

# CREATIVE MIND



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**IN TERMS OF SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM  
CREATIVITY IN ART AND PHILOSOPHY OF ART**

**MASTER THESIS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The aesthetic creation experience surpasses the regular known form of aesthetic subject-object relationship. It is unfortunately not sufficient to approach the problem in terms of sustaining subject and/or object side in this relation. However, the classical explanation of arts consider the relation according to one-sided approach(es). It is known that the fundamental approaches of aesthetics in the history of philosophy can be reduced to epistemological, ontological or ethical divisions. The contemporary approaches in aesthetics are in need of psychological theories as much as they require philosophical holistic outlook.

**Keywords:** Creativity, aesthetics, subjective idealism, technical arts, imagination.

## INTRODUCTION

In this study, the subject-object-creation relationship in philosophy of art in general is discussed. In the philosophy of art, the subject-object relationship is somewhat different from the general context of the philosophy of knowledge. From the point of view of philosophy of art, it is not important that the objects are knowable, but what kind of stimulus these objects assume. The pursuit/act of art, which appears within the framework of the subject-stimulus object relationship that is directed in classical explanations, is in this sense the subject of both epistemology and ontology. Plato' *s conception of mimesis*, Aristotle's analysis of *tragedy and his view of catharsis are summarized in the first chapter in this sense*, Husserl's conception of consciousness, how the object is seen by the subject in creation and creativity, and in which connections it is perceived. The subject-object tension, which is the driving force of art, shows that the object is re-created and re-created in the aesthetic way of knowing and comprehending. Thus, the aesthetic debates that started on an epistemological basis are carried to the ontological dimension. To think about how objects of creation are formed requires that the object be examined as a complex product of a design process in its own right, rather than as a "thing." This discussion through Hartmann and Berkeley inevitably presents us with the relationship between consciousness and reality. Therefore, the discussion that started with rationalist foundations in the first chapter turned into a review of the relationship between self and perception through Locke and Hume. Such a comparison ultimately culminates in the expression of the relationship between creation and creativity in idealism and the establishment of the artistic in idealism.

In the second part, the subject-object creation relationship discussed in the philosophy of art is re-evaluated through the representatives of subjective idealism. As a result of the evaluation, we see that the meaning that German idealism attaches to the concept of experience provides an important opening in today's design understanding. Thus, creation can lead to conceptualizations such as experience, intuition, transcendence, reflection, factuality, infinity, limitlessness, consciousness, non-self-imagery, wanting, etc. The possibility provided by idealism, especially in Schelling's philosophy, shows how much influence abstract thought can have on a given object. Therefore, when evaluated from the point of view of idealism, the process of creation and creation requires aesthetic intuition,

genius and discussion in the relationship of divine freedom. For this purpose, Hegel's understanding of spirit is also mentioned in the second part. Schiller, on the other hand, examines the concept of impulse, which forms the framework of Freud and Jung's definitions of consciousness, and says that subjective thinking is in itself an imaginary activity. Thus, the process of creation and the creative subject are discussed in idealism in its most competent form.

In the third part, the connection of creativity and artistic act with game theory is discussed and it is investigated in what kind of relations creativity and creativity in art can be understood in the face of technique. Thus, the effects of the idealist understanding prevailing throughout the study on the act of creating in today's technologically based life plane are described.





# CHAPTER 1 THE SUBJECT-OBJECT-CREATION RELATIONSHIP IN ART PHILOSOPHY

## 1.1 SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATIONSHIP IN PHILOSOPHY OF ART

In the epistemology, ontology and ethical debates that make up the history of philosophy, the relationship of the subject with the object has been examined by various views. This relationship involves the possibility, certainty, transferability of object-related knowledge in epistemological research; On the ontological dimension, the question of whether the object actually exists/is discussed is discussed. The examination of the subject-object relationship in an ethical context is based especially on the discussion of the value of the art object. In the philosophy of art, the position of subject and object in relation to each other is important in terms of creation and creativity. Only by determining this position can we analyze the process of "imaginary design" of the subject. From the point of view of philosophy of art, when the subject is confronted with the object, it makes connections between the properties it acquires from it. It may be possible to create an imaginary design by establishing a relationship between the features we acquire from the objects we perceive around us throughout our lives (color, shape, smell, sound, etc.). The perceptual characteristics of the subject and perception can become important at this point in the creative process. Thus, imaginative design also means the conceptualization of the process:

Imagination, the ability to think in terms of images (...) It is the ability to combine and fuse acquired images and to design new images from these compounds (...) An image created by the imagination may not have an objective counterpart in nature, but the basic materials of the created image are the images reflected from the objects (...) (Hançerlioğlu, 1976, p. 75)

On the other hand, design is defined as follows:

Design, on the other hand, is the reproduced image of what was perceived before (...) It differs from perception by expressing what is created through imagination (Hançerlioğlu, 1976: 251).

İsmail Tunalı (1928- ) defines perception as the comprehension of a whole in today's psychology. Tunalı concludes that the activity called "perception" gives us objects and that these objects show us reality. According to him, what is meant by "whole" is the "complex" shown by the sensations provided by our senses and the fact that this "complex" finds support in memory. Such a whole becomes a meaningful whole. Perception is closely related to sensations and they give individual sensations about the external world, our perceptions establish a world of meaning based on them (Tunalı, 2012).

From the point of view of philosophy of art, the reality of objects cannot be considered independently of the problem of the knowability of objects, because art and creativity in art act from the unknown as much as from the known. In addition, art can mean the critical

backdrop of reality and sometimes even the negation of reality. The issue of the knowability of objects (objects) has been examined by epistemology according to certain principles and "isms". The history of the object, the subject-object duality occupies a wide place in the history of philosophy. " 'object' (lat. *The* first use of the word objectum) is in a late period, in medieval philosophy (or not in Antiquity) (...) 'Objectum' means 'in front, in front'" in Latin" (Sözer, 2009: 65).

Önay Sözer stated that the word "objectum" had a dual meaning when it was first used in philosophy, and that it was used in the sense of "what is known" on the one hand and "what actually exists" on the other (2009: 65). According to him, Duns Scotus put an end to this dual meaningfulness, using the word in the sense of "that which is known." But when we look at medieval history, the "known thing" of the Middle Ages is not the same as what we call objects. In the Middle Ages, the object was what stimulated our ability to know. The object is the visible color. Today, when we say "object", we understand a certain objective content from it. In medieval philosophy, the object is a form related to our ability to know. Things that affect our senses have been considered "existing" without debate whether they actually exist or not. For scholastic philosophy, the real reality is substance, god. The object is not substance. The existence of the object is secondary to the existence of the god. In the New Age, especially with Descartes, there were two major changes in the concept of objects. First, the object is granted the existence of material reality. The object has now become something that has a real presence outside our minds. This reality is only designed by our mind, and we can acquire designs related to it. Secondly, the subject who knows "object" was thought of as something opposite to consciousness, and thus the subject/object duality that is at the basis of our present thinking was born. In medieval thought, the intermediary between object and subject (the one who knows) was the god. Descartes abolished this intermediary duty of God, and the "knowing subject" gained independence. In Descartes, the knowing subject is also a substance, a being whose essence is thinking. The chief problem of the metaphysics of the New Age in this case has been the determination of the knower-known. This metaphysical problem reached as far back as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). For Kant, there is in itself, the thing, the material being; But we can't know. The object of our knowledge is the objects of appearances-senses. In this case, design objects take their place in our sensory world as a reflection of the conceptualization of imaginations. For example, the book I'm holding in my hand right now is not a "thing"; moreover, it is a look and design. These appearances do not change according to everyone, but are relative to the mind of the perceiver. In this case, the object that applies to everyone has acquired the property of relativity. Kant tried to liberate the concept of the object from the concept of substance without losing any of its objectivity. The turning point for the concept of the object came with the New Age, which attributed to it the determination of reality, material being. It can be said that the efforts to get rid of the consequences of this materiality through the filter of logic with the help of mathematics and physics have shaped Kant and post-Kant philosophy. Thus, two kinds of object understanding emerge, the "ontological", "being scientific" object and the critical object understanding in the sense of Kant (Sözer, 2009).

Following Kant's critical line, the views both against him and following his line have found their place in the history of philosophy. " Attempts to unite the "thing in itself" and the "appearance", the subject (I), have been traced back to Hegel through Fichte, Schelling. In Hegel, the dialectics of concept and object and the self-realization of concept as object, that

is, the acquisition of "objectivity in itself". In the 19th century, the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1917) reconsidered the concept of the object. Brentano treats the object as "what is heard," just as in the Middle Ages. The object is a meaning, what exists because it is made sense by us. It is the object inside our consciousness, not the outside" (Sözer, 2009: 71). Thus our consciousness is defined as the consciousness of something. Brentano's teaching amounted to psychiatry, so his student, Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920), tried to place his teaching on a realistic basis. In doing so, he tried to reach the object simply by excluding the subject. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) criticized Brentano and Meinong for his own theoretical goals. While extending Brentano's concept of the inner object with the concept of the external or transcendent object, he revived the line of Kant and Descartes by reconsidering Meinong's concept of the subject. Husserl sets out to elucidate the subject-object relationship. According to Husserl, objects are what they appear to our consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand, is the whole of our meanings of objects and the world (Sözer, 2009).

The subject-object debate has been going on throughout the history of philosophy within the framework of epistemology and ontology, but it has also taken its place in the pursuit of art. The relationship between art and the world of artistic thought with knowledge was questioned by philosophy and the *epistemology of art* was born. The relationship between creation and creativity in art has been tried to be explained in the axis of subject-object discussions.

In ancient philosophy, Plato and Aristotle were the first philosophers to treat art as a source of knowledge. Plato takes his place in epistemological and ontological teaching. "According to him, artistic activities cause people to form an unstable mood and develop bad characters. Artists are people who can imitate something without having any knowledge of it" (Worth, 2003). Plato explains this situation in his work *The State*: "If you want, take a mirror in your hand and hold it all over the place. In an instant, you made the sun, the stars, the earth, yourself, all the things of the house, living beings" (596e). As can be understood from this statement of Plato's, according to him, there are two different worlds: the world of real and the world of unreal objects. Plato called the objects seen inside the mirror *eidola*. "Plato calls the objects that he claims to have been composed of universal reason eidol, in the sense of copies of the first examples . Epicurus also used the same term *in the sense of reflection*, according to which perceptions are eidolas and objects are not upappropriate, the word *eidola* is used in the Greek for image (Os. Ghost, Fr. *Fantome*) also expresses its meaning" (Hançerlioğlu, 1976: 17). In this case, when a picture of any object is made, that object is moved from the real world to the unreal world. The artist is just imitating (*mimesis*). The main problem, according to Plato, is that an artist can imitate an object without having real knowledge, while on the other hand he can write a poem without knowledge of courage. The artist, who acts only according to the data provided by his senses, will therefore be wrong in the information he transmits. Plato expresses his thoughts *in the Dialogue of the State* in these words: "-We may say, then, that poets, starting with Homer, are merely parables, whether in their expression of the highest values or in making up anything; they cannot reach the truth itself (...)" (601a). From these statements, we can conclude that Plato did not see art as a true source of knowledge.

Aristotle, unlike Plato, did not accept the belief that art would create a disorder in one's character. According to Aristotle, this interaction between art and man has positive effects on the human psyche. Aristotle, *in his Poetics*, dealt with tragedies and continued his example

through this branch of art: "Tragedy imitates those who act; it does this not through a narrative, but through the fear and pity it arouses, purifying such affects" (Aristotle, 2007, p. 533). Aristotle thus developed the view of *catharsis*. "*Yu, which means purification used in various meanings in ancient Greek philosophy. The term catharsis generally refers to bodily and spiritual relaxation after nervous or excited tensions... Plato regarded death as a catharsis, because by dying a person his soul was freed from the impurities of his body and from his passions. According to Aristotle, music, and especially the art of tragedy, cleanses and purifies people from their passions*" (Hançerlioğlu, 1976: 243). Aristotle *may be considered the first philosopher to think that art could make a difference in the spiritual world of man.*

In the history of philosophy of art, what kind of knowledge the subject obtains from the object remains an important question. Various currents have expressed different ideas about this. For example, the Rationalists denied the sensory aspect of knowledge and regarded it as the product of reason alone. What is sensory in this case is not, according to rationalists, a source of information. On the other hand, the romanticism movement, which was born as a reaction to the enlightenment movement, gave importance to emotions and intuitions and saw art as a source of knowledge for man to make sense of the world. It can be said whether art is a source of knowledge or not, and it is possible to treat art as a source of knowledge in several ways. The first of these sources of information is the source of "*cognitive stimulation*" (Jhon, 2005). Cognitive stimulation is the activation of a person's activities such as thoughts, feelings, perceptions. However, such stimulation may or may not lead the subject to knowledge, understanding the work of art is a cognitive activity, whereby feelings and attitudes towards the work are realized. Another way to treat art as a source of knowledge is to claim that it imparts "*experiential knowledge*." Experiential knowledge is information about what something will look like after experiencing it. This type of knowledge, which is subjective, is more the knowledge of emotions, and

is experiential justification. Another source of information is "*moral knowledge*." Within works of art, it is especially suggested that literature provides moral knowledge. Moral knowledge informs us about how to behave. In this case, moral knowledge is also a concept that includes practical knowledge. Finally, another way of treating art as a source of knowledge is to use the "*art and categories of knowledge*" that, according to this view, art has a role in shaping categories of knowledge (Jhon, 2005).

In line with these explanations, when we look at the information sources of art that Jhon states and includes separately, it is possible to see that the source of cognitive information includes other sources of information. As it is called in what has been quoted so far, "Cognitive, informational, information, design, design) is the mental process of the subject" (Hançerlioğlu, 1976). Perception through the senses, memory are parts of this mental process. When the subject encounters the object of art, he can form experience, judgment and concept in accordance with his cognitive process. In this context, the psychologist approach comes into play. The activity we call art for the psychologist understanding can only be understood by analyzing the emotions of the subject who watches the work of art (Tunalı, 2012: 47). However, the way of analyzing the subject's emotions in the face of the work of art was insufficient for the question of what the work of art was. "At a time when such a psychologism was dominant, the powerful voice of Husserl (1859-1938) in philosophy was raised: *Zurück zu den Sachen*. This reproach was, above all, a voice that had risen against psychologism in

philosophy: "To return to things means to let go of the acts of subject, to return to objects. In a short time, this desire in the field of philosophy leads to the birth of a school of phenomenology" (Tunalı, 2012: 48.).

He rejected the distinction between Husserlian Phenomenology and Kant's "thing in itself" (*ding an sich*). According to him, we can know things themselves through sensory vision. As Kant claimed, "there are no things in itself." Kant also states in *his Critique of Pure Reason* that subjects are not capable of mental vision. Husserl, on the other hand, conceives of consciousness as directionality; The essence of consciousness is orientation and is always the consciousness of something. According to Husserl, consciousness is in constant orientation to the object that actually exists or can exist. He defines all the features of consciousness as *noema* (Cevizci, 2009).

As the structure that allows consciousness to relate to the object, noema is defined as follows:

[N]oema; He expresses phenomenological truth, as Husserl puts it, which he considers neither objective nor subjective. According to him, this phenomenological truth is obtained by eliminating the acts of perception and sense. This is an essence of reality that is detached from the object, but has not reached consciousness. Husserl enumerates this phenomenological essence between the real (in the object) and the truth (in the subject), and considers it in the sense of what is in thought (Greek. Noesis) (Hançerlioğlu, 1976, p. 268).

The influence of Descartes on Husserl is evident in his movement from the thinking self. Every consciousness has an "object." In phenomenology, objects do not exist in reality, but in consciousness as phenomena of consciousness. In our daily lives, objects are concrete, and in the phenomenological approach, objects are not real objects but ide. However, the knowledge of the object arises as an act of consciousness, so the knowledge of that object is a clear knowledge. According to Husserl, when we perceive a person or object, we cannot infer that there really is a person or object there. The person we perceive also makes sense of the world through his own consciousness; *Noema* is always a person's *noema*. On the other hand, in our encounters with physical objects, it is not the sense data obtained from the visible, but with the sense data we cannot make an inference about the object being there. What makes it possible for us to see the object is *that our current noema* is the noem of the object (Cevizci, 2009).

On the other hand, in Husserl, the subject of "someone else's I" is very important. In Edmund Husserl's *The Problem of Someone Else's I*, Nermi Uygur describes how Husserl approached the subject and how it should be handled:

There is no doubt that the "I" referred to here indicates a thing-state that is completely different from another man's self. When we say the I of another human being, I generally mean my congeners, the I of my congeners: the I of those with whom I live in a common social-order; it is a meaning established in natural behavior, within the framework of that behavior. Others, other I's, constitute one of the various being-forms that make the general assertion of natural behavior. Indeed, *Husserl* took other I's to the broad-lined description of the basic assertion of natural behavior in *Ideen's* first book to make way for *reduktion*: Other people are "here for me without intermediaries; When I look up, I see them, I hear them approaching, I shake their hands, and when I talk to them, I directly understand what they are designing, what they are thinking, what emotions are agitating inside them, what they wish for or what they want. They are in my perceptual field as facts, even when I am not paying attention to them." "Just as I myself am an I-subjectjekt (Ichsubjekt), I recognize and accept them as subjects, experiment by experiment as human beings; they, like me, are in contact with their natural environment. But it is such that I objectively conceive of my own environment and their environment as one and the same world;

but this same world brings consciousness in each of us in a different form." Husserl's brief explanation reveals two crucial qualities of the meaning that the phrase 'someone else's I', 'other-I's' or 'others' must have at the base of natural behavior. Other I's are, first, *entities*, inherently part of the real world in one way or another. (Uygur, 2007, pp. 49-50) On the other hand, "(...) ' When we say 'I of someone else', we are not referring to someone else's I in the natural sense, but *to someone else's I in the transcendental sense, that is, the natural meaning is the bracketed area "someone else's I".* (...) Therefore, when investigating someone else's self, it is absolutely necessary to remain on the basis of transzendent-phenomenology" (Uygur, 2007: 51).

Husserl, who argues that there is no world independent of consciousness, explains that the world is structured by the expectations and assumptions of the subject who experiences the world. "The world is a world that exists relative to me. Moreover, Husserl argues that the world that the natural sciences explain and unfold is a world that is structured or shaped by a set of assumptions that are self-evident and absolute, starting with the assumption that 'objects exist independently of the observer'" (Cevizci, 2011: 216). Within the framework of these discussions, ontology claimed that phenomenological aesthetics overlooked real existence. Ontology is the field that investigates entities and their types. Art ontology investigates what kind of existence a work of art has. The existence status of the works given by various art styles is different according to the ontological view. For example, the ontological status of a piece of music or painting differs. On the other hand, the prevailing view in ontology is that works of art are physical objects. In this context, Tunalı compared phenomenological aesthetics and ontological approach and stated: "Phenomenological aesthetics, with the formula 'let's return to things', ignores the real existence of objects by understanding things and phenomena as an ideality, as an essence [*eidōs*] stripped of reality, and as a natural consequence of this, it moves away from the attitude towards real existence" (Tunalı, 2012: 49) Tunalı argues that phenomenological aesthetics are works of art he claimed that he did not succeed because he had overlooked his existence.

## **1.2. WAY THE OBJECT IS SEEN AND PERCEIVED BY THE SUBJECT IN CREATION AND CREATIVITY**

The problem of phenomenological aesthetics' inability to cover works of art that arise in various conditions of existence becomes a question of how the object of art is seen and/or perceived by the subject, not what it is.

The new problematic of how the object of art would look, how it would be understood, and its formal perception was of particular interest to 20th-century thinkers. Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943), in his *Principles of Art* (1938), opposed the physical object view by introducing a view called "imaginary being". According to him, in the creation of works of art, unlike physical objects, imagination was essential, it was what was in the composer's head before a musical work became a physical object. On the other hand, imagination was necessary to see a work of art. Richard Wollheim, in his book *Art and Objects* (1980), proposes the *type-sample* theory, arguing that *different types of works of art are not physical objects, but types*. Accordingly, he states that works of art are types and copies are examples of these (Thomasson, 2004, pp. 82-83).

Thus, the tension between subject and object still persists and the debates remain relevant. Especially on the plane of creation and creativity, the mutual position and relationship of subject and object should be shed light in order to explain these processes. In the background of all these historical developments, the questions of how the subject perceives the object and what kind of consciousness he establishes in the process of creating the work of art are unanswered. In terms of creation and creativity, the approach of both ontological and phenomenological fields to the object may not be sufficient alone to explain this process.

In his book "Introduction to Aesthetics," *Dabney Townsend* addresses the question "what is an object?" and gives definitions:

In its most general sense, the object refers to physical beings that are inanimate, such as stones, trees, and books, and alive, such as dogs and humans. But 'object' can also be used as a more neutral term, expressing everything that man can think of. A number is an object, but not a physical object like a stone. Although they do not have separate identities like numbers, 'goodness' can be thought of as an object. Goodness exists only as a quality of something good, and we can refer to it and think of it as an independent object. In the case of physical objects, it is assumed that we know a lot about them; that they belong to a class of objects in which they exist, that they have a certain kind of reality that we can perceive, that they can be separated from other objects and determined (Townsend, 2002, p. 103).

According to the answer given to the question "What is an object?", the objectification of the non-physical can only take place through an artistic act of creation, except for physical objects such as tables, windows, stones, glasses, etc. that we encounter around us in daily life. In this case, the abstract concepts experienced by the subject, such as good, evil, happiness, unhappiness, can become physical objects.

Abstract concepts interact with meanings attributed to physical objects. "We can design some pretty interesting combinations: a beautiful round square or a sky-blue pink angel. Such combinations have led some thinkers to think that not only imaginary objects, but even non-existent and impossible objects exist. Just as there is no sky blue pink angel, such a mixture of colors is inherently contradictory" (Townsend, 2002, p. 104). Townsend states that these objects do not exist alone, but refer to a possible world even if these objects do not exist in the plain sense (Townsend, 2002). Objects that refer to the possible world and are not in the real world can bring us to the metaphysical understanding of objects. Objects that are not already in the real world can be thought of as a design of the creative process. Many objects that are considered impossible in artistic, technical and scientific creativity are presented to humanity today only by creative subjects. Objects that do not exist in space and time are considered abstract objects. However, the ontological embodiment of these abstract objects in thought can be possible through the objects of creation.

Concrete objects are all living inanimate things that exist in space and time. For example, a certain person, a certain horse, a certain piece of rock, a certain atom is a concrete object. By abstraction from a concrete object, that is, by means of the extraction of certain properties, we will call the resulting object an abstracted concrete object, or in short, a semi-concrete object. For example, the non-mechanical, let's say electromagnetic, properties of an object studied in mechanical physics are abstracted. Thus, a semi-concrete object with only mechanical properties is obtained (Grünberg, 2003, pp. 33-34).

As it is told, the creative imagination, the transition from the concrete to the abstract, or the abstraction about the semi-concretely transmitted objects can be thought of as a combination



of concrete objects. The relations between the given objects, the properties of these objects in themselves, the secondary conditions of existence that can be carried or related to each other can form the possibility, the basis of abstraction. Thus, the process of mental creation of the subject, although it seems to involve abstraction in itself, is obtained through concrete objects; it works or appears. The object of creation, as a result of the ability to abstract from concrete objects, turns into a concrete object again.

When we look at John Locke (1632-1704) in this context, we see that he said that the objects of thought appear as ideas:

Ideas are objects of thought. There is no doubt that there are such ideologies in people's minds as the words 'reason', 'thinking', 'motion', 'man', 'elephant', 'army', 'darkness' and other words describe: the first thing to be investigated is how he acquired them. All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Experiment is the basis of all our knowledge, and all of those tools are derived from it. What endows our momentary with all the tools of thought are observations either on external sensible things or on the inner processes that our mind does in relation to what we perceive or think (Locke, 2013, pp. 97-98).

The subject can construct new object designs in the field of creativity with the abstraction he makes through external objects. Also in this context, we can make use of Locke's concepts of simple and complex ideas.

Simple ideas, unjoined appearances, complex ideas, the mind made them out of simple ideas. The mind, which is completely passive in the acquisition of simple ideas, performs many actions to make ideas other than simple ideas, which form the means and foundations of all its ideologies. The principal acts by which the mind exercises its power to its own simple ideologies are the following: (1) Combining many simple ideas into one compound idea; (2) The second is to take two ideas, simple or complex, and put them side by side in such a way that they produce a view of the two together, without combining them into a single idea; The mind acquires all its *ideas of correlation* in this way. (3) The third is to distinguish ideologies from all the other ideologies that accompany them in their true existence; this is called abstraction (Locke, 2013, p. 143).

Thus, according to Lock, a new object design can be created in the mind with the abstraction obtained through objects. For example, when we talk about objects that are the subject of our perception in our daily lives, when we abstract the iron pipe of an ordinary vacuum cleaner, the wooden door of a cabinet from its main objects, it is possible that we will get a new table. The vacuum cleaner and the wooden cover of the cabinet are abstracted from their other main objects and combined into a new object of creation. The resulting table is creative enough to exceed the ordinariness of the objects used as materials. The created table will be different from other tables. Locke speaks of "intentionally made objects":

The mind has the power to change and multiply the objects of its thoughts far beyond what sensation and reflection provide to it; Once the subject has acquired simple ideas, the mind is no longer confined to observation and what is offered from the outside; combine his own ideas with his own eye, and he makes new complex ideas that he can never acquire unjoined in such a way (Locke, 2013, p. 144).

When we consider how the objects of creation are formed in this context, the "pink angel" that Townsend points to as an example may not seem inherently contradictory to the mind. The color pink, abstracted from a wiper, the wings abstracted from the bird, can be made the physical tangible object of goodness. As Locke put it, objects made voluntarily can be objects of mental design, objects of creation. The abstract object that is in the stage of design is still inherent in consciousness and can only be perceived by the subject. This object is not

ontological in the external world. However, only the abstract object, which is in the form of a project, can be moved by the subject into the realm of being.

The most fundamental feature of a real being is that it is an "object of knowledge". When we look at Nicolai Hartmann, "the real-field of existence is something that is determined by the laws or categories of real existence. It is something that is known for its information acts. So what is at stake here is *objectivity*. Objectivity shows that an entity is a subject of consciousness. In contrast, the work of art is an *objectivation*. Objektivation is decisively different from objektion" (Tunalı, 1989: 53). Objectivation is the manifestation of something that does not exist. "What is at stake in Objektion is the objectification of something that exists. In contrast, objectivation is the creation of something that does not exist. In Objektion, the live spirit (Geist) is only the receiver. In Objektivation, he is creative" (Tunalı, 1989). However, the subject who encounters the object at the stage of mental design imagination can be active rather than passive, not only receptive. In the mental design stage, it can load various properties that it abstracts from other objects with the object, or it can subtract some properties from the object again through abstraction or combine them with other existing objects. The mind, which carries out activities such as loading, subtracting and merging, can play an active role in the creation phase in its relationship with the existing object (object). In this case, the creation process can begin at the stage of encountering the object.

The subject's encounter with the object is one of the elements that triggers the creative process, and it is the conscious person himself in the creative act. In this activity, the artist or scientist encounters his own world. In this encounter, in the process of creation, the subject can realize his imaginary design in line with the information he has obtained from the object. A dialectical relationship can be formed between subject and object.

[Information, in terms of the subject, is the comprehension of the object; information in terms of the object is the transfer of the properties of the object to the subject, the image or design in the subject is directly determined by the properties of the object. In order to know something, the subject has to turn to the object as the thing in front of him, to reach out outside his own space. The prerequisite for the subject's ability to objectify something is that he leaves his own space. But if the subject does not return to his own sphere, he will not be able to become conscious of what he has grasped. Therefore, in order for an acquisition of knowledge to take place, the subject must leave his own field, objectify an existing thing, and then return to himself. Thus it is seen that knowing shows a triple structure; going outside oneself, being outside oneself, and returning to oneself again (Hartmann, 2010, pp. 8-9).

