, *Satisfaction_{feelings-don’t-count}*, or *Disposition_{not-natural}*, then what glosses of the second thought are available depends on how an ambiguity of “heart/mind” is resolved. There is no such dependence if the doctrine involves only some of the other three positions.

If the doctrine involves...	then the doctrine implies (re: how to become or be <i>yì</i>) that, in the sense below, “ <i>yì</i> reaches one and one takes it.”	If we endorse such a doctrine in our practice, then we might (a) omit to “gather” <i>yì</i> and (b) act in a way that “leaves the heart/mind unsatisfied” in the sense below.
Source-of-recognition <small>not-the-mind</small>	What would satisfy <i>yì</i> is settled by sources outside one and is recognizable to one only by one’s encountering it outside.	If “heart/mind” in 2A2.15 means specifically the <i>heart/mind of yì</i> ... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gloss 1: If the doctrine leads us to ignore the heart/mind of <i>yì</i> – which is a compass indicating what would satisfy <i>yì</i>, disposition to have appropriate feelings, as well as disposition toward <i>yì</i>–, then (a) the way we act, are motivated, or deliberate might run afoul of some <i>yì</i>-requirement, failing to instantiate <i>yì</i>, and thus (b) disappoint the heart/mind of <i>yì</i> <i>insofar as this heart/mind is disposed correctly</i>.¹⁴ and/or Gloss 2: Insofar as the heart/mind of <i>yì</i> is not yet fully realized and we are not yet always disposed by it correctly, the doctrine causes us in effect (a) to neglect to bring it forth, and consequently (b) even aspects in which our action is sometimes correct could “disappoint” this under-realized heart/mind.
Satisfaction <small>feelings-don’t-count</small>	<i>Yì</i> requires only a behavioral pattern that can be shown to and acquired by one successfully independently of how one feels and how one is disposed to feel.	
Disposition <small>not-natural</small>	The disposition toward <i>yì</i> is alien to common human nature, so that it has to be acquired from some other source at some point.	Alternatively, if “heart/mind” in 2A2.15 means the <i>overall cognitive-affective disposition</i> (which includes that of <i>yì</i>)... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gloss 1 and/or Gloss 2 and/or Gloss 3: If the doctrine causes us to ignore and (a) to neglect to bring forth our heart/mind of <i>yì</i>, (b) a disposition not concerned with <i>yì</i> might be wrongly engaged and dissatisfied (even if what we do conforms to <i>yì</i> in some aspect).¹⁵

¹⁴ A specific variant of Gloss 1: The “heart/mind” in the passage means one’s *inner moral awareness*, and the idea is that, even if one’s act happens to be outwardly right, so long as this act does not issue from one’s inner moral awareness, one does not truly fulfill *yì*, leaving this inner moral awareness unsatisfied. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation.

¹⁵ For example, suppose someone has asked a question in some specialized field in the presence of x, y, and z. Suppose *yì* requires x to defer to y as one who is known to x to have more relevant expertise than x themselves. However, x stands to profit if they impress z by answering the question. Suppose x adhering to the social

Grounds-of-requirement not-natural-dispositions	Why things required as pertaining to <i>yì</i> are required not at all because they fit any (actual or potential) need, tendency, capacity, desire, inclination, emotion, or judgment in oneself, so that to do what is required as pertaining to <i>yì</i> , or to acquire a behavioral pattern that conforms to <i>yì</i> requirements, would be like picking something up and grafting it onto a plant regardless of fit.	(Whether “heart/mind” in 2A2.15 means the overall cognitive-affective disposition or specifically the heart/mind of <i>yì</i> ..) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gloss 4: When we are trying to be <i>yì</i>, we are led by the doctrine not to consider whether any course of action fits anything in ourselves, and so we might (a) fail to accumulate a series of instantiations of <i>yì</i>, (b) from time to time taking actions that do not fit, disappointing the heart/mind of <i>yì</i> that we have.
Grounds-of-requirement not-nature		
Grounds-of-requirement not-oneself		

In conclusion, all six interpretations can make sense of the passage in 2A2 that ascribes a doctrine explicitly about *yì* to Gaozi.

§ 4.3: *Mengzi* 6A4 alongside 6A1

In 6A1, Gaozi says to Meng Ke, “To fashion *rén* and *yì* with human nature is like fashioning cups and bowls with willows.” The very first thing Meng Ke says in reply is the rhetorical question, “Can you, going along with (*shùn* 順) the nature of a willow, fashion cups and bowls with it?” where he clearly expects the answer to be “no.” Meng Ke is not quibbling over whether Gaozi has chosen a suitable analogy to make a point that Meng Ke himself agrees with. Rather, he disagrees with what he takes to be Gaozi’s point, and he disagrees because – his rhetorical question suggests – he perceives it as having the implication that *rén* and *yì* cannot be fashioned in a human being while “going along with” their common human nature. This would indeed be an obvious and immediate consequence of Gaozi’s point if his point clearly is or implies that neither *rén* nor *yì* conforms to anything in common human nature. So, Gaozi likely appears to Meng Ke to be conveying the idea that, just as being cups and bowls does not fit anything in common willow nature, (N) *rén* does not fit anything in common human nature, which clearly and immediately entails, first, that (GN) things required as pertaining to *rén* are required not at all because they fit something in common human nature. Second, (N) clearly contains this weaker version of itself: *rén* does not fit any disposition in common human nature, from which it follows that (GND) things required as pertaining to *rén* are required not at all because they fit some disposition

custom defers to *y* but is unsatisfied, privately lamenting that they have forgone an opportunity advantageous to themselves. Meng Ke might say, perhaps *x* does not yet regard the forgone action as something they simply will not do (cf. 7B31), and their existing disposition to shame and disdain is therefore not engaged. Instead, their desire for personal social advancement may be agitated and they may accordingly feel unsatisfied.

in common human nature. Third, if in common human nature there is some disposition toward *rén*, then *rén* would fit at least this aspect of common human nature. Therefore, (N) also has the obvious and immediate consequence that – just as in common willow nature there is no tendency to be cups and bowls – (D) in common human nature there is no disposition toward *rén*.¹⁶ (GN), (GND), and (D) say the *same* things about *rén* as what Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature}, Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-disposition}, and Disposition_{not-natural}, respectively say about *yì*. However, Gaozi in 6A4 *contrasts* *rén* as being “internal, not external” with *yì* as being “external, not internal.” Therefore, after the exchanges in 6A1 and 6A4, there are strong indications of two things to Meng Ke: On the one hand, Gaozi, in assimilating fashioning *yì* with common human nature to making cups and bowls with willows, conveys Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions}, Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature}, and Disposition_{not-natural}; on the other hand, he is conveying *something else* in saying, “*yì* is external, not internal.”

Of the three remaining promising candidates, Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself}, Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}, and Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, the last two seem strongly suggested by Disposition_{not-natural}, while the first would seem to follow from Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature} if nothing other than common human nature seems to be something that could be in oneself and the fit with which could constitute a basis for some *yì*-requirements. So, for all that has been observed thus far, Gaozi could appear to Meng Ke to convey any or all of these three positions in his all-out externality statement.

