AESTHETIC MIND

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“Thıs book was COMPILED from the doctoral thesıs on the problem of recıprocıty ın aesthetıc apprecıaton”

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There is no such thing as "art". There are only artists"

Ernst Gombrich.

"People reach the experiment through memory. In fact, many memories of the same thing eventually form a single experiment, and the experiment seems to be something of almost the same nature as art and science. However, with the difference that science and art are accessible to people through experimentation."

Aristotle

# PREFACE

The thinking brain... This phenomenon of the mind, which remains a mystery and which many scientists are being pursued today, is still waiting to be explained. Artificial intelligence studies, which have gained momentum in the twenty-first century, have also achieved significant developments thanks to interdisciplinary studies on the mind. Neuroscience conducts a lot of research on the brain. However, the debate about how the mind, that is, the thinking brain, takes place in the processes of perception, interpretation and judgment that cannot be followed by the eye, is still hot. This debate has been and is still being conducted by many thinkers in the philosophical tradition. Today, we can develop various theories in the light of the data we have obtained throughout the history of ideas. But for the development of these theories, the joint work of all sciences is needed. Philosophy, in particular, plays an important role in these studies, but has been set aside in an unfortunate way in recent years. However, while all the sciences that left the roof of philosophy in the twentieth century produced separate theories, a century later, that is, today, the history of ideas was needed again, and the roof of philosophy, which was left alone, was re-entered. But this loneliness has led philosophy over the past century to the defeat of explaining what its definition and function are. However, trying to justify philosophy by trying to explain its definition and function is equivalent to questioning the accepted data of all the sciences known today. Thought discoveries; Producing theories is a product of the philosophia philosophy, the love of knowledge of effective and creative thinking. The practical field takes place in the interrelationship of theory with technical skill. In this way, as a result of experiments in the practical field, the theory may change. In this sense, two areas are in a state of exchange. In this case, to talk only about the existence of the practical field will not go beyond waiting for the surprises that coincidences bring us.

The Roman philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (477 AD), who showed us in the Middle Ages that theory and practice were closely linked, tells us *this connection in his work The Consolation of Philosophy*:

Just as I was recording my painful complaints with my pen, a respectable woman appeared above my head. His eyes were as bright as fire, and there was certainly more to man. It wasn't like one of our years (...) Her garment was woven with the finest thread, On the lower part of her dress were the letters Π [Greek: P] with Greek letters on one side and θ [Greek: Th], on the upper part, and between these two there were steps from the bottom to the top, resembling a merdifen... (Boitheus, 2015 p. 3)

This description of Boethius explains that the theory and the praxis field are connected to each other by reason. This relationship is sometimes overlooked today. This oversight confines the sciences to their own castles. What is practiced, unless it is leaned against a base, will be unfounded. However, only justified practices can produce new theories. The progress of philosophy also depends on it. This book attempts to show that the practical field is inextricably linked with philosophy.

**About the aesthetic mind....**

How the minds that produce art, technology and science work, and how the great discoveries that creative people add to our world come into being are always a matter of curiosity and research. It is obvious that these people have a special thinking structure. Art is one of the best instruments we have at our disposal to study this mindset. His art and objects, where thought, perception and sensation come together, can show us the key clues to this special way of thinking. Since Plato and Aristotle, the concept of logos has been defined as the logical basis, the principle of consciousness. This principle is opposed to all concepts outside the logical basis. The Logos seeks knowledge of things on the ground of reality. Logos has an analytical structure within the framework of this definition. However, in a field such as art, talking about logos within the framework of this definition will raise objections. Because, until today, the general social acceptance about art is that art is a work of feeling. Of course, human beings and their emotions and the contribution of these feelings to art cannot be denied. At this point, freeing art from the analytic has been the work of the definitions attached to the concept of aesthetics (aesthetic) throughout the history of thought. Aesthetics has carried responsibilities such as what is about beauty, what is about proportion and proportion, what is pleasant. In the 18th century, Alexander Baumgarten imposed another responsibility on aesthetics, a responsibility for sensation and perception. After that, with the involvement of perception and sensation, aesthetics has turned into another field that needs to be considered and examined.

My suggestion is to put another responsibility on aesthetics. This responsibility is the logos that carries the principles of the mind to the analytical structure. The processes of perception/sensation, meaning, and judgment are integral to understanding what things are and making a judgment. If, as with the definition of aesthetics, we consider only perception and sensation, the process of making sense and judgment will disappear into the sky like a stray kite. It is precisely at this point the logos helps us to hold the string of the kite firmly in our hands. Logos and aesthetics as a new concept (logosthetic) can technically define the aesthetic mind with this structure. Throughout the book, I have structured the functioning of the aesthetic mind with the history of philosophy in mind. Leaving aside the usual perspective on the field of aesthetics, I aimed to open the door to a new perception for those who work or are interested in this field.

Art has always been a controversial concept from past to present, and its products have been glorified or left in the background within the framework of subjective judgments and discussions. This approach to art objects brought with it the problem of taste and was characterized by the concept of 'relative' accepted by many. However, I believe that leaving the objects of human hands to such a random evaluation is equivalent to the problem of not understanding a language. Art objects are structured like a language. A language in which we have the chance to read the artist's expression, what he says and even what he does not say... With this feature, it has a structure that prioritizes language. However, just as we learn a foreign language and its features, it is also necessary to learn the language of art objects. In this way, whether we are an artist or not in the face of an art object, our actions such as perception, interpretation and interpretation will be far from ordinary at different levels. Understanding the aesthetic mind allows us to make sense of the various intellectual designs that exist in the world. Through this understanding, we can gain a creative and critical perspective. This book aims to enable artists to produce and discuss new theories in the minds of people who are interested in art or who work on the problem of the mind. The debating and questioning structure of philosophy forms the basis of scientific studies. Scientific progress cannot take place without discussion and questioning. I think that the field of aesthetics is a suitable field for explaining the phenomenon of the mind, so the research I have done on aesthetics, art, perception and creativity during my master's and doctoral studies has formed the result of a research on the functioning of the aesthetic mind in my doctoral thesis. Thank you to everyone who supported this encouraging work and believed in me.

 Derya Ölçener

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**Entrance**

Apart from being the subject of aesthetic appreciation associated with liking, art products are also objects waiting to be understood and analyzed. This interpretation and analysis require the subject to give a different judicial process from his perception of daily life in the face of the aesthetic object. The object of art is not an inanimate object, but also the carrier of the intellectual adventure of its artist. This adventure stands before us as a product of human cognition and its life. It is also necessary for the analysis of this language for the viewer subjects to come face to face with this experience and to perceive the art object correctly and to make sense of it. Evaluating an aesthetic object requires a special vision. This study aims to provide awareness of this special vision and addresses the issue of perception based on the characteristics of the aesthetic object. Based on this, the main problematic of this study is the investigation of the possibility of identity as a result of the subject's perception and form interaction within the scope of reciprocity in aesthetic appreciation. In general*, the induction* method was used in the handling of the problematic, and the results obtained in each subsection were related to the concepts of perception and form.

As an introduction to the concept of aesthetics, the definition made by İsmail Tunalı (1923-2015), who has been working in the field of Aesthetics in Turkey for many years, in his work titled Aesthetics is explanatory as the starting point of our subject. Tunalı says that "aesthetic attitude and perception coincide" (Tunalı, 2012: 34). On the subject of sensation, perception, meaning, it expresses:

Meaning appears for the first time in perception, sensations are devoid of meaning. I see the object I call the stove, I receive various sensations of sight from it, I combine them with the sensations I have already received, and these combined sensations form the body of sensations that I call the stove as a meaningful whole. Perception is closely related to sensations. The senses give us individual sensations about the external world, our perceptions construct a world of perception based on them. In this sense, perception gives meaning to objects and comprehends them as a meaningful whole (Tunalı, 2012: 34).

We can say that Tunalı's statement that perception makes sense of objects and at the same time that it is an "aesthetic attitude" and Ömer Naci Soykan's statement that aesthetic attitude is an "aesthetic sensation is an aesthetic experience, it is an experiment, a psychological experiment" as such a thing has constituted the most inclusive expression in terms of our time (Soykan, 2015, p.53). Soykan, who blends perception with meaning and judgment in aesthetic appreciation, said, "It is the subject that attributes value to the object. Even if such judgments are accepted by people, that is, by all subjects, their validity is not objective, but subjective, intersubjective", underlining how objective and how subjective the processes of perceiving, making sense of and analyzing an aesthetic object are within the framework of determinations about sensation and perception. (Soykan, 2015, p. 57) In addition, we understand from these statements that the perception data obtained by one subject and the perception data obtained by another subject through the same object are identical to each other / reciprocity is effective in the evaluation of that work. Thus, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, the problematic of perception in aesthetic appreciation has been conceptualized as a result of different but accumulated discussions and different ways of dealing with each other within the framework of the activities of truth, reality, universality, rationality, finding expression in language, giving meaning and evaluating.

Alexander Baumgarten ensured that the discussions between the concept of *aesthesis* and the philosophy of art were not limited to the concept of the pure beautiful attributed to the object of art, but also the critical approaches related to it and the sensations of the subject were especially discussed. Therefore, Baumgarten's understanding of aesthetics has led to the study of the mind through subject-object interaction. In the post-Baumgarten discussions of aesthetics, aesthetic objects are works of art waiting to be understood and analyzed, unlike the perception of ordinary objects. Thus, since the subject who makes sense of and analyzes it should be taken into account as well as the art object, it is important how the view of an art object should be and what the subject should pay attention to when perceiving it in order to realize this special intellectual activity. Only in this way can we evaluate the scattered data obtained from the sensations about the object in accordance with the art object.

Since antiquity, the problem of man and knowledge has been the subject of debate; in this sense, both the subject itself and matter have been conceptualized. In particular, the concepts of knowledge (*episteme*) and illusion (*doxa) that we encounter in Plato* have confronted us with the question of what reality is. According to Plato, we see the reflections of the concept of beauty, not the concept of beauty. In order to get closer to the beautiful itself, the intellect is required. Therefore, the knowledge of episteme can be reached through the mind. To attain the knowledge of episteme in this context means, of course, to perform a different mental process. Like Plato's mental determination, we must not be passive but on the contrary active in mental action when making the final judgment of an object of art. We need to know what an art object is, what we can or cannot say with certainty when we judge it. This knowledge is also a condition for being able to interpret that work correctly. The information that we can obtain precisely through an aesthetic object is not subjective, but the objective information that the object carries on itself, that is, its quantitative properties. The subject's healthy access to these judgments is directly proportional to the quantitative information.

At the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, there were movements to interpret the work of art and to experience the works of artists of various branches of art through the works of other artists. Thus, a problem of intersubjectivity between artists can be mentioned, as well as the processes of comparing two or more works of art with each other and influencing each other. These movements have often been evaluated under the category of mysticism and have *tried to obtain special judgments* based on dreams (imagination) based on feeling art objects.

To what extent can an art object be resolved in close proximity to it? What should be noted here is, as we know, the competence with which we answer the question "what can I know?" asked by Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. An art object is the sum of its space-space, relationship, quantity and qualities. In addition to their physical existence, subjects are in front of the object with their body, sensation, perception and mental processing abilities. In this case, how these existing features that we have counted in the aesthetic object are first reciprocated in the subject's perception and then how they are analyzed by making sense of it make it necessary to investigate the subject of perception in depth. The subject’s entry into a relationship of reciprocity with an aesthetic object *means that its space-space, quantity, and qualities enter into a reciprocity with the mind, and what makes it possible for this reciprocity to take place is necessary for this determination.*

The form of an object is one that can be expressed mathematically and is one of the most fundamental determinants of the reciprocity relationship expressed above. Just as the form of an ordinary object can be expressed mathematically, the form of an art object can be expressed in the same way. Aristotle, while making determinations about the object in the study of matter and form, also explained what quantities and qualities are in a comprehensive way in *his Metaphysics*. From this point of view, it should be determined which features of an art object can provide precise information to the subject and which features are far from this certainty. While the expression of quantities such as size and weight of an object is certain, expressions such as quality (color) can be relative. One of the best examples of the knowledge of form and quantity is music, which also found expression in Pythagorean philosophy. The fact that qualities meet quantity and express what is certain is also clear from the point of view of the subject's perception. Branches of art; painting, music, sculpture, poetry, literature and theater differ from each other in terms of their forms in this sense. The perception of the branch of art, which has different forms, by the subject also differs. Not only the art object itself, but also the fact that the space it is located in structures it or the art object structures the space can make a difference in terms of perception. In this sense, although the currents of formalism and new formalism, which carry out studies on the form of the work of art, argue about the relegation of the emotional aspect specific to a work of art, they have nevertheless revealed the importance of form knowledge in relation to perception. Of course, a work of art cannot be separated from the emotion it conveys to its viewer, but the acquisition of knowledge of form can prevent arbitrary interpretations of the art object because the knowledge of form is objective.

In the face of an aesthetic object, the subject must be able to comprehend what the message that object conveys to him is. The accuracy and inclusivity of this understanding depends on having the most competent knowledge of the form of the object. This understanding of form-emotion reciprocity should also be a response to discussions of relativism about the work. For Kant, emotion and appreciation are subjective; But the object itself is outside of all this, and as such the subject's connection to the object is not objective. However, if we are based on this understanding, the perception of the subject becomes more ambiguous in terms of an approach that examines the art object on the basis of reciprocity; our judgments of appreciation about the object of art cannot cease to be the subject of debate. However, in the light of the subjective data of the object, it is possible to investigate what can be the subject of objective perception. In the light of these data, the objective data of the art object has been the subject of many artificial intelligence applications with the help of computer science today. For example, it is with the help of this data that sensory elements can be transformed into pictures or three-dimensional models. In this sense, it is possible to transform art objects into each other by transferring quantitative properties by changing form.

It is the artist who creates an aesthetic object and the one who follows it is the aesthetic subject. The viewer subject in front of the work of art is the here and now vis-à-vis the object of art, unlike the artist. But unlike the artist viewer, he is in the here and now with his subject. Therefore, the determination of the reciprocity of art is also the product of the association/encounter of the conscious and unconscious in the triangle of art object-artist-follower-subject. What needs to be asked here in terms of both interobjectivity and intersubjectivity is how an art object, while being consciously created, contains its unconscious elements or, on the contrary, how the audience consciously adds its unconscious elements to its evaluation while trying to make sense of the art object. While consciousness is the conscious side of the subject, the question of how it transfers unconscious (unconscious) elements to its work with this conscious side can be decisive in terms of perception. Or the question "Can a viewer evaluate the work correctly with his unconscious data?" seems to be a point that should not be missed in terms of art object-subject perception reciprocity. Hegel’ s *determinations of the steps of perception and meaning, which he explains in his Phenomenology of Spirit*, draw attention to the subject's mental structure and dialectical processes vis-à-vis the object. In this sense, especially the determination made by the subject's error in the face of the object on the basis of the subject's share sheds light on the questions of how the unconscious data is formed. Indeed, Carl Gustav Jung's statement that all data, including the unconscious, which separates the conscious and the unconscious – unlike Freud – consists of a loss of energy in the data pushed into the unconscious, where all data, including the unconscious, are processed in the conscious, suggests the question of whether what Hegel experiences through the mind-object and what the subject experiences until he identifies his mind with the object is a waste of energy. This loss of energy, according to Jung, is called forgetting, and it is not really an act of forgetting, but the source of unconscious data. The revelation of the unconscious determinations in terms of perception, the satisfaction of aesthetic appreciation is decisive in terms of the readiness of the aesthetic subject and the aesthetic object. The human mind makes sense of and analyzes the world with all its conscious contents. In this case, knowing the characteristics of both the artist and the viewer belonging to the conscious and unconscious can provide a different perspective on the phenomenological approach.

Many theories such as informational *aesthetics,* phenomenological aesthetics, Marxist aesthetics, structuralist aesthetics, etc. are aimed at investigating the criteria by which and how the subject's taste is determined. Within these theories, within the framework of the main problematic of our study, informative aesthetics and phenomenological aesthetics give primarily clues about the perception of the subject. Informative aesthetics complement each other in that they examine the knowledge of the art object, while phenomenological aesthetics examine the subject's perception of the art object while orienting towards it. However, in the light of these data, *it may be possible to talk about the readiness* of the aesthetic subject against an art object. The readiness of the aesthetic subject in the face of a work of art *is realized in accordance with the world of qualities* (the mental world determined by all categories of quality-quantity) and his feelings and experiences in relation to this world. In this sense, the qualifications related to perception and the investigation of the world of emotion are also necessary in terms of the subject's judgment of the art object. The readiness of the aesthetic object also differs between art objects. Each art object differs from each other in terms of space-space. Accordingly, they need not only the mental perception of the subject, but also – in the light of Bergson's concepts – components such as the body and duration. For example, while a piece of music is subject to duration, a sculpture needs the subject's body due to its three-dimensional structure. However, with the help of the body, other dimensions of the sculpture can be perceived.

The privileges we briefly determine about perception lead us to the question of what is its reciprocity in terms of forms of perception. The subject is confronted with an aesthetic object, with the object, thought, and world connections. These connections also differentiate his thought processes. The dialectical processes of the subject may also differ according to the objects of art. Accordingly, it is possible to talk about symbolic dialectical processes and dialectical processes of language. It would be appropriate to give examples of symbolic dialectical processes through music. On the other hand, dialectical processes of verbal expression can manifest themselves in literature and other branches of art. Again, within the framework of Croce's determinations about the readiness of the subject, the subject of intuition should be considered together with the study of perception. In particular, the relationship between intuition and experience, memory and probability should be evaluated together with today's cognitive psychology research. The determinations we make about the readiness of aesthetic objects and the examination of individual art forms in the context of Schelling's aesthetic understanding also provide us with clues about how it can be transformed into another form of art object. The artist and the aesthetic, who have the structure of art forms, also have the knowledge to transform and make sense of it between branches of art. Sensation and perception are the first steps in meaning-making. At the end of the meaning, the conclusion that informs the judgment for the object occurs. However, sometimes we come across different types of perception, especially in the field of art. One of them is synesthesia, which is experienced by the artist and most aesthetic subjects.

Within the scope of phenomenological perception from the point of view of the subject, the treatment of synesthesia brings with it a different view of the subject. Synesthesia can be called the state in which the non-object is perceived by the subject in multiple forms in an object. What is striking here is that, when considered in the context of phenomenology's principle of "let us return to things themselves", the perceived multitudes are not integrated with that thing. But the discussion of the existence of mental phenomena within the framework of Husserl can give us clues about synesthesia, unlike Brentano. Again, the collective cultural returns specific to this type of perception are the subject of today's research as dealt with by Goethe in his Theory of Colors, even if the connection of images with art objects is not under the name of synesthesia.

In the history of philosophy, the debates about perception that we have dealt with form the basis of the debates about aesthetic perception and taste. When making judgments about an aesthetic object, how we perceive it and the problems of liking (liking) and not going are among the contents of perception. When we perceive an art object, which features of that object do we perceive on the common plane between subjects, or which features do we perceive differently between subjects? This problem appears as a perceptual reciprocity problem. Again, while addressing this problem, the extent to which sensation and perception are separated or integrated in historical discussions, the independence or association of judgment from perception, the relationship between object and subject of the analytical and phenomenological approach shed light on the subject. These interests gain importance for aesthetic attitude. In the first part, the problematic of perception and form and then the interaction of perception and form are discussed in a comprehensive way within the framework of the research of the philosophical history literature and it is tried to reveal what can and cannot be known about the perception of the subject and the structure of form. In this section, discussions such as beauty, perception, art object, sensation, taste, phenomenological aesthetic approaches, etc. from the philosophy of antiquity until the 20th century are discussed. The aesthetic debates of the 20th century are marked by the expansions of the analytic tradition and phenomenological approach. In this context, in the first chapter, the idea of Wittgenstein, one of the representatives of analytic philosophy, that objects form a world by adding objects together in relation to space and time and that this is the place where objects are proven. In Kant's philosophy, space and time are a priori forms of appearance. Wittgenstein also admits that the error in the expression of the world, which is considered the ground of reality, is the ambiguity of language. In Kant's determinations, the place where things are proved seems to be more like the mind. Post-Kantian German idealists state that perception is grounded in the dialectical process of thought. In Fichte, the perception directed towards the object is concluded as the perception that turns inward and outward, and in Hegel it is concluded whether the perception directed towards the object is identical to it, and that it is the subject who shares in the delusion of the reality ground of the object. Again, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty gave the information that perception takes place in a gradual manner, contrary to the apparent expression of perception at a glance. Thus, in this chapter, the discussion of reciprocity in taste in terms of its historical background is discussed within the scope of the problem of perception and the combination of perception and form.

As of the second part, attention has been drawn to the conscious and unconscious about what are the defining features of aesthetic taste, and the problem of whether these structures can be separated from perception is discussed. In particular, these determinations of consciousness have been determined to be actively determinant in the states of readiness of the aesthetic subject and object. When the subject comes face to face with an aesthetic object, although he seems to be alone with his own thought processes, he is confronted with an object that has been revealed as a result of the thought processes of another subject. In this case, the subject shapes his appreciation with the object he creates as a result of the perception and judgment processes of the artist who has shaped the object. This situation brings with it the problem of meeting aesthetic appreciation. Appreciation seems to be quite rich due to its infrastructure rather than just a simple process of the subject. As a result of evaluation and judgment, for example, discourses such as "this is how it is for me", "this is how it is for me", "this is what it is for me" can lose their closeness to reality when considered from the point of view of aesthetic objects. Of course, art objects lead us to imagination and in this sense, they pave the way for us to be creative individuals in our intellectual world. However, in terms of the subject of this book, appreciation is to shed light on the problem of reciprocity with the perceptions and thoughts of the other (the artist) while the artist and his object are evaluated by the subject. In this context, in the second part, firstly, the effect of consciousness and unconscious on perception is discussed in terms of the readiness of subject and object in ontological, phenomenological and structuralist dimensions in Freud, Jung and Leibniz. In addition, in this section, performative art creations, objects and products and the unconscious-unconscious influence of the audience are included.

Finally, in the third part, intersubjectivity is discussed in terms of the differences of dialectical structures related to subjects, object-thought and the world. By examining the determinations about subjects and objects and how art objects transform into each other, it is investigated that the survival of synesthesia, which is a different type of perception, by artists and aesthetic subjects affects the art object in terms of perception-understanding and evaluation.

In terms of the relationship of the aesthetic subject with the subject, how dialectical processes differ within the scope of Fichte is discussed and the process of transformation of thought into judgment in the context of object-thought and the world is examined. Kant's determinations of the principles of reason also seem to be the general rules of intersubjective communication. In the context of Revonsuo, how reflexive consciousness is separated from pure consciousness is discussed and the relationship of pure consciousness with reflexive consciousness is revealed. Again, within the scope of intersubjectivity, the share of Gombrich's determinations about association and memory in the illusion is discussed. Within the scope of interobjectivity, the theory of formalism has been discussed extensively, and the forms of different art objects have been discussed within the scope of Schelling's definitions. The problem of how different art objects and forms can transform into each other is examined. Art objects and how the subject who encounters these objects transforms them into an ideal for himself in his own mental world is discussed in the context of Hegel. Starting from the transformation of the ideal, Synesthesia, which is not only an object but also a form of perception that has no object but can be sensed, has been defined within the scope of Goethe and contemporary cognitive psychology and examined in terms of Husserl phenomenology.

# PART ONE: PERCEPTION AND FORM IN THE AESTHETIC MIND

Aesthetics, named by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), appears as the teaching of sensations. Baumgarten explored beauty through sensations and interpreted beauty through the perception of nature as a spiritual experience belonging to subjects. The problem that aesthetics poses in relation to sensation, especially the sensation of beauty, is that beyond the understandings that preceded it, it is not only a sensory process, but rather an active process initiated by sensation, it also brings with it perception, meaning, analysis and then judgment. Baumgarten's determination is an upheaval that leads to a re-discussion of the issues of perception, interpretation and analysis that were often in conflict with each other in the history of philosophy. In the usual way of dealing with the history of philosophy, the perception of subjects and with it the meaning and analysis in the context of the problem of intersubjectivity are also discussed in the fields of epistemology, ontology and ethical inquiries, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, etc. Literally "aesthetic": "[Deutsch] *Aesthetic]* [Yun. *Aisthetike* (*episteme*) doctrine of sensory]. In accordance with the Greek root meaning, it means "the doctrine of sensible perceptions" (Akarsu, 1988, p. 72). In the 18th century, Baumgarten treated aesthetics as a doctrine based on the senses and encouraged the study of philosophy. Aesthetics, which carries the research on what is beautiful within its scope, has not remained only in philosophical debates as a research on the doctrine of sensible perceptions in this context, but has also found the opportunity to spread to different scientific fields. Aesthetics thus constitutes both the purpose and scope of discussions of the philosophy of art.

Terry Eagleton, in The Ideology of Aesthetics (1990), *in which he makes a comprehensive re-reading of the aesthetic debates of our time,* states that Baumgarten's definition of aesthetics leads us to the concepts of perception and sensation:

In the original formulation given by Baumgarten, the term refers not to art in the first place, but to the realm of all man in the realm of perception and sensation, as opposed to the highly studied realm of conceptual thought, as indicated by the Greek word aisthesis. The term 'aesthetic-one' is defined in the 18th century. The distinction he first introduced in the middle of the century was not the distinction between 'art' and 'life', but the distinction between the material and the immaterial: the distinction between things and thoughts, sensations and designs, and what relates to our created life as opposed to what governs a vague existence in the hidden recesses of the mind (Eagleton, 2010, p. 31).

Eagleton's aesthetic determination also refers to the realm of sensation and perception. As the thinker points out, the idea that thought, sensation, and design, and even the unknown aspects of the mind, which he referred to as secret games, govern existence, may require that the subject's problematic of perception be dealt with first.

## **1.1 PERCEPTION OF AESTHETIC APPRECIATION**

Alexander Baumgarten's introduction of the concept of *aisthesis* to the field of discussion of philosophy brought with it the question of the relationship of sensation with perception and how different the cognitive processes of the subject can have in the context of the art object. Thus, aesthetic research has also allowed not only an evaluation of the work of art, but also the investigation of the cognitive functioning of the subject.

Perceptionis within the framework of contemporary psychology and epistemology: perception is the apprehension of ordinary objects such as trees, houses and chairs. Perception has also been defined, firstly, *as sensation*, and secondly, as imagination and the processes of reason and design. Qualities from perceptions previously obtained from sensations also help to identify the perceived object (Runes, 1942, p. 228).

In Runes' definition, sensation and perception are considered together. Accompanying the emotions obtained through the art object through sensations is located under the roof of perception. Within the framework of the definition of perception, the problem of aesthetic appreciation has been discussed from many different angles. The transfer of the object created by the artist to another artist or audience and the perception, interpretation and ultimately judgment obtained through this object, and the extent to which it covers the subject's appreciation as a result of this judgment, have again been the subject of different aesthetic views.

Ages before Baumgarten's *Theoretische Aesthetik* (1750), Plato and Aristotle investigated the effects of theater plays, which were especially common in their time, and then music, on individuals and society, and tried to determine the effects of both individual and social sensations on social life and the effects of subjects on their characters.

The philosophers of antiquity generally debated whether art could be regarded primarily as a source of knowledge. The question of whether art is a source of knowledge or not was first dealt with by Plato and Aristotle. The sensations of art and the objects of art that are its products, the sensations of the subjects, have also been a matter of curiosity about these objects, and what kind of information the subjects obtain from these objects, if any. Plato*,* in his discussion with Socrates in his Ionian dialogue, deals with the processes of making sense of and analyzing the information obtained from the object of art. In the dialogue, in particular, it considers the extent to which what is perceived between an artist and other artists is reciprocal and finally the possibility of perception from the point of view of the audience, and is explained with a description appropriate to the period. First of all, in the dialogue, the object created by the artist as a result of inspiration and other artists are tried to be told how this inspiration is passed:

(...) This is the tax on Homer, the tax of eloquence on Homer, not, as I have said, an art, but a quality of what I call Euripides' magnet stone, which most people call the stone of Heracles, the kind of stone that comes from the gods. You know that what this stone does is not only attract iron rings, but it also imposes its quality on to them, in these rings they do what the stone can do, they attract other iron rings to themselves, and many rings hang on to each other with the power they receive from that stone. Thus, the power transferred from Moses to the poet passes from them to other poets, and a chain extends (534 a) (Plato, 2013, p. 267).

The Moses mentioned in the dialogue are portrayed as the inspiration of the artist. The parable of the "stone of Heracles" also exemplifies the effect of the object created by the inspiration bestowed on the artist's perception of another artist . Thus, all the designs that the artist transfers to the object regarding his sensation and perception during the creation of the art object are perceptible by the subject who senses the art object. The emotion conveyed by a painting, music, or staged play is experienced by the subject. *The* Ionian dialogue continues to discuss this experience:

Socrates: Notice now, Ion. Answer my question frankly. Are you self-absorbed or ecstatic as you read the verses of a composition in your beautiful voice, holding the hearts of the audience in your hands, whether it is when you sing the song of Odysseus, who rushes into the midst of his enemies and lays his arrows at his feet, or of Achilles who attacks Hector, or an influential piece by Andromakhe, Hekebe, or Priam? Is not the soul, which has been caught in the flood of its inspiration, in Troy in Ithaca, in the places narrated by the verses of events?

Ion- (...) Let me be clear; When I read a heartfelt piece, my eyes fill with tears, I get scared, and in the terrifying parts, my heart comes to my mouth and my hair gets goosebumps. (...)

Socrates: Do you know that you announce what you hear to the majority of the audience around you?

Ion- I know, I know that as I tell them, they cry like me, or they look at me with anger or tremble. It is one hundred percent necessary for me to consider their reactions while I am in the chair. Because if I make them cry, my earnings will be high, I will laugh; If they start laughing, it falls to me to cry because our wage will swallow the pill (Plato, 2013, 535. b-c. pp.) 268-269).

In this part of the dialogue, there are clear clues about how effective emotions are in the face of the art object. So, considering the *Ionian* Dialogue, we can talk about the effect of the art object on emotions.

Socrates- (...) The last link to snatch the spell from the stone of Heracles is the spectator. You are the middle ring: Ozan, actor. The first link is the poet himself. God transfers the value in himself from one such person to another, pulling people's souls wherever He wants, and like the iron rings hanging on that stone. On the rings stuck all over Moses hang rows of poets. (...) The first ring, the poets, are connected to others, and some are inspired by someone, such as Orpheus, some by Moses, and most by Homer (Plato, 2013: 536a, p. 269).

 *As* it appears in the Ionian dialogue, it is explained how the artist's perception of his object intersects with the perception of other subjects. Particular emphasis was placed on the effect of a poem on other poets and the audience, and on the display of emotion. Socrates' affirmation that what we hear ourselves in poetry is heard by others shows that the intended effect, rather than accidental feelings on the object of art, can be transferred to another subject. It is discussed that the kind of emotions that the artist transfers to the created object, such as anger, love, disgust, etc., *are transferred to other subjects in the Ionian dialogue and create the same effect.*

In Plato, we see that the unity of perception and sensation continues. What is sensed also falls within the scope of perception. In his *dialogue with Theaitetos, Plato*  makes determinations about knowledge, perception, and sensation. In the dialogue, he accepts the argument that the measure of everything as quoted from the mouth of Socrates is man, the measure of things that exist and things that do not exist. In the light of the teaching that "things are as they appear to you, as they appear to me", he states that "appearance" is to perceive (Plato, 2013, pp. 463-64).

In the dialogue of Plato *Theaitetos, it is* stated that the number of perceptions as a result of sensations is infinite. According to him, perception is divided into "those who have names" and "those who do not have names." Perceptions with names are experienced and named by subjects; Unnamed perceptions, on the other hand, are those to be experienced. Thus what has been felt and perceived before will be different from what will be sensed and perceived for the first time.

There are two types of movement: both are limited in quantity, and in terms of their internal structure, one is active and the other is active. From their participation and interrelationship an infinite number of products are formed, but they are always paired, one being the perceived perception and the other being the perceived, which always arise and are born at the same time as the perceived. For perceptions, we have words such as seeing, smelling, coldness, warmth, and consequently pleasure, bitterness, ambition, and fear; the number of perceptions that have no names is infinite; those with names are a heap. What is perceived, on the other hand, always corresponds to individual perceptions; various perceptions of sight correspond to various perceptions of colors, perceptions of hearing to sounds, and other perceptions to which they depend in terms of their proximity to other perceptions (Plato, 2013, p. 269).

Finally, the *dialogue of Theaitetos bases* perception on existence and knowledge on perception with the following statements:

Since what affects me is for me and not for anyone else, then I am undoubtedly the one who perceives it; I'm not anyone else (...) So to me, my own perception is real; because it is always based on my presence. According to Protagoras, I am the one who judges that what exists exists, and that what does not exist does not exist. (...) Since, then, I am not erring and making mistakes in my judgments with what is existing and what is happening, shouldn't I, since I am the perceiver, also be the one who knows what is being dealt with? Knowledge, then, is nothing but perception (Plato, 2013, p. 475).

When we look at this inference, it may be possible to conclude that the perceiver of things also obtains knowledge from that thing. *When we consider these expressions of the Theaitetos* dialogue in the context of the question "Does the object of art provide information?", when we consider it from the point of view of aesthetic perception, it may be possible to think that it provides information specifically to the perceiver. Again, in the history of philosophy of art, it has been debated by philosophers whether the aesthetic object provides information or not.

Aristotle says in *On the Soul* (*De Anima) that acts such as* thinking and sensation must first be defined; "Actions and operations precede forces logically" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 199). Again, Aristotle distinguishes between "cognitively sensing" (as thought) and "actualized sensation" (act) (see Aristotle, 2007). Accordingly, cognitive sensation is sensation that has not yet encountered any object:

Since we consider the term sensation in two senses (because we say that the being who has the power of hearing and sight sees what he hears and sees even if he is asleep, and we mean the same thing about the being who actually hears (hearing), wehave to talk about two meanings for sensation: there is cognitive sensation and there is actual sensation (Aristotle, 2007, p. 204).

In this case, an effect is required for sensation to become a verb, "the term to be influenced is not a simple term: in a sense, it is a certain distortion by the influence of the opposite" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 205). The distortion of the opposite also describes a change as a result of the combination of sensation and perception. This change shows that the subject opposite the object interacts with the perception of the subject by the qualitative and quantitative structures contained in the object.

The sensation of the true senses is always true or less likely to be mistaken. The perception that these special senses are the accident comes later, and there may be error in this place: for the fact that the senses are white is a point at which it is impossible for us to error; but it is possible to be mistaken about white being this or that thing (Aristotle, 2007, p. 217).

Aristotle states that what is fundamental in qualitative perceptions does not change, but can change by subjects in degree. If we remember Plato's statement in the *dialogue of Theaitetos*, how something looked changed according to the subjects. Accordingly, Aristotle stated that it is possible to be mistaken that a quality is this or that thing. The thinker again argues that he is "actually identical to the object of knowledge" and continues with the following statements (Aristotle, 2007, p.223):

And in fact, it seems that the sense is heard, it passes only the cognitive faculty of sensation into the verb, because the sense is neither affected nor changed. So it's another kind of movement. (...) Thus sensation is similar to simple explanation and simple comprehension, but when the sensible object is pleasant or annoying, the soul, which is the source of such affirmation or denial, pursues or escapes from the sensible object. Hearing pleasure and pleasure acts as an intermediary and behaves through the faculty of sensation in relation to good and evil, good and evil. And revulsion and desire are ultimately acts of the same faculty, (...) though different in substance, they are neither separate nor separate from the faculty of sensation. As for the dianetic soul (inferential thought), imaginations replace sensation in it, and when this soul affirms or denies good or evil, it runs away or follows. Therefore, the soul never thinks without images (Aristotle, 2007, p. 223).

From Plato and Aristotle's assumption that the difference of previously experienced and newly experienced sensations about perception and sensation will also make a difference in terms of perception, it can also be thought that it can also influence emotional expressions such as liking/disliking of the subject. However, the fact that the object is alien to the subject, that this perception has not been named (experienced) before, and that it has been named (experienced), can also make differences in terms of emotional response. The subject's perception of the object and the emotion experienced by the object and the experience of this feeling again by the subject show that the perception is twofold.

 In the tradition of ancient philosophical thought, perception/experience or sensation regarding the aesthetic manifests itself in the form of, on the one hand, processing of the subject's existing sensations and, on the other hand, making an evaluation of what has occurred in his inner world with the newly acquired sensations. The history of medieval philosophy contains examples of rearranging the way of experiencing what will be called perception both in the object-object relationship and in the total-singular relationship, especially in the axis of the existence of a higher regulatory consciousness than man. Medieval philosophy was shaped around Plato and Aristotle and sought harmony between the external world and inner perception. In medieval philosophy, in particular, it may be possible to observe another structural feature of perception. This structure is the effect of belief on perception. The fact that the processes of sensation and perception are not affected by any structure frees the judgment of the subject. Belief structures are effective in directing the processes of perception and analysis. The medieval thinkers Anselmus and Augustine "want faith to precede every thought and every idea of religious things" (Weber, 1998, p. 148). Accordingly, the structure of perception means the affirmation and confirmation of an accepted premise. An accepted proposition seems to be resolved without the subject of sensation, perception and judgment.

The discussion of universals has made determinations about the structure of reality for the medieval system of thought and beyond. One of the most intense debates in medieval philosophy is the debate on universals. Rocelinius is considered the founder of nominalism. "Nominalism does not accept that universal concepts are real, that they exist on their own. According to this epoch, universal concepts are things that man has thought of for similar objects; are the names that human beings attach to the common similarities of objects" (Gökberk, 2016: 143). In this case, going back to ancient philosophy, Plato's totalities seem to have been restored to human consciousness by Rocelinius, and Anselmus's Platonic acceptance of the totality seems to have been dealt a blow. Abelardus' disciple, Thomas of Aquino, said, "Explanation (religious truths) and reason (hence experiment) are two separate sources of knowledge, teaching us other things. For this reason, the fields of "believing" and "knowing" do not coincide with the whole whole" (Gökberk, 2016: 151). Thus, believing and knowing are separated from each other. The experiment requires the subject's processes of sensation, perception, meaning, and analysis. Thus a new approach to consciousness was brought by A. Thomas. In the discussion of universals, "universal concepts *are found in the object (in re*), they are the essence of the object, they are essential forms *(forma substantialis*)" (Gökberk, 2016, p. 153). This idea makes the object the material of the experiment. In the last period of medieval philosophy, Duns Scotus and William and Roger Bacon of Ockham prepared the building blocks of the road to the New Age. Duns Scotus brought a whole new perspective to the subject by bringing the will to the forefront. His philosophy is the view that asserts the primacy of will (voluntas) over reason (ratio)" (Gökberk, 2016, p. 155). The exaltation of the will may require obeying the rules of the will, rather than the mind. Thus, facts can be shaped around will. For William of Ockham, "but the individual has reality; therefore, experimentation (internal and external experiment) is the basis of all knowledge" (Gökberk. 2016, p.156). Thus, O. William seems to have made man the measure of every reality in a sense and separated him from the phenomenon of religion peculiar to the medieval period. Finally, Roger Bacon, O. William's "besides the external experiment, there is the experiment that gives us information from our soul, the purpose of which is to be enlightened by God, and to become one with God in the state of ecstasy, which is the highest step of this" (Gökberk, 2016, p. 157). He ended medieval philosophy by making the unknown reality known again through the subject's inner experience. Therefore, from the point of view of our subject, medieval philosophy deals with the inner experience that aesthetics makes the problematic of research in terms of its relations with its concepts. This way of dealing with the new age will evolve into a subject-based understanding.

 With the New Age, the science movement has again changed the mindset of the subject and has succeeded in directing the subject's perception to the unknown. Giordano Bruno now puts the universe before us as a system of operation, "the universe is the principle of the world, its eternal and eternal cause, natura naturans" (Weber, 1998, p. 201). Bruno considers the human soul "the highest opening of the life of the universe." (Weber, 1998, p. 203). Thus, it seems that the subject who perceives the world is now endowed with a feature that can make sense of it at the same time. Another thinker, Campanella, made what could be called scientific determinations about the subject's mind. According to the thinker, our knowledge comes from two sources: "sensory experimentation and reasoning; they are either experimental or speculative" (Weber, 1998, p. 201). This determination, made by Campanella, transferred the responsibility of sensation, perception and judgment of the knowledge of the external world to the subject. At the same time, he seems to have attributed the error of the knowledge of the external world to the subject. Francis Bacon, known for his criticism of scholastic philosophy, argued that the perception based on faith was wrong. Thus the thinker is confirmed, *Apriori* it proposes to get rid of mindsets.

Today it is a question of completely reorganizing the human mind, of building science on an entirely new basis (instauratio magna). You want to know the essence of things; well, stop asking the secret of this to the books, to the authoritatives that dominate the School, to the preconceived ideas and to the a priori ideas (Act. Weber, 1998, p. 207).

Bacon's proposal, as quoted by Weber, also paves the way for science. This mindset also seems to lead the subject to external experimentation. Another thinker who placed observation and experiment at the basis of human knowledge was Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Hobbes wrote that "outside the science of observation, there is no real knowledge (...) Thinking means hearing as a result. To know is to collect sensations. Sensation, on the other hand, is nothing but a change, a movement, that occurs in the sensible body. Memory, which is the necessary helper of thought, is nothing more than the continuation of a sensation (Act. Weber, 1998, p. 211). Hobbes sees inner perception as the basis of all mind processes. Hobbes now seems to have established that perception is subjective. These ideas can be said to be the initiators of seventeenth-century philosophy and later theories of perception.

Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who was the determinant of 17th century philosophy at the beginning of the new age, *examined the determinations of perception and such aspects of perception in his work Emotions or Moods*. According to him, "our perceptions are of two kinds; one is the perceptions caused by the soul, the other is the perceptions caused by the body" (Descartes, 2015, p. 38). Descartes argued that the perceptions caused by the soul depend on "will" and "will"; it means that the perceptions formed by our body depend on nerves. (Descartes, 2015, pp. 38-40).

All perceptions, which I have not yet had the opportunity to explain, come to the soul through nerves. But there is a difference between them: We see some of them as perceptions of external objects that strike our senses, and some of them as perceptions of our body or some of its parts; others as perceptions of our soul (Descartes, 2015, p. 40).

Descartes, in his time, the determination that perceptions are transmitted through nerves is a considerable source for scientific studies on perception. In the following chapters, Descartes again explains the perceptions that strike the senses from objects and the feelings related to the parts of the body:

(...) Emotions are perceptions of the soul, or they belong to the soul, and as a result of a special stimulation of the particles they are formed and strengthened (...) Since emotions are perceived in the soul just like objects of the external world and are not learned differently by the soul,  *we can also call them feelings* or *sensations. (...) I add that emotions belong specifically to the soul* so that we can distinguish them from other sensations that we associate with external objects, namely smells, sounds, colors, and the hunger, thirst, and pain that we associate with our bodies (Descartes, 2015, pp. 44-45).

Descartes opened the subject of perception to a comprehensive discussion with the acceptance that emotions are active as a result of special stimulation by accepting the integrity of perception. Within the scope of the perception of subjects, the qualities in the external objects themselves are transformed into judgment by integrating with the subject's perception, determinations, that is, meaning. As Descartes pointed out, the states associated with the body are the subjective experiences of the subject. Descartes stated the following about the stimulation of objects on subjects:

The perceptions we see as perceptions of objects outside of us originate from the objects themselves. (at least as long as our opinion of these objects is not wrong). Because these objects create some stimulation in the external sense organs and cause some stimulation in the brain through the nerves. These stimulations also cause the soul to feel objects. Thus, when we see the light of a torch and hear the sound of a bell, this light and this sound cause some of our nerves as two different factors and through these nerves cause two different stimulations in our brain and evoke two different sensations in our soul. We associate these sensations with those objects that we see as their cause in such a way that we think that we have seen the torch or heard the bell itself, but in reality we do not think that we only feel the stimulation caused by these objects (Descartes, 2015, pp. 40-41).

Accordingly, it seems necessary for the subject to relate his sensations to objects, to name that object and to try to describe it. Descartes' remarkable determination is that, apart from the influence of the attributes of the object, the subject can feel the stimulation caused by the objects he imparts.

When we come to the Enlightenment Philosophy of the 18th century, John Locke (1632-1704),  *in An Essay on the Human Moment*, distinguishes perception from the act of thinking by performing an in-depth study of the functioning of the human mind.

*Since perception* is the first faculty of the mind to be exercised on our ideologies, it is the first and simplest idea we derive from reflection, and some generally call it thinking. However*, thinking* usually marks the process by which the mind is doing and acting on its own ideas while examining something with a certain degree of volitional attention" (Locke, 2013, p.129).