The subject, who goes outside himself and turns to the object, may encounter his 'own world' at the stage of returning to himself again in the creative act. The subject can create a new object image by designing the object to which it is directed differently in the mind. The subject can obtain information from the object in the direction of his perception and synthesize this knowledge in his own world.

When we consider the ontological view of the triple structure of knowing expressed by Hartmann, going out of itself, existing outside oneself and returning to oneself again, "the transfer of what is happening in the third stage to the subject is nothing but the reappearance of the qualities of the object in the contextual formation of the subject, in the knowledge or in the image of the object" (Hartmann, 2010, p. 9). In the process of creation and creation, the subject can perceive the information of the object in line with his own sense perception and

process the information he perceives in the design process. The subject, who enters the process of creation, can create images with the abstractions he makes from the objects he perceives during the design phase.

Looking at the subject of Nese and perception from the point of view of idealism, according to George Berkeley, one of the leading representatives of Subjective Idealism, "the existence of things depends on their perception. What else do we perceive but our own ideologies and our own sensations? Whatever we do to comprehend the existence of objects, we think only of our own ideologies. According to Berkeley, according to someone who is blind from birth, no object can exist unless it is perceived" (Öktem, 2003: 143). In this case, the subject can go out of itself in line with his own perception, encounter / meet the object and create his own design.

The different functioning of the sense organs in the subjects, their perception of the object can be effective at the design stage. A designer who cannot see the eyes will establish his relationship with the object not by seeing but by other sense organs, and in this direction he can create the image of creation differently from a subject who sees the eyes. In this case, Berkeley's understanding of perception and the example he gives through the 'blind subject' are limited by the function of vision. When we reproduce this example, when we add the functions of the other sense organs to the subject as an aid in evaluating the object, it may be possible to see that it makes sense and depicts the object in different ways with other functions other than the visual function. In the process of creation and design, the existence of objects may depend on the perceptual characteristics of the subject, and only through abstraction from the perceived objects can a new object image be designed. The problem of making sense of what the object is, the problem of existence and design, seems to lead us to the problem of reality and truth.

### **1.3. CONSCIOUSNESS-REALITY-TRUTH IN TERMS OF PHILOSOPHY OF ART**

Man as an existent brings with him what does not yet exist. This "non-existent" carries a certain potential in the field of creation and creativity in the artistic sense. On the one hand, it can be said that man is an existent, between the other existing and the non-existent. At this point, the reality-truth problem becomes very important in the artistic sense. "Truth, that which exists concretely and objectively, independent of (real) consciousness... Reality, the quality of what is real... It is used as the counterpart of what does not exist... Truth (*fr.verite, ing truth*) is the reflection of objective truth in thought... expresses its subjective reflection in our minds" (Hançerlioğlu, 1976, pp. 214, 220 and 276).

In line with these explanations, it is possible to say that art changes the existing world of man and creates a world of meaning. Man can also provide this world of meaning by building a bridge between reality and truth. "The fundamental subject of philosophy is being. The problems of truth, truth, thought arise from the problem of being (...) To say that something exists or does not exist, we express it by necessarily being present (*etre*). When we say that

this thing does not exist or that there is absence, we inevitably show all these attitudes with being (etre)" (Ülken, 1968: 94). Debates revolving around existence, truth, and reality have been examined by various thinkers who have been at the forefront of the history of philosophy. Reality and Truth are closely related to the concept of the existing human being, "I", that is, "subjectivity", the mind. Only by clarifying these concepts can it be possible to comprehend creation and creativity in art.

In this respect, within the scope of philosophy of mind, the concepts of "mind", "thinking", "consciousness" and "subjectivity" have a central importance in the philosophy of art, especially for the subject of creation and creativity, in terms of its relationship with reality and truth. These concepts are interrelated concepts and can form the main elements of creative thinking in the artistic sense. The mind's capacity to think contains understanding and consciousness. Thinking is a mental act. Many of the human actions are performed by this activity. Making decisions, solving any problems, etc. Consciousness is "the ability of man to know himself and his environment, consciousness." TDK: *consciousness*). Subjectivity means to have all these mental characteristics and to make sense of and interpret the world in this way.

Every work of art implicitly carries its creator within itself. The world we see in the work is primarily the artist's world, and in a broader context, the whole world. No matter how far we pull ourselves back while creating, we participate in a whole world in our work (Timuçin, 2013: 69).

As understood in these sentences of Afshar Timuchin, artistic creativity is largely subjective. In this context, the artist participates in the existing world with his own world and can cause change in this world. In this context, from the point of view of subjective idealism, which "subordinates the existence of the physical world to the establishment of the human mind or makes it dependent on its perception by the mind" (Cevizci, 2014, p. 345), consciousness, self-knowledge can be important in the establishment of this world and reality can be important in terms of the truth problem.

In the 17th century, John Locke, in his *essay on the Human Moment*, first used the term "consciousness" in a way that was close to its common meaning today. According to him, consciousness, the internal states of a person are connected with subjectivity. The person is directly aware of their own mental state through the introspection method (Locke, 1996). Mindfulness is another philosophical problem linked to consciousness, and it's a problem with what we can and can't be conscious of. For example, when we listen to a piece of music, we may be aware of the notes we hear, but biologically we are not aware of how hearing functions in our bodies. Therefore, in the problem of the perception of reality and what exists, the biological processes of the person can also gain importance. On the other hand, the debate about whether there are situations that we are conscious of or not has an important place in philosophy of mind. At the same time, "being conscious" is a necessary condition of being conscious of the external world. According to Descartes and Locke, to be conscious in this sense is to be aware of what is happening around us. Therefore, the person is also conscious of what is going through the mind and what is going on. The coming together of the desires, feelings and thoughts that the person has takes place again thanks to consciousness. Locke states that "consciousness is always with our feelings and perceptions, everyone is what he calls himself, for himself, myself" (Locke, 2004: II, 23, 9).

According to Descartes, who made more detailed investigations inspired by Locke's observations on consciousness, the mind sees its own contents with its own "eyes". However, Sigmund Freud stated that many mental states occur in the unconscious, especially emotions and desires. These discussions have opened up debates about what we are conscious of and what we are not. While some thinkers believe that there are neural states that we are not aware of, the other part has developed the current of *epiphenomenalism* with a materialist orientation. "Epiphenomenalism proposes that states of mind that have no causal forces depend entirely on the central nervous system, or the brain... Although it does not deny the existence of conscious states of mind, it considers them as a by-product or shadow of physical states" (Cevizci, 2014: 158). These debates can be important in terms of what we are or are not aware of, and the connection of our state of consciousness to reality and truth. Neurological findings show that some psychopathological disorders create differences in perceptions. One of the most important findings on this subject is a neurological disorder called "*blindsight*", which makes some areas in the person's field of vision invisible. Larry Weiskrantz (1989), who is known for his experiments with patients with blind visual impairment, tried to provide an answer to the question of whether each mental state is aware of the person. In the experiment, the patient was asked what he saw by projecting a red square light onto the area with blind vision. Although the patient states that he did not see anything, he is asked to make a guess. The answer received is close to the truth. These patients process sensation information in their brains and have knowledge of what they see. However, this whole process takes place outside of their consciousness and they are not aware of what they know. The patient is sighted but lacks visual awareness. Weiskrantz interprets this as a damage to consciousness (Weiskrantz, 1989).

Within the scope of these experiments, the question of how reality is perceived and how truth is mentally constructed by subjects continues to be discussed around consciousness. Different perceptions by people according to sensory characteristics (subjectivity), the reflection of objective reality in thought may be important for the establishment of "artistic truth". Self-consciousness is linked to self-awareness, perception, making sense of the world, one's mental state and doings. David Hume *said of "self and perception," "I think that if I were to get closest to what I call the self, I would always be struck by this or that particular perception of warmth or coldness, of light or shadow, of love or hate, of pain or pleasure. I can never capture my self without a perception, and I can never observe anything other than perception"* (Hume, 2010, p. 240). Hume states that the self can be captured by perceptions. On the other hand, Kant argued that "experience is empirical knowledge, e.d. it is knowledge that determines an object through perceptions. It is a synthesis, then, of perceptions that itself is not contained in perception, but involves the synthetic unity of the multitude of perceptions in a consciousness. This synthetic unity constitutes the knowledge of the senses *of objects*, and the essential aspect of experience (...)" (Kant, 1993, p. 235). According to Kant, thanks to self-consciousness, thanks to one's abilities such as perception and imagination, one establishes a design world and maintains the knowledge of this world under the same self. While Hume claimed that there is no principle that allows our various perceptions to coexist, Kant claimed that our designs are synthesized by self-consciousness. Kant's theory caused us to perceive our multiple and disparate experiences as activities of the subject. Reality has been accepted as "the permanent and continuous entity behind everything or appearances that exist, independent of the perception and knowledge of the subject" and this entity is different from the designed world of the subject (Cevizci, 2014, p. 194). From the ontological point of view,

knowing is an act that extends beyond the subject. Hartmann writes that "it is necessary to draw a line of demarcation between truth and being. To assert that truth is relative is at least a meaningful thesis; but it is meaningless to carry truth into being and to speak of the 'relativity of being'" (Hartmann, 2010, p. 12). But objects of artistic creation take shape in the subject's design world before there is a physical existence in the real world. It is precisely at this point *that the* relative reflection of real objects that are described as truth against the minds can create a new physical existence. Accordingly, a picture or piece of music joins the (real) world of the have-and-is. Again, these physical entities (real) are presented to the perception and experience of the subjects. In this case, the human being who exists between the truth and the truth can act as a two-way bridge. This dichotomousness between truth and truth in artistic creation and creativity can also demonstrate its informational nature.

Similarly, Henri Delacroix argues that consciousness unites and compares "the world" and the "I." According to him; only the unity of thought unites the opposition of these two terms. The consciousness of the universe surrounds the consciousness of the subject, the subject can perceive himself as perceiving the universe. Every consciousness is the center and part of the universe. The condition of all existence is consciousness. Wherever there is it, there is activity. According to Delacroix, *spontaneous consciousness* and *conceived consciousness* are separate things. *Spontaneous consciousness* is the direct consciousness that a person acquires from his own life, from his existence. *The conceived consciousness* is the consciousness that it obtains by orienting itself in a rational and discriminatory attitude. Within the history of philosophy, while classical philosophy assigned a dominant role to the subject with competence, contemporary philosophy doubted this competence. Nietzsche stated that the subject would not be fully competent, but was blind or half-blind. Freud, on the other hand, expressed that consciousness is not opposed to mental activities with the concept of "unconscious". In Aristotle, consciousness corresponds to all human activities, to all mental and intellectual formations. The Stoics saw consciousness as intuition, Descartes expressed it as the essence of the soul, thought itself. According to Leibniz, consciousness sees the true nature of the substance, the essence of the soul. Two of the philosophers who saw consciousness as the direct knowledge of itself and other things were Kant and Hamilton. According to Kant, consciousness can never reach being itself. The formal unity of consciousness is the objective condition of all knowledge. According to Hamilton, consciousness reveals a subject-object relationship, and since these two are connected, all information is relative. Hamilton is opposed to the definition of consciousness because he thinks that consciousness cannot be defined. On the other hand, in Marxist thought, consciousness is the consciousness of the objective world, that is, the world of its realities. This consciousness is a consciousness acquired from the world and carries it in a power that will transform it. In another respect, Merleau-Ponty's approach to consciousness clearly distinguishes between things and consciousness. According to him, things that exist exist either as things or as consciousness. In Husserl, consciousness is the consciousness of anything. With this statement, Husserl states that there can be no consciousness without content. With the subject's active orientation to the outside of himself, consciousness becomes the consciousness of "something". Just as every consciousness is the consciousness of any object, every object is an object for consciousness (Timuçin, 2004).

These debates on "consciousness" in the history of philosophy also seek answers to the questions of reality and how to perceive reality. Where reality is located in relation to

consciousness and what truth is can also be very important in the process of artistic creation. The question of where the objects of artistic creation, which have joined reality to the world of what exists in the history of thought, stand in reality, has brought about the necessity of investigating what kind of mode of being these objects carry. Reality is the modal category that determines things in time and space, that we grasp with our senses. In Nicolai Hartmann's theory of layers, the real entity determined by the modal-category is spread over a wide area. Within these categories of real beings, the fields of inorganic, organic, psychic and living spiritual beings also enter. However, within these categories of real beings, aesthetic objects are not encountered. Works of art have a real being, but they are not a real entity. Even if they are done in accordance with the real example, they are not real assets. According to Max Bense, the concept of "aesthetic reality" introduced by Teodor Lipps into aesthetics can be defined by the mode of participation in reality. Accordingly, the work of art has a certain connection with reality and receives a share. Even if the work of art is taken to reality and partakes from it, it cannot be imposed on it in its entirety. According to Nicolai Hartmann, the work of art has a connection with reality, but this connection alone cannot explain the way the work of art exists. According to him, the work of art is an entity based on objectivation. *It is an objectified spiritual being*. The existence and mode of existence of the work of art will be explained by this objectified, ontic structure that we call spiritual existence (Tunalı, 2012: 66-72).

Reality, the real thing itself, the essence of what is real, the existence of the external world, everything that exists is the active one. Reality should not be confused with truth. Righteousness manifests itself in judgment and is related to the affirmation of reality on an intellectual level or in our minds. Henri Delacroix is of the opinion that the world of reality is not the world of truth, the world of reality is only a condition for the world of righteousness, and he argues that it is a function of thought. On the other hand, Delacroix states that man's spiritual activity transcends what is not and opens up to the realm of the possible completely, and that although dream and reality seem to be opposites, they can be complementary elements and appear to be a face of reality. J. Joubert says that the dream is a reflection of reality, that reality is relative not as the absolute, but as what appears to be reflected in man (Timuçin, 2004).

In the process of creation and creativity in art, exactly where reality is located in relation to the subject can be quite important. Alfred de Musset formulated this as "reality is a vision." From time to time, dreams are so active or appear that they are effective enough to determine reality, so that it becomes impossible to distinguish between the reality in the dream and the dream in reality" (Timuçin, 2002, p.230). According to the artist, dreams can be effective enough to determine reality. As a matter of fact, as a result of mental design, the products of artistic creation cease to be an abstract thought and participate in the world of the existing ones by becoming concrete. In this context, Hegel sets out to answer the question of whether art is an appearance, a delusion, or an illusion. Hegel argues that appearance is essential to the self. "Truth (wahrheit) would not be truth if it did not manifest itself or appear in appearance, if it did not exist in the 'Spirit' in general, as it does for itself and for anyone" (Bozkurt, 2005, p. 162) On the other hand, it continues with a striking expression, "We are accustomed to give the outer and inner world, these two worlds, the name and value of active reality and truth even in our experimental life, that is, in our life in the world of phenomena; however, we also accept that art lacks the same reality and the same truth" (Bozkurt, 2005: 162). Hegel says that

true reality must be sought and found beyond the directly perceived objects, according to which there is no truth other than that which is in itself. Everything that presents itself to appearance in space and time, that continues to exist in itself and for itself, is the true truth. What art reveals and makes visible is the action of this universal force. Art reveals the truth contained in mere appearances from the deceptive and misleading forms of the world (Bozkurt, 2005).

Nietzsche ascribes to art the task of building the world. Whatever is in the world is the result of this artistic will. According to him, the world we live in is a work of art that is constantly being created. "Existence, and the world, find their eternal justification only *as aesthetic phenomena*" (Megill, 2012, p. 73). With these statements of Nietzsche's, truth seems to be justified by aesthetic facts and its upcompatibility with reality. On the other hand, when we look at Heidegger, he says that art builds a world. According to him, art creates truth. "Art (...) *a becoming, a becoming, a happening*. Does the truth then come out of nothing? If nothing is used here in the sense of not only what *is (das Seiende)*, and if we see what is in us as an object that exists in a known way, then our answer is yes" (Megill, 2012, p. 274). According to Heidegger, truth and truth can be contacted through art. In the process of artistic creativity, the subject, who is between truth and reality, can approach these two concepts most often at the stage of intellectual design.

#### **1.4 THE ROOTS OF IDEALISM THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATION AND CREATIVITY**

The system of idealism that began in Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century has also made a lot of noise in the field of art and has caused various debates to germinate. Idealism, in a general sense, recognizes that the mind is the only reality. According to this, the external world has no reality, it is only a mental appearance. However, idealism did not remain within this general framework and was divided into types with the introduction of different ideas. There are different types of idealism, such as objective, subjective, ontological, epistemological idealism: according to objective idealism, they are ideas independent of the mind that actually exist; it asserts that what is real is only the essence of things and is made up of it. Objective idealism, advocated by Plato, argued that what really existed were ideas, and that objects in the physical world had a share of ideas. Subjective idealism (eng. *subjective idealism*) asserts that it is the individual mind that really exists, while subordinating the existence of the physical world to the constitution of the human mind or making it dependent on its perception by the mind. "The most important representatives of subjective idealism are Berkeley and Kant. Berkeley's idealism is also called ontological idealism, while Kant's idealism is called transcendental idealism" (Cevizci, 2014, p. 345). Ontological idealism, on the other hand, (eng. *ontological idealism*) is "the kind of idealism that asserts that the physical world depends on the mind, and that the conflicting worldview of common sense and science is flawed." (Cevizci, 2014, p. 330). Ontological idealism was developed by Berkeley. He said that objects in the external world and the impressions and sensations we acquire from them exist as long as they are perceived by the mind. In the epistemological type of idealism, (eng. *epistemological idealism*) is "the idealist understanding that states that objects in the physical world exist as long as they are perceived by the mind, or that phenomena depend on the



establishment of the human mind, and that physical objects are constructed by the human mind" (Cevizci, 2014, p. 158).

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is referred to in the history of philosophy as an "empiricist thinker". He argued that there would be no reality independent of the mind, that reality was subordinate to the mind, and that "he is an idealist philosopher in the sense that he says that matter does not really exist but that what actually exists is ide" (Cevizci, 2009). Berkeley argued that knowledge is acquired through experience. Another argument is against Locke. According to Locke, it is objective in primary and continues to exist in the body no matter how it changes. For example, even if a bean is divided into pieces, it will still have a volume of space. Secondary qualities are not found in the objects themselves, sensations such as taste and color are such qualities, and therefore subjective. But Berkeley says that primary qualities are subjective, just like secondary qualities. Rejecting this distinction, he argued that there are only secondary qualities, according to which secondary qualities are relative. "For instance, from the fact that an object is hot to one of our hands and cold to the other, it follows that heat is not an objective property of an object independent of the mind, but a subjective, mind-dependent quality; that it is not the object but a quality of the perceiving subject" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 603). Here, perception is the primary determinant. There is no physical world independent of the mind. Berkeley does not exactly think that the existence of the external world is an illusion. He "makes a distinction between what is real and what is illusion" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 601). According to him, the pigeon is a real bird, but the simurg bird is a mythological imaginary image. The problem here is that while we have consistent experiences of the pigeon, we lack these experiences in the face of the image of the simurg bird. In his epistemological argument, Berkeley argues that even if we accept that the physical objects of the external world exist, we cannot know whether they exist or not independently of our minds. We can know the physical objects of the external world with sense or reason. However, through the senses, man can only know his own mental contents. Again, according to the thinker, the mind is incapable of knowing the physical world "it is not possible for it to infer the existence of physical objects in the external world from the existence of certain experiences and mental contents" (Cevizci, 2009: 604,605). According to Berkeley, all objects are sensations; existence requires perception. With this statement, he does not deny the existence of other minds. It connects the continuity and coexistence of the external world to an external mind; This mind is God. God is the only cause of order in nature. The thinker's theory of knowledge was born almost as a reaction to materialism and was the beginning of his adventure from empiricism to idealism.

Immanuel Kant, who interpreted idealism with a unique system of thought in the history of philosophy, (1724-1804) *in his thesis titled Critique of Pure Reason*, tried to reveal in which areas human beings can reveal valid knowledge, where the limit of this knowledge lies and what valid knowledge is. In his work, Kant calls his philosophical system *transcendental idealism*. In his research, the thinker aims to reveal the structure of the human mind, cognitive abilities and abilities. Kant's pure/salt/bee (Eng. *pure*) is the mind that he understands by the mind, which has not yet encountered experience, and knowledge begins with experience according to him.

There is no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience, for if the faculty of knowledge were not through objects, which, by stimulating our senses, on the one hand, create spontaneous designs, and on the other hand,

by comparing and connecting or separating them, moving our cognitive activity to process the raw material of sensory impressions into a knowledge of objects called experience, in what other way could there be practice? Therefore, *according to time*, no knowledge precedes the experience in us, and all knowledge begins with experience" (Kant, 1993, pp. 51, 52)

Kant investigated whether pure reason could give us knowledge of the conceivable world (*mundus intellegibilis*). In seeking this, he set out to investigate the types of knowledge that the human mind can acquire. Kant first divides the types of knowledge *into a priori* and *a posteriori*; then adds the types of analytical and synthetic knowledge. Accordingly, *a priori* judgments are judgments whose truth is necessary and universally valid. This necessity and universality are not found in the results of experience. According to Kant, mathematical propositions clearly carry this necessity. *A posteriori* judgments incorporate data provided by the results of the experience. The data obtained from *A posteriori* judgments do not have the nature of necessity and universality. Again, in Kant's words, "Universal knowledge must be clear and fragile in itself, irrespective of experience; accordingly they are called a *priori* knowledge; but what is conversely borrowed only from experience is known, as it has been said, only a *posteriori* or empirical" (Kant, 1993, p. 52). The thinker puts forward two more types of propositions that he puts forward as innovation. Analytical and synthetic judgments. Kant explains analytic and synthetic judgments in his *Critique of Pure Reason* as follows:

Analytic judgments (positive judgments) are therefore judgments in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is considered through identity; but it must be called judgments in which this relation is conceived without identity. The former may be called explanatory judgments, and the latter expansionary judgments (...) When I say, "All bodies are space," that is an analytical judgment. For I do not need to go beyond the concept which I associate with the object in order to find space in relation to the object; on the contrary, in order to find this predicate in him, I only need to disassemble the concept, e.d. I must only be conscious of the multitude which I always think of in him. Judgment is therefore an analytical judgment. Conversely, if I say, "All bodies are heavy," the predicate is something entirely different from what I usually think of in the simple concept of an object. The addition of such a predicate is therefore a synthetic judgment. (Kant, 1993, pp. 59,60)

Kant states that the basic principle of analytic judgments is non-contradiction, so that every analytic judgment is *a priori*. *A posteriori* and synthetic judgments, on the other hand, are experiential judgments that can expand knowledge. Within the framework of these judgments, the thinker has put forward a whole new type of judgment; "*synthetic a priori*" Kant stated that this type of judgment is found in all the propositions of mathematics, as well as in the basic principles of the natural sciences. In his thesis *The Critique of Pure Reason*, the thinker writes that "In all the theoretical sciences of reason, Synthetic *A priori* judgments are covered as a Principle (...) real mathematical propositions are not empirical but always *a priori* judgments, because they carry within themselves the necessity which cannot be derived from experience" (Kant, 1993, p. 63). Kant explains synthetic *a priori* judgment again in terms of a mathematical proposition.

Accordingly, a proposition such as  $7+5$  gives us the result 12 *a priori*. However, the necessary result of the proposition  $7+5=12$  can be reached in other ways. Such as  $8+4=12$ ,  $2+10=12$ . Such propositions, the thinker argues, "may be thought of as a purely analytic proposition arising from the concept of a sum, but when examined more closely (...) it is found that both numbers contain nothing more than being combined into a single number, and nothing is considered here as to what this odd number is that includes the two. The concept of twelve can in no way be conceived of merely by my contemplation of that union of seven and five, and even if I were to parse my concept of such a possible sum, I would not encounter twelve out of ten (...) Because I first take the number 7 and intuitively call the fingers of my hand for help with the concept of 5, and now I add the units that I took

together to form the number 5 one by one in that imagination, and so I see that the number 12 emerges. I have certainly thought of adding 5 to 7 in the concept of sum = 7+5, but not that this sum equals the number 12. The arithmetic proposition, then, is always synthetic" (Kant, 1993, pp. 63-64).

Accordingly, Kant *says in his Critique of Pure Reason*:

What we need to distinguish here is a distinction that will allow us to reliably distinguish pure knowledge from empirical, experience undoubtedly teaches us that something is of this or that nature, not that it will not happen otherwise. Therefore, *if there is a proposition that is first considered and at the same time considered with necessity, it is an a priori judgment* (Kant, 1993, pp. 53-54).

Especially within the framework of *technical* and scientific creation and creativity, it can be said that mental design-imagination are a priori propositions. Propositional knowledge is "set forth by propositions contained in a statement or declaration. This information is also called *descriptive* information. The second type of information is usually referred to as information about the "how" or the manner in which a particular activity is to be performed. It is called *transactional* information. The third type of knowledge is knowledge through acquaintance, which is the result of coming into contact with things. In the first of these, the subject of knowledge is a proposition or truth, in the second it is a skill or a certain type of agency, and in the third it is a thing or a person" (Cevizci, 2014, p.74). Given the relationship between mind and language, it may be possible to express design images propositionally. Kant wrote, "It is easy to show that a priori judgments are found in the act of human knowledge. If an example of the sciences is desired, it is sufficient to look only at all the propositions of mathematics; if an example of the most eloquent uses of understanding is to be sought, the proposition that "All change must have a cause" will work for this purpose" (Kant, 1993, pp. 55-56). It is found in the statement. The relationship between knowledge (proposition) and design-imagination within the framework of technical and scientific creation can be very important in terms of meaning and interpretation.

At Berkeley, the mind is inadequate to know the physical world, but Kant explored the limits of the mind with the system he established. For Berkeley, all objects are sensations, and existence requires perception. Kant, on the other hand, set out to investigate whether we have a priori concepts of sensory knowledge in transcendental aesthetics. Kant's aesthetic term did not deal with the conception of the beautiful, but in Greek, *aisthesis* in the sense of perceived through sense and perception. According to the thinker, there are two aspects in every knowledge as perception and concept. On the one hand, our mind comprehends the information given to our senses concretely, and on the other hand, our ability to understand connects with thinking, so without sense, concepts will be empty, and without concepts, senses will be incomplete.

As Kant pointed out in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, *without synthesis and unification, knowledge of objects cannot be formed in the subject. Synthesis is a characteristic of understanding. The combination of all perceptions is necessary. Kant calls this the "unity of the transcendental judgment."* Although objects are thought of under the categories determined by the thinker (quantity, quality, relationship, style,) they will not be comprehensible without complete perception. Without awareness, it is impossible to make the connection between thinking and the multiplicity of sensory data. Multiple data from the

senses must be correlated with each other by a single self-consciousness. Otherwise, knowledge of experience or objects cannot be obtained (Kant, 1993).

An in-depth study of Kant's philosophy, and especially the subject of perception and forms of knowledge, can be important for understanding artistic creation and creativity, the construction of the artistic, even the construction of the scientific and technical. In particular, Kant's words that "the underlying intuition provides me with the multiple tools needed for synthetic propositions, which I can relate to in more than one way, and since I can start from multiple points, I can arrive at the same proposition in different ways" can contain information about the design of the artistic object (Kant, 1993. p.714). In the process of creativity, it may be possible to bring the object of art, which does not yet exist in the physical world, into being as a whole in thought (which can be thought of as a proposition in the mind) and to establish multiple relations in the manner indicated by Kant during the transfer of what is known in the mind to the outside world.

Metaphysical Idealism was undoubtedly much nourished by Kant's philosophical system. "The most appropriate starting point for explaining the development of metaphysical idealism from critical philosophy is the concept of thing in Kant himself" (Copleston, 1990, p.13). Accordingly, the thinker limits knowledge to sensory experience. "Man cannot transcend experience, he cannot possess knowledge of something that transcends the realm of experience, that has not been given to him in sensory intuition; it cannot know the very existence of things themselves or their existence independent of the way they affect consciousness" (Cevizci, 2009, p.721). Kant made a distinction between the reality we perceive with the senses and the reality we perceive with the mind. From this point of view, it may also be possible to connect with Plato's teaching of knowledge. In Plato, the reality we obtain with our senses and the reality we obtain with the mind are different, just as in Kant. When we look at it from this perspective, it is possible to see the roots of German idealism.