§ 5 What Meng Ke perceives and resists in Meng Jizi’s all-out externality statement

§ 5.1 Jizi’s cross-examination of Gongduzi

What about the position espoused by Meng Jizi? In 6A5, whereas Gongduzi, traditionally taken to be a follower of Meng Ke, defends the claim that *yì* is internal, Meng Jizi – who is called simply “Jizi” later in 6A5 – objects and concludes that *yì* is “on the external, not from the internal.” Meng Ke participates through telling Gongduzi how to respond. Since *Mengzi* does not feature any direct interaction between Meng Ke and Jizi, Jizi was probably not as close to Meng Ke as Gongduzi was. And it is unclear to what extent Jizi might be an associate of Gaozi, who is not mentioned in 6A5.

¹⁶ (Van Norden 2007, 291) similarly argues, on the basis of 6A1, that “Gaozi is not saying in the opening of 6A4 that benevolence is a part of human nature.”

The reader is hereby advised that Gongduzi and Jizi's arguments I reconstruct below are not deductively sound. This should not be surprising because Gongduzi, unable to defend his view against Jizi, is not portrayed as being particularly bright in 6A5 and, in the case of Jizi's, my reconstruction is of what Meng Ke would understand to be Jizi's argument, to which Meng Ke would go on to object.

6A5 begins thus:

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| (1) 孟季子問公都子曰。何以謂義內也。 | (1) Meng Jizi, asking Gongduzi, said, "By what <do you> say, 'yì is internal'?" |
| (2) 曰。行吾敬。故謂之內也。 | (2) <Gongduzi> said, "<I> do my <i>jìng</i> . That's why <I> call it internal." |

Soon we will see that much depends on the exact meaning of "*jìng* 敬," of which "respect" and "reverence" are two common translations. By "I do my *jìng*," Gongduzi could be interpreted as expressing either premise:

(A) In performing a *yì* act, I put into action the way I by common human nature am disposed to feel *jìng*.

(A') In performing a *yì* act, I put into action the way I feel *jìng*.

From (A), Gongduzi might conclude that what is required as pertaining to *yì* is required (at least in part) (i) because it fits some disposition in common human nature, hence (ii) because it fits something in common human nature, and hence (iii) because it fits something in oneself. Alternatively, it would be comparably sensibly for him to argue from (A) that (iv) what satisfies *yì* is something to be recognized (at least in part) from features of the heart/mind, or that (v) the disposition toward *yì* lies (at least in part) inside common human nature. From (A'), it would be comparably sensible for Gongduzi to argue that (vi) a person satisfies *yì* (at least in part) by their feeling a certain way. These six are plausible interpretations of what "*yì* is internal" would mean as the counterpart to "*yì* is on the external, not from the internal" according to the six promising interpretations. So far, then, it seems that any of these six could be what the master, Meng Ke, perceives and resists in the all-out externality that Jizi goes on to conclude of "*yì*" through this argument:

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| (3.a) 鄉人長於伯兄一歲。則誰敬。 | (3.a) "If <your> fellow villager is senior to <your> eldest brother by one year, then whom <do you> <i>jìng</i> ?" |
| (3.b) 曰。敬兄。 | (3.b) <Gongduzi> said, "<I> <i>jìng</i> <this> elder brother." |
| (3.c) 酌則誰先。 | (3.c) "If <you> are pouring wine, for whom <do you pour> first?" |

(3.d) 曰。先酌鄉人。	(3.d) <Gongduzi> said, “First <I> pour for <my> fellow villager.”
(3.e) 所敬在此。所長在彼。	(3.e) “Whom <you> <i>jìng</i> is here; whom <you> treat as being senior is there.
(3.f) 果在外。非由內也。	(3.f) Indeed it is on the external, not from the internal.”

For Jizi to be able to proceed with his argument (segments 3.e-f), it is crucial that the answer to his initial question (in segment 3.a) picks the villager or the brother but not both. Since Jizi is confident that Gongduzi would pick only one, “*jìng*” in Jizi’s question is probably short for something impossible to do to both persons, e.g. *jìng* one *over* another (at the same time, with respect to the same things). If so, then, against (A) or (A’), Jizi intends the thought experiment in 3.a-3.d to prove this objection:

- (J1) In the wine-pouring scenario, *yì* is instantiated in one’s privileging one’s fellow villager over one’s eldest brother even though one neither feels, nor by common human nature is disposed to feel, greater *jìng* toward the fellow villager than toward one’s eldest brother.

Being Meng Ke’s associate, Gongduzi does not dispute the relevance of the situation in Jizi’s thought experiment to *yì*. For according to Meng Ke, “Obeying one’s older brothers is the fruitful substance (*shí* 實) of *yì*” (4A27) and it comes spontaneously to everyone to *jìng* one’s elder brothers (7A15). Carefully choosing his thought experiment, Jizi seeks not only to challenge the internality claim but also to establish his own conclusion, that *yì* is “on the external, not from the internal.”

On one of the six interpretations, Jizi’s argument involves such reasoning:

- (J2) In the wine-pouring scenario, the only thing (a) that would be in oneself and (b) with which the fit of the *yì*-requirement to pour first for the fellow villager might ground this requirement is one’s feeling greater *jìng* toward the fellow villager than toward one’s eldest brother.
- (J3) Sometimes, one is required as pertaining to *yì* to privilege x over y without the requirement fitting something in oneself. [putatively from (J1) & (J2)]
- (Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself}) Things required as pertaining to *yì* are required not at all because they fit something in oneself. [putatively from (J3)]

Via (J2) or even some less bold variant of it, one could conclude Grounds-of-requirement_{not-nature} or Grounds-of-requirement_{not-natural-dispositions} with no less plausibility. Alternatively, Jizi's argument proceeds via another conditional that is an analogue of premise (J2):

(J2') In the wine-pouring scenario, the only feeling eligible to be involved in instantiating *yì* is one's feeling greater *jìng* toward one's fellow villager than toward one's eldest brother.

(J3') Sometimes, one satisfies *yì* without any feeling that is eligible to be relevant to such satisfaction. [putatively from (J1) & (J2)']

(Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}) How one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yì*. [putatively from (J3)']

Similarly, Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind} and Disposition_{not-natural} could each be argued with comparable reasonableness, each via a suitable analogue of (J2) or (J2'), *mutatis mutandis*. Therefore, all six interpretations can also make sense of Jizi's argument in segment 6A5.3. In all six readings, however, the inference from some variation like step (J3) to the conclusion is not deductively valid without a further (tacit) premise that affirms some move from the particular to the universal. Call whatever auxiliary assumption is needed to warrant such move the "bridge principle." One form it could take is this: If a feature is absent in one instance of *yì*, then this feature has no necessary connection to *yì* in *any* instance.

§ 5.2 Meng Ke's intervention

§5.2.1 Text

Meng Ke has the following response for Jizi:

(4.a) 公都子不能答。以告孟子。

(4.a) Gongduzi was unable to answer. He told it to Mengzi.