If we consider what Locke said within the framework of perception, interpretation and analysis, we encounter the active structure of thinking. As for perception, we can say that the subject who encounters the object receives only the qualitative and quantitative properties that the object provides. Another of Locke's observations is that the ideas of sensation can often be replaced by judgment.

When we place a monochromatic sphere of gold, marble or amber in front of our eyes, it is clear that the ide that will be engraved in our minds will be a full-circle ide, variously shaded by varying degrees of light and illumination that come to our eyes. But since we are accustomed to perceiving what kind of images convex objects usually produce in us, and what changes in light reflections will occur due to the separation of the sensible shapes of the bodies, our judgment, through the habit of practice, immediately transforms the images into their causes. So much so that he creates a shape from things that are actually shadow or color changes, and reveals his paintings as a sign of the shape, as they appear, and although the ide that comes to us from it is nothing more than a plane of different colors, he establishes a convex shape and a perception of color for himself (Locke, 2013, p. 131).

Locke used the term "habit" in relation to perception. Locke spoke of the effect of the spatial effects of objects on the perceptions of subjects. Locke's conclusion on perception is that it is a gateway to knowledge.

Thus perception is the first step to knowledge and the gateway to all the instruments of degree and knowledge. (...) I think it suffices to state that perception is the first process of all our mental faculties and the gateway to all the information in our minds" (Locke, 2013, p. 133).

Condillac developed a theory of knowledge on sensations influenced by John Locke's empiricism. *His Treatise on Sensations (*1754) specifically examined individual human sensations, while *his Essay on the Source of Human Knowledge* (1746) was an examination of how knowledge is realized. He expresses the subject's initial state vis-à-vis the object as follows: "Let us consider one of the first moments of his existence: the soul of this man first encounters such separate sensations as light, colors, sorrow, pleasure, movement, rest; these are his first thoughts" (Condillac, 1992, p. 18). Thought first expresses that the subject is confronted with internal and external perceptions, as Descartes pointed out. In the second stage, Condillac explains the activity of thinking: "Let us follow this man in those moments when he begins to think deeply about what sensations lead to in him: we shall see that this man will turn to the ideas of various kinds of activities in his own soul, such as intuition, imagination: such are his second thoughts" (Condillac, 1992, p. 18). The actions that come through sensations and perception have initiated the thinking process. This act is included in the meaning-making. Every thought that corresponds to the object is for the meaning of that object. On the other hand, the thinker finally describes making decisions about the object as follows: "It follows, then, that as external objects act upon us, we acquire all kinds of ideas through the senses; As we reflect on the actions that sensations cause in our souls, we acquire all the ideas we may have acquired from external objects (Condillac, 1992, p. 18). After the process of thinking and making sense of the object, making judgments about that object ensures that the object is named by the mind and defined according to the subject.

This means that there are three things to distinguish in our senses:

1) the comprehension we hear,

2) the correlation we establish between this conception and anything outside of us,

3) the verdict that what we attribute to the thing is actually what we attribute to that thing (Condillac, 1992, p. 27).

Condillac argues that our knowledge comes from sensation in his *Treatise on Sensations* that "all our knowledge comes from sensations; on the other hand, our sensations are nothing but our states of being" (Condillac, 1954, p. 23). Thus, with the idea that the information from the sensations is related to the states of existence of the subject, the sensation seems to have gained a new expression. In this work, Condillac takes a sculpture and begins his investigations by opening his senses one by one, first activating the nose of the statue, and the sculpture, which has none other than this sense, will only have a perception of smell. "The knowledge of our sculpture, which has only a sense of smell, can only comprehend smells. There are no ideas of space or shape in this sculpture" (Condillac, 1954, p. 45). The thinker, who also researched what kind of emotions the sculpture with only this sensation could feel, also examined the way it existed in this way and carried out an empiricist work in this field. In the following sections of his work, he dealt with the senses as multiple as well as the wire one. In the last chapter, Condillac states how much perception and judgment processes, apart from raw sensations, will affect the subject's design of life.

 (...) The more we move away from [D]harmony from its original state, the more the life of our being will develop and diversify: this life will spread and expand into so many things that we will find it difficult to understand that all our faculties can be a common principle consisting of sensation (...) Let us observe the light when the sense of touch teaches the eye to permeate colors throughout nature: in the course of this many new sensations, and consequently many new pleasures and many new pleasures, arise. (...) For we cannot enjoy it alone through the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, the sense of taste, the sense of smell, and the sense of touch; we also enjoy memory, imagination, reflection, passions, hope. But the activity of these principles in all human beings is not one (Condillac, 1954, p. 303).

Apart from declaring that sensations are the only source of our knowledge, Condillac can also be thought of as adding a subtitle to the subject of sensation with his examination of how pleasure and similar feelings are the sensations he examines one by one. Indeed, when we evaluate the unity of sensation and perception through the aesthetic objects that are our subject, these determinations of Condillac's also open the door to the subject's pleasure and similar impressions of the object. The idea that sensations are the source of various emotions can also trigger the creative side of the subject by activating his faculties.

When we continue our discussions of perception and sensation from the point mentioned by Condillac, we encounter the following statements about perception in David Hume's (1711-1776)  *Treatise on* Human Nature:

(...) All perceptions can be different, distinguished, separated, examined separately, exist separately, and do not need anything to support their existence, so in what way do they belong to the self and how are they related to it? I am always struck by this or that particular perception of warmth or cold, of light or shadow, of love or hate, of pain or pleasure. I can never capture my self without a perception and I can never observe anything other than perception (Hume, 2010, p. 240).

In his determinations of perception, Hume also distinguished between immediate sensation and later portrayal of this sensation in memory.

Everyone readily agrees that there is a great difference between the two kinds of perception, such as the feeling of suffering from too much heat, or the pleasure of equanimous heat, and the subsequent memory of this sensation, or hearing it in advance by imagination. These last two faculties can provide us with an imitation or copy of the perceptions of our senses, but they cannot provide the first feeling with all its force and vitality (Hume, 1986, p. 22).

Hume distinguished perceptions of the mind from designs. The thinker makes the following statement about the perceptions he distinguishes as impressions:

For example, hearing is the ball of our most vivid perceptions, such as love, grudge, desire, or willpower. In excess, we also separate impressions from ideas, which are relatively little living perceptions of which we are conscious when we think about one of the above-mentioned senses or movements (Hume, 1986, p. 24).

Hume recognizes that within the framework of the senses and experience, the data provided also constitute the reflection, and that these reflections accompany our designs.

No matter how limitless the independence of our thought may seem, when we look more closely at the question, we see that this thought is confined to truth, within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind is nothing more than the power to compose, to replace, multiply or reduce the material that the senses and experiment provide us with (Hume, 1986, p. 25).

Hume took Condillac's view of sensations even further, sharply stating that the perception that comes from sensations is a state of being, that is, the perception of the self. With this expression, perception also seems to become part of the self, transcending subjective expressions and the idea of subjective gaze. When we evaluate it from the Hume window, the perception obtained through objects acquires a subjective form. In this way, measurable, mathematical objects on the plane of reality that can find expression can be evaluated differently within the scope of subjective perceptions. Apart from the subjectivity of sensations and designs, Hume also investigated the nature of nature, that is, what can be expressed precisely outside sensations: according to him, "we need to investigate how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect in order to determine the nature of this certainty, which constitutes the source of certainty in us about things of fact, as if it would please ourselves" (Hume, 1986, p. 38). As a result of this research, the thinker says, "It is futile for us to attempt to infer a cause or a conclusion without the help of observation and experimentation" (Hume, 1986, p. 43). Another striking remark of Hume's is about geometry and other areas of mathematics:

If desired, the help of natural philosophy should be called upon by geometry, which has gained a reputation for the authenticity of reason, neither to find a cure for this defect nor to lead us to the knowledge of the end, of the causes. Of course, all branches of the mathematics (mixed mathemathics) proceed from the assumption that nature has established some laws to which it subjects its functions, both to assist the experiment in the discovery of these laws and to determine what the effects of these laws will be in some particular case – an effect which in these particular cases is subject to a certain degree of distance and quantity (...) Geometry (...) can help us to provide the exact magnitudes of the shapes: but the discovery of the law itself is only possible through experiment (Hume, 1986, pp. 44-45).

Hume considers that common acceptance, through experiment and observation, is the origin of mathematical laws. Thanks to these common acceptances, there seem to be perceptual responses between subjects.

While the debates about perception in the plane of thought of the 18th century and the effect of the combination of sensation and perception on the subject's definition of the world were investigated, the thinkers of Enlightenment thought and especially German Philosophy treated the debate as a problem of philosophy of mind in terms of understanding and defining the mind. It is said that with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in the first place, the subject of perception began to be examined as the subject of mental functioning: "Everything we perceive takes place in time and space, and every change has a cause. However, according to Kant, this is not because this is the ultimate state of reality: it is a contribution of our minds" (Warburton, 2015, pp. 167-168). While this determination of perception again expresses its subjective characteristic, on the other hand, the determinations of philosophers have also been a source for many psychiatrists working on perception.

He argued that the organized family, formed by various pure concepts of comprehension, provides the necessary framework for expression for all judgments that we humans can make about the experimental world . Similarly, the self-world (the "numen" world) is certainly not "constituted" by us, but the world perceived-thought by us (the "experimental" world of three-dimensional physical objects) actually shows the material component, fully reflecting the special contributions made by our own internal cognitive machine to the field of cognition (Churchland, 2017, p. 11).

This cognitive structure has been tried to be determined within the framework of the understanding of "categories" that constitute the basic explanation dynamics of Kant's philosophy. "General logic, as has often been said before, abstracts all the content of perception/knowledge *(early tintinis)* and expects to be given designs that it will analytically transform into concepts wherever it may be" (Kant, 2017, p. 210). Kant's most important remark on perception was also on space and time: "Space and time contain a plurality of pure a priori intuition, but they still belong to the conditions of our mind's ability to receive, and since the mind can only receive designs of objects beneath them, they must always be influencing the concepts of these objects" (Kant, 1998, p. 210).

Categories have taken their place in the world of thought as an important determination of the qualities of the mind. "Previously, categories described the qualities of the universe that were only reflected in our minds. These, along with the philosophy of Kant, describe the qualities of our mind in which the universe can enter our mind in any form. For this reason, the truths of the universe can never be reached, and the categories change their character from the structures of the universe to the structures of cognition" (Spitzer &Maher, 1998, p. 341). Thus, the relationship between subject and object seems to have gained a completely different dimension. In another stage, the thinker speaks of synthesis so that our thought can form the knowledge of the multitude:

In the most general sense, *I understand synthesis and the* act of adding different designs together and comprehending the multitude in them in a single perception (...) In general, synthesis, as we shall hereinafter indicate, is merely the product of the faculty of imagination, of a blind but nevertheless inalienable function of the soul, without which we have no knowledge, and yet we are only rarely conscious of it, no matter what. But it is the task of the mind to bring this synthesis into concepts, and it is primarily through this task that the mind provides us with the perception/knowledge in its true signification. (Kant, 1998, pp. 210-211).

In connection with the subject, Kant's statement that space and time are also a priori forms of the mind and the subject's evaluation of an object within the framework of its own mental forms is again the subjective expression of the mind. When making judgments, Kant examines the logical functioning of the mind under four headings: "1- Quantity of judgments: (Universal, particular, singular), 2- Quality: (Confirmative, denial, eternal) 3- Relationship: (Categorical, Hypothetical, Discrete), 4- Modality: (Problematic, Assertoric "Pre-emptioned", Apodicic "obligatory" (Kant, 1998, p. 206). Kant's determination is a determination of how the subject forms judgment about what is in front of him, and again the number of these concepts of the mind is equal to the number of categories that Kant repeats following in the footsteps of Aristotle.

We call these concepts, following Aristotle, categories, because our purpose is undoubtedly the same as it was in the beginning, even though the process of fulfillment departs greatly from his. 1- Quantity: (unity, multiplicity, totality). 2- Quality (factuality, negation, limitation). 3- Relationship: (Relatedness and permanence, Causality (cause and effect), Community (reciprocity of agent and passivity), 4- Modality: (Possibility-impossibility, existence-non-existence, necessity-contingency) (Kant, 1998, p. 212).

Again, post-Kant 19th century German idealism J. Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854), Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), subject, perception and consciousness issues related to the subject were discussed intensively. Fichte states the following regarding the subject's perception of the object: "Every object obtains its own place in space from its relation to the designing subject, and it is in no way possible to determine the place separately from this relationship. However, in order to determine the position of something else in space, anything that is assumed must itself be in space" (Fichte, 2006, p. 219). Fichte thus brings into being anything in space through the relationship between the consciousness of the subject and the perception of it. According to Fichte, a person is not completely independent in his perception of himself and his perception of being oriented towards anything in space. "It is impossible to assume anything in space without discovering that one is also in space; however, if one does not place an object in space, one cannot discover that one is in space" (Fichte, 2006, p. 219). In this case, when perception is evaluated on the axis of internal perception and external perception, perception seems to exist as a single perception in 'I' as an inward and outward orientation. On the other hand, the Tranzendental philosophy of Schelling, a follower of Fichte, bases knowledge "on the subjective conformity of the objective because, according to this understanding, only what is true is *known*; but accuracy was generally put into the harmony of the designs with their own objects" (Soykan, 2016: 109). Again, within the scope of these statements, we see that Schelling is in line with Fichte. According to Fichte, "the objective and the subjective are so united that it cannot be said which of the two belongs to the right of preferential. There is no first and no second here; both are one at the same time (Soykan, 2016: 109). The subjective is the cause of reality. Perception continues to appear as a reality that belongs to the subject with Schelling. The determinations made about the subject and perception in this period brought about the problem of what is the basis of reality. The reality of the object and the degree to which the information obtained by the subject through the object is subjective and to what extent it is objective have been the subject of debate. Aesthetics, which is the knowledge of the sensible field, has investigated at this point what kind of appreciation is the appreciation for the art object, what kind of knowledge it provides subjectively and objectively. Up to this point, German idealist thinkers such as Fichte and Schelling have maintained that the knowledge derived from the object is a reality of the subject. Hegel, on the other hand, *stated in his work The Phenomenology of Spirit* that the object is an indirect universal. "Since the principle of the object is universal, an indirect universal in its simplicity, the object must tell this to itself as its own nature; the object does this by manifesting itself as *many featured Things*. The variety of sensory information belongs to perception, not to immediate certainty. " (Hegel, 2011, pp. 77-78). Hegel designates consciousness as the perceiver, and consciousness can change reality as it receives objects.

If consciousness itself has done anything in this reception, it will change reality by such addition or subtraction. (...) Since the object is real and universal, that which is identical to itself, and since consciousness itself is changeable and non-essential, consciousness may well discern the object in an untrue way and deceive itself. The perceiver is conscious of the possibility of being deceived. (...) His criterion of reality, then, is self-identification, and differentiating behavior as self-identical [to the object]. (...) But if a non-identity appears in this comparison, then it is not an unreality of the object - for the object is identical to itself - but an unreality of the perceiver (Hegel, 2011, p. 80).

Hegel's determination of perception differs in terms of the fine boundary he draws between subject and object. Contrary to the surrender of the possibilities of reality to the subject completely, it is stated that the object has a reality and the error of the subject's perception of the object is mentioned. This delusion is not a reality of the object, but a delusion of the perceiving subject. Thanks to this error, the subject constitutes his own truth.

Analytic philosophy in the 20th century excluded the ambiguous from philosophical inquiry and sought clarity in meaning. According to analytic philosophers, the Earth is already the sum of sense data. In this period, perception will find its meaning through linguistic integrity, and one of its representatives, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1950), summarizes this understanding when he says, "The world is everything that is as it is, the World is the sum of facts, the World is determined by facts, and in this way, this is all facts" (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 15). According to Wittgenstein, "the phenomena in logical space are the world (...) Just as we cannot conceive of spatial objects outside of space and temporal objects outside of time, in the same way that we cannot think of any object outside the possibilities of connection with other objects" and clearly establishes an analytical link between facts and subject logic (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 15). According to him: the spatial object must exist in infinite space (the point of space is also a proof-place). "A speck in the field of view does not have to be red, but it has to be in a color: it seems to have color-space around it. The sound must be at a height, the object of the sense of touch must be of a hardness, etc. (...) Clearly, however different it may be from reality, a world that is conceived must have something in common with its reality – a reap" (Wittgenstein, 2013, pp. 17-19). In analytic philosophy, the ambiguity of objects and mind has been replaced by the ambiguity of language. "language obscures thought" (Wittgenstein, 2013, p. 47).

From what has been conveyed so far, we understand that while the Analytic tradition considers that the obstacle to the relationship of perception to reality is the ambiguity of language, the phenomenological tradition aims to turn to the objects and grasp them clearly.

Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) refers to phenomena, "returning to things themselves" (Husserl, 2010, p.60). In his philosophy, "intuition" (lat. *intuitus*, alm. *Anschung*) is very important to Husserl. "He uses intuition in the sense of the genus label of everything given to us in direct experience, in a way that corresponds to the faculty that gives us its object directly (Hussel, 2010, p. 60). Thus, in Husserl's philosophy, returning to things themselves means "returning to the acts of consciousness and the objective selves constructed within these acts, that is, to what Husserl called phenomena" (Hussserl, 2010, p. 60). Directionality encompasses perception and subsequent processes related to the mind.

Non-reflexive means that in consciousness we tend to and mean objects, while reflection reveals this in such a way that it has a special characteristic, inherent in all experience, however infinitely different in form. To be conscious of something is not to have an empty form of something in consciousness. Each phenomenon has its own directional structure. For example, the observation of the appearance and dimensions of a cube perceived from different angles and the synthesis relationship between them will show that each stage and interval is already "conscious" of something in itself and always remains the unity of one and the same object without losing its synthetic unity at any moment (Husserl, 2010: 67).

As Husserl stated in the example of the cube, the perception of the synthesis of the object within itself is also the consciousness of something at every stage, and he made a determination about how the process of perception leading to the unity of the object and its totality are reflected in consciousness. Perception, then, is Husserl's phenomenology, and therefore knowledge, "the knowledge of man alone. It depends on the forms of the human mind, it cannot reach the nature of things themselves, the things themselves" (Husserl, 2010, p. 103).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), who also proceeds from Husserl's phenomenological view and interprets it differently, *determines the perceptual position of the thinking subject vis-à-vis the object in* his work The Phenomenology of Perception as follows:

When I own the face of the cube, it doesn't just mean that I am putting it into a state of clear vision, it means that I am arranging the cube with a word that I consider it close, and the gaze is the perceptual genius beneath the thinking subject who knows how to give them the right answer that things are waiting for to exist before us (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 358).

When perceiving the cube, the arrangement of the cube, as mentioned by Merleau-Ponty, can be considered together with the intervals to which consciousness is directed when Husserl's perceives the cube. While perception tries to achieve the unity of the object, it also arranges it in that way. The thinker also states that "perception is a judgment, but it does not know its own causes, which means that the perceived object gives itself whole and as one before we capture its perceived law." (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 358) In this statement, the thinker also evaluates perception as judgment at the same time in the triangle of perception, meaning, analysis that we expressed at the beginning. Perception seems to be equivalent to the concept of analysis in this framework. With the expression "what is given is not a thing alone, but the experience of the thing, a transcendence in the trace of a subjectivity, a nature that becomes transparent through a history", the thinker expresses that perception is almost an abstraction of the subject's habit and historical accumulation. (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 439).

Finally, Marleu-Ponty, in *Phenomenology of Perception*, in contrast to the analytic holistic view, states that meaning and sensible experience are a process:

Just as the most fundamental is nothing to build the whole by superimposing—it is no longer a simple means for the whole to establish itself. The most fundamental events are already covered in a meaning, and functions from the higher level, using and sublimating dependent processes from the lower level, only perform a more integrated mode of existence or a more valid conformity. In turn, sensible experience is a vital process of reproduction, breathing, and growth (...) When I say that I have a red stain in front of me, the meaning of the word stain is provided by my previous experience, which has taught me how to use this word (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, pp. 38-43).

When we sum up the subject again between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological approach, as Wittgenstein, one of the representatives of Analytic philosophy, expressed, we cannot perceive objects outside of their relation to space and time; this is the very place where objects are proven, and the objects form a world by adding them together. In Kant's philosophy, space and time are a priori forms of appearance. They belong to the reception of our mind, and Wittgenstein recognizes that the error in the expression of the world, which is characterized as the ground of reality, is the ambiguity of language. In Kant's determinations, the place where things are proved seems to be the mind. When we come to the post-Kant German idealists, we see that perception is grounded in the dialectical process of thought. In Fichte, the perception directed towards the object is concluded as the perception that turns inward and outward, and in Hegel it is concluded that whether the perception directed towards the object is identical to it or not, and that it is the subject who shares in the delusion of the reality ground of the object. Again, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty gave the information that perception takes place in a gradual manner, contrary to the apparent expression of perception at a glance. In the light of all these discussions, the problem of form will have to be examined first in order to analyze perception.

## **1.2 AESTHETIC FORM**

"Form is what makes matter intelligible by embodying it with its various properties, and art, in contrast to contents, transcends emotions by expressing the definite aspects of the work of art" (Runes, 1942, pp. 110-111). With this statement of Runes, we conclude that the relationship between aesthetic taste and form is the mathematical (measurable/formal) part of the effect of an art object on aesthetic taste in terms of the meaning of that object by the subject. Again the format [Alm]. *Form*, Lat. *Jersey*, Yun. *Morphe, Eidos*, Eng, *Form] is the "how" as opposed to "substance" and content, the "what" is the opposite of* what is, and in the state of chaos, it refers to the "bounded," the "ordered," as opposed to the disordered and undetermined. Aesthetically, it refers to the way the object appears as perceived by the senses (Akarsu, 1988, pp. 33-34). In the light of these definitions, we can define form in its most general form as the quantitative structure of the object. The problematization of form from the point of view of the history of aesthetics has led to the investigation of the extent to which the qualities of the aesthetic object as well as its quantitative properties have an effect on the subject's liking.

First, Pythagorean philosophy spoke of the fact that everything counts with absolute judgment. "All things are countable, and we can tell many things numerically" (Copleston, 1990, p. 35). Accordingly, it can be said that the properties of things that inform certain judgments can also be mentioned. Things expressed numerically can be judged with certainty, find meaning in the mathematical expression used as a common language "Thus, the relationship between two related things can be described according to the numerical ratio: the order between a certain number of regular objects can be understood numerically, and so on." (Copleston, 1990, p. 35). The Pythagorean philosophy again applies this idea to the field of music in art.

... What seemed particularly striking to them was the discovery that musical intervals between notes in the lyre could be described numerically. Musical pitch can be said to be dependent on number to the extent that it depends on lengths, and intervals in the gamut can be described by numerical ratios. Just as musical harmony is dependent on number, so the harmony of the Universe is based on number (Copleston, 1990, p. 35).

In music, in particular, the fact that inter-note intervals can be counted justifies the relationship that Pythagorean philosophy establishes with mathematics and music. "Anaximeander produced everything from the Infinite or Indeterminous, and Pythagoras combined this *concept with the to πέρας* concept, which gave form to the Unlimited . This is exemplified in music, because in it proportion and harmony can be described arithmetically" (Copleston, 1990, p. 36). Naturally, when we examine the do major scale, we see that the vocal intervals consist of two full half and two full half sounds. These intervals are expressed as the finding of the mathematical form of the sound heard, that is, the quality. Sounds that are considered as qualities outside the sound ranges also have mathematical expressions. When we evaluate art objects in different fields with the Pythagorean view, it may be possible to talk about the effect of the mathematical properties of form on the perception of the subject. The dimensions of the object, its shape, can be the subject of liking.

One of the ideas developed by pre-Socratic philosophers about perception-form is also one of the most striking of Empodocles. The thinker, who does not distinguish between thought and perception, expresses that things open themselves to us as they are. "In sensory-perception there is an encounter between an element in us and a similar element outside. All things are constantly flowing outwards, giving information, and when the pores of the sense patterns are of the proper size, these fluxes come in and create perception" (Copleston, 1990, p. 79). Therefore, when we evaluate what Empodocles says about perception, we can reach the conclusion that the knowledge of the form of things in the external world, that thing itself opens its knowledge about itself to the subject, and that the subject thinks while perceiving it through the senses. In this state, things carry the knowledge of form in themselves and transmit their quantitative properties as well as their qualitative properties directly to perception. Pre-Socratic philosophers continued their discussions, especially on the natural sciences, thought about being-decay and the universe, evaluated the world through sensation-perception-reflection and tried to reach certain knowledge.

Early Greek philosophers were interested in the object and tried to determine the ultimate principle of all things. In addition, the teachings of Heraclitus and Parmenides (...) resulted in a skeptical attitude about the validity of sensory-perception. If the perception of being and motion is an illusion, or if, on the other hand, everything is in a state of constant change and there is no principle of immutability or stability, then our sensory-perception is unreliable and thus the foundations of cosmology weaken themselves (Copleston, 1990, p. 103).

This interpretation of Copleston is important in terms of the issue of the validity and non-validity of the qualitative and quantitative properties of the perceived aesthetic object on the ground of reality. At this point, whether the knowledge of form is subjective or objective within the perception of care is shaped around the axis of these discussions.

 When we look at Plato's views on real knowledge, he held the idea that reality exists within the scope of the doctrine of ideas. "That knowledge is accessible, and that knowledge is (k) infallible and (i) infallible. *of the factual* he was of the opinion that it should be (...) Plateau *Theaitetus*shows that neither sensory perception nor correct belief have these two characteristics; neither of the two will then be equated with any real knowledge" (Copleston, 1985, pp. 35-36). It is certain that in Plato's time the reliable basis for truth exceeds the subject's ability to perceive in relation to sensation. "Plato embraces Protogoras' belief in the relativities of sensory perception" (Copleston, 1985, p. 36). True knowledge should be permanent, not temporary. In this case, Plato considers that the perception obtained from real knowledge is not from sensations, but the knowledge that the subject can obtain as a result of his cognitive processes.

In his work Plato, Copleston  *makes the following determinations in Plato*'s *Doctrine of Forms* in summary: If things are named in common by subjects, they have forms in response to their ideas. Plato thought that concepts with universal validity were not merely subjective. Plato, who emphasized the concept of beauty, constituted a single universal concept from beauty. "Thus, in contrast to sensory perception, the object of thought, e.d. universals, must bear factuality" (Copleston, 1985, p. 55). Plato, on the other hand, identified things with numbers:

Formats are numbers; (ii) Things exist by joining numbers; (iii) Numbers are composed of one and the greatest-and-smallest, or "indefinite duality" *(aoristos duas*), not (apeiron*) and boundary (*peros*), as the Pythagoreans thought*; (iv) *Mathematics* occupies an intermediate position between forms and things" (Copleston, 1985, pp. 92-93).

Plato recognized that forms are numerical forms. Within the scope of these expressions, we can say that things carry a mathematical expression by taking a share of numbers with the property of joining numbers, and numbers by taking a share of things. Copleston's comment on Plato's relationship between number and form seems to be that the thinker's "drive to equate forms with numbers seems to be the drive to rationalize and make intelligible the mystical and transcendent world of forms. To make it understandable  *is to find the principle of order* (Copleston, 1985, p. 93).

Plato, in his dialogue with *Theaitetos*, expressed some impossibilities with regard to the perception of things:

(1) Something that is known without being perceived and has a memory in the soul; confusion with something else that is known, as well as traced and not perceived; (2) that something known is taken as something that has no unknown trace; (3) the confusing of the unknown with the unknown in the same way; (4) confusing the known with the unknown (5) confusing one perceived thing with another; (6) confusing something that is not perceived with something that is not perceived (7) confusing something that is not perceived with something that is perceived; (8) confusing something perceived with something not perceived; [(9) moreover: to confuse perception with something for which there is a trace of its counterpart] is more impossible than any of the preceding ones. (10) the confusion of something known, perceived, and well traced with something else known, (11) and the confusion of something known, perceived by the same conditions, with something else; (12) confusing something unknown and unperceived with something unknown and unperceived; (13) and the confusion of something known, perceived by the same conditions, with something unknown; (14) or the confusion of something unknown and unperceived with something that is not perceived. In all these cases, it is directly impossible to be falsely assumed. Only the following situations remain where it is possible to think wrongly. (...) 1-If what is known is confused with what is known and perceived; (2) if something unknown but perceived is confused with something else known and perceived: (3) or if something known and perceived is taken as something else known and perceived (Plato, 2013, pp. 515-516).

Although Plato gives the subject the margin of error of the perception of the given, his determination, especially about the confusion of the unknown but perceived object with anything previously known and perceived, is a warning that the unreality of the form of that object can be incorrectly justified by the subject. The judgment that the subject will make in his process of sensation and perception in his first encounter with the aesthetic object seems to be the same as the evaluation process of a previously unperceived object. Accordingly, Plato's explanation of the initial perception of the unknown has revealed the possibility of the subject making judgments and comparisons of the work with the imprint of another object that he has previously known and perceived in his cognitive processes. This possibility is factual in the evaluation of the current form and content data of the aesthetic object:

If an impression with a perception is juxtaposed with an impression whose perception does not exist, the thinking soul naturally falls into error" (Plato, 2013, p. 518). Plato, from the point of view of the doctrine of knowledge, made determinations about perception-form and especially about the beautiful. At the beginning of the period when "beautiful" was one of those who attempted to determine mathematics (...) We see the plateau" (Tunalı, 2012: 209).

Beautiful is what has certain proportions, that is generally accepted, that there must be a consensus that it is beautiful. From this point of view, this determination of the concept of beauty tells us that there is also a form of its subordination to the generally accepted and perceived as common. In this case, it has ceased to be a beautiful relative knowledge and has become an objective knowledge.

After all these discussions, Aristotle  *came to striking conclusions by making a study of the Pythagoreans and Plato in* his Metaphysics:

The so-called Pythagoreans, the first people to immerse themselves in mathematics, not only developed this discipline, but also thought that the principles of mathematics were the principles of everything because they were raised in it. Whereas among these principles they think that they see that there are many similarities between numbers, and between things which exist or come into being by their very nature, and which come into being, than between Fire, Earth, and water, (...) and also because they see that the changes and proportions of musical scales can be expressed in numbers, so that all other things appear to be similar in nature to numbers, and that numbers appear to them as the first thing in the whole of nature. Because of their appearance, the Pythagoreans thought that the elements of numbers were the elements of everything and that the whole sky was a harmony and a number (Aristotle, 2017, pp. 130-131).

As for the doctrine of ideas of Plato and his successors after Pythagoras, Aristotle argued that Plato "will have no description of sensual things (...) for he says that sensuous things are constantly changing, thus (...) he calls these other kinds of things ideals" (Aristotle, 2017, p. 139). In Plato, sensible objects existed by taking part.

Only "taking" of share was new here, because the Pythagoreans say that things exist by "imitation" of numbers, while Plato makes a subtle name change that says that they exist by "taking" (...) In addition, Plato accepts the existence of mathematical objects outside of sensory things and Ideas (...) Another point peculiar to him is the view that numbers exist outside of sensory things. However, the Pythagoreans assert that numbers are things themselves and put forward the objects of mathematics as "intermediary entities" between ideas and sensory things (Aristotle, pp. 141-143).

Plato, as Aristotle stated, excluded mathematical objects from the sensory realm. However, Plato seems to have used mathematical objects as a mediator between the world of ideas and the sensible by mathematically proportioning a sensible beauty that had taken its share in his idea. Aristotle, on the other hand, examines the nature of substance and concludes that "Substance is form" (Aristotle, 2017, p. 406). Aristotle describes the unity of substance and form in these terms:

Substance is a principle and a cause: this should be our point of departure. To ask why now is always to ask why a quality belongs to a subject. Because to investigate why a musician is a musician is to investigate why a person is a musician, as we have just said, or to investigate something other than that. To investigate why something is itself is to investigate nothing. (...) But the fact that a being is itself is the only explanation, the only reason, that can answer every question of "why man is human" or "why a musician is a musician"; If man prefers to give it as a reason, an explanation, that every being is inseparable from himself. But this is nothing but an affirmation of its unity (...) The right question to ask is why man is such and such an animal. In this case, it is not investigated why a person is a human being; it is investigated why something belongs to anything else (Aristotle, 2017, p. 407).

Aristotle detached the relationship of reality between the subject and the sensible objects from the realm of ideas by arguing that it was more appropriate to investigate the structure of the subject than to investigate what is sensible, that is, what is opposite to the subject, with the question "what is it?" Aristotle*, in his book Metaphysics*, sums up matter, refers to matter as (i) what is a definite being as a force, (ii) what is form and form, and (iii) a composite being composed of matter and form. Being, which is subject to matter and form, is also subject to formation and decay. In this case, matter also has quantitative changes (Aristotle, 2017, p.414). Aristotle distinguished between quantity and quality; quantity refers to multiplicity if it is countable, and magnitude if it is measurable. Within the scope of size, it refers to height, width, narrowness and depth. Aristotle also characterizes some things as quantity by their very nature; For example, according to him, truth is inherently a quantity. The thinker, who also deals with quantities in the scientific sense, such as whiteness, states that what whiteness belongs to is a quantity. On the other hand, movement and time are also quantity. This is because what they are attributes of is constantly divisible. By this expression, Aristotle does not mean what moves itself, but that space is divisible "because motion is a quantity, because space is a quantity, and because time is a quantity, and because motion is a quantity" (Aristotle, 2017, p. 300). Quality is; (i) refers to the distinction of substance, the thinker gives the example that man is a certain quality with two legs and the horse with four legs. (ii) On the other hand, attribute is also used for the stationary entities of mathematics, which means that numbers have a certain quality. What lies outside of quantity at the core of a number is quality, "for the essence of every number is what it is once" (Aristotle, 2017, p. 302). (iii) Temperature, coldness, weight, lightness, whiteness, are all kinds of special states of changing bodies. (iv) Virtue and immorality are also qualities (Aristotle, 2017, pp. 299-301-302).

 If Aristotle has a clear definition of quantities and qualities, *Categories* He gave in his book: A man is told what he is in front of when he is confronted with a white color, or when he is told that it is white or a color, and a quality is expressed (...) when it is found opposite the size of a pole, if it is said to be the size of an elbow in front of it, it will be shown what it is; and a quantity is expressed" (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 118-119). When we think of an object or an object of art, we perceive the quantitative and qualitative properties of its form as sensory in addition to its material structure. This shows that the form of the object is also measurable. Aristotle states the following about measure and what is measurable:

Magnitudes are measured in quantities, more specifically in length, length, width, width, sounds by sound, weight by weight, units in units (...) it is necessary to say that the measure of numbers is a number. (...)We say that sensation and science are likewise the measure of things, because of the reason just before, that we know something through them. In fact, science and perception are things that are measured themselves, rather than measuring other things. Their condition is really like us being measured by someone else: we know what our height is; for one has applied the measure of stroke upon us many times in order to understand how many strokes we have. However, when Protogoras says that man is the measure of all things, he  *means the man who knows and the man who hears*. (...) For they possess sensation and science, which are the measure of the objects we have mentioned above. This teaching, then, says nothing extraordinary. It is only remarkable in appearance" (Aristotle, 2017, p. 467).

Aristotle seems to be expressing here that science and perception are measurable. Subjective differences and evaluations are left to the measurable and objective in Aristotelian teaching. When we re-evaluate the evaluation of quantity and quality and the relationship of what is measurable to the object through the aesthetic object, it may be possible to see signs that objective, objective, general evaluations can be made for the art object in addition to the subject's liking (liking).

Thanks to the objective properties and quantitative values of the various forms of art objects, the practice of works such as architecture, music, sculpture, painting, dance, and the various environments that support these forms can be arranged in proportion to these quantitative values. The fact that these environments can be created according to art objects is a result of their having a mathematical form. For example, the performance of a piece of music may vary according to its acoustic, outdoor or in any hall, as well as the choice of instrument and its surroundings can be arranged accordingly. When we examine the medieval period, Vitruvius (90-20 B.C.), the Roman writer, architect and engineer, who adapted the formal form of art to architecture in the most efficient way, explained the quantitative properties of art in practice in  *his book On Architecture*. Vitruvius made a connection between the mathematics of music and the mathematics of space by establishing a relationship between the knowledge of harmony and space. In his work, he first dealt with the knowledge of harmony:

It seems that nature has divided the sound into intervals to form tones and tetrachords, determined the curtains according to the size of these intervals, and added its characteristics to the intervals by fixing their widths. The masters who manufacture the instruments create perfect designs according to the harmony of the intervals by taking advantage of this order established by nature (Vitruvius, 2017: 185).

Vitruvius identifies the various authorities and establishes his connection with the theatre and sound he will design:

Therefore, taking into account these researches on mathematical ratios, bronze bowls (sound boosters) of appropriate size should be made for the width of the theater. Manufacture these bowls so that, when touched, they can sound in other harmonious ranges between themselves, up to four, five, and then double octaves. Then play niches according to the seating rows of the theater and place these bowls in those niches according to their musical grade (Vitruvius, 2017, pp. 187-188).

Vitruvius established a relationship between the bowls and the maqams and aimed to preserve and enhance the resonance of the sound in an audible form. "Thanks to this system, the sound that spreads in waves as if coming from the stage, from a center, hits the inner parts of the bowls one by one, increasing both the clarity and creating a sound in harmony with itself" (Viruvius, 2017, p. 189). This information written by Vitruvius seems to be an application of the Pythagoreans' arguments *. The relation of mathematical expressions to the object of art is the only feature of the subject's ability to describe it. The form of the art object can also be the subject of liking* . Although the quantitative properties of the object remain generally valid in the relationship it establishes with the sensations of different objects, differences in taste may occur. Finally, Vitruvius also makes connections between the art of painting and architecture (murals) in relation to liking and form.

Since the walls of the airy sections were wide, they painted the façade of the theater building, which depicted tregedia, comedy and satire subjects. They equipped the covered galleries with a variety of scenes, which they took advantage of the length of the space and selected from the caralist landscapes of specific regions; (...) for example, statues of the gods, mythological story series, even the Trojan wars (...) However, these examples drawn from known events are despised from today's corrupt point of view. Because now wall coverings are depicted as freaks instead of representations of certain things. (...) The artistic perfection that the ancients managed to achieve through hard work and sweat is now achieved through colors and the mesmerizing landscape created by colors; The reputation that the artist's sensibility adds to the work is now a victim of the employer's unaccounted bookless expenses and ceases to be a desirable value (Vitruvius, 2017, pp. 279-283).

Here he made determinations about the form of Vitruvius' art object. First of all, he established the relationship between space and dimension in painting; In terms of content, he dealt with the narrative of the work and finally established the relationship between its desirability and value. The fact that the painting is drawn on wide walls for the subject of form also supports his narrative contextually. This is a formal expression of that work. As can be seen, the formal structure of the work is also related to its desirability, that is, its value. In Vitruvius' statements, form embodied these relations together.

Up to this stage, in the examination of form, a different aspect of the conditions of knowledge of the subject vis-à-vis an object has been shown. These conditions of knowledge include a qualitative and quantitative distinction in a clear statement. The knowledge of the object that the subject obtains through sensation and perception is subject to distinct distinction. The distinction between objective and subjective has begun to become clear. Another approach to this distinction belongs to Descartes. *He* explained the matter in detail in the twelfth rule of Rules for the Management of Reason. According to him, subjective and objective conditions in knowing differ from each other:

We must use all the help of understanding, imagination, sensation, and memory, for it is in this way that we can first obtain a clear intuition of simple propositions, then accurately compare the unknown with the known, which will enable it to be found, and finally, find what needs to be compared with each other without skipping a part of human endeavour" (Descartes, 2011, p. 52).

The thinker wants the subject to first obtain a clear perception of the object with the help of cognitive processes. As we will recall Plato's discourse on the subject's interpretation of the object vis-à-vis it, we see that in Plato*'s dialogue with Theaitetos*, a formula for how the definitions he gave in relation to situations and illusions in which perception is impossible are given by Descartes as to how they will be clear.

As far as the knowledge of things is concerned, only two points must be examined: the we who know and the things themselves to be known: we have only four faculties that can be used for this purpose: understanding, imagination, sense, and memory. Undoubtedly, only understanding, imagination, sense and memory. Of course, they are capable only of perceiving the comprehensible reality, but they must be supported by imagination, sense, and memory so that nothing within our power is omitted. It is enough to poll three points besides what is to be known; first, self-evident, second, how we learn from someone else, and third, what to infer and why. It seems to me that this order is complete and cannot circumvent anything that human forces can reach (Descartes, 2011, p. 53).

After establishing the correlation between mind and object, Descartes examines the knowledge of the quantitative and qualitative properties of the object. "For example, no matter what kind of count you bring about what color is, you cannot deny that it is spatial and therefore concrete" (Descartes, 2011, p. 54). Although the thinker can submit a color attribute to the result of the subject's prediction, he disagrees with it about its space:

Thus, the first point we need to make is that when we relate individual things to our knowledge, we must see them in a different order than when we examine them in their actual existence. If, for example, we examine any object of space and concrete, we shall undoubtedly admit that it is one and simple from the point of view of the thing itself; for in this sense we cannot see it united in corporeal nature, space, and nature, for these elements have never existed separately from each other. (...) Therefore, in so far as we here consider things only in relation to our understanding's perception of them, we will call simple only those whose information is so transparent and distinct that it cannot be analyzed by other information more distinctly known to the understanding; description, space, motion, etc. is of this kind; We conceive all the others as united from them in a certain way (Descartes, 2011, p. 59).

Descartes defined what *discrete* knowledge is and made measurability the specific determination of the object. On the other hand, the relationship of form information with space and the subject's relationship of form with space are also effective in evaluating the object. When we look at the history of philosophy of art, in the 20th century, the formalism movement in art history artists "avoided painting and created their canvases with non-representative clusters of shapes and colors. Their goal was not to capture perceptual views of the world, but to make images noteworthy through visual editing, form, and expressive design" (Carrol, 2016, p. 162). In relation to the beginning of formalism, apart from the fact that works of art try to depict reality, we can think of it as an effort to bring out the objective side of the interpretation of the art object, as opposed to the sharp and non-subjective side of the interpretation of the art object.

Clive Bell argues that what determines whether a painting is art or not is that it has one important (distinctive) setting; In other words, a painting is art only if it has a striking design. (...) Obvious form; It consists of lines, colors, volumes, vectors and the arrangement of space (two-dimensional space interactions of three-dimensional space). In this view, real art, like forms of Gestalt psychology, appeals to the imagination; the viewer moves the work of art in a way that allows us to perceive it as the arrangement of lines, shapes, spaces, directions (Caroll, 2016, p. 164).

The connection that mathematical features establish between painting and space creates a different effect on the subject's perception. Just as Descartes stated, space cannot be separated from quality, so the subjective interpretation of quality is different from the objectivity of quantitative interpretation. The formalism movement seems to have tried to evaluate the effect of the art object on an objective basis by taking into account the perception of the subject. Gestalt psychology, which is also a theory of psychology, "revealed the connection of the physical elements with psychology analytically. The part does not precede the whole, but it forms the whole. *The concept of Gestalt* mentally studies the process of organization of sensation in physics and physiology, as well as psychologically" (Runes, 1942, p. 117). It is obvious that not only the qualities, but also the existence and quantitative properties of geometric orders in art objects, their relationship with space are the effect of that object on perception and its objective aspect. The Formalism movement was criticized for its lack of content and the New Formalism Movement began. For the neo-formalists, the artistic expression of formalism seemed to be devoid of content.

The Neo-Formalist theorist states that for something to be considered a work of art, form and content must be satisfactorily and appropriately related. That is, for neo-formalism: if and only if (1) x has content, (2) x has form, and (3) the form and content of x are satisfactorily and appropriately related; x is a work of art (Carroll, 2016, p 188).

Neo-formalist thought, by adding the expression of *satisfaction to the form of the art object,* has reactivated the subjective side of the work of art, making the subject a center of measure. While the matte appearance of a sculpture or the exuberant sensation of a piece of music is considered by the new formalists as a content of that object, for the formalists a matte appearance is not an evaluation of form by a piece of music with an exuberant or dim attitude. "The neo-formalist says that x is art only if it has content, if it has meaning, if there is something about it" (Caroll, 2016, p. 196). However, in line with our subject, it is not possible to evaluate this expression of neo-formalism within the scope of perception, interpretation and analysis through an aesthetic object. Many works of art reflect complex perceptions and meanings together through the work. When the subject tries to make sense of a work of art by encountering it for the first time and sensing it for the first time, he may not be able to evaluate it in a category to that of his previous experiences. In this case, the form of the object will first transfer its quantitative properties to the subject. These features are its formal features. The subject first evaluates a content that he has not encountered before within the scope of his formal characteristics. This valuation, as expressed by Gestalt theory, is the holistic view of the shape-ground relationship. "The format works on what constitutes the content. Again, this makes us dependent on our concept of 'the form of a work of art'; that is, without knowing what is being regulated, we cannot decide how to regulate it" (Caroll, 2016, p. 205).