The current of idealism that emerged after Kant in the history of German thought was represented by Fichte, Hegel, Schelling. "The idealist philosophers in question consider the world understandable by reason as the starting point for their philosophical reflections or speculations, (...) they get. The world that really exists is the ideal or the supra-sensory world, the world of the mind or the soul" (Cevizci, 2009: 801). Looking at Fichte after Kant, "Starting from Kant's position and developing him into idealism, he began to call his principle as fully inherent the 'I' and translated Kant's transcendental 'I' into a metaphysical or ontological principle. But he tried to explain that what he meant by this was not the individual finite 'I', but rather the absolute 'I'" (Copleston, 1990, p. 14). Other idealist thinkers, on the other hand, have dealt with the I in different ways and have begun to bring Kant's critique of metaphysics back to the metaphysical dimension. Again, as Copleston points out in his book *German Idealism*, it is possible to see that the influence of Kant's thought was felt by Fichte more than by Hegel or Schelling. These idealists were influenced by other aspects of Kant's critical philosophy. For example, the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason has been a powerful stimulus for Fichte's explicitly emphasized moral worldview, which he interpreted as an infinite practical reason, a moral will, that sees the pure 'I' as a means for moral activity and regulates nature. Fichte thus translated the critique of practical reason into metaphysics. Schelling placed emphasis on the philosophy of art, the role of genius, and the metaphysical aspect of aesthetic intuition and artistic creation, and dealt with Kant's third critique, "*The*

*Critique of Judicial Power.*" The post-Kantian idealists, like the subjective idealists, did not argue that they could only know their own thoughts outside of the physical existence, nor that all objects were the product of the finite subject. Fichte's I was not a finite 'me' but a transcendental 'me', a supra-individual principle. According to Schelling and Hegel, "the reduction of things to the products of the individual finite moment was totally contrary to the idea of both" (Copleston, 1990, p. 18). German idealism was later described as the philosophy of romanticism. Although this description is open to debate, Fichte and Schelling had an influence on some romantics. Schelling, in particular, has accounts of the spirit of romanticism. Fichte, on the other hand, was a harsh critic of the Romantics. Hegel, on the other hand, was not very compatible with some aspects of romanticism. Metaphysical idealism and romanticism were also cultural phenomena of Germany, so there was a fundamental spiritual similarity. In the face of the Enlightenment's concentration on critical, scientific, analytical intelligence, the Romantics exalted the power of the creative imagination, emotion and intuition. "artistic genius *has taken the place of le philosopheun* (Copleston, 1990, p. 24). The emphasis on artistic genius focused on the creative powers of man and his experience, and was directed toward each subject, not what is common to all men. From this, some romantics found inspiration in Fichte's early thought. Fichte was "interested in explaining on idealist principles the state of the finite subject in the world of objects which are given to it and which affect it in different ways, such as in sensation" (Copleston, 1990, p. 25). Again, the romantics emphasize their emphasis on creative genius over Schelling rather than Fichte. Schelling emphasized the metaphysical aspect of art and the role of genius. Again, "eternal" formed a common ground for romanticism and idealism. German idealists tend to think of the infinite as infinite life, which describes finite and through it. In Hegel, in particular, we see a conscious attempt to achieve a compromise between the finite and the infinite (Copleston, 1990).

There may be various confusions in the relation of German Idealism to creation and creativity in art. Art has been reinterpreted in many ways.

In his Lectures on Aesthetics in the 1920s, Hegel declared: "the science of art ... in our time it is more necessary than when art is for itself as art which provides complete satisfaction" In *The System of Transcendental Idealism*, by contrast, Schelling argued that art is "the only true and eternal organ and document of philosophy" and that it "always and constantly documents what philosophy cannot describe externally." At the same time that Kant and Fichte's accounts of the undeniable philosophical role of human freedom began to be read, Friedrich Schiller, in his book *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Humanity* (1775), explored sensory ways of communicating the idea of freedom through the work of art to a wider public. Thus, it makes clear the socio-political dimension of the new subject of aesthetics. Schiller's ideas are included both among the features of Early Romanticism and in "The Earliest Programme for a System of German Idealism" (probably written in 1796 by Hegel or Schelling). This text speaks of "the supreme act of reason that encompasses all ideas" as an "aesthetic act." For the aesthetic act combines the faculty of understanding and reason, and connects the sensory objective material of the work to the "ide" of the supersensory freedom, which is itself invisible but symbolized by the work and thus expressible in society. Schelling developed ideas about this in the *System of Transcendental Idealism* and in the chapters of his *Philosophy of Art* (1802-3) before ceasing to see art as the basis for his philosophical project. After an early enthusiasm for subjectivity and the idea of an aesthetic reconciliation of divisions between objects in the world, Hegel also became more cautious about the philosophical significance of art in his own aesthetic lectures. During the collapse of German Idealism after Hegel's death, idealist aesthetics were suppressed by the attitudes of the likes of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who, though influenced by idealism, rejected the central teachings of idealist thought (Bowie, 2009, p.63).

Throughout the history of German Idealism thought, the subject of aesthetics has been the scene of various debates. The relationship between Man and Art was discussed and a new understanding of art was put forward in the philosophical sense. This conception sprouted from the idea that the world could not be understood without art, because in the idea of idealism, the work of understanding, perceiving, making sense of the subject's abilities through design in the face of an art object began to be reconstructed.

#### **4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARTISTIC IN IDEALISM**

Until today, the relationship between subject and object is very important in the establishment of the artistic. As a result of this relationship, the subject-object relationship in the history of philosophy has led to the germination of various theories of knowledge. According to these theories, the object was interpreted in different ways, and the establishment of the artistic under the title of aesthetics was evaluated in the same way. The main theories of knowledge are objective materialism, subjective materialism, objective idealism, and subjective idealism. The object has been interpreted differently under the title of these theories of knowledge according to the subject, bringing about various discussions.

Oktay Taftalı (2005) dealt with the aforementioned debates in his article titled "The Spirit of Time" and examined the appearance of the object in the light of this and revealed the horizontal and vertical relations between these theories of knowledge. In this direction, in objective materialism, objects express reality exactly. The ideas formed in our consciousness are nothing but our inner reality, the reflection of objects outside us (the external world). In this case, human consciousness is shaped by the world of objects outside itself. The quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the material world are thus comprehended and expressed. In this theory, consciousness does not have any doubts about the reality of the external world. The freezing of ice and the burning of fire in the outside world are facts independent of "I." This objective truth is dominated by legality. Accordingly, nothing is accidental. Although this view of knowledge about existence is often subject to criticism, almost until the beginning of the XIX century, Renaissance art perceived the world of objects in this way. In the Enlightenment period, objective materialism continued to be supported, accompanied by unwavering confidence in knowledge. The subjective materialist theory of knowledge, on the other hand, deals with the reality of the external world in a subjective interest. Matter and the reality of the external world as a whole are not denied, but here an interest is established between the external reality and the way it is perceived. Material reality is shaped according to human sense perceptions. On the other hand, sensory perceptions vary according to time and space. The outside world is how it is perceived at a given moment. The world of material beings and objects gains mobility by being reduced to the moment. In this case, the entity is not in a static but in a continuous flow and becoming. In this case, the reality of any object or thing in the external world is not denied, but varies according to the person who perceives it. Interpreting the world of objects in an ever-changing and occurring way leads to subjectivism. Since the 19th century, subjective materialism has gained weight in Continental Europe. The impressionist art that emerged in this period and the impressionist philosophy of Ernest March are expressions of the subjective materialist interpretation of the

object. While the existence of being in the external world is not a matter of debate, the interpretation of the being and the determination of appearance by the subject summarize the subjective materialism theory of knowledge. On the other hand, according to objective idealism; Everything we see in the external world is not the entity itself, but its reflection. True existence is unchanging and absolute. Thanks to his senses, man can perceive only images and reflections. Therefore, the perception of the true being is not a process related to the senses, but a process related to the mind. When we go to the roots of objective idealism, we see that Anaxagoras defended the idea that the existence of the material world can be determined as thought. Again, the interpretation of objects in this theory of knowledge influenced the period starting from Plato to the European Enlightenment, and the same idea was represented by Husserl in the 20th century. When we look at subjective idealism, we see that this theory of knowledge is called "single selfishness", "solipsism". In this case, there is no question of any reality other than "I", on the other hand, the world that is claimed to exist outside the I is shaped by it. Our knowledge of reality will only be our sense impressions and consciousness contents. Something exists as long as it is perceived because it is perceived by me. Without me, there is nothing (Taftalı, 2005).

In the light of all these theories, it may be possible to obtain different data when we turn to the design of the artistic and its relation to creation and creativity. From the point of view of objective materialism, the object to be created/designed may not be expected to go outside the established reality. When we talk about an organization in the artistic sense within the scope of this theory of knowledge, the designs to be realized by different subjects may not differ. When we exemplify through the art of painting, the transfer of a river existing in an external world to the canvas has to be as it is independent of the contributions of the subject. However, the theory of subjective materialism stated that this sameness could not be possible and that different subjects could transfer the same river to the canvas in line with their different perceptions. However, in subjective idealism, different perceptions will reach the same reality. Unlike objective materialism, subjective materialism has accepted the flexibility of accepting different interpretations of reality. In subjective-subjective idealism, on the other hand, subjects with completely different perceptions can reach the designs of different objects because they design their sense data in their mental processes. The diversity of objects of artistic creation can be evaluated in the light of this theory of knowledge. On the other hand, one of the most important problems in the history of philosophy that idealism has not been able to overcome is the problem of solipsism (solipsism). Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924), in his work *Materialism and Empirio Criticism*, wrote the following about idealism and materialism in line with the ideas of Friedrich Engels, one of the defenders of materialism, and Ernst Mach, who followed the line of idealism and claimed that objects are a mess of sensation:

There is a conflict between materialism and idealism, an *antinomie*, a separation between the two basic lines of philosophy . Is it necessary to go to hearing and thinking about things? Or from thought and sensation to things? (...) If they are "combinations of sensations," as Berkeley puts it, it follows that the world is nothing but my design. Proceeding from this premise, we do not accept the existence of people other than ourselves: mere on-selfishness (Lenin, 1993pp. 34-35).

Monotheism (ing. *Solipsism*) basically accepts no reality other than its own 'I'. The main thing is the subject itself. "It can be said that apart from solipsism lies skepticism. Like Descartes, we can doubt everything but ourselves" (Timuchin, 2004: 458). In this case, the relationship

of the I with the non-self and the way of communication is very important. In the history of philosophy, solipsism has been tried to be overcome with various theories. The concept of 'non-I' (eng. Non-ego) is "one who opposes or departs from me, that is, the subject." (Timuçin, 2004, p. 60). Especially after the concept of "I" gained importance in the 17th century with the philosophy of Descartes, other philosophers interpreted the I in various ways.

Afshar Timuchin summarizes the perception of the I by philosophers as follows: David Hume and John Stuart Mill defined the I as the succession of distinct mood states. For Kant, I think was a unifying function that brought together presentations in a relationship. Henri Bergson combined the concept of the self with time, expressing that "I am the time I perceive." Epictetus, on the other hand, said that the things that are external do not depend on me, that my will depends on me, that I must seek the good and the bad in what is mine in myself. Claude Bernard emphasized that art should be personal and science should be impersonal by saying "Art is me, science is us" (Timuçin, 2004, p. 57). Albert Einstein, on the other hand, determined the value of a man by his criterion of getting rid of the I, Pascal and Claude Levi Strauss found the I disgusting (Timuçin, 2005).

Apart from the various meanings attributed to the I, it is a very important problem how many I's living on earth communicate within the framework of the theory of idealism. If the self can't get out of itself, how does it communicate with other selves and become aware of the existence of other I's? These questions lead us to debates between skepticism and reality. The problem of solipsism was overcome by Gilbert Ryle with "language", according to him, the proof that other people exist is that they can communicate with the same language. Again, when we think within this framework, art objects, as objects of communication, can overcome the problem of *solipsism*. By transcending mental design, art objects presented to the perception of other minds can thus realize the common communication space.

Arda Denkel (2011) talks about the theory of design in his work *The Foundations of Knowledge*, and says that Descartes developed designer reality and Locke developed his theory. Both philosophers share a dualism in their explanation of perception. This dualism derives from the assertion that everything that exists must be physical, or instantaneous. Apart from this, a third form is not possible. The external world, which is the subject of perception, is physical, and the design or images that make up the content of perception are instantaneous. In this case, design has approached skepticism to some extent. The main philosophical goal of design is to draw a line to skepticism by giving an explanation of the relationship between the world of images and the external world, and to form a basis for knowledge by finding out which of our perceptual beliefs accurately reflect the external world. Designing asserts that physical objects can never be given directly to us within our sense experiences because the characteristic of the instantaneous form of being is that it is not physical. An instant entity encompasses snapshots and their contents. 17th and 18th centuries It consists of ideas with its name in the century. Everything that can be content to the moment and consciousness is in the presence. Descartes and Locke stated that the moment could contain nothing but its own ideologies. The source of the ideas in the moment was the content of perception. Accordingly, sensory experiments are also instantaneous. In this frame, physical objects can have many properties, directions. Some of these characteristics may or may not be known to us. Locke called the properties of objects that we grasp through perception "sensible properties", and following Galileo, Gassendi and Descartes, he argued that the qualities of objects are not of



the same kind and that there is a distinction between various qualities. At the end of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Locke argued that the secondary qualities (sound, color, smell) are in the perceiver:

Locke's conclusion is that there are no qualities such as colors, sounds, etc. in the external world, that is, there can be no 'true color of an object'. (...) When Locke says that secondary qualities are not in objects but in the perceiver, he is not saying that these qualities arise from the momentary moment of the perceiver, that they are created there. The cause of secondary qualities are objects, they arise from objects" (Denkel, 2001, p. 28).

On the other hand, Denkel argues that the most important consequence of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that while it is not said that there are qualities in the external world as a counterpart to our secondary quality ideologies, our primary attribute ideologies say that they correspond in the external world. They do not have qualities such as color and smell independent of the individual perceiving objects, but they have space, number and motion independent of the subject (perception). Accordingly, Locke drew a line to skepticism with his explanation of primary qualities. Although secondary qualities may be doubted, this will disappear with the necessity that primary qualities be based on scientific data. Accordingly, when the color of a notebook changes, we can determine its space scientifically since its dimensions will not change. Accordingly, Locke finds reliable data in primary qualities. Berkeley denied Locke's realism, replacing it with subjective idealism, which he believed would be consistent in his empiricism. Berkeley criticized Locke's scientific reality of existence and information science design. Again, despite his view that there is a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Berkeley aims to show that they are 'indistinguishable'. Accordingly, primary qualities are not in the position of being the basis of knowledge. Berkeley has two arguments; the first is that these two kinds of qualities are inseparable, and the other is that they are indistinguishable. Berkeley opposed the idea that the latter qualities were not inherent. According to him, Space and color are inseparably interconnected. It is impossible to think of something that has color but no space. Color-space, then, primary and secondary qualities are inseparable. The thinker concludes from this that primary qualities are subjective, just like secondary qualities (Denkel, 2011).

After explaining Locke's and Berkeley's views of knowledge, Denkel examines the imperative that Berkeley has established between primary and secondary qualities and considers two propositions in order to examine whether there is in fact such a necessity:

1-Everything that has elongation necessarily has color.

2-Everything that has color necessarily has space.

Of these two propositions, which declare mandatory relations, only (2) are true. It is contradictory to the extent that to suggest that you are thinking of a triangle without three vertices in order to suggest that you are thinking of a color emanation without space. This contradiction arises from the logical impossibility of a color propagation without space. If so, (2) is always true. On the other hand, (1) does not seem to be a necessary truth at all. Yes, the vast majority of physical objects we know (i.e., elongated) are also objects that have one color or another. However, we also have to be able to think and imagine objects that have space and no color. That is, it is not contradictory to think of an object that has space but is colorless, and this idea is not necessarily (or always) wrong. For example, we can think of objects that have complete transparency. Beyond thinking about such objects, we can also make them happen. The fact that we can sometimes hit the glass doors or windows of the stores by not seeing them will support this view (Denkel, 2011: 31).

When we look at Denkel's first and second propositions, it is possible to see identity. Of the examples of secondary qualities that Locke expressed, he focuses only on the quality of color. A piece of music presented to perception has an auditory quality as well as a space. "Sound is a material thing as vibrations in the air" (Soykan, 2015, p. 232). If we separate the sound from the notes, there will be no elongation if the sensation does not occur. Again, Denkel mentions transparency in his example. However, transparency is a color created by diluting white in the art of painting, and in this way, images such as raindrops, glasses and water can be transferred to the canvas. The fact that a person hits the store window because of its transparency may be related to the difficulty of detecting the transparent color. Accordingly, when we look at it within the framework of the establishment of the artistic, it may still be possible to accept Berkeley's ideas about qualities.

#### **1.4.2 CREATION-I/CREATION-OBJECT DISTINCTION IN SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM**

When we examine the subject of Creation-I and creation-object from the framework of subjective idealism, it may be important to grasp the subject thinking structure of George Berkeley, the founder of subjective idealism, in order to make sense of the thoughts of other idealist thinkers who would come later. According to Berkeley, what really exists are minds, the thinker does not deny that the external world actually exists. Again, if what exists has to be made sense of by another existent, it is relative. Accordingly, the quality of the object is not in itself, but a quality of the subject. If the first qualities of the object (physical) are not "the defining essential properties of an object, it follows that physical objects do not have an objective existence independent of the mind, but exist only when they are perceived" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 603).

Ahmet Cevizci (2009) states that Berkeley followed Locke in at least three respects. Accordingly; Berkeley, everything we perceive, directly or indirectly, consists of our ideologies or our own mental contents. On the other, our ideas are not innate, and all our ideologies derive from perceptual experience, and finally, our knowledge is a function of the ideologies we have, so all the knowledge we have comes from the ideologies we have, through experience. According to Berkeley, there is no human society separate from individual people (Cevizci, 2009: 607). In the same way, it is not possible to speak of an entity that exists independently of being perceived. To exist means to be perceived, that is, to be the object of a perceiving, thinking mind. The philosopher thinks that sensory things are a collection of ideas and/or ideas (Cevizci, 2009, p.608). Again, Berkeley distinguishes between fantasy and fantasy. "Accordingly, there are three criteria by which it is possible to distinguish things that are real, or rather real perceptions, from imaginary things or fantasy; (1) that the perceptions of the real things in question are vivid and clear; (2) they must appear in the mind involuntarily rather than voluntarily, and (3) they must have a certain coherence relationship with the rest of the experience" (Cevizci, 2009, p.609).

Starting from subjective idealism, the importance of sensory qualities, experience and components such as imagination in terms of creation and creativity seems to be quite

important. "In modern aesthetics, the importance of creativity comes from the ability to shape experience in different ways. Experience belongs to individuals (...) My experience may be similar to someone else's, but it can only be like theirs, it cannot be the same because it is unique to me" (Townsend, 2002, p. 182). As Townsend points out, these phrases express the subjective side of creation and creativity. On the other hand, "creativity is closely related to perception. Perception is a complex process. It is more than just looking and seeing. The way we process sensory input, our inclination, what we expect to see influences perception" (Townsend, 2002, p. 183). It is precisely at this point that the perception processes of the person who will design an art object, as well as other biological and psychological processes, can be important in the establishment of the artistic. The interaction of the subject with the object is also one of the factors involved in its design process. As the artist tends to objects, he attributes various meanings to them. "to conceive of objects in sensuality, to experience objects in sensuality through *them* (Einfühlung, empathy in Greek). Indeed, in the case of identification, we grasp and experience things through it. But what we comprehend and experience in objects is not the object itself, but our own emotions that we attribute to the object" (Tunalı, 2012: 41). The feeling experienced in front of an object is the feeling that the object gives us. For example, the feeling of sadness in the face of a ruined house does not belong to us, but a feeling that the ruined house gives us. This interest in objects is identical. Theodor Lipps explains the aesthetics of identification as follows; "The starting point is the human concept of perceptive activity. ' Every sensible object," says Lipps, "is always a combination of two elements, sensible data and my grasping activity, as long as it exists for me." If the object perceived as sensible is grasped only by the perceptive activity, spiritual and emotional quality is added to it and that object acquires a vitality and a life" (Tunalı, 2012: 42). These feelings that the subject, who encounters the object, feels in front of him are the end of his mental process. The interpretation of the sense data taken from the object and the design-image creation seem to be important when evaluated within the framework of creation and creativity. When we return to Kant's epistemology in the context of these statements, we see that he is; The "unity of transcendental complete perception," that is, the totality of sense and comprehension in comprehending objects, may seem necessary for identification. Sense

In the process of making sense of the data, it can be considered normal for psychological and biological factors to be effective on the subject. Lipps said, "What I hear in The Object is, generally speaking, life. And life is strength, it is sincere work, it is effort, and it is putting forth something. Life is activity in a word. If this activity takes place without any hindrance, then a sense of freedom arises in the person involved in this activity. This sense of freedom is a sense of pleasure. It is this activity that leads a person to pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, and the feeling of freedom that arises from it" (Tunalı, 2012: 42- 43). In this process, Lipps describes the phenomenon of identification. In all these processes of interaction between subject and object, the desire for activity is framed by pleasure. On the other hand, when we look at Kant, we see that he said that "the subjective side of a design is pleasure or displeasure" (Kant, 2006, p.39). Again, in this context, Lipps claims that "aesthetic pleasure is the pleasure we feel from ourselves in an object" (Tunalı, 2012: 43). When such a psychological approach is considered, we can see that the subjectivist-aesthetic understanding emerges.

Within this framework, when we consider the subject's act of creating, he can take into account that similar processes can be effective. Factors such as desire, pleasure, life effort, etc. can be one of the important elements in the subject's act of creativity. In subjective idealism, it may

be considered normal that there should be changes and diversity in the object created by the perceiving, designing and interpreting characteristics of other minds. Because it is possible to say that each subject has its own design world, a difference in processing information. We can observe this difference through the variety of art objects.

Subjective idealism can also be important in explaining the creator-I's interrelation to the world, the "encounter" of the created object. The American existentialist psychologist, Rollo May (1909-1994), refers to the creative act in terms of 'encounter'. May states that creativity cannot be expressed solely by explaining subjective processes, and states:

The encounter is always a meeting between two poles. The subjective pole is the conscious person himself in the creative act. But what is the objective pole of this dialectical relation? I will use a word that will escape very simply: It is the encounter of the artist or scientist with his own *world* (...) The world is a model of the meaningful relationships in which a person exists, and that person is involved in the design of this world. It is clear that there is an objective reality, but it is not that simple. The world is in mutual relationship with the person at every moment. An uninterrupted dialectical process goes on between the world and the self, and between the self and the world; Each of these two poles signifies the existence of the other, and the absence of one of them makes it impossible to understand both. This is the reason why creativity can never be limited as a *subjective* phenomenon; creativity can never be examined in simple terms of what is happening in a person. The Earth pole is an integral part of an individual's creativity. What is happening is always a *process*, a *making* – a process that specifically brings a person and his world into a mutual relationship. How artists encounter their worlds can be seen in the work of every particular creative painter (May, 2012, pp. 72-73).

From the point of view of subjective idealism, the process of creative-design is what happens in the subject itself. On the other hand, the dialectical process it has entered into with the outside world also consists of its own mental meanings and designs. May states that the act of creativity cannot be explained only by what is happening in the person; however, he still says that artists' encounters with the world can appear in their work, and that their subjective processes should be observed. In this context, a work of art can go beyond the creative subject, be evaluated by other subjects, and take its place in the dialectical processes of other subjects.

On the other hand, May states that artists experience marked neurological changes in moments of encounter, "it is not anxiety or fear that the artist or creative scientist feels; is enthusiasm. I use this word against happiness or pleasure" (May, 2013, p. 68). With these statements, we can see that May *meets the common ground with Kant and Lipps by using 'enthusiasm'* as a reward for happiness and pleasure. In subjective designs, biological and psychological processes can play an active role. *Neurological* effects such as pleasure, happiness, *enthusiasm*, etc. can be realized by any stimulus object or can be designed by imaginary animation. When these feelings are designed to be transferred to the field of action, they can be realized through desire. In subjectively creative act, it can be said *that desire* has an important role. "Art expresses the same thing in every field of life, that is, man's desire, intentions, way of viewing, quality, man's relations with the world and nature" (Mengüşoğlu, 1988: 205). In this direction, art and creation and creativity, which are a making of the subject we consider in relation to it, can also be closely related to its biological and psychological properties.

Emotions and wanting can be central to the creator-self's design of objects. Vasily Kandinsky (1866-1944) is of the opinion that the work of art is the source of our emotions; "Art is one of the most powerful elements of spiritual life, and spiritual life is a complex but easy to

distinguish and distinct movement that goes forward and upward. Movement is the movement of experience. It may take different forms, but it is actually based on the same inner thought and purpose" (Kandinsky, 2013, p. 33). The process of interaction of the subject with an object and the role of this process in the design phase can be examined within this framework. The influence of emotions, biological needs, in the process of creation can be projected onto a design object, and from there to other subjects.

David Hume, in his *Treatise on the Human Moment*, expressed the following about will, will, emotions, and reason: When we expect pain or pleasure from any object, we feel either an excitement or a discontent attached to it. Accordingly, our approach to the object will change. Depending on this object we perform a reasoning. Depending on the emotion we experience, we either approach the object or move away. Within this framework, they achieve corresponding change in our actions. But this impulse does not arise from the master, but is directed only by it. Where things don't affect us, such connections never affect us. Reason only discovers this connection, but it will not be through him that objects affect us. Hume concludes that reason is incapable of debating the preference for passion or emotion. For reason says that it has no ability to prevent wanting by giving an impulse in the opposite direction to impulses. Nothing but an opposing passion can resist or stop the impulse of passion. "Reason is and must be a slave to the passions; can never undertake any task other than to serve and submit to them" (Hume, 2010, pp. 264, 265).

With these discourses, Hume seems to be expressing how emotions affect the will and how it overshadows reason with its strength. At this point, art objects have been seen as the strongest expression of the emotional side of subjects from past to present. Accordingly, art objects have begun to be examined around the psychological processes of the subject, especially processes such as creation and creativity have begun to be examined within the scope of neuroscience in the last century. Psychological and neurological processes can only be observed and explained in individual subjects. On the other hand, philosophically, subjective idealism approaches this issue through the subject within the scope of the creation-self and the created-object of the subject, and confronts the concepts such as consciousness, unconscious, impulse, intuition and emotion in this context.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PROCESS OF CREATION AND THE CREATIVE SUBJECT IN SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

#### 2.1. CREATIVITY AT FICHTE

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) was one of the founders of German Idealism. Post-Kantian idealist-oriented thinkers sought to achieve a system totality in the field of philosophical knowledge. In general, Fichte is of the opinion that philosophy is a general science, and therefore strives to establish a systematic unity. Starting from the point that every science must have a fundamental principle, the thinker tends to look for a solid point of departure. According to Fichte, Kant began to build his system by continuing on his philosophy. Fichte needed two propositions to create his system. First, "the idea of starting from the thing, the object; Kant said that in numen or in himself the thing is unknowable. To him, reality consisted of things in themselves. In this case, we could not have knowledge of reality, so we could not know reality. Fichte thought these statements were contradictory.