(4.b) 孟子曰。敬叔父乎。敬弟乎。

(4.b) Mengzi said, “ ‘<Do you> *jìng* <your> father's-younger-brother? <Do you> *jìng* <your> younger brother?’

(4.c) 彼將曰。敬叔父。

(4.c) He would say, ‘<I> *jìng* <my> father's-younger-brother.’

(4.d) 曰。弟為尸。則誰敬。

(4.d) Say <to him>, ‘If <your> younger brother is personating a dead ancestor, whom <do you> *jìng*?’

(4.e) He would say, ‘<I> *jìng* <my> younger brother.’

(4.e) 彼將曰。敬弟。

- (4.f) 子曰。惡在其敬叔父也。
 (4.g) 彼將曰。在位故也。
 (4.h) 子亦曰。在位故也。
 (4.i) 庸敬在兄。斯須之敬在鄉人。
- (4.f) Say <to him>, where is his ‘I *jìng* <my> father’s-younger-brother’?
 (4.g) He would say, ‘It is because <my younger brother> is occupying the position.’
 (4.h) Also say <to him>, ‘It is because <my fellow villager> is occupying the position.’
 (4.i) The usual *jìng* is at <that> elder brother; a little while’s *jìng* is at <that> fellow villager.”

§5.2.2 Shift-reliant vs. Shift-independent Readings of Meng Ke

There are at least two ways to read what Meng Ke means by the formula of “*jìng* (敬) x” in this context. Neither reading has to abstract from the readiness or intent to privilege x over some third party. Neither has to abstract from the attitude – while privileging x – of paying attention to x, treating x seriously, and perhaps even *taking* x as somehow more important than oneself.¹⁷ However, on one reading, Meng Ke’s use of “*jìng* x” in segment 4 includes a *jìng-feeling* (which perhaps is or resembles *feeling* deferential regard) – more specifically, feeling more *jìng* toward x than toward some third party. On the other reading, his use of “*jìng* x” signifies something that includes an attitude but in abstraction from the said feeling.

§ 5.2.2.1 The shift-reliant reading

According to the former reading, Meng Ke expects Jizi to judge that, while one’s younger brother is personating an ancestor at a sacrifice, it is expectable to *feel* more *jìng* toward this brother than toward one’s *shūfù* 叔父, i.e. father’s younger brother. Then, Meng Ke expects Jizi to concede that, similarly, in the relevant circumstance that involves pouring wine, it is expectable not only to pour wine for one’s fellow villager before one does for one’s eldest brother, but also to *feel* more *jìng* toward the former. (On this reading, it contradicts Meng Ke’s position when Gongduzi says, “I *jìng* this elder brother,” if he means that *always* one would or should feel greater *jìng* toward one’s eldest brother than toward that fellow villager.) If so, then the person whom one privileges and the person toward

¹⁷ For how this more generic sense of “*jìng* x,” which does not reference a third party, could be reconstructed from early Chinese texts, see (Shun 1997, 52-55), (Shun 2013, 45-55), (Shun 2014, 270-274), and (Shun 2021, 24-27). Meng Ke uses “*jìng* x” here to mean something that puts x ahead of a third party even if *jìng* in the more generic sense might be required toward that third party. This use seems not so much an alternative to the generic sense as a more specific use built upon it.

whom one feels more *jìng* coincides in the *yì* action even in this situation. Therefore, Jizi's thought experiment does not actually prove (J1). Call this "the shift-reliant reading."¹⁸

However, there are three indications that Meng Ke does not depend on such putatively expectable object-shift of a *jìng*-feeling or *jìng*-emotion. First, the idea itself is unintuitive. It may be expectable to feel greater *jìng* toward the ancestor (which could be called "*jìng zōng* 敬宗") than toward one's *shūfù*. However, despite the special position the younger brother occupies, it is much less intuitive that one would or should *jìng dì* 敬弟 *in the sense of feeling (greater) jìng toward one's younger brother (than toward the uncle)*, given that one usually feels that toward the uncle than toward the brother.¹⁹ Nor does feeling more *jìng* toward the ancestor entail, or justify the expectation of, feeling the same toward the individual personating the ancestor. Suppose a retiring professor has been awarded emeritus status in recognition of their achievements and service, but they cannot appear in person due to ailments. They send their grandchild to represent them at the ceremony to accept the honor. Suppose a junior scholar who benefited from this professor's instruction and mentorship is handing a symbolic souvenir to the grandchild with devoted attentiveness, treating the latter seriously, partly out of a feeling of deferential regard toward the awardee. However, the junior scholar does not *thereby* have, and it is unintuitive to expect them thereby to have, the same feeling toward the grandchild. Similarly, at the sacrifice, one is reasonably expected to present the sacrifice before one's younger brother with devoted attentiveness, and to treat him seriously, out of one's feeling of deferential regard toward the ancestor, but it is unintuitive to expect one *thereby* to also feel deferential regard toward this younger brother. It seems also unreasonable – though perhaps less so – to expect someone who all along has been rightly feeling greater deferential regard toward their eldest brother to temporarily feel greater deferential regard toward their fellow villager just because all three of them are at a meal or a ritual.²⁰ Second, the idea is not very intuitive to either of the parties who are in direct conversation. Even if Meng Ke himself expects the temporary shifts of feeling in those thought experiments, so much so that he counts on Jizi to judge the same way, Gongduzi should not have been at such a loss about the wine-pouring case and unable to answer Jizi. That is, Meng Ke would be counting on an opponent to arrive at a judgment that is not very intuitive even to Meng Ke's own associate. The third

¹⁸ (Van Norden 2007, 297-298) articulates a similar reading, translating "*jìng*" Meng Ke's use of "*jìng*" as "revere" and "reverence" and interpreting what he means as involving an emotion.

¹⁹ Especially if and when this personator is so young as needs to be hand-held. See passage 36 in the chapter, "Zengzi wèn 曾子問," of the *Record of Rites* on <https://ctext.org/liji/zengzi-wen/zh>.

²⁰ One may argue that it is possible to feel something like deferential regard toward even a hand-held child if one imagines or pretends this child to be the ancestor. I am not sure if the resultant feeling could be deferential regard *toward the child*, but even if it were, invoking the feeling based on such artifice is at best an obscure way to resist Jizi's argument for any of the five alternatives to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}.

sign is that Meng Ke introduces a situation featuring one's *shūfù* versus one's younger brother as a response to Jizi's situation featuring one's eldest brother versus one's fellow villager. In Jizi's example, the special occasion requires one to privilege the villager, who is stipulated to be older than even one's eldest brother. Why does Meng Ke then invoke an example in which one is required to privilege the younger brother, who is junior even to oneself? What relevant point could Meng Ke plausibly intend to show that is not as apparent in Jizi's example? To explain this dialectical move that Meng Ke makes is a desideratum for interpreting 6A5. Suppose Meng Ke's point is that one's feeling of greater *jìng* would expectably shift toward the senior fellow villager in Jizi's wine-pouring situation. It would seem dialectically redundant, if not counter-effective, for him to come up with the *shūfù*-versus-younger-brother situation, because it seems psychologically even more difficult for one's feeling of greater *jìng* to shift toward a brother junior to oneself than for such feeling to shift toward the villager who is senior even to one's eldest brother. Jizi has already said, referring to the eldest brother and the fellow villager respectively, that "whom you *jìng* is here; whom you treat as being senior is there" (segment 3.e). It is obscure how Meng Ke, *by introducing the case of shūfù versus younger brother*, could plausibly intend to convince Jizi or anyone that "whom you *jìng*" is in fact also "there" (i.e. the fellow villager) on the occasion that involves pouring wine. Should Meng Ke's point indeed be that one's feeling of greater *jìng* expectably shifts toward the senior fellow villager, then it would be dialectically more efficient to simply retort that, when the fellow villager is occupying the relevant position, the one whom you *jìng* continues to be whom you treat as being senior (*zhǎng*), but it is just that "the usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while's *jìng* is at that fellow villager" (4.i), skipping what he actually says in segments 4.b-4.h.