Technically, if we consider how the subject perceives form within its physical and psychological process; it would be necessary to include a psychological process in the discussion, as Rudolf Arnheim points out in his work "Art and Visual Perception": "Physicists clearly state the optical process; Its ambient light makes the object visible, the retina of the eye reflects the object and transmits it as a message to the brain. But the problem here is what happens in the psychological process" (Arnheim, 1954, p. 42). After completing the physical process, the form of the object is determined by our visual experience, which "belongs entirely to the object, or we compare this object with the objects we encounter throughout our lives. For example, when we encounter a hollow melon, we see its whole, not its missing part, which is invisible to us" (Arnheim, 1954, p. 47).

 These determinations are within the debates of philosophy of art. It brings a new perspective to the formalist view within the scope of the role of perception. Before valuing the content of the art object, the physical and psychological processes related to its perception must be taken into account. The form structure of the work of art seems to be its objectively valid feature. On the other hand, the form varies according to the works of art, and the form of the objects of different fields of art cannot be perceived and evaluated in the same way as another. A piece of music differs from a two-dimensional painting object, a sculpture from others in three dimensions, the living objects of the performative arts from the form and the form in the field of literature and the whole of it. "The format depends on the vehicle and the possibilities it offers. These possibilities vary from one vehicle to another" (Townsend, 2002, p.101).

In the 20th century, we see that Kurt Wenner (1958) brought a different dimension to artistic perception in terms of quantity with his three-dimensional works that he started as street art for form and content. The artist, who is described as *Pavement Art* and carries his paintings to the dimensions of human body perception, has succeeded in making it interesting by uploading elongation content. The combination of space and perspective and the coexistence of coloring give clues about the totality of formal and qualitative features. Sidewalk art first of all starts with the artist's search for space, and after finding the appropriate space, it is first determined how much space is in the environment and how much space is suitable for artistic design. On the other hand, the sunrise and the shadows that will fall on the design are also taken into account. It is then determined how the subject sees the design while standing at various angles and from where he is sitting. After the draft measurement is made, the picture begins to be drawn by means of the measuring instrument and finally, the colors are used as perspective (Jones, 2012).

The three-dimensional visualization of the properties of quality and quantity of the painting also differentiates its qualitative and quantitative properties as a form. In aesthetic discussions, the unity of space and content should be rethought in this art style. When we consider the qualitative and quantitative properties of an art object, John Locke's distinction about this property of the object comes to mind. Locke states that there are three types of attributes in objects. Accordingly:

The hollowness, shape, number, state and motion or stagnation of solid parts. They are in the body, whether we perceive it or not, and if they are of such a size that we can observe, through them we can acquire an ides of the body as it is in itself, as is evident in artificial things. I call these *primary qualities* (Locke, 2013, p. 127).

When we re-evaluate Locke's first qualities by remembering the approach of Pavement Art in the context of the problem of space and perspective, we again encounter the view that quantity and numerical expressions are one with the object. Accordingly, we can conclude that the form and mathematical structure are not separated from the body. On the other hand, the thinker defines sensible qualities as "the power that exists in the body due to its primary qualities and that influences any of our sensations in a special way and produces in us different sounds, smells, tastes and similar idees" and "the qualities that are usually audible to the ideas produced by this power" (Locke, 2013, p. 127). Locke stated that sensible qualities are carried by the first qualities. Accordingly, he also commented on the certainty of the information transmitted by the object to the subject and expressed his opinion on the certainty of mathematical knowledge. "I have no doubt that it will be readily accepted that our knowledge of mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge, and that this is not the empty obsession of the brain's contentless and meaningless fantasies" (Locke, 2013, p. 390). Under the heading of form, it may be possible to talk about the measurement of the expressions that make up the external perception and content of the art object. Whether it is a two-dimensional or three-dimensional picture, it may be possible to say that a piece of music written in four or six octets also constitutes the content of the mathematical structure of a sculpture. In this case, this mathematical structure is also the source of certain expressions.

Murielle Gagnebin's *For a Psychoanalytic Aesthetic evaluated works of art in a psychoanalytic* direction in terms of thinking and interpreting. Gagnebin, who examined Escher and his works in relation to the quantitative structure of the form, found that his works "have always been based on sound mathematical principles (...) Escher's invention reveals the unique relationships between tip, surface, volume, cause and effect (...) He interpreted the scientific solidity itself, which appeared with his elaborate line and scenes of daily life" (Gagnebin, 2011, p.132). The statement of scientific strictness speaks of the objective side of the form of the work of art from a psychoanalytic point of view. Gagnebin: "The desire to arbitrarily manage thoughts and emotions is basically works that are marked by consumption. Just as it is necessary to fill the surfaces in an orderly manner, it is necessary to prevent the viewer from thinking alone. In addition, the "filling" process takes place with a very careful line. He states that Esher's configuration, which is motivated by the concern of objective painting in accordance with pure realism, is short" (Gagnebin, 2011, p. 128). To prevent the viewer from thinking alone is to try to subordinate the viewer to the knowledge of the form of that art object. It means the obstruction of the meaning of the viewer's subjective approaches to the work, his dreams to the object or his diminishing. With this attitude, Esher seems to have fixed the exchange of information between his works and the audience. The viewer's appreciation of the form of the work will emerge from his own imaginary world and will be formed as a result of objective evaluation.

Geometry, algebra, the arithmetic sciences, and in short, by intuition or proof, are of the first kind in every statement with certainty. The proposition that the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of the two sides is a proposition that expresses a relationship between these shapes. Three times five. The proposition that it equals half of thirty expresses the relationship between these numbers. Such propositions can arise only through the processing of thought, based on anything that exists in the universe (...) The truths proved by EUKLIDES will forever retain their certainty and clarity (Hume, 2010, p. 378).

Hume expressed the relationship between the structure of mathematics and the functioning of thought. The self-evident knowledge of the subject who thinks about what exists in the universe, in other words, the subject who thinks about the form of what exists in the universe, about those objects is justified by mathematics. Another of Hume's remarks is that "every chapter of applied mathematics proceeds from the presumption that nature imposes certain laws on its own processes; the use of abstract reasoning is; either to assist experience in finding these laws, or to determine the effects of these laws on a certain distance and quantity in certain situations" and explained abstract reasoning" (Hume, 2010, p. 387). In this explanation, we can conclude that the connection of abstract thought with applied mathematics is again related to mathematics and natural knowledge. As a matter of fact, abstraction is obtained by making it from an object that is fully perceived sensory. In terms of form, it may also be possible to objectively trace the form of various abstract works of art. Pablo Picasso's *The Bull* is a common example of this objective abstraction. Picasso abstracted a picture of a bull made in vivid colors in several stages. The bull picture, which was abstracted by following the same measurements as much as possible, found expression with a few lines. By abstracting an object that is known to everyone, it has turned it into an art object that will not be recognized at first glance or that will cause different ideas and interpretations by subjects. The viewer who encounters such an abstract painting is out of his habits. Hume says that habit is important in the subject's intellectual processes; for, according to him, "if the repetition of a particular act or operation confirms the tendency to repeat the same act or action, without being required by any process of reasoning or understanding, we always say that this tendency is the effect of habit (...) Habit, then, is the supreme guide of human life" (Hume, 2010, pp. 398-399).

The abstract expressions of art objects change this habit of the viewers. By changing the habitual habit of a known art object (a known object in painting, a frequently heard verse in music, or a sculpture of a known person, a similar dance, a literature with various examples in form), it reactivates the process of understanding the new form. The change and abstraction of the object is the result of quantitative and qualitative change. Aesthetic appreciation occurs positively or negatively as a result of the judgment of the form knowledge of the aesthetic object. Therefore, it seems necessary to treat aesthetic appreciation as a whole, not as two different issues with aesthetic judgment. Perception, meaning, and analysis are mental processes initiated to describe an aesthetic object. As a result of these processes, the object will be judged to be defined and the form will become evident as a result of liking, Kant states in the context of determining whether something is beautiful or not:

In order to be able to distinguish whether something is beautiful or not, we correlate design not to the object for knowledge through understanding, but to the subject through the faculty of imagination to his sense of pleasure and displeasure. The judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of knowledge, and therefore not logical but aesthetic, by which we understand what is not otherwise the basis of determination other than subjective. But the whole relation of designs, increasingly even that of sensations, can be objective; but the correlation with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure cannot be objective; by this nothing is indicated in the object, but in it the subject senses itself as it is influenced by design (Kant, 2011, pp. 53-54).

Kant says that the judgment of taste is an expression that belongs to the subject and that this expression is not objective, and that the subject affected by the design is sensed only in itself. This statement explains that the judgment given in the analysis of the form should not be confused with the judgment that is objective. As a result of the sensation, perception, interpretation and analysis of an art object, the attribution of subjective judgments to the object seems to be the source of the problem of appreciation. The expression of subjective judgments as if they were objective judgments is the result of the error of objective interpretation.

The faculty of imagination proceeds spontaneously forever without anything obstructive to the joining process necessary for the design of magnitude; but the Truth guides him through the concepts of numbers, for which he must provide a scheme; and in this process there is no doubt an objective efficacy in relation to the logical calculation of magnitude, in agreement with the concept of an end (like any kind of measurement), but there is nothing purposeful or pleasurable for aesthetic judgment (Kant, 2011, p. 112).

In his Critique of Judicial Power*, Kant* analysed aesthetically contemplation. He distinguished between form (the design of the object) and the object, which is presented to the subject's liking as pleasant or non-pleasant.

What is pleasant, as the motive of desire, is of one kind from beginning to end, no matter where it comes from, and no matter how specific the design (the objective sensation of the sense) is. Accordingly, in judging its effect on the moment, only the multiplicity of its charms (simultaneous or consecutive) and, in a sense, only the mass of pleasant sensation are taken into account; and this is not made intelligible by anything other than quantity. (...) Beautiful, on the other hand, demands the design of a certain quality of the object that can be made intelligible and allows to be reduced to concepts (Kant, 2011, pp. 128-129).

Noting that the validity of judgments about the pleasant and the beautiful is personal, the thinker says: "The judgment of taste is concerned with the objects of the senses, but not in order to be able to determine a concept of them ; because it is not a judgment of knowledge. Accordingly, as a perceptible singular design related to the feeling of pleasure, it is a purely personal judgment" (Kant, 2011, p. 215). According to this result, the formation of appreciation between an object and a subject is not a property of the object, but of the subject. But knowledge of the form and design of the object is a characteristic of the object. When we seek an answer to the question "Can the judgment of taste be transmitted objectively between subjects?", although the expressions that express judgment find linguistic expression, it does not seem to involve any other speech than a bet about the object because it contains subjectivity:

*Sensus communis, with the idea of a common sense,* e.d. a faculty of judgment should not be understood so that in the act of self-reflection it takes into account in thought (a priori) the way in which all other people design, so that in a sense it can compare its judgment with collective human reason, and in this way the illusion arising from subjective personal circumstances, which can easily be taken as objective, can be prevented from having a detrimental effect on judgment (Kant, 2011, p. 160).

We conclude, then, that the judgment of taste about a form of art object is subjective. Again, Kant examines the ordinary man's order of thinking and states that man: "1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the place of each other; 3. Always think harmoniously. The first is *unprejudiced*, the second is extended*, the third is the coherent* way of thinking (...) the first is a combination of understanding, the second  *is the faculty of judgment, and the third is a regularity of reason" (Kant, 2011, pp. 161-162).*

As Kant's conception of judgment points  *out in his Critique* of the Power of Judgment, subjectivity precedes appreciation and has the function of thinking in place of all others. Kant's statement that the subject thinks from a universal standpoint (which can only be determined by putting oneself at the point of the position of others) indicates that he is someone who has a broad way of thinking" includes the view that the subject can actually have an objective expression about taste in a sense (Kant, 2011, p. 162). He supports this statement with his last statement: "Taste can be called *sensus communis* with a greater right than sound understanding " (Kant, 2011, p. 132). Kant defended the objective validity of the faculty of judgment.

But Kant poses another problem in the context of taste analysis. How are subjective judgments of taste to be prevented from becoming objective judgments? The judgment of appreciation given by the subject of a work of art (thinking for someone else) can be problematic in making that judgment the universal judgment. A like seems to be a comment that takes place after analysis. However, in the judgments made about the form of the object, objective quantitative properties can be transferred to another subject. The formal properties of the object of form knowledge and the formal features of the work as content have objectivity other than appreciation. In this case, it seems more valid to form a common sense about the structure of the form on what can be measured in common. The transmission of appreciation through the expression of the canteen can only *be a subject* of empathy.

Schelling's critical approach before and after Kant is about the universality of art and its validity:

He has memorized the *Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment of* many people and presented it aesthetically both in their lectures and in their writings. After Kant, a few eminent minds have left us some admirable points of departure for the true philosophical science of art and by making various contributions to such a science, but no one has put forward a scientifically constructed whole or the absolute principles themselves that will be universally valid and presented in a consistent, precise form (Schelling, 2017, p. 55).

Accordingly, Kant's universal taking of human judgment and appreciation does not seem acceptable to Schelling. "Music and painting are comparable to the sciences of arithmetic and geometry. The geometric figure needs space that is external to him, because he has no claim to reality and only depicts the ideal space in space" (Schelling, 2017, p. 2012). According to the thinker, arithmetic and geometry, which produce precise judgments, and painting and music objectify. On the other hand, in the same way, the law of sculptural art and dance, which is subject to movement, can be put forward similarly. Schelling explains that "every art form corresponds to a certain dimension, and this particular element in every art form is its essence and the substance that best corresponds to its dimension" (Schelling, 2017, p. 233).  *According to Schelling, the construction of an empirical (empiricist) art object is expressed as follows:*

*Empirical truth is the* last thing expected of art, because above all art depicts a truth elevated upon the senses (...) (the linear perspective, which cannot be related to colors, is based on universal laws of space, and size is related to the general determinations of the body). In fact, it is true that a picture in which a spatial perspective is observed reminds us less than a picture that does not take into account itself that it is a work of art. However, if this principle is universalized, there will be no art left (Schelling, 2017: 231).

In addition to denying arithmetic and geometric objective reality, the thinker underlines that a work of art should not be analyzed solely on the basis of form structure. When we consider what Schelling said within the scope of the Pavement Art mentioned above, we can think that qualitative features, especially space, size, shape drawings before the use of colors, are incomplete aspects of art. However, it will only be a stain if the qualitative characteristics are outside the shape of the specified and targeted space size of the colors. In the same way, if a piece of music is not measured, it will be anything else. In this case, the judgment given about quality and quantity seems to be complete.

Hegel states that Kant, in his analysis of subjectivity and objectivity, seeks objectivity in the mind of the subject:

Kant (...) left no alternative but to express in the form of subjective ideas of reason. Thus, too, Kant actually brought the reconciled contradiction before our minds, yet he could neither develop its true essence nor show it as what is really the operative in itself. It is true that Kant went further to the extent that he found the unity needed in what he called the intuitiven *Verstand*; but here too he stood in opposition to subjectivity and objectivity, so that while Kant affirmed the abstract analysis between concept and reality, the general and the particular, the faculty of understanding and the sense, and therefore the idea, this solution and compromise itself is again transformed into something completely subjective, not necessarily something real and performative (Hegel, 2012, p. 57).

In this case, all the explanations of a subject about the object and the truth of that object seem to exhibit a subjective structure. On the other hand, Hegel wrote, "With Schelling, philosophy has reached its absolute point of view, art has already begun to reveal its own nature and self-worth in relation to the highest human interests (...) is approved in terms of its pursuit" (Hegel, 2012. p. 62). Hegel makes the following remarks about the art object:

The element of art (...) is essential to appearance itself. If it did not manifest itself and appear in the eye, and if there were no truth for one and for oneself, as well as for the spirit in general, the truth would not be truth. As a result, pure appearance in general can change, but not the pure appearance that art brings into existence in it, but only a special kind of condemnation in which art gives reality to what is really true in it. In this context, if the pure appearance in which art brings its own conceptions into existence is to be described as "deception"; this condemnation acquires its meaning first, in our own world of feeling, that is, in the world of the inner sense in comparison with its unmediated materiality (Hegel, 2012, p. 9).

Hegel states that in the conception of the object, reality has a truth to the subject rather than a truth for itself. All the illusions that may emerge from this are again an illusion of the subject. So far, we have encountered different aspects of the evaluation of an art object form. The discussion of how subjective and how objective the subject's judgment about the object of art, its relationship with taste is, and the question of whether the form conveys information or not have been discussed from the point of view of different views. As a result of these evaluations, it can be assumed that the art object form has an objective structure. The arithmetic structure of the form, both external (form) and content, seems to be general and objective in terms of its quantity outside the subject of liking of the form. Accordingly, how and what kind of interaction the subject's perception with the form of the work of art within the framework of aesthetic appreciation is a subject of perception and form interaction in aesthetic appreciation.

## **1.3. PERCEPTION-FORM INTERACTION IN THE AESTHETIC MIND**

Perception-form interaction is not only the interaction of the subject with the object, it is transferable and reconstructable. When we consider the interaction of perception and form in terms of art objects, we see that the perception of care changes according to the objects of different art branches. The sensation and perception of the subject who encounters different branches and works of art such as music, painting, dance, theater, cinema, etc. will vary according to these works of art. Accordingly, the relationship between the forms of the products of different branches of art and physics is also different. When we consider the interaction of aesthetic art object, perception and form, the relationship of mathematics with these objects, that is, with physical objects, should be considered in terms of both taste and the transfer of the object to another form. Mathematics can transfer the physical properties of one object to another physical object by designing and modeling. In this case, the perception of the form of any physical object can be transferred to another physical object thanks to mathematics. As an example, we can show that a piece of music with three verses is rhythmically transformed into a waltz figure in dance.

Within the scope of the interaction of perception and form, the formal properties of the object other than the physical and mathematical certainties are the error about perception and form. The fact that the perception directed towards the knowledge of the form of the object results in a judgment requires an analysis of the certainty of that judgment and therefore of the perception. Through perception, the knowledge of the object and its form seems to regain reality. The reality of the object, the upwardness of perception to the reality of the object, has again been debated by thinkers. The source of the information obtained by the subject through the object has been the subject of particular research. In this context, the reality of the object was discussed and issues such as information transfer between subjects were questioned.

John Locke, who claimed that knowledge was gained through experimentation, explained how he prioritized perception by saying, "Judgment satisfies the lack of knowledge" (Locke, 2013, p. 450). Perception, along with sensation, gives us information about how things appear to us. Judging is a different mental activity from what is sensed and perceived. Locke had this to say on the subject:

Where there is no clear and definite knowledge, the faculty which God has given man to satisfy its deficiency  *is judgment*; by this, the mind supposes, without perceiving an evidentiary apparent evidentiary in the evidence, that there is no agreement or disagreement between its ideologies, or that a proposition to mean the same is true or false. The mind sometimes makes this judgment out of necessity, where evidentiary evidence and conclusive knowledge are impossible; sometimes it does so out of laziness, incompetence, or urgency that proof and precise information can be found. When this faculty of mind is applied directly to objects, it is called judgment (Locke, 2013, p. 450).

Locke's assessment of judgment seems to indicate that judgment is erroneous. Where clear and precise knowledge is not given, the mind's judgment about an object after sensation and perception arises either from the impossibility of definite knowledge or from the subject's haste in such various states. "Judgment is to assume that things are so without perceiving them," the thinker said, clearly expressing the illusion in the interaction of subject and object. (Locke, 2013, p. 450). After his discourses on judgment, Locke also emphasized *the possibility*. "Probability is the appearance of agreement on evidence of the kind that may be false" (Locke, 2013, p. 451). It may also be possible to speak of probability as the set of convictions that the subject has realized outside the reality of that object in interaction with the form of the object.

For example, in proving the line that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, one sees the definite and invariant relation between the angles of a triangle and the intermediate idees which serve to prove their equality to two right angles; Thus, at each step of the inference, through the intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement between the intermediate ides used, thereafter acquires an obviousness that clearly indicates whether the three angles and two right angles coincide or not, and he thus obtains the precise knowledge of it. But another, unable to bear the trouble of fulfilling the requirement of proof, adopts it, that is, accepts it as true, having heard a mathematician, a believer, say that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. In this case, it is the probability of that thing on which his approval is based (Locke, 2013, p. 451).

In this case, we can say that the result of the determination of another opinion regarding perception and subsequent judgment may have the possibility of being wrong. As in the case of the mathematician, an expert's judgment about any object may not apply to a similar object, while the subject conveying this invalidity may strengthen the possibility of false probability by making a wrong judgment. "The sources of probability are two: its relevance to our own Experience or the Testimony of others' experience" (Locke, 2013, p. 453). When we consider these expressions in terms of the situation of the subject in assessing the form of an art object, it should be borne in mind that he can use his probable convictions within the framework of his own experiences or in situations where the object does not inform him. This can lead the subject to illusion in the face of form. "Provisional judgments about the probable intent that always lie at the basis of the declaration, which eventually lead to interpretation and illusion (...) are tests of consistency" (Gombrich, 1992, p. 227). It is clear that the share of error in the relationship of perception and interpretation with the object belongs to the subject. It is clear that in our determinations of what an art object is and how its content is, we have to take into account the margin of error involving probability, because an object of art is also what is criticized.

The form can be independent of the contents. In his treatise *On the Idea of Necessary Connections*, Hume argues that the ideas of mathematics and the sciences that follow them are always clear from the others. "The slightest distinction between them is immediately perceptible, the same terms express the same ideas without falling into polysemy, or deviation from meaning" (Hume, 2010, p. 411). Hume says that mathematical forms are what they are, according to which a square is never a rectangle. The sensed form is clearly opposite to the subject. Emotions, on the other hand, are ambiguous, not exactly as clear as form. In this case, we can begin to produce more than one judgment about an object: "Polysemy, permeation, seeps into our reasoning: Similar objects are easily seen as the same, and eventually the result falls far behind the premises" (Hume, 2010, p. 411).

 Art When we consider the mathematical structure of the form of the object and, on the other hand, the aspect of it acting on emotions, one can argue that the former is more certain than the latter. Emotions can be considered open to producing probable judgments. It may also be possible to evaluate Hume's cause-effect explanation of the idea of necessary connections in terms of the subject's interaction of form:

From the first appearance of an object, we cannot predict what effect will come out of it. However, if the force or power of any cause could be found by the mind, we could know the effect in advance without experience and we could definitely decide on this effect from the very beginning, only through thought and reasoning (Hume, 2010, p. 414).

From this point of view, the effect of the art object on the subject's subjective emotions, can be considered in the context of cause-effect. This effect is not an effect that the subject can foresee. For example, there is a difference between an art viewer listening to Mozart's *Requiem* for the first time and listening to it a second time. The first listen is the first encounter, and the effect of the piece of music is newly defined by the subject. When the subject listens to the piece for the second time, he is again confronted with the consciousness of his decision that the melody has made him emotionally sad or cheerful. When we apply what Hume says in terms of cause and effect to audience-art object encounters, we may be able to come to the same conclusion. The effect of the first form encountered is unknown to the subject.

Also on this subject, Kant states in *his Critique of Pure Reason that* qualities are transformed into knowledge through concepts with the following example: "We can form the intuition of the shape of a cone without the help of experience and according to the concept alone. The color of this cone must have been given in experience before" (Kant, 1998, p. 631). Kant says that concepts carry knowledge. Without experience, there is neither a subject nor a design for the object. When we consider objects that did not have a concept on the subject before, it is possible to talk about probability in judgment. Wherever we talk about probability, we can talk about illusion. There have been many debates about whether the perceived form can be identical with perception, or whether the object can be known, and with his work on the mind, and therefore on perception, the 18th-19th century German philosopher Kant put forward ideas that are still debated today. When we look at Kant's determinations of the interaction context in terms of perception and form, we see that the sense and mental functions of the subject are more real than the object:

A knowledge, in whatever form and by whatever means it relates to objects, the manner in which it relates directly to objects, and the concentration of all thought on this relation as if it were the means of an end is invisibility or intuition." [...] "Objects are given to us through sensitivity (Sinnlichkeit), visions (intuitions) come only from sensitivity; but the one who thinks these things is instantaneous, and the concepts are born of the instantaneous." (K.D.D.V., 1,1) (Kant, 2014, p. 9).

Our ability to provide visions constitutes knowledge. It has left it to the subject to think about objects and form concepts. But the subject can only know what appears with the senses. But what is behind what appears cannot know anything in itself (*Ding an sich*). In this case, the subject of the experiment is phenomena. Kant  *made* this determination clear in the first preface to his Critique of Pure Reason. "Space and time are solitary forms of sensory intuition, and they provide the conditions for things to exist. We can "carry a knowledge that the knowledge of things is not an element of any element and of our concept of mind, except that the intuition corresponding to the concepts is given, and that according to this, an object is not a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensory intuition" (Kant, 1998, p. 115). Kant also argued that "mathematics and physics are two theoretical sciences that objects must determine a priori. While the former is perfectly pure, the latter is based on sources of knowledge other than the master" (Kant, 1998, p. 107). The fact that physics is based on sources other than the master seems to be the properties of "things in themselves" outside the subject. Since the knowledge of mathematics is based on reason, it can be thought of as giving the knowledge of concepts by showing a difference from physics. In the context of the subject-object relationship, which we have considered as the reciprocity of perception and form, it should be evaluated in terms of the relationship between the mathematical structure and the physical state of the form. The relationship and debates on the reciprocity of mathematics and physics can be reconsidered within the scope of discussions of perception and form. When we evaluate it from the point of view of Kant, perception is subject to mental processing with the mathematical knowledge belonging to the subject. Since the object has its own knowledge, in other words, since the subject does not know what it is in itself, the physical state of the object consists of the determination of reason about it.

When we look at Hegel after Kant, we see that he expresses what the criterion of the subject and the object itself and its concept is and how the dialectical process between them takes place with consciousness:

So much so that while consciousness tests itself, we are left only to watch. For consciousness is, on the one hand, the consciousness of the object, and on the other hand the consciousness of itself; for him the consciousness of what is real and the consciousness of the knowledge of truth. Since they are both for consciousness, consciousness itself is their comparison; it is for consciousness to know that its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object. The object, of course, appears to consciousness only in the way in which consciousness knows it. (...) On the one hand, consciousness is 'in itself' for something, but on the other hand, knowledge, or the existence of the object for consciousness, is another mode for consciousness. The test is based on this existing distinction. If the two modes are incompatible in this comparison, it seems that consciousness must change its knowledge to make it conform to the object; but in the change of knowledge, in reality the object changes itself, because what exists is essentially the knowledge of the object; as knowledge changes, the object becomes another object, because in essence it belonged to this knowledge (Hegel, 2011, p. 63).

Hegel states that in order for concepts to provide information, they must coincide exactly with the knowledge of the object. "Concept and object, being-for-another, and being-in-self fall into the knowledge itself we examine" (Hegel, 2011, p. 63). In this case, while determining the form of the object, the subject will define the information he has obtained from it through sensation and perception under the category of concepts in his own mind, and in cases where the object does not fit, he will be mistaken. Hegel states the following about the process of experience:

It is the transition from the first object and its knowledge to the other object, which says that experience has been gained on it; According to what has been said on this transition, knowledge of the first object, or the consciousness-for-existence of the first 'self', must be the second object itself. What is usually seen, on the other hand, is this: We experience the unreality of our first concept on a second object that we find randomly and externally (Hegel, 2011, p. 64).

The subject's interaction with the object involves many different interactions, rather than the transformation of his knowledge from the senses into perception. When we examine the cognitive process of the subject, the concepts and experiences he has acquired, within the framework of Kant and Hegel, it brings many questions to mind. How much of the reality of an object can experience provide precisely when assessing its form or content? How identical are the learned concepts, acquired and transmitted through objects, identical to the object? While the information provided to us by experience cannot be ignored, it can differ, especially in relation to the perception of art objects. Even if the first object experienced is similar to the next one to be experienced, it may not be identical to it.

 Arthur Schophenhauer (1788-1860) The relationship between subject and object *The World as Intent and Design* In his work, he states that "the world is my design" (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 8). With this discourse, he attributed the reality of the external world and objects to sensation and perception. "It is the subject unknown to anyone who knows everything. Accordingly, it is the carrier of the world, the condition of all phenomena and all objects" (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 10). The subject and his perception of the object are measures.

So, as a design, the world, the only aspect of the world that we consider for the time being, has at its core two necessary, inseparable halves. One half of it is the object. The patterns of the object are space and time, and through them multiplicity. By design, the other half of the world is the subject. It is not in space and time, for the subject is whole in every perceiving being, undivided. Thus, a perceiving person integrates the whole world as a design, together with the object, exactly as millions of existing people do (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 11).

According to the thinker, perception complements the world. The interaction of perception with form is designed without considering that form is independent of subjective perception. But Schopenhauer points to space and time as the basis for the world of objects that he attributes to the other half of the world. The thinker, affirming Kant; the subject, not in space and time; He says that he should be determined as a being who integrates the world with his perception:

The fact that we can reveal and fully know the patterns that are inherent in all objects and therefore generally accepted even when there is no knowledge of space, time, causality and the object shows that this limitation is mutual. Obviously, in Kantian language, these patterns are found in our consciousness a priori (before the experiment). Finding and revealing this is one of Kant's main achievements (Schopenhauer, 2009, p. 11).

Being confronted with an art object, perceiving, making sense of and analyzing that art object is quite different from our daily life experience. Our daily life experience is to repeat the habitual. However, the art object encountered has the need to make sense of it and to reinterpret and analyze it. The object of art can contain meaning beyond what is visible, that is, beyond its form, and the analysis of this meaning is the share of the art viewer. Subject and form interaction The subject's definition of form, how much of this object can be transferred in mathematical precision on the ground of reality or how subjective it is, and how much the subject provides communicative certainty of the world of meaning within the designed and designed world are discussed.

In his work The World as Will and Design*, Schopenhauer*  explains the philosophical underpinnings of perceiving things by going beyond conventional perception. The subject is able to make the mind more capable by freeing it from habitual perception. For this, it is necessary to set aside the determining conditions such as the principle of sufficient cause. Because these principles will dictate conditional inferences such as cause and effect to the subject. It leaves aside the space and time in which objects are located. The subject only investigates what the object is. He does not allow the concepts in his own mind and the abstract thoughts he produces to guide him. In this state, the entire potential of the mind is directed towards perceiving the object.

It fills its entire consciousness with the silent contemplation of a natural object that really exists. (...) A person loses himself in the object. Obviously, he forgets his own individuality, his will; as a purely pure subject; it continues to exist as an immaculate mirror of the object. So much so that it is as if there is no perceiver, only an object. One cannot separate the perceiver from the perceiver, henceforth the two become one (Schophenhauer, 2009: 122).

During perception, the person has forgotten all his wishes and has been left out of space and time. The subject has lost itself in knowledge. The fact that Schopenhauer's subject dives into the object with an unaffected clear mind and tries to analyze what it is also means being free from prejudices. How the subject perceives and makes sense of an object when analyzing it depends on many factors. If these factors are generally expressed; We can list them as physiological characteristics, cultural characteristics, habits, illusions caused by what is generally accepted. Although everyday experience shares in these relationships, the object of art requires a pure consciousness that follows the object, just as the thinker expresses it.

The thinker holds the subject independent of space and time, which are dependent on the object:

Mathematics only considers the molded space and time. The ideas that pervade the multitude in these patterns are put forward for the knowledge of the subject as an individual. All those whose common name is science proceed in their different patterns, according to the principle of sufficient cause. What they follow are always phenomena, the laws of phenomena, their context, the resulting relations (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 131).

Art has reached its purpose everywhere. For he takes away the object of his navigational diving, detached from the flow of the earth's course, and keeps this object isolated in front of him. This one thing, which is a tiny thing in this current, becomes the representative of the whole for art, equivalent to the infinite multiplicity in space and time. So art stands on this special thing, stopping the wheel of time. For art, relationships disappear; its object is only the essential, the idea. We can define art, then, as the way of correctly seeing things independently of the principle of sufficient cause. This path is the opposite of the way of seeing, which proceeds according to the principle of sufficient cause and is the method of experiment and science (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 132).

According to this discourse, the subject's leaving aside ordinary mental activity and watching the object, leaving out of his perception of mathematical and spatial, that is, quantitative, knowledge of its form, may mean that he abandons his property as an object of knowledge. Whereas, the mathematical structure of the form can carry information. For example; Two sounds played half a volume apart in a four-by-four scale can be used in the smell scene in a motion picture. As a matter of fact, the 1975 film *Jaws, directed by Steven Spilberg, used*  these double intervals to warn in danger scenes. These scales and sounds, which span a certain time and space, carry information in terms of form. Art, as the thinker conveys, requires the subject to be in a different process of perception while viewing the object. Again, according to the expressions, the subject, space and time may also undergo a different perception process not in terms of form, but in terms of content. However, quantitative features of form, such as the syntactic structure of language, are realistic and may contain expressive commonality. Schopenhauer actually states that ideas can be grasped in this way, so that in itself the thing can also be grasped. "Ideas are only (...) the object comprehensible through pure diving absorbed this navigation" (Schophenhauer, 2009, p. 133). In the context of what the thinker is describing, then, time and space are abstracted in order to grasp the idea of things, thus forming an ideal world. However, the art object is a bridge between the ideal world (designed in the mind) and the real world in terms of form and content. What the subject designs are reflected in the real world as an object, and the impressions obtained from the object return to the ideal world again. The non-subjective information about the object from the real world is its quantitative properties in the real world.

One of the notable works on the real world and the field of the subject is Henri Bergson's (1859-1941) *Matter and Memory*. Bergson determines the area that belongs to matter and the area that belongs to the subject. The thinker is opposed to the idealist attitude to the subject-object problem. Objects have the property of existence independent of us. Objects are independent of the subject, but the subject's body sets the objects in motion. The body acts on the object. Bergson says that "my body, which is the object for moving things, is therefore a center of action" (Bergson, 2007, p. 18). Bergson brought a  *different dimension to the concept of perception by bringing the idea of body movement*. Rather than the position of objects, the position of the body vis-à-vis objects is a different dimension for perception. In terms of subject and form interaction, the interaction of the body angle with the object is also necessary for perceiving, making sense of and analyzing that object. Bergson states that "images need to indicate in any way to their faces that they turn to my body the benefit that my body can derive from them. In fact, I know that the size, shape, and even the color of external objects vary depending on the way my body moves closer and farther away from them; that the power of smells and the intensity of sounds increase and decrease with distance" (Bergson, 2007, p. 18). As the thinker says, the distance taken by the body to an object is less than the whole of the three-dimensional object that exists in space. When the body turns to a statue to watch it, its senses will perceive a certain part of that statue and will only have to analyze that part. Bergson attributes the perception of the body to the perception of matter with these words: "I call the body of images matter, and I call these same images attributed to the possible action of a certain image, that is, my body, the perception of matter" (Bergson, 2007, p. 19). The thinker also states that perception is not fixed, but changes according to the function of the brain, that is, physiologically, so that his images are changed by this movement: a system of images that I call "my perception of the universe" and that is turned upside down from head to toe by the slight changes of a certain privileged image – my body! (Bergson, 2007, p. 21). Bergson tried to show how the subject's perception can change the object. "As my body shifts in space, so do all the other images; my body, on the contrary, remains unchanged. Therefore, I make my body, of course, a center to which I can connect all my other images" (Bergson, 2007, p. 36). The body is also one that can remain fixed between things that change. "First, there is the body of images; within this whole are the "centers of action" on which interesting images are reflected; This is how perceptions are born and this is how actions are prepared. My body is what appears in the midst of these perceptions; the entity to which these actions must be ascribed is my personality" (Bergson, 2007, p. 36). When we consider these expressions of Bergson's in terms of the subject encountering the forms of art objects, we see another diligent aspect of the effort to perceive bodily in the face of objects. The closer the subject hearing a piece of music is bodily closer to the center from which the sound comes, the higher it is, the farther away it is, the quieter the sensation will have, or the subject watching a dancer will perceive the moving dancer's form from me from different angles, as well as the fact that his body remains stable. Again, the viewer who perceives a picture will perceive and evaluate that picture with the reflection of light from the point where his body is standing. It may also be possible to call all this an illusion. Except for the change in the position of the body and the perception of the object, the existence of that object is absolute. Whether the sound of a piece of music is loud or low is independent of its form and content, that is, its existence.

Errors are also based on real facts. We can already indicate them so that they are interpreted correctly. The first of these facts is that what you hear needs education. Neither sight nor touch can immediately determine the location of their own impressions. A series of parallelisms and inductions are mandatory (Bergson, 2007, p. 37).

Bergson put the body in the center position. "So, we considered the living body to be a kind of center. The influence of the surrounding objects on this center is reflected from this center to the surrounding objects: External perception consists of this reflection" (Bergson, 2007, p. 43).

The object is not completely passive, it acts on the body. The perception reflected from the body becomes a perception of objects. The thinker also distinguished between inner and outer sensation. Emotions belong to my inner sense, and the senses belong to my outer sense: "my perception is outside my body, and my affect, on the contrary, is inside my body (...) affectivity is when we incorporate outward body images into our bodies; affectivity is what must first be withdrawn from perception in order to regain the purity of the image" (Bergson, 2007, p. 44). In order to perceive the image in a pure way, we need to distinguish it from affect. We can deduce from these statements that the subjective side of affectivity destroys the pure perception of the image. Accordingly, the body can be both the creator and the transformer of the image as the center.

Our perception in its pure form will, indeed, become part of things. And literally sensation, spontaneously springing from the depths of consciousness, far from weakening in space, coincides with the necessary transformations that this particular image, which each of us calls his own body, undergoes in the midst of the images that affect him. This is the simplified, schematic theory we have promulgated about external perception. This is pure theory of perception. If we take this for granted, the role of our consciousness within perception is limited to connecting the continuous thread of memory with the continuous thread of snapshots that are part of things rather than us. That this is the particular role of our consciousness in external perception can already be deduced a priori from the definition of the living body. Because, although the purpose of these bodies is to receive stimuli and prepare them in the form of unpredictable reactions, there is still no room for coincidence in the choice of reaction. This choice takes its inspiration from past experience, no doubt; and there is no reaction without a call to the memory that similar situations leave behind (Bergson, 2007, p. 49).

By including memory in perception, the thinker also demonstrated the existence of experience in perception. Bergson, who argued that even the unforeseen reactions of the judiciary were not coincidences, also stated that there were past life experiences in these reactions. Memory, in this state, is one of the subject's mental processes in assessing form.

 One of Bergson's most important determinations of perception is that of time. Time is shaped by mind and space. The thinker is "concrete time, the oneness of our consciousness, is creative evolution. The mathematician and the geometologist have a different view of time" (Bergson, 2013, p. 74). There is a difference between the time determined by man and the real time. Bergson *duration* concept:

While it is used for the concept of time that takes place in the human soul and consciousness; it is not used for time spent in the material universe except for man. This is because there is a difference between the timekeeping in the material universe and the timekeeping in our soul. In the material universe, time moves uniformly, following the points of a drawn line, while no creation expresses mobility and becoming. However, the real time is dynamic and continuous creation (Bergson, 2013, p. 75).

When we evaluate the concept of duration within the scope of art object, the effect of time on perception can be effective in the reception of art object in terms of subject-form interaction. For example, the measurable time and felt time of a piece of music may differ from each other. A June 13, 2017  *article in Language Alters Our Experience of Time* pre-empted the conclusion that language alters the perception of time:

This new study shows that language differences have certain psychophysical effects in bilingual minds. These people may have the same experiences differently depending on the content of the language. Swedish and English speakers, for example, prefer to tell the duration of events by emphasizing physical distancing (Athanasopoulos, 2017).

The semantic structure of the language affects the perception of time, and accordingly, the author gives the following example in the article:

For speakers of the Aymara language (a language spoken in Peru), looking forward (ahead) means looking at the past. The word for the future (qhipuru) means "behind the times." Thus, the spatial axis is reversed: the future is behind us and the past is in front of us. The logic in the Aymara language is that just as we cannot see back, we cannot look to the future. We know the past, we can see it in our field of vision, like anything in front of us (Athanasopoulos, 2017).

As a matter of fact, Bergson established two fields of reality related to time and related to it. These two areas are different.

Psychological phenomena—physical phenomena, internal ones—external ones, spiritual and conscious ones—those that belong to the material world. Among these dualities, where real time manifests itself is in the first realm of reality. The first field of reality has change, occurrence and mobility, which is qualitative, while the second field of reality refers to a spatial state that is quantitative (Bergson, 2013, 75).

When we consider the article about language and time perception with Bergson's concept of duration, we can think of the syntactic structure of language as the physical field and the semantic structure as the psychological field. Bergson's determination can be related to the subject when we consider that the quantitative structure of language is related to length and brevity, and that its semantic structure interacts with internal time. Under the leadership of this example, the form of any art object can interact with the subject in the same way. When we perceive a sculpture, its spatial subordination to time allows us to determine its quantitative properties, while the content of the form can be semantically subject to subjective time. Bergson says that the sugar he adds to the water and the lemon melt into lemonade depends on external time: "The real physical time that passes outside of me will melt the sugar and turn the water into sorbet or lemonade. But the time that passes in my inner world can no longer be a phenomenon of matter, but perhaps a fact of life that goes against the flow of matter" (Bergson, 2013, p. 76). Duration is an internal state that belongs to the subject, it is non-quantitative, everything that depends on space is countable and measurable. Bergson exemplifies inner time this way: "The moment we close our eyes and just listen to the melody itself, we step outside the boundaries of the external world and experience a period that is completely vivid and fluid belonging to our inner world. Here, it is the memory that provides continuity and transition between states. Therefore, time is 'memory'" (Bergson, 2013, p. 80). The thinker defines the relative inner time with memory, and the example he gives indicates how a piece of music is perceived internally. On the other hand, this piece of music is space-dependent, measurable. Apart from the special perception of time of art objects or ordinary objects, there is also a perception of space that can be measured. Again, with these features, objects have the opportunity to be transferred.

 Since the psychological time of an art object is related to memory according to Bergson's philosophy, its psychological effect is related to the fact that the subject is associated with each object it can be the same when confronted. However, when the object with physical space changes its physical space, its psychological perception may also differ. For example, hearing a piece of music in the rickety basement of a house and listening to it in a concert hall can change the psychological effect of that piece, its effect on memory, and therefore its internal time. On the other hand, the spatial position of a sculpture inside or outside the building can also affect the subject in terms of psychological time. "According to Bergson, the fabric that weaves our psychological life is only and only time (...) real time is states of consciousness" (Bergson, 2013, pp. 80-81). Again, Bergson says that mood changes depending on memory: "Even in the external perception of a mood that we think has changed the least, there will definitely be a difference between my first perception and my later perception. The reason for this is that my memory has definitely added something to my first perception in my second perception (Bergson, 2013, p. 83). Duration is an active process, not a stationary one, in its relationship with memory.

 After all; Bergson's association of time with the internal dynamics of the subject also prevented him from making evaluations based only on space, and paved the way for him to be subjectively active and decisive on objects. On the relativity of time revealed by Bergson, Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) *Cinema, Motion-Image*perception of the subject in ; In particular, he examines how his perception of cinema is:

Things and perceptions of things are prehensions; but while things are holistic objective conceptions, perceptions of things are partial, biased subjective conceptions. If the model of cinema is by no means subjective natural perception, it is because the mobility of its centers, the variability of its frames, always leads it to re-establish vast spaces that are decentralized and frameless (Deleuze, 2014, p. 92).

As Deleuze mentioned, cinema, independent of subjective perception, quantitatively subjects the subject to a certain time. Just as the other art objects we have mentioned contain objectivity in terms of space and temporality, Deleuze states that subjective perception makes various reductions on the thing while exemplifying the inner and outer time expressed by Bergson on cinema. When we consider the interaction of the subject with the object, it may be possible to see the differences in objective and subjective valuations of the effect of internal and external time differences on perception.

Cinema, then, tends to participate in the first regime of movement-image, universal variation, holistic and objectively disseminated perception. In fact, cinema travels the way in both directions (...) we are moving towards a subjective perception that is separated from it by simple subtractions or subtractions (Deleuze, 2014, p. 92).