Because when we say something exists, it means that we already know something about it. Moreover, Kant put forward the existence of the thing in itself to explain our perceptual experiences by saying that the thing in itself is the cause of sensation. To say that things or numens exist in themselves as the cause of sensations contains a contradiction in itself. Because the category of existence is a concept that can be experienced only through the sense of the mind, that can be applied to objects. (...) For Fichte, it is a contradiction to say that something is unknown because it implies that we know something exists, and that is why it is knowable. This expresses the collapse of the conception of thing in itself because it violates Kant's rules, which limit the concepts of existence and cause to the objects of experience (Cevizci, 2009, p. 803).

In this case, according to Fichte, starting from the thing, the thing, was a path that would not be preferred since a free and thinking self would be insufficient to explain how. According to the thinker, if the basic principle, the conscious being, is a thinking self, it would be possible to explain how the conscious subject constructs and designs the external world, the world of objects. Fichte emphasizes the concept of experience. Consciousness means that an object is known on the subject's side. Experience, on the other hand, requires the experiencer to know this.

As Frederic Copleston mentions in *his work German Idealism*: Fichte states that what is required of philosophy is the clarification of the ground of experience. When we examine the content of consciousness, we see that there are two types of content, which we can explain as follows: "Some of our designs (*Vorstellungen*) are accompanied by a sense of freedom, while others are accompanied by a sense of obligation" (Copleston, 1990, p. 51). For example, if I think of a horned horse or a robot with a human head and a metal body in my images, or if I decide to go from Istanbul to Norway in my mind, these designs are my own designs. Such fictions are the subject's own designs and are accompanied by a sense of freedom. However, when I walk in a park, the perceptions from the environment, what I hear, what I see do not depend only on me. These bills are accompanied by a sense of obligation. They seem to have been imposed on me from the outside. This design string is what Fichte *calls experience*.

Performative experience is always the experience of something by someone being experienced. Consciousness is always the knowledge of an object by the subject by the moment. "But through a process that Fichte calls abstraction, the philosopher can conceptually isolate the two factors that are always unified in operant consciousness and thus form the concepts of self-instantaneous and self-thing" (Copleston, 1990, p. 51). Accordingly, there are two paths in front of him: As given in the example of the 'horned horse' of his own design, he can try to explain it as the product of self-instantaneity, in other words, creative thought. Or one can try to explain the experience as the effect of something in itself, as in the case of walking in the park (Copleston, 1990).

In this context, two paths are being opened. The first is the path of idealism, while the other is the path of dogmatism. As a philosopher who espouses idealism, Fichte is opposed to realism. "For, for Fichte, no matter how coherently realism is put forward, in the final analysis it must result in materialism and determinism. While materialism says that everything consists of matter or nature and that it happens in a mechanical way, it treats the soul as something between things" (Cevizci, 2009: 804). According to Fichte, consciousness is a being. "Since consciousness contains both existence and knowledge of being in itself, idealism is a philosophy far superior to realism" (Cevizci, 2009: 804). According to the thinker, materialism cannot even explain the concept of freedom, it is insufficient. In this case, the mind, the "I," is the foundation. Fichte stated the following about the system he had established in his letter to Baggesen in April 1771.

My system is the first system of freedom, and from its beginning to its end, it is an analysis of the concept of freedom. Just as the French nation freed humanity from its material chains, so in my system it freed humanity from its own thing and from external influences, and its first principles made man an autonomous being (Fichte, 2006, p. 11).

When we evaluate these ideas of Fichte within the framework of creation and creativity, it is possible to understand more or less the position of the subject in the creative process. Fichte, who pursued the concept of freedom in particular, tried to explain how man as a whole was an autonomous entity through his deeds. Fichte, who prefers idealism, tries to explain the doctrine of science from the point of view of the self. I am an absolute unconditional I. The I, which is an unlimited activity, cannot be objectified. If it becomes objectified, or attempts to be objectified, it must be based on something else.

In Fichte lectures, his students are taught; 'Think of the wall,' he says. Then, 'Think of the wall thinker', At each stage there is an 'I' that escapes from being an object to consciousness, and so on and so on forever. At the end there remains an 'I' that resists being an object of consciousness, which is the first principle of philosophy as a 'transcendental' or pure 'me'. We reveal this pure 'I' only through 'momentary intuition' (*Intellektuelle Anschauung*). More precisely, he reveals himself to our thought. Late in Fichte's philosophy, this pure 'I' would evolve into the concept of 'Life(a)', which is what makes it intuited into thought in consciousnesses as unlimited activity (Fichte, 2006).

Fichte's philosophical system has been interpreted in different ways. Some commentators have claimed that what he wanted to do was 'ontology'. The reason for this claim is that the thinker starts from the ethical concept of freedom. The demonstration that the practical is superior to the theoretical and that the existence of life operates on the world, changes and transforms it,

and thus changes and transforms the active one, has made the basis of this argument strong. According to another interpretation, in the phenomenon-numen distinction, to remove the thing (*Ding-an-sich*) in itself is to reject ontology in the traditional sense. According to Fichte, the first principle is pure 'I' because it appears in consciousness. This is not a 'thing' but pure activity itself. The proposition 'I am' refers to the act of doing something that is possible. In this case, there is no ontology in Fichte. Since there is no subject-independent object, Fichte's philosophy is a 'metaphysics of the subject'. The subject manifests itself in different ways, which constitutes its essence. In the absolute sense, the subject is infinite unlimited activity, and there is no such thing as anything outside of it. According to another interpretation, it is possible to produce a phenomenology from Fichte's philosophy. That is why Heidegger says that he prepared the way for Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The fact that all knowledge proceeds from the I, the investigation of the principle itself, which is the basis for the subject-object relationship, leads us to a relation of identity involving the subject-object relationship. When we look at Fichte's philosophy, it is very important that human states such as 'impulse' and 'effort' are not external in the development of the mind and the formation of the moral process, and that they are the elements that make up this process (Fichte, 2006, pp. 24-25).

When we evaluate this whole framework in terms of the creative process, it may be possible to see the connection of the concept of experience that Fichte talks about on our own designs. What we necessarily experience (things in itself) can be the material of the design of the self (instantaneous in itself). Because it is possible that perceptions that are necessarily abstracted from external objects and things turn into the figure of a horned horse. For example, the horned horse may be a combination of a necessarily perceived horse and a horn isolated from the rhinoceros. The limit of the subject's creation within the framework of idealism takes place independently of objects.

### ***2.1.1. The Absolute Self and Mental Intuition***

What am I in the first of the most important questions that need to be answered in idealism? question. In order to find an answer to this question, it is necessary to find out what the absolute I is. In Kant's view, the I transcends the limits of the experience of the I; however, Fichte disagrees. Because, according to Fichte, we carry the mental intuition of the self. When we think of the example of the wall that Fichte gave to his students, we see that there is always a mole left. This I is a transcendent self that transcends objectification and becomes a prerequisite for the unity of consciousness. Fichte says that the most distinctive feature of the absolute self, or consciousness, is action or activity. Therefore, when thinking about what consciousness is, the ultimate proposition to arrive at is not 'I think' but 'I act', as in Descartes. The pure self, consciousness is not a fact, but a first-making, acting. It is for itself a first attainment of existence. According to Fichte, the *self* represents itself to itself in the form of an activity. Fichte says that consciousness is also a condition for representing the world outside itself: a mind gains the possibility of representing the world outside itself only on the basis of the representation of itself. In his system, the 'I' is not the 'thinking thing' but the 'thinking activity' itself. The proposition that 'I am'  $x$  is  $x$  expresses an act (Cevizci, 2009, pp. 806-808).

Fichte describes the concept of the self, momentary intuition, in his own words. The thinker who wants us to establish a concept of self in our minds as a hypothesis goes on as follows:



It has been claimed that if a person does what is asked of him, *he will discover that he is active and also that his activity is directed towards his active self*. Accordingly, the concept of the I is formed only through an *activity of self-return*, and in the opposite direction, the only concept that occurs through this type of activity is the concept of I. While engaged in this activity, by observing oneself, one becomes directly conscious of it; in other words, *a person puts himself as a self-putter*. This direct self-consciousness, as the only direct form of consciousness, must be assumed in the explanation of all other possible states of consciousness. This is *called the original intuition of the I*. (The word 'intuition' is used here in both a subjective and objective sense. Because intuition can mean two different things; (a) That I is the subject, the sensing subject, may mean the intuition that I possesses; or (b) it may mean intuition in which intuition is objective and leads to the I, in which the I is the perceived object. It will be observed later that one does not set oneself to *be acting without a state of stillness to the contrary*. When a state of stillness is established, a concept—in this case, the concept of I—is produced. All states of attainment of consciousness are accompanied by a direct self-consciousness called momentary intuition, and if one has even a modicum of the ability to think, this direct self-consciousness must be presupposed. But consciousness is an activity. And self-consciousness, in particular, *is the mind's self-returning activity, or pure reflection*. Explanation: Everything occurs as a result of the expressed self-execution. This act of pure reflection, seen as a concept, is thought of by I. Accordingly, I clearly put myself through myself, and all other states of consciousness are conditioned by this act of self-assertion" (Fichte, 2006, pp. 212-213).

The thinker started from the principle of identity when he said, "I" is mine. In this case, from the statements of the thinker, we can perceive the subjective consciousness-objective anti-world opposition, that is, the principles of antagonism and non-contradiction. There is a contrast because it asserts the I, the non-I. The I, then, is asserted by expressing what is not the I. Again, Fichte describes the relationship of the I with the non-I:

When one establishes the concept of the I in one's head, one also realizes that one cannot put oneself as active without setting this activity as self-determined, and that one can do this by saying that the transition movement itself is the very activity one observes here (see Section 1.c.). 1. And 2. Chapters) have been claimed to discover that he cannot do so without making a transition motion from a state of uncertainty or indeterminability. Similarly, one cannot grasp the concept of the (I) that is formed through certain activity without determining the concept of the I through an opposing non-I. The state of stillness that can be determined is the same as that which was previously called (1), since it is precisely determined by its transformation into an activity. Moreover, in relation to the intuition of the I, what is a concept of the I is intuition for the non-I. More specifically, this is the concept of the act of intuition. (part 4). As a result of this opposition, it can be characterized as the (real) negative of non-I-activity; that is, it can be described as 'being', which is the concept of non-self, eliminated activity. For this reason, the concept of being is in no way an original concept, but a negative concept derived from activity (Fichte, 2006, p. 213).

Fichte, while constructing his philosophical system, put forward propositions such as the fact that the self originally revealed its own existence and that it put another self in front of the self. However, since speaking of another self to the I is problematic for the system of idealism, Fichte's approach to this problem is expressed by Copleston as follows: The proposition that I is not a given set of objects is generally infinite rather than a set of finite objects. This unlimited, 'not-I-I' is put in opposition to the Me. Since it deals with the systematic reconstruction of consciousness, consciousness in this state is the unity that encompasses both the I and the non-I. Therefore, the activity that constitutes the pure I must also put the non-self within itself. But if both are unlimited, each will strive to fill in all factuality at the expense of the exclusion of the other. They will tend to destroy each other. In this case, consciousness becomes impossible, so it is necessary to have mutual limitation of the I-not. Each must eliminate the other, but only part-by-section. In this sense, both I and I-are not 'divisible'. Fichte puts forward the following proposition: I put in 'I' a divisible 'not-I' as opposed to a divisible I'. In other words, the absolute I puts in itself a finite I and a finite I-not-as mutually determining and limiting each other. Fichte means that each is not just one. What is thought

of as limited activity is that no consciousness is possible unless the pure I produces finite, 'I' and 'not-I' within itself. (Copleston, 1990).

The propositions put forward by Fichte are in the form of theses, antitheses, syntheses, 'I', 'non-I' and 'not a divisible I' in divisible contrasts to 'I'. When we examine the relationship of the I with the non-I from the point of view of creation and creativity, it may be possible for the subject to perceive the non-self while designing the object of art in his mind. Fichte's seeing the 'I' and its totality in action can be achieved at the stage of creating the subject's object of art. It is precisely at this stage that the mind is able to perform the activity of reflection. It may be possible to speak of such an exchange between design and action. "When this reflective activity through which the mind immerses itself is perceived, it is perceived as a self-determining activity, and this activity is perceived as a movement from a passive state of stillness and uncertainty to a state of certainty, which is nevertheless determinable" (Fichte, 2006, p. 214). For example, a sculptor, while realizing his design, is aware that while he exists in that image, on the other hand, the 'I' and the other I exist in the imagination. Just as in Fichte's famous wall example, the thinker thinks of the self and interacts. However, when the Sculptor objectifies his image, while he is acting, the 'I' can become aware or intuit of himself.

Being arises from doing, from acting. According to Fichte, who states that the self is nothing more than self-preservation, that it exists not only for itself, but through itself, the acts expressed in the principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient cause, respectively, do not exist in a pure state in experience, nor do they represent acts of the self isolated from everything else. In other words, the mind, in the same way, it is impossible for it to say "I am" without also thinking about something else. In his idealism, subject and object are inseparable (Cevizci, 2009, p. 807).

According to Fichte's dialectical method, human knowledge is formed from three stages. These stages are identity, non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient cause. Accordingly, knowing an object requires comprehending it; the identity is ' $x = x$ '. On the other hand, knowing an object requires knowing it by comparing it with other objects, so the principle of non-contradiction is limited to ' $a$  is not  $a$ ' and finally, a high concept in the synthesis stage with  $a$  and not  $a$ . To illustrate it accordingly, I see and recognize the book, I distinguish it from the notebook, I comprehend the book as something limited by one or another characteristics in the face of the notebook. This process is the process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Man knows himself by this dialectical method.

Accordingly, after I have given himself, he has to put or give up the non-I. Although the synthesis that occurs from the combination of these two not only contains but balances the thesis and the antithesis in itself, it continues to contain opposite elements. Fichte therefore argues that the first synthesis of the mole itself points to two separate investigations, theoretical or epistemological, and one practical or ethical. Because the self asserts itself as a being that is limited by the non-self, that is, it exhibits a cognitive function, as well as a self that determines the non-self, that is, acts effectively and voluntarily (Cevizci, 2009: 808).

Fichte built his idealistic system on the absolute self. By explaining the will and free action through this reproach, he became the representative of subjective idealism. Fichte describes active/performative consciousness and freedom as follows.

A person (from the determinable to the certain 2) will discover that the basis of this transitional movement is entirely within himself. The action that takes place in this transition *is called the real activity, and it is the opposite of the ideal activity that only imitates it*, and the whole activity of the I is thus divided between these two kinds of activities. According to the principle of determinability, no real activity can be put without at the

same time putting a *real or practical* power to work. Actual and ideal activity mutually condition and determine each other. None of these things is possible without the other, and one cannot understand what any of them are without understanding the other. From this act of freedom I himself becomes objective. *An active consciousness* is formed, and from this moment on, everything that is essentially the object of consciousness must be connected to this starting point. Freedom, therefore, is the ultimate ground and the first condition of all being and all consciousness" (Fichte, 2006, p. 214).

According to Fichte, the true character of Ben is manifested in the inseparability of practical power and intelligence. This practicality is freely established. Practical power and intelligence are identical. "Free self-determination can be conceived as a determination that will be 'something' that must have only a practical (power) or (freely established) concept of self-determination. This kind of conception is called 'the concept of a purpose'" (Fichte, 2006, p. 215). Experiential consciousness's experience of the world takes place through what Fichte calls *the productive power of imagination* activity.

The development of consciousness requires that the product of the creative imagination be made more specific. This is done by the powers of understanding and judgment. At the level of *understanding*, the 'I fixes the designs as concepts, and in the meantime it is said that the faculty of judgment turns these concepts into thought-objects, in the sense that they begin to exist not only in understanding, but only for understanding. Both understanding and judgment are therefore necessary for understanding in the full sense of the word. 'If there is nothing in understanding, there is no faculty of judgment: if there is no faculty of judgment, there is nothing in understanding for understanding' (Copleston, 1990, p. 66).

It may be possible to apply Fichte's discourse to the framework of the process of creation and creative design act. In particular, the interrelationship of understanding and judgment can explain the reflection of concepts and objects at the stage of creativity. In the process of creating an object, the faculty of judgment can play an important role. The process of deciding what and how to do over the object of creation may require the cooperation of understanding and judgment.

According to Fichte; "the act of comprehension is a free act of reflection on pre-derived intuition and is manifested as a free act" (Fichte, 2006, p. 217). Accordingly, the design of thing and thing, as the thinker indicated, is achieved by the act of reflection. Fichte establishes the act of comprehension as necessarily a freely occurring act. Again, we mentioned that wanting has an important role in the design phase. According to Fichte, what he says about wanting and doing can shed light on the combination of object cognition with will. "Pure will is the immediate object of all consciousness and all reflection. However, reflection *is based on reasoning* , which is discursive (...) Considered in a simple way, this act of reflection is an act of willingness; As long as it is intuited, it appears as a 'don't make'. The same act of reflection is the basis of all empirical consciousness" (Fichte, 2006, pp. 220-221). When the comprehension of the object as a whole occurs as an act of reasoning, of wanting, it appears as doing. In the design process, it may be possible to talk about the processing of this reflection act.

In Fichte, the first limitation of the unlimited activity of the self provides the birth of sensation. Since the self produces it unconsciously, sensation appears as something constituted by outside influence. The second stage is intuition. He reaches intuition when he thinks about the sense of self, when he puts in front of himself something that limits him. When we think about intuition in the third stage, an image of what appears to be intuited is formed and that image

is distinguished from what corresponds to it. Fichte says that categories emerge in this way together with the object like time and space (Cevizci, 2009, p. 809).

According to Fichte, the sensory dimension of information is complemented by the mental dimension. The ability to understand is also the cause of intuition. In cooperation with the faculty of understanding, the faculty of judgment, the faculty of pure self (pure self) is formed. This is the field in which theoretical consciousness emerges. Informational development exists at this level. Copleston states:

Saltik is the only philosopher who consciously re-watches the productive activity of the 'I' that is unconsciously contained in himself in the act of transcendental thinking. For the non-philosopher, and for the empirical consciousness of the philosopher himself, the natural world is a given thing, the state in which the finite 'I' finds itself. This power Fichte calls the power of imagination, or more precisely, the productive power of imagination or the power of productive imagination. The power of imagination occupies an important position in Kant's philosophy and served as an indispensable link between sensibility and understanding. But in Fichte it acquires a vital role as a basis for ordinary or empirical consciousness. Admittedly, in addition to the 'I' and 'not-I', it is not a kind of third force: it is the activity of the self itself, in other words, the pure 'I' (Copleston, 1990, p. 65).

Stating that it is the philosopher who re-traces the act of transcendental thinking, Fichte can be said to be trying to emphasize that the awareness of this mental activity can be discovered through an introspective gaze. Creation and creativity are also intense in the design stage, and the use of the power of imagination seems to be explained from Fichte's point of view and the subject's contact with the object within the framework he has drawn. Just like the philosophical think movement, the discursive process and the creative process can be similar. The formation of abstraction and imagery from objects can take place in a discursive process, which is then transformed into an object.

## 2.2. CREATIVITY AT SCHELLING

Frederich Willhelm Joseph Von Schelling (1775 - 1854) was a follower of Fichte. However, the thinker developed his own system of thought by shedding Fichte's thoughts later. Schelling gradually worked from the field of subjective idealism, natural philosophy, philosophy of identity, negative philosophy. In particular, "in his writings on natural philosophy, Schelling proceeded from the objective to the subject, from the lowest steps of nature to the as a preparation for consciousness, while in *The System of Transcendental Idealism* he began with the I and proceeded to follow its process of objectification of itself" (Copleston, 1990, p. 112). The thinker was of the opinion that philosophy should be a system of coherent propositions. For Schelling, dogmatism is the absolutization of the non-self. According to this dogma, freedom is completely eliminated. The thinker argues that dogmatism cannot be refuted theoretically, and therefore fails in critical thinking. According to him, as long as one does not remain on the theoretical plane, both dogmatism and criticism lead to the same result. First of all, in both systems, they try to make the transition from the infinite to the finite, one being the infinite object or matter and the other being the infinite spirit or geist. Schelling says that philosophy cannot move from the finite to the infinite. Although it is always justifiable for infinite space to manifest itself in finite space, he considers that it is a closure of a gap or the elimination of impotence. In order to eliminate this, the philosopher thinks that traditional a posteriori proofs are useless in natural philosophy, and says that the finite can be seen as infinite and the infinite as finite (Cevizci, 2009: 819).

Taking these expressions of Schelling, it may be possible to reach the following conclusion when we evaluate it in terms of creation and creativity. When designing an object, it is possible that the power of imagination is performing infinite combinations. However, when design becomes objectified, it becomes finite, seemingly infinite. Now the object is the finite object of the end-of-the-box imagination. But other subjects who follow the object can still have unlimited imaginations on the finite object. This is like the infinity unfolding of the seemingly finite art object.

In response to this basic thesis, Schelling says that the world of nature is at least as real and important as the world of the self. In reality, it is nature that gives consciousness what consciousness reproduces. Nature is the objective. It is known from the beginning. Nature is eternal. But by limiting itself, consciousness presents itself to itself as something different from nature. For Schelling, the essence of the self is the soul or spirit. The essence of nature is matter. The essence of matter is power, attraction and repulsion. The subjective is the spirit and shows an active characteristic. The objective provides repulsion in the face of matter (Cevizci, 2009: 820). By identifying nature as non-self, Fichte created a duality between nature and spirit, objective and subjective. Schelling, on the other hand, was driven to transcend this duality in his metaphysics of nature.

He argues that it is the development of the faculty of deep thinking that has brought about a disconnect between the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real. If we are to abstract the work of the act of thinking, we need to see man as one with Nature. More precisely, we will have to see it as experiencing this union with Nature at the level of the immediacy of the feeling. But through the power of deep thought, man has distinguished between the external object and his subjective design, and has become an object for himself. In general, thought has grounded and maintained the distinction between the objective external world of Nature and the subjective inner design and life of self-consciousness, the distinction between Nature and Spirit. Nature thus becomes the opposite of externality or Spirit, and man, as a self-conscious being capable of thinking in the abstract, is alienated from nature (Copleston, 1990, p. 122).

In Schelling's philosophy, the constructed self-impaired by the subject is cast aside. Our ability to think abstractly makes distinctions such as objective-subjective, nature-spirit. With Schelling's metaphysics of nature, he tries to eliminate this artificial distinction. "What causes problems is thought itself. On the plane of ordinary common sense, there is no problem with the relationship between the real and the ideal order, between the thing and its conceptual design. It is the deep, abstract thought that gives rise to the problem, and it is this same idea that solves it" (Copleston, 1990, p. 123). From the framework of subjective idealism, Fichte absolutized, according to Schelling, the subject. According to Schelling, it is abstract thought that makes distinctions such as object-subjective, spirit-nature, but the thinker's seeing the ability to overcome problems in the abstract thought structure that creates duality can again create a duality. In this case, the subject can be absolutized again. Schelling says that one's first impulse is to try to solve the problem in terms of causal activity:

Things exist independently of the moment. Thus, they cause the design of themselves. The subjective is dependent on the objective. But Schelling knows that by saying this, he will run into more trouble. According to their own statements; If he asserts that external designs exist independently and cause my own designs, he will necessarily be putting himself above things and designs. And that would be secretly asserting itself as a spirit. This leads to another problem: How can external things be a decisive influence on the soul? Accordingly; Instead of saying that things cause their own design, we can say, as Kant said, that the subject imposes

its cognitive forms on a given object of experience and thus creates phenomenological factuality. Only then are we faced with the concept of something in itself, which is unthinkable. For something is nothing but forms that are said to be imposed by the subject. However, to the question of the conformity of the reconciliation between the subjective and the objective, the ideal and the real, Spinoza and Leibniz carried the intuition of the fact that the ideal and the real are ultimately one. According to Schelling: It must be shown that nature is the visible spirit, that the spirit is the invisible nature. Given the picture of nature, design life is not merely something alien to it, opposed to the objective world. Design life is nature's knowledge of itself and the de facto state of nature's secrecy. Thus, the sleeping soul awakens to consciousness (Copleston, 1990).

The fact that spirit and nature are so identical leads us to the absolute. Schelling's identity, Absolute subjectivity, is the pure identity of absolute objectivity. "And this identity is reflected in the mutual interweaving of the knowledge of nature on the one hand, and of man on the other, and of Nature itself through man" (Copleston, 1990, p. 124). The absolute is a single act of knowledge, and there are three stages in this act. "But only if we see them as chronically following each other. In the first fidget, Spirit objectifies himself in the ideal of nature, in a sense in the mold of the ideal of Nature, for which Schelling uses Spinoza's *term natura naturans*. In the second fidget, it becomes pure as objectivity and pure subjectivity. And the third mode is the combination, which is 'two absolute objectivities in him (pure objectivity and pure subjectivity) are again one absolute merit.' It is thus a firstless-infinite acquisition of self-knowledge" (Copleston, 1990, p. 125). In this case, these logical phases, which do not follow each other temporally, first objectify the absolute self as the ideal nature. Spinoza's *Natura Naturans* means 'nature that naturalizes'. Second, the objectified absolute becomes the absolute as subjectivity. And in the third stage we appear as synthesis, absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity again appear as a single absolute. This is how the acquisition of infinite self-knowledge takes place. When we look at these phases, we can see the reflection of the system of particular ones in nature. In the second stage we see the transformation of the objective into the subjective. This transformation takes place in the world of design. Especially in the second phase, Schelling seems to explain how the objective in terms of creation and creativity turns into the subjective. In the final stage, when we examine the formation of two unity, that is, an absolute art object, it may be possible to see it as a synthesis. In this case, it is possible to observe the subject-object-synthesis phases from the perspective of creation and creativity.

When we look at Schelling's line of transcendental idealism, the thinker believes that natural philosophy and the system of transcendental idealism are mutually complementary. He considers the nature of the absolute to appear as the identity of subject and object, the ideal and the real. If the identity of subject and object is accepted, then in the field of knowledge this is self-consciousness. The term self-consciousness is, according to Schelling, "I." But this "me" is not an individual "me." It symbolizes the act of self-consciousness in general. Self-consciousness is an absolute and single act, the production of the I as an object. The self here can be grasped through self-knowledge, through a momentary intuition. Schelling's transcendental system is the construction of self-consciousness (Copleston, 1990).

Schelling's transcendental idealism is based on Fichte's system of thought. Schelling, in parallel with Fichte, also examines consciousness in three main phases: The thinker has

developed a three-stage theory of knowledge ranging from sensation to perception, from perception to reflection, from thinking to will. First, the consciousness of the non-self is felt and experienced as sensation. At the boundary of sensation, self-consciousness, directed outward, encounters objects coming from outside. At this stage, thinking takes place. In the final stage, a person becomes aware of gravity's actual world in space and of his own activity. Thinking from perception about the external world also arises from the will from thinking about one's inner world. Schelling's teaching also had an impact on Hegel. In this framework, Schelling says that knowledge is separated from its object only through abstraction. In this context, too, knowledge is the encounter of objects with the self, so concepts are not independent of objects. The self is the state of knowledge, while the essence of the self is activity in the pure self and derives from the unintentional, which is the action of the self (Cevizci, 2009, pp. 821-822).