§ 5.2.2.2 The shift-independent reading

Consider the other reading: Meng Ke uses "*jìng* 敬 x" in segment 4 to signify the *jìng* behavior that privileges x over some third party, performed with a *jìng* attitude – which perhaps consists of giving attention to x, treating x seriously, and taking x as somehow more important than oneself – but in abstraction from whether the agent *feels greater jìng* toward x than toward the third party.²¹ Accordingly, Meng Ke's topic in segment 4 would be, "Which

²¹ For evidence in early Chinese texts that "*jìng* 敬" was at least at times used to signify a posture or attitude "that has to do with the way we direct our attention," possibly in abstraction from the *feeling* of deferential regard, see (Shun 2013, 45-55) and (Shun 2014, 270-274). In *Mengzi* 4A1, Meng Ke seems to use "*jìng*" in such abstraction when he affirms, "To show good and shut off evil is what is called '*jìng*.' <To say,> 'My prince is not capable,' is what is called '<being a> thief.'" When KONG Qiu says, "居處恭。執事敬。與人忠"

party is it apt to privilege with a *jìng* attitude?” Meng Ke on this reading, too, supposes that the privileging treatment due can aptly change from one’s *shūfù* to one’s younger brother, and from one’s eldest brother to one’s fellow villager, when the latter in each pair occupies a specific position in some circumstance. But on this reading, Meng Ke does not depend on one’s feeling of greater *jìng* to also shift accordingly between the target parties, and he acquiesces to the idea that, in the wine-pouring scenario, one can satisfy *yì* in privileging one’s fellow villager over one’s eldest brother while aptly feeling greater *jìng* toward the latter than toward the former, thereby acquiescing to Jizi’s step (J1). Call this “the shift-independent reading.” Construed thus, Meng Ke’s point in invoking the personator scenario that calls for *jìng* toward one’s younger brother, and his point in saying of Jizi’s scenario that “The usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while’s *jìng* is at that fellow villager,” have to be reinterpreted.

Under the shift-independent reading, when Meng Ke introduces the personator scenario that requires one to *jìng* one’s younger brother, he seems to suggest that, even if the one whom you are supposed to privilege is not the one toward whom you can be expected to feel greater *jìng*, *you are nonetheless supposed to privilege the former with some *jìng* attitude*. This attitude is required even when the party to be privileged is your younger brother and so, *a fortiori*, it is required when the party to be privileged is your fellow villager, who is older than your eldest brother. If this required *jìng* attitude is a feeling that is eligible to be part of what instantiates *yì*, premise (J2’) and Satisfaction_{feelings-don’t-count} are called into question. However, neither (J2) nor any of the other four analogues of (J2) is likewise challenged. For although, while *z* is performing the act of privileging *x* over *y*, this *jìng* attitude probably consists of paying attention to *x*, treating *x* seriously, and perhaps even taking *x* as somehow more important than *z* oneself, and although this attitude characterizes how *z* privileges *x*, it does not itself *dispose* *z* to privilege *x* over *y*; nor does it *indicate* which party is to be privileged. It is an attitude *with which* one is to privilege one party over a third one but not an attitude *because of which* one would or know to privilege the former over the latter. For *in relation to the act of privileging *x* over *y**, it is a merely characterizing attitude, not a prompting attitude²² (whereas feeling greater *jìng* toward *x* than toward *y* would be one). Therefore, neither this *jìng* attitude nor the disposition thereto, nor the fit therewith, is a probable candidate for grounding the *yì* requirement to privilege one specific party over a third one, for being a resource in the heart/mind for figuring out which of these

in *Analects* 13.19, he also seems to use “*jìng*” in a similar way. While such abstraction is sometimes more evidently probable when something other than persons is the object of “*jìng*,” it seems viable to use “*jìng*” in such abstraction also to signify (an act with) an attitude with a person as the object.

²² *In relation to the less complex act of privileging *x* over oneself* (involving no third party), the same attitude may be a prompting attitude if it indeed includes taking *x* as somehow more important than oneself.

two it is *yì* to privilege, or for being a common-human-natural feeling that disposes one toward *yì*. For *these* roles, the personator scenario does not reveal a promising candidate any more than Jizi's wine-pouring scenario does, and it is another example where one's unshifting differential feeling of *jìng* would prompt one in a direction contrary to *yì*. Hence, under the shift-independent reading, Meng Ke's invocation of this personator scenario favors Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} among the six interpretations of what externality claim Meng Ke is reacting to.

The above, for Meng Ke under the shift-independent reading, may yet not be the best path of resistance against Jizi's position. Defending Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, Jizi (or someone in his position) may counterargue that the said, merely characterizing attitude, even if required by *yì*, is not a feeling. He may argue so on the grounds that this attitude – paying attention to someone, treating them seriously, and perhaps taking them as somehow more important than oneself – is no less subject to voluntary control and no more a desire or emotion than the act of privileging is. Thus, the argument goes, it is no more internal than the act, and is a *manner* of conduct rather than a feeling. There may or may not be a good reply to this counterpoint. However, this is not necessarily Meng Ke's only path of resistance against Jizi's position, under the shift-independent reading.

Take also into account what Meng Ke says at the end (4.i): “The usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while's *jìng* is at that fellow villager.” What does Meng Ke achieve by saying this? It cannot be an objection to step (J1) since under the shift-independent reading, Meng Ke acquiesces to it. As for premise (J2) and its five analogues, our observation above concerning 4.d-4.e carries over: the only thing that Meng Ke might be nominating in what he has said from 4.d through 4.i to resist an all-out externality view in the wine-pouring situation is still the merely characterizing *jìng* attitude, and this has a chance only against (J2'). (But, as we have just observed in the preceding paragraph, this may not work at the end of the day.) Now, given both (J1) and (J2), (J3) does follow, as does each analogue of (J3) follow from (J1) and a suitable analogue of (J2). So, the only remaining path of resistance is against the inference from (J3) or from its analogue to the corresponding conclusion. In segment 4.i, the resistance conveyed, at the obvious, surface level, might be this: Even if the party whom one is expected to privilege occasionally differs from the party toward whom one is expected to feel greater *jìng*, there must also be cases where the two objects coincide. So, even if Jizi is right about the case of *yì* he invokes, he may not have the warrant to draw his conclusion on all cases of *yì*. But does anything Meng Ke says in 6A5 really provide a reason to think that Jizi's leap from the particular to the universal is unwarranted? Among the six interpretations, what Meng Ke has said makes a promising objection readily available only if the leap he resists is from (J3') to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, rendering this more likely to be what Meng Ke takes himself to be resisting.