Edmund Husserl's idea of an internal consciousness of time in relation to the mental process of the subject-form subject is quite noteworthy about the object-oriented subject, time that is not discussed independently of this process. "For Husserl, the most direct form of experience is sensations, and sensations do not represent an object logically separate from having a particular sensory experience (...) Husserl takes experience directly back to its sources in sensation" (Husserl, 2010, p. 78). The fact that experience extends directly to sources within sensation makes it necessary to think of objects temporarily. Subjectively, the temporal conceiving of objects "belongs to the succession and continuity of intellectual experience and acts, in the sense of the events of the life of consciousness (...) since it has a subjective and special character, it is not measured by earthly time" (Husserl, 2010, pp. 79-80). The inner consciousness of time that Husserl spoke of is the consciousness of the process of the conscious life. By standing in front of the world, the inner consciousness of time "provides *the noetic structures that allow the world to emerge*  " (Husserl, 2010, p. 80). The thinker asserts that with his inner consciousness of time, he experiences in the present the phenomena that have happened and will happen in the past and in the future*. "Therefore, past events are expected to take the form of events that have not been experienced in a past present, and those in the future are expected to take the form of the present" (Husserl, 2010, p. 81). Husserl exemplifies the connection of past and future in the present through music, an art form:*

Although the melody consists of the succession of different notes, it is perceived in a unity and harmony. For example, at a given time, we have the original impression of the note 9 that is formed in it now, and if we have the original impression of the note 8, we keep it even if we do not have it, that is, we are aware of it as having just passed. In the same way, when the note 10 is formed, we are aware of the 9 as the past and the 8 as the past before. As the melody progresses, its 8 notes are pulled back in the past, and each changing catcher appears in the modification. Thus we retain not only the individual notes of the melody, but also the order in which they are composed. Similarly, at any given time, we expect its future flow (Husserl, 2010, p. 81).

When we look at Husserl's example of musical notes, it is possible to observe the act of memory that helps the internal time directionality of consciousness. In the ongoing melody, the remaining notes are kept in memory and carried to the present, and in the ongoing melody, we follow the future flow of a note that is now sung by combining with the note of the past. In fact, a competent musician with a strong memory can keep a few measures of melodies in his memory, carry them into the present, and with his knowledge of harmony, he can have the potential to predict the future flow. From the point of view of an art viewer, as Husserl points out, we can perceive the melody with temporal orientation and, in this case, "reveal the constitutive or, in other words, constructive" character of the consciousness" (Husserl, 2010, p. 82). In Husserl's philosophy, truth established in consciousness seems to constitute a world.

 In aesthetic appreciation, the interaction of subject and form is the qualitative and quantitative property of the form, its own ground of reality, the problem of the subject's sensation and perception, the form its mathematical structure, its connection with time and space, and how the subject perceives this connection can be effective in terms of the process of understanding and analysis. Although subject-form interaction is actively part of the subject's cognitive processes, the margin of error of consciousness vis-à-vis the object again belongs to consciousness and its contents. Both the artist and the person watching an art object affect the aesthetic appreciation, perception and analysis processes of the art object in situations that exceed the level of consciousness awareness. Apart from the state of awareness of consciousness, it is also possible to talk about the effect of the unconscious.

# [PART TWO: RECIPROCITY IN TERMS OF AESTHETIC TASTE AND DETERMINISM](#_İKİNCİ_BÖLÜM:_ESTETİK)

The knowledge offered by nature is sweet;

Our struggling mind,

It spoils the beauty of the forms of things:

We slaughter to examine.

(W. Wordsworth, "The Tables Turned" 1798)

Investigating the functions and role of the conscious and unconscious in aesthetic appreciation seems necessary to investigate the determinants of taste in the aesthetic subject. Apart from the conscious states of the subject, the states that affect his consciousness but are not aware are generally expressed as unconscious. First of all, the functioning of consciousness, which is still the subject of research, and accordingly how the unconscious is formed, should be examined. The activity of philosophy, which has been the product of the subject's mental life since the beginning of the history of thought, has again made analyses of what consciousness is through its own eyes and has again made its own behavior the subject of examination in the context of its relations with others. With the development of autonomous research in the fields of psychology and medical science, many researchers have benefited from the debates of philosophy on consciousness and its contents and continue to be injured. A person's consciousness governs his body as well as his self. The individual's decisions, his actions in accordance with these decisions, are a product of his conscious contents as a whole. In this case, within the scope of aesthetic appreciation, it should be investigated how effective the consciousness and the unconscious that affects it are when evaluating an art object. The effect of the contents of consciousness and experiences on the actions of the subject and how the unconscious processes are formed and the effect on consciousness and aesthetic appreciation as well as the relationship with perception in general are also issues that need to be investigated.

Although consciousness is often an indescribable concept, it has been described as the experience of consciousness through introspection. Consciousness was first stated by Sir William Hamilton as a concept that we cannot define exactly what it is, but that we can communicate exactly what we grasp, perhaps what we ourselves can describe as complete awareness. Consciousness is at the root of all our knowledge. Analysts have concluded that the contents of consciousness and the actions of consciousness can be separate. Consciousness, on the other hand, is divided into three principles. Perception, tendency, desire (Runes, 1942, p. 64).

When we look at the ancient thinkers, the philosophers before Socrates tried to understand the nature in front of them and carried out discussions to look for ways to live virtuously in this nature. Again, in these periods, various determinations were made about the soul and it was reduced to the substances present in nature. The soul was based on substances such as fire, air, and atoms. Plato brought a new perspective to psychology with his thoughts, and in this way, he examined consciousness through the life of society. Plato defines the soul as "the self-initiator, the movement" or "the source of motion." As such, the soul precedes the body in the sense that it is superior to the body" (Copleston, 1985, p. 110). The fact that the structure of consciousness could not be fully explained in antiquity and the idea of the immortality of the soul in terms of the value of human life brought the idea that the soul is also a member of consciousness. "Plato says; the only thing that truly exists in the immediate is the soul, and this is invisible, whereas fire, water, earth, and air are all visible bodies" (Copleston, 1985, pp. 110-111). While the presocratics thought that the soul partook of nature's contents, bringing with it the idea that man is a part of nature, in Plato the soul was conceived as something invisible and bearing all the functions of consciousness. According to Socrates, "the soul can govern the body and its desires" (Copleston, 2010, p. 111). Copleston comments on Socrates' statement that the soul governs the body and its desires as "it is absurd to think that a mere harmony is the harmony of itself" (Copleston, 2010, p. 111). As a matter of fact, this determination also expresses the dilemma that the subject falls into about his consciousness. The subject's control over himself is governed from time to time. This determination seems to point to the existence of an unconscious side as well as a conscious side of thinkers in conducting this discussion, in other words, an unspeakable structure. In Plato *Phaidon*, the soul is shown as separate from the body. In the words of the early Greek philosopher Simmias, "he rejects the immortality of the soul, arguing that the soul is only the harmony of the body, and that it disappears when the body with which it is in harmony disappears" (Copleston, 1985, p. 111). He supports this argument with the following example: Soul and body resemble the harmony of a lyre and harmony. Harmony is sacred or much more beautiful (because we hear harmony rather than intervals of notes and notes) Apart from the destruction of the lyre, harmony and lyre also disappear (Corrigan, 2010, p. 148).

Plato separated the soul from the body and put forward the view that the body could be affected by the influence it received from the physical environment. Considering the relationship between the physical environment and conditions of consciousness today, and considering the effects of physical conditions on consciousness, we can justify this determination.

Plato, who said, "There are two things called body and soul, and there are two arts that correspond to these two things," reveals in Gorgias that physical education and medicine are related to the body, and the judgments and laws encompassed by the art of politics are the arts related to the soul. The first two arts mentioned here are related to the goodness of the body (that is, to be healthy), while the last two arts are related to the goodness of the soul (that is, to be measured and true) and exist to make them proper / orderly and appropriate / harmonious (Kutlusoy, 2014, p. 341).

Within the framework of these determinations, it may be possible to talk about the development and structural tendencies of the cognitive structure. When we consider that the perception of various arts is different from each other, the structure of consciousness can be shaped according to those arts. The perception of objects by a person engaged in engineering may be different from the perception of a person dealing with social sciences. As a matter of fact, Plato divided the various professions according to these structures. Plato divides the soul into three parts: the rational  *"part" (to logistikon*), the hearted or lively "part" (to *tumoeides*), and the appetizing "part" (*to epitumatikov*). (...) The to logisticon is what distinguishes man from the animal, and it is the highest element or formality of the soul, immortal or close to divine. The other two formalities, to tumoeides and to epitumatikov, can disappear (Copleston, 1985, p. 112). Plato made distinctions in the State according to three distinct parts of the soul:

Towards the end of the fourth book, according to Plato, who distinguishes between the 'calculating thinking side' and the 'simple desiring side that does not think', the first of these is our 'mind side' while the other is 'wants'. But apart from these, there is also a resentment side that 'fights with reason, listening, wanting'. Plato, who says that the parts of society are also within man, thus draws parallels between the idea of the soul—which has a three-part/functional nature (i.e., reason, anger, and will)—which he will deal with in Phaidros and Timaeus—and the three citizen classes of society (i.e., rulers, warriors, and producers, respectively). He states the three virtues of the soul, which he associates with each part separately, as wisdom, courage and temperance (...) respectively (Kutlusoy, 2014: 344).

When we return to definitions of consciousness, the consciousness of analysts; His idea of it as the sum of a structure of perception, inclination, and desire seems to be consistent with Plato's account of the parts of the soul. "For Plato, the soul has a tripartite structure consisting of the parts of thinking, affect, and physical need; that is, the soul is the source of these three distinct forms of action/function of vitality, or of motions in the three spheres of activity. The immortal part of the soul is only the logos or nous (intellectual, rational, knowing) part" (Kutlusoy, 2014, pp. 344-345). Thus, when we reconsider the concept of consciousness, it is certain that we are faced with a complex structure.

Consciousness is a phenomenon that is tried to be defined through our subjective experience. "The flow of subjective experiences constitutes our conscious life as we know it" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 23). In this respect, current research on consciousness is in cooperation with the analyses of consciousness of previous philosophical discussions. Especially in philosophical discussions, the mind-body problem, the interaction of physical and psychological phenomena with each other are sources of discussions on consciousness. On the other hand, aesthetics has been a favorable field for the study of consciousness in the subject-object relationship within the scope of philosophy of art:

It would not be wrong to start the investigations of the mind carried out by Western philosophy in the most general sense with Antiquity and not with Descartes in modern philosophy, and moreover to regard Plato, who systematically deals with the mind, as the pioneer of these investigations (...) it is that the beginnings and origins of the two main approaches in the branch of philosophy that deal with the mind as a problem/subject, namely dualism (dualism) and essentialism/materialism (materialism), can actually be captured in Ancient thought (Kutlusoy, 2014, p. 341).

When we look at Aristotle after Plato, we see that Plato's dualistic conception of the soul has been abandoned and evolved into a single-minded conception of the soul. Aristotle: "Consequently, they think, they are right to think that neither the soul is without a body, nor is there a body [without a soul]: for the soul is not a body; but it is anything of the body. Therefore, the soul is found in a body and in a body of a certain quality" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 196). This understanding of Aristotle seems to have opened the door for the scientific study of the mind. Accordingly; The soul, along with the body, is subject to research. He began to approach the concepts of soul, mind, consciousness. Aristotle makes the following determinations about the mind:

On the one hand, we have defined the soul as the principle of two different things, first the principle of local motion, and then the principle of thought, judgment, and sensation; on the other hand, we thought of thought and intelligence as something akin to sensation (for in both cases the soul chooses and recognizes what exists), and the ancient philosophers at least identify judgment with sensation (Empedocles says: "In men, intelligence develops according to what is actually given to the sense; but in another work he says: "That is why they have always changing ideas"); and Homer's quote tends to state the same thing: "For such is intelligence" (...) – on the contrary, we say, sensation and intelligence are not identical; It is clear that sensation is also present in all animals, while intelligence is present in very few animals (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 213-214).

Aristotle's important determination here is that he distinguishes between sensation and intelligence, that is, the two phenomena involved in the process of the formation of consciousness. Sensing is not enough on its own, except for a cognitive process. Therefore, the processes of interpretation and judgment contained in cognitive processes seem to be different components of consciousness.

 Descartes, who accepted the soul and body as two separate substances; When we look at Descartes' determinations of aesthetic taste and perception, when we re-examine Descartes' interaction between perception and physical objects, we see that physical objects activate the cognitive process, Descartes *Emotions or Moods* In his treatise, he states the following about perceptions of objects: "The perceptions we see as the perceptions of objects outside us, that is, the perceptions of the objects of our sense organs, arise from these objects themselves (at least as long as our conviction about these objects is not erroneous)" (Descartes, 2015, pp. 40-41). With this approach, Gustav Fechner (1801-1887), who scientifically measured consciousness and produced physical data, called "psychophysics (...) he was able to relate various aspects of subjective psychological reality (sensory experiences) to physical measurements and quantities" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 99). As Descartes pointed out, the beginning of the cognitive process with the effect of objects is now measurable.

Fencher realized that when an observer is given a set of physical stimuli, certain contents of subjective experience can be produced. When the experimenter carefully altered the physical properties of the stimuli, he was able to regulate and control them in some way due to the contents of the observer's consciousness. Fencher was particularly curious about the intensity of the stimulus and the relationship of that violence to the subjective sensations that occur after it. Violence is a characteristic that characterizes the physical stimulus. One tone of voice may be louder than another. (such as when the signal has more physical energy) or one weight may be physically heavier than others. The intensity of the stimulus can be measured objectively precisely. At the same time, the subjective experience generated by the stimulus varies in proportion to the extent of the violence. Voices can feel louder or lower, a load lighter (Revonsuo, 2010, pp. 99-100).

In line with these statements, when we evaluate our subject through aesthetics and consciousness, it seems possible to say that the art object that stimulates the consciousness of the subject in front of an object is shaped against its physical structure. As Fencher points out, the severity of an object's physical qualities and quantities can alter the subject's cognitive state during his or her experience of the object. "He noticed that in situations where the physical stimulus was of very low intensity, no subjective experience arose in the mind," Fencher said. He called these negative sensations (...) subjective experience was a logarithmic function of physical stimulus intensity" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 100). Later, many theories of consciousness such as structuralism, holistic theory, behaviorism were put forward and the schools of psychology came to an end. However, the data obtained by Fencher seem to make the subject-object and consciousness relationship concrete.

Since the discussions of ancient philosophy, the discussion of the concept of beautiful, especially the examination of whether taste is subjective or objective in the philosophy of art, is aimed at investigating the objectivity of the concept of beautiful. The cognitive investigation of the concept of the beautiful also brings with it a problem of perception, and this problem seems to be related to the structure of consciousness, the contents of consciousness. Today, various studies on neuroscience and consciousness are taking place. This field is divided into sub-branches and conducts various researches in the field of neuroaesthetics. The subjective aspect of aesthetics is a problem worth investigating in the philosophical field, but it is also a problem of neuroaesthetics. In measuring the aesthetic activity of neuroaesthetic consciousness, Fencher and others who work in this direction make use of it. The difficulties of empirical research and epistemological research in terms of neuroaesthetics are expressed by Roney as follows:

He proposed that neuroaesthetics be 'an (empirical) aesthetic from below', 19. It is well known that the German psychologist of the century, Gustav Fencher, still owes a lot to his Experimental Psychophysics. Aesthetics, according to Fencher, is characterized by reports obtained from participants, internally grounded in their subjective experiences, 3. It was understood as a branch of experimental psychology that attempted to establish a link between observations of aesthetic behavior from the perspective of the person. (N 28) The aesthetic response, on the other hand, occurs only to the extent that it is experienced as an internal state by anyone, and thus only 1. It is accessible through one's ontology. An affective experience as a conscious state is only 1. It exists from the person's point of view, so we can only give him access by asking him what that person feels, and therefore the idea of establishing an aesthetic science that incorporates epistemological objectivity seems doomed from its inception. Yet if epistemological objectivity were accessible, it might not be through empirical psychology, but rather through something like a phenomenological inquiry into the structures of consciousness that reveal themselves for consciousness. The danger of an empirical theory of the aesthetic response is that if it is true that aesthetics exist only at the level of internal experience, then any attempt to resolve the representation of an affect, such as liking, senses something about the brain states that give rise to representation that deprives aesthetic experience of its meaning (Roney, 2013, p. 85).

With these statements, Roney also makes us think about what is about consciousness and what is the share of aesthetics. Again, the footnote given within the scope of his determinations states the following:

This issue has been accepted in the literature and discussed in detail. Chatterjee sums it up succinctly this way: 'If the goal is to understand aesthetics (as opposed to understanding the brain), what should neuroaesthetics propose? What's missing is a more advanced psychophysics that can answer the question, "when does neuroaesthetics add something to understanding the psychology of aesthetics that can't be explored by behavioral studies alone?" (Chatterjee p. 60) (Roney, 2013, p. 85).

Roney concludes his article with Chattejee's question. "If the goal is to understand aesthetics, what should neuroaesthetics suggest? Does the science that links the stimulus to sensation, the neural state to the mental state, contribute to our understanding of the nature of aesthetic experience?" (Roney, 2013, 92). Measurements of consciousness within the scope of neuroscience are about the subject. On the other hand, an aesthetic object is not just an object, but appears by its artist as a fixed state of a conscious structure. In this case, the subject is ontologically not only alone with his own consciousness in the first-person state, but also interacting with another consciousness fixed by his artist on the object. On the other hand, some qualitative and quantitative features that we have distinguished through the aesthetic object throughout the study are those that can open the door to empirical experimentation as their general validity is also measurable. The interaction of subjective consciousness with another consciousness (art object) appears to be a dialectical process belonging to the subjective sphere. It is our minds rather than things that distort the forms of things, in other words, transform them. What empirical measurements do not take into account may be that the consciousness of the subject is culturally shaped differently. In this case, the feelings and thinking styles of the consciousnesses whose cognitive processes are shaped differently from different cultures may not be the same in the face of the aesthetic object. On the other hand, the pure properties of the object independent of beliefs and convictions are in itself. In this case, the consciousness that the artist has fixed on the object (the artist's own consciousness, all the cognitive processes in creating the object, its contents such as perception and judgment) can be objectified with its quantitative and qualitative properties. The dialectical processes of another subject's consciousness vis-à-vis the object can transform that object.

 Phenomenology has offered various explanations for the structures of consciousness. In this context, on reality and subjective consciousness, the following statements of Hegel are noteworthy.

Consciousness (...) suffers from the deterioration of its limited satisfaction (...) the fear of reality can hide itself from themselves and others behind the following façade: it is as if its fervent desire for truth itself makes it very difficult, increasingly impossible, to find any other truth than the only truth of arrogance, that is, the fact that it is more open than every thought taken from oneself or from others, no matter what; this arrogance—which he understands how to frustrate every truth in order to turn inward and graze on his own understanding, which knows how to always decipher all his thoughts and find a purely dry I instead of all content—is a fulfillment that must be left to itself; because it escapes from the universal and seeks to be only for-itself (Hegel, 2011, pp. 60-61).

This determination, which Hegel  *made in The Phenomenology of Spirit*, is that consciousness constitutes its own reality rather than thing. The consciousness in front of the thing will form the knowledge of its own self as a result of the dialectical process. "Consciousness knows that the unreality that arises in perception falls on it. But knowing this, consciousness is also capable of eliminating this unreality; distinguishes the distinction between the real and the unrealistic" (Hegel, 2011, p.82). This determination made by the thinker on consciousness seems to be important in terms of the activity of consciousness in the field of aesthetic appreciation and the possibility of aesthetic science. Consciousness is the source of distinguishing processes specific to consciousness, such as illusions of perception and the unconscious.

 In addition to the conscious activity of an aesthetic object such as sensation, perception and analysis by the subject, other factors affecting perception and interpretation in the process of this conscious activity have also been investigated. In particular, the unconscious debates that began to become evident in the 19th and 20th centuries gave a new dimension to perception. Aesthetic discussions in the early periods have treated perception as a conscious activity. However, the effect of the unconscious, which remains in the dark of the human mind and is still being studied on this subject, on perception and analysis should be investigated.

The first scientific approach to consciousness was made in a nutshell by Wilhem Wundt (1832-1920), inheriting from Fencher's prediction that an objective measurement of consciousness could be made. Wundt treated psychology as a conscious experience, disabling the introspective method. Consciousness is determined as the content of the entire experiential field. Wundt thought that consciousness exhibited a holistic structure. (Revonsuo, 2010, pp. 100-102).

On the other hand, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) brought a new debate to the field of psychology. To paraphrase Revounsuo, Freud makes a contribution to the removal of consciousness from psychology:

Freud actually made a great contribution to the removal of consciousness from psychology" His influential theory gives consciousness a very small role and explicitly opposes the identification of the mind with the conscious mind to the introspective idea and the Wundtian idea that the "unconscious mental life" contains a contradiction. Instead, Freud believed that abnormal mental states or psychopathology could never be explained solely on the basis of the concept of the conscious mind (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 114).

Starting from the explanation of abnormal, mental states, Freud did not define the concept of the unconscious only in terms of individuals with pathological disorders. Freud strikingly proceeded from Aristotle to talk about the psychopathological personalities on the stage:

If, as Aristotle had assumed since his time, the purpose of theatrical play is to evoke "fear pity" and thus "discharge emotions," we can describe this purpose in more detail as the problem of opening up the sources of pleasure or enjoyment in our ecstatic life, just as humor or entertainment during mental activity opens up similar resources, most of which render that activity unattainable (Freud, 1999, p. 113).

Freud used Aristotle's concept of Catharsis under the title of *Psychopathic Personalities on the Stage*, and as Revonsuo stated, he defined the concept of the unconscious through these personalities and established its relationship with art. Aristotle, in his Poetics, uses the following expressions when describing Tragedy: "Tragedy imitates those who act; it does this not through a narrative, but through the pity and fear it evokes, purifying such affects" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 533). This determination of Aristotle seems to have been the basis of the concept of the unconscious that Freud discussed in the 19th and 20th centuries. When we make an evaluation through tragedy and other branches of art, artistic content can activate various emotions of art viewers. The contextual structure of the art object can be shaped by the subject according to its unconscious contents. Freud "speaks of man being freed from his own feelings by emptying his will" (Freud, 1999, 115). The expression of getting rid of emotions here seems to be the melting of an emotion by rising to the level of consciousness, triggered by an object or situation that does not already exist on the surface of consciousness. The purification of feeling that Aristotle spoke of seems to point precisely to this point. The unconscious is not a phenomenon that the subject can clearly define to himself. But with the help of consciousness can have the ability to base traces of their actions on their unconscious formation. According to Freud, "consciousness is only the icing on the cake" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 114). On the other hand, Freud speaks of the dual structure of the unconscious: "In the psychological sense, both are unconscious; But the first, which we call the unconscious, has no chance of reaching consciousness. The second is called pre-conscious because it can reach consciousness after narrating certain rules of stimulation... It expresses the relationship of the two systems to each other and to the consciousness, that the preconscious is like a screen between the conscious and the unconscious." (Quoted in Revonsuo, p. 115). In this case, Freud's preconscious in the dual structure of the unconscious functioned by acting as a blind spot in the connection between the unconscious and the conscious. However, when we try to evaluate the unconscious as a structure independent of consciousness, we may be left with the situation of losing the conscious structure that can form the contents of the unconscious. In order for the unconscious to form, it seems necessary for a conscious structure to record for it. In this case, it may be possible to talk about the interactionist structure of the conscious and unconscious.

 In this context, Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) supports the possibility of an interactionist structure of the conscious and the unconscious with the following statements:

It is also impossible to determine the range of the unconscious, that is, what contents it covers. Only experience decides on these issues. We know by experience that the contents of consciousness can lose their energy value and become unconscious. This is the normal "forgetting" process. We know by experience that these contents do not simply disappear below the threshold of consciousness, but that decades later, under appropriate conditions, they may emerge from where they sank with the revival of the occasional (...) connotations of forgotten content (Jung, 2016, pp. 14-15).

How unconscious data are formed in 20th-century psychological science and 21st-century neuroscience studies is still being questioned. The suggestions about the fact that the unconscious manifests itself in actions by separating from consciousness, but is a blind spot whose source cannot be known, are reminiscent of the concept of Tabula Rassa, in which Locke expressed his discourses on consciousness. Locke almost supports Jung with the statement that "it seems incomprehensible to me to engrave something in the mind in such a way that the mind does not perceive it" (Locke, 2013, p. 73). Locke, who likened the human mind to a blank slate from the moment it was born, argued that the ideologies in the mind include cognitive processes such as experience. Again, the thinker who ascribes a very important function to reason is "nothing more than the ability to infer unknown truths from known principles or propositions, how can these people say that it is necessary to use reason to discover principles that are supposed to be innate?" (Locke, 2013, p. 75). Although the issue here is whether innate principles can be known or not, we can say that it is similar to the theory of the unconscious in that the condition for the appearance of these principles is consciousness. In this way, we can talk about the force of consciousness to push the data of the unconscious. As Jung mentioned above, the energy value of the contents of consciousness seems to be able to push them to the conscious level instead of losing them.

 About the data of the unconscious, Jung says that "we can distinguish the personal unconscious, which includes everything that is achieved in personal life, everything that is forgotten, repressed, perceived, thought, felt below the threshold of conscious perception" (Jung, 2016, p. 16). In this case, it seems possible to trace how the personal subconscious life is formed. When we consider the experiences of consciousness, it would be wrong to say that every data that is sensed is constantly kept on the surface without any process of forgetting taking place on the surface of consciousness. We know that the phenomenon of forgetting that Jung expressed is the cause of the elements of the subconscious. Before the phenomenon of forgetting, again Locke's *An Essay on the Human Moment* In his work, he argues that the source of the ides is the objects of sensation and the other source is the processes of our mind, that not only the conscious processes, but also the processes after the sensations that the subconscious mind acquires from the objects, "perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing (...) Its source is in everyone's own (...) and it would be appropriate to call it the inner sense" (Locke, 2013, p. 98). Accordingly, we can analyze how it creates subconscious data. In particular, the sensations and perceptions of different subjects in the face of objects can be forgotten by recording in memory many differentiated meaning-making activities in the process of making sense of that object. The dialectical process that the subject goes through in order to make sense of the object can also cause different judgments to be formed about the object.

 The relationship of the subject to the one standing in front of him (the object) seems to depend on his process of sensation, perception and meaning. When we identify the object in front of us as an epistemological process governed by cognition, it may be useful to take a closer look at the activity that consciousness carries out in this process in order to re-evaluate the concept of the unconscious. Especially *Phenomenology of Spirit* Friedrich Hegel, who dealt with the subject of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason in detail, closely examined the cognitive process of the subject with the object. The determinations detected by the thinker who examines the process of the conscious consciousness in the face of the object shed light on the unconscious data. In the case of being conscious (awareness), the process of processing the data obtained from the object can create its unconscious data. Hegel describes the dialectical process of consciousness in the stage of sensing and making sense of the object as follows: "Consciousness distinguishes something from itself and at the same time comes into contact with it; or as it is said, that something exists for consciousness; and the particular aspect of the existence of this relation or thing for a consciousness is knowledge" (Hegel, 2011, pp. 61-62). According to this, the activity of consciousness is the source of the formation of knowledge, and the existence of something is transformed into information for consciousness. After the determination of consciousness, the thinker determines the object more closely and states:

Since the first principle of the object is an indirect universal in its universal simplicity, the object must tell it to itself as its own nature; the object does this by manifesting itself as many featured Things. The diversity of sensory information belongs to perception, not to immediate reality (...) because it is only perception that inherently carries negation, distinction or multiplicity. (Hegel, 1986, pp. 77-78).

While the object manifests itself as many characteristic things, it will be mediated by perception by being sensed by the subject. In this process, the direct object will be tried to be understood in the dialectical process with the mediation of the subject. However, at this stage, if we examine the cognitive process that the subject carries out quickly, we can conclude that the relationship between the determinations and evaluations of the object and memory is important. "The brain is in relationship with objects and reacts to objects in that relationship. Rather than recording the complete structure of the being, it records the multiple properties of the being" (Damasio, 2012, p.141). At the stage of information transition from object to subject and from subject to object, the subject's perception and meaning-making differences may lead to an attempt to identify with the object itself.

So much so that while consciousness tests itself, we are left only to watch. For consciousness is, on the one hand, the consciousness of the object, and on the other hand the consciousness of itself; for him the consciousness of what is real and the consciousness of the knowledge of truth, since they are both for consciousness, consciousness itself is their comparison; it is for the consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object (...) On the one hand, for consciousness, one thing is 'in itself', but on the other hand, the existence of information, or object, for consciousness is another mode for consciousness. The test is based on this existing distinction. If the two modes are incompatible in this comparison, it seems that consciousness must change its knowledge in order to make it suitable for the object (...) while the information changes, the object becomes another object, because in essence it was a knowledge of the object (Hegel, 2011, p.63 ).

Within the framework of this discourse, the test of consciousness by turning to itself in the stage of perceiving and making sense of the object can not only show that it perceives the object in its own state and sends it to memory, but also that the meaningful and evaluated images of the object in the testing phase can be recorded in memory. "Another striking observation that Hegel made about perception is; that consciousness itself can change reality with the additions and subtractions it makes against the object, and this determination can be the source of subconscious data" (Ölçener, 2016, p.46). The evaluations made by the subject through the sense of the object can take place in the memory instead of being erased and destroyed. According to Aristotle: "Memory is neither perception nor conjecture, but rather a strange modification of one or the other that appears after the passage of time (...) Memory is merely a faculty of indirect thinking, and is actually a faculty of the central power of perception (Aristotle, 2007, 450a-450b, pp. 228-229). Modifications that occur over time can revive unconscious data that is already unconscious.

It can be easily understood that maladaptive psychological elements are subject to repression and therefore are pushed into the unconscious. But on the other hand, this also means that once the suppressed content is noticed, it can become conscious and be kept there (Jung, 2016, p. 158)

Just as in the statement of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961), the suppression of maladaptive psychological elements is that it can rise again to the level of consciousness. The different images that take place during the addition and subtraction movement that the self-self performs in the process of making sense of the object, which do not fully belong to the object, and which are incompatible with it, can also take their place in the subject's memory and reappear to the level of consciousness. Basically:

'Failing to understand the object' We can say that the perceptions obtained through consciousness raise the problem of identity in terms of object and consciousness. However, this failure may appear as the only reflections of perception that constitute the unconscious. The resulting lack of identity with the object can cause the perceiver to produce new truth. This may lead to the establishment of a new truth of the other person or object in the unconscious (Ölçener, 2016: 47).

Accordingly, we can talk about the active structure of the unconscious and the cooperation with the conscious. Jung explains how this active structure combines with consciousness:

In the light of our current experience, we can say that the unconscious process has a compensatory relationship with the conscious mind. I have not used the word "opposite" here, but specifically the word "compensatory", because it is not necessarily possible that the conscious and the unconscious are necessarily opposed to each other, but on the contrary, that they complement each other and form a whole, that is, the self (Jung, 2016, p. 201).

Looking at this determination, it is possible to think that the structuring of the unconscious is not only a structure completely independent of consciousness. This may be an indication that unconscious data is not passive and repressed in what man does, but rather has a say in the cycles of factors and actions. As a matter of fact, the unconscious is not opposed to consciousness, as Jung pointed out, but on the contrary, it forms the self by being complemented by it. According to him, the self is what exists in the world of action for each subject and can be viewed by the others. It would not be out of place to say that the relationship of consciousness with the object and the unconscious data obtained in this way are the only areas in which art can be observed. The concretization of different sensations and meanings of the object can be possible with the art object.

 The consciousness's awareness of the data of the unconscious is like that of the artist and his creative characteristic. Freud said of the Psychoanalysts, "It takes sensitive ears to be able to call out the material pushed back in the unconscious. We cannot say that everyone's ears are equipped with the same degree of sensitivity" (Freud, 1992, p.52). Just as a psychoanalyst can address unconscious data with his sensitive ears, the artist can easily access unconscious data by monitoring his own consciousness and transform it into an object of art. Access to the unconscious data of the artist may be related to the memory recording of the different appearances and perceptions acquired by the subject at the stage of defining the object, in the process of becoming identical with its knowledge. Accordingly, if the different processes of identification and interpretation of objects or entities are noticed by the artist to be remembered later, he can easily use these data by moving them back to consciousness during the creation of the work. When we look closely at this process, we can see that perception needs to be re-examined and its importance.

G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), in his *Monodiology,* makes the following observations about perception:

Your perception must be carefully separated from awareness or consciousness. It was at this point that the Cartesians made a big mistake, ignoring the perceptions that we were not aware of (...) The activity of the inner principle, which ensures the change in perception, that is, the transition from one perception to another, can be called work. Although he does not always have full access to the perception towards which he is directed, he always obtains something from it and reaches new perceptions (Leibniz, 2011, p.17).

The stage of perception before the object is defined and made sense of can be an important source of unconscious data. Stating that it is a mistake to ignore unnoticed perceptions, the thinker stated that the transition from one perception to another is the desire, which is the activity of the internal principle. The fact that the desire does not always reach the perception to which it is directed may be related to memory. The fact that the different perceptions obtained from the entities cannot be remembered exactly, but according to Leibniz, the fact that he always reaches new perceptions by obtaining something from it can also be effective in the artist's process of creating a work. Accordingly, desire and fantasy differ in that they are active and passive, as Jung mentioned:

Active fantasies are the product of intuition, that is, they activate an attitude towards perceiving unconscious contents (...) Active fantasy is one of the highest forms of psychic activity. For here the conscious and unconscious personality of the subject merges into a product by flowing together. Such a fantasy can be the supreme expression of human individuality (Jung, 2016, pp. 24-25).

It may be possible to speak within this framework that active fantasy is the activity of carrying unconscious contents to consciousness. In this case, it can be said that the unconscious data is actually brought into existence by being carried to the consciousness in the work of art through active fantasy. In this way, active fantasy can be considered as a possibility of the unconscious in art. Thinking seems to be one of the most effective activities in transferring unconscious data to the artistic environment.

The work of the senses is to see, the ability to understand is to think. To think is to combine designs in a consciousness (...) The unification of designs in a consciousness is through judgment. Thinking, therefore, is nothing more than making judgments or bringing designs into relation to judgments in general (Kant, 2000, pp. 55-56).

When we consider Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) determination about thinking together with Jung's active act of fantasy, we can say that we make judgments by moving the data we obtain as a result of the different evaluation of objects or existing things during conscious intellectual activity while producing works of art to the now. Accordingly, the agent may have the opportunity to reflect different aspects of the unconscious data of fantasy to the work of art. According to Kant, thinking already accompanies all the designs of the subject, so it may be possible to say that the data of the unconscious have also been thought of before and contain judgment. If we look closely at how these judgments are formed, it  *may be possible to establish in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* that the system of categories that the mind has formed in its determinations about the qualities of the mind and the structure of thinking is also related to the unconscious.

Previously, categories described the qualities of the universe that were only reflected in our minds. These, along with the philosophy of Kant, describe the qualities of our mind so that the universe can enter our mind in any form. For this reason, the truths of the universe can never be reached, and the categories change their character from the structures of the universe to the structures of cognition (...) In Kant's words, "our mind writes nature according to its own laws" (Kant 1783, A 113) (...) Kant (...) For Kant, cognition is a balance between experience and its formal conditions in the mind (Spitzer &Maher, 1998, p.341).

When we re-evaluate the expression that the universe can enter our minds in any way and that our mind prints nature according to its own laws in terms of art objects, we may be able to see how the appearance of what exists is again changed by the mind's own law.

We can see that Nature offers us all the variations that can be in the perception of a particular object, without ever bestowing on us the object itself. The idea of form that we can obtain is only one aspect of the whole, that is, an abstraction that we make by comparing our different visual perceptions, an aspect that we can say is obtained by separating the necessary from the random elements. This idea is not just a single perception, it is a study of a large number of perceptions obtained by adopting a certain point of view (Hildebrand, 2016, p.16).

The abstractions made by the artist as a result of different visual perceptions seem to be an act that constitutes his unconscious data. The qualitative or quantitative intellectual abstractions of the subject from the object can be transformed into judgment by meeting with the intellectual action during the design and formation of the art object. Accordingly, under the categories of our ability to understand, which Kant identified, "1. According to quantity: Unity, Multiplicity, Totality 2. According to quality: Reality, Negation, Limitation 3. According to the relationship: Substance, Cause, Unity 4. According to Modality: Possibility, Existence, Necessity", it can be reconsidered and constructed intellectually. (Kant, 2000, p.54). It may be possible in the object of art to objectify the unconscious data obtained from those who exist through abstraction by rethinking them under categories through active fantasy action.

 From the branches of art, When we evaluate the intellectual activity of the painter and the sculptor, we can consider the differences and similarities of the stages of sense, perception, thought and meaning before the work design process:

The specific mental material of the sculptor consists of kinesthetic thoughts (...) When we consider the activity of the painter, we see that his mental material consists of the visual thoughts he expresses directly on a surface, thus creating a picture in the sense of visual reflection. The painter's problem is expressing the form of an object only through visual impressions on the plane. To do this, he must discover what really awakens this third-dimensional sense. So we see that both the sculptor and the painter are dealing with the correlation that exists between visual impressions and kinesthetic thoughts. While the sculptor shapes something three-dimensional in order to give a flat visual impression, the painter transfers the visual impression of a three-dimensional form onto the plane (Hildebrand, 2016, pp.26-27).

In the art of painting and sculpture, although the perception of space and its transfer to the art object differ, they differ in terms of the perception that these two arts and their objects evoke in their viewers. The objectification of the painting and sculpture artist in the external world can bring about differences of opinion. The transmission of moving or stationary entities in the art of painting, for example, the painter's "the more he emphasizes the volume of space in his painting, the more positive the spatial references in the perception of the painting, the more vivid and convincing the illusion created by the painting will be" (Hildebrand, 2016, p.38). Accordingly, the sense of sight in painting is important for both the artist and the viewer. The three-dimensional image transferred to the plane can be monitored with the help of the eyesight. In the art of sculpture, we are confronted with a similar three-dimensional transfer of those who exist in the external world in motion or motion. Unlike the art of painting, the subject's approach to sculpture with body movement also includes the senses of sight and touch. While we can approach the painting with the eye, we can contact the sculpture bodily with our senses of sight and touch. Again, when we evaluate it within the framework of sense, we can think that unconscious data are used differently on these art objects that differ from each other.

Apart from the fact that our senses provide data for our survival, it is the raw material of the ability to design in the artistic field by combining with the intellectual process and thus we can redesign the world. Subconscious data generated through the senses can be considered as the source of the richness of fantasy in the sense of artistic production. Again, when we consider the unconscious from the framework of Jung and Freud, according to Freud, the unconscious "has taken on two basic aspects. In the first topic, it is the unconscious system that is excluded from consciousness, radically separate from consciousness by repression, and does not come back to consciousness without suffering a distortion that renders it unrecognizable. In the second topic, the unconscious is not a place that stands apart" (Clero, 2011, p. 31). According to this, Jung said, "The actual existence of unconscious content without being involved in consciousness (...) that he freed himself from every possibility related to his ability to know" (Jung, 2016, p.14). Thus, the unconscious, which is not included in the consciousness, differs from the unconscious movement that is activated during the activity of artistic production. Jaques Lacan (1901-1981) said: "With Freud, he recognizes that no spiritual production can escape the unconscious: "The unconscious does not exclude any of our actions outside its sphere." (...) "The unconscious, to tell the truth, is this meaningless part of the subject's relationship that constitutes it [SXI, 326]" (Clero, 2011, pp. 31-32). It seems important here that Lacan states that the unconscious is the part that constitutes the subject. As a matter of fact, according to the thinker, "The unconscious is structured like a language (...) We can only grasp the unconscious through what is poured into articulated words" (Clero, 2011, p.32). When we evaluate the same discourse from the point of view of art, we can observe the unconscious in works of art just as well as in words. On the other hand, the American existentialist psychologist Rollo May (1909-1994) said, "There is no certain unconscious; the unconscious is rather the unconscious dimensions of life (or its sources, its faces). I define the unconscious as the potential forces of action and awareness that the individual cannot or will not realize. These latent forces are the source of what we might call 'free creativity.'" (May, 2012, p.77). May, who thinks that there are hidden powers of creativity in her unconscious data, does not seem wrong in this regard. Many fields that investigate how creativity takes place, both in the field of art and in the technical field, continue to seek answers to this question.

Although we think of the world we live in as the totality of the judgments that subjects have arrived at as a result of their conscious intellectual activities, it seems difficult to say that only the judgments arising from the overlap of consciousness with reality shape life and its components in line with all the above explanations. Accordingly; Although the unconscious seems to be a subjective concept, it can have the power to influence the total. As a matter of fact, if we consider that art objects have been influential in historical processes for centuries and if we can see how the artist's unconscious has been transferred to the object, it may be possible to understand, make sense of and analyze the concept. "We would probably be getting closer to reality by assuming that the conscious and personal soul is based on a broad-based and universal spiritual tendency that is actually unconscious, and that our personal soul is connected to the collective soul, just as the individual is to society" (Jung, 2016, p. 169). Just as "analysis" raises the personal unconscious to consciousness, it informs the subject of what he notices in others, but certainly not in himself. This discovery therefore makes it less individually unique and more collective" (Jung, 2016, p. 171). The conscious re-interpretation of the art object by the artist and his viewer can also reveal the awareness of the importance of unconscious data. Freud  *states the following in the chapter "Michelangelo's Moses" of his work* Art and Literature:

In my view, what affects us so strongly can only be the artist's intention insofar as he manages to express it in his work and make us understand it. I realize that this will not be merely a question of intellectual comprehension; what he aims at evokes in us the same emotional attitude, the same mental regulation as the one that creates in him the impulse to create. But why should not the artist's intention be amenable to being communicated and understood in words, as in other cases of mental life? Perhaps it will never be possible in the case of great works of art without applying a soul analysis. If this is an effective expression of the artist's intentions and emotional activities, the product itself must allow for such analysis. To find the artist's intention, I must first find the meaning and content of what is represented in his work; in other words, I have to be able to interpret it. It is possible, then, that this kind of artwork requires interpretation, and that I may not know why I was so strongly influenced until I completed that interpretation. I dare even hope that after having managed to analyze it in this way, the impact of the work will not undergo any diminution (Freud, 1999, p.240).

The mental life of the artist, the trace of his intention, is based on the analysis of the soul, as Freud pointed out. Only in this way will it be possible to interpret the work of art with a different perspective. The artist's subjectively unconscious data can be transformed into "a collective of all psychic contents that belong not to a single individual, but also to many people, that is, to society, the public, or humanity in general." (Jung, 2016, p. 49). Accordingly, the object of art can become unconsciously possible, and we can evaluate the subject and his attainments and appreciation from this point of view.

##

## **2.1. AESTHETIC THEORIES AND AESTHETIC APPRECIATION**

As we mentioned in the previous section, since aesthetics is a concept related to sensations, it is also closely related to the taste of the subject. All the factors that make up the structure of perception can be effective in the subject's liking. The state of consciousness, the influence of the unconscious, the biological structure, the physical needs constitute the building blocks of the concept we call "liking". As such, rather than being a simple concept, appreciation obliges us to investigate its perceptions and processes. Aesthetic appreciation opens the doors of the subject's world of perception not only in the individual sense, but also in the socio-cultural and socio-psychological sense. The identity of the processes of perception, analysis and judgment with the artist of the art object is also important today in terms of multidisciplinary fields (technology and art, artificial intelligence, the interaction of two different art objects, etc.).

In the history of philosophy, many ideas have emerged in relation to the analysis of aesthetic objects. Movements such as phenomenological, ontological, Marxist aesthetics, informative aesthetics, reception aesthetics, structuralist aesthetics are related to how the subject perceives the aesthetic object. Regarding the phenomenological approach, Dufrenne argues that "aesthetic perception is correlated with the aesthetic object and can be evaluated separately from the aesthetic object, when we examine the aesthetic object, the reflection on these objects clearly shows that the reflection of the subject is for perception. The object itself demands perception (Dufrenne, 1973, p. 16). These statements necessitate phenomenological analysis. As is known, Husserl's expression "let us return to things themselves" and his phenomenological approach have returned us to objects. As Dufrenne has already pointed out, trying to perceive the reflection that the object carries is a way of returning to things themselves. The phenomenological approach seems to be a philosophical intellectual system that needs to be reworked in terms of the problem of perception and appreciation. In  *his Five Lectures on Phenomenology*, Husserl states:

The real immanent is considered beyond doubt because it shows nothing but itself, it does not "mean" anything "outside" itself, and what is meant here is precisely self-given. Other than the self-giving of real immanence, there is not yet a self-giving on the horizon (Husserl, 2003, p. 37).