When we take this system of thinking of Schelling and attribute it to the creator subject, it may be possible to say that sensations turn into perception and from there to reflection and finally to will. Willpower, in a general sense, means "the power to control and determine our actions according to our desire, intentions, and purposes; the person's determination to perform certain actions or actions; the power to compare and apply the action to be performed in the face of a certain situation without any external coercion or obligation" (Cevizci, 2014, pp. 238-239). It is possible to talk about the cooperation of the will with the will, the wishes of the human being, who is a biological being, can be mentioned together with the will, because if the will is a determination to perform an action, "wanting requires a doing" (Mengüşoğlu, 1988: 126). Within Schelling's system, it may be possible to situate the will within the framework of creation and creativity. When the relationship of design with desire is considered, it may be possible to reach another concept behind it. One of these concepts is 'impulse' and the other is 'drive'. Urge; "It's the driving factor to action. The impulse that leads to action" (Timuçin, 2004, p. 171). is. On the other hand, the concept of motive was again explained by Timuchin as follows:

Any cause or factor in consciousness that leads to voluntary actions. All kinds of intellectual factors in consciousness. The intellectual factor that creates the voluntary orientation in consciousness as opposed to impulses, which are emotional determinants in consciousness. The rational factor that determines a decision or an attitude. P. Janet says: "Every man, in his actions, must obey the motives of which he is conscious or not. If these motives are at the intellectual level, that is, at the level of ideas, they are specifically called motives. When they are at the level of sensitivity, they are more often called impulses. Motives are directed or driven, but no matter how they do it, man cannot manifest himself without them." There is always a head-on in the impulse, always a volitional orientation in the motive. However, since we cannot treat emotions and thoughts separately, we do not know at what point impulses are mixed with motives or when motives become impulses. The separation of feelings and thoughts is nothing but our abstraction. That is why La Rochefoucauld quite rightly said in the XVII century; "We would be ashamed of our best actions a long time, if people could see the motives that create our actions." Accordingly, motives are the reason for the existence of our rational behavior (Timuçin, 2004: 244).

In this state, before the subject proceeds to the design stage, any conformant can activate its motives. It is possible for this stimulus to reach the subject from objects. Schelling's stage of perception is immediately after the subject's encounter with the object without reflection, the subject can use his will in the stage of bringing the object into existence by performing reflection on the object. In this case, it may be possible to observe the will in an art object that

is brought into existence. On the other hand, Schelling also states the following about willpower and imagination:

Where perception is limited, imagination is free and limitless. From his point of view, his imagination and ideologies mediate between perception and will. Where the concepts of comprehension are finite, the ideologies of the imagination are infinite in one aspect finite in another. Indeed, according to Schelling, the relation of an idea to its object is a finite relation, while the activity of the imagination in this relation is infinite. Every idea falls within the scope of an ideal; The function of the will is to idealize the imagination or ideas. The contradiction that arises here gives rise to the impulse or action, which is defined as the desire to restore the identity that has been damaged and destroyed. The realization of ideals is thanks to this impulse or action. The distinction between will and intelligence, then, must be a relative, not an absolute, one. (...) According to Schelling, who says that the life of the soul arises from the interaction of the intelligence that approves of the non-self and the will that frees it from it, these two must be identical when considered from a higher point of view, although the competition between them constitutes the history we know as the life of the species. Indeed, the self that acts in intelligence and the I that knows are one and the same. Where an object is created for the acting self, the knowing self perceives only other objects. Since in action the subject becomes an object for himself, there is no transition from the world of nature to the world of mind. While every change in the external world is taken as a perception, every action leads to this kind of change. Action, therefore, is perception, and self-determination is the first and most fundamental condition of consciousness. (Cevizci, 2009, p. 822).

As Schelling points out, imagination and ideologies mediate between perception and willpower. When we look behind imagination and ideologies, as we mentioned above, it may be possible for us to place impulses and motives. On the other hand, where the concepts of comprehension are finite, it is possible for the subject to find his own meanings on the object. A foreign object that cannot be identified after being detected can be interpreted by the subject in various ways. This interpretation can be accompanied by imagination. Schelling, on the other hand, did not distinguish between the "me-acting" and the "knowing-me." The thinker thought that the act-self had become an object for him, closing the transition from the world of nature to the world of mind. Here, it may be possible to observe the process in which the creative subject of the actor-self leaves the design stage and begins to form the art object in the light of these sentences. It is possible to discuss the reciprocal relationship of the self-non-self in terms of creation and creativity in terms of design-action.

### ***2.2.1 Creativity and the Unconscious***

As a philosopher involved in the Romanticism Movement around Jena, Schelling saw art as the instrument of philosophy. In Schelling's line of transcendental idealism, he clearly uses the following expressions for art; "The objective world is the only original, yet unconscious poetry of the Spirit. The universal organ of philosophy—and the keystone of an entire arch—is the *philosophy of art*" (Copleston, 1990, p. 136). The thinker placed a central emphasis on art and attempted to examine the problem in Fichte's theory of knowledge. Fichte was experiencing himself as me, and the world as something different from me. In this case, if the world were to produce the self, the product of the self would be a product that the self did not know. In this case, an unconscious product would occur. Fichte seems unable to reach any conclusions about the problem of how philosophy can reach the conscious or unconscious. Accordingly, neither in theory nor in practice can the self recognize itself in unconscious production. Schelling, when he uses the phrase that the objective world is a free and unconscious poem of the soul, seems to be saying that by ascribing a third verb to the self, the self can recognize itself when it produces unconsciously. It must produce consciousness and be aware of what it produces, it must know it. How, then, is the relationship between knowing



and known to be understood? In *his The System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling answers the question "what is knowledge?" as follows:

Knowledge is <<the suitability of the subject and the object>> [...] The subject of our knowledge is the self or intelligens, and the object is nature. Subject and object, I and nature, are diametrically opposed to each other. I is the entity of consciousness, while nature is the being without consciousness. In knowledge, subject and object, consciousness and nature reside in an identity. However, in this identity, if one is asked which of the elements of subject and object comes first: 1) It is assumed that the subject from which the object comes first joins the object later. Then one rises from nature from the object to the consciousness of the I. A knowledge investigates this process, and this knowledge *is called natural philosophy*. 2) Or it is assumed that the subject came first and the object joined him later. How, then, does the object come into being from the subject, from the nature from the I, from the intelligens? question arises. This question is also examined by a philosophy (Tunali, 1989: 149).

According to these statements, conscious and unconscious production are together in art. In knowledge, the subject, the object, the conscious and the unconscious are identical. Schelling attaches importance to intuition. Aesthetic intuition shows the reality of the unity of the conscious, the unconscious and the ideal:

Copleston, *in his work German Idealism*, states: When we consider aesthetic intuition from the point of view of the creator and the artist, the genius, we can see that he knows what he is doing. The artist consciously reflects the statements that he is acting knowingly, he says, and continues:

Michelangelo Musa didn't know what he was doing when he made his sculpture. But at the same time we can say with equal accuracy that genius acts unconsciously. Genius cannot be reduced to an applied skill that can be instilled through teaching: the creative artist is, in a sense, the bearer of a power that acts through him. And for Schelling it is the same force that operates in Nature. In other words, the same force that acts unconsciously in producing Nature, the unconscious poetry of the Spirit, acts consciously in producing the work of art. In more precise words, it acts through the consciousness of the artist. And this exemplifies the fundamental unity of the unconscious and the conscious, the real and the ideal (Copleston, 1990, pp. 136-137).

The work of the self and the non-self is experienced internally in the field of art, as Schelling mentioned.

The fact that conscious and unconscious production are identical does not mean that they annihilate each other in opposition. But by rejecting each other, they reflect eternal opposition. It is for this reason that since there is no reconciliation between the conscious and the unconscious, not a single interpretation can be made to the work of art" (Fackenheim, 1954, p. 312).

In this context, the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) *describes his journey to understand the artist and his object in the chapter "Michelangelo's Moses" of his book Art and Literature in these sentences:*

In my view, what influences us so strongly can only be the artist's intention as long as he manages to express it in his work and make us understand it. I realize that this will not be merely a question of intellectual comprehension; what he intends is to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same mental regulation as the one that creates in him the impulse to create. But why should not the artist's intention be amenable to being communicated and understood in words, as in other cases of mental life? Perhaps it will never be possible in the case of great works of art without applying a soul analysis. If this is an effective expression of the artist's intentions and emotional activities, the product itself must allow for such analysis. To find the artist's intention,

I must first find the meaning and content of what is represented in his work; in other words, *I have to be able to interpret it*. It is possible, then, that this kind of artwork requires interpretation, and that I may not know why I was so strongly influenced until I completed that interpretation. I dare even hope that after having managed to analyze it in this way, the effect of the work will not be diminished (Freud, 1999, p. 240).

In the direction of Freud's statements, Fackenheim points out again in his article on Schelling, that conscious and unconscious production are identical but not mutually exclusive, and that the artist's emotional attitude and impulse to create, as Freud mentioned, try to evoke the same mental plane as the creator in other subjects, showing that the object of creation can be interpreted. But Freud's view that the object of art can give precisely the artist's emotion and intention may not be defensible when we consider it from the point of view of subjective idealism. Because the object of art can be open to interpretation with the feelings, intentions and perceptions of other subjects with its perception, just as it reflects the feelings and intentions of its creator. Freud "sees the unconscious as the real field of spirituality, as the center of spirituality, according to him all thoughts and actions are governed by the unconscious. Freud understands the unconscious as dynamic processes that profoundly affect our behavior but are not conscious" (Timuçin, 2005: 80). On the other hand, Rollo May, who studies the relationship between creativity and the unconscious, dramatically states in a different way from Freud: "There is no certain unconscious; the unconscious is rather the unconscious dimensions of life (or its sources, its faces). I define the unconscious as the *potential forces of action and awareness that the individual cannot or will not realize*. These hidden forces are the source of what we might call "free creativity" (May, 2012, p. 77).

According to Schelling, "the production of art begins with a conflict" (1978, p. 222). The contradiction between nature and mind can only be eliminated through the work of art.

That is, the subject, consciousness, both as myself and as the object, as non-consciousness, as non-self, excludes a vision or a vision (*Anschauung*). Such a vision, which encompasses the Subject and the Object, the I and the non-I, *is an aesthetic* view. The product of this appearance is a work of art. Accordingly, the work of art includes the subject and the object, the I and the non-self, the conscious and the unconscious. The work of art, then, is both me and non-me, both free and obligatory. The work of art is a harmony in which all these opposites disappear. Only a genius can create such a harmonious existence, a work of art (Tunalı, 1989: 149).

From this point of view, as May points out, it is possible to say that Schelling recognizes the self in the stage of creating and creating creativity, that is, aesthetics, within the framework of this whole system of thinking. I recognize myself in the production of the unconscious. The thinker says that "intelligence first became conscious of itself in art" (Cevizci, 2009: 824). The I reveals itself in a tangible way in the work of art. In this context, it can be said that the non-self-art object establishes a connection between subjects, both free and necessarily. As Schelling said, since an object of art includes the self and the non-self, it is possible for consciousness to be an object that opens up to the perception of other subjects. But again, the subject may not be independent of the perception and interpretation of other subjects.

### 2.3. CREATIVITY IN HEGEL

George Wilhelm Friederich Hegel (1771-1831), a philosopher who represented German idealism, was a key figure in the systems of thought that would come after him. Hegel made considerable efforts to make sense of philosophical problems and to understand terms.

According to him, the unchanging contents of the concepts are not accepted. "For Hegel, the task of philosophy is to understand the particular; for he is the most in need of being understood. The particular or the individual can only be known by their relation to everything else (...) When understood in this way, it means that it will no longer be seen as a 'substance' or 'thing', but can only be treated as something that happens in the process of changing events" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 826). Hegel argues that such a structure of consciousness can only comprehend reality as it is, realize that it is a process of change. The concept refers to the total. In this context, Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969) states that "Kant's aesthetics focus on concepts, while Hegelian aesthetics focus on the particular art object" (Altuğ, 2012: 44). When we evaluate it from this point of view, we can say that Hegel's aesthetic understanding is stripped of concepts and exists in particular objects.

When we look at Hegel's philosophy in general, we see that he perceives the universe as an organic process of reality. For Hegel, what really exists is the absolute. According to the thinker, the subject of philosophy is also the absolute. He is God in this 'absolute' theological sense. But it is not a divine reality that is transcendent to the world and separate from it, but rather reality itself as a whole. Accordingly, philosophy deals with what is true. However, what is real is a whole (Cevizci, 2009: 827). Hegel combines the divine as unity and incorporation with his view of art and expresses it with these words:

We have seen that Art must, above all, make the Divine (das Göttliche) the center of its designs (...). But when seen clearly as unity and universality, the Divine exists in essence only for contemplation and, by being imageless in itself, is not amenable to imagination and shaping by the imagination. (...) On the other hand, however, although unity and universality are characteristics of the divine; The divine is nevertheless essentially self-determination, and so because it frees itself from abstraction, it keeps itself open to descriptive design and visualization. Now, if the Divine is captured in its own deterministic form and is represented by the imagination in a descriptive manner, then a variety of determinations immediately enters into play, and it is only here that the ideal is the beginning of the original field of art. (...) On the other hand, what is divine in itself *as pure* spirit is only the object of intellectual reflection. But since the spirit *embodied in* the activity always resonates only in the human chest, art belongs. Yet above them immediately come to light particular interests and actions, determined characters, and their immediate conditions and situations—in short, they intertwine with the external world; therefore, it is difficult to describe the place of the Ideal in relation to this area of determination in general terms at the outset (Hegel, 2012, pp. 174-175).

Within the framework of these statements of Hegel, it is possible to say that the absolute world is not embodied as transcendent, but rather as reality itself, "The field of natural existence, for Hegel, is a field in which the Absolute or the idea is manifested, in a sense, it becomes flesh and blood" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 832). Hegel takes a stand against materialism, also known as essentialism. "Essentialism, (ing. *materialism*) is the worldview that asserts that there is no substance in the reality of all kinds of reality, which is not only objective but spiritual and spiritual" (Akarsu, 1988, p. 144). On the contrary, the philosopher asserts that what really exists is "absolute, or Reason, or *Geist*" (Cevizci, 2009: 827).

The absolute, concept, ide, or spirit is dynamic, and this becomes concrete in a dialectical process. Again, the concept, the ide and the spirit, is a being of possibilities devoid of reality. In order to attain its own consciousness, the soul wants to gain reality, and for this it goes outside of itself. *The concept, which is a thesis* in itself, goes outside itself and becomes opposed to itself, it becomes a foreign being to itself. In this case, this entity *constitutes the antithesis* step. In this way, the philosophy that studies nature is called natural philosophy.

While realizing itself in nature, the *ide*, which is alien to its own essence and opposed to itself, turns to itself at the third stage of the development of the soul and *synthesis* occurs. The return of the soul of the *id* to this essence of itself takes place in three stages: *the subjective spirit*: the individual spirit. This spirit studies psychology, anthropology, phenomenology. *Objective spirit*: This shows the Objectification of the free will (will). Hegel, in particular, finds the objective tone in the field of law and morality. *Absolute spirit*: it is a synthesis of subjective and objective spirits. In him the soul becomes fully conscious of itself. The realization of the soul to its own consciousness also takes place in three stages. firstly, art is born when the soul freely follows its own word, and secondly, religion is born when the soul grasps its essence with symbols. Finally, philosophy is born with the conceptual intellectual comprehension of the essence of the soul. Thus, philosophy is the highest stage of development of the soul (Tunali, 2012: 151).

Hegel takes a stand against the exclusion of art from philosophy and the view of it as merely the instrument of transient desires. According to the philosopher, what man produces expresses the mind of man. Hegel expresses his determination of the soul with these words:

At least this much will be immediately admitted that the soul is capable of examining itself and having a consciousness, a thinking consciousness, of itself and of all that finds its origin in it . Thinking is precisely what constitutes the innermost essential nature of the soul. In a consciousness that thinks about itself and on itself, although they always have freedom and transient desire, the soul is acting according to its intrinsic nature, provided that it exists in them as a matter of fact. Now, art and works of art, being born of and created by spirit, are themselves of a spiritual kind, yet their presentations appear to the appearance of a sensuality and envelop the sensuous with the spirit (Hegel, 2012, p. 13).

As it is understood from these sentences of Hegel, it may be possible to trace the cognitive characteristics of its creator on a work of art. Because, according to the thinker, the work of art arises from the soul of the subject. The object of art, which reaches from mental imagination to the realm of sensuality, is a part of human intelligence.

Aesthetics (*Yun.aisthetike. aisthetike*) in accordance with the meaning of its origin in Greek, also carries the meaning of the teaching of sensory science (Akarsu, 1988, p. 72). Hegel uses the word aesthetics to express the beautiful. His conception of aesthetics is also a spiritual philosophy, which Hegel bases on in his *Lessons in Aesthetics (Vorlesungen, über die Aesthetik)*. The main idea and starting point of this work is the idea that "aesthetics is the science of artistic beauty. Because, alone, 'the beauty of art is born of spirit, and in this respect the beauty of art is superior to the beauty of nature'. Since spirit products are superior to nature products, the beauty of art, which is a product of spirit, will also be superior to the beauty of nature" (Tunali, 2012: 151). For Hegel, truth is the idea.

According to the thinker, "beautiful" is <<ide>>. The *ide*, on the other hand, obtains objectivity and reality with the elements that the concept takes within it. For example, the concept of human being is objective and general as a totality with its sensory-mental, physical-spiritual aspects. This totality *is ide*. <<ide is such a whole, it is a continuous harmony of these totalities. Thus the *ide* is righteousness and all righteousness (truth) All that exists is true in the sense that it is the existence of the *Ide*. Because only the *ide* is real. For an object or an appearance to be true (truth), for it to have an internal or external existence, is usually not because it is reality, but because that reality fits the concept. Only then can existence have truth and reality.>> Again, according to Hegel, this truth should not be understood as, say, a being conforming to my visions, but rather as an object of the self, or an external object, an action realizing the concept itself within the reality of an event and situation. in a sense, it must be understood. If there is such an identity between concept and reality, anything is generality, if there is

no such identity, then it is a solitary aspect that exists. Instead of the totality of the concept, only a part of it becomes objective" (Tunalı, 2012: 152).

When we consider it within the framework of these explanations, we can conclude that Hegel saw the beautiful as "the truth". "Art's dependence on the sensual does not arise as its lack of truth, but as its power. For *only art can present us with the Idea in its sensory existence*. Therefore, neither religion nor philosophy can give the truth as expressed by art. This cognitive autonomy of aesthetic consciousness *makes art 'free in both its purpose and its means'*" (Altuğ, 2012: 47). On the other hand, it has forms that depend on art and its concrete expression. The thinker examines art forms in three parts: The thinker states that the first stage of art is *symbolic art*. Accordingly, "the ide is still in search of the expression that is peculiar to it. For it is still abstract and uncertain to itself, in which it lacks its peculiar appearance, and here nature dominates matter, matter. *Symbolic form manifests itself best in architecture*" (Tunalı, 2012: 152). According to this narrative, the symbol expresses the meaning but does not express itself. "symbolic art is characterized by the conflict between sensory form and rational content" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 845). The other phase is *the classical art* form. Here we can say that the content is almost a whole with the form. "In this art form, the IDE is freed from abstraction, from ambiguity. Here the soul conceives of itself as a free subject, where complete harmony occurs between the ide and appearance. This is best seen in the art of sculpture" (Cevizci, 2009: 845). In the classical art form, form and spirit are almost in unity. Finally, Hegel talks about *the romantic art* phase. "The ide here conceives of himself as the absolute spirit, and therefore finds no appearance or expression in the external world, in matter, in the sensuous. The spirit dominates the ide matter. The harmony we find in classical art between the ide and the appearance is completely broken. This looks best in pictures and music. Literature, on the other hand, combines these three forms in its existence and therefore becomes the most superior art" (Cevizci, 2009, pp. 152-153).

Hegel's categorization of the forms of art in this way may also raise the question of whether there are different ways in which the mind functions according to the types of art. When we consider the fields of art such as painting, music, sculpture, dance, architecture, etc. within the framework of creation and creativity, it may be possible to say that imagination may be specific to those branches of art. Accordingly, the designs of objects produced in symbolic form can be considered to be different from the designs of classical and romantic forms and the expression of spirit. When the relationship of the form with the mind is considered, considering that the form given to the subject is different in the tools he uses, it is possible to say that the connection of the tool used with the body also relates to different regions of the mind. For example, in the art of dance, the subject objectifies and gives form to his body. On the other hand, in the art of sculpture, the sculptor uses his hands while giving form to his object. In the art of music, the musician objectifies the sound with the instrument he uses as a tool. However, Hegel preferred classical art within the division of art he categorized. According to this, "classical art presents the soul in perfect unity with the body" (Cevizci, 2009: 845). According to these statements of Hegel, we can deduce the idea that the art of sculpture is superior to other arts. However, the art of sculpture, just like music, painting and dance, requires the cooperation of body and mind.

Hegel wants to clarify the subject's creation and creativity. The artist reveals the difference between his talent and creation and the creation of gods with these words:

Here the production of talent and genius appears only as a *state of affairs*, and especially as a *case of inspiration*. It is said that the genius can enter such a state, partly by being stimulated by an object, and partly by his own passing whim, with the help of the champagne bottle, to put himself in this state. In Germany, this notion became evident in the so-called Genius Period, which began with Goethe's first poetic productions and continued with Schiller's. In their early works, these poets made a new beginning, setting aside all the rules laid down at the time; they deliberately worked outside these rules, and in so doing surpassed all other writers. I will not, however, go further into the confusions that have prevailed about the concept of inspiration and genius, and that even to this day there are about the omnipotence of inspiration. What is essential in this direction can be expressed in the following view: Even if the talent and genius of the artist have a natural element in themselves, this element still needs to be developed in essence by thought, by reflection on the mode of production, and by the practice and skill of producing. For, above all else, an essential feature of artistic production, what constitutes the apparent superiority of its external work over natural reality, is not only continuity, but it has made spiritual inspiration self-evident. Nevertheless, the higher position of works of art is also called into question by another widely accepted idea. For it is said that nature and its products are the work of God, created by his grace and wisdom, whereas the product of art is a purely human work, made by human hands according to human insight" (Hegel, 2012, pp. 27-30).

Hegel is of the opinion that human creation should be considered differently from divine creation. Another important point is that genius and creativity can be developed. The thinker emphasizes that natural talent should be developed by the ability to produce, and especially by reflection. Within the framework of these sentences, when we consider the close connection of creative activity with art, we can conclude that people can be trained in this direction.

On the other hand, Hegel *examines art as mimesis and art as creation, replacing art as imitation with art as creation*. Hegel understands art not as a design (Vorstellung), *but as a presentation* (Darstellung). It is a sensory representation of the idea. The design depicts something other than itself, and with this feature, it embodies *the mimetic* duality. What the presentation looks like is just itself. Presentation does not lead us to anything other than itself. The mode of consciousness of the idea is art, but it is not the design of the idea. Design gives a description of something. But presentation is not a description or description of anything. It is a mode of consciousness. (Hegel, 2012, pp. 49-50).

When we consider these statements of Hegel, it is possible to see that he considers presentation as original creation, not design. "For Hegel, the purpose of art is not an imitation of nature, nor is it to evoke emotions or to teach moral perfection. The purpose of art *is itself*" (Hegel, 2012, p. 52). From these statements we can conclude that the purpose of art and its product is for itself.

### **2.3.1 Artistic Imagination: Genius and Inspiration**

According to Hegel, the work of art *arises from the soul*, so the features peculiar to the subject will be contained in the work of art. Imagination, genius inspiration concepts in terms of creation and creativity have been discussed for years in the world of thought. These characteristics, which still belong to the artistic subject today, are the subject of research. Imagination is the power of imagination, "[Eng. *fantastic*] Visionary design power, design

efficiency, imagination, creative imagination. It means to dream: to take the perceived into the soul so intensely that it has an effect on us, to establish it within us" (Akarsu, 1988: 63). When we examine the relationship between perception and imagination within the scope of this definition, it is possible to see that these two are connected. Aristotle stated the following about this relationship between perception and thought:

True perception means a kind of change of quality. For this reason, a perception process does not only take place while the organs of perception are active, but on the contrary, it continues to perceive after it has ceased to be active (...) When we direct perception over something else, the essential impression lasts, for example, when we look at the darkness from the sun. For we do not see anything in the dark, but the movement (light) revealed by the sun in the eyes is still continuing (Aristotle, 2007, p. 238).

Within the scope of these statements, it is possible to say similar things about the subject's encounter and subsequent reflection as well as emotional encounters and reflections. As Hume said, "when we reflect on our past feelings and excitements, our thoughts are a faithful mirror and faithfully copy objects in a way that corresponds to reality" (Hume, 2010, p. 369). Within the scope of these words, we can say that the dream phase is a re-enactment activity. Hegel thought that the subjective aspect of the artist should also be discussed on the basis of subjective productive activity, and he expresses the justification of his research with these words. "we have to discuss how the work of art belongs to the subjective inner consciousness, even though the work of art as the product of subjective inner consciousness is not yet born into actuality, but is shaped only by creative subjectivity, that is, by the genius and talent of the artist" (Hegel, 2012, p. 279). Accordingly, Hegel begins to examine imagination, genius and inspiration.

In his Lectures on the Aesthetic Fine Arts, *Hegel* makes a distinction between imagination and imagination. Because imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) is passive, Imagination (*phantasie*) is an active artistic talent. Creative activity includes comprehension and sense. His ability and sense of comprehension, with his attentive sense of hearing and sight, give the soul a wide variety of impressions of what exists. This activity also requires a memory in which all these very diverse images will be kept, preserved. Hegel states that in art, and especially in poetry, the artist should create not from the richness of abstract concepts, but from the richness of life. The medium of production of art is the outward reflection of the verb and its finding form. The artist must have experienced, seen, heard, experienced many things and stored them in his memory. Because the artist processes all his experiences for later use and spreads them to countless subjects. In particular, the strict preservation of what has been seen in memory is the first condition that the artist needs. On the other hand, one should also be familiar with one's inner life, that is, with one's passions and feelings. This is twofold knowledge because in this way, according to Hegel, the soul is able to express itself in the externality of its inner world (Hegel, 2012).

When we look at Hegel's statements, it is possible to see the effect of the perception of the existing on the imagination. But on the other hand, the thinker is talking about another component of the mind, memory. Encounters with objects, comprehension, impressions seem necessary for imagination. However, it seems impossible to preserve these impressions without memory. Memory according to Aristotle:

[...] it is only an ability to think indirectly, and in fact it is a faculty of the central power of perception (...) every time something we learn appears in memory, we sense it in advance, and this sensation stipulates time before and after. (...) The objects of memory are in fact indirectly the objects of depiction, and the objects of memory are the objects that prescribe a description. (...) Because the movement that emerges with perception leaves behind a trace of the perception picture, as if it were printing a seal with a ring (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 229-230).

Hume, on the other hand, thought that memory worked in a certain order. According to this, "in our strangest and most stray dreams, even in our dreams, the imagination does not run from place to place; we see that there is still a connection between the different ideas that come one after the other" (Hume, 2010, p. 375). It is possible to say that imagination is closely related to memory in line with these narratives.

In his *Lectures on the Aesthetic Fine Arts*, Hegel spoke secondly of "the necessity of reflection." Every artist is not content with merely invoking what exists in his own mind. He says that in great works of art, the material is thought out at length, deeply measured and calculated. The rapid flow of imagination does not produce any work of art. The artist is obliged to describe what has accumulated in him within a certain framework. Only the artist can adapt these forms and appearances to suit his own purpose. In order to ensure that the external is intertwined with the mental, that is, the form, the mind, the prudence and the emotions must invoke its depths. The artist's exuberant experiences and life are very important for him in the creation process. Hegel finds the artist's material, which he shapes through emotion, as his own self. The reason why the artist internalizes the object he produces is that he is charged with his own emotions in that object (Hegel, 2012).

The philosopher underlined with a bold line that emotional life and their impressions should be in the creative subject. For Hegel, the productive activity of imagination is "what is called genius, talent, etc.; Through this activity, the artist takes what is absolutely mental in himself and, by giving it an external form, processes and reveals it as his own self-creation" (Hegel, 2012, p. 282). Hegel states that genius and talent are based on imagination and are its elements. On the other hand, the philosopher, on the basis of his explanations, it may be possible to ask how much emotions exist or not in order for the artist to find his own self under his own material that he has shaped. Accordingly, we can say that the only, the field in which the creator finds his self-self is the object produced by the artist.