Suppose what Meng Ke perceives and resists in Jizi's all-out externality statement is Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, that how one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yì*. Against the inference to this conclusion from (J3'), there is some promising objection that can be reconstructed from what Meng Ke says in segment 4.b through 4.i. First, when he says of Jizi's example that "the usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while's *jìng* is at that fellow villager," his point may not be merely that the party to be privileged sometimes is the party for whom one is expected to feel greater *jìng* but, more specifically, that the *jìng* in which the act and the feeling align is the *usual* one in a normative sense. For "yōng 庸 (usual)" may denote or connote normality in Meng Ke's use here. The act and the prompting feeling align in the kind of *jìng* that is *normally* required as pertaining to *yì* (insofar as any *jìng* is required at all), whereas *jìng* that privileges one party while the agent feels greater *jìng* toward the other party instantiates *yì* only as an extraordinary or derivative case. Second, rather than merely asserting this normative asymmetry or hierarchy, Meng Ke has a ready explanation for it. Cases of *jìng* where the act and the prompting feeling align are the norm *because* accurately expressing one's feeling of *jìng* is essential to the *primary yì* instances of *jìng* performances.²³ This explanans contradicts the bridge principle that Jizi needs if it is the conditional that, if a feature (e.g. feeling greater *jìng* toward the party whom one is supposed to privilege) is absent in one instance of *yì*, then the feature has no necessary connection to *yì* in *any* instance. If the bridge principle turns out false, then Jizi does not have the warrant to conclude Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} from (J3'). The explanans (which seems to be lost on Jizi) can become apparent upon attentive reflection on Meng Ke's personator scenario. In Jizi's wine-pouring scenario, although one might not feel greater *jìng* toward the party to be served first than toward the party to be served later, to serve the former is in itself nothing extraordinary – after all, this villager is senior to oneself and senior to one's eldest brother. It is still straightforwardly to *zhǎng zhǎng* (長長), i.e. treat the senior as being senior. At the personator ritual, it is not just that one might not feel greater *jìng* toward the party whom one is required to privilege in ceremonious form (one's younger brother) than toward the other party (the *shūfù*), but serving the former in ceremonious form in itself is *prima facie* extraordinary, not straightforwardly to *zhǎng zhǎng* – the younger

²³ This would not be the only time Meng Ke relies on a distinction between primary or central instances and secondary or derivative instances. Such a distinction is presupposed in the ethical process of extension – in which an attitude one used to exhibit only in some cases, where it is more intuitively or vividly called for or its exhibition more instinctive, is eventually exhibited by one in all instances that call for it – a process that Meng Ke envisions in *Mengzi* 1A7, 2A6, 7A5, 7A45, 7B1, and 7B31. Cf. 4B29 and 5B1. A similar process and a similar distinction seem to be implied in Kong Qiu's teaching in *Analects* 12.2. Also important to my case, however, Meng Ke does *not* think that *every* attitude required in a relatively central case is always required in a relatively derivative case (7A45).

brother is junior not just to the *shūfù* but *to oneself*. This extraordinariness is a sign that an intentional action to privilege x in ceremonious form with a merely characterizing *jìng* attitude is supposed to *mean something*. The ceremonious service characterized by a *jìng* attitude, in its primary *yì* application, *expresses a jìng feeling* – a prompting attitude, perhaps something like deferential regard – from the agent toward those whom they serve. If so, then the possibility of *yì* in “a little while’s *jìng*” depends on *yì* in “the usual *jìng*.” This means that, if there is ever any *yì* instance of *jìng* – as Jizi thinks there is – then some instances must accurately express the agent’s *jìng* feeling. It does not follow that one’s satisfying *yì* in every case involves one feeling a certain way. Meng Ke may be sympathetic or even personally committed to this sweeping claim, but at the same time he may also find it difficult to defend. If Meng Ke limits himself to defending the weaker claim that feeling a certain way is a constituent of some instantiations of *yì*, then my reading has an explanation for why he is not reported in the *Mengzi* to have said “*yì* is (from the) internal,” insofar it means or entails that one’s satisfying *yì* in every instance involves one’s feeling a certain way.²⁴

Under the shift-independent reading, insofar as Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} is the target, it is dialectically useful for Meng Ke to introduce the younger-brother-versus-*shūfù* scenario, because it is so much more of an “exception” that it indicates “the rule” that Jizi’s less extreme scenario does not indicate: an extraordinary instance of *yì jìng* can require of one an act that privileges someone (e.g. a sibling who is younger than one oneself but is old enough to follow the social code) that is expected to have the *jìng* feeling (perhaps something like deferential regard), which this very act *ordinarily* expresses, toward one oneself. What is strikingly extraordinary prompts us to recognize what constitutes the norm.²⁵

The same idea, that accurately expressing one’s feeling of *jìng* is essential to the primary *yì* instances of *jìng* performances, is not effective for challenging the validity in inferring from (J3) to Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} or the analogous inferences to the other four alternatives to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}. As we observed above, each such inference *is* valid under a bridge principle that warrants the relevant move from the particular to the universal. The principle may be false, but nothing Meng Ke says in 6A5, under the shift-independent reading, seems able or intended to show it if the targeted conclusion is one of the five alternatives to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}.

Consider why things required as pertaining to *yì* are required. If the *yì*-requirement in one instance (say, in Jizi’s wine-pouring context) does not fit anything in oneself – which

²⁴ It is true that Meng Ke assists Gongduzi in a debate that opens with the latter defending the statement, “*yì* is internal.” However, Meng Ke intervenes at a juncture when Jizi has argued for an all-out externality position, and Mengzi could be objecting to Jizi’s argument without pretending to prove that “*yì* is internal.”

²⁵ I thank Dhananjay Jagannathan for suggesting this purpose of the younger-brother-versus-*shūfù* scenario.

would entail (J3) – then even if a *yì*-requirement turns out to fit something in oneself in other instances of *yì*, it is obscure why such fit would constitute a basis for the requirement there. Grant that, in a primary instance of *yì jìng* performance, since accurately expressing one's feeling of *jìng* is essential to such instances, what is required of one turns out to fit something in oneself because the required act fits the feeling it expresses. Even so, it does not follow that the required act's fit with the feeling it expresses *explains* why one is required to express it. Between one's eldest brother and one's fellow villager, grant that in a primary instance of *yì jìng* performance, one is required as pertaining to *yì* to privilege the brother, which means that here the requirement fits one's feeling greater *jìng* toward him over the villager. Even so, it does not follow that this fit explains why one is required to express that feeling. In fact, one might object, this fit seems not a suitable basis for the requirement, for, while one consistently feels greater *jìng* toward one's eldest brother, one is sometimes required to privilege the fellow villager. So, why are we not warranted to conclude that *yì*-requirements are never based on their fit with something in oneself? Nothing Meng Ke says in 6A5, under the shift-independent reading, seems able or intended to address these concerns.