Obviously, this approach aims to exclude doubt and allows science to be done in this state. In the following sections, the phenomenological approach to our subject will be reconsidered. Ontological approach; The artist is a system of thought that examines the aesthetic existence of an aesthetic object that has come out of his hand together with his participation in the field of being. In Tunalı's words, "apart from this mysterious and unknown activity we call creation, it will deal with the subject's acts, from the object, value and value judgment" (Tunalı, 2012, p. 50). However, before coming to the values and value judgments, this mysterious process, which is called creation in Tunalı's expression, needs to be illuminated both from the point of view of the artist and his object and his viewer. Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) with his work Knowledge in the Light of Ontology examines the debates about the object objects in the field of being, art objects look ontologically different. "Objectified*, objectifiable,* objiciendum, unknown (*transobjektive*), and irrational or *transintelligible* (Hartmann, 2010, p. 10). The objectis made up of the objects around us, and perceiving does not require any special effort to judge "They are the broadest elements of perception. It is what consciousness perceives directly" (Runes, 1942, p. 217). In Tunalı's words, "objektion is a characteristic information phenomenon: Something that exists becomes the object of a subject, and in what exists, no change occurs" (Tunalı, 2012: 53). Another discussion about the object is that which can be objectified. Objectivation is *"the* manifestation of an object as a result of the transformation of sensation and perception, in which the mental process operates" (Runes, 1942, p. 2017). As it is understood from the definition, it is about the creative side of the subject. Ordinary objects in the realm of being are grasped by subjects with certain precision. Objectified objects, on the other hand, require a special effort by the minds that try to perceive them. "What exists is grasped and known by the subject as what it is. The subject, then, does not bring about any change in what exists in this process of knowing, but comprehends it as it is, as it is. In this regard, in the process of objectification, the subject plays a completely passive role. Now, when it comes to objectivity, we see the exact opposite of this situation (Tunalı, 2012: 53).  *The concept of objectivition* needs analysis because it involves the mental and intellectual processes of an artist. This is the process of analyzing the art object. "Every objectivation requires a third being, an entity outside of objectivation. What has been put into matter and put into it must be revealed, saved, revived; it should be grasped by the living spirit again (Tunalı, 2012: 57). Here again, what is important for our subject is how the "thing in matter" of the art object is perceived, understood and analyzed. *The difference between objection*  and *objectivitism is the*  question of how close we can bring the object of a mind to the perception of objects, as opposed to the certainty in the perception of objects.

 In this fundamental problematic framework Apart from phenomenological aesthetics, various responses have been developed in the context of Marxist, informative, structuralist and reception aesthetic approaches. As for Marxist aesthetics and object thought; Since the object is the product of labor, it is a production activity.

While Marx was concentrating on his work Critical of Politic Economy, he asked Charles Dana to write an article for the problem of aesthetics for publication in the New American Encyclopedia, and the encyclopedia offered to devote a page to it. French and German encyclopedists put forward ideas about aesthetics. In the same book (1857-1858), Meyer's Coversation-Lexicon, the article contained details about aesthetics, written by Frederic Thedor Vischers. Many experts argued for the importance of the relationship between natural things and their aesthetic value. It is not the quality of natural things that are mentioned, but there is nothing beautiful in the matter. Marx stated that the beautiful occurs in consciousness, so it may be related to matter. Therefore, 'beautiful' has become the property of humanity, yet it still seems to be the beauty of things in nature. But this does not mean that aesthetics are completely purely subjective. As is known, within the framework of Marx's economic-philosophical point of view, we can see the role of the production relation played in subject-object activity in Schiller's passage noted by Vischer: "When we touch, beautiful is at the same time an object and a subjective situation, the form we judge, as well as vitality, our initial creativity (Lifshitz, 1938, pp. 95-96).

In this way, Marx brings a new perspective to the concept of beauty. The aesthetic object, unlike the natural object, is a product of human activity. Marx's philosophy of economics does not go beyond its limits and considers the aesthetic object to be the subject of consumption, as stated.

As another movement, informative aesthetics has inspired aesthetic ideas  *based on information theory, which is a mathematical probability theory and concept.*

This probability indicates a problem that arises in a 'message transmission' that occurs between individuals or between the individual and the environment. When the transmission of a message is subject to some distortions arising from the transmission, to the influence of foreign elements, a 'probability' problem arises by itself. This is a question of how likely it is that the message will be delivered. What are the chances that a message from A to B will be grasped by B? And how does this probability be measured? (Tunalı, 2012, p. 85).

Information theory should be supported by continuous development and interdisciplinary studies in the field of aesthetics. The fields of psychology, social sciences, mathematics, neuroscience and philosophy can shed light on the subject of subject's perception with their contribution to this theory. "Information aesthetics is a scientific aesthetic, a mathematics, a technological aesthetic" (Tunalı, 2012, pp. 85-86). It is important here that the message reaches the recipient intact. Within the scope of our subject, it is also within the scope of reciprocity that the message of the aesthetic object realized by the aesthetic artist reaches the recipient completely and completely. Information Continuing his aesthetic studies, Max Bense (1910-1990) makes semantics and aesthetic segmentation

In a piece of theater, content, action, and story enter into semantic information, as do grammatical structures and logical determinations. The players' gameplay, the warmth of the sounds, the expression and richness of the color enter the aesthetic information. Although these two pieces of information are materially linked, they are bound by rules that are independent of each other. (See Max Bense Aesthetica) (ect. Tunalı, 2012, p. 87).

This determination also reminds us of the quantitative and qualitative properties of the art object, as we mentioned in the first chapter. As we have mentioned, the grammatical and logical structures made by Bense are measurable and should not be overlooked that they are used in computer systems. When we compare Athanasopoulos' article on Language and time and Bergson's thoughts on time, which we mentioned in the first chapter, we talked about the effect of the quantitative structure of language and time perception. Informative aesthetics, within the scope of our subject, will be considered together with the phenomenological approach and evaluated within the framework of aesthetic appreciation and perception.

Structuralist Aesthetics *(structuralist*) approach is the theory put forward by Czech Professor of Aesthetics Jan Mukorowski (1891-1975). Mukorowski: "The problem of the relationship between standard language and poetic language can be approached from two different points. Poetic theorists point to the following questions: Are there standard rules of poetry? Or how is it suggested that these forms are in poetry?" (Mukorowsky, 2014, p. 41). *It coincides with the ideas of the thinker who uses semiology in his work on art. For him, art is "like language. If it is considered that language is a system of signs, it is understood that art similar to language* will also be a system of signs" (Tunalı, 2012: 99). When we consider the association of language with cognition in this system, the fact that art is like language indirectly draws attention to its cognitive property, but Mukorowsky says, "The object of art is characterized by pointing to something. It states that neither the consciousness of the person who performs the work nor the viewer of the work is considered a substance or a substance" (Mukorowsky, 1978, p. 171). So what does the art object indicate? According to the thinker, "the work of art exists as an aesthetic object; the aesthetic object is the consciousness of society" (Mukorowsky, 1978, p. 171). This determination indicates that there is a collective consciousness on the aesthetic object. When we consider the intersubjective equivalence of concepts and words of language, it is possible to easily understand the thinker's evaluation of the art object. It is stated that the art object should cease to be the state of consciousness of the individual or the recipient and should be understood just like a common language. Again, this theory seems to start from the fact that it points to the collective consciousness and contains a certainty such as language that the aesthetic object actually belongs to a common language.

The *reception* theory examines the reception in art by emphasizing how subjects will be effective in analyzing the object in terms of sense organs and differentiating features. "Receptivitiy is generally known as the function by which it perceives the organs of perception or sense and activates the motor activities of the mind" (Runes, 1942, p. 265). Here, the subject receiving the aesthetic object is sensory and cognitively active. The precision of the sense data raises the questions of how the subjects will be effective in analyzing the object in terms of sense organs and differentiating features in this theory. On the other hand, in the aesthetics of reception, without the aesthetic subject, there is no work The reader is as vital as the writer for the existence of literature." (Eagleton, 2014: 87). It is certain that there is a conceptual relationship between subject and object in reception aesthetics. On the other hand, it is certain that the subject, who plays an active role in the reception process, is effective in the judicial processes of man, which is considered as a whole with its physiological, biological processes leading to the act of comprehension. We can repeat that the subject, who tries to analyze the object of art by the act of comprehension, goes to the subjective perception by subtracting and subtracting from it, as Deleuze mentioned. These approaches and discussions that we have mentioned also put forward ideas about how the communication between the aesthetic object and the subject takes place while trying to determine its essence. Although it is important that the aesthetic object is perceived and analyzed by the subject, the following subject is not only alone with the perception of an aesthetic object that cannot be its subject (artist), but also with the perception and meaning of its subject. Words and concepts refer to common things that are agreed upon in societies. However, an aesthetic art object is more than that because it needs to be understood. "Works of art or parts of works of art can have spiritual characteristics through their point of view" (Carroll, 2016, p. 1499). As such, the perception of an art object is exempt from being a simple object. In terms of the perception and interpretation of the art object, which is the whole of formal, spiritual, qualitative-quantitative elements in Carrol's words, it is necessary to examine the processes of subject-object (indirectly considering the problem of reciprocity between the aesthetic subject and the artist who performs the aesthetic object) in order to answer this question. In particular, within the scope of the phenomenological approach and informative theory we have mentioned, how it occurs between aesthetic subject and aesthetic object, intersubjectivity (artist-aesthetic subject, artist-artist) will be examined separately.

## **2.2 AESTHETIC SUBJECT**

The aesthetic subject is the person who will make judgments on the aesthetic object and judge it by his idea of what it is, and as a result he will perform the act of appreciation. "The aesthetic subject is the person who can take an aesthetic attitude towards the aesthetic object in general and the work of art in particular" (Soykan, 2015: 41). This attitude results in a judgment, of course. However, what we will examine in this title is not the result of the attitude, but the processes of the attitude. As a conscious being, man interacts with the objects around him. During this period of interaction, the brain acquires many perceptions, consciously or unconsciously. However, aesthetic attitude differs from an ordinary attitude. The aesthetic subject means "the entity of consciousness that perceives an aesthetic object, comprehends it and enjoys it aesthetically, and derives aesthetic pleasure from it, 'I'" (Tunalı, 2012, p. 23). The existence of consciousness must be examined before the attitude of the self to the aesthetic object, what its readiness means.

I, "[Alm. *ich*] [Fr. *moi*] *myself*] [lat. *ego*], the word that expresses the separation of the conscious individual from others. 2-It means the bearer of the acts of consciousness." (Akarsu, 1988, p. 31). Consciousness "can be thought of as a state of wakefulness, experience or mind, as well as aspects of self-consciousness such as self-knowledge and self-knowledge" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 193). According to this definition, the self is a being that is directed not only to the aesthetic object but also to itself. This brings with it the understanding of phenomenal consciousness.

The concept of Phenomenal Consciousness refers to subjective experience. To be phenomenal means to be experienced; therefore, being experienced must be included in a subjective psychological reality (...) Phenomenal consciousness, as a whole, includes all our subjective experiences or "feelings" that we have at a given moment. (...) It includes the sensations of light and darkness, sounds and colors, bodily sensations, emotions, desires and desires, inner mental images and inner speech that runs through our minds. Taken together, all this gives us, at least in our normal waking state, a monolithic dynamic-sensory perceptual world in which we find our own self, at the center of which we find our own self connected to our body image (Revonsuo, 2010, pp. 128-129).

The formation of this dynamic perceptual-world is the result of an encounter with qualities. He interpreted this idea as "to be conscious is to have quantities" (Stubenberg, 1998, p. 12). This statement states that the absence of qualities will also destroy the state of being conscious. Revonsuo agrees.

Other aspects of the mind, perhaps even other aspects of consciousness, can be explained by science; but it seems that qualifications do not come to physical explanation. If qualities cannot be explained, phenomenal consciousness cannot be explained. Because phenomenal consciousness is nothing more than the brain mind system in which the qualitatives are placed, or perhaps a comprehensive, organized system of qualitatives. In any case, if there are no qualifications, there is no phenomenal consciousness (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 130).

In this case, the effect of the qualities we mentioned in the first chapter on the consciousness of the subject encountering the aesthetic object through the aesthetic object seems to be necessary for the explanation of phenomenal consciousness. Since the structure of the qualitatives interacts with the subject, the effects of these structures stand before us as another problem that needs to be solved. Revonsuo's judgment that the system of mind can consist of qualitatives is closely related to the subject's readiness vis-à-vis the aesthetic object. The subject's world, which consists of the qualitative and quantitative whole of objects, can change his judgment of the aesthetic object according to his physical and biological differences. In short, we can say that the world of qualitatives is related to experience in the light of this determination. Experiential differences specific to subjects can allow one to comprehend objects and aesthetic objects from a different point of view. The ability of the wannabe to reflect on his own cognition, unlike the normal way of thinking, involves logical dialectical processes. The world full of qualitatives also forms the basis of human knowledge. In this way, the subject engages in logical inference, thinking, art and science activities.

We can say that Descartes made the attempt to experiment by abstracting qualitatives from thought. First of all, the person who tried to reach his self that he had a consciousness (*myself*) had begun the knowledge of his own self, as it is known and often repeated in the thinker's cogito, by doubting everything. Descartes began by purifying quantitatives from Stubenberg's brain with quantitatives, Emperors IV and V. *In meditation, he uses the following expressions:*

These days it has become a habit to take my momentary lapse away from my senses, and I have seen so clearly that we really understand very little about corporeal things [percipo], and more about human moments, and more about God, that I can now turn my thoughts without difficulty away from the things of the imagination to things that are merely intelligible, completely separated from the essence (...) I imagine space clearly in length, breadth, and depth; moreover, I can count many different parts in it, and I can load all kinds of sizes, positions, and local motions into each of these parts, and give each of these movements a certain amount of time. And not only are the things which I have examined in such general terms entirely clear and familiar to me, but as soon as I pay a little attention to them, I see an innumerable multiplicity of particulars, which are clear to their reality and in accordance with my nature, in terms of numbers, facts, motions, and other things of the like, that when I first begin to discover them, it seems to me as if I am not learning anything new, or remembering what I have already known; in other words, it feels like I'm paying attention for the first time to things that I already have in me, but to which I have not yet directed my momentary gaze. (Descartes, 2011, pp. 65-78)

After Descartes reached the core of the thinking I (*myself*), he left behind important clues before he actually came to the conclusion that these two meditations reached.

In the end, we can say that the debate has developed on two main axes. First, by distancing the thinking mind from its (instantaneous) senses, that is, trying to reach a different kind of intellectual structure from the external objects perceived by the senses, this structure that Descartes expresses as the knowledge of God requires a thought system that is far from imagination and not perceptible to the senses. In this respect, the thinker who wants to reach abstract thought seems to have reached the knowledge of abstraction by falsifying and ignoring what exists, that is, abstraction based on what exists. To reach what is immaterial and considered sacred is to strive to reach Plato's world of ideas with a mindset beyond things. Second, Descartes seems to have offered a different perspective on 'experience'. Accordingly; Particulars speak of the clarity of the multiplicity and its conformity to the nature of the subject. What he has examined clearly before and mentally processed with additions and subtractions is that he already knows quantitative properties when he compares them with other appropriate things in nature. It's just that it's the first time he's turned his attention to those things, it's like he's confronted for the first time.

These phrases take us to another dimension of experience. It states that the person who encounters particular objects for the first time forgets the spatial, dynamic, etc. contents he has encountered before and realizes the comprehension by experiencing that object again and again. This information is important in the context of the subject's readiness in the face of the work of art. What kind of experience the subject's experience is can play an important role in his encounter with the art object. In the first article, again, when the subject encounters the work of art, it is the approach towards the art object by falsifying or ignoring the information he receives from his sensations. This approach can be called an attempt to search for the idea of the ontological art object.

From the point of view of the phenomenological approach, the analysis we have done with the theory of Descartes is important in terms of how the subject who returns to the thing comprehends it. As we have stated above, when Husserl's view that the real immanent does not show anything but itself, that it does not "mean" anything "outside" itself, is taken together with Descartes' statement of the openness of the subject in the face of things, when he encounters things, the relation of the openness of things to experience must also be taken into account.

After all these determinations, Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) speaks of possible perception with the statement that "every perception or something that is considered to exist or the essence of something alone takes the object to itself" (Spinoza, 2017, p. 56). Spinoza; "the less the mind perceives more and less it understands; the greater the capacity to create dreams; and the more he understands, the less capacity he has to form dreams", he draws attention to the subject's ability to understand as well as perception. The additions and subtractions made against things are related to how much the subject understands the thing. Apart from the subject's perception of an object of art and the world of experience associated with that object, the problem of understanding is also effective in the subject's analysis of that object. As Descartes has already pointed out, in order to grasp the purely intelligible things that are stripped of the substance by getting rid of the existing objects, Spinoza examines the idea that the object has no counterpart in nature but is the object in our minds:

For example, to create a concept of a sphere, I make up a reason according to my will and say that a semicircle rotates around itself, and that what constitutes the sphere is, in a sense, a rotation. This is undoubtedly the right idea; Although we know that no sphere in nature is formed in this way, this is nevertheless a correct perception and an extremely convenient way of constructing a sphere concept (...) All the error here arises from the affirmation of something else which is not included in our conception of that thing (...) It follows from this that simple thoughts must be true. eg. As in the simple idea of a semicircle, motion, quantity, etc. Whatever is contained in the name of affirmation in simple thoughts is compatible with its concept and does not extend beyond the concept. Therefore, we can form simple ideas without the risk of error (Spinoza, 2017, p. 65).

Spinoza made an examination of how simple thoughts of the subject are formed, and stated that thoughts containing it that do not extend beyond the concept can be produced without the risk of error. The idea that the thought produced under the concept we have considered in favor of Descartes can be accepted as real for the subject if it does not exceed the concept continues in the teaching of Spinoza. In the field of artistic creativity, the mental action, which the thinker calls simple thoughts, is necessary for the subject. Again, the knowledge of this intellectual action by the subject is also important in terms of understanding the object put forward as a result of artistic creativity. However, when this mindset is considered between subjects, it seems risky within the framework of our subject in terms of different perceptions, meanings and judgments. As Spinoza noted, simple thought that does not extend beyond the concept may satisfy the concept, but may not fully satisfy its object.

In the third chapter of his work Ethica*, Spinoza*  examined the mind-body interaction in his examination of the human mind and emotions and stated:

I call the cause the cause, the result of which can be perceived clearly and unambiguously only by itself, a one-to-one cause. I call the cause whose result cannot be understood only by itself a non-one-to-one or partial cause (...) I say that we are active when the exact cause of something happening inside or outside of us is caused by us. I say that if anything that happens outside of us originates from our nature, it can only be understood clearly and unambiguously through our nature (Spinoza, 2014, p. 198).

In the second part, fourteenth premise of the Ethica*, Spinoza* states that "the human mind is capable of perceiving many things; As the body gets closer to influencing external objects in different ways, this ability increases" (Spinoza, 2014, p. 136), and he did not only consider man as a mind, but also drew attention to his integrity with the body. Within the framework of the subject of perception, the contribution of the subject's body to perception other than the mind is clearly revealed by Spinoza. "Because the human body is affected by external objects in many different ways, and it can come to affect external objects in many different ways (...) the human mind has the ability to perceive many things, and as the said possibility of the body increases, the mind's ability to perceive many things increases" (Spinoza, 2014, p. 137). In this case, bodily factors are also included in the subject of perception. The subject in front of an aesthetic object is in front of that object not only with its mental activities but also with its bodily movement. "The human mind perceives both the nature of many objects and its own nature" (Spinoza, 2014, p. 138). With this approach, Spinoza clarifies Descartes' mind-body problem. "His solution is that mind and body are phenomena that completely and mutually imitate each other in different appearances, but arise in parallel from the same essence. He firmly believed that the mind was not the cause of the body, and likewise the body was not the cause of the mind" (Damasio, 2018, p. 214).

 Spinoza states that when man perceives the nature of objects, he interacts with his own nature. This interaction and the emotions it contains will of course become part of the experience. After that, the subject who encounters an object will have an idea about how that object makes him feel while trying to make sense of the object. In this case, the mind is confronted not only with the quantitative and qualitative properties of the object in its encounter with the object, but also with what it reminds and feels about it. So when we return to the third chapter of the Ethica, we find the following statements about emotion:

By emotion, I mean the different states of the body that multiply or decrease the power of influence of the body, that help or hinder this power, as well as ideas about these states (...) Our mind is active in some cases, passive in others; in other words, it is necessarily active as long as it has one-to-one ideas, and necessarily passive as long as it has non-one-to-one ideas (Spinoza, 2014, p. 199).

Spinoza's remark also emphasizes the relevance of the idea to both the object and the subject itself. The fact that the emotions reflected by the objects are one-to-one with the object or not brings with it the concept of doubt about that object. Spinoza*, in his Treatise on the Correction of Comprehension*, states:

In the soul, doubt never arises from what is the object of doubt itself. That is, if there is only one idea in our consciousness, whether that idea is true or false, there will be no doubt or certainty, but instead a kind of consciousness. Because the idea is nothing but a certain consciousness in itself. Doubt stems from another idea; it is an idea that is far from clarity and clarity to the extent that we cannot reach any certainty as to what is doubted. So the idea that leads us to doubt is not clear-cut. If, for example, a person has never been inclined, through experience or otherwise, to reflect on the deception of the senses, he will never doubt that the sun is larger or smaller than it seems. This is the reason why the people living in the provinces are so surprised to hear that the sun is much larger than the earth (Spinoza, 2017, p. 68).

This determination made by Spinoza is important in that it contains the knowledge of how the subject should behave towards objects in order to correct the ability to understand. As a result *of the interaction of the subject in front of the art object with the object, it is important not only to identify the object*, but also to the interaction of the object with its emotions and the subject's judgment on these feelings. In addition to the analytical comprehension of the quantities and qualities of the art object, it is necessary for the correct evaluation of the object to which the artist perceives the emotion embedded in his object. Spinoza pointed out that the definition must be pure, saying, "For a definition to be complete, it must explain the innermost essence of the thing and take care not to substitute any other property of the thing for it." (Spinoza, 2017, pp. 73-74). According to the thinker, ideas must be in harmony with the object. On the other hand, in the last pages of his work, he states that the feelings of objects cannot be understood without a full understanding of the faculty of understanding: "I will not spend time discussing other things such as love, joy, etc. attributed to thought, for they are not relevant to our purpose, nor can they be comprehended without understanding them. For if competence disappears, which it does completely" (Spinoza, 2017, p. 79). With these words, he clearly reveals the relationship of the subject's comprehension of the object with emotions. The comprehension of an art object by the subject will be able to bring out the appropriate emotion that the object reflects. For example, if the subject of the destructiveness of war and the emotion to be conveyed to the audience contains emotions such as sadness and shame, the fact that the subject evaluating the object feels happiness in the face of this painting is a result of the inability to comprehend that object. "False and fanciful ideas have no positive qualities which give rise to their being so called (as we have so shown; they are regarded as such only because of the lack of our knowledge" (Spinoza, 2017, pp. 79-80).

 From Spinoza's idea of emotions to Descartes 'When we go back to "we can also call emotions perceptions", we encounter the expression. (Descartes, 2015, p. 44). *Emotions or Moods* In his work, the thinker explains the formation of emotions from impressions of objects. "after exemplifying how the impressions of objects are combined in the special place in the middle of the brain, he describes how emotions occur in the soul" (Descartes, 2015, p. 51). The object seen will surely cause an emotion. The structure of the shape seen will create a different feeling according to the subject's experience "if this shape is a very strange and eerie shape (...) If it bears a great resemblance to things that have previously harmed the body, it causes the feeling of anxiety to awaken in the soul (Descartes, 2015, pp. 51-52). Man is already a being who has various emotions and can remember them in the absence of a stimulus. Descartes deals with six basic emotions; He thinks that Wonder, Love, Hate, Desire, Joy and Sorrow are the other emotions derived from these main emotions.

The feeling of amazement does not cause a bodily change:

This is because when we marvel, we have no good or bad judgment about the joy in question, but only the knowledge of the object that is the subject of our astonishment. Therefore, astonishment has nothing to do with the heart or blood, which is the source of health of our body, but only with the brain, where the sense organs that help us to learn about it are located (Descartes, 2015, pp. 79-80).

Regarding the feeling of amazement from these phrases, according to Descartes, it can be said that we are simply dealing with a subject who tries to make sense of the knowledge of the object. The feeling of Love and Hate are emotions that can cause movement in the body as well as from objects. "Love is a spiritual excitement; it arises from the movements of the particles that allow the soul to voluntarily participate in what it sees. Hatred is also an excitement born of grains and causes the soul to get rid of things that seem harmful to it (Descartes, 2015, pp. 85-86). These two motions are, of course, different from each other, causing the perceived object in question to be attracted or pushed to it by the subject. This emotion, which causes bodily movement, recommends having an idea in the perception of the object. However, the motion produced by emotion can also prevent the full meaning of the object, as Spinoza pointed out.

Emotion caused by desire: Descartes describes the motion that this type of emotion will create in the body as turmoil rather than movement. "Through this turmoil, the soul begins to want what it sees fit for it in the future" (Descartes, 2015, p. 82). Desire seems to be different to the subject than to other emotions. The subject can carry the potential to objectify the object for itself through desire.

According to him, the feeling of joy is "a sweet excitement of the soul and comes from having a goodness that is shown by the particles in the brain as the soul itself" (Descartes, 2015, p. 96). In his explanation of joy, Descartes draws particular attention to the fact that the soul is as if it were his own. In the classification of these emotions, it is also important in terms of the dynamic difference of the body.

He defines the feeling of grief as "arising from the discomfort of the soul from an evil it encounters, or from a defect presented to it by the particles in the brain as its own" (Descartes, 2015, p. 97). Here, the thinker presents the dual structure of the feeling of grief by talking about a stimulus or an illusion that the mind presents as if it were his own.

 Descartes'In *Emotions and Moods* Thedefinition of emotions, and in particular his analysis of what he called the particles in the brain and their relationship to the body, provided the key to the structure of emotion long before today's neuroscience studies. Antonio Damasio, who continues interdisciplinary work in the field of philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, *Self Comes to Mind* In his work, emotions (*emotions*) and feelings (*feeling*) distinguishes:

Emotions are a large-scale autonomous program compatible with evolutionary behavior. These actions include precise ideas and modes of perception by the cognitive program. But the world of emotions is more than what our body carries and expresses, what our facial expression depicts, and the changes in our bodily posture, in our internal organs. Feeling emotions, on the other hand, depicts us by conveying to us the perception of what changes are taking place in our body and mind when we feel emotions (...)

How are emotions triggered? Quite simply, it is the image of an object, or an event that has happened now, or an event that has happened in the past, remembered in the present time (...) If what is 'alive' is reconstructed in memory or is the product of someone's imagination, these images start the chain of events. These signals stimulate many areas in the brain and start the process. Some of these regions contain language, some suppress movement, others suppress reasoning. The activities of these regions produce a variety of results: how you classify the object, to draw conclusions about the object by association faster than other similar objects; The most important thing is that the signals that precisely represent the object initiate the specific emotion chain in the brain region (Damasio, 2010, p. 116-119).

It is important that the correlation of the body and emotions, from Descartes to Damasio, is explained and correctly described by the subject. Objects, objects of art, convey their knowledge to the subject. In particular, art objects can convey the emotional state of the artist and the emotion he attaches to the object as information. The subject, who is present in the face of the aesthetic object, is not only confronted simply with the quantitative and qualitative properties of that object, but also with the knowledge of the emotion. The subject, who is present in front of the art object, is not completely neutral to the object because it is a being of feeling, but  *it is also the carrier of self-directed feelings* that will soon enter into emotion-information exchange with it.

To revisit the subject of emotion in the following chapters, let us return to the theories of what the subject's perception of the aesthetic object might be. In the history of philosophy, many philosophers have carried out in-depth studies of perception. Perception psychologists have also developed two known theories of perception. Structural perception and direct perception: "constructive perception (...) He argues that people "structure" perceptions by actively selecting stimuli and combining sensations with memory. The other theory is the theory of direct perception. Accordingly, perception consists of the direct information we obtain from our environment" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 125).

As can be understood from the definitions, structural perception is that the mind chooses its object and initiates the path to the judicial process with the cooperation of memory. In the light of this theory, Descartes and Spinoza's contemporary Leibniz's Monodology gives us clues about structural perception.

Memory bestows upon souls a kind of sorting ability; This faculty imitates the mind, but it must be separated from it. As a matter of fact, as it has been observed, when animals perceive something striking, if they have a similar perception before, they hope for something that is combined with their previous perceptions thanks to the representations in their memories and experience similar emotions to those they have experienced before. For example, the dog shown the stick moans and runs away remembering the pain of the stick (Leibniz, 2011: 25).

The structure of the memory of the event or object brings its judgment about it. It can be a remembrance of a shape, or it can be a feeling, as Damasio puts it. Thus, an object can be structured both about what the thing is and about its feeling. "Structural perception theory is based on both the sensations we receive during perception and the idea that we generate and test hypotheses about perceptions based on previous information. Thus, perception is a result of the interaction of our sensory system with our experience of the world" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 125). Again, when we return to Leibniz's views on the structural theory of perception, we see that the soul is a perceptive subject.

Emotion/feeling [sentiment] is the midpoint between simple perception and consciousness, which is called awareness. Emotion consists of perception, which is accompanied by an echo of memory, that is, a perception that remains in the soul for a long time. Memory imitates the mind, for it allows us to anticipate and act appropriately; but not with the same certainty as the intellect. Memory, by its intrinsic nature, is radically different from reason because it is based on impressions left by a single fact. However, reason is based on the knowledge of causes (Akt, Boutroux, 2017, p. 75).

Leibniz pointed out another important concept in his statements that we identify with the structural perception above. This concept is intuition. Based on the statements of the thinker, it is possible to say that he again relates the concept of intuition to memory, When we examine the structuralist theory, we see that the act of intuition is not within the definition. But if intuition is a function of memory, we can examine its connection to recall and experience by opening a parenthesis again.

 Although intuition is an epistemological problem, it has been interpreted by thinkers with various ideas. The subject, who encounters an aesthetic object, is able to cognitively process the data of his intuition while describing it. For example, the aesthetic subject will begin to intuit a picture of an oil painting with a sunset view, both formally and contextually. He will judge in what mood his artist made this work, the period in which he lived, etc. "Intuition refers to the mind's object, or the subject itself, immediately and without reasoning is a direct comprehension" (Runes, 1942, p. 149). We are talking about a direct unmediated conception here. Intuitionism is "the teaching that suggests that intuition provides us with absolute knowledge or reality" (Timucin, 2004, p. 433). According to this idea, the non-experimental result can be reached with reason. As such, intuition, which appears to be a mysterious teaching, is like a faculty that performs the act of comprehension at a glance, free from empirical and inferential processes. So, can we consider intuition in the category of reasoning? Can we know the ground of what is intuited to be upstream with what is actually itself? "Knowing how the brain works when reasoning and thinking raises serious questions about how today's psychology is addressing these old problems of philosophy" (Solso &; K. MacLin &; O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 525).

When we consider that Leibniz, as a perceptive subject, has elements such as remembering and experience, we see that he establishes the path to the knowledge of truth with the principles of reasoning. In his Monodiology of Reasoning, Leibniz states:

Our reasoning is based on two main principles. The first of these is the principle of contradiction, by which we conclude that what contains contradiction is false, and that the opposite or contradiction of falsehood is true. The second is the principle of sufficient ground: Accordingly, we think that we cannot judge the truth or existence of any fact, the truth of any statement, if there is not enough ground for it to be so, and not otherwise. However, most of the time this ground is not within our knowledge. Likewise, there are two kinds of truth: rational truths and factual truths. Rational truths are necessary and their opposites impossible; factual truths are probable, and their opposites are possible. If a truth is necessary, we can reach its ground through analysis; that is, we can break it down into simpler ideas and simpler truths, and finally we can reach the first truths. Therefore, there must be sufficient ground in the set of probable and factual truths, that is, in the set of things spread throughout the realm of creation. In this sequence, the analysis of specific causes can reach an unlimited detail because of the enormous variety of things in nature and the infinite divisibility of objects. There is an infinity of movements and shapes in the past and in the past, which are included in the proper cause of my writing now; in the same way there is an eternity of small tendencies and tendencies in my soul that are involved in the ultimate cause, past and passing (Leibniz, 2011, pp. 29-31).

The fact that factual truths have opposites is important in terms of their relation to decisions in the context of intuition. In our daily lives, most of our decisions are based on probability, and these choices seem to be linked to intuition. For example, believing that you can solve a difficult math problem, knowing who the killer is by intuiting when a detective film is still in its first scenes, or intuiting a person's life by looking at their appearance. Researchers have conducted experiments to explain errors in the use of such information. One of these is the "*avaliability hypothesis*". "In one study, Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein (1977) asked people to estimate the relative probability of 41 causes of death. Participants were given two causes of death and asked to decide which one was more likely to cause death. Seriously mistaken choices were the more commonly heard causes of death" Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 527-528). According to the results of this experiment, experience and memory are part of mental processing in the case of probability. When asked about a person, I sense that a sentence that begins with is a set of "probable or factual truths," in Leibniz's words.

 Another thinker who has extensive work on the theory of knowledge, especially in the field of aesthetics, is Benedetto Croce (1866 - 1952). Croce deals with the theoretical and practical aspect of the soul. Theoretically, the soul is an activity of knowing, while in practice it is related to wanting. It is specifically the theoretical spirit that we will consider here. "By the theoretical, form of the spirit, man comprehends things, by the practical form of the spirit he modifies them; he approaches the universe with someone; it creates the universe with the other." These two main spiritual activities are also divided into some sub-steps within themselves. So much so; theoretical activity, the activity of knowing, on the one hand an intuition (*intuition*), know, expression (*Expression*) indicates, on the other hand, also mental; shows conceptual knowing (Tunalı, 2018, p. 26). How does the theoretical form of spirit relate to its comprehension of objects and intuition?

As for intuition knowledge, it is knowledge based directly on intuition, and is an autonomous knowledge that is completely independent of conceptual knowledge. "In everyday life, the knowledge of intuition is constantly relied upon. It is said that definitions of certain truths cannot be given, that these truths cannot be proved by means of facts, and that they must be grasped by intuition. (...) No concept is possible without intuition." While intuition knowledge is independent and autonomous from conceptual knowledge, conceptual knowledge is based on intuition knowledge. 'Generally, water conceptual knowledge cannot occur without this water intuition knowledge (info transfer, Tunalı, 2018, pp. 27-28).

It is possible, then, to speak of the experiential correlation of the relation of intuitive knowledge to concept. Apart from the fact that the subject has in his memory the experience and its consequences—if he has not seen any water, as in the example given—he will not be able to assert an intuitive way of knowing about the concept. However, it will also be able to communicate intuitively with another object whose concept is not this (e.g. water) but which is the same appearance. Croce similarly states that perception is combined with intuition through experience:

Perception is, of course, intuition; the perceptions of the room in which I write, of the ink juggler, of the paper in front of me and the pen in which I write, of the objects which I touch with my hand and which I use as the tools of my person who writes and exists for this; all these are intuitions (...) If an image of another self crosses my mind, as if I were writing in another room, in another city, with another pen, on another piece of paper, and with another ink juggler, that is just as much an intuition. The separation between reality and non-reality is completely alien to the essential essence of intuition, which is secondary. If a state is accepted in which a person with a spiritual being has an intuition for the first time in his life, then it seems that this person can only know the reality that actually exists through intuition, and therefore only has intuition about reality. However, since the consciousness of reality is based on the separation between real and irreal designs, and since such a separation does not exist at first glance, these intuitions are neither intuitions about real nor intuitions about irreal, they are not perceptions but purely intuitions (info transfer Tunalı, 2018, p. 29).

Croce brought a new look to the field of aesthetics with the concept of intuition, examining it as a part of human cognitive characteristics in the full sense of the word. "In intuition, we, as an empirical being, do not put ourselves in front of external reality, but rather we unconditionally objectify our impressions, no matter what kind they may be" (info transfer, Tunalı, 2018, p. 31). The objectification of impressions is an expression, which is realized not only through language but also through objects of art. "As it is understood from this, in intuition, the spirit gives form to impressions, sensations, and feelings, thereby freeing them from matter, from inertia. Spirit, in this sense, is a being and principle of forming" (Akt. Tunalı, 2018, p. 31). In this case, with the explanation that cognitive processing, which is described as spirit in intuition, gives form to sensations and emotions, we cannot consider the memory-experience feature we mentioned above separately from this process. The complex structure of the brain is exempt from a single element by its backward-forward orientation on both speed and, as we explained in the first chapter, memory during inferential processes. Indeed, Croce does not distinguish between everyday intuition and art intuition.

Likewise, there is no science of small intuitions next to a great science of intuition, there is no science of everyday intuition next to a science of artistic intuition; on the contrary, there is only one and only aesthetic, the science of intuition or expressive knowledge, of which aesthetics and the phenomenon of art consist of itself. This aesthetic is similar to logic, which deals with the emergence of the simplest and most mundane concepts, as well as the constructions of the most complex scientific and philosophical systems, since both are of one and the same essence (Act. Tunalı, 2018, p. 34).

Croce examined aesthetics in a manner befitting the doctrine of sensory science, emphasizing the unity of everyday intuition and artistic intuition, pointing out its importance to cognition. Now, in the light of these data, it is clear that we will not evaluate the 'intuition' activity of the subject who will evaluate an aesthetic object outside of his meanings and inferences. However, it is possible to say that intuition, the subject's first encounter with the aesthetic object, the interaction with his memory in his description of that object. It is a process in which the closest probabilities and predictions in terms of both the external appearance of the object and the meaning are carried out by the brain. In this case, the thought that a person can jump off a high wall and nothing will happen to him, which we can  *call intuition*. It is about experiencing similar activities and transactions in the past, even if it is not one-on-one. When we reconsider the definition of structural perception theory, including our explanations of intuition, we can see the importance of the subject's mental posture and processes before structuring the object in front of him in structuring that object. Again, the Direct Perception we are talking about about the subject's readiness is the subject of experience in the sense that the object directly shows itself.

The richness of the optical field is the same as the richness of the world (...) it is emphasized that the stimulus contains enough information for a correct perception and that internal representations are not necessary for perception. During perception, the perceiver does very little work, because the world presents so much information, leaving little work left to form perception and draw conclusions. Perception is formed by the correct acquisition of information in the environment (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 125).

In direct theory of perception, things already offer their richness to the subject. James Gibson (1966, 1979) gives an auditory example:

When you listen to a piece on the piano from the G key and listen to the same piece from the C key, you probably notice that the second one you listen to is similar to the first. If there is enough time between interpretations, you can decide that they are the same. Even when the notes in one piece are different from the notes in the other piece, the relationship between them is fixed or unchanging. Similar invariants can be seen in visual perception (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 127).

When we consider the theory of direct perception from a philosophical point of view, it is possible to trace its indirect, if not direct, relation to the phenomenological approach, so that it is possible to rethink the relationship between both approaches (structural and direct).

 Husserl worked on how to reach objective knowledge by the phenomenological method. His goal is "how the objective validity of knowledge can be grasped from its basic principles" (Husserl, 2017, p. 14). In this state, the fact that the object reveals itself to us in its ordinary richness is the first condition for our ability to perceive it. "Everything that I will speak of in a meaningful way is probably necessary for me. What I can connect with through the processes of consciousness in perceiving, sensing, desiring, loving, believing, must have been given to me in some form" (Husserl, 2017, p. 14). Thus, the correct the theory of perception states, what is perceived should not exclude consciousness in the sense that it is in fact what consciousness is directed towards. "In order for consciousness to be the consciousness of something, it must first be conscious of its power to make the "thing" in question visually visible. The orientation of consciousness to an object is not a static relationship with the thing" (Husserl, 2017, p. 15). What direct perception theory ignores is that it states that consciousness acts as if it were a static relationship with the thing. As a matter of fact, in the case of music, it is possible to say that this relationship is only related to instant perception. That is, there is a significant tonal difference between the chords C (do major) and G (left major). The notes starting from the Do natural note, which everyone knows, and extending to Si, progress by becoming high-pitched. When we transpose a track that we are listening to from the left key to the Do key (when we give up the notes by three and a half voices), although we perceptually hear it as if it were the same notes, they are not the same. The tones of the notes have changed qualitatively and quantitatively (sound interval frequencies). We see, then, that this example of direct theory of perception is momentary delusion in the subject. The statement "If there is enough time between the interpretations, you can decide that they are the same" supports this idea. The theory of direct perception seems to be the first step of the phenomenological approach. "The real immanent is distinguished from the immanent in the sense of spontaneous giving which establishes itself in the obvious. The real immanent is not yet on the horizon of self-givenness other than that which it shows nothing but itself, that it does not "mean" anything "outside" itself, and that what is meant here is precisely self-given" (Husserl, 2017, p. 3). In this case, there is no problem with the thing opening itself as it is, and the error is the subject's share. As for the margin of error of direct encounter with objects, Husserl says that the ideographical abstraction still helps us. "He gives us clear generalities, kinds of things (...) We are looking for clarity that sees the essence of knowledge. Knowledge belongs to the realm of cogitationes, that is, we cannot elevate the general objects of knowledge to the consciousness of generality by sight so that a doctrine of what is related to knowledge is possible (Husserl, 2017, p. 6). In the third step of phenomenology, the levels of openness of phenomena are examined. Husserl explains how direct vision and its concept are: "At the lowest level of gaze, that is, in the naïve gaze, openness appears first as a lonely sight, as an unincorporated view of the soul, as an example in itself, always one and the same" (Husserl, 2017, p. 9). If we recall the example of direct perception theory transposing from the note Left (G) to the note Do (C), it is possible to catch the idea of why it is perceived the same in Husserl's words. Perceiving two things as essentially different but seemingly the same has been referred to as a "lower outlook." "Vision only sees things, things are simply there and in the true open vision in consciousness, and vision sees only what is in consciousness. [Sight] is the direct grasp or reception or pointing out of what is so there and what is there" (Husserl, 2017, p. 9). Although all these steps constitute the first step of the self-presentation and perception, they should not remain only at the level of the lower gaze.

 When we think of the theory of direct perception together with intuition, the fact that the object opens itself to us as it is and that the subject can perceive it as it is is appropriate in the axis of the idea that Croce also defines it with the experience-concept relationship. However, the fact that the same piece of music, played in two different tones, is different in essence, but still sounds the same according to the direct theory of perception, is the contingent consequence of the subject of intuition. The readiness of the aesthetic subject against the aesthetic object and its relationship with the object is a very dynamic structure. As we mentioned in the evaluation of an aesthetic object, many factors must be considered together with the cognitive processes of the subject. Of course, each subject has to Physiological characteristics and the world of experience differ from each other. In this case, we can think of direct perception theory as the first step of subjects' perception of an aesthetic object, and structural perception theory, which includes components such as emotion-experience, object-experience, including intuitive properties, as the second step. In direct connection with the theory of perception, we examine the issue of the readiness of the aesthetic object, the effect of the properties of the object on the readiness of the subject, and finally the dialectical process between them. Aesthetic appreciation will also help us to examine the problem of reciprocity.

## **2.3 AESTHETIC OBJECT**

The aesthetic object that the aesthetic subject is confronted with is there to be defined in the field of being, again by a mind, independent of all minds. We can say that the aesthetic object has the physical properties of an ordinary object, but since it comes out of the hands of an artist, it contains its subject. As such, it is possible to call it a "living object". The classical aesthetic tradition examined the aesthetic object with an objectivist and subjectivist attitude, and then the modern tradition went from the combination of these two approaches to the evaluation of the aesthetic object. "What really interests us here is the question of what the work of art is, although it is related to the attitude of the aesthetic subject, it requires that the work be considered on its own" (Soykan, 2015, p. 39). The aesthetic object differs from each other, as we have already mentioned in relation to its existential properties. As an object; Objectified quality and quantitative designs such as sound, sculpture, painting, poetry and dance will finally meet with a perception. However, perception may not always be able to make an up-fitting judgment with its object about the certainty of what the object is. In this case, it would be incomplete to examine the aesthetic object without evaluating it together with a perception. Accordingly, we can use a method similar to Descartes' method of doubt for our perceptions. When the subject opposite the aesthetic object first separates his perception of the relationship with the object from it by the method of doubt, he can examine the object independently of judgments. First of all, what the subject encounters is a matter: "matter is the space it occupies in space, its volume, its motion, its mobility, its stasis, its durability, its impenetrability, its repulsiveness, or a combination thereof (...) Elements other than the mind are also the cause of subjective experience (Runes, 1942, p. 191).

The fact that the matter has motion can create a change in perception with the area it occupies and the displacement feature. Aristotle, who examined the subject of matter with his metaphysical work, states the following:

It is evident that matter itself is a substance; for within the changes that go from one opposite to another, there is something that is the basis (subject) of these changes. Displacements, for example, are what happens here now, what will happen elsewhere later; Quantitative changes are also what are now of such magnitude, but which will be greater or smaller; qualitative changes are also what is now healthy, what will later become sick; and finally, in the same way of fundamental changes, what is now in becoming, what will later be in extinction, what is now a subject determined by form, then a Subject determined by privation. And the change in substance includes other changes. In contrast, material change is not included in other changes (neither one nor two of them). For he who has only the matter of displacement does not necessarily have the substance of his being and disappearance (Aristotle, 2017, pp. 414- 415).