When we return to Hegel's *Lectures on the Aesthetic Fine Arts*, we see that he thought that talent and genius were not identical, although there was often a distinction between them. Although art generally exhibits an objective appearance, it needs separate subjects and demands different specific faculties accordingly. Accordingly, we can talk about someone who plays the guitar or sings very well. But if the object of art is to be perfect in itself, then it needs genius. Without genius, talent cannot go beyond just a skill. Hegel states the following about genius and talent and genius:

It is often said that talent and genius must be innate. Here, too, this is very true in one respect, but equally false in another. For man as man is also born for religion, for thought, for science, for example, so he as a man is capable of acquiring a consciousness of God and attaining intellectual thought. For this, nothing is needed but to be born and nothing but education, training, diligence. For art, the situation is different; Art requires a specific talent in which the natural element also plays an essential role . Just as the very beautiful is itself the Idea, made real in the sensual and performative world, and the work of art takes that which is spiritual and displays it in the immediacy of existence so that it may be grasped by the eye and the ear; In the same way, the artist has to shape



his work not specifically in the form of spiritual thought, but in the realm of vision and emotion, and more precisely in connection with the sensory material and in a sensory environment. Therefore, like all art, this artistic creation contains in itself the aspect of immediacy and naturalness, and it is this aspect that the subject cannot reveal in himself, but must find in himself in an unmediated form. Only in this sense can we say that genius and talent must be innate (Hegel, 2012, p. 283).

Mental content needs a "tool" in order for the imagination to become an object of art. For example, in order for the fish-faced winged horse figure, designed with the help of think in the mind, to be objectified, it needs material and, most importantly, a formater. At this point, it can be said that the mental image needs talent to be realized in the sensory environment for which it is designed. In this context, Hegel explains that genius and talent may have to be innate in cooperation together.

Hegel also *spoke of inspiration in his Lectures on Aesthetics and Fine Arts*. According to the philosopher, the view that inspiration occurs through sensory stimulation is opposed to his thesis. According to him, sensory stimulation alone does not activate genius. On the other hand, inspiration does not occur with intention. Simply any desire is insufficient to inspire decision-making. If the artistic impulse is of the right kind, it is already concentrated in an original object and is tightly bound with it. Inspiration is both the subjective world of the artist and the sum of the situations that occur in the process of shaping his own objective practice towards the work of art. Inspiration is the filling of the theme and continues until the theme is finely crafted and completed. Hegel calls the subject's self-emphasis in the work of art a lack of inspiration. Accordingly, the artist must set aside his own personality and particular characteristics so that the only appropriate form is the artist himself. The inspiration in which the subject puts himself forward instead of being the mediator and invigorate of the theme itself is poor inspiration (Hegel, 2012, pp.286-287).

Hegel is of the opinion that in order for the work of art to gain objectivity, an inspiration in which the subject emphasizes himself would be poor. However, there may be a connection between Hegel's discourse and the inspiration that fills the theme and the particular characteristics, because in the artist himself, his characteristics are present as a whole. Tendencies and desires in the artist can create inspiration not only on their own, but only when they provide unity. Hegel said of character: "The character, therefore, is the essential center of artistic presentation of the ideal. (...) For the Idea, which is shaped as its ideal for the idea, that is, for the sensory imagination and vision, and which acts in its own appearance and completes itself, is the subjective individuality connected to itself in its determinism" (Hegel, 2012, p. 235). Accordingly, it does not seem possible that the characteristic features of the subject do not exist in its object. The subject's emotional life is again part of his character. As a matter of fact, Hegel argues that "in this richness of the exuberant life, character must also reveal itself" (Hegel, 2012, p. 236). Therefore, it may be possible to see in an art object the reflection of the characteristics of the subject in the whole both at the stage of inspiration and after its completion.

The subject of "being inspired" has been the subject of debate in the field of philosophy of art. In particular, it has been claimed that the artist's deeds have exceeded those that cannot be explained by him. This is the philosophy that best explains what they are doing. Townsend states that artists "fail to explain what artists really do when they produce works of art" (2002, p. 173). When we return to the concept of 'inspiration' within the framework of this discourse,

we see that Townsend concludes that "the subject of genius and inspiration is theoretically ambiguous" (2002, p. 177). Kandinsky, himself a theorist and artist, made the following statements about the artist:

The voice that the crowd does not hear, the artist hears first. He follows this call almost unwittingly. In fact, the seeds of rebirth are hidden in that "how?" question. When the question "how" is not met with a satisfactory answer, other things than matter can be seen in the objects around the "thing" (what we call personality today); By moving away a little from the 'material' dimensions, it can find the possibility of perceiving everything 'as it is', that is, in a different way from the period of realism that aims to produce everything 'as it is', that is, without imagination. (...) The artist must go deep into the soul, examine it and develop it so that art has a foundation, otherwise it remains like a separated, useless glove (Kandinsky, 2013, pp. 40-108-109).

According to these statements, it may be possible to conclude that the components of the artist such as spirituality and emotionality have an important role in the imagination and creation of the art object. As a matter of fact, Hegel says that the artist "can now embody the Ideal again through the deep emotional union with the object" (Altuž, 2012: 123). According to Hegel, the subjective spirit manifests itself above the objective spirit. When we look at it from this perspective, it is possible to observe how the art object, as a product of subjective creation, acts as a bridge in reaching other subjects.

## 2.4. CREATIVITY AT SCHILLER

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) was a thinker who wrote various works in the fields of poetry, literature, aesthetics and playwriting. Schiller examined the relationship between art and culture and established the relationship of this relationship with the aesthetic education of man. Many of Schiller's ideas were written under the influence of Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. The thinker Kant tried to interpret his aesthetics. Schiller proceeded by putting the concept of beauty into aesthetics and aesthetics into the concept of politics, and expressed the conflict between human emotions, minds and nature. Hegel made the following statements about Schiller:

It must therefore be admitted that a deep and philosophical mind demanded and expressed unity and reconciliation in opposition to the abstract infinity of reasoning, which conceives of artistic sensation, nature and agency, sense and emotion as an obstacle which contradicts and is hostile to itself, to assignment for task's sake, to the Faculty, which has not taken on a definite form (even before philosophy itself accepted them). Schiller [1759-1805] should be given a respectable place because he risked the Kantian subjectivity of thinking and his attempt to go beyond abstraction. Because Schiller not only paid great attention to art and his interest in art, regardless of its relation to philosophy, in his aesthetic writings; at the same time, he contrasted his interest in the beauty of art with philosophical principles, and it was only from these principles that he penetrated, and with the help of them, into the deeper nature and concept of the beautiful" (Hegel, 2012, p. 61).

Schiller examined the concept of the beautiful from a psychological existential and ontological point of view. We are confronted with the fundamental contradictions which he "seeks to overcome: rationality-sensuality, objectivity-subjectivity, totality-individuality, necessity-freedom. In this series of contrasts, the former can be seen as determinations of the state and the latter as determinations of art" (Altug, 2012: 16). Between these seemingly contradictory concepts, man can remain in conflict. Thanks to this alienation and conflict, people become ill and can close in on themselves. "Schiller argues that the cure for this alienation is in art"

(Megill, 2012, p. 47). According to Schiller's thoughts, it can be said that art moves from a position that appeals only to the sensory side of the human being to a field of vital importance.

As Hegel noted in his *Lectures on Aesthetic Fine Art*, Schiller reflected his insight into the nature of art in his *Letters on Aesthetic Education*. The point of departure of the thinker is that man has within himself an ideal human sufficiency and carries it. The state represents this people. The state collects the diversity of individual persons and deals with them in an objective, total, legal manner. Schiller thought that this idea and the state should be reconciled and that there were two ways to do this. Accordingly, ethics, law, reason can abolish the state; that is, it can remove individuality. On the other hand, by elevating himself to the intellect, to the *genus (gattung/genus)*, the individual can abstract himself into a human being in terms of the idea over time. According to Schiller, while nature demands diversity and individuality, reason demands *unity that is appropriate to the genus*; in these two forces it is the legislator and they demand the same rights over man. Aesthetic training is necessary to avoid the clash of these opposing sides. Because, according to Schiller, aesthetic education allows the development of tendencies, sensuality, inner impulse and become rational. In this way, reason, freedom, spirituality emerge from their abstraction. In this way, the rationalized nature becomes alive. Therefore, it is argued that beauty is the reciprocal formation of the mental and the sensual, and in this formation it is performative. With his aesthetic education, Schiller tried to achieve the unity of the universal and the particular, freedom and necessity, nature and spirit. According to him, the principle of existence and knowledge is a principle of the idea (Hegel, 2012, pp. 61-62).

When we look at these expressions from the perspective of creation and creativity, we can see that it is possible to observe the importance of aesthetic-sensation knowledge in building a world through Schiller's thoughts. Schiller's view of man as having an ideal human competence in himself is related to the fact that the potential in him can be developed. Human aesthetic education is aimed at the development of this potential in man. Only through this education can the beautiful world be built. Schiller, as a Kantian, began his line of aesthetic thinking, first wanting, like him, to distinguish the beautiful from concepts close to the beautiful. Accordingly, the thinker sets out to distinguish the concepts of pleasant, good, and sublime from beautiful. Accordingly, 'pleasant' is not worthy of art, and good is not the purpose of art. The purpose of art is pleasure. Accordingly, in good theory and practice, juice cannot be the intermediary. 'Pleasant' is pleasing to the senses, and 'good' is to the mind. Since the beautiful is a means to sensory liking, it differs from the good. With this form you like it in your beautiful mind. Thus, the beautiful is separated from the pleasant. In this case, it is good but reasonably pleasant. It pleases with its beautiful mind-like form. It is pleasant solitary matter and has no form. Schiller expressed what Kant said in another way with his well-thought-out, pleasantly audible and beautifully bespective expressions. In this case, the beautiful, the pleasant, and the good have become a synthesis of the senses and the intellect. However, later on, Schiller's concept of beauty was separated from Kant and became an important educational concept for human development, cultural formation and humanization (Tunali, 2012: 148). Accordingly, it is possible to say that Schiller no longer has the concept of beauty as a theory and has taken on a more active role.

On the other hand, aesthetic education can liberate the human being and enable him to develop his cognitive, rational nature, feelings, desires. Accordingly, as Schiller *states in his Letters on Aesthetics*:

In the freedom of aesthetic creation, it tends to find the source of man's power to freely shape his mixed, (sensory-mental) nature. Civilization has shown that the *enlightenment* of the mind has left man wild in terms of heart. At this point, *it's time to revive and educate the repressed or ignored aspects of psukhe*. (...) If it is the intellect that makes a human being, it is the emotion that directs him. What needs to be done in this case is to expand the concept of mind to include the irrational processes of perception and thinking. It should not be forgotten that man is a sense being before he becomes a conscious being, and in this temporal primacy of man's sensory nature, the key to the entire history of human freedom can be found (Altuğ, 2012, p.23).

The education and development of not only the sensory aspect but also the mental aspect of man seems to be very important for the world he will design. Since the irrational processes of perception and thinking, that is, the aspect of emotion, will be in cooperation with the mind, the relationship of these concepts to 'believing' may need to be examined.

Because believing can be considered a key point between perception and reason, in the process of making sense of it. Man's individual, political freedom can be closely related to the process of believing. Schiller's aesthetic education, the harmonization of the processes of sensuality and reason, tried to solve the opposition, which he called the impulse of form and sensation, which constitutes the focus of psychology, with the concept of the game impulse, and argued that aesthetics could be passed with this impulse. In Tunali's words:

These two sides of man are reciprocated by these two instincts. The sensory-matter introduction next to nature (sense), the form introspection next to the intellect, the form introspection next to the mind. These two instincts are opposites, even as nature and reason to which they belong are opposed to each other, or even two such opposing forces. However, if human existence were dominated by these two forces alone, there would be a constant field of conflict between the opposing forces of these two internal forces. But it is a third instinct that frees human existence from being a field of such conflict, from such disorder: *the playfulness*. Playthrough. It surrounds the other two internals within itself. That is, the instinct of sense is directed towards life, the instinct of form is directed towards the mind, and the instinct of play is directed towards the living form by combining the objects of both introspections. Behold, this *living form* takes on a new name: *Beauty* is neither only sensual nor only rational; on the contrary, beauty is the harmony of sense and mind. (...) Schiller's statement <<beauty is freedom in appearance>> should be understood in this sense. (...) For in beauty the instinct of matter and the instinct of form, which alone seek to dominate man, unite in harmony, and the coercive power of both disappears in the freedom of the instinct of play. Such a person is now *an aesthetic* person. Aesthetic man is the human being who plays and is the only being who plays, a free being (Tunali, 2012, pp. 148-149).

In this context, it may be appropriate to examine the process of believing in the process of anti-sensation and reason, *leading to the instinct of the game*. The urge to sensation refers to our natural behavior. Our eating and drinking habits, experiencing objects, include our behavioral orientations. The impulse to sensation is not active, but rather passive. The subject passively receives data other than itself. The impulse of form (intellect) is active in the opposite of the impulse of sensation. The urge to play synthesizes these two impulses, making them harmonious. In this case, we can say that the belief mechanism of the subject is effective in the apparent opposition of the impulses of sensation and form. In the process of perception between the sensed and the intellect, the subject can perform synthesis in line with his beliefs. Accordingly, the subject can make judgments.

Correct counting, or the subjective validity of judgment, stands on three steps in relation to opinion (which is also objectively valid): *conjecture*, belief, and *knowledge*. Conjecture is a subjective inadequate truth-count as well as consciously objective. If correct counting is seen only as subjectively adequate and at the same time objectively insufficient, then this is *belief*. Finally, it is called sufficient truth-counting knowledge that is subjectively as well as objectively (Kant, 1993, pp. 739-740).

Whether the subject is actively designing in the creation process or when he encounters an object of artistic creation, how he evaluates it may depend on his beliefs and special judgments. Because in the face of a work of art, different subjects will bring different interpretations from each other. This view again seems to explain the difference between artistic creations. Regardless of beliefs, art objects can carry information. This informational property of the object allows it to be interpreted. Schiller may have started from this feature especially when he emphasized its importance for aesthetic education. Accordingly, Schiller's impulse to play requires a mental imperative. Man is free to interpret a work only by the impulse to play and respecting the opposites, that is, the limits of reason and sensation, or in the stage of creation and creativity.

In this context, Altug, in *his work Art at Last Sight*, describes the path from the beautiful to the freedom, the ethical and the political, as follows: Moral freedom, which is the mental necessity of the civilized man, is embodied in the beautiful and becomes valid in the game context. This gives way to the ultimate aesthetic freedom, which is the harmony of all minds. Freedom is inherent in man's natural equipment, and man must attain it at the very end. The object of the game instinct is beautiful, and the ideal harmony appears here. The importance of this ideal harmony for the art of living (politics) is this total freedom. In the words of Schiller: "Man plays when he is human in the full sense of the word, and only when he plays is he fully human (*fifteenth letter*)" (Altug, 2012, p. 31). According to this, we can only achieve freedom through the beautiful, and it is through him that we can realize humanity. Only the beautiful thing allows man to transition from sensuality to rationality. Therefore, there is no other way than to make the human being, who is a sense being, aesthetic first (Altug, 2012).

When we think in this context, we can say that aesthetics is in the middle of the living space of subjects. It may be possible to see from Schiller's window that beyond just enjoyment and enjoyment, the indispensable concepts such as 'politics', 'freedom', 'state' and 'morality', which constitute the roof of humanity, are the basis of his building. In one of his letters, Schiller describes the matter as follows:

What compels man to be in society is necessity; though in it it is reason which cultivates and roots the principles of social behavior; Only the beautiful can give it a social character. Only taste brings one into harmony; for it establishes harmony in the individual, and divides him, since all other forms of perception are based on either the sensual or spiritual aspects of human existence; however, the perception of the beautiful makes it a whole, because both natures of man enter into harmony in the beautiful (Altug, 2012: 32).

With these statements, it can be said that Schiller objectified art. Besides, "where art reigns, it is the laws of beauty that are at work. And here the limitations of reality are overcome; freedom becomes complete" (Altug, 2012: 39). The education of aesthetics, the transmission of aesthetics, according to Schiller, is important for the development of humanity. Education provides the development of thinking of individuals. When we think about art knowledge in this context, we can see that it is also important for critical thinking, creation and creativity.

When we look at Schiller's aesthetics within the scope of the human-world-information relationship, it is possible to see the importance of beauty and education and how he creates a world through this communication channel. "The art-life distinction is an inappropriate one. What the artist does is to show situations within certain limits; to indicate their value by extracting the most important events among the innumerable events or possible ones, giving them new dimensions; to enable other people to see their meaning" (Kuchuradi, 2013, p. 3). In creation and creativity, it may be correct to evaluate the participation and importance of the object to be designed in the world within this whole.

#### ***2.4.1 Impulses and Dreams***

Starting from Schiller's impulse for sensation and form, the examination of the concept of impulse, which also forms the framework of psychology, can be important in terms of creation and creativity. Impulse (fr.*mobile*; Alm. *Trieb, Beweggrund*, eng. *mobile*) is defined as the impulse that leads to the direction. The impulse may be linked to a feeling, an idea, an interest (Timuçin, 2004: 171). Proceeding from this definition, the fact that the impulse is connected to an emotion or an idea or interest can also bring to mind its close relationship with the dream. Namely, the role of think in creation and creativity, the related imagination is known. Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) states that it is the complete loss of the concept of reality that determines the consciousness of the dream. Everyone will dream in their own state of consciousness. The images of the dreamer are both alien to him and familiar to him. The dreamer believes in the objectivity of what he sees. He begins to live in this world, and according to him, this world still has sound laws. Freud understood the dream as the fulfillment of a desire. According to him, dreams are symbols of deprivations and desires. Many thoughts hidden in our world of thought arise in this field. Carl Gustave Jung (1875-1961) sees dreams as the product of the unconscious. For him, to think about his dreams is to turn on himself. According to A. Adler and K. Horney, every dream, like a work of art, reveals symbolic, appearance and meaning (Timuçin, 2004: 174-175).

The world of philosophy and psychology thought has brought and continues to bring various interpretations in relation to dream. As Sartre put it, the dreaming subject believes in the objectivity of his own constructed world. When we start from this sentence, the images that make up the dream may seem "consistent" in themselves, even though they seem inconsistent in the context of the mind. Accordingly, it is possible for a painter to paint all four seasons simultaneously on his canvas. Many propositions that may be inconsistent in reality may be consistent within the subject's imagination. In distinguishing between dream and reality, the conformity of the think, the truth is checked by the mind, and the consistency is reached by checking the inconsistency. In this context, Locke said that the ideologies that the subject encounters with the external world correspond to the reality of things, and that the images in the external world are logically in harmony. "These images are real distinguishing qualities and their truth lies in the immutable correspondence of these images with the definite structures of beings" (Timuçin, 2004, pp. 257-258). On the other hand, Locke states that complex ideas are volitional combinations. Willing combinations can lead us to concepts of creation and creativity such as imagination and fantasy.

We can say that while the mind is completely passive in respect of its simple ideologies, it is not so in respect of its complex ideologies. Since these are combinations of simple ideas brought together and united under one common name, it is clear that the human mind enjoys a kind of freedom in constructing these complex ideologies. Where can the fact that one's gold or charter ideas differ from another's is that one of them puts a simple idea in it that the other does not, or excludes one of his? (Timuçin, 2004, p. 258).

When we look at these statements of Locke, we see that complex ideologies are formed voluntarily and in doing so, we see that he makes use of freedom. When we consider Schiller's statement that only the person who plays games is free in Schiller's view of aesthetics, the freedom of art, the creative subject to create complex ideologies, can remind us of its connection with aesthetics. Because the artist has and/or should have the freedom of imagination and fantasy in the stage of creation and creation. Original creations can only arise from a free subject. Namely;

Fantasy: (Eng. Dreaming). A state of marked confusion with spontaneous activity of the mind. In fantasy, the determining activity of reason or the directing power of attention has completely disappeared. The resulting state of mind is completely closed to criticism. As such, one might argue that fantasy is the form of the dream seen in wakefulness. But in fantasy, although the control of the mind has disappeared close to the whole, it has not disappeared completely. (...) Henri Delacroix says: 'The state of fantasy takes place in many different degrees, from the passive association of memories and images to the establishment of a more or less volitional system of presentations.' Duchess stimulates the rich apparatus of consciousness, especially in creative activity, while provoking the subconscious. Artistic predisposition is revived and strengthened by fantasy. The fantasy is a desire for breakthrough, a source of joy. Loaded with rich images, it contributes greatly to the establishment of the work (Timuçin, 2004: 175).

Within the scope of these statements, it may be possible to speak of creative activity in fantasy, where the control of the mind is not completely abolished. If we consider Locke's statements, we can say that the creation of complex ideologies is actually the work of both active and passive consciousness. Because the subject can consciously abstract form from objects, as well as confront the image of a whole constituted object by abstracting from the unconscious unconscious. It may be possible to give the following example for the active fantasy. The subject can consciously create an object imagination from different objects placed in front of him. A piece of wood can form the image of a table, from two chairs. Accordingly, it can reach the whole by placing the legs of the chair on the lower part of the piece of wood. This example can be shown as a simple creation-design example. On the other hand, with the same example of abstraction, the table can be transformed into an object of artistic creation. On the other hand, in dream-like situations that are seen as passive, the subject passively watches the objects he has encountered before, in the words of the science of psychology, by bringing them from the unconscious. In the subject's dream, he can imagine a world under the sea, and when he wakes up, if he is an artist, he can project this dream onto his art.

can make it concrete. Again, the dream, which is shaped according to the individual characteristics of the person, is a part of his creative feature. Again, if we remember that May has a dimension of the unconscious that lies outside of life, we can think that the conscious and the unconscious are a whole and are in continuity. Accordingly, both 'dream' and 'fantasy' seem to be one of the important parts of creation and creativity as a whole.

When we look again at the contrast of Schiller's impulse for sensation and form in the context of all this narrative, it may be possible to see the apparent separation of the sensory impulse from the real world with dream and fantasy. The dream world, which is consistent within

itself, sometimes tends to interpret what it senses according to this world. But the impulse of form comes into conflict with the impulse of sensation at this point, the logical limit of the mind. Hume said that "I will try to prove that reason alone can never be an motive for any action of the will, and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the management of the will" (2010, p. 263). From these expressions we can see the *conflict between reason and sensation*. In the field of art, before coming to the concept of play that transcends these two conflicts, it may be possible to think on the path to seduction and creativity in the artistic field by extending this formula of Schiller. It may require believing on the basis that the conflict between the motives of sensation and form is overcome by play. The instinct of play may require the presence of believing.

[...] along with the liking for appearances, as soon as the instinct of play is set in motion; The imitative shaping spirit that treats appearance as something independent follows [...] Thus, when man has come to the point of distinguishing appearance from reality and form from object; he has also come to the position of abstracting one from the other (Altuğ, 2012: 35).

Constructing another reality by abstracting from one reality can be realized by believing. Again, according to this: "The reality of things is the work of things themselves; the appearance of things is the work of man; nature, which enjoys appearance, no longer feels a liking for what it receives, but for what it creates" (Altuğ, 2012: 35). Accordingly, the impulses and imagination of subjects can play an important role in building an aesthetic world. On the other hand, Schiller's playing man, through dream-belief, creates a world freely. Again, subjects' encounters with this world, their reinterpretation in their own subjective worlds and their continuous existence can be important for the change and continuity of the world.

In the chapter "The Creative Writer and Daydreams" of his work *Art and Literature*, Freud states the following about the activity of imagination and play: Imaginative activity should be sought during the childhood years. Because children's favorite intense occupation is games. Every child behaves just like a creative writer and creates a world for themselves just like them. The child takes the game very seriously and imposes an emotion on it. Although the child imbues the game world with emotions, it separates it well from reality. He likes to relate his imagined objects to the comprehensible and visible things of the real world. This is the only thing that separates play and fantasy. The creative writer also does what the child playing does. While he really discerns what he is dreaming, he also takes it very seriously. He is creating a world of fantasy. Freud states that the adult human being ceases to play, but this is not an absolute end, but only changes shape. This change is when the adult stops making connections between objects and play, and starts fantasizing instead of playing. He dreams daydreams with imaginary imaginations (Freud, 1999, pp. 126-127).

In terms of creation and creativity, the artist must continue to play games, as Schiller put it, and fantasizing as Freud puts it. It can be said that these mental characteristics are important in terms of creation and creativity.



## CHAPTER 3

### THE SELF-OTHER RELATIONSHIP IN CREATION AND CREATIVITY

#### 3.1. SHARING CREATIVITY IN SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM

Although the object of art is constituted by subjects, it has the characteristic of being watched and evaluated by others. The art object, which contains the individual characteristics and/or feeling-thoughts of the subjects, presents itself to the perception of other subjects and has the feature of being shared. In this context, when we evaluate the art object, it may be possible to say that it is not static, on the contrary, it is mobile and has the property of multiplying. For the other, who evaluates a work of art, in his encounter with the object, may transcend the boundary of its 'being as it is'; it can multiply it. The individual characteristics that the artist transfers to his object can be evaluated by other subjects in the space where they are shared with uploads within the scope of their own characteristics. In this case, the work of art may *have the property of proliferation*. An art object that emerges from human hands can also contain the emotions and various informational features that are unique to it. In particular, the transfer of emotion and knowledge seems to be easily transferred from one subject to another subject by attributing it to the object of art. However, in the past and still it has been unclear what exactly the object of art means, and in this context, art critics and interpretations have become part of art. This may be an indication that art is not static, but rather moving. When we evaluate art and the object of art within the scope of subjective idealism, the subject and its qualities may be important. In this case, "the artist is an identity (=personality) and a *nelik*, to which the question 'who' is asked to him, and the work of art is to which the question 'what?' is asked. (...) The creator of the work of art is a person with a personality and an identity" (Soykan, 2015: 148). The personality characteristics of the subjects may have the feature of passing into the art object of "the sum of the spiritual and spiritual qualities of the individual" (Akarsu, 1988: 117). From this point of view, *it seems appropriate to explain the concept of pathos-pathetikos*, which belongs to the subjects. In Greek, *pathos-pathetikhos* means what happens to a person, event, experience, experience, emotion, etc. While Herodotus and Sophocles used the word 'pathos' as the event itself, Plato and Aristotle used the effect of an event

interpreted it as what was happening in the person below it. The fact that Pathos was attributed to the person by virtue of mere events and appearances made him suitable for art theory. *The words pathos and pathetikos* contain passivity. This passivity is the openness of the person to

the influence coming from the outside, to be exposed. In all impression and affect, the subject is passive. Pathos is something that comes to the subject from the outside; This feature allowed the artist to comment that the quality of creativity was by God. In this state, although the person is passive by being under the influence of pathos, he has also become active with the feature of creation. Kant was quite reluctant to use the concept of God in these explanations, calling the power of creation in the artist a 'tax of nature' and expressing that nature creates through the artist with the concept of non-experimental nature. Following Kant's point of view, the German Idealists explicitly used the term 'god' in this regard. There is also a morbid aspect to the act of creating Pathos. He is also the ancestor of the modern word 'pathological' (morbid, diseased). This again goes back to an ancient understanding. Aristotle's *conception of catharsis* again means the cure of pathos. Accordingly, pathos was perceived as a diseased condition that needed to be provided. Pathos is understood both as what objects undergo and as the interactions that the soul is subjected to. As what objects suffer, it involves influences in it, while the second aspect, love, fear, hate, gives birth to strong emotions in the soul. These feelings can lead to pleasure or grief (Soykan, 2015, pp. 150-152).