Now, consider whence one recognizes what satisfies *yì* and what might dispose one toward *yì*. If the feeling of greater *jìng* toward one's eldest brother wrongly prompts one to privilege him over someone else in Jizi's wine-pouring context, then, even though in another instance the unshifting feeling turns out to prompt one to privilege the correct party, this *jìng* feeling seems too unreliable to be a compass in the heart/mind that indicates what satisfies *yì*, and too unreliable to be what disposes human beings toward *yì*. Between one's eldest brother and one's fellow villager, grant that in a primary instance of *yì jìng* performance, since accurately expressing one's feeling of *jìng* is essential to such instances, one is required as pertaining to *yì* to privilege the brother, which means that, here, the requirement turns out to align with one's feeling greater *jìng* toward him over the villager. Even so, it does not follow that this feeling is a trustworthy feature of the heart/mind whence what satisfies *yì* is to be recognized or a disposition that tracks what satisfies *yì*, for, while one consistently feels greater *jìng* toward one's eldest brother, one is occasionally required to privilege the fellow villager. So, why are we not warranted to draw the universal conclusions that what satisfies *yì* is not something to be recognized from features of the heart/mind, and that in common human nature there is no disposition toward *yì*? It is not that there is nothing Meng Ke could say in reply, but nothing he actually says in 6A5, all the way through segment 4.i, under the shift-independent reading, seems able or intended to address these concerns.

Therefore, under the shift-independent reading, the deductive validity of inferring Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} from (J3') is squarely disputed by Meng Ke if he is appealing to the

relevant conceptual asymmetry and dependence when he says, “The usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while’s *jìng* is at that fellow villager.” In contrast, there would seem to be no point for Meng Ke to say that if any of the five alternatives to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} were his target.

§ 5.3 Jizi’s response to Meng Ke

- (5.a) 季子聞之。曰。敬叔父則敬。敬弟則敬。
敬。
(5.a) Jizi heard it. He said, “To *jìng* <my> father’s-younger-brother is to *jìng*; to *jìng* <my> younger brother is to *jìng*.”
- (5.b) 果在外。非由內也。
(5.b) Indeed it is on the external, not from the internal.”

To the Meng Ke as construed under the shift-reliant reading, Jizi’s reply would appear very weak. His point in 5.a may be something like, *jìng* (or *jìng*’s proper object) varies with the situation. But he has hitherto depended, for his all-out externality conclusion, on the unshifting of the relevant feelings. His present reply seems to do nothing to defend against the contention that the relevant feelings expectably shift in the same direction as the parties to whom the privileging act is due shift.

To the Meng Ke as I have construed him under the shift-independent reading, let us see how squarely Jizi’s reply would make sense as a response defending an all-out externality position that involves Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}. Jizi’s response can be read as showing that he grasps it at what I described above as the obvious, surface level: Even if the party whom one is expected to privilege occasionally differs from the party for whom one is expected to feel greater *jìng*, there must also be cases where the two objects coincide. Jizi’s reply now is that, since privileging the younger brother in the personator circumstance, in the absence of a matching feeling of greater *jìng* toward him, already satisfies *yì*, any expectable feeling of greater *jìng* toward the *shūfù* than for the younger brother is *irrelevant* to *yì* even in circumstances where one is required as pertaining to *yì* to privilege the *shūfù*. This denial of relevance relies on the same sort of bridge principle as he must rely on (in any reading) to leap from the particular to the universal in segment 3, e.g. If a feature is absent in one instance of *yì*, then this feature has no necessary connection to *yì* in *any* instance. Meng Ke already understood Jizi to depend on it in inferring from *some* satisfactions of *yì* where no relevant feeling is present (J3’) to the irrelevance of one’s feelings to *any* of one’s satisfactions of *yì* (Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}). However, if I am right, then Meng Ke’s point back in segment 4 is not only that the feeling and the act align in some

cases of *yì*, but also that certain cases with such alignment are conceptually prior to or presupposed by cases where they do not have to align.

If Meng Ke were present when Jizi gives the rejoinder at 5.a-b, the former might spell out the point he initially made in 4.i as follows: Focus on what it is like to serve your younger brother in ceremonious form when he is personating an ancestor. Part of you might feel reluctant. Why? It's because he is junior to you, whereas, in its original, primary application, the act of performing ceremonious service for someone with the attitude of paying attention to them and treating them seriously (and perhaps taking them as somehow more important than yourself) expresses your feeling of deferential regard toward them as being of a higher status. If I serve wine to my eldest sibling before I do to the fellow villager, you might think that I am directing my *jìng* behavior improperly. But if I serve a dish first to the toddlers before I do to the eldest sibling, you might not think that this is *jìng* behavior at all in that context. Why? It's because you know that persons related to one in certain ways, e.g. one's eldest sibling, is a usual, standard object of one's *jìng*, toward whom one expectably feels deferential regard. Though there may be special occasions on which the proper *jìng* behavior does not reflect exactly the way one can be expected to feel deferential regard, such behavior is *yì* and *jìng* by derivation from the primary cases. Between one's eldest brother and the villager, *jìng* due to the brother is more common and of the standard type, whereas *jìng* due to the neighbor is occasional and of a derivative type (even though a derivative instance of *yì* is not thereby a defective instance of *yì*).

§ 5.4 Gongduzi's final reply to Jizi

If Meng Ke indeed understands Jizi's point in segment 5.a-b as I have proposed, then Gongduzi seems to understand it differently:

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| (5.c) 公都子曰。冬日則飲湯。夏日則飲水。 | (5.c) Gongduzi said, "On a winter day one drinks soup/hot water; on a summer day one drinks <simply unheated> water. |
| (5.d) 然則飲食亦在外也。 | (5.d) So, then, drinking and eating would also be on the external! |

The argument Gongduzi takes himself to be opposing is something like this: Between my father's younger brother and my younger brother, I should *jìng* the former in some circumstance but the latter in some other circumstance; therefore, it is the circumstance, not how I feel, that determines whom it is *yì* for me to *jìng*. This argument would be, as Van Norden points out, a rather weak response for Jizi to have given Meng Ke – *if* the shift-reliant reading were right. For if the party toward whom one feels greater *jìng* and the party