Aristotle examined the concept of matter without leaving any room for doubt in perception and realized the meta-physical view with the idea of "the object that is subject and matter". (Aristotle, 2017, p. 415). The fact that art objects differ from each other is also related to their substances. For example, the quality of sound is different from the quality of sculpture. As can be understood from the definition, an object is one that occupies space in space with space and is related to time. The aesthetic object that exists with its burden of quantity and quality is the one that is about to be perceived.

 Henri Bergson *Matter and Memory* In his work, he examined the relationship of subject to matter. "Since matter is something that time gives rise to, if space is life, matter exists in space. That is why it is only intelligence that dominates matter. Because matter remains as it is, or because it changes under the influence of an external force, intelligence designs these changes as the displacements of unchanging parts" (Bergson, 2013, pp. 52-53). The existence of matter in space is an expression of its necessity. "Where the necessity of matter relaxes, consciousness settles" (Bergson, 2013, p. 53). Accordingly, we can say that the mind is free with its transformative activity on matter. "The expansion of consciousness means, in a sense, the expansion of life, and the reason for this expansion is that consciousness works with time and uses time at its disposal (Bergson, 2013, p. 53). The concepts of matter, consciousness, and time may also differ in terms of the readiness of aesthetic objects vis-à-vis the subject in relation to their mode of being. In this regard, it seems appropriate to consider the arts separately.

*Music Availability:* The fact that matter and energy form the basis of objects and are opposed to the subject as phenomena has led to the question of what kind of matter or what is physically them. In particular, music and the kind of object that constitutes it are important in terms of perceiving it. Sound appears to differ (from the point of view of physics) in terms of mobility from other objects. "Physics is a postulate-based enterprise. What this means is that things make sense of the assumptions of the foundations as postulates. Or it is for us to correctly understand and (assume) what is (given), to create a model and understand how the world works" (Rogers, 2012, p. 9). First of all, it is necessary to investigate the physical properties of the music we listen to, to consider it in a philosophical integrity in order to comprehend it. The conclusion to be reached in the understanding of physics and music; "1- Music, as a physical phenomenon, can be understood under the principle of physics, and 2- Understanding and evaluating how music works behind the principles of physics leads to a richer understanding of it" (Rogers, 2012, p. 11). Pythagoras, who made use of the mathematical formula of physics, was a philosopher who established the interest in physical objects and numbers and carried it to his philosophy, especially this interest of music to philosophical thought. Pythagoras discovered the sound scheme and found the tuning. "But the problem was where to divide the tones on the musical instrument. How would it be possible to "create" musical intervals? The solution, of course, was to structure the power of the finite numbers in it (...) by a strange coincidence the phenomenon took place on a broken wire. The first wire was almost in league with the first. Then two, three, and four strings adapted, and a small fraction of the vibration of the string produced a high tone, and this was called the harmonic tone series" (Guthire, 1988, p. 37). Pythagoras created the tuning system using the harmony of the sounds on the instrument and found the mathematical expression of physical structure. "With his research into musical harmony, Pythagoras also turned the direction of his philosophical investigation away from the traditional materialist cosmology's understanding of form (Guthire, 1988: 43). This invention can be likened to the transformation of matter into form. Sound ceases to be what resonates in the vast void and is now transformed into a harmonic structure by mathematical formulas.

 When we look closely at the ontological structure of sound, we encounter its dimensional properties. "All physical quantities have 'dimensions.' At its simplest, "length", "mass" and "time" (...) When solving dimensions, it is important to treat them only as algebraic variables" (Rogers, 2012, p. 18). If we use this information on the variation of the quantities of notes, we can say, "For example, if there is a sound wave, t1 moves from one position to another in time, starting from position x1 and reaching position x2" (Rogers, 2012, p. 18). This shows the movement of the sound wave. Where the subject has no perception of time also shows that this property of sound and time exists without perception. This finding, which is suitable for the physical object of sound, also reveals its difference in terms of its readiness as an object. In particular, the cooperation of the object with time makes the functioning of its perception evident. If the beginning or subsequent notes of the melody encounter a subject in a period of time, the subject encounters the quantitative characteristics of the melody such as tonal structure, beat over time, loudness, etc. from any time of the melody, and then encounters the structure that the harmonic structure is trying to convey to the listener. In this case, let us explain the encounter of music with an ear and consciousness within the framework of Husser's phenomenology.

 Husserl is based on the relationship of sound physics to time, which he exemplified in his lecture on phenomenology, with which Husserl aims to distinguish between what is visible (Erscheinung) and that which is visible (Erscheinendes). "The sound goes on for a bit; we have the clearly given unity of sound and its duration with its present and past tense phases" (Husserl, 2017, p. 8). The aspect of the melody that is possessed at first sight has not yet been mentally reflected, and mentally we have the image of the melody as whole at the same time. On the other hand, when we are in reflection, the phenomenon of sound lasting for a certain period of time, which is itself a temporal phenomenon, carries its present phase and its past phases to itself. In any phase of this phenomenon considered, not only objectively there is no present of sound itself, but also the present of sound (*tonjetz*) in a sound duration (*tondauer*) is just a point (Husserl, 2017, pp. 8-9).

Husserl distinguished between appearance and what appears, stating that the object is not actually part of appearance, "that is, the past phases of sound that are going on are now still objective; but they are not included in real terms in the present phase of appearance" (Husserl, 2017, p. 9). When a musical object is present before the subject, we can say that the note perceived by the subject in any piece of time is incomplete, since it does not contain the next ones. When the piece of music appears in appearance, it is not whole vis-à-vis the subject, since it does not complete all of its time. A piece of music that completes its time can only manifest itself as a whole and is not perceived by the subject when its time ends.

*Readiness of Sculpture:* The sculptural art object, in which the sense of sight and touch is active, is of course different from the sound object in terms of readiness and perception. The form given by the subject through the substance conducive to the sculptural structure ontologically has the potential to take its place in the world of beings over time, as long as it is not subject to destruction and destruction, unlike the sound object, for a long time. The sculpture has a three-dimensional characteristic. "In terms of perception, there is no distinction between painting and sculpture. Whether objects are two-dimensional or three-dimensional, we always see them in two dimensions" sculpture and painting are as two-dimensional as sight, but perception differs from each other. (Soykan, 2015, p. 264). Because a feature of the sculpture is that "the dimension of time and movement also participates (...) it is a work that can turn the space itself into a sculpture" (Huntürk, 2015: 17). Knowing the difference in vision and perception between painting and sculpture is also important for the artist to know the effect of his work and to give shape to it. While the perception of painting does not encourage our body to move, the perception of sculpture encourages our body to move to see other dimensions of the sculpture because it is three-dimensional. For example, we don't wonder what's behind a picture we see on a book, but we wonder what's behind a three-dimensional sculpture. According to cognitive psychology theory, "pattern recognition, whether a two-dimensional black-and-white form or a complex, three-dimensional form, is always represented in the retina as two-dimensional. From these two-dimensional representations in the retina, higher-level perception, including the three-dimensional illusion, becomes possible" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 129). However, there is another important note to this theory: "Since the image falling on the retina is formed at a certain time, some are considered to be another dimension" (Solso &; K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 129). Since the images falling on the retina are again dependent on the time and moment factor, the visual data can again be scattered without depending on the process of meaning-making. At this point, Hume's principles of connection or association are: "Similarity, Intimacy, and Causality (...) they are the only bonds that bind our thoughts together and give rise to the chain of regular speech or mutual speech, which is more or less seen in the whole human race" (Hume, 2010, p. 405). Thus, the subject can complete the interpretation of seeing by intellectually providing the correlation of these principles between the images and the moments. As a matter of fact, visual pattern recognition models support Hume's theory. For example:

Gestalt theory: (...) the parts of the form infer their meaning from their membership in the whole. Bottom-Up and Top-Down processing: (initiated by bottom-up; alternatively recognition of the whole (top-down) allows recognition of parts (...) Pattern Matching: Pattern recognition occurs when a pairing is made between the sensory stimulus and the internal mental form corresponding to the stimulus. (...) Feature analysis: Pattern recognition occurs after incoming stimuli have been analyzed according to their simple characteristics (...) Prototype Theory: Pattern recognition occurs when a pairing is made between an idealized or abstracted mental pattern and a perceived pattern. Pattern detection: Pattern perception is reviewed from a variety of theoretical angles (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 128-129).

As can be understood from the definitions, the physical activity of seeing, the mental processing of the image also seems to improve the field of two-dimensional vision. The subject's ability to see painting and sculpture in two dimensions is only possible thanks to his perception of the distinction between these visions and the relationships he will establish between mental processes. The perception dominated by the three-dimensional illusion depends on the distinction between the sights. The sculptor should know that his three-dimensional work directs the viewer's body. The sculpture may have the power to direct the subject's body. It allows the subject to move around, move or touch around the sculpture. Aristotle states the following in his Metaphysical work on 'Change and Motion':

In every movement, there is the close mover, there is the thing that moves, and there is also what happens in the movement itself, that is, time. Finally, there is a point of departure and a destination. But forms, affections, and the place to which moving things turn are stationary: (...) it is not temperature that is motion, but warming (Aristotle, 2017, p. 523).

Years later, Bergson would put motion at the center of the subject. "The representation of matter is a measurement of the possible movements we can make on bodies" (Bergson, 2002, p. 38). Aristotle and Bergson revealed how the thing moves the body. The sculptor can know from the effect that his object is stationary but will also provide movement in the subjects. To put it in a new way, the art of sculpture is not static. On the contrary, it has the power to move its environment by providing movement and motion.

 StatueAlthough the readiness of the subject in time and space is deficient in terms of vision when first encountering the subject, this deficiency can be easily compensated for by movement. Unlike music, the sculpture is always ready again with its static structure. The expression 'to be ready again' is the possibility that it can be perceived and interpreted again with the movement of the subject.

*Readiness of Painting:* Painting as an object of art is in front of its viewer as a completed whole. The artist has reflected the form and content he has uploaded to the work as much as he wants to convey it to the buyer. While a piece of music needs time to be completed, the picture is there in its entirety in the time frame. When the painting meets the aesthetic subject, the evaluation of the aesthetic subject will be completed at the time. Turning to Bergson again, time is a concrete reality, an existential state, experienced through a constant flow of consciousness and moods" (Bergson, 2013, p. 74). When we talk about the aesthetic subject as the process of evaluation, it is when it proceeds with the flow of thought. As we mentioned earlier, Bergson evaluated the internal and external phenomena about time internally and spatially. In this context, while painting is subject to the time of outer space, its readiness vis-à-vis the subject seems to be subordinate to the internal space time of the subject. In this case, it can be said that the painting completed by the artist is completed again by a subject. Another thinker, Merleau Ponty, again makes an important observation about temporality. "Time assumes the sight of time (...) future time cannot be prepared somewhere behind the observer, but premeditates itself in front of him, like a storm on the horizon" (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 551). Similar to Bergson's view, Merlau Ponty stated that time arises from the subject's relation to things. The conclusion reached is that consciousness establishes time. The completed object of art, then, subject to space, will be subject to time again and again when presented to different subjects. We can say that the picture is ready, first with its forms and then as content. The eye will primarily perceive the form.:

If you look at a particular feature in a pattern for a relatively long time, it assumes that we are acquiring more information than if you were looking at it haphazardly. Yarbus suggested that the eyes remained fixed for longer on things that had more information in terms of properties. He also found that the distribution of focal points is a function of one's purpose (...) Thus, the perception of the properties of complex patterns seems to depend not only on the nature of the physical stimulus, but also on high-level cognitive processes such as attention and purpose (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 150-151).

In particular, the fact that the eyes have more information in terms of characteristics may involve the formal evaluation of the subject in terms of being the area where his perception intersects. Indeed, in prototype mapping theory, "for example, if a Volkswagen is of a different color, shape, or very different from what we have in mind, we still recognize it. (...) a prototype is not only the abstraction of a set of stimuli, but also the best representation of the pattern, or the pattern itself" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 151). Abstraction is a form that is separated from qualities as content, as in the example of "The Bull" we mentioned earlier. (See p. 38). Although the bulls are different from each other, the bull you see in a picture will be under the bull name bump, just like in the case of Volkswagen. With this feature, the picture object needs the image scanning and identification act of the aesthetic subject.

*Readiness in Performative Arts:* Under the heading of performative arts, dance and theater differ philosophically from other branches of art. The confrontation of the objects of these branches of art, where several elements of sensation are together, with the audience, the diversity of sensations, can also make a difference in perception, meaning, analysis. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the performative arts separately as movement, space-time and audience. Dance, theater and the art of literature differ from each other in terms of these subjects. Under the heading of performative arts, it is necessary to examine and relate these branches separately.

*Readiness in Dance:* Another branch of art that is subject to movement is dance, which is a member of the performative arts. The branch of art, which combines with music from time to time to objectify the human body in a visual rhythm, also appears as a living object. The aesthetic subject (the viewer) is also interconnected with the movement, moreover, with a vivid reflection of the artist's emotions on the body. "In staging, the 'producing' artist and the substance produced cannot be separated from each other. The artist creates his own "work" (...) from matter with a substance that is completely unique and of his own" (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 131). In this sense, the art object of dance is a different structure of being with its self-existence and inseparability from the body. In this case, while a painting is on a two-dimensional surface, a sculpture is in a three-dimensional space, and a piece of music is presented in a certain quantitative structure in terms of its notes, the art offered by the body is also different in form. Every body is different. In this case, the object of dance that the viewer is confronted with is "the body itself, that is, that body is subjective" (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 131). The art of dance is a field in which the aesthetic subject also encounters the other. For the first time in this area, the subject may expect a sharing other than language. While the artist makes this sharing with his body, the viewer communicates through the navigation, because "performative acts that take place in the form of bodily actions must be understood as 'unreferential' unless they are associated with something previously given, an inner state, substance, or an entity that they are supposed to express" (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 41). A reference to the bodily act must be in the content of the dance, which is the realm of performative aesthetics, otherwise a body object without a reference cannot be considered a dance.

 The spatial place (topos) where the audience and the artists come together is the only space where they communicate and again constitutes a unity with the artist.

As actors perform different actions by moving around the space, making hand and arm gestures, changing the shapes of their faces, using objects, talking or singing, the audience perceives and reacts to these actions. Perhaps some of these reactions may have been experienced in a purely "internal" way, but nevertheless many reactions stand out here in a very obvious way: the audience laughs, keeps pace, moans and sighs, sobbs, cries (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, pp. 61-62).

In this state of confrontation, the object is ready to experience all this to its viewer. The viewer is ready to make this reception. A pre-prepared choreography includes the determination of all these messages and the target emotions to be experienced by the audience. Before moving on to the processes of perception of the art object and the audience, if we talk about the readiness of an art object, we can continue to talk about the simple perception of that object by the subject. In a dance object, of course, as mentioned above, the artist is ready to convey various emotions, to receive these emotions in the viewer. However, the first elements that the viewer will encounter are the elements of time, space and movement. In addition, if performative art is presented with musical accompaniment, as we mentioned, the subject's musical sensation will also be evaluated together. The music, the image of the body, the opening of the three-dimensional figure (unlike sculpture, the body presents other parts of its body to the fixed subject in motion) is ready for the viewer. Merleau-Ponty, in his interpretation of the body as Object, states:

The body is the means of being-in-the-world, and to have a body is to participate in a certain environment for a living being, to be intertwined with some designs and to be constantly connected to it. It finds certainty in the clarity of this complete world, where tangible objects still appear, in the force (...) of the movement leading towards it, which still contains designs for writing and playing the piano. But just when the world hides its deficiency from it, it also reveals its deficiency to it: for if it is true that I have arrived at the consciousness of my body through the earth, if it is true that my body is the unnoticed term at the center of the world to which all objects turn their faces, it is true that for the same reason my body is the pivot of the world: I know that there are many faces of things because I can turn around them, and in this sense I become conscious of the world through my body (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 127).

The environment in which the art object is presented is the place where it is presented, and the intertwined design is again a body. In this field, the subject-object relationship has become the relationship of subject and subject in terms of being an object. The fact that the subject arrives at the consciousness of the body, which finds its expression through Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological view, with the accompaniment of his own movements, with his 'being in the world', seems to find a different meaning in the fact that he remains fixed in front of the rotating and moving art objects in contrast to the body that returns to stationary objects. Unlike a body and mind that travels around objects, it is cruising in a space where objects are moving. Dance, like music in the temporal sense, involves a process that includes the beginning and the end. This process ends with completion. For this reason, it is again difficult to express the art of dance as the whole as standing here and now. This branch of art is subject to time from the moment it meets its audience.

*Theater Readiness:* The Theater, where movement and decorative elements that will convey messages to many senses meet the space, includes the multiplicity of perception. "We can think of the place where the staging takes place as a performative space. It offers special possibilities for the relationship between the actor and the audience, for the forms of movement and perception that he organizes and constructs. (...) A movement of people, objects, light, every timbre of sound can change this space. It is not constant and fluctuates continuously. The spatiality of staging occurs in a performative space and it is perceived under the conditions set by such a space (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 185). There are many different views about the space, and according to this view, it is expressed as the presentation of the staged play to the perception in the integrity of the conditions of the space. Although the geometric structure of the space stands out in the first place, the movement and the inner time of the game itself are limited to that space. Internal time can be considered the rhythm of the staged play. The player pre-constructs his movements on the axis of the width of space and the organization of objects. In the plays that are constantly staged, when the actor will take a glass from the table and when the value in front of him will enter into a dialogue with the actor is determined by the theatrical text. However, changes to the movement of players in the venue are also possible. There are also various games in which the player/actors are mutually active with the audience and use the space together with this active structure. In this case;

It is possible to mention three different methods that make the performative structure of the space more pronounced: 1) the use of an (almost exclusively) empty space or a variable space that allows for various movements between actors and spectators; 2) the creation of specific spatial arrangements that offer hitherto unknown or untapped possibilities for negotiating the relationships between spectators and actors, or between their movements and perceptions; 3) Investigation and testing of the specific possibilities of previously known spaces and used for different purposes (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 189).

Space is the place where the subject is confronted with a theater play, where there is no movement, it is the place that will come into contact with the perception of the subject.

 Unlike other art objects, subjects are confronted with the objectification of the stories of the life of the world by living subjects in their encounter with theater. The stage presents the multiplicity of perceptions offered by the life of the world to its viewers again vividly with the actors. From a phenomenological perspective, the following subject can have the following conception of space: "Space is not the medium in which things take their positions (real or logical), but the medium through which things are put possible. That is, instead of imagining it as a kind of ether in which things are washed away, and abstractly grasping it as a common property of things, we should think of it as the universal relational force of things" (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, p. 331). When we evaluate this view of the subject about space from the point of view of the theater space, that is, from the point of view of a subject watching the space, we can see that the space of the theater stage is presented to the subject again within the universal connection reality of the positioning of the objects of the play, and the reality of the encounter of the art of theater with the subjectcan increase the influx. Erica Ficher-Lihte *Performative Arts* In his book, he states the following about the spatial perception of the audience:

Within the spatial audience, it always offers the possibility of different perceptions from each other. For example, audiences can concentrate their gaze on the actors in front of the stage, the chorus in the orchestra, or other spectators, by hovering over the entire theater area and the surrounding landscape under a bright sunlight that constantly changes during the day; Or they can look at a backstage stage set up by the principles of central perspective, lit by candles. It makes a significant difference whether they have a perfect point of view here or only a fragmented perception of perspective (...). As a result, all these spatial arrangements always offer different perception possibilities to the audience (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 186).

The act of perceiving the subject of the space in question can be explained by Merleau-Ponty's determinations of space, after considering it as the universal relational force of space:

So either I don't reflect and think of space vaguely, sometimes as the medium of things, sometimes as their common features, or I do reflection and recapture space at its source (...) In the first case, my body and things, their concrete relation to up and down, right and left, near and far, may seem to me an irreducible multiplicity. In the second case, I discover the ability to describe a unique and indivisible space. In the first case, what I am facing is physical space with its different characterized regions; in the second case I have before me the geometric space, the dimensions of which are interchangeable, there is homogeneous and isotropic spatiality, at least I can think of a displacement that will not change the moving at all, and therefore I can think of a pure position separate from the concrete context of the object (Merleau-Ponty, 2016, pp. 331-332)

Merleau-Ponty made a phenomenological analysis of the subject's view of space. Thus, it may be possible to make an interpretation of the viewing subject's view and perception of the scene. Determinations about perceiving space without performing reflection, recapturing space again by performing reflection. The scene can also clarify the perception of the space on the first encounter.

 The place, which is the first place where the viewing subject meets and where a theater work is first present, can be considered as its quantitative feature in terms of giving an idea of what it is. Just as a painting is presented in a certain place, music in a certain time, and a sculptural object in a certain place, a theater work is also exhibited in a certain place. To use an analogy, space for theater is like the frame of a picture. Secondly, a theater play, from the moment it begins to be staged, interacts with the audience. The stage (source) is constantly sending verbal or non-verbal messages to the audience (receiver). In this case, the subject is re-created and re-created it is in readiness. The 'exhibition' of the theatrical work also requires a period of time, which is subject to time in terms of readiness in understanding. The work is completed with the completion of the playing time.

*Readiness in the Art of Literature: We*  can say that the language that is the only means for the subjects to express themselves is reflected on a plane before it meets the sound. "Without the ability to understand thoughts conveyed by words and to convey one's own thoughts to others, man would be no different from an animal (...) whatever is the importance of speech for man and the place it holds in human life, it is also that of art" (Tolstoy, 2013, p. 51). Tolstoy's remark is for all branches of art in general. The words of the thinker who touches on the importance of speech for human beings and equates art with it becomes even more important when we think about the art of literature. Whether it is prose, a novel, a poem, or a script, the object of writing appears to be a different form of language in that it is behind sound. The meeting of thought with sound can also be separated from linguistic expression and the writing of thought by meeting with the pen or through some technological possibilities other than it can also be separated in terms of the cognitive act of the subject. While speaking can be fast and fluent, writing production can be variable in duration. The art of writing is an object of art that is completed by its artist in terms of readiness, but needs another subject in terms of completion. In this respect, the art of literature is subordinate to the time of the subject who will read it. As with any art object, the literary object must come into contact with a subject in order to find a response.

 When we examine the types of summer again in terms of readiness, we see that there are differences in terms of their characteristics. For example, a script can complete itself as a work when it is staged. In order to fully reflect the meaning of the dialogues in the script, the actors also need their gestures and movements. A story or novel can fully convey to the reader the place and time of the author and the gestures and movements of the heroes by writing them down. Poetry and art, which are the most specific of the literary genre and have been discussed a lot throughout the history of thought, differ from other literary genres. The art of poetry, by having "essentially the same nature" as other forms of literature, allows the act of absolute knowledge to appear directly as a mental act. Poetry is the higher potency of the formative arts in that it preserves in the artistic imagination itself the nature and character of the ideal, the essence of the whole" (Schelling, 2017, p. 324). When we think about this statement of Schelling, we can say that poetry has the ability to reflect the nature and character of the whole while preserving it, and that the essence of language is the act of objectifying the mind in the sense that the universals offer the key to the essence. This act also makes poetry different from other genres of literature in terms of readiness. Apart from the encounter of a prose with a subject, it will expect to be perceived by a mind that will perceive and make sense of the nature of the ideal, that is, with a special cognitive process. "The art of poetry, our evaluation, cannot be sustained by a fiction from the general to the particular, as in the formative arts, because in poetry particularity is stronger and freer. The totality that can be expressed in poetry can only be expressed in the big picture and collectively" (Schelling, 2017, p. 325). Accordingly, the perception of a poem requires the perception of the big picture. As such, a work completed by its artist seems to be waiting to be resolved by the perceiving subject in order to complete the act of 'perception'.

 Without going into the content analyses of aesthetic objects, we have touched on the differences in their encounters with the subject. When we consider the existence of various art objects in terms of time and space and their relationship with the subject, we see that an art object cannot be evaluated independently of the subject. The presence of the subject in the face of an art object and the presence of an art object in the face of the subject require each other. On the other hand, the various fields of art we have examined show the same and separation from time to time with each other in terms of readiness. After the music we first dealt with, we saw that dance and theater met the subject again in time because time is subordinate and involves a process. This encounter also brings with it the ability to be ready again. On the other hand, when we consider sculpture, painting and the art of literature, we can say that the processes of perception of these objects, which have been completed by the artist, should be completed only by the subject in the encounter.

# PART THREE: RECIPROCITY IN TERMS OF AESTHETIC FORMS OF TASTE AND PERCEPTION

In general, one of the most important elements of the readiness of aesthetic objects to meet their followers is that another subject is the artist (creator) of that aesthetic object. The subject who makes sense of an aesthetic object is confronted not only with the object but also with another subject. Here, subjects are in a different communication process apart from communication with language. Language has now been replaced by an aesthetic object and carries all the communication codes on it. The analysis of language and objects is also important for solving the problem of consciousness. In particular, studies on objects and perceptions contribute to cognitive studies. Philosophically, the problem of intersubjectivity and debates are very valuable for understanding the consciousness of the other. The language-thought-world axis has now left its place to the aesthetic object-thought-world in the problem of aesthetic intersubjectivity. The artist paints the world with his residual objects, and the viewer must analyze the objects in order to understand this picture.

## **3.1 INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND RECIPROCITY IN ART**

 When we look at the process of historical development of the problem of someone else, we can say that the roots of the problem are mostly and intensely rooted in subjective idealism. Before, we can trace Plato's idea of doubting the real world back to Plato's episteme of the world of ideas and appearances, and the ninety. The subject, unable to see the ideal structure of the universal in the world of phenomena, began to doubt all the objects with which he came into contact. This idea led Descartes, who used doubting phenomena as a method, to the "self intuition." The only thing I was sure of now was his intuition. With the words, "I cannot doubt that I may not be sure of my body, or that I am awake, or that I am being deceived, but that I doubt" he seems to have placed consciousness on a firm footing (Price, 2008, p. 50). This determination, which took place in the history of philosophy, later became evident with Berkeley's philosophy and became visible at the basis of his philosophy.

As is well known, George Berkeley asserted that "everything that conscious beings can experience consists of their own consciousness. It was impossible to know that anything else existed" (Magee, 2000, p. 110). This was a rather ambitious theory. The idea that no other consciousness could be known outside of the self consciousness made any 'I' unique in the world. Berkeley, however, does not reject all that is happening in the world, especially subjects and their experiences and the qualities of things can be perceived. "Berkeley believed that we perceive not things, but qualities such as color, and that these qualities are related to the perceiving subject" (Magee, 2000, p. 111). When we think in terms of the Berkeley perspective, we come to the conclusion that the qualities on an object vary from person to person. Berkeley specifically mentioned qualifications. Can we be sure, then, that the knowledge of perceptions such as the quantities remaining from the object (space, size, etc.) is precise? The question comes to mind.

George Berkeley, summarizing from *Principles of Human Knowledge*, gives an example of how subjective ideas generalize. Accordingly, a line is drawn on the chalkboard. Although this line is singular, it represents all singular lines. All lines shown on this line are now shown on general lines. Thus, when this singular line is shown as a symbol, it becomes generalized. Whoever has clearly proved and thought that qualities such as special, color, and taste exist only in the mind will see that (not being outside the mind) exists equally strongly in form and movement. It is clear that in a mind that does not think the qualities of the external thing cannot be known. (Berkeley, 1935, pp. 22-42) In this teaching, if something exists when it is perceived, there is no time when it is not perceived. "These external objects, which are examples of our ideas, are either perceptible or not. If you say that they can be perceived, you accept that they are a set of ideas (because idea = what is perceived)" (Weber, 1998, p. 275). If what is perceived consists of ideas, then the source of knowledge consists of ideas. My knowledge of an object will only be my knowledge of that object. However, the fact that our perception of objects and the knowledge we derive from them originates only from ideas and loses its sharpness on the ground of reality brought about the questioning of the self again, and as we have mentioned, Condillac's questioning of the ground of reality of objects, such as the search for sensation, "all our ideas, without exception, come to us from the senses and especially without touching" again made the objects of the external world ambiguous while prioritizing subjectivity. (Weber, 1998, p. 281). However, these studies helped to investigate the cognitive characteristics of the subject and helped to gather information about their cognitive characteristics. Condillac drew attention to the importance of memory, saying that "inner perception, or I, is nothing but the sum of what our present sensations and memory remind us." All these discussions also confronted us with questions about the complex structure of the brain. The question of the representation of the external world in the mind, perception, memory, thinking, how the objects of the external world (phenomena), other subjects, are perceived by a subject as they are, has begun to be examined by thinkers. In particular, the search of the 'I' by the representatives of the German idealism movement, which has been going on since Descartes, has brought about different approaches to the problem of intersubjectivity.

In terms of the emphasis he has placed on the capacity of the human mind, it seems appropriate to start the research on 'I' and 'other' with Kant and to evaluate this research through the object of art. "Kant agreed with Hume and the empiricists that our sensations begin with the perception of the external world, and he also agreed that our innate sense abilities determine how we see the world. In other words, our mind was not passive, our mind was giving us the knowledge of the world" (Price, 2008, p. 88). But how, according to Kant, do we arrive at the knowledge of reality?

Kant thought that we would never have a complete picture of how things were... Kant's world of numen (see Kant's world of numen). Chapter 1) also signals that we can't get a definitive information about things. "What you can see is a world of phenomena – grass, cars, the sky, buildings, etc. (Warburton, 2015, pp. 169-170).

According to this, there are aspects of what exists that cannot be known by subjects. Kant, with his table of categories, presents us with a determination of the principles of reason: "1. Axioms of intuition, 2. Expectation of perception (prioritization) 3. Parables of experience, 4. They are the postulates of empirical thought in general" (Kant, 1998, p. 285). If we summarize them in relation to our subject;

1. Intuitions are "spatial quantities, all phenomena encompass an intuition in space and time according to its form" (Kant, 1998, p. 286). Kant states that the knowledge of the space of things includes an intuition, and perceptually the mind can have this knowledge of phenomena. "In all phenomena, every phenomenon is magnitude as intuition, since intuition is either space or time" (Kant, 1998, p. 288). Thus, the fact that the perception of a phenomenon makes experience possible, that the space of objects can be known, and that it prioritizes the qualitative properties of an object in this respect, can be considered as the first step for the perception of the other/others other than me. From this determination, the other(s) have a present and share the same time.

2. Expectation of Perception (Prioritization) In all phenomena, factually there is a dominant object of sensation, that is, a degree of magnitude. "Perception is a phenomenal consciousness, and in it there is also sensation. Phenomena are not pure intuitions like space and time (because they do not perceive space and time in themselves), so phenomena, apart from intuition, also encompass a substance. (Something that exists in space and time is designed in this way)" (Kant, 1998, p. 290). The phenomenon affects the consciousness of the subject. Sensation derived from phenomena, distinct from the intuition of space and time, is also added here. "All the information that allows me to know a priori what belongs to phenomenal knowledge can be called the prioritization of perception" (Kant, 1998, p. 291). Accordingly, we know the knowledge of the phenomenal world a priori, but it develops depending on the perception of a phenomenon. "The quality of sensation always belongs only to experience and cannot be designed in any way a priori (e.g. colors, taste, etc.)" (Kant, 1998, p. 295).

3. Parables of Experience Experience is the connection of previous perceptions and is "possible only by the design of a necessary relation of perceptions, its general principles: All phenomena, according to their existence, stand under the rule of determining their relation to each other over a period of time" (Kant, 1998, pp. 295-296). Accordingly, experience is constituted by the mode of existence of phenomena and the way in which their relationship to each other is established by the subject. Within the scope of perception, it is possible to say that experience has a great role in knowing things. "experience is knowledge that determines the object through perceptions" (Kant, 1998, p. 219). When we consider the role of memory here, it is possible to justify the mental relation of the external subject to objects and other subjects. Kant says that the cat of time and space cannot be known in itself, Objects are in relation to this time and space. "Since time itself cannot be perceived, the existence of objects in time can only be known through their connection in time, and can only be known through concepts that relate a priori" (Kant, 1998, p. 295). Objects, then, are in a relation with time, and apparently we cannot know this, but we can know through connected concepts that there are elements that these concepts necessarily carry in them. These; "The three modes of time are continuity, sequentiality, and synchronicity, so there will be three rules of the temporal relations of phenomena, each phenomenon can be determined according to this phenomenon in terms of the unity of time (...) These rules precede all experience and make it possible" (Kant, 1998, p. 296). These will precede the subject's experience. The fact that these rules precede experience and are rules does not seem to leave the knowledge about phenomena to chance. The knowledge we obtain from phenomena, and our experience of them, the perception we obtain in this way, does not seem to be shaky. Because, "I perceive that phenomena follow one another, that things are opposite in the previous time. Then I actually connect the two perceptions" (Kant, 1998, p. 304). Here, the subject is actively perceiving things, and with the help of memory, he is also forming a synthetic unity of perception. "We will, then, derive the subjective succession of separation from the objective succession of phenomena, for the former will be entirely indeterminate, and we will not be able to distinguish between phenomena" (Kant, 1998, p. 307). It is clearly repeated by Kant that subjective distinctions are based on phenomena. "All experience and possibility require a power of understanding, and the first thing this power of understanding does is not to make the designs of objects clear, but to make possible the design of an object in general" (Kant, 1998, p. 310).

4. Postulates of empirical thought in general: "1. The formal conditions of experience (in terms of concepts and intuitions) are possible. 2- The material conditions of experience are actual, which is connected with sensation (actal) 3. It is necessary to determine the actual (performative) according to the universal conditions of experience" (Kant, 1998, p. 321). The fact that experience is possible in terms of concepts and intuitions, especially that it is necessary under the universal conditions of experience, has made it possible. For "the determination of things requires the relation of things in general to the formal conditions of an experience (...) The objective form of experience in general involves the entire synthesis for knowledge of objects. If a concept is not related to the object (with the synthesis of the object), it is empty and is not related to any object" (Kant, 1998, pp. 322-323).

 Kant's determinations of the principles of reason are also indicative for determining the contents of the process of perception and interpretation of the subject in the face of an object. It carries the spindle. While Kant speaks of the clarity of the subject's judgment about spatial quantities in relation to intuition, the premise of perception says that experience arises together with a phenomenon and will never arise a priori. Experience analogies, on the other hand, appear as the design of previous perceptions. These designs exist as a result of previous experiences in subjects. However, when we return to the premise of perception, even though the subject makes sense of a first encountered object with these designs, each encountered object will still form the content of a new experience. Finally, Kant states that concepts derived from things are empty when they do not correspond to their object. In the aesthetic subject and subject relationship, in other words, in the aesthetic subject and artist relationship, we can express readiness as direct subject (aesthetic subject) and indirect subject (artist). In the first, the subject's intellectual processes are active on the object, and in the second, they are either in a process or are there as completed. The reason why we choose the word "there" instead of the word passive here is, on the contrary, because we think that it is not static because the thought processes of its followers are activated. When we evaluate this picture from Kant's point of view, the aesthetic subject, with its intuition, experience connections, perception prioritizations and approach to the object with the concepts it has acquired, is confronted with an indirect subject (object), a subject whose intuition as an object has been completed, whose experience has been transferred, who has designed the concepts and priorities of perception.

These categories, which Kant considered for all subjects with a healthy mind, seem to be the general rules of intersubjective communication. The fact that the concepts are objects has also made it possible to communicate about interpersonal language. When we consider it from the point of view of the aesthetic subject, as we mentioned above, since we will now consider the language-thought-world interest in the axis of aesthetic object-thought-world, we can think of the aesthetic object as a language. The reason why we think this way is that the aesthetic object (artist) communicates with a subject. However, since this communication is reciprocal, since it is an active process, it seems necessary for the subject to enter into a dialectical process related to the object, that is, (in relation to the artist), in order to complete the processes of perception, interpretation and analysis. "Human thinking and problem-solving can be conceptualized as processes involving language. Many, but not all, forms of thinking and problem-solving are internal and done without external stimuli. For example, the abstraction of puzzles into verbal symbols creates an opportunity for us to think about how to solve these puzzles" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 382). Therefore, in intersubjective communication, we cannot exclude language. The subject is able to relate any object to language, including visual themes, during its subjective dialectical processes when evaluating it. When he sees an image of the sea in the picture, as in the example of the puzzle, he will call up his name from memory. In Kant's postulates of empirical thought in general, the relationship between concept (names) and object relations and experience is established in this way. However, before proceeding to the dialectical process, in order to determine the style of this dialectical process, it is necessary to examine how the language relationship between the aesthetic subject and the object (the artist subject) is.

In intersubjective communication with the same culture speaking the same language, perception and signification often contain identical elements. The semantic and syntactic structure of the language may vary according to the speakers of different cultures and languages. In this case, "language influences perception due to the fundamental components of cognition. According to some, the language we use to describe the world also affects how we perceive it (...) the process of perception and language is interdependent. The fact that language influences perception and perception is the dependent process of language is the only proof that it establishes the ontological connection between subjects. (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 382, 383).

On the other hand, Noam Chomsky, there is an immutable structure in the language, and this basic structure is more related to the meaning of the sentence than to the superficial features of the sentence, the elements in the basic structure of the language are common to all languages" (Quoted by Solso &; K. MacLin &; O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 390). Chomsky talked about the general characteristics of language. What is important for our topic here is the commonality of the elements in the structure of the language. When we translate from one language to another, although we generally talk about the commonality of elements in the structure of the language, syntactically, the rules of sequence and grammar are formally changed. Two different languages are brought together in approximately the same commonality of meaning. As we mentioned before, when we come from the language-thought-world axis to the aesthetic object-thought-world axis, let's look at how the aesthetic object is structured like a language:

In the first part, we investigated the certainty of the quantitative and qualitative features we have obtained on an object in terms of perception, and stated that quantitative features can be expressed mathematically, and in this sense, qualitative evaluations in terms of perception and meaning have more certainty in terms of knowability than some of them. In this case, when a subject is reciprocal with an aesthetic object, the dialectical process, which is called an intellectual process, will be shaped differently in the field of mathematical expressions and differently in the field of qualitative expressions. The field in which mathematical expressions are located will be different in that judging by means of predetermined symbols is more precise than judging meaning by qualitative expressions. Indeed, under Kant's metaphors of intuition and experience, it may be possible to evaluate the linguistic structure of the object in this sense and the dialectical process of the subject. The history of dialectics is quite old, but it goes back to Aristotle and Platonic dialogues.

As conceived by Plato, two different theories have been the principle of overcoming coping with one another. This is done to reach the highest and clearest state of knowledge. Aristotle used the dialectical method for the generally accepted, principles of logic for the destruction of ideas (...) In modern philosophy, in his Critique of Pure Reason, he used dialectics to avoid special difficulties such as antinomy, paralogism, and ideas, and the transcendental illusions that arise from them (Runes, 1943, pp. 78-79).

In nineteenth-century philosophy, the dialectical process has been the justification for the subject's free action, almost as a source for cognitive research with Fichte. Fichte made knowledge a science. "The thinker sets out from two simple assumptions: the first premise is the 'I' or-self-consciousness, which describes the truth, the second assumption is the dual view of truth as opposed to the first, and consequently we can speak of three principles" (Horstmann, 2006, p. 121). These three principles are necessary elements for the construction of Fichte's system of dialectical thought. "The three basic premises that make up Fichte's system are 'the self that reveals its own existence', the 'non-self that is set against the 'I' and the 'I am also a divisible non-self' as opposed to the 'divisible me'. (...) Despite the tendency of the I and the non-I-to annihilate and destroy each other, he formulated his third proposition, "the absolute 'I' establishes within itself a finite 'I' and a finite 'I-not' as mutually limiting and determining each other" (Copleston, 1990, p.59). The establishment of a finite I, that is, an indivisible I, is necessary for the completion of the judicial process. One of the best examples of Fichte's system is in his statements: "Think of the wall. Then, 'Think of the wall thinker', At every stage there is an 'I' that escapes from being an object to consciousness, and so on and so on forever. In the end, there remains a 'me' that resists being an object of consciousness, which is a 'transcendental' or pure 'me'" (Fichte, 2006, p.56). This active structure of thinking seems to explain the subject's processes such as problem solving and declaring judgments. Because in cognitive psychology, scientifically, "thinking is a thought that occurs intrinsically in the mind; but it is a cognitive process that is extracted from behavior" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 501). Fichte, unlike Kant, revealed the dual structure of consciousness. This structure is intended to explain how judgment is rendered by subjects. According to Kant, the multiple appearances of objects, that is, their synthetic unity, are solved by an analytical consciousness. Kant states that "the Polymorphism of the visionary will be brought together by 'unifying consciousness' in a design. In order for a design to share a commonality with different designs, it must be considered in unity with other designs before the analytical unity of consciousness" (Armaner, 1998, p. 82). Fichte clarified consciousness's ability to think dialectically by interpreting it in a different way.

According to Fichte's interpretation, what Kant is describing here is "Pure I-Consciousness." It is the same in all consciousness; that is, it cannot be determined through a contingent property related to consciousness. I am determined only by itself—absolutely. This is not the same as the consciousness of our singularity; Because the consciousness of our singularity needs both another consciousness: the consciousness of the You (Armaner, 1998, p. 82)

Fichte's consciousness of you is necessary for the subject to be able to make dialectics, to reach a judgment by inference. The analysis of these processes by an aesthetic object through the object (subject-object) relationship, including the processes of creating an art object, is dependent on these processes.

In the system established by Fichte, it is not the same action for Ben to direct his consciousness to an outside place as to to direct it to himself (...) The artist's thinking about the work of art and thinking about the self that thinks of the work of art are different actions. Since we cannot consider the actions of consciousness and thinking independently of language, the artist's thinking within a linguistic structure is also included in the process of creation (Armaner, 1998: 82).

Within the framework of this important determination, we can say that the artist is able to explain the production process in the dialectics of a specific linguistic structure. We have argued that the linguistic expression of quantitative and qualitative processes can be different from each other. Accordingly, the expression of a piece of music, just like the symbols of mathematics, is expressed through the symbol, and its dialectical processes are analyzed without being open to interpretation. As an example, we can give a written solfege piece dictated one-to-one by the subject. The part of the quality that reaches the senses (the subject's dislike or dislike of sensation) requires a dialectical process different from the symbols. Liking or discontent requires the dialectical expression of all the subject's feelings towards the object. In the case of symbolic expressions of quantitative properties, we judge right or wrong by making a correlation between the subject, the symbolic expressions. However, judgments such as liking, pleasure, dislike are still specific to the subject as a result of subjective dialectics.

When we consider the dialectical processes that constitute the system of thinking from the point of view of the subject's readiness in the face of an aesthetic object, the elements in the basic structure of the dialectics realized by the self are also important in terms of analyzing the subject's processes of making sense of the object and judging it. Today, "debate continues about whether thinking exists to the extent that behavior can be measured, and whether it is an internal process. For example, a chess player thinks about his next move for a few minutes before taking action. Is the thought occurring when the player is thinking about what move to make?" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 500-501). Scientists who could not clearly observe this behavior were skeptical. In fact, what is wanted to be observed here seems to be the relationship that Fichte establishes between "me" and "non-me".

The center of consciousness, defined as the place where focused selective attention is directed or directed into the field of consciousness, also acts as a gateway for the higher levels of conscious processing. The content at the center of consciousness is not only experienced more clearly than the background, but is involved in the complex cognitive processing that takes place in what is called reflexive consciousness. Cognitive functioning in reflexive consciousness is accomplished by taking the images at the center of phenomenal consciousness as inputs and allowing them to access a wide variety of other cognitive mechanisms. Thus, phenomenal images can be named, recognized, or used to guide behavior (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 141).

Of course, it could be argued that we are under the reflexive motion that drives our behavior. If it were not for these dialectical processes, it would not be possible for us to bring the objects I experience into concept. Another question here is to investigate what are the other various mechanisms within dialectical processes. Revonsuo separated pure phenomenal consciousness from reflexive consciousness. Accordingly:

reflexive consciousness is different from pure phenomenal consciousness. The broad layer of pure phenomenal consciousness consists of patterns of qualities that we might call senses, perceptions, emotional experiences, feelings, and sensory-perceptual images (...) Reflexive consciousness consists mostly of auditory-linguistic images that have a phenomenal surface (for example, how they are felt in terms of their hearing or imaginary auditory qualities). But even more important is the semantic content that these images carry (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 143).