*When we evaluate this dual meaning of pathos* from the point of view of the art object, it may be possible to say that the object and the subject actually act alternately in this context. Accordingly, we can evaluate the concepts of effective-concepts in this transformation. Since the object of art is again shaped by a subject, it may be possible for it to relate as "what the object suffers" and on the other hand as "influencing subjects" in the field of sharing. Accordingly, the object of art shows both active and passive properties, and can also be the source of this inspiration. "With these meanings, pathos shows a state of mind, a deep excitement and an inspiration that the artist is exposed to at the moment of creation" (Soykan, 2015, p. 152). The emotional state of the subjects, their desires and passions, can also direct their doing. At the beginning of these doings, art and the activity of creation-creativity under this title can be considered as an intellectual act. Because artistic creation is a product of mental activity. In this regard, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) establishes a link between the concepts of passion, life and the intellectual, stating:

In fact, our practical, real life is annoying and insipid unless it is driven by passions; and when it is driven by the passions, it soon begins to ache: therefore only those who possess any excess of intelligence, above the measure necessary for the service of their will, are happy. Because in this way, in addition to their real lives, they lead themselves in an intellectual life that is constantly painless but still vividly engaged and entertaining. A mere leisure time, that is, intelligence which is not engaged in the service of the will, is not sufficient for this; a real excess of force is necessary: for only this excess can sustain a purely mental occupation, which is not in the service of the will: "Leisure which does not involve a mental occupation is mortal" (Seneca, Ep., 82). But according to whether this surplus is small or large, there are countless steps between real life and the vanguard intellectual life, from merely collecting and describing insects, birds, and mineral coins, to the highest achievements of the art of poetry and philosophy. Such an intellectual life protects not only against boredom, but also against its destructive consequences. In other words, create a wall of protection against evil society and against the many dangers, misfortunes, losses and extravagances that a person falls into when he seeks happiness entirely in the real world (2009, p. 32).

When we evaluate the idea that art and its object are an intellectual preoccupation of the subject within the scope of these expressions of the thinker, it may be possible to say that this mental activity ceases to be solely for pleasure and creates the world in its relationship with the other. On the other hand, the mental activity of the creating subject may differ from the

minds of subjects that are not engaged in this activity. The thinker even distinguished between the subject and the genius who were engaged in art as an amateur and said:

Since the purely amateur interest in art is still far from creative ability, and since the purely real sciences are interconnected in relation to events, this man cannot penetrate all events, cannot fill all his essence with them, and therefore cannot weave all his existence with them to such an extent as to lose all interest in other things. This can only be done by those of the highest mental superfluity, identified by the name of genius; for only an extraordinary mindset deals with the essence and existence of things wholly and absolutely; then, according to individual orientations, through art, poetry or philosophy, he attempts to interpret the same thing in a profound way (2009, pp. 33-34).

Thus Schopenhauer expressed genius as the one who sees the essence, the one who sees the whole. The mental structure of subjects with these characteristics differs from the mental structures of other subjects in the sense of performing the act of creation. However, the sharing and transmission of the mental characteristics of creation and creativity with others can also be an indication that art education is possible. Art, its cognitive contents, its transferability is an indication that the human brain is suitable for this. In recent studies, neuroscientists have been talking about the plasticity of the brain:

He wants to explain that the brain is an organ that reacts tremendously, has the ability to adapt and changes forever. Its adaptation and change is through its reactions to the demands and pressures of the environment in which it enters. Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic movement made us aware that experiences from an early age influence our emotional development and behavior later in life (Andreasen, 2013, p. 187).

Within the scope of this knowledge, it may be possible to see the legitimacy of the importance of aesthetic education. As Freud pointed out, the later influence of the experiences we have on our emotional life is important in terms of artistic creation and transmission in the context of creativity, when it is associated with pathos and education. According to Schiller:

The fact that the artist is a master of emotions means an emotional education. A good artist is, first of all, someone who educates and glorifies their emotions well. The same is true of the receiver of art. There is no better tool for training our emotions than art. Emotional education also shows the main relevance of art to morality. The contribution of art education to the fact that human beings are a moral being, a *homo moralis*, cannot be denied (Soykan, 2015: 158).

The fact that creation-creativity can build a world by incorporating these elements has led to the formation of branches such as 'sociology of art' and 'psychology of art' rather than philosophy of art, and a bridge extending from the creator to the society has been established. In this case, it can be said that the subjectively created art object is a bridge towards other subjective thoughts, giving way to new reflections. The education of emotions and their ability to be conveyed through objects of art can be important for individual-society or society-individual relations, even for society and society relations. As a matter of fact, just as there are feelings with love content, violent emotions are also present in people. What is desirable is not the violent emotions, but the domination of loving emotions in the individual-society, society-love relations. From this point of view, art can also regulate violent emotions through art. As a matter of fact, we can observe the dominance of violence in cultures that reject art and its object.

The object, which is the result of the intellectual activity of the creative subject, presents itself to other subjects in many different branches in the field of art. These branches include dance,

music, painting, sculpture, literature, theater, cinema, etc. "Art, in all its forms, is an intellectual activity from top to bottom, and the true artist is more or less a philosopher in matters related to his art. Every true artist is a person who knows and discusses his own art, gradually all art, and accordingly the whole human world. Every artistic activity is a fully intellectual activity at the level of creation and at the level of monitoring" (Timuçin, 2013: 134). Accordingly, the subject who knows and creates the human world well can have a say about that world. Therefore, while the creator reveals his object to the world through the branch of art in which he is competent, he can be the stimulus in other subjects. It is for this reason that within the scope of philosophy of art, the ethical position of the art object has been discussed and continues to be debated. Because an art object can affect the cognitive processes of subjects, such as judgment and belief structure. When we think within this framework, art is not only a means of pleasure, but can play an active role from the judicial faculty of individuals to society and finally to the state system. It is possible to observe examples of this in the states and societies that have lived on the world for centuries and have disappeared. A country with a different culture of each era offers us different examples of art and creativity. When we look at these again, it is possible to clearly see the effect of the creating subject on art and culture. The difference between German, French or English art is not the result of the same intellectual movement, but of the intellectual movement of different subjects. In this sense, it may be correct to examine the issue of creation and creativity in art from the point of view of subjective idealism. That the object of art that emerges from a mind capable of artistic creativity reaches other minds; "art comes from man and turns into man" (Timuçin, 2013: 135).

The influence of creation and creativity and its consequent art and object on culture is undeniable. We can say that the artist is someone who is aware of what is happening around him in this sense. "The artist walks with life, with reality, and makes up steps for them. The artist is the one who acts in advance, who has a premonition, who shapes what he foregives" (Mengüşoğlu, 1988, pp. 205-206). In this sense, the artist who possesses this special faculty can also connect with his object in order to develop the awareness of other subjects:

With the increase of meanings affixed to or derived from the world of phenomena, awareness increases, and as awareness increases, care for human life develops. The height and subtlety of the care given to life and human life in general is related to the fact that the knowing subject makes himself, among other phenomena, the subject of his own thought. Where there is no thought, there is no care for life (Taftalı, 2015: 26).

Within the scope of these expressions, the art-artist relationship, which is not an ordinary intellectual activity, can make careful thinking teachable to other subjects with the objects it produces, with the feature of "making itself the subject of its own thought". As a matter of fact, creativity, attentive thinking and critical thinking, which is almost complementary to this, can be transferable. The artist can reach his followers directly as well as indirectly with the objects he creates. The creator can influence the feelings, thoughts, likes and judgments of the audience with the possibilities of design and fiction.

### 3.2 THE EFFECT OF CREATIVITY ON EMOTION, THOUGHT, JUDGMENT AND ALTERNATIVE BELIEF FICTION

Although an art object is seen as the product of the imagination of its creator, thanks to the connection it establishes with the outside world, it is able to create reality in the common space with other subjects. Accordingly, the object of creation can have the power to reconstruct reality, and in doing so, it can influence the emotions, thoughts and judgments of other subjects, as well as give it behavior. Judgment: "The process of the mind that determines the relationship between concepts or ideas (...) ' Kant defines judgment as the power to 'put it under rules' and says, 'A judgment is nothing but a way of leading certain information to the objective unity of consciousness'" (Timuçin, 2004, p. 506). The relationships between an art object and a concept and idea can be presented to the audience in different forms and expressions through the vast design of creativity. For example, the concept of "patriarchy" can be transferred to other subjects in different ways in branches of art such as sculpture, dance, music, painting, etc. Accordingly, subjects can have different perspectives on a concept. Accordingly, it may be correct to say that art produces reality. The art object, which also establishes various relations between existential judgments and value judgments, is also in communication with the subjects in the touch of this network. "We also need to distinguish between existential judgments and value judgments. *Existential judgments are judgments* that reveal any reality (it is raining). *Value judgments are judgments* that determine a value in a qualitative framework (this picture is very beautiful). Value judgments are especially valid in the field of morality and art" (Timuçin, 2004: 506). In the realm of the physical world, existential judgments can allow subjects to make universal-valid inferences. For example, if everything on the street is wet, the subject may infer that it has rained. This logical inference will be the same wherever it is in the world. On the other hand, value judgments vary from society to society and their cultures.

The object of art occupies an important position in terms of value judgments. Because just as it can construct value judgments, it can also be destroyed by value judgments. As a result, the object of Art contains thought in it. Thoughts are the center of values. The ability to form ideas by comparing concepts and all of these formed ideas express the unity of thought and consciousness. The ability to draw conclusions from judgments through comparison" (Timuçin, 2004: 176). However, thought can contain truth as well as falsity.

As a matter of fact, Frege said that thought is the meaning of a sentence that can be used to make a claim, and therefore the content of thought can be true or false. Taken in this sense, it is necessary to say that thought is something conceptual or logical, rather than something related to individual psychology. Accordingly, different individuals may share the same thought, even if they do not share the same act of thinking. For this reason, Frege argued that thought creates a third field other than the physical and the psychological (Cevizci, 2014: 141).

Again, when we look at the art object that is the product of thinking from this framework, it is possible to repeat that it creates the concept-logic weave. Concept and logic can also be considered in relation to publicity. The concepts accordingly contain objectivity. The creative artist can create a concept with his object or, while shaping the existing concept, he can also direct society under the sensation of that concept. For example, the physical appearance of Jesus, the prophet of Christendom, was depicted differently by sculptors and painters in various races and societies and a perception of this appearance was tried to be created in that

society. In this respect, art can be effective not only in the creation of the object but also in the creation of public perception under its own roof. This public perception created can lead to the fact that judgment and belief are almost as general in the consciousness of the subjects. The mental design, emotions, imaginations, judgments and beliefs of a subject who is creative in the field of art can be objectified in the public sphere. Accordingly, the object of creation can be thought of as a window from the framework of subjective idealism to the subjective, to the "others."

As a result of the creation of perception in the field of artistic creativity, the mechanism of emotion, thought, judgment and belief can also be manipulative. While an object of creation evokes emotions such as joy, anger, happiness, violence and love in its viewer, it can influence its thoughts and enable it to develop judgment and related beliefs. In evaluating the objects of creation of different branches of art, the subjects' 'judgment' and related evaluations can also be in line with their beliefs. The fact that the subject making the judgment experiences and judges emotions such as pleasure, appreciation, disgust in the face of the objects of painting, sculpture, music, dance, cinema, theater, literature, etc. may be related to his inferences. "Judgment is an interest that confirms or denies something that we have established with a conjunction (is) between two concepts or two terms in a logical sense. One of these concepts (term) is the subject, the other is the predicate, and the conjunction is 'is'" (Tunalı, 2012: 247). The reason why the ability to create from past to present and its products are based on genius-specific talents may be related to the concept of "negation". Creativity promises and presents to subjects what does not exist in the context of the artistic object. Accordingly, objects of creation may logically appear with different inferences from our daily inferences. The tension of "negation" between subject and object of creation can be one of the important characteristics of creativity. The fact that what is denied is different from what is approved may also be related to the fact that it disrupts the usual to accommodate the new. Creativity includes the new and the unconventional.

The habitual denial of truth inherent in creation and creativity is also associated with the act of being surprised. About habit, Hume argues that "if the repetition of a particular act or operation gives rise to the act of doing the same act or operation again, without being required by any process of reasoning or understanding, we always say that this tendency is the effect of the habit" (Hume, 2010, p. 398). As usual, as the thinker points out, there may be cases in which the action is done without thought, as mental processing is minimal. In the encounters of subjects with objects, the cognitive process of the habitual and the non-habitual may differ. While the unconventional mind tries to make sense of it, the habitual is like the repetition of the action, as Hume said. Accordingly, by breaking the reaction of the 'new' subjects, which are specific to creation and creativity, to the habitual, it can create the effect of negation and surprise. Art, which often goes beyond existential logical inferences, seems to contain inference models that are specific to self-meaning, creativity in its own world.

Logic (*logos*), "reason, thinking, law (both nature and the law of thinking), the word, in the aspect that includes its meanings; it shows very well the relevance of logic to the mind, thinking and word (language)" (Özlem, 2011: 28). Logic in a general sense is associated with reasoning as the knowledge of correct thinking, forms and rules. "Reasoning is the act of treating one of these thoughts as the proof of the other between at least two thoughts and arriving at a conclusion from there. In other words, reasoning is a thinking process that we

call proof and proof" (Özlem, 2011: 30). Existential logical inferences in general, especially 'nature', can lead directly to conclusions by allowing conventional inferences to be grounded. Objects of artistic creation, which are opposed to the usual, can always lead to an indirect result rather than a direct result. Only with logic, which is the law of thinking, can the human mind comprehend and make sense of art objects.

To give an example of the logical understanding of the art object from various branches of art; For example, in a work transferred to canvas in the art of painting, it may be possible to encounter a landscape that is out of the ordinary. Therefore, a painter of creative quality can depict on his canvas four seasons that we have not experienced before in the outside world. When we see the sun on the one hand, snow, rain and people entering the sea at the same time, we can be met with denial and surprise. Accordingly, reasoning about the external world can take a different form the moment we evaluate the object of art. Another example is about the art of sculpture. The artist can skillfully give his subject a look that allows him to be seen differently from three angles. Every time the statue is looked at by the viewer, one can see an umbrella standing upside down on the cane, on one side on the pillar, and on the other. However, from an ontological point of view, the laws of identity, non-contradiction and impossibility of the third state are valid in the external world. From an ontological point of view, the object of art that satisfies these laws, and thought in the context of creative thinking can also rise above these laws. Design and mindset may require it.

From this very point of view, in the world of thought, the debate on the rationalization of man's psychic life, which is defined as psychologism in logic, has begun:

Thinking is an act, but it is not limited to logical thinking. There are also acts of thinking, such as remembering, imagining, designing, etc. With this complex aspect, the act of thinking is one of the important subjects of psychology. Psychology as a science deals with thinking as a phenomenon, it studies the phenomenon of thinking. In other words, investigate how we think, what are the bodily and psychic factors that affect the phenomenon called thinking, etc. (...) However, we know that logic is never concerned with this complex phenomenon called thinking itself. He only wants to establish and systematize the principles and forms of the type of thinking called proper thinking, logical thinking, the formal properties of concepts, propositions and inferences. (...) The subject of logic is the principles and forms that make it possible to think properly. Of course, psychology also *deals with the principles of logic inference forms within a special branch called psycho-logic*. But this interest is a scientific interest in human psychology, the study of the place and function of logical thinking. (...) Logic examines logical thinking from a purely formal point of view as a non-personal subject, independent of the human psyche; it is not an empirical science (Özlem, 2011, p. 371).

The Psychologism in Logic Movement has been an attempt to base logic on psychology, an attempt to search for logic and its principles within the psychic life of man. Doğan Özlem stands against this quest, according to him, "the error that psychologism has fallen into is the error of showing the source of the principles of logic in a scientific way. Psychologism has been a historical demonstration that the logic that lies at the basis of science and makes science possible cannot be grounded in a scientific way" (Özlem, 2011: 372). However, when we consider that biological and psychic factors are effective in creation and creativity, and that the work of art is transported from a subject with these characteristics to the physical world, it may be possible to see that the approach of psychologism can at least justify its effort. Psychology, which is accepted as a science, has put forth many studies in the field of creativity and has attempted to search for its source. The logic that makes science possible, in the words of longing, has attempted to formally examine the structure of thought about the subject, just

as it has made the science of psychology possible. When we consider the need of the sciences for logic and the applicable structure of logic to the sciences, it may be possible to think that it is not static but dynamic. In this respect, it can formally examine the logical structure of creation and creativity. As a matter of fact, when we look at the history of philosophy of art, we encounter such works.

The characteristic of creation and creativity arising from the biological and psychic characteristics of human beings is closely related to the concepts of "design", "dream", "imagination" and "subconscious", as examined. Especially in Freud's theory of the unconscious, when we consider the relationship of desires and dreams and their connection with the artist, it may be correct to consider and rethink the logical structure of artistic creativity, albeit in a psychological sense. As a matter of fact, Jacques Lacan (1901-19081) defends the idea that "The unconscious has an active structure on all the functions of human existence and has a structure just like language" (Çoban, p.1). This unconscious activity of the language-thinking-logic triad can manifest itself in the object of creation. It may be possible to observe that the creative character of art has been transformed into the formal when we consider the possibility of constructing a world. Because art has the potential to create culture, and a single creator-artist can show the ability to overflow from the subject to the world. Accordingly, unlike the inferences we existentially make in the external world when viewing an art object, we can subjectively be left with our own mental connections, and so each of our inferences about the art object may differ from one another.

The object of art can be compared to an object that stands between two subjects in the external world, as well as an object that multiplies and carries out dream transfer from one mind to the other mind in the context of meaning-making. The object that emerges from the artist's design and imagination may have the property of 'multiplying' or 'decreasing' as a result of the viewer's own meaning. This can be seen as a result of the logical inferences that the viewer establishes with the art object. Accordingly, the multiplication of an art object by exceeding the design of its creator with the meaning of its viewer can also be evaluated below the limits of the design determined by the artist and the object can decrease. Within the framework of these judgments, the viewer can make decisions about the object of creation.

The fact that the object of art should be evaluated from a different point of view from the external world and daily life is often emphasized in art education. Different evaluation is the result of the fact that the judgments given to the object of art are different from the judgments we make in everyday life. The judgments we make in the outside world are often part of the common field. As a matter of fact, social norms are often objectified according to tradition, custom and legal rules specific to that society. Subjectively, the judgments of individuals can often depend on this objectivity, and the judgments of the audience towards the work of art can often be conflicted. For example, although the judgment that an individual living in a closed society will give to a 'nude' work is liking and liking, the reaction he will give when he expresses it according to social judgment may be the opposite. According to this, the objectified judgments of society and subjective judgments can often be in conflict. On the other hand, the determination of judgment belongs to the subject. Kant states:

The first phrase of appreciation lies in the premise that every tasteless person thinks to guard himself against condemnation: *Everyone has his own liking*. This means that the ground for determining this judgment is the mere subject (pleasure or pain), and that the judgment has no right to the obligatory approval of others. The



second phrase used even by those who accept the right to speak on the judgments of taste as valid for everyone is this: Taste is not discussed. This means that the basis for determining a discretionary judgment can undoubtedly be objective (2006, p. 213).

Subjective judgments can be subject to criticism by judgments that are often objective. This can also play an important role, especially in the evaluation of the art object. A person who develops beliefs as a result of objective judgments and conclusions can, as Kant mentioned, develop an "alternative belief fiction" as a result of conflicts in which subjective judgments are also sensed by the ground. "Faith is the act of believing in the truth of something. The approval of a proposition" (Timuçin, 2004: 280). The alternative (option) is; "a forced choice between two possibilities (...) when one of the two is accepted, the other is excluded and considered invalid" (Akarsu, 1988: 157). Accordingly, if we consider that most subjects base their propositions on objective, that is, socially general, judgments, they can also base their feelings and impulses, which are positioned against objective judgments, on the basis of 'alternative beliefs' on which they will establish. In particular, works of art can have the feature of presenting alternative fiction to their viewers. The artist, who can act independently of objective facts and value judgments, can enable them to produce new judgments as a result of the connection he establishes with the biological and psychological background of the subject. These judgments can be called 'alternative belief fiction'. Accordingly, it may be possible to observe the alternative belief fiction on art objects; Suppose we paint on the canvas as a creative subject the miserable death of the treacherous king of country x. According to this example, he may find himself confronted with two concepts that follow, one of which is treachery and the other is pity. According to the objective judgment of society, while the execution of the traitor is natural, on the other hand, the follower is left alone with a sense of pity and dragged into conflict. The subject, who has to approve the death of the king within the framework of objective judgments, can make the opposite judgment according to his own alternative belief. It may be possible to observe another example in the examples of scenarios projected in theater and cinema. Again, according to this, the subject of "forbidden love", which is contrary to the norms of society, can be presented to the audience in a way that can be approved while being stoned on the one hand. In this context, the presentation of conflicts to the viewer within the object of art and giving rise to alternative belief fiction may lead other subjects to subjective judgments. It can also be said that subjective judgments have the potential to turn into objective judgments. As a matter of fact, Schiller attributed an important role to art on the education of the individual-society and attributed a responsibility extending to political actions.

According to Schiller, art would change society in such a way as to cure the divisions in the inner world of each individual that moral and political actions would no longer be a self-imposed task but would become a spontaneous expression of the individual freed from division. (...) For Schiller, the fine arts were not merely a symbol of morality, as in Kant, but instead the embodiment of a supreme truth that would transform us by reconstructing our lost integrity. "Humanity had lost its dignity, but Art saved the dignity of humanity. ... Truth today lives only in the Artistic illusion, and from its copy here, or indeed from its immediate image, its original image will be reconstructed (Schiller, 1967, p. 57).

If it is thought that art and its objects have an effect on the judgments of individual subjects, it can be deduced from Schiller's statements that it can transform objective beliefs and judgments. Accordingly, apart from objective beliefs, we can say that 'alternative belief' has the potential to create a brand new perception. As a matter of fact, politics and politics can direct subjects to alternative beliefs through art. Through arts such as music, literature,

painting, sculpture and dance, they can benefit from the transformative nature of political art, which tries to put forward the alternative.

With this position, the art and object can be manipulative. Society and the masses can produce judgments that can become new objectified by destroying existing objectified judgments through the objects of creation and creativity. However, "A true work of fine art never seeks to achieve any particular end, such as stimulating emotions, teaching faith, or glorifying morality (Schiller, 1967, pp. 204-205). However, as Schiller argues, as a result of aesthetic education, subjects can make sense of their art and objects with the right perception and create a new and humane world with it.

### **3.3. CULTURE AND HUMAN PLAY (HOMO LUDENS)**

One of the most effective tools of the thinking subject, which has the potential to build and transform the world, is art and its object. Since the existence of man, he has bequeathed his objects from generation to generation by using the feature of creation and creativity unique to him and has also contributed to the formation of various cultures. Culture can be defined as "the sum of material and immaterial products and whole, symbolic and learned products or characteristics that human society socially transmits from generation to generation" (Cevizci, 2014, p. 273). In the various communities living around the world, the culture is also diverse. The concept of culture emerged with the age of enlightenment, and according to the creator of the concept, the German philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), culture:

It is the way of life of a nation, a people or a community. From this point of view, it can be said that culture is a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morality, laws, traditions and all other tendencies and habits acquired by man as a member of a society. (...) According to Herder, every culture is different and has its own system of meaning and value; therefore, it is not possible for all cultures to be at one and the same level in the same universal ruler (Cevizci, 2014: 273).

The society and culture in which the creative subject lives can have the power to influence the design stage of his art object. As Herder points out, it may be possible to observe the traces of the weave of elements such as laws, beliefs, traditions, etc. on the object of art. With this feature, art is the carrier of social cultural codes. On the other hand, art can also have a transformative feature of society. Again, the artist has the ability to create a work that is contrary to the cultural codes of the society in which he lives. Accordingly, individuals and society who are alone with the unusual art object will be faced with a brand new perception. With its ability to present and reinterpret new perceptions, the object of art can have the property of changing and transforming the individual and society. In this context, the object of art has the property of changing the individual by influencing the ongoing collective consciousness and thus changing society. Thanks to this feature, the object of art has been and is frequently discussed under the headings of ethics and faith for years. However, "The

scientist, the philosopher, the man of art cannot be satisfied with even the most competent knowledge of the common consciousness. They are people who argue for the collective consciousness, for its transformation. These discussions of the people of science, philosophy and art are reflected in their products in a way that creates the characteristics of new formations" (Timuçin, 2013: 137). Accordingly, creation and creativity from the social framework can find their meaning in the reflection of the new in society. From this point of view, the freedom of the artist seems to be a condition for him to create an art object that is outside the usual. However, the free artist does not draw boundaries when designing his object and can reveal what is unusually unique.

The relationship of the art object with society and its ability to create culture have been discussed as *a problem* in the world of thought. Both thinkers and artists have put forward various ideas about what the object of art is for. However

No one, from Plato to Schiller, dealt with the problem of art and society in its general form, because at that time there was no such thing as Art as a separate field or social subsystem whose relations with society required conceptualization. When something called fine art was constructed as a set of private institutions reified into an independent space by canonical disciplines, only then could it be asked what the function of art was in the general society (Shiner, 2004, p. 297).

However, apart from the evaluation of art and its object from the point of view of society and the debates on how it should be, the fact that the potential of creation and creativity in the subject cannot be limited by morality, judgment, tradition, custom, etc., may be a situation that transcends art and its object. Because creative intellectual activity is effective not only in the field of art, but also in fields such as scientific and technical. Science and technique are the only fields that can transform society and cultures. With these features, art can have the feature of changing and transforming established dogmatic ideas by going beyond the ongoing learned common consciousness of the science-technical society. The confrontation of the objects of art and the objects of science with society in the past centuries has shown us his struggle in this regard. With this feature, the concept of creativity requires free intellectual activity. Only free intellectual activity can transform society.

We can say that creative intellectual activity, which is in an indispensable connection with the concept of freedom, is also fed by the free imagination of the subject. The most important overlooked characteristics of the subject, whose creative potential has not yet been categorized and analyzed under the headings of art, technique and science, may be his free imagination and the drive for play. If we need to think about what the game is, the game;

Spiritual and physical activity that is not directly beneficial. Spiritual and physical activity based on pleasure. A form of spiritual and physical activity regulated by rules that will determine success and failure. Nietzsche showed the importance of play in human life by saying, "The real man has two desires: danger and play." In Latin, *jocus* determined 'acting' as opposed to *ludus*, or 'work'. Play, especially in the child, determines the aimless instinctive activity. The child bases his game on spontaneous actions rather than rules, and the power of the image is the main determining force in the realization of these actions. Accordingly, children's games are often unregulated, that is, they occur with spontaneous acts. These actions, together with a discharge of energy, give the child a tendency to know the world. The child knows the world by playing, learns the qualities and relationships of objects by playing (Timuçin, 2004: 380).

Play can be effective in the cognitive processes of the subject from childhood to adulthood, from perception to meaning, and creativity. In today's understanding of education, the importance of the game has started to become apparent.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) in *his work Emile* explored the connection of play with education and focused on the education of the child in the natural environment. Accordingly: Education can be provided in a variety of ways, it can come from nature itself, through what someone else teaches, or it can be provided by circumstances. The school of our inner development is the parts of our body that nature has given us and what we have learned from what we experience with their help. The education provided to us by nature from different types of education does not depend on us, but it is realized by adapting to the conditions it brings. We are alone in this type of education and we are the only judges with this feature. Nature makes us think about who we are. Along with this, education turns into art. The object of education is nature itself (Rousseau, 1889, pp. 12-13).

In terms of creation and creativity, the relationship between nature and man can be very important. The fact that nature presents itself to man with its objects can stimulate the play and imagination of the subject by giving the feeling of a riddle that needs to be completed in terms of creativity. As a matter of fact, the concept of play has been frequently discussed in the history of philosophy of art and its connection with creativity has been tried to be established. "The purpose of artistic play is to discuss the world, to explain the world. Free action and free thought transcend the limits of individual sensation in art and acquire the character of a human investigation. In his play, the individual attains the world, becomes integrated with the world. The game experiment is one of the most useful experiments, even if it is a useless experiment" (Timuçin, 2004: 380). As it can be understood from these words of Timuçin, artistic play is carried out by the subject who acts freely, and yet art is free from any discussion of utility, interest. The object of art can only contain benefits in itself as the free occupation of the subject.