whom it is *yì* to privilege shift together in the same direction as the circumstance varies, it is not obvious that it is the circumstance rather than one's feeling that determines whom it is *yì* to privilege. And this is Gongduzi's point. In contrast, under the shift-independent reading of Meng Ke, whereby Meng Ke interprets Jizi as defending Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, there is a more charitable way for Meng Ke (and for us) to interpret Jizi at 5.a-b, which is as I constructed it in the previous section. Under this reading, then, Gongduzi probably did not understand Jizi as Meng Ke did. Under this reading, however, it does not contradict Meng Ke's position when Gongduzi tells Jizi in segment 2, "I *jìng* this elder brother," if he means that one always would or should feel greater *jìng* toward one's eldest brother than toward the fellow villager. It does not contradict Meng Ke, whose use of "*jìng* x" is in abstraction from whether the agent feels greater *jìng* toward x. In contrast, as observed above, the same idea would contradict Meng Ke's position under the shift-reliant reading. So, under either reading, one thing or another that Gongduzi says is not in line with Meng Ke's position. But the three indications noted in §5.2.2.1, *before* any of the six interpretations enters into consideration, strongly suggest that the shift-reliant reading is untenable. The shift-independent reading as I construe it, on the other hand, enables a specific reading that can make sense of Meng Ke's introduction of the *shūfù*-versus-younger-brother scenario and his contrast of *jìng* toward the eldest brother with *jìng* toward the fellow villager. Among the six interpretations, under Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} alone is this specific reading possible, which also has a straightforward explanation for why the *Mengzi* has no report of Meng Ke saying "*yì* is (from the) internal," even though he resists Gaozi's and Jizi's all-out externality conclusions and he objects to their defenses. Contrast this with (Chong 2002)'s account, on which Meng Ke in effect takes Gaozi's "internal" and "external" not to be jointly exhaustive. From my Meng Ke's perspective, in the ways Gaozi and Jizi use the terms, "(from the) internal" and "(on the) external" may or may not be jointly exhaustive, and even if they are, "*yì* is (from the) internal" and "*yì* is (on the) external" are not, since these are the propositions that *yì in every instance* "is (from the) internal" and that *yì in every instance* "is (on) the external."

§ 6 Meng Ke's contrastive use of "*wàì*" and his view expressible as "*yì wàì*"

Compared to Meng Jizi's all-out externality statement, there is much more uncertainty regarding Gaozi's: Consideration of 6A1 alongside 6A4 left us still with three live options; our finding concerning Meng Jizi lends some but limited support for Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} concerning Gaozi (depending on how closely Meng Ke associates Meng Jizi with Gaozi ideologically); and, for all we have seen, it is also possible that Meng Ke takes Gaozi's all-

out externality statement to involve two or all of the three meanings. So, let us consider further clues that might help predict, when an interlocutor characterizes *yì* using a condense expression of externality in contrast to internality, how Meng Ke might interpret it. One potential clue is an instance of Meng Ke himself using “on the external” in contrast to something that can be reasonably understood as internal; another is a view he himself holds that could be condensely expressed as “*rén* is internal; *yì* is external.”

Meng Ke in 7A3 uses “*wài*” in contrast to something relatively internal: he compares seeking “what is on the external (*zài wài zhě* 在外者)” with seeking “what is with me (*zài wǒ zhě* 在我者).” This appears to suggest that Meng Ke might interpret an externality statement or an all-out externality statement to be interchangeable with or to involve “*yì* is outside *me*,” which would seem to favor Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} and Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind} over Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}. However, Meng Ke speaks of seeking “what lies in me” in 7A3 to explain how “if one seeks, one will attain it,” a saying he utters *verbatim* in 6A6 as a conclusion of his premise that all humans possess dispositions that are or can become virtues. He states this premise to countenance the ideas that common human nature is good and that the not-good instances are not the fault of the *cái* 才, or raw materials, of the human being. Therefore, even if Meng Ke in 7A3 uses “on the external” interchangeably with “outside me,” “outside me” in this context is very likely to mean, specifically, *outside any disposition I have by common human nature* or *outside me with respect to my common human nature*. But it is clear to Meng Ke that neither sense could be Gaozi’s sense of “external,” as I have explained in § 4.3, drawing upon 6A1 alongside 6A4. This means that, at the end of the day, Meng Ke has a strong reason not to project his own user meaning of “external” in 7A3 onto Gaozi.

In some other passages, Meng Ke expresses a view it would not be unreasonable to condensely express as “*rén* is internal; *yì* is external.” In 4A10, he describes *rén* as one’s “secure residence” and *yì* as one’s “correct road.” In 6A11, he says that *rén* is a/the human heart/mind and *yì* is a/the human road.²⁶ Both passages suggest that, insofar as there is a difference between being and acting, or between attitude or disposition and conduct, and insofar as *rén* and *yì* are conceptually distinct, *rén* may be in some sense relatively more immediately about how to be, and *yì*, about how to act. Meng Ke clearly thinks that *rén* also concerns what to do and *yì* also concerns what attitude or disposition to have – as e.g. 6A6, 6B8, 7A33, 7B31, and even a later part of 6A11 together show. So, his contrasting characterizations of *rén* and *yì* in 6A11 are most likely relative, not absolute. Nonetheless, the contrast sounds somewhat similar to Gaozi’s statement contrasting *rén* and *yì*. Is this evidence in any way regarding the probability of any of the promising interpretations? It

²⁶ See also 2A7 and 5B7.8.

may appear that, insofar as Meng Ke resists Gaozi's arguments for his all-out externality statement about *yì*, Meng Ke is more likely to have interpreted the latter's statement to mean something different rather than similar to Meng Ke's own views. However, while it is of course not incoherent to reject some view insofar as it is different from one's own, this does not prevent what is rejected from being also similar to one's own in some respect. If Meng Ke was a charitable or sympathetic listener genuinely trying to make the best sense of what Gaozi said, and if Meng Ke was at once a subtle thinker being able to draw a fine distinction when necessary, then, *ceteris paribus*, when he heard of Gaozi's externality statement about *yì*, it is not unlikely that he interpreted it to express a view that is similar to his own, even if he would disagree eventually when he noticed some critical difference. To the comparison Meng Ke makes in 4A10 and 6A11, Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} comes closest, that how one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yì*, even though Meng Ke's own view does not entail it and thus does not logically forbid himself to reject it. If Meng Ke does not hold views that are as similar to Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself} and Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}, then we have some indirect evidence lending modest support for Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} as what Meng Ke perceives and resists in Gaozi's all-out externality statement – insofar as Meng Ke was subtle and charitable to him.²⁷