According to Revonsuo, pure phenomenal consciousness includes sense, perception, emotional experiences, and feelings. Reflexive consciousness may or may not depend on a phenomenon. But pure phenomenal consciousness seems to be the source of reflexive consciousness. Accordingly, we can state that there is interaction between them. On the other hand, we have distinguished the dialectical processes of the art object between symbolic language and non-symbolic language. If we accept dialectical processes as reflexive processes, in the case of judging by the use of non-symbolic language, that is, with semantic content, it may be appropriate for the dialectic of an art object to evaluate feelings and emotional experiences under reflexive experiences, which Revonsuo evaluates in the title of phenomenal consciousness. In this case, it can be stated that reflexive consciousness (dialectical process) also works with emotions through memory, association.

It has been argued that introspection can be carried out in different ways, that there are three forms (the argument that dialectical action can have different aspects from the point of view of our subject). These are analytical introspection, interpretive introspection, descriptive introspection. "Analytic introspection is the kind of introspection used by Edward Titchener's school called "structuralism". (...) The goal is to analyze an experience down to its simplest phenomenal elements: pure, isolated senses and qualifications" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 145). This view was rejected because different results were obtained. "(but painters may be using something like analytic introspection to capture similarity to visual experience by dissociating patterns of light and color in a landscape and turning them into patterns of watercolor or oil paintings on canvas)" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 143).

This interpretation, parenthetized by Revonsuo, seems to support our response that quantitative and qualitative values, which we have dealt with throughout this work, are aided by subjective dialectical processes. The reflection of the dialectical processes of quantity and symbolic expressions of certain qualities by the painter on the canvas is also a provision of the real image and the image on the canvas. In analytical consciousness, experience seems to be reducible to the simplest phenomenal structure. For, "the mind must become familiar with the possibilities of action. Such acquaintance can explain all actions a priori by assuming the existence within the I of an impulse in which the inner activity of the I is limited precisely because it is an impulse" (Fichte, 2006, p. 216). In this case, the capture of a visual experience by the artist, and the basic ability to distinguish between patterns of light and color, may arise from the mind's familiarity with the possibilities of action.

Another form of view, the interpretive introspection, involves knowledge of everyday life. "when trying to interpret or explain our emotions and other experiences, we naturally use this type of introspection" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 145). In our daily experiences, we also experience emotions in this introspective method. This kind of introspection method can also bring illusions.

Our justifications, which seem reasonable and valid, are often the post hoc\* rationalizations we use for ourselves and others, both for ourselves and for others, to show that we have mastered the situation and always know why we do it. Perhaps these choices are actually determined by factors of which we are not at all aware, and yet we believe that we know why we act or feel a certain way (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 146).

One conclusion that follows from this is that inference based on illusion is the wrong grounding of the first cause of dialectics. It shows us that when an aesthetic subject tries to analyze the object in his readiness with the method of interpretive introspection (dialectics), he can have possible illusions about that object. In the readiness of an aesthetic subject against an aesthetic object, 'illusion' is important in terms of the meaning and analysis of that work.

When our mind receives the slightest timbre of a memory through the senses, it springs into action and does not stop remembering everything that needs to be remembered. So, no matter how much of something our senses, which are also the door of our mind, perceive and present to our mind, our mind takes this part and completes it into the whole. Just as a small jolt on the underside of a long spear travels along the entire stalk and reaches the tip of the spear... a small part is sufficient for our mind to perceive the whole (Act. Gombrich, 1992, p. 199).

This quote from Gombrich in Francisus Junius' Painting of Ancients, referring to Maximus Tyrius, shows us that in the face of phenomena, association and memory are effective in the process of meaning-making. However, as Revonsuo points out, such post-hoc approaches, from one point to the whole, can sometimes lead to illusion.

Finally, the descriptive introspection "is still a useful method as a scientific method (...) is to try to describe the experiences that take place in the phenomenal consciousness in their own words in everyday language. The descriptive point of view seems to be a dialectical process carried out to convey the responses of perceptions in terms of being expressed through language. In the interpretation of art objects, it is the description of what is perceived as much as the linguistic expression of what it is. "Without excluding anything and without making any additions" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 147). We have also examined in the previous sections how much the aesthetic subject can convey the properties of an art object without any additions. Accordingly, we have already said that the aesthetic subject will reveal the quantitative properties of the works more clearly than their qualitative properties. Accordingly, we can say that the dialectical processes of the subject can also be judged more precisely about mathematically symbolized quantities such as note measure, line lengths, space, dimension in terms of obtaining precise data, while the illusion that interpretations about the object can be less precise also play a part. In the light of all these data, we can investigate the design of an art object by the artist and how the formal counterpart of this design is reflected on other subjects.

## **3.2 INTEROBJECTIVITY AND RECIPROCITY IN ART**

If you want, take a mirror in your hand and hold it all around. In an instant you made the sun, the stars, the earth, yourself, all the things of the house, living beings" (Plato*, The State*, 596e).

If we consider these well-known statements of Plato in his work The State from the point of view of the formal design and reciprocity of an art object, we can think that this discourse contains a secret question for us as a matter of course. This question; The question is how an artist can turn all four sides into an object of art as if he took a mirror in his hand. The way the artist reflects the world in which the subject is in his work, the encounter of other subjects with this world and the way they perceive it is a question that is expected to be answered in this statement. The artist works with reality as much as he works with imagination. Just as Kant expressed the relationship between concepts and visions as "senseless concepts are empty, senseless senses are blind" (Kant, 1998), imagination would be without data without the knowledge and concepts of those in the field of being. Plato, as can be understood from the above statements, thinks that artists are analogies. Accordingly, what exists is objectified in the hands of the artistic subject. Plato; "What does painting want to give of everything? Does it do something as it is, as it seems? Is it the parable of the visible, or the truth itself?" question, and this question is answered as "that which is visible" (Plato, 2013, 598b, p. 339). In this question, Plato actually refers to a parable, but he added the question of what a painting wants to give everything to the question of whether the analogy of the visible is the reality itself. What does he want to give of everything? The question can also reflect a cross section of reality (e.g., a tree) that can be an art object (e.g., a part of a tree trunk), and since this section partakes of that thing because it can be a view of reality, it can enable us to call that part that thing. To give another example, when we see incomplete walls in a painting, we can continue to guess that it could be a building that we see in real life. It is a part of the realm of reality that, although not complete, can remind us of it. Plato said that if the painter "can simulate everything; This is because it does a small aspect of everything; this direction is the shadow of the shadow" (Plato, 213, 598b, p. 339). The masterful analogies of the artists and the perception of these analogies by others have led us to the search for the formal aspect of the work of art that provides this certainty. Plato so acknowledged the power of the parable that he expressed it with the following words: "Do you think that if a person has the power to make both himself and the likeness of something, he will be engaged in doing similar things with all his might? Does life do it with only care, dignity? As if there was nothing better to do" (Plato, 2013, 599a, p. 340). This statement of Plato also refers to the power of the art object to be believable in a sense. On the basis of this rather sharp reference, it leads us to the exploration of the formal aspect of art in cognitive acts, such as perception, interpretation and analysis.

In the light of Plato's questions, the question "what can the similarity of an art object formally convey to other subjects" is a question waiting for an answer. On the other hand, our main question within the scope of this study is: "How do these features reflected in the art object from the field of reality find a response?"

In order to solve both problems, it is necessary to explain what is reflected to us from the field of reality. Today, there are many different branches of art and artists. But the physical world in which all people live and the world of things are common. The artist, through the creative act of imagination, has the potential to transform the world of nature and things into an object of art. Although this transformation is of course influenced by imagination, it will have its share of reality. Schelling states that "all the potentialities of nature and the Ideal world—but only at the highest potential—are repeated here, and thus it becomes completely understandable how philosophy of art is constructed of the universe in art form." (Schelling, 2017, p. 181). According to Schelling, art forms are constructed in real and ideal contrast, but "both forms re-decompose themselves into all other forms (...) both essential forms take all other forms or associations as potence and transform them into their own symbols or particulars" and take this expression as a condition under the title of the real direction of the art world or formative arts (Schelling, 2017, p. 183). It was here that Schelling really began to examine in depth the explanation underlying Plato's theory of imitation for each branch of art. The exchange of the real and the ideal world, which we have been talking about, Schelling's transformation of two worlds into symbols or particulars, is a kind of linguistic expression of the real field in the ideal field. Before proceeding to Schelling's examination of the formal elements of branches of art, let us try to explain how these symbols or particular elements can be.

 Townsend says that "everything that man has produced and to which he attaches a meaning brings with it the distinction of form and content" (Townsend, 2002, p. 92). This distinction seems to be a justified one. The format is often handled by people by keeping it separate from the content. For example, formally geometric shapes in a painting can be easily distinguished by the subjects, and the picture is resolved by making sense of it separately as content. Here it is that formal signification is different from meaning as content, and that what is formal is different from what is content in terms of degree of certainty. For example, the roof of a house is triangular. A triangle is a shape based on general common acceptance. However, whether a child sitting on a stone next to the house is sad or joyful or experiencing some other emotional state is open to subjective interpretation and analysis as a contextual evaluation. "Form is specific to the work. In artwork, form involves the arrangement of the line, color, image, and surface. In music, the medium is the up-tempo sound arranged according to the patterns" (Townsend, 2002, p. 179). However, although the form is considered separate from the content, it is not completely independent of each other. Because, as Townsend says, the form is specific to the work. For example, when we examine Johann Sebastian Bach's "Erbarme dich mein gott" (Have mercy on me, my God) in terms of its form, we are confronted with a 12/8 measure Fa minor piece, but contextually the minor formal content of the piece is also related to its content. This minor formal structure is emotionally combined with words that involve an invocation to a god, creating an emotionally charged piece. Another example can be given through Francisco Goya's "La lucha en la Venta Nueva" (1777) Formally, when we look at the work, we see a tree with its leaves falling, and a two-wheeled carriage in front of it, and a horse with man on it apart from the cart, a fallen tree, a church, a yellow sky, and people We are clearly confronted with these elements before formally making sense of the content. On the other hand, when we evaluate the table contents, it is possible to draw a catastrophic scenario about a tree with fallen leaves and yellow sky as autumn, about a horse carriage in front of a falling tree and people with their faces piled in pain in front of the church. In our subjective evaluations, we agree on the elements such as trees, churches, people, etc. in the table with a clear and precise language between subjects through formal features. On the other hand, we can make unclear analyses about the incident that happened to people lying on the ground in front of the church and scattered left and right. But one of the obvious things that form makes to the content is that the dry, non-blue gloomy image of the tree and the sky can reinforce our judgment that something bad happened to people scattered left and right. Through sculpture, we can give the pieta of Michelangelo (1497–1499) regarding form and content. In this figure, a formally young woman held a lying adult male horizontally in her arms, her neck slightly directed at the young man. The woman's dress and the veil on her head were skillfully embroidered by the sculptor. In the first place, someone who does not know that formally this statue does not represent the virgin Mary and her son Jesus will have this generally accepted judgment about the work in terms of form. Again, someone who does not know this image represented by the Bible will make various interpretations about the connection between the young man and the woman and whether the young man was injured, dead or unconscious. However, works such as the 'pieta', which is based on the generally accepted common acceptance on the symbolized, will not be open to interpretation after analysis because they become symbols wherever they are seen. Again, in this work, the form and content give information about the event in relation to each other. "The analysis of form and content can be carried out in all fields of art. This analysis is an important faculty for both art viewers and critics (...) To evaluate form requires seeing it in context" (Townsend, 2002, pp. 101-102). According to this, in fact, although we separate the formal features from the contents, it is possible to talk about the content that the formal elements carry information to us, therefore, when the subject is confronted with the formal elements in the face of a work of art, he can begin the processes of making sense of and analyzing the content.

 If an art object has the potential to formally carry information about the content, it is necessary to examine the symbolizations of the subject from the past to the present by including them in the subject. "The history of symbolism shows that everything can be given a symbolic meaning; beings (stones, plants, animals, people, mountains and valleys, sun and moon, wind, water and fire) or man-made things (houses, ships or cars) or abstract forms (numbers or triangles, squares and circles). In fact, the entire cosmos is a potential symbol" (Jaffe, 2016, p. 228). The fact that the cosmos is a potential symbol also means that existing data can be used in common, such as language: "Man, who has the ability to form symbols, unconsciously transforms objects and forms into symbols (by bestowing great psychological importance on them); it expresses to them both in religion and in their visual arts" (Jaffe, 2016, p. 228). Jung had previously stated that "the unconscious process has a compensatory relationship with the conscious mind" (Jaffe, 2016, p. 201), and he also stated that the data of the unconscious can be transformed into a collective consciousness, that is, the artist can be transformed into "a collective not only to a single individual, but also to many people, that is, to all psychic contents belonging to society, the people, or humanity in general" (Jung, 2016, p. 49). Considering all these data, it is possible to say that formal data is structured like a language. We can make common sense and analysis of the relation of form and content thanks to the collectivization of symbols. One of the questions that may come to mind is especially in the visual arts are abstract works. These studies, in which the formal structure is more prominent than the content, may be appropriate to show us the unity of form and content, especially how the formal structure carries information about the content. The symbolization of geometric shapes also helps to make sense of and interpret abstract paintings. "Sensory style is usually a direct reproduction of nature or the subject of painting. The imaginative style, on the other hand, presents the artist's experience or fantasy in an "unrealistic", moreover, dream-like and sometimes "abstract" form (Jaffe, 2016, p. 243). It is possible to produce nature or anything directly but indirectly, again by abstracting the knowledge of what exists. A person can not be projected directly, but indirectly on the canvas by abstracting his formal features. For example, "The Bird" by Wassily Kandinsky; It is composed by abstracting the parts of the objects by separating the formal side of the bird from other features and reflecting it on the canvas.

 When we look at the dilemmas of symbolization, form and content to the contrary, we do not encounter E. H. Gombrich's (1909-2001) comment that Plato "we have to learn generalization neither at the level of ideas nor at the level of perception" (Gombrich, 1992: 108). Gombrich actually opposes the repetition of a symbol that we have generalized. Because a fish figure has different appearances and asks the following striking questions; In our act of creation, do we not give ourselves over to the management of the idea, like Plato's carpenter who copied the idea of a cedar? Suppose we adopt this metaphysical conception; then don't we imitate a human design that exists in our heads?" (Gombrich, 1992, p. 108). Accordingly, he states that the objects we conceptualize do not have a single appearance, and that they will have more than one appearance even if the concept is the same. Gombrich gives the example of the snowman:

A pile of snow is our basic scheme; We make a number of corrections through this scheme until the minimum conditions of our definition are met. The one who emerges thus is undoubtedly a symbolic human being, but nevertheless of the human kind. It belongs to a subclass or sub-species called "snowman". The study of symbolism teaches us that in our world of thought the content of concepts is not rigid, but flexible (Gombrich, 1992, p. 108).

With this interpretation, Gombrich actually wanted to save art from the uniformity of symbolism. He argues that art is not mechanical, but dynamic. The famous Rorchach's ink stain justifies Gombrich's defense. The shape, which represents more than one content, is open to different perception, interpretation and analysis. Gombrich also criticizes the painting classes given in art schools: "Before the student ignores the real birds he wants to draw in the forest and in the field, he is organized to learn how to create a bird with the help of such geometric elements. The defining markers of a particular species, and especially the peculiar characteristics of a single animal, come at the end" (Gombrich, 1992, p. 154). This criticism was made against the prominence of formalism and the ignoring of the specific elements that make up the content, and drew attention to the risk of symbolization in loss of meaning. The problem of formal reciprocity in the object of art is this loss of meaning.

 So far, we can say that the transfer of formal elements to the subject is easy to make sense of since it has a common language between subjects. The theory of formalism in art has also taken its place in the philosophy of art with the emphasis on the formal aspects of the branches of art.

With the advent of formalism, the artistic practices that were particularly associated were developments in the field of painting and sculpture, known as modern art or modernism (...) Modern artists have avoided illustration (visual storytelling, illustration, illustration, creating non-representative shapes and colors in their canvases. Their goal was not to capture perceptual views of the world, but to make images noteworthy through visual editing, form, and expressive designs (Carrol, 2016, p. 162).

In every sense, the formalism movement has in a sense overturned the perceptual design of the world and used all formal possibilities and colors for the painting itself. To give an example from the field of music, the atonal music movement was obtained by presenting the notes in a completely different structure and characterizing them in a new order, unlike the known ranges" (Forte, 1975, p. 1). Thus, the art object that meets in painting and music offers a whole new perception to its viewers.

Noel Carrol , in his Philosophy of Art, describes the evolution of modern art and formalism at certain stages. In summary, they first attempted to analyze the objects as they appeared prominently in the pictures. Cezanne, on the other hand, reduced objects to shapes such as squares, cubes and circles, almost laid the foundation of Cubism and laid the foundation of Cubism in the 20th century. The era of abstract art had begun in the twentieth century. Modern art as it stands needed a new theory, and Clive Bell was guiding in his book Art on how to understand modern art. According to Bell, what determines whether a painting can be art or not is that it has a clear style. This form consists in the arrangement of lines, colors, volume and spaces. In this view, real art refers to the imagination, as do the forms of Gestalt psychology. The viewer animates the art object in such a way that all the line space and vector arrangement forms our perception (Carrol, 2016, pp. 162-164).

The theory of formalism, as Carrol stated, is the encounter of the formal structure of the art object with the viewer. However, in the determinations of most formalist theories, such as Carrol, the idea was that the purpose of this art was "not a picture to show the world, but a picture for painting's sake" (Carrol, 2016, p. 163). However, as Bell stated, a viewer's interpretation of formal form within the context of Gestalt theory cannot separate that picture from the subject's perception. Again, Carrol argues that "formalism has found its natural home in the field of painting" (Carrol, 2016, p. 166). However, in other areas we can encounter expressions made with the abstraction of formal features. As for music, Carrol says that "it is not very controversial to define a composition in terms of the temporal games of auditory forms" (Carrol, 2016, p. 166) However, we can exemplify the atonal musical structure we have mentioned in this regard. If we do not format the tones of sound with any period of time, for example if we play an eighth note with an instrument that is half the size or longer than the time it is given to us, it will go out of its form and change.

Following the theory of formalism, the neo-formalist theory, that is, "states that in order for something to be considered a work of art, form and content must be satisfactorily and appropriately related" (Carrol, 2016, p. 188). Here the format should not be independent of the content. In this theory, only perception should be clear along with meaning. "The content of a work of art, then, is its meaning. – is what it is about; Form is also the presentation of meaning. It is the way in which what it is about is revealed and told" (Carrol, 2016, p. 188). In this case, the idea of painting for painting seems to have turned into the idea of painting for the viewer in the new formalism. In a way, the new formalist thinking does not seem to want to break the link of art from reality.

After the theories of formalism, we can take a look at art forms on the axis of Schelling: "The inseparability of the formation of the infinite into the finite is the timbre when it is considered as pure indifference" (Schelling, 2017, p. 183). At first, we can re-evaluate what Schelling describes as the special part of the philosophy of art, what he says about the real direction of the art world or the formative arts, in the light of the knowledge of symbolism, the theory of formalism. This quote by Schelling about the finite shaping of the infinite is an emphasis on the defining feature of the formal structure in the work of art. The formation of the qualities such as color, sound, raw material of sculpture, dialogue times of a theater play, etc., the formation of the features and the finite structure characterizes that work and gives us information about what that work is. Moreover, what manifests itself here is the naturalness of forms and qualities into a pure non-discrimination. Schelling examines the forms of music, painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, and tragedy. Accordingly:

*Form of Music:* Schelling primarily determines the formal structure of music "Music as art is fundamentally subordinate to the first dimension (it has only one dimension) The necessary form of music is succession, because time is the universal form of the finite shaping of the infinite, provided that it is perceived as form abstracted from the real" (Schelling, 2017, p. 186). Scheling's determination of time, the way sounds are shaped by time, is a determination to be considered. Not only the musical formations, but also the sounds that objects make in nature are formed in unity subject to time. For example, the sound of a train going on the track has a temporal character. A rhythm of hexadecimal notes in a four-way measure can provide the connotation of a train sound. From the point of view of perception, the interpretation and analysis of this formal structure seems clear from the point of view of perception and is open to association. "In music, it is the shaping of the unity that is conceived / encompassed as a particular unity itself again into the multitude or the real unity in music is the rhythm" (Schelling, 2017, p. 187). In particular, the thinker who states that rhythm determines the characteristic of music gives an example that confirms our determinations about rhythm: For example, the feeling that a piece of music evokes as a whole is completely homogeneous, uniform. For example, it is either cheerful or sad. But this single feeling, which alone will be completely homogeneous for itself, acquires multiplicity and diversity through rhythmic divisions. Rhythm is one of the most wonderful mysteries of nature and art, and no human invention seems to have taken its inspiration from nature as directly and directly as rhythm (Schelling, 2017, p. 187).

The mystery of rhythm, as we have already stated, is an expression of things in nature, of the movements of objects. For example, depending on the strength of the wind, the sound of the trees, the sound of the waves of the sea, the sounds of animals, the creak of the door, the sounds of the wood burning in the fireplace are not alien to the human ear. Musical rhythms take their inspiration from nature. For example, The Four Seasons (1725) (Italian: Le quattro stagioni), composed by the Italian composer Antonio Vivaldi, is a work consisting of four concertos. This work took its inspiration from the rhythms of the seasons. When we listen to the autumn section, it is rhythmically at a medium speed, a windy rhythm that increases in intensity from time to time, which is characteristic of the season, and sometimes decreases in a rhythmic structure. The rhythm of the winter concerto, unlike autumn, reflects the rhythmic feeling of the season. The Summer concerto begins with a static rhythm, while the Spring concerto has a rhythm that expresses vitality. As we mentioned earlier in the intuition section, the subject's actions, such as emotion-experience, object-experience, are active in the evaluation phase of the art object. The sounds that nature has presented to people since they are born are within their field of experience. In this state, it is usual for a subject, when he hears the winter concerto, to think of the winter season. "In a broad sense, rhythm is the dominant potency in music" (Schelling, 2017, p. 191). To make an analogy, rhythm can be thought of as the main perceived color of a picture. On the other hand, Schelling argues that harmony and melody are considered to be opposed to each other in relation to the formal structure of music, but that "harmony is related to rhythm and, in this respect, to melody – for melody is nothing but integrated rhythm (...) Harmony is related to melody just as the formation of ideal unity into real or multiplicity into unity is related to the formation of unity as opposed to multitude" (Schelling, 2017, p. 193). Although the ideal of melody and harmony form unity, they are as separate as they are in unity. What Schelling wants to say here is that rhythm, harmony and melody "are therefore the identity of all three associations expressed here in ideal unity" (Schelling, 2017, p. 194). Schelling's conclusion about the musical form is that music is a form of the universe. "Therefore, music is nothing but the rhythm heard and the harmony of the visible universe itself" (Schelling, 2017, p. 196). In return for this statement, it is necessary to remember Pythagoras' defense of rhythm and music that emerged from the celestial bodies and their movement. In line with Schelling's statements, it seems to be clarifying how the sound of nature can be transformed into rhythm and music, and its place in human perception.

*Form of Painting*: In the art of painting, which we can define as the ideal form of reality or imagination;

Here reality dissolves again in ideality or dissolves itself again in ideality. But this ideality must be subject to reality and distinction in the broad sense, because it is the ideal unity within the real unity. Since the universal form of the real is space, it must appear as the ideal element of space or the ideal element in space. Therefore, it has to define space without filling that space, and it has to show all the qualities that matter shows in real terms in the ideal way everywhere as the ideal unity of matter. All these conditions can only be met with light: for this reason, light is the eternal idea of all separation within the real unity (Schelling, 2017, p.201).

Just as Schelling states that rhythm is the basic element of music, light is the main element of painting, just like rhythm. If there were no light in the world we live in, it would be impossible to perceive the colors and quantitative properties of things. Therefore, light is necessary for things in the real sphere to be reflected in an ideal way. Schelling writes that "the absolute identity that unites light and materiality, whether in the reflection or refraction of light, is gravity. The general expression of such a materially synthesized light is dim, blurred light or color" (Schelling, 2017, p. 203). The basic expression of light and colors are the basis of the formal features of painting. Schelling also uses the concept of time in the form of the painting: "The obligatory form of the picture is the abolished time... It is time for unity to take shape into multiplicity. Since painting is based on opposing unity, on the formation of multiplicity into unity, the necessary form of painting is abrogated time" (Schelling, 2017, pp. 211-212). The thinker establishes the relation of the abolition of time to space. "Painting needs space by abolishing time, and this is such a need that it has to attach space to the object itself" (Schelling, 2017, p. 212).

 The concept of time is the decisive element in Schelling's philosophy of art, both in the field of music and painting. We talked about temporal determinations in musical rhythms and made an example of the sound of the train on the tracks. Just like this illustration, we can conclude that painting has a rhythm from the Schelling perspective, from the inference of the relation of time. We can say that this rhythm forms its formal structure in terms of reflecting the temporal succession in the painting to the space. Schelling, 5. In the conclusion proposition; "Just as music is a quantitative art of the whole, painting is also a qualitative art of the whole. For painting is based on pure qualitative antitheses of reality and negation", and when particular forms of unity are repeated in painting, drawing, light-shadow and it says it's coloring. (Schelling, 2017, p. 213). While particular forms of unity find quantitative expression in music, the fact that the temporal succession of this rhythm manifests itself in painting may show that the picture is not only qualitative but also quantitative.

*Form of Sculpture*: "Sculpture is an image of the universe that has space in itself and has no space outside of itself" (Schelling, 207, p. 294). As we mentioned before, the time-space relationship is also different from other art objects in terms of the form of sculpture. Sculpture is what is there in time and space.

The sculpture can be evaluated according to three categories. The first is truth or pure necessity, which is specifically concerned with the representation of forms. The second is elegance based on measure and proportion. The third is competent beauty itself as a synthesis of these two. (...) The necessity or the beauty of forms can be thought of as real form in a general sense, and therefore as the pure rhythmic element or drawing in sculpture (Schelling, 2017, p. 301).

Schelling thinks that measure and proportion as form constitute elegance, thus making beauty competent. "The purely necessary or rhythmic aspect of sculpture is concerned with the beauty of forms and figures. The harmonic aspect is related to measure and ratio" (Schelling, 2017, p. 303). The harmony of measure and proportion reflects the quantitative aspect of sculpture, just as it does in music and painting. The thinker, who makes the connection between beauty and rhythm, seems to be in favor of harmony in relation to taste. Especially since ancient times, the art of sculpture, which has been working mainly on animal and human figures, has led Schelling to evaluate this form especially through these figures. Thinker; "Sculpture is an art form that embodies the essence of matter. The essence of matter is the mind, and its direct real reflection is the most perfect organism. Since this competent organism exists only in human form, the most direct reflection of the mind is the human figure" (Schelling, 2017, p. 294). For this reason, it would be correct to perceive form and harmony especially through these figures.

*The Art of Literature, The Form of Poetry: "*The universal form of the art of poetry is, in a broad sense, its depiction of ideas in words and language" (Schelling, 2017, p. 327). Language seems to be more competent than other arts in terms of identifying objects. Schelling also talks about the reflection of this feature of language in poetry. However, the thinker again says that "the act of absolute comprehension appears on the one hand as an ideal, not as real as it appears in language, in being, but on the other hand, it integrates itself into language through something real without ceasing to be ideal" (Schelling, 2017, p. 327). Here we are talking about the emergence of the real, ideally the real again. We can think of the ideal presentation of the real as the idealization of the form of the thing, its regaining its form and joining the real sphere. The analysis of the art of poetry may in a sense involve the solution of this ideal form. For example, we can define the form of a stone existing in the real field quantitatively, that is, in the ideal field other than its symbolic definitions through measurement. This ideal definition can idealize both the photographic properties of the stone in space-time, such as how it participates in the world of color with the reflection of light properties, and information such as how it conveys a feeling to the subjects. "Poetry is essentially a whole that has its own inner time and movement, and as such it is separated from the larger whole of language and is completely closed to itself" (Schelling, 2017, 330).

The fact that poetry has internal time and motion, and that it is separated from language, shows that it is a completely different means of linguistic expression. The inner time of poetry is that it has a rhythm as a form. "Through rhythm, the word declares that it absolutely carries its purpose within itself" (Schelling, 2017, p. 330). Rhythm seems to be the essential form of poetry. According to the content of the poem, for example, enthusiastic, sad, joyful, etc. It has the potential to be revived by meeting with the rhythm of emotions. Schelling, on the other hand, thinks that prose does not have a rhythm and ideal expression like poetry. "Prose is ultimately (...) it is a language occupied by the faculty of comprehension and shaped by its purposes" (Schelling, 2017, p. 330). The prose form, which is a type of writing that can be easily analyzed by our comprehension when we read this sentence more carefully, differs from the form of poetry in which our comprehension will perform intense intellectual actions without entering the analysis stage. Prose is a general pass of the objective world

*Performative Arts; Form of Theatre and Dance:* "When action is described, it passes through the filter of thought, which by its very nature is the freest. (...) The action represented objectively-real is navigable and must conform to the law of vision (...) necessarily requires continuity. The continuity of action, then, is a necessary characteristic of every rational drama" (Scheling, 2017, p. 408-409). The point to be considered here is that Schelling's action passes through the filter of thought and requires a dialectical process. In the staging of written texts, the actor can mentally rehearse the combination of thought and action before staging it. The display of the form of the play by the player again requires a dialectical process between thought and action, in which we can again make Fichte's (if we recall his dialectical processes) by considering Schelling's statements how the subject reaches the action.

Ask yourself: For what purpose and on what occasion do we say this? What kind of courses of action accompany these words? (Think salute!) In which environment they are used; and for what? How do I know that this chain of thought led me to this action? (Wittgenstein, 2007, p. 155).

A conscious action does not happen without thought. The end of conscious actions also takes its place in terms of evaluation in thought. While thought is intertwined with thought, action shows succession. "A change here also has to be accompanied by a change in the rest of the structural arrangement [Die Konformation] (Schelling, 2017, p. 409). Here, the connection of the continuity of the movement with each other is discussed. The form of tragedy is that these movements cooperate with each other. In improvised plays, that is, in which no dialogue text has been prepared beforehand, thought and action will of course be different from ready-made texts. In this type of game, the player is free and the form of the game will be characterized by the game.

 In the matter of time and space, Schelling prioritizes the unity of time. "The continuity of time is the dominant of the three associations that Aristotle spoke of. The unity of space, called the unity of space, is needed only to the extent that it is necessary for the unity of time (Schelling, 2017, p. 409). As a matter of fact, in the theater, space is static, but movement is in cooperation with time.

 On the other hand, the actors' body forms and the external expression of thoughts with the body can be seen, again, as the objectification of the external world. The degree of emotions and their reflection on actions may vary from person to person, according to this, love, anger, jealousy, etc. can present the situations related to the various states of the subject to the audience by objectifying and in a way limiting them. Thus, the form of emotions has the potential to be objectified in the body. In the performative arts, we can talk about the formal structure of dance, the objectification of the external world. Schelling states that "Only the most perfect combination of all the arts, poetry becomes one in music and song, poetry becomes one in painting and dance" (Schelling, 2017, p. 443). Dance confronts the form of many art objects. The main element in music is rhythm and time, sometimes the reflection of the word/poem in the music to the body as an emotion, the bodily expression of the formal features of painting and sculpture... As such, dance can express the quality and quantitative characteristics of all these art objects through body movements. Temporally again As Schelling points out, it needs succession but is not static in space.

 When we look at Schelling's idea of art forms in general, we see that infinity ends in the object of art. The formal structure of the art object is a form of expression in this sense. Most of the time, objects, and often emotions, are embodied again in their brand new forms. Here, it is not the form of the real structure, but the form of the ideal structure and its transfer to other subjects that are important. Just as the real field is expressed in language between subjects, art objects can be expressed in ideal language. This ideal language is changing in terms of the perception and transmission of different, non-artist subjects between artist subjects.

## **3.3 RECIPROCITY AND SYNESTHESIA IN TERMS OF ART TYPES (MULTIPLE PERCEPTION)**

Since the work of art is born of spirit, it needs a subjective generative activity as its own cause, and as a product of this activity, the work of art exists for others, that is, for the course and feeling of others. This activity is imagination. So, after all, we now have to deal with the third aspect of the ideal again, that is, to discuss how the work of art belongs to the subjective inner consciousness" (Hegel, 2012, p. 279

Since it would be incomplete to consider the structural features of the aesthetic object solely and exclusively from the point of view of the subject's processes of perception meaning and analysis, it is necessary to analyze the subjective internal structure of the artist, as Hegel stated, and even to investigate how he turned the real world into the ideal world. We have stated that this ideal world can be structured like a language through art objects. If this ideal world is structured like a language thanks to art objects, it should be transferable and can find its expression in another art object from an art object again, and it should be idealizable again. To illustrate this statement, let's consider how the color red can be objected in various branches of art. Goethe,  *in his Theory of Colors* (1810), identified an interest between music and colors.

If it is to borrow hue, or rather, from music, and applied to coloring, it can be used in a better way so far. Because it would not be unreasonable to compare a powerful effect, to achieve tone, with a sharp key of music; A picture of the soft effect with a piece of music in a flat key can be found in other two equivalent modes, as well as other equivalents for modifications in the other two equivalent modes (Goethe, 1840, p. 342).

If we justify our example through this interest, it is possible to think that musical tones are in reciprocity with color tones. Many artists and thinkers have tried to make connections between colors and sound. The Russian composer Rimsky Korsakow (1844-1908) said that "colors are connected with nature. C major; white, G major, brownish-golden color, D major; daylight, in A major, was said to be light pink, while the American composer Amy Beach (1867-1944) is said to have synesthesia the colors with piano keys" (Rose, 2010, p. 265). These studies show that; While artistic subjects idealize the real world, they reflect the quantitative and qualitative properties they acquire from objects to art objects in a unique language. In this study, we are not investigating the ambiguous aspects of this artist-specific language, but the features that can be transferred precisely and clearly between subjects. Trying to understand the artist's ability to create, his perception of the world and his way of thinking about it can help him to enlighten in the questions we ask. "Cardinal [Ippolito] of Este asked Aristotle about the Furioso of Orlando: "Master Ludovico, where did you get all this cursed material?" When asked a similar question, Raphael replied in his famous letter that he was trying to conquer a certain 'ide'" (Hegel, 2012, p. 280). When we look closely at this answer, it means that the artist has the right to transform it in himself. A creatively minded mind has the ability to transform the qualities, the quantities of things.

 Scientifically, our thesis of reciprocity in perception and meaning-making between artist subjects is as follows; It proceeds from SAV:

In the case of synesthesia, a sensation from one modality (e.g., auditory) may be experienced in another modality (e.g., visually). People can taste shapes, feel sounds, or see numbers and letters in color (...) The surrealist Russian painter Kandinsky (1912) says that "the sounds of colors are so sharp that it is very difficult to find anyone who would try to express bright yellow in a thick voice or a dark lake in a very high-pitched voice" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 375).

Although it can be conveyed as if it were a language to match colors-sounds or sounds-colors above, as some artists did above, the state of synesthesia is still not fully clarified. "Synesthesia occurs in a rule-based way, not a random one. For example, there is a positive relationship between increased brightness and increased pitch of sound" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 376). The world of philosophy has sought this relationship in the intellectual structure of the artist, Hegel draws attention to a cognitive link between memory and interests, saying that "the artist embeds in his memory what interests man, and a deep spirit spreads the sphere of his interests to innumerable subjects" (Hegel, 2012, p. 231). Scientifically, the following experiment was conducted:

Marx (1974) gave participants a series of sounds in different tones. Participants were asked to match each tone with colors of different brightness (...) there is a positive relationship between tone and brightness (...) In assessing the "sounds of colors", it turned out that yellow and white are bright, red and green are medium, and black and brown are dark. There is almost always a perfect reciprocity between colors and sound pitches: high pitches are linked to bright colors, low pitches to dark colors (Marx, 1987a). (Quoted in (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, pp. 376-377).

Scientifically, the starting point of this experiment is confirmed by what Goethe said. Hegel's idea that the artist extends his interests to endless subjects, taking over the idea with his real-world perception and strong memory, also confirms the correlation between sounds and colors.

In full devotion to the knowledge of the external form, there must be an acquaintance of the inner life of man, the passions of his heart, and all the purposes of the human soul (...) Secondly, (...) what the ideal work of art really provides is not only the appearance of the inner soul in the reality of the outer forms; on the contrary, it is the absolute truth and rationality of the performative world that must arrive at the outward appearance (Hegel, 2012, p. 281).

Emphasizing the importance of the artist's perception of the real world and his relationship with this world, Hegel is of the opinion that he can integrate the knowledge of things in the real world with the objects he creates in his ideal world. In a way, this conviction seems to form the basis of the idea of synesthesia. "According to Ramachandran's Brain and Perception Laboratory in San Diego; “... There is a network system in the normal brain. So much so that concepts, facts, and object names are interconnected" (Solso & K. MacLin & O. H. McLin, 2018, p. 377). From this point of view, our thesis that the aesthetic object is structured like a language is getting stronger. "The artist must depict what lives and ferments in him in the forms and appearances in which he has adopted his image and form, because the artist can subordinate these forms and appearances to his own purpose in such a way that they become capable of adopting and fully expressing what is intrinsically true to them" (Hegel, 2012, p. 282). From here, regarding the problem of "liking" related to our thesis, we can say that an aesthetic object has a character that prioritizes appreciation in terms of perception, meaning, and analysis rather than the subjectivity of its response with liking. If we agree that the artist's object is constructed like a language, what he wants to convey in relation to his object must be different from the appeal to taste. For example; with an example of synesthesia; When we make metaphors in literature, such as "black music was playing in my head after he died", it is understood that pitch black music is a music of mourning, and we can find ourselves in a perceptual reciprocity with the aesthetic object that prioritizes appreciation. "The aim of art is precisely to strip away the material of everyday life and the way in which it appears, and through spiritual activity from within, to reveal only that which is absolutely rational and to give it its true external forming" (Hegel, 2012, p. 288). The artist's stripping of material related to everyday life and reshaping it through spiritual activity shows that he has a share of his real object. They can be objectified by real objects and various branches of art, and although they acquire different appearances, they take part in the same real object. For example, we can ask a 'chair' to be objectified separately by a musician, painter, man of letters, dancer, theatre maker and sculptor. Since artists rely on a single object while making this objectification, the denominator of the objects they produce will be common. Therefore, the common denominator is knowable because it carries knowledge. The unknown aspect of this multiple perceptual state, which is called synesthesia, may be that the properties of the object in the common denominator manifest themselves in the form of an ide in the subject. In this case, the perception of the quality and quantitative properties of the objects and art objects we have mentioned by the subject and the similarity of these features between various objects can make them meaningful and analyzable. If the qualities and quantities of an object can find expression in language in literary objects and make us feel the common language more precisely, then music, sculpture, painting, and dance offer a common language other than the language I am already accustomed to. This language can be learned by understanding the artist's mindset. "A composer, for example, can only communicate in melodies what most profoundly moves and enlivens him. What he senses becomes directly the melody; just as what the painter senses becomes form and color, or what a poet senses becomes poetry, the power of design encompasses his structure in sound-coherent words" (Hegel, 2012, p. 285). Unlike the ordinary thinking structure, although the artist's thinking structure in the design process varies between artists of different art branches, it can enable them to meet on a common ground due to the share they receive from reality in terms of the object they create. Multiple perceptual synesthesia seems to support this idea.

 'Synesthesia' is a state of multiple sensation that, to repeat, is "a state of multiple sensation caused by a stimulation in cognition" (Malika & Ophelia, 2018, p. 1). Many artists who profess to have synesthesia experience multiple states of perception. For example, when he hears music, he can also sense the colors and transfer them to his canvas, or vice versa, when he sees a picture, he can match the colors to the notes. In this respect, synesthesia can affect many people differently.

The painter Mellisa McCracken was painting what she heard. Mellisa was asked how she accomplished this. Melissa: I used to think that my synesthesia was normal and that asking about it was like smelling and identifying the coffee in a coffee shop. But one day while choosing a melody for my phone, I saw that a melody had changed my phone to the color blue, then I told my friend that I would choose an orange song to catch the orange. For my friend, this is not normal. That's when I realized that it wasn't an ordinary situation (Denham, 2017, p. 34).

Keeping the appearance of colors, notes, movement, in physical science separate, considering the subject of Synesthesia together with symbols, iconology and emotions in the philosophical sense can help to explain the transformation of different art objects to each other. As in the example above, the notes McCracken heard turned his phone blue, and then he turned to choose an orange song to change the phone's color again. This example shows that the properties of objects learned by the brain can be symbolized and transformed by the subject. In the first chapter, we touched on the importance of the unconscious in the cognitive life of the subject. Jung: "As a general rule, the unconscious aspect of an event is shown to us in dreams as a symbolic image, not a rational thought. Historically speaking, the study of dreams has given psychologists the opportunity to examine the unconscious aspects of conscious mental phenomena" (Jung, 2016, 19). Just like this, synesthesia may be able to analyze this phenomenon by following the traces of the transformation of things by symbolization. Therefore, we first need to investigate the correlation between iconography, symbols, and the subject's feelings and moods vis-à-vis these physical things.

 "Iconography is a branch of art history that deals with the subjects or meanings of works of art versus their forms" (Panofsky, 2012, p. 25). Here, as we have always mentioned, iconography is dealt with by Panofsky by keeping the form separate and the subject matter semantically separated.

When someone I know greets me on the street with his hat off, from a formal point of view, what I see is the change of certain details in a structure shaped by the general color scheme, lines and volumes that make up my world of vision. When I automatically detect this structure as an object (gentleman) and the change of detail as an event (hat-off), I transcend the boundaries of pure formal perception and enter the first realm of subject or meaning. Thus perceived meaning has a fundamental nature that is easily understood, and we might call it factual meaning; This meaning is understood simply by associating some visible shapes with some objects recognized from actual experience and determining the change in their relationship to some actions or events (Panofsky, 2012, p. 25).

This evaluation of Panofsky's is important for us to look at the concept of synesthesia from another angle. The influence of actual experiences, in particular, on sensation and making sense of them cannot be underestimated. At the same time, this experience on things can also apply to emotions. "By looking at the way people I know act, I can feel whether their mood is good or bad, whether their feelings towards me are indifferent, friendly or hostile" (Panofsky, 2012, p. 25). When subjects transmit their feelings to another subject, they become comprehensible to the other. As such, emotions are a form of communication and are comprehended by the other subject in comparison with the similarity of their own feelings. The artist reflects the emotions of the subjects formally on the art objects, and since the object carrying the emotion has the ability to convey an emotional message, it transmits this feeling to the subject who encounters the art object and the subject tries to comprehend the emotion through empathy. "Expressive meaning differs from factual meaning in that it is understood through 'empathy' and not through simple deviation. To understand it, I need to have a certain sensitivity, but this sensitivity is also part of my practical experience, that is, my everyday familiarity with objects and events" (Panofsky, 2012, pp. 25-26). Understanding the emotion of a work of art, then, is within the competence limits of practical experience. In examining the readiness of the aesthetic subject, Spinoza stated that ideas must be in harmony with the object, while Descartes stated that emotions are perception. When we evaluate an object iconologically, we can consider emotion as an integral part of perception, along with Panofsky's discourses, as the visible aspect of object perception. Panofsky also says that we must distinguish three layers of subject or meaning: "The object of interpretation is: 1- The primary or natural subject (A) factual (B) expressive- the world of artistic motives 2- The secondary or consensual subject constitutes the world of images, stories and allegories. 3- Internal meaning or content constitutes the world of symbolic values (...) For equipment for interpretation, practical experience (familiarity with objects and events) is required" (Panofsky, 2012, p. 37). We can say that these three worlds are intertwined in art objects. We can liken the formal structure of art objects to the emotion that the artist imposes on it, an unfolded message waiting to be understood and analyzed. Only with the opening of this message do we encounter a rich world of meaning waiting to be resolved. Just as Jung stated that the unconscious symbols seen in dreams should not be deciphered.