²⁷ In theory, sources beside the *Mengzi* could shed light on our interpretative uncertainty about how Meng Ke understands Gaozi. So, in the research leading to this paper, I considered, from texts also of the Warring-States period, views that could be conveyed within an all-out externality statement. *Zhuangzi* 11 includes the saying, “遠而不可不居者。義也。親而不可不廣者。仁也。” Other passages I considered include chapter “*Jiè*” in the received text of the *Guanzi* (“仁從中出。義從外作” (Fang n.d.). Cf. (Luo 1931), and (Rickett 1985)), a passage reconstituted from both Guodian's *Xing Zi Ming Chu* (Jingmen shi bowuguan 荊門市博物館 1998) (Cook 2012) and Shanghai Museum's *Xing Qing Lun* bamboo strips (Ma 2001) ((3) ……(始)者近(情)。終者近義。(知)【Strip is broken here. (Jingmen shi bowuguan 荊門市博物館 1998) supplies three characters: 情者能】(4)出之。(知)(義)者能內之……), one passage from Guodian's *Yü Cóng 1* strips ((22) (仁)生於人。(義)生於道。(23)或生於內。或生於外 |) and one passage from its *Liù Dé* strips ((26)…… | (仁) · 內也 · (義) · 外也 · 禮樂 · 共也 · 內(位) · 父 · 子 · (27)夫也 · 外(位) · 君 · 臣 · 婦也……(30)……門內(31)之(治) · (恩)(弁)(義) · 門外之(治) · (義)斬(恩) · (仁)(類)(柔)而(束) · (義)(類)(持)(32)而(絕) · (仁)(柔)而(納) · (義)強(剛)而(簡)……). These passages do not attribute them to anyone named “Gaozi” or “Jizi,” and I found that each of them either does not adjudicate between the three remaining candidate interpretations, i.e., Grounds-of-requirement_{not-oneself}, Source-of-recognition_{not-the-mind}, and Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count}, or offers modest support to Satisfaction_{feelings-don't-count} which has received relatively the most support already. So, I decided not to discuss these extra-*Mengzi* passages in the interest of conciseness. Franklin Perkins's recent study considers how the excavated texts – in particular, Nature Issues from Mandate: 9-14, 39 and Thicket of Sayings I: 18-20, 22-23 – might bear on the different interpretations' relative likelihood without assuming constancy of Gaozi's position between 6A1 and 6A4 (Perkins 2023, 69-72). Under his reading, when pushed by Meng Ke from 6A1 through 6A3 to be more specific, Gaozi shifts from his sweeping claim in 6A1 that human nature is ethically neutral to conceding that one virtue, *rén*, is already incipient in human-natural dispositions. But to concede this about *rén* as opposed to *yì* would appear an odd response to the immediately preceding objection in 6A3 that human

§ 7 Conclusion

Below I summarize the best sense the four sets of passages can make should each of the six interpretations be what Meng Ke perceives and resists in Gaozi's or Jizi's all-out externality statement:

		Disposition not-natural	Grounds-of- requirement not-natural- dispositions	Grounds-of- requirement not-nature	Grounds-of- requirement not-oneself	Source-of- recognition not-the-mind	Satisfaction feelings-don't-count	
Gaozi	6A4	Comparably sensible						
	2A2	Comparably sensible						
	6A1, 6A4	Gaozi's use of "external" and "internal" clearly inconsistent to Mengzi			No known inconsistency in Gaozi's use of "external" or "internal" in Mengzi's eye			
Meng Jizi	6A5	<p>Mengzi would be insisting (seemingly not very intuitive to Jizi or Gongduzi) that the feeling of greater <i>jìng</i> would shift from one circumstance to another. It would follow that</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Gongduzi's statement, "I <i>jìng</i> this elder brother," contradicts Mengzi's position, Mengzi's invocation of the personator scenario would be dialectically inefficacious and thus mysterious, Jizi's response to Mengzi would appear to him to be at best quite weak, and Gongduzi's final rejoinder would not suggest that his interpretation of Jizi differs from Mengzi's. 				<p>Mengzi's stance: perhaps <i>yì</i> acts and feelings diverge sometimes, but accurate expression is essential to central <i>yì</i> instances of <i>jìng</i>. It would follow that</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Gongduzi's statement, "I <i>jìng</i> this elder brother," does not contradict Mengzi's position, Mengzi's personator scenario illustrates an extreme possibility of <i>yì</i> that the wine-pouring scenario does not, Jizi's response could then make sense to Mengzi as addressing part of his point, and Gongduzi's final rejoinder would suggest that his interpretation of Jizi differs from Mengzi's. 		

nature must be distinct from other natures, for many animals that were familiar to early Chinese also exhibit compassionate or caring behaviors, whereas *yì*, even in its incipient form, is much less noticeable in non-human species. Another reason why Gaozi seems not moved by the objection in 6A3: the first thing he says after it is that the appetites for food and physical beauty "are nature," which clearly do not distinguish humans from other animals. Also, as observed in section 4.1, he lists no virtue or anything else alongside those appetites, nor does he mention those appetites in the succeeding, all-in internality statement about *rén*.

6A4 can make roughly as much sense under each of the six interpretations of Gaozi’s all-out externality statement as under any of the other five. The same can be said for 2A2. However, having also had the conversation in 6A1, Meng Ke would have strong reasons both to believe that Gaozi holds $\text{Disposition}_{\text{not-natural}}$, $\text{Grounds-of-requirement}_{\text{not-natural-dispositions}}$, and $\text{Grounds-of-requirement}_{\text{not-nature}}$ and to rule them out from Gaozi’s meaning in his all-out externality statement in 6A4. The contrast between *rén* and *yì* that Meng Ke himself draws in 4A10 and 6A11, which could be condensely stated as “*rén* is internal; *yì* is external,” suggests that, if he is charitable and subtle, he might be more likely to perceive $\text{Satisfaction}_{\text{feelings-don't-count}}$ in someone’s utterance of an all-out externality statement than the five other views, but this is by no means decisive.

As for what Meng Ke perceives and resists in Meng Jizi’s all-out externality statement in 6A5, $\text{Satisfaction}_{\text{feelings-don't-count}}$ – how one feels is irrelevant to whether one satisfies *yì* – is most likely. The passage itself favors the shift-independent reading of Meng Ke’s argument, which in turn favors $\text{Satisfaction}_{\text{feelings-don't-count}}$, because for it alone would there be a clear rationale for Meng Ke to introduce the *shūfù*-versus-younger-brother scenario, as well as to say, “The usual *jìng* is at that elder brother; a little while’s *jìng* is at that fellow villager.” In saying it, Meng Ke is not conveying the expectation on one’s feeling of greater *jìng* to shift temporarily in special circumstances. This expectation, which many readings of 6A5 have ascribed to Meng Ke, is not very intuitive even to Gongduzi. On the new reading, Meng Ke can acquiesce to Jizi’s idea that, in some (secondary or derivative) *yì* instances of *jìng*, the required act to privilege the fellow villager over one’s eldest brother does not reflect the agent’s unshifting feeling of greater *jìng* toward the eldest brother (though it must still be performed with a merely characterizing attitude of *jìng*), but Meng Ke’s point is that the very existence of *yì* instances of *jìng* performances presupposes that some of them, the “usual” cases, accurately express the agent’s *jìng* feeling, which I call a “prompting attitude.” (The extraordinariness of the *yì* instantiated in privileging with a merely characterizing *jìng* attitude one’s young brother over one’s *shūfù* in ceremonial form – which is not even “treating the senior as being senior” in any straightforward way – vividly demonstrates the conceptual dependence of such *yì* instances on more normal instances of *yì*.) It would follow that some agential instantiations of *yì* do involve the agent’s feeling a certain way. Although Meng Ke, for other reasons (4B19, 6A6), might be sympathetic or even personally committed to the sweeping claim that every agential instantiation of *yì* involves the agent’s feeling a certain way, he might also perceive difficulty in defending it. It would not surprise us, then, that the *Mengzi* has no record of Meng Ke affirming “*yì* is (from the) internal,” even if *nèi* and *wài* are jointly exhaustive predicates for him.

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