 When the artist subject is given a concept or shown an object (just as synesthesia is also mentioned), he has the ability to symbolize it in the object of art. In the work of a man of letters, it is like a dancer describing a situation or event, a musician describing a waterfall that cascades, a painter expressing a table according to his own style. The movement here is a movement as opposed to the resolution of an art object. Nature and its objects are symbolized, so emotions can also be symbolized. When we look at the work called 'The Scream' by Edward Munch (1893), which is known to the majority, we see a man who formally covers his ears with his hands. This man in the picture his expressive appearance seems quite far from cheerful. When one looks at this painting and thinks in the context of Panofsky's layers of meaning, one might think that he is frightened or anxious in the light of the knowledge he has gained from practical life. Emotions such as fear and anxiety are fundamentally reflective of the world differently to us and are reflected in the subject's mood as uneasiness. Looking at Munch's "The Scream," let's imagine that we are going to dance, compose an eight-measure melody, or make a sculpture, etc. In the context of common assumptions (consensual-images), this eight-measure melody that we will compose cannot be cheerful, the objectified image of the body with dance movements cannot be contrary to emotion or the opposite of the sculptural work to be made. This also runs counter to the rules and concepts of language that point to the symbiosis between subjects, but there may be a number of exceptions, which may arise from art's attempt to exert a surprising effect on subjects. When watching a motion picture in the context of expressive and collapsing images, the movements in the scene shown are supported by music or sound to reinforce the meaning. In a joyful scene, if we hear a melody that makes us feel a sense of sadness or a sense of fear, the knowledge that a bad event will happen to the characters in the next scene is not a prophecy, but expressive clarity. Now, when we return to the concept of synesthesia in the light of these explanations, we can understand how effective Panofsky's layers of meaning are in multiple sensations. Synesthesia, which is sometimes expressed pathologically, seems to be a feature of the artist in the field of art. The structure of synesthetic thinking stands before us as a structure that needs to be understood and even taught. Teaching this structure will also improve the world of perception, meaning and analysis of individuals. Therefore, in accordance with our thesis, we can ask the following question: *Can synesthesia be associated with philosophical theories?*

The theory of multiple perceptions synesthesiais still being investigated today. This type of perception is especially manifested in various ways. For example, letters as food, sounds as color, etc. Multiple perceptions appear to be the combination of the non-object-related qualities of the sense data with the object. Hume, the representative of empiricist epistemology, thinks that we create awareness through the impressions of things, as we have already stated and as it is known, so that we get an idea of thought about that thing. "If we ask what Hume's explanation means, according to it the mind is nothing but a collection of perceptions. Matter, on the other hand, is a fiction, the presupposition used to explain the identity of physical objects" (Priest, 2018, p. 223). This theory tells us about the ability of the subject's mind to construct the object. From the point of view of the theory of multiple perception, when the mind perceives the object, it not only reflects the qualities of the thing in itself, but also establishes the qualities of other objects (that is, those that are not in the perceived object) together with that object. "What establishes the time-long identities of minds and physical objects is also the relationships between the contents of perception that give minds and physical objects their own unity and consistency. These relationships are thoughts realized in the imagination, and imagination is an empirical faculty that makes it possible" (Priest, 2018, p. 223). From the point of view of synesthetic thought, the subject is able to establish the mental identity of an object while establishing its identity with features other than its own unity. But is this fiction a figment of fiction? Or does it depend on physical realities? After Hume's empiricist epistemology and the theory of mind, which forms the roots of the idealist approach, it may be possible to seek the answer to this question in analytic philosophy and phenomenology.

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) approached the language of physics with the idea that phenomena exist in space and time and therefore occupy a place in these fields. "We can have physical and intellectual experience of events. About physical things, we can say that this is hard or this is a gas. But some things do not allow us to touch, such as the rainbow, the reflection behind the glass" (Russel, 1925, pp. 6-7). Russell acknowledges that percepts are mental, but makes an explanation of the nature of perception: "Whatever perceptions are, they are ultimately events (...) In Russel's view, what is really perceived or directly perceived is the sound, color, shape, and size that we ascribe to the object. Russell calls these contents of perception sensory data" (Priest, 2018, pp. 244-245). Sensory data emerges as a subjective process as a result of interaction with things. Because what is directly perceived is what we attribute to the object. Of course, in the light of these data, the subject will have experience about the object and will use this data to identify the next object. When synesthetic perception subjectively constructs this data on an object, for example when it sets the note 'do' as yellow, it can revive the color yellow whenever its ear hears a fragment of the same note. "When we acquire a perception, what we are really perceiving is the perception by our mind of an event that takes place in space and time by physics. What we perceive is not the matter that makes up the tables, chairs, and stars, but the part of the matter that builds our minds" (Russel, 1970, pp. 291-292). Russell says that sense data is "not inherently mental or physical" (Priest, 2018, p. 247). At the same time, he says, "sensory data is data for both psychology and physics" (Russel, 1970, p. 217). Although these two discourses seem contradictory at first glance, they can be considered as both a part of the physical world and the subject of the physical world in the other sense. In particular, the fact that sensory data is the subject of psychology may be important in terms of allowing synesthetic perception to be examined through the subject, and being a physical object, allowing the comparison of colors and sounds, visual or auditory wavelengths and examining their place in perception. In this case, Russel underlined that physics and psychology are related, not alone, in the study of sense data. "A painter wants to know what things look like, and philosophers want to know what they are (...) When we turn a table, which is the biggest proof of this, there is no color, or from another point the color of one part of the table will look completely different, and these colors are in no way more real than the other (Russel, 2017, pp. 9-10). Russell formed his ideas about perception by considering the ambiguity of qualities. In this context, when we evaluate synesthetic perception in conclusion, we can think of it as a phenomenon belonging to mental phenomena, but it is still important to remember that physical data about things will encounter psychological and physical data, as Russel pointed out. As a matter of fact, since the first part of our thesis, we have mentioned that the quantitative and even some qualitative properties of things can be perceived by the subjects in the same way, and thus artists can transfer them to art objects. Looking at the theory of multiple perceptions (synesthesia) from the Russell perspective in the light of psychology, physics, and even mathematical teachings can be useful in terms of clarifying the subject.

 Franz on the case of synesthesia Looking from the lens of phenomenology pioneered by Brentano's (1838-1917) may be useful in terms of examining the subject. Brentano states that "the phenomena of our own inner world can be known by our mind" (Brentano, 1995, p. 22). Brentano *Psychology from an Experimental Perspective* (1974), he distinguishes between mental and physical phenomena. Accordingly, he considers that our knowledge of sounds, colors, and other qualities are mental phenomena, and judgments can be made on these phenomena. He describes physical phenomena as the appearance of images of color, sound, etc. in the mind (Brentano, 1995). The determination of physical and mental phenomena by the mind seems to be possible by the reflection of the mind and the distinction between the mental and the physical. Again, in this context, it is important to know subjectively whether the state of synesthesia is physical or mental through reflection. This determination may be a determinable feature of whether synesthesia belongs to the realm of creativity or the field of pathological. "In Brentano's words, it is presentation" (Brentano, 1995, p.4). The subjects' presentations of things are the content of their presentations of their awareness of things. Again, Brentano made determinations about space and time, thinking that "the raw data, phenomenal sounds, smells and others that reach the subject as sensory input are not themselves located in space, but are spatially organized by the perceiver" (Priest, 2018, p. 278). When we examine it from the point of view of synesthetic perception, it may be possible for the perceiving subject to reach multiple sensations by organizing the data it has received from the stimulus in its own mental space in its encounter with the object in the external world. This different state of perception is the subject's way of constructing the world. "We need to remember that Brentano still tells us about physical phenomena/physical appearances and considers it at least probable that the world as we perceive it is partially mentally constructed" (Priest, 2018, pp. 278-279). Brentano's, *Psychology From an Emprical Standpoint* Its editor, Oskar Kraus, comments on Brentano's use of the term perception:

We perceive some qualities of things with our outward perception. In fact, the sounds, colors, and feelings that things give us are, according to Brentano, spread out over time (...) Perception in the full sense of the word should not be understood as the perception of mountains, houses and forests. The picture given to us in visual sensation goes beyond Brentano's technical 'external perception'. It should not surprise us that the term perception is used inappropriately and in a broad sense; Brentano has repeatedly said that these external perceptions do not deserve to be called "perceptions." (Brentano, 1995, p. 305).

The fact that perceptions are spread out over time and become mental phenomena also gives the possibility of comparing things with each other in the mind. In particular, Preist's example of Brentano's theory of perception can bring a different perspective to the theory of synesthesia (multiple perception).

Phenomena such as pain appear to us as having greatness; For example, a pain may have spread in the lower half of a person's leg, although 'My pain is thirty centimeters tall.' So it's going to be weird, though. Perhaps pains are like the visual field in that they are spatially spread but still do not have well-defined boundaries. In any case, the recognition that some mental phenomena are spread in some sense is sufficient for Brentano's argument against this distinction, because it is part of this distinction that mental phenomena must be purely temporal (Priest, 2018, p. 280).

Although it is open to debate, the fact that sense data are interpreted by the subject's mental processes, and that physical phenomena turn into mental phenomena and find their place in the field of reality, make this mental phenomenon valid in the field of reality. Artist intersubjective reciprocity brings with it a kind of multiple perceptions. The process of mental creation, unlike the process of thinking about sense data obtained from any physical object, is an attempt to bring into existence an object that does not already exist. This striving to exist is the design of acquired perceptions of things in mental time, independent of real time. The aesthetic object exists in mental time and space, before the elongation is reflected in any period of time from the realm of reality. In the field of reality, another artist can carry information about the mental time and space of the object artist when he encounters the object. Brentano's philosophy, in particular, is important in this respect. "He takes steps to claim that mental phenomena are the only phenomena that can be perceived in the full sense of the word. It shows no evidence to reach this conclusion" (Priest, 2018, p. 286). Perhaps Brentano's proof is hidden in the theory of multiple perceptions and the mental processes of the art object under discussion today.

 Artists operating in different fields of art have different perceptions of their art objects in the design processes it objectifies. Accordingly, the type and number of uses of quantities and qualities may also vary between branches of art. When we consider the problem of reciprocity between artists, one will be the aesthetic subject of the other. However, this aesthetic subject, unlike an ordinary subject, is a creative aesthetic subject that can design. Accordingly, we can call it the "upper aesthetic subject" to indicate the difference. The processes of perception, interpretation and interpretation of the upper aesthetic subject are different from non-creating subjects since they are creative subjects. "Perception itself has the character of a judgment, it consists of subject and predicate. Where the mesh layer acts on its own for any reason (without the contribution of a direct stimulus from the outside), as in the case of posterior images and the like, we project color, spots elongation; they are not in our eyes, but in front of us. (...) This phenomenon shows the difficulty of transferring the appearance of objects to the canvas" (Gombrich, 1992, p. 253). The process of creating a work of art brings with it difficulties and problems, The artist is the one who overcomes these thought processes at the same time during the creation of the subject. Therefore, when an artist is given the object of another artist and wants to reflect it on his own object, at the same time that artist subject is left with a problem that needs to be solved. The mental phenomenon that he projects this problem onto the object of the other artist, in Brentano's words, is his mental universe, in our own words. In terms of the relevance of our study, we have touched on understanding and analyzing this mental universe through the art object, determining the aspects of the object that are absolutely knowable, the aspects that are ambiguous, that is, its quantitative and qualitative properties. "Since we can never directly perceive polysemy, we often fail to realize that 'pure' forms enable a fluffy number of spatial interpretations" (Gombrich, 1992, p. 257). We argue that by creating awareness of these pure forms, you can understand the art object to some extent in terms of perception, meaning and analysis. Thanks to the awareness of these pure forms, when the artist subjects encounter the object, it is possible for them to create a new object related to that object, that is, with the characteristics of that object. On the other hand, we have stated that the intellectual structure of artist subjects is different from people who do not create art objects and that they can be at a higher level in understanding this pure aspect of art objects. For this reason, the transfer of the intellectual adventure of works of art and design processes will bring a different perspective to the issues of perception, meaning and analysis in general. Gombrich said, "Nothing gives us more pleasure than our 'ability to emulate,' that is, to expect things that will enable us to share the artist's creative journey" (Gombrich, 1995, p. 271). Understanding this adventure will allow us to re-evaluate the concept of 'liking' about works of art from a different perspective. The problem of appreciation is the subjective interpretation of the aesthetic object, but this study shows us that when we fill in concepts such as perception meaning and analysis by rethinking the aesthetic object, it is more than simply a matter of liking or disliking. Gustav Thedor Fencher (1801-1887) "renounces any objective determination of the concept of the beautiful, preferring empirical conditions of pleasure for the purpose of inductive exploration of its laws" (Roney, 2013, p. 81). Appreciation for beautiful or such expressions is the content of subjective pleasures. However, the search for objectivity in perception, meaning and analysis through the aesthetic object is just as important as the analysis of a common language and making it understandable interpersonally. The analysis of this common language can also take place through art objects. This analysis is not only an ontologically analytic analysis, but also involves the analysis of the multiple perceptions involved in the mental phenomenon of the artistic subject. Therefore, it seems important to examine the perceptual responses in various art objects.

# RESULT

When we consider all the creative and technical skills of an art object, we can observe that human beings are engaged in a cognitive effort different from their daily activities, and we can make sense of this effort in the most concrete way through an art object. From this point of view, art is the name of the process of re-creation or uniquely, both through technique and through a different view of objects. On an art object, it is possible to trace the sensations and compositions of the subject, the perspective on the knowledge of form, the traces and emotions of the conscious and unconscious. When all these data are taken into consideration, it seems that Baumgarten's aesthetic understanding continues to be valid by increasing its margin of justification. Aesthetic objects are waiting to be interpreted as another form of intersubjective communication. The analysis of this language is important for the development of our cultural, social, political and educational life. It is obvious that art has a different epistemological structure and the understanding of this structure by the subjects is also important for individual and social development. Of course, not every person can be an artist; however, it can comprehend the mental properties that the artist projects onto his object and transform the worlds of perception, meaning, and judgment in a different way. As we mentioned in Plato's Ionian dialogue, the fact that the stone of Heracles not only attracts the iron rings to each other, but also conveys the quality in itself to them, can be described as the fact that the object of art does not attract people to itself, but transfers to them the property that is in itself. Although this characteristic from the gods is mentioned as a gift of creativity given to man in the dialogue, this gift seems to be able to share between subjects.

The existence of the aesthetic subject vis-à-vis the aesthetic object, as Aristotle stated, "sensing and actually sensing" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 204) shows the active structure of mental movements such as dissolving and reuniting with the effect of the opposite while performing this act, the analysis in perception and interpretation between the object and the subject. A philosophical examination of the processes of this active structure, whether it involves or not being aware of the subjects, sheds light on the subject of perception. In particular, it is necessary for the objectivity of the judgment to learn what the aesthetic subject, who is confronted with the aesthetic object and who will make a judgment by making sense of it, can and cannot make sense of it objectively through that object. Since the past, there has been a general belief among theorists and society that tastes, colors, and certain qualitative and quantitative characteristics can differ from person to person. However, in terms of our work, just as Kant stated in his Critique of Pure Reason that the limits of reason should know its limits in terms of understanding, drawing the limit of what the aesthetic subject understands through the aesthetic object is important in order to determine and investigate the characteristics of the faculty of understanding. In his *work Prolegomena, Kant states that "*man is so eager to build the mind that after climbing the floors of the tower, he often destroys it again to see how its foundation was laid" (Kant, 2000, p. 4). Kant's attempt to deal with this determination through the aesthetic object is an attempt to objectively justify the tendency of the faculty of understanding to establish it in Kant's words. The question of whether the interpretation and judgment of an aesthetic object, which differs from person to person, is based on a subjective fiction or on the criteria of objectivity, the determination of the processes of making judgments and the limit in this regard, can also provide the basis of objective criteria, first of all the view of aesthetic objects, and even the ability to judge in the philosophical sense.

Art objects, of course, are not phenomena devoid of emotion, waiting to be evaluated analytically, but they have been transferred to the art object and emotions are expected to be evaluated correctly. Descartes wrote that "the perceptions we see as the perceptions of objects outside us (...) it originates from the objects themselves. At least as long as our opinion about these objects is not wrong" strengthens our argument (Descartes, 2015, p. 40). For example, Edvard Munch's painting "The Scream" is controversial in terms of making sense of the emotions of the figure that is still the subject of the painting today. Although it is debated whether the figure screams or reflects a problem with mental health to the subjects, it is certain that the figure does not reflect an image that brings joy and happiness. The emotions that are the subject of discussion are divided into fear, screaming, expressions of mental illness, similar and dissimilar emotions, as Descartes examined in his work Emotions or Moods. Again, with a clearer example, fear, screaming, fear-based spiritual restlessness will be different from acts such as bodily joy, happiness, being energetic. Nevertheless, as we have discussed throughout the work, emotions do not seem as clear as quantities in objects and aesthetic objects. However, current scientific studies are conducting various researches by developing theories that emotions can also be measured quantitatively. In this sense, this question is still relevant in terms of research. However, on the other hand, the fact that the quantitative properties of objects are the subject of perception and interpretation stands before us much more clearly than emotions. As Hegel mentioned, the object/object's "criterion of reality ... is to distinguish [the object] as self-identical" (Hegel, 2011, p. 80). As it will be remembered, Hegel mentioned that in the encounter of the subject with the object, the subject can make various additions and subtractions to the object other than its properties, but this is a problem in understanding what exactly the object is. The object is identical to itself, and it is up to the subject to grasp this identity. The share of every error that may arise from this lack of identity belongs to the subject. When we return to our subject through the aesthetic object, quantitative and qualitative researches of works of art in different fields are the necessity of perceiving the art object as self-identical as possible. What makes this perception mentally possible is the "phenomenological method". In Hegel's conception of perception and meaning, it is the method of phenomenology that the mind returns to itself with orientation to the object and multiplies and decreases the object. In Husserl's case, "let us return to things themselves" is the main slogan of the phenomenological method and describes the journey of the mind on the path of perception. The arrangement of the perceived thing in the mind consists of a series of cognitive processes, precisely the management of this process of the object is possible through the correct evaluation of the aesthetic object. In this case, an aesthetic object in front of us is, on the one hand, identical with itself, and on the other hand, an expression waiting to be (correctly) made sense of as it should be.

The feature of the aesthetic object that is waiting to be understood and presenting itself to us at first sight is its form. Pythagorean philosophy states that we can tell many things numerically. Numerical data is the way we can express objects as forms. The most obvious and well-known example of this is music. Sound and sound groups have mathematically acquired form. In the same way, objects of other branches of art also have form. They are quantities that inform subjects of precise judgment in the evaluation of forms. In this context, Aristotle  *defined in his Categories that* color is a quality and that expressions of magnitude are quantities. For example, when we examine Vasiliy Kandinskiy's Oriantalisches, we see how colors are used in a skillful form. It is highly probable that with a casual glance, it is said that the qualitative features of this table are in the foreground. However, when viewed from the framework of the doctrine of aesthetic perception, it is clearly seen that colors that seem random are forms and are an expression of the aesthetic object. From Aristotle's point of view, it must be reiterated that subjective evaluations have given way to the objective. From the point of view of aesthetic doctrine, Aristotle's teaching constitutes the essence of the evaluation of the work due to our subject. Although this idea is considered as the Formalism movement in terms of the history of philosophy of art, it is necessary for the analysis of an aesthetic object structured by a subject. Although the formalism movement has been criticized as a lack of emotion and the exclusion of content, nevertheless the importance of form has not been denied and the New Formalism movement has been restructured by emphasizing the importance of content. However, in terms of perception, interpretation and analysis, the new formalist theory raises the following question: Is not a work of art a work of art that is encountered for the first time and about which no information is given about its content? However, a work of art can show its content as a result of the evaluation of form information. Not only the aesthetic object, but also factors such as the spatial structure, time and space in which it is located should not be overlooked in terms of the form evaluation of various branches of art. One of the biggest examples of this is Pavement Art. Such works have become an aesthetic object in the relationship of form depending on the space. To give another example, Bedri Baykam's work titled Empty Frame in an exhibition he opened in New York is striking in terms of the subject's freedom to position the frame in the space and to re-form it, apart from his own form. However, an ordinary evaluation may lose its meaning to empty frame work and may face the danger of being passed over as a target of negative appreciation under the title of a liking problem. In the evaluations we have made so far, we have not reduced the art object as an element of appreciation. On the contrary, we emphasized that it carries messages with quantitative and qualitative expressions and that this message should be perceived correctly.

Aesthetic appreciation includes the processes by which the subject perceives, makes sense, and judges vis-à-vis an aesthetic object. "Judgment is a mental act of assertion (approval or disapproval)" (Runes, 1942, p. 157). This definition points to the importance of the concept of judgment. Judgment is again one of the conditions of intersubjective communication. The healthier this mental act is, the healthier the communication takes place. Making judgments is based on knowledge, on the correct evaluation of data. When subjects express their appreciation in the face of aesthetic objects, they actually reveal the judgments of their cognitive processes about the object. It should be questioned to what extent the judgment words we often hear about the aesthetic object, such as "beautiful, ugly, boring, funny, vague, rough, thin, shapeless, balanced, unbalanced", coincide with the objective knowledge of that object.

The subject's interaction with the object in terms of making aesthetic appreciation judgments, its qualitative and quantitative properties, and its ability to comprehend its relationship with space correctly will be effective in its meaning-making and analysis processes. It is possible to say that the subject does not only meet the aesthetic object perceptually with a conscious awareness, but also that it is important in the perception and evaluation of the object in its unconscious elements. While the mind, which turns to the aesthetic object, consciously tries to make sense of the properties of the object in itself, the non-conscious will try to establish consciousness-object identity. Indeed, as Hegel said, reason "understands how to frustrate every fact in order to be able to go back within itself and graze on its own understanding" (Hegel, 2011, p. 61). This tension between subject and object seems to be an attempt at meaning, and this struggle cognitively involves more than one process. The concept of the unconscious we use here is not a state of not being unconscious, but on the contrary, it is the elements that we carry to the conscious state without being aware of it. "For example, information in our long-term memory may remain in an unconscious form or become conscious when activated, or remembered" (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 154). To illustrate this statement through the art object, we can give Sussie MacMurray's work titled "Medusa" from the "Strange Fruit collection" exhibited at Akbank Art Gallery on 13 January-10 March 2018 (MacMurray, 2018). Although the artist's medusa sculpture has the appearance of a woman's dress, the skirt of a female figure in Greek Mythology, whose hair consists of snakes, is the invention of form again in the art object. At this point it is necessary to mention Jung again, as we have already mentioned, according to him the unconscious is not somewhere far away, it is not opposite, but compensatory. Moreover, Jung speaks not only of the subjective but also of the existence of the collective unconscious: "Primordial images are the oldest and most universal 'thought forms' belonging to humanity. These are thoughts as well as emotions" (Jung, 2016, p. 83). MacMurray's Medusa is a very convenient example of primitive forms reappearing in the object of art and the aesthetic subject making sense of it. Aesthetic appreciation is also reciprocity, the relationship between art object and subject is influenced by all these cognitive processes.

Within the scope of the problem of aesthetic appreciation of aesthetic discussions, many theories such as phenomenological, ontological, Marxist, Information aesthetic approaches have been developed. However, when all these approaches are taken alone, they seem to lack a complete answer to our problem. Today, the subject of aesthetics needs an interdisciplinary working environment as in other subjects. Among the theories of aesthetic appreciation and reciprocity, the fact that our preconception is intensively shaped within the framework of aesthetic perception analysis has led us to the conclusion that phenomenological and informative approaches are considered together. In the phenomenological approach, as we mentioned before, the subject is in a process of reflection with the object. This approach is based on Husserl's idea, as we noted above, that the object means nothing but itself. To study the object, which means nothing but itself, seems to be compatible with the informative aesthetic approach developed from a mathematical probability theory. This theory tries to investigate the distortions of the message conveyed by the aesthetic object during the reception by the subject and the effect of foreign elements. At this point, the state of consciousness of the subject vis-à-vis the object, which Hegel mentioned in The Phenomenology of Spirit, and the unconscious effects that we have investigated throughout the work, can be considered as a path illumination about the factors that distort the message in the informative aesthetic approach, and the feature of this approach is closely related to what is measurable, that is, to the quantities and qualities that we have mentioned in the axis of Aristotle. Here, the phenomenological approach mainly allows the cognition of the subject and the informational approach allows the investigation of the properties of the data of the object. From this point of view, it is necessary to investigate the readiness of the aesthetic subject and the aesthetic object in order not to have an incomplete structure of what the perceptual reciprocity is.

The aesthetic subject is the one who will make judgments on the aesthetic object. Within the scope of phenomenal consciousness, the subject turns to the object; afterward; it enters a process of meaning-making by turning back to its own mind. However, before all this, the object in front of it must have its properties. It is at this point that Revonsuo makes a remarkable statement, saying that "if there are no qualitatives, there is no phenomenal consciousness." (Revonsuo, 2010, p. 130). This statement shows the relationship of the world of qualitatives in the subject (in other words, the sum of quantities and qualities of objects) with experience. Subjects base their knowledge on the world of their own qualifications, establish logical relationships and make inferences. In particular, he argues that qualitatives are based on experience, and that Descartes *IV*. and *V*. *We can watch from their meditations. The thinker describes with his words that as a result of his effort to get rid of all the qualities in his mind by the method of doubt, he* does not teach anything new in his encounter with countless particulars, and that he feels like he is seeing them for the first time. This is how Descartes arrived at the idea of an intangible God as an image. secondly, particulars revealed the multiplicity and the relationship of experience. In a sense, a distinction such as Plato's distinction between the audible and inaudible worlds stands out here. Buddha is related to the boundary drawn by the subject in terms of his judgment against the aesthetic object. For example, some subjects may ascribe an abstract message to an object, or some subjects may be regarded concretely as an object of experience. This is the metaphysical dimension of the art object at the same time. Another issue is the subject and the concepts contained in his consciousness. Concept and perception are tightly interrelated. Subjects think, infer and generalize many things through concepts. But often the union of concepts and particulars can be problematic, as we mentioned above, as in Spinoza's example that the rotation of the hemisphere does not misleadingly reflect the singularity of the concept of the sphere. Objects or the singularities on the objects may not be identical to the concepts in most cases, but it may be inaccurate to express them under that concept, even if it is incomplete. This deficiency seems to be a point to be considered in terms of the subject's readiness and judgment towards the aesthetic object. Another point that Spinoza draws attention to is the effect of the subject's body on perception. Bodily motion can move the object as well as the subject itself. The emotions gained as a result of the subject's interaction with objects also become experiences. Emotions have the potential to move the body. The emotions that the subject experiences when he encounters an aesthetic object will again affect his judgment towards that object, and even when he experiences an object similar to the object he has experienced, the emotion he associates with the first object may affect the second object in the direction of making sense and making judgments. As we have mentioned, the structural perception theory, in which memory based on sensation and previous knowledge are also of great importance, seems to be compatible with this argument. In particular, we can trace the roots of the cognitive theory of structural perception  *through the examples given by Leibniz in his work Monadology*. The thinker expresses that emotions remain in memory for a long time but are not as confident as reason, in a sense, as Spinoza argued, "false and imaginary ideas arise only from the lack of our knowledge" (Spinoza, 2017, p. 80). Therefore, in the presence of the subject, the emotions moving the body, or the judgment about the object given by means of it, may not be identical with the mind itself. Leibniz says that memory imitates reason, and this is based on foreboding. Since the structuralist theory of perception includes memory activity in its definition, it seems possible to relate the concept of intuition to memory from the Leibniz window. To look for intuition outside of memory in this sense is to drag it into a kind of unknown.

Intuition has emerged as a controversial concept throughout the history of aesthetics and has been treated as an epistemological problem. Intuition has been defined as reaching conclusions without experimentation. However, whether this result is valid or not is a matter of debate. Leibniz is of the opinion that in the distinction between rational and factual truths, factual truths are probable in the face of the necessity of mental truths. Often we make various interpretations about situations in which we do not know the exact outcome. However, as we have mentioned, experiments have shown that most intuitive interpretations of events and situations are the results of similar events. In this vein, experience memory appears to be active during probability estimation.

Benedetto Croce, who deals with the subject of intuition in the field of aesthetics, argues that the theoretical aspect of the soul comprehends objects, while the practical aspect is related to wanting. The theoretical spirit is that which tends to know. The thinker argues that the knowledge of intuition is an autonomous knowledge independent of cognitive knowledge, and that everyday life is based on knowledge of intuition. By stating that conceptual knowledge is based on intuitional knowledge, Croce also reveals the relationship of intuition knowledge to experience, because conceptual knowledge such as 'water' does not arise without this intuition. As a result, the thinker says that "perception is undoubtedly intuition" (Act. Tunalı, 2018, p. 29). In this sense, the thinker has examined intuition as a cognitive property of the subject, rather than being unknown. According to this, the intuition of an aesthetic object cannot be outside the features that are not present in the object, and in the first encounter of the subject and the object, intuition is important for the identification of the object and these descriptions are related to experience. The experiences we have gained from situations, events, objects in the past can calculate probabilities in new encounters thanks to memory. In connection with the subject of intuition, it is possible to think of things themselves together with the theory of direct perception that they are to us and that leaves us little work to draw conclusions. The fact that an object shows the features that are in itself to the subjects in order for us to perceive can be evaluated directly within the scope of perception. However, as in Husserl's statement, the orientation of consciousness to an object is not a static relationship. What direct perception theory misses is that the mind thinks as if it were static in relation to the object. Given the theory of intuition and direct perception, the source of the contingency of the outcome may be hidden here. The perception of two different melodies played in separate tones as if they were the same can actually exemplify this different argument. In the face of the aesthetic object, the readiness of the aesthetic subject is to bring about many complex processes. His world of concepts, of experience, will at this stage completely influence intuition, emotions, and body movement, meaning, and judgment processes. Here, the error falls on the subjects. The readiness of the aesthetic object is different from the readiness of the subject.

The aesthetic object is the object completed by the artist, on which we can watch his mental acts, the decision of which does not change, and which is therefore obligatory. It is obligatory, it is in itself. However, of course, the readiness of every art object does not have the same formal features, and in this respect, it is necessary to evaluate art objects together with their substance other than the artist. For example, the physical structure and substance of music is different from other branches of art. The object that is completed in itself exhibits an incomplete structure in the state of reciprocity with its listener, the piece of music is not what is there for the listener in a snap, it is subject to time and is completed by process, and the result of this completion is no longer what is perceptible. When we consider the art of sculpture, unlike music, it is ontologically able to remain in time and space as long as it is not destroyed. The sculpture, which has a three-dimensional structure, seems to be incomplete in terms of its interpretation, and this deficiency is realized as a result of encountering the perception of the aesthetic subject. The sculpture, with its three-dimensional structure, needs the body movement of the aesthetic subject. At this point, it is useful to remember Bergson's statement that "the representation of matter is the measurement of the possible movements we can make on bodies" (Bergson, 2002, p. 38). Accordingly, a sculpture can be ready again and again for the aesthetic subject, which allows it to be perceived and interpreted again. The art of painting can be defined as what is there temporarily. The form and content that the artist reflects on the painting is ready. Painting is also subject to the subject's time in terms of its interpretation. To rephrase Bergson's view, painting is dependent on internal time as an external spatial phenomenon. As we noted in Merleau-Ponty, he states that time arises from the relation of subjects to things. When we consider Yarbus's theory of vision, we can say that painting is readily available first as form and then as content. Apart from looking at it haphazardly, capturing internal traits are different processes. Again, according to the theory, the eye tends to focus on what it knows most. As an example of this, we can give that the fact that a fish figure is abstracted into a brand image by turning it into a bony image does not deny and easily recognizes the fact that it is a fish in terms of form.

Performative arts, on the other hand, contain more than one element of sensation. The excess of sense elements will be different from the arts such as sculpture, music, painting, etc. in terms of perception-interpretation and interpretation. For example, it contains sensations such as dance, music (hearing) and visuality (hearing). Here, first of all, there is a living object that is ready before us. The artist "creates his own work (...) it creates from a substance of its own" (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 131). The viewer is confronted with the elements of time-space, movement. Dance, like music, is subject to time and ends when it is completed. Theatre, on the other hand, has quite complex elements as a performative art. As such, it includes the multiplicity of perceptions. As a form, firstly, the structure of the space and the quantitative and qualitative features it contains stand out. Space is designed to be used skillfully, with actors subordinated to the time of this "performative space" (Ficher-Lichte, 2016, p. 185). Ficher-Lichte thinks that what is constructed in the scene is a universal connection, and the stronger this connection is, the more perceptive it has. The fact that the art object carries the force of perception in itself is also effective in its readiness. The form of the theater is the stage, and from there the message is constantly conveyed to the audience, and the subject is present again and again in the face of the message. When we examine readiness in the art of literature, it is possible to say that it differs in terms of its types. For example, a script can be completed when it is staged. Because it can result in gestures and gestures planned for the players and the participation of the whole movement. Poetry, as we have expressed through Schelling, reflects the essence of nature. Poetry is quite adept at ideating the multitude of nature. It preserves the essence of the whole in such a way that, when it meets the aesthetic subject, it contains more data than we can imagine from a small box waiting to be opened. As such, it differs from prose. It extends from the singular to the universal. Unlike prose, poetry is waiting to be analyzed in terms of readiness.

So far, we have made many determinations about the aesthetic object and the aesthetic subject. In conventional approaches, since aesthetics are expressed as objects (objects), they carry the qualities of the object. In this way, "object" or "object" can be thought of as inanimate concepts. By examining the material form of painting, sculpture and music, we have shown that it is distinct from the living performative arts in terms of its substance. In terms of philosophy of art, we also called the products of performative art branches "objects". However, when we consider music, painting, sculpture, dance, the art of literature, the performative arts again, it would be unfair to claim that they are inanimate by separating any one, no matter how different its substance. Whatever the work of art, the cognitive characteristics of a subject; the object of art to which the world of sensation, perception, interpretation, emotion, memory, quantity and qualities transmits such faculties as the skill of skillful use, etc., is alive and awaits to meet another mind; every time he meets, he comes alive again. These encounters lead us again to the question of intersubjectivity and the exploration of dialectical processes.

We can now call an art object and an aesthetic subject as the subject that creates the art object and the subject that tries to make sense of it and analyze it. Just as two subjects use language as a tool to communicate, here the object of art can be perceived as a different language structure used by its artist. Thus, the subject is now confronted with the message given by the subject who created the object of art. The most important problem here is the problem of correctly perceiving the message of the subject who creates the art object. In this case, we can easily say that an art object is structured like a language. This language contains a world of quantities and qualities and needs to be understood correctly. Here the I is in contact with the world of the other (the aesthetic object). When an aesthetic subject interprets an art object, he is in a dialectical process by turning to the object, to his own mind. This process is for making judgments. On the other hand, during creativity, an artist turns to his own mind and transfers it to his object by making judgments as a result of the dialectical process. In the first, there are dialectical processes that are directed from object to mind, and in the second, from mind to object. The aesthetic subject tries to analyze the object that the creative subject has structured, such as language. But can this analysis, the perceptual reciprocity between two subjects (creative subject-aesthetic subject), be exactly identical? This question leads us to mental research. In the study of the mind, the answer to this question is still sought in the German thinker Kant's table of categories, because this table is a data for us to investigate the principles of reason.

Thanks to the axioms of intuition, which encompass spatial magnitudes, we can grasp the quantities of phenomena. In the expectation of perception, it is now processed in sensations that we obtain from phenomena other than intuition, so that we can know the phenomenal world a priori, but nevertheless it varies according to the perception of this phenomenon and belongs to the sphere of experience, while experience is never a priori. In experience analogies, experience perceives the object, determines the path, and acquires knowledge. According to Kant, time itself cannot be perceived, but can be known through the existence of objects in time. Because the mind has three modes of time, continuity, sequentiality, and synchronicity precede and make possible the experience. The conclusion reached by the postuates of empirical thought is; it is possible in terms of the formal conditions of experience (concepts and intuitions), the material conditions of experience are possible by sensation, the universal conditions of experience must be determined according to the actual. The conclusions we can draw from this about what exactly a mind can perceive through an aesthetic object are as follows, for reconsideration: In terms of the axioms of intuition, the perception of spaces, the world of quantity, can be expressed mathematically, the aesthetic object can be comprehended in relation to time of the different art objects we have expressed, the sensations we obtain from phenomena are compatible with the concept of objects. To illustrate concretely through the art object, we can show Kandinsky's work "View Murneu with Train and Castle". At first glance in the table, the train and the tracks and the house catch our eye. If we were to compose a composition based on this painting, it would be similar to Hans Christian Lumbye's "Cophenagen Railway Galop". When we put both painting and music side by side, it is clear how the perception of their quantity meets each other. In the work, which is constructed with a three-way rhythm, our sensation of the train coincides with Kandinsky's train figure. This is the judgment that the aesthetic subject, who has been definitively oriented towards the Object up to this point, can reach on the works. After Kant's explanations about the consciousness of the subject, the "self theory" developed by Fichte, a thinker who has another subject in mind research, in the name of freedom, can offer a different perspective in order to examine intersubjectivity and the artist's processes of creating works.  *When we read the Critique of Pure Reason*, when Kant speaks of pure self-consciousness, we see that the self is determined by itself. It shows us the way how we arrive at judgment through Fichte's theory. The I, the non-self and the divisible self versus the indivisible self is not the establishment of the absolute self, but leads us to the conclusion of the doings. When an artist creates his work, we can perceive the fact that he has a say over his object as a practical form of this theoretical activity. Moreover, this dialectical process can be divided into two as imaginary or oral dialectical process in the field of art. In this case, unlike the art of writing a piece of music, the dialectical process brings with it the thinking in terms of symbols. Fichte says that the mind must become familiar with the possibilities of actions (Fichte, 2006, p. 2016). Thus, the activity of the mole can be limited. Analytical, interpretive and descriptive methods that we can reconcile with the dialectical methods involved in psychology are examined in terms of the subject of judgment. The work created by the artist as a result of both symbols and verbal dialectical process will be distorted and reconstructed in terms of the aesthetic subject's understanding and judgment of the object. As we have already noted at this stage of deterioration, what does not deteriorate is identical in its perceptual reciprocity to remain identical to the work. Here, the problem of intersubjectivity and dialectical process can be defined as the deterioration of perceptual reciprocity.

It would probably not be wrong to say that the formal response of an art object with aesthetic subjects reflects its most objective side. In a sense, the comparison that Plato worshipped between the artist and the mirror in his work The State led us to examine the perception of the work of art and the investigation of the role of forms in this perception from the point of view of the problem of taste. Plato characterizes an artist's projection of reality as it is on an art object as imitation. The clear reflection of the world of quantities and qualities on the art object has led it to discussions of appreciation and has often been criticized on this issue. Can a work of art exist outside the quantitative and qualitative world of reality without reflecting the reality in nature to its audience? Picasso's "Bull" is quite different from the actual image of a bull reflected in a mirror by Plato's expression, but it is nothing but a bull in its quantity. In the same way, we see such abstract works in works of art such as dance, music, sculpture, etc. Without data on the world of quantities and qualities, it seems unlikely that an art object can be structured, but it is possible to create new works with the distortion and restructuring of this artistic subject. Liking, on the other hand, is actually a case of liking or not liking with its general expression. However, it would be unfair to evaluate the function of the work of art only under these judgments and to criticize it under these judgments. Kant argued that "in order to be able to distinguish whether something is beautiful or not (...) we attribute it not to the object, but to the subject and his sense of pleasure and displeasure (...) the judgment of taste is therefore not the judgment of knowledge, and therefore it is not logical, but aesthetic" (Kant, 2006, p. 53). According to him, " (...) the whole relation of designs, increasingly even that of sensations can be objective (Kant, 2006, p. 53). Again, as we have pointed out, since the data on the world of objects we live in are common, it is natural that the connection of designs is objective, as Kant stated. This characteristic of art has made it a part of mystical, intuitive work in past centuries. Under the title of art, studies such as the analysis of works based on intuition among artists, the transfer of perception from one art object to another art object in this way, art therapies have been realized and are taking place. In particular, the transfer of a work of art to its own object by another art branch artist has led to the emergence of mystical movements in the field of art. This movement, which is based on intuition, has been realized especially between music and painting. The fact that a painter paints a musical work or a composer voices a painting has brought the importance of art to the agenda again in perception research, and especially the aesthetic field has been the subject of cognitive studies in this sense. This issue has been the subject of neuroaesthetic studies through neuroscience, taking into account the extensive philosophical literature on perception. Our researches on the qualitative and quantitative properties of an art object, subject and object, (form, temporal properties, perception of the subject, etc.), which we have dealt with within the scope of reciprocity in the perception and meaning of the Art Object between artists and throughout the study, have led us to the research of how synesthetic perception of art objects is also possible in terms of perception.

We see the first traces of synesthetic perception in Goethe. This particular state of perception, called the multiple perceptual state, is possible according to the thinker through the measurable properties of art objects. As we mentioned in his Theory  *of Colors, the thinker's statement is*  equated with the statement that "a piece of music in a flat key is a picture of a soft effect" (Goethe, 1840, p. 342). Many synesthetic-perceptive artists express that music, colors are associated with other qualities, and sense them simultaneously. So how is this possible? If, as Goethe put it, this is possible with the frequency of things, the matter seems quite clear. Today, in cognitive science, he states that "synesthesia is not without selection" (Solso et al., 2018, p. 375). Therefore, it would not be out of place to speak of a direct proportion between the quantitative and qualitative values of objects. Even if we do not have synesthetic perception, we agree that the color black, gray, its sadness, and colors such as yellow, red, green are different from its sadness. Again at this point, we should reconsider Jung and Kant; for in Kant the objectivity of the connection of designs seems to gift us with Jung's collective unconscious. It is obvious that the objectified codes determined collectively in this way will not make us paint a picture of a joyful day of black or gray. If we leave aside the intuitive guesses we have obtained through works of art, we argue that the most objective aspects of form information, which we have been talking about from the beginning, can be conveyed with sharp ground. For example: When we tried to illustrate the song 16 Horse Power, Black Soul Choir (1996 A&M Records), we couldn't help but draw a picture of a walking horse, and for the most part, we would be depicting snowy and rainy weather where we could hear the horse's footsteps. Apart from all these, the place in which the horse was positioned and the environmental factors could not go beyond being a part of the artist's imagination.

Another important issue with synesthetic perception is how it is mentally possible. When we consider the subject of synesthesia again from a phenomenological point of view, we see that we have a dilemma with the slogan "let's return to things themselves". Is the artist here turning to two things in the context of synesthetic perception? Or, "by adding a new quantity to the thing itself, does it again turn only to that thing? To put it more clearly, when he sees red, does he sense the major chord triad in him simultaneously? Or when he sees red, is he identifying the object as a result of the judgment of two different asynchronous orientations? Here lies the effort to bring into existence in another object an object that is not already in sight. Brentano, as we have noted, argues that properties such as sound, smell, and color are not themselves located in time, but are spatially organized in the mind of the subject. The idea that this organization belongs to the subject relieves the question of synesthetic perception to some extent. However, Husserl thinks that "the state of non-directionality, that is, not being 'of' or not being about something, is inherent in certain sensations or is simply given (Priest, 2018, p. 294).

Here the condition and condition that sensations are mental phenomena shows that for Husserl they are organized by the perceiver from the window of Brentano that although they are not related to something, it exists. Is synesthesia a *constitution* problem? When the subject constructs its perception of the object, is it constructing it together with the properties of another object? Husserl makes a determination about directionality here: "Things that are presented in experience (...) it is not two, we do not experience both the object and the directional experience directed towards that object" (Priest, 2018, p. 298). This explanation suggests that since we cannot experience our orientation while orienting towards the object, we are actually simultaneously directed with another object within the scope of synesthesia. But when we qualify with the judgment that quantitative similarities between two objects "look alike," we can turn to the two seemingly mental or objective (things).

Within the scope of synesthetic perception, we attribute the properties of another object to the properties of the object in front of us. Accordingly, when we turn to the object, it may be possible to simultaneously add to the qualities that are in the object that are not in the object, but that belong to another object in the mind. The question that remains open here is whether the qualities of one object are involved in the dialectical process when being added to another object, and if so, whether they are learned. Artists can easily transfer the different impressions they get from things to their art objects; it can transform the world of qualities and quantities. We can call the creative subjects who make such transformations "the upper aesthetic subject". The world of perception, meaning, and judgment of the higher aesthetic subjects differs from that of non-creating subjects. Unveiling this world can be beneficial not only for art and artists, but for everyone else.

Being confronted with an art object, perceiving, making sense of and analyzing that art object is quite different from our daily life experience. Our daily life experience is to repeat the habitual. However, the art object encountered has the need to make sense of it and to reinterpret and analyze it. The object of art can contain meaning beyond what is visible, that is, beyond its form, and the analysis of this meaning is the share of the art viewer. Throughout this book, we have explored a different view of the world of perception through aesthetic objects. The importance of this particular aspect of perception in terms of making sense and judging has been pointed out. Interpersonal communication is important to make judgments in the face of events and situations, and to bring this judgment as close to the ground of reality as possible. Learning the processes such as perception and interpretation of art objects and making judgments can help to gain the perspective on situations and events and the processes of judging correctly in this sense. The question of whether the computable qualities of an art object form are identical in terms of physical response as well as the same quantities, and whether the perception of quality in the context of contemporary neuroscience can provide information as precise as the perception of quantity, can be the source of further studies to be explained.

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