About the coexistence of play and imagination and the effect of creation on creativity, Freud had sought in his childhood years in his imaginative activity. From Freud's perspective, the idea that imaginative activity should be sought in childhood seems to merge with Rousseau's conception of education. Because nature presents us with its own objects and the subject's ability to abstract and imagine in the face of this can only be possible with the understanding of natural education. Children's games established with naturalness and its rules can allow creative thinking along with imagination. In order for the subject's creative activity to develop both in childhood and adulthood, it may be necessary to be left with what is not established (ready) and not with what is not established (ready). Accordingly; An example of what is installed (ready) is a stool. What is not installed (ready) is the one that is not a stool. It brings with it the use of the established result. Therefore, it may not be possible to observe creative activity in him. On the other hand, in order for the non-stool to become established, it will first have to go through a process of mental design, and then it will begin to be created with the objects provided by nature. Just like in this example, children's games include what is not established and can become established as a result of the creative thought process. The presentation of what is established, what is ready, to the subjects in both childhood and adulthood can minimize their creative activity, their fantasy world.

When we look at art and its objects from past to present, we see that different subjects have built different original works. In all activities of both architecture and art, it may be possible for us to observe the play and imagination of these subjects and combine them with our own imagination. Since the earliest known history of mankind, the creative activity of subjects has overflowed from the cave walls, objectified in various ways, forming the cultures of communities. When we look at creative activity from the perspective of 'play', it may be possible to come across the same activity when we dig the foundation of cultures. When we examine the megaliths and the Egyptian Pyramids, it is possible to observe the power of human creative activity. "Man has rebelled and resisted everywhere. Fifty-ton stones, erected individually or in rows or circles, testify to man's effort to do something that will remain forever, beyond his own life. These first great megaliths were more long-lasting than their creators" (Boorstin, 1992, p. 70). As can be seen from these sentences of Daniel J. Boorstin (1914-2004), the idea of infinity had an effect on the creative power of the subject, almost merged with the perception of immortality. A person who plays games and produces art objects can also be alone with the idea of eternity. Because the imagination seems to cooperate with eternity. Accordingly, imagination; it is not finished, it is endless. "The practice of burying the dead witnessed in the monuments of prehistoric megaliths also shows the effort of the first man to create, to stay beyond his own short life. (...) Architecture begins with the discovery that the meaning of death, that is, one's own life, is limited. And the creator man sets out to work to conquer time" (Boorstin, 1992, pp. 71-72). The relationship of imagination with play and the idea of infinity, reaching out to architecture that is important for culture and objectifying there, again seems to reveal the property of art and its object that moves culture.

Rousseau explains in *his work Emile* that man is born weak and needs strength. He describes the source of man's weakness in these words: "Where does man's weakness come from? From the disparity between his power and his desires. It is our passions that make us powerless, because it takes more power to satisfy what is happening than nature gives us" (Rousseau, 2010, p. 207). Within the scope of this expression, man seems to be looking for more than the power given by nature in creation and creativity, in art. By integrating his desires and power with the object of art, he seems to have objectified his existence in the world. "The most important factor in Nietzsche's finding aesthetics attractive is the concept of creativity. He constantly glorifies the artist. Overflowing with power and happiness, the artist transforms reality. It transforms the coarse material offered by existence into something created in its own image. 'He sees nothing as it is; he sees fuller, leaner, stronger'" (Megill, 2012, pp. 78-79). As the thinker expresses, this act of the creative man seems to be related to the concept of play. Play is a phenomenon that can go beyond the established rules of real life, often not having the opportunity to happen. While the dreams, desires and fictions of single, single subjects cannot easily find a place in the real world, it is possible to observe that they are objectified in the totality of play and art. The fact that the desire for power in subjects coincides with the duration of his bodily existence on earth, in other words, his struggle with death, seems to have left him alone with the feeling of nothingness. "Nothingness (fr. *Neant*; Alm. *Nichts, Nichtseindes*; eng. *Non-being*). Nonexistent. Its presence is out of the question. There is no equivalent in reality" (Timuçin, 2004: 258). Means. This concept gave rise to the currents of nothingism and nihilism and argued that "we cannot know anything about reality" (Timuçin, 2004: 256). "Nietzsche proposes this nihilism as the appropriate attitude to modern and postmodern existence. Instead of retreating from the void into fear, we dance on it. We invent a world instead of whining that there is no world fit for our own existence. We become

artists of our own existence, unhindered by natural boundaries" (Megill, 2012, p. 76). Within the scope of these discourses, we can only say that the act of creation and creativity tries to combat the sense of nothingness. The sense of "constant nothingness-emptiness" that may exist in subjects may be the motive of its creative potential. On the other hand, "For Nietzsche, art is not a truth, but a means of illusion. In fact, in one of the fragments in Nachlass, he links the 'will to art' to 'lie, to run away from 'truth,' to negate 'truth'" (Megill, 2012, pp. 80-81). Neging the truth, running away, lying is the existential structure of the 'game'. Because the game is the fictional world of subjects. According to this, the subjectively created totality of play and art seems to create a new truth while negating the truth.

The objects of creative subjects also seem to be closely related to the transformative power of art, 'faith', 'science' and the world-life design in this context. Indeed, "while Schopenhauer sees the world as 'idea' or 'design' (Vorstellung), Nietzsche, like Schelling, sees it as a work of art" (Megill, 2012, p. 51). When we consider that ideas and designs turn into works of art, and that objects of art turn into ideas and designs, it is possible to say that the three great thinkers are right. Man, who is in search in the life cycle, seems to realize the design of life thanks to what faith and science provide him in different societies. The returns of religious belief and the results of science can lead masses to different designs of life in different societies. The idea of the "immortality of the soul" promised to individuals in monotheism and other religions, in another sense, the permanence of the human soul, seems to have alleviated the sense of nothingness by reflecting on the actions of the subject. Apart from the creative subject, who is thought to be able to answer the question of nothingness with the help of his art, it is possible to think that other subjects seek an answer to this question with the help of science and beliefs. The effort to survive inherent in human nature and the desire and desire underlying it seem to be continuous only if the question of nothingness is answered. Schopenhauer;

It tries to provide a solution or way out of this picture, which is depressing in every aspect, based on aesthetics and ethics. In other words, he finds the way out of the vicious circle of wanting and futile striving out of pain and unhappiness in art and morality. Because, according to his theory, our types of knowledge and modes of understanding must be activities determined and directed by the cosmic will. Indeed, Schopenhauer says that scientific inquiry is the most perfect example of determination by the will: the most important reason for this is that the main function of scientific inquiry is to provide us with practical techniques for the satisfaction of our wants and desires, through the discovery of natural regularities. Schopenhauer therefore tries to secure a practical, not theoretical, way of salvation. It also shows aesthetics as the first and important candidate for this practical path. Because aesthetic experience makes it possible for a person to take a considerable distance on the way to get out of the wheel of wanting and trying in vain (Cevizci, 2009: 928).

In this context, aesthetic experience seems to show us a way in a practical sense despite the struggle for life. The thinker's adaptation of the fields of art and morality to the practice of life seems to remind us of the importance of beliefs and science in our design of life. Therefore, Schopenhauer;

It actually distinguishes between two types of information. The first of these is everyday knowledge, which exists to serve the needs of the will, to satisfy our wants and desires. He says that the systematization of such everyday knowledge, which is governed by the principle of sufficient cause and, therefore, gives us only the knowledge of appearance, corresponds to that science. In addition to the knowledge in question, there is also the knowledge of the eternal or the ideals. Since ideas exist eternally, according to Schopenhauer, if we immerse ourselves in the constellation of these ideas, then we get lost in Platonic ideals and, transcending the limits of time, completely forget our individuality. While such aesthetic experiences arise in human responses to natural beauty, it is

important to remember that works of art are also the firmest and most powerful carriers of Platonic ideas. In this way, the works of art that give Platonic ideas to the non-volitional subject of knowledge allow people to get rid of the narrow limits of the principle of individuation with the principle of sufficient reason (Cevizci, 2009: 928).

The thinker's evaluation of the object of art within the scope of platonic ideas is in a sense an indication of his immortality. It is only within this relationship that man transcends his narrow limits and takes part in that immortality. Within the scope of this understanding, the spiritual glorification of art began to resonate especially in Europe. "In the nineteenth century, people like Alfred de Vigny 'Art, modern [...] is spiritual belief'" and confronted with art that had been at the disposal of religion in previous centuries (Shiner, 2004, p. 263). "The spiritual exaltation of art often took a Schillerian form, which saw art as the revelation of a superior truth with the power to save man. According to this view, the insights of imagination and emotion are evidently devoid of the clarity and precision of scientific or practical reasoning, but through these insights we can attain a spirituality that transcends religious distinctions among people" (Shiner, 2004, p. 264). The idea of the sanctity of art, its relationship with religion, the religious motifs that adorned the church walls in the past centuries, the sculptures may have been thought of because they offered people the unimaginable in this regard. Christian art, which makes religious teachings, the other world, visible to people, was founded in the 19th century. Century beyond that, it was conceived as the art of redemptive revelation. This way of thinking seems to be compatible with the idea of subject-art-immortality. Some idealist philosophers translated these ideas into "speculative Art Theory," in the words of Jean-Marie Schaffer. The essence of speculative art theory is the claim that art reveals the essence of the universe (God, being, absolute) through the sensory means of image, symbol and sound" (Shiner, 2004, p. 264). Within the scope of these statements, art is seen as the truth of the human spirit. Thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche and Schopenhauer are among the thinkers who ascribe this role to art. The idealist understanding of art revolving around God-immortal soul-human seems to differ from the life designs of other communities in terms of life design on the subject-game-art relationship axis.

While the traces of idealist thought continue on the European continent, 21. By the turn of the century, this "Saint-Simonian, socialist, and Darwinist of the century did not accept the metaphysics of speculative art theorists" (Shiner, 2004, p. 265). Darwinism asserts that "this whole organic world, including the human species, came into being through a natural and gradual process of evolution, and that the determining mechanism of this process is natural selection. According to the teaching, nature weeds out the species that are best adapted to the environment in which they live and the members of the species in question" (Cevizci, 2014, p. 110). The doctrine that reduced human beings to biological phenomena offered subjects a different design of life.

The Darwinian explanation of nature, as it is known, is an attempt to explain the building blocks of nature, the structure and functioning of organisms, and their relationship to each other and to their environment only with the principles that emerge from nature. This attempt to explain any supernatural field of existence, thought and belief without allowing them to be accepted as a reference point corresponds to the axis of positivist and naturalistic based explanation that science has acquired after the enlightenment (Önkal, 2013: 630).

Although the reflection of this system of thought on art is quite different from the reflection of idealist thought on art, socialists and Darwinists nevertheless:

[...] they often ascribed to art a similar exalted spiritual role. Art and the artist were at the heart of both Claude Henri Saint-Simon's and Auguste Comte's social visions of the future. In his 'positive philosophy', Comte considered art on the same plane as science and his own religion of humanity. At one point, Comte even claimed that Art was higher than science because it was closer to emotions and combined theory and practice (Shinner, 2004, p. 265).

Within the scope of these statements, it may be possible to say that the design that reduces the subject to a biological phenomenon is looking for immortality in the object of art. Man's efforts to prove God in explaining the flawless design of nature can be sought in Comte's idea of identifying art with science. The English philosopher/scientist/clergyman William Paley (1743-1805) conceived of God and the order of nature as "inherent and active in all the workings of the world, nature, and the universe in general." Thus, for Paley, the design argument is that nature is a product of design rather than an attempt to prove God by accepting his existence; and tries to show that it is designed intelligently" (Önkal, 2013, p. 629). From this point of view, it is possible to say that the idea of art, which is thought to be revelation, has not been able to get rid of Darwinism in its journey to Darwinism, mostly in references such as 'holiness' and 'sublime-sightedness'. The integration of religion with art, which is intertwined with the concepts of holiness and greatness, can be likened to Comte and like-minded positivists claiming that art is higher than science, just as Paley "carries the banner of his effort to make God the subject of empirical science" even though it is outside the limits of the dominance of science (Önkal, 2013: 629). However, both the understanding of art, which is seen as a revelation, and the understanding of art, which is seen as superior to science, are seen as the 21st century. We can say that its appearance in the century has integrated with science, technology and art and brought the existence of man to us with a new design of life. The existentialist philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who evaluates art as a force on the opposite side of technology, and his subjective idealism, which puts the subject at the center, seem to have similar characteristics (Megill, 2012, p. 247). Accordingly, 21. The art, game, cultural design of the individual may also differ in the century.

### **3.4 HEIDEGGER FROM SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM TO EXISTENTIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF ART INTO TECHNIQUE**

The existentialism movement, which is evaluated under the name of continental philosophy, was founded in the 19th century. It began to make a name for itself in the mid-century as a reaction to the dominant systematic philosophy. "Existence, (alm. *Existenz*, *dasein*; ing, *existence*). State of being. It's a case of having a reality. To exist is to be concretely. For man, existence is to have a concrete and conscious experience. (...) to exist means to manifest oneself as oneself with consciousness" (Timuçin, 2004: 490). The current based on the concept of being is *existentialism*;

It is distinguished by its opposition and rebellion against the modern worldview, which sees existence as composed of essences and essences, or classical metaphysics from Aristotle to the 20th century. Second, it challenges the scientific worldview, the sweeping domination of modern science, combined with technology, which has reached the point of wiping man off the face of the earth. Finally, existentialism opposes a rational worldview, the idea that the world is a place where reason and meaning permeate (Cevizci, 2014, p. 443).



The philosophy of existentialism adopted by thinkers such as Karl Jaspers, Jean Paul Sarte, Albert Camus, Merleau Ponty, Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger has been evaluated with different concepts and fictions. Accordingly, "Existentialism for Heidegger and its concept of 'forms of existence' are "the manifestations or basic structures of human existence or existence. These are determinations about human existence, as opposed to categories that are objective determinations of thought. (e.g. Being in the world, being together, understanding, situation, anxiety, fear). The human world cannot be measured by objective scales, but by forms of existence, which are qualitative determinations" (Akarsu, 1988: 191).

According to this idea, it does not seem possible to talk about an objective mind. It is possible to talk about the perceptions of the existing minds of individual subjects. Heidegger's aesthetic view, which is considered within the philosophy of existentialism, has often been examined and discussed by other thinkers. The thinker does not think that art is a cultural phenomenon or an act related to the soul of man; "Art is considered neither a site of cultural achievement nor an image of the soul; o 'The meaning of being' (see Of the meaning of being). Being and Time) belong only to Ereignis, whom he will describe" (Su, 2014, p. 115).

Heidegger says that Descartes claimed to have inverted the subject-object relationship. According to him, "Descartes refers to the subject, the subjectum (or Yun.*hypocheimenon*) He claims to have radically changed the meaning of the concept. In Greek, *hypocheimenon* meant what stood in the way, the reality that confronted man. (...) The Greeks called what is called an object today a "subject." Because they saw themselves in, not against, the reality that came to the fore" (Su, 2014, pp. 117-118). Accordingly, Descartes made man the center of all that is happening. This idea was heavily criticized by Heidegger. Because, according to the thinker, "By placing man at the center, Descartes paved the way for the attempt to establish absolute domination over nature, which forms the basis of modern technology" (Su, 2014, p.118). Heidegger set art against technology and attributed it a liberating power. This thought can lead us to the distinction between art and craft or art and *tekhne*. Again, in the history of thought, the question "art or craft-tekhne?" has been frequently asked and various theories have been developed. Heidegger opposed the reduction of art to technique, stating that "technology, in its modernistic form, is of a purely manipulative nature. When we look at it from the point of view of creation and creativity, the development of science and technology, new inventions and art have started to be fed by scientific developments and have gained new appearances and even brought new fields. As an example, it is still in the 19th and 20th centuries. After centuries of technological studies, cinema *has been accepted as the seventh art*. Heidegger argued that in the modern age, "we have closed ourselves off to the mystery that art can bring. Like everything else, it is subjectivized in art, subordinated to the human will. Our relationship with art has become 'aesthetics', that is, another post-Descartes science" (Megill, 2012, p. 247). When we consider it in this context, the cooperation of art with technology and science can be considered as the inevitable end. Accordingly, it is possible to see the unity of technique and art in terms of creativity clearly in the century we live in.

On the other hand, one of the most crucial criticisms of Modernism was the formalization of reason and the consequent instrumentalization of its actions. People's high ideals were about to melt away, and instead they turned to the beneficiary, the beneficiary. With industrialization, "the symbol of our age was the engineer. The engineer's mind is the

mentality of industrialism in its most developed form. His goal was to reduce human beings to a collection of means without an end" (Horkheimer, 1986, p. 161).

In art, this was now part of the instrumental and formalist point of view. A human figure just walking by in a painting would not have meant any emotion to the children of modern times. "It is no longer superfluous to just walk, to mingle with the view ahead; Thus, the concept of appearance as a pedestrian lives becomes meaningless and arbitrary. The view degenerates into image hunting and photography" (Horkheimer, 1986, p. 79) It is at this point that it is possible to see the transformation of art into technique. Large oil paintings made in past centuries have begun to be replaced by photographs that we take with smartphones and can display in digital frames. Even with the development of application programs on computers, it has become possible to apply the appearance of old large oil paintings to photographs using various effects.

The concept of "time" is very important in a society where technology has developed so much. Time should be used practically and sparingly. The man of industrial society does not have time to rest. Even if he finds time, the free time activity he will perform should be of a nature that motivates him to work life again. When it comes to leisure activities, art and its various branches come to mind. Music, painting, cinema, dance, etc... Modern man has not abandoned these arts in all his hustle and bustle, but seems to have managed to adapt them to the speed of his life by combining them with his success and creativity in the technical field.

In modern social life, the combination of art and technique evokes the period before the 19th century when art and technique were seen together. Is art technical? Or "is art what is technical?" By the end of the 19th century, "artist" and "craftsman" had become opposites; Now the 'artist' was the creator of fine works of art, while the 'craftsman' was just someone who did something useful or entertaining." (Shiner, 2004, p. 23). With this distinction already made, while the industrial revolution was taking place in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, the progress of technological developments would almost reunite this distinction and raise the above questions. Today, artisans are thought to be able to combine technique and art, just as the great artists of past centuries did, to give their followers feelings of wonder and greatness.

When we look before the distinction between fine art and craft, "there was no word in the language of the Greeks that corresponded to what we call fine art. The word *techne*, which we usually translate as "art," encompassed what we now call crafts, just like the *ars* of the Romans. The *techne* encompassed such disparate things as carpentry, poetry, shoemaking, and medicine, sculpture, and dressing. Indeed, *techne* and *ars* referred to the ability of people to goods and perform rather than a class of objects" (Shiner, 2004, p. 22). Modern man seems to have managed to combine only this described picture with the technique he has gradually developed. Behind all these discussions and distinctions may be the artist's ownership of the emotional field. In the 18th century, the separation of the artist from the craftsman is like a declaration that this emotional field is a special field. Today, this field of emotion has become almost open to the public with technique, and almost everyone seems to have found an opportunity to activate the creative potential in themselves with various technological devices.

Behind the technique lies science. Heidegger; "The origins of this power are in modern science" (Megill, 2012, p. 239). Scientific advances nourish and enrich technique. While trying to ground the feelings of art in philosophies of metaphysical origin, technique was based on positivism. The most important of Max Horkheimer's criticisms is "the pragmatism that underlies positivism." He has had his share of this movement in art. Positivists criticized metaphysical systems and excluded them from art "In their view, heartless intellectuals who did not trust the scientific method relied on other methods of knowledge, such as intuition or revelation" (Horkheimer, 1986, p. 94).

At the end of all these discussions, art gained a new appearance, combined the emotions of modern man with technique, and became the target of criticism that it turned them into automatons. But how did art allow this transformation? How did art and technique come together? Their questions lead us to reconsider the structure of art.

It is its mathematical structure that enables the combination of art with technique. Mathematics is one of the oldest sciences in human history. According to the Pythagoras, the early Greek school of philosophy; Everything is made up of quantities, and the fact that everything is made up of numbers means that we can understand the universe through mathematical expressions. This is the basis of modern science. "The most important element determining the philosophy of the Pythagoreans was order and harmony. The most basic concept of Pythagorean thought, the "harmonia", is explained largely through numerical relations in connection with music theory. Accordingly, the Pythagoreans, the creators of acoustics, that is, the science of sound, determined that there was a relationship between the length and shortness of the string and the lowness and treble of the voice in stringed instruments. In parallel with this determination, when they changed the length of the string on a single-stringed instrument to a certain extent, they found the eight-note sound range and the four-note sound range in the scale order, respectively. Indeed, when the Pythagoreans saw that these vocal intervals corresponded to the lengths expressed in arithmetic ratios of  $1/2$ ,  $2/3$  and  $3/4$  respectively on the string, they concluded that the ranges of sounds, which hitherto only the sensitive ear of the musicians had empirically and practically become aware of, could be expressed mathematically precisely by means of the first four integers and the relationship between these numbers" (Cevizci, 2009, p. 45).

The mathematical relationship that the Pythagoreans discovered over music extended to other arts as well. Mathematics, on which the structural feature of arts such as painting, sculpture, architecture and dance is based, is indispensable in the technical field. Computer technology uses operating systems, mathematics. The common denominator where technique and art meet is mathematics, and thanks to this denominator, technology is in unity with art today. The task of original art instruments, as well as oil paintings and brushes, photographic programs on computers; Digital audio programs seem to be able to perform the task of musical instruments easily.

With all these developments, the transformation of art into technique seems to have accelerated the people of modern society. People no longer had to pose in front of a painter for hours as in the old days. In the same way, the painter had gained speed and ease by combining his creative talent with technique. The invention of photography in the 19th century was just the beginning. In other arts, one by one, it has continued to meet with technique.

Technology is one of the fields of human existence. "In art, it deals with the field of human existence and everything that has to do with it. Man's sphere of existence varies from situation to situation, from age to age, from human society to human society. For this reason, the works of art created in every age show a different quality" (Mengüsoğlu, 1988: 206). When we look at the combination of technology and art from this point of view, we can think that it does not seem very independent in human beings. Subjective idealism, which subordinates existence to the constitution of the human mind, seems to realize one of the elements of existence by making the discoveries of individual subjects in the field of science, art and technique into the field of existence.

According to Heidegger, the questioning of human existence is also the questioning of existence. Man, who is in a constant state of being, is thrown into the world, that is, he exists in the world, he is there, he is uncertain towards the past and the future. All that is certain for man is that he knows that he is mortal, and therefore man is in a state of anxiety, inner distress, curiosity and doubt. All these emotions act as a stimulus to man's realization of his own existential existence (Heidegger, 2011, p.9).

In the face of Heidegger's assessment that only art can save us from the destruction of technology, man who is integrated with technology seems to become aware of his own existential existence with it. Man seems to be trying to eliminate his feelings such as anxiety, curiosity and inner distress in the science-technical circle that he has made one of the elements of his being. Today, the existence of art in technology is considered as a necessity of the irrepressible development of society. Both artists and art viewers benefit from technology. Technology is a tool, just like the instruments used in art; Instrumentalization is a human behavior. The root of this behavior can only lie in the degeneration of emotions such as admiration and amazement. When these feelings degenerate, although classical art, technology and everything else in the world are doomed to instrumentalization, the relationship of creation and creativity with art, whether presented through technology or performed in its classical form, remains one of the indispensable areas of man and can always be the main tool of the cultural evolution of human beings.

## RESULT

The point of discussion of philosophy of art today is not based on subject-object opposition, but on the contexts in which these parties coexist. The image has ethical implications beyond the epistemological or ontological foundations in the perceiving subject-perceived object relationship. Therefore, the process of imaginary design is the result of a communication between the features we acquire from the objects we perceive as a process. The world is structured by the expectations and assumptions of the subject experiencing the world. Thus, the study of philosophy of art cannot help but investigate what kind of existence a work of art has. The problem of phenomenological aesthetics' inability to cover works of art that arise in various conditions of existence becomes not a question of what the object of art is, but of how it is seen and/or perceived by the subject. Abstract concepts are deeply connected to the meanings of physical objects. The perceiving subject can design quite interesting combinations. Thus, objects that refer to the possible world and are not in the real world can be confronted within the framework of the metaphysical understanding of objects. The object of creation, as a result of the ability to abstract from concrete objects, turns into a concrete object again. So much so that a new object design can be created in the mind with the abstraction obtained through objects. The subject's encounter with the object is one of the elements that triggers the creative process, and it is the conscious person himself in the creative act. In this activity, the artist or scientist encounters his own world. In this encounter, in the process of creation, the subject can realize his imaginary design in line with the information he has obtained from the object. The subject, who enters the process of creation, can create images with the abstractions he makes from the objects he perceives during the design phase. In the process of creation and design, the existence of objects may depend on the perceptual characteristics of the subject, and only through abstraction from the perceived objects can a new object image be designed. The problem of making sense of what the object is, the problem of existence and design, seems to lead us to the problem of reality and truth.

The relationship between reality and reality is evaluated from the point of view of the relationship between creativity and consciousness in terms of philosophy of art behind the ontological context discussion in the history of philosophy. So much so that the individual who is aware of his own mental state is obliged to be conscious of the outside world. In particular, the consciousness-emotion-perception debates on which 17th century philosophy is based deny the existence of conscious states of mind in the face of the materialist-oriented epiphenomenalism current and evaluate them as a by-product of physical states. The fact that people construct objective reality in terms of artistic truth in their thoughts through different perceptions based on their different subjectivities has become the focus of a new debate. In the process of creation and creativity in art, exactly where reality is located in relation to the subject is a very important problematic. According to the artist, dreams can be effective enough to determine reality. In this context, some philosophers attempt to answer whether art is appearance, delusion, or illusion. Ultimately, art is the formation of a will that builds the world, a form of truth, and sometimes truth itself.

In the process of creativity, it may be possible to bring the object of art, which does not yet exist in the physical world, into being as a whole in thought (which can be thought of as a proposition in the mind) and to establish multiple relations in the manner indicated by Kant

during the transfer of what is known in the mind to the outside world. The post-Kantian idealists, like the subjective idealists, did not argue that they could only know their own thoughts outside of the physical existence, nor that all objects were the product of the finite subject. Debates on post-Kant philosophy of art (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, etc.) Within the paradigm of German idealism, truth in art was determined within the framework of discussions of art in truth.

Throughout the history of ideas in the context of German Idealism, the subject of aesthetics has been the scene of several debates. The human-art relationship was discussed and a new understanding of art was put forward in the philosophical sense. This realization sprouted from the idea that the world could not be understood without art; Because, in the idea of idealism, the work of understanding, perceiving, making sense of the subject's abilities through design in the face of an art object has begun to be reconstructed. On the other hand, from the objective materialist point of view, the act of creation absolutizes subjective qualities by limiting them to the object. At the point of overcoming this limiting relationship, it is decisive whether the weight of the philosophical relationship established with matter is on the side of the subject or the object. Ryle, for example, wants to overcome the tension between idealism and materialism through language. However, this tension can be overcome through the art object itself without resorting to language. Thus, the problem of solipsism that arises in the act of creating in art is overcome. Therefore, the problem of creativity in art is not based on the orientation of the subject, but on how the object should be handled.

In this context, when we consider the subject's act of creating, he can take into account that similar processes can be effective. Factors such as desire, pleasure, life effort, etc. can be one of the important elements in the subject's act of creativity. In subjective idealism, it may be considered normal that there should be changes and diversity in the object created by the perceiving, designing and interpreting characteristics of other minds. Because it is possible to say that each subject has its own design world, a difference in processing information. We can observe this difference through the variety of art objects.

From the point of view of subjective idealism, the process of creative-design is what happens in the subject itself. On the other hand, the dialectical process it has entered into with the outside world also consists of its own mental meanings and designs. Rollo May states that the act of creativity cannot be explained only by what happens in the person; however, he still says that artists' encounters with the world can appear in their work, and that their subjective processes should be observed. In this context, a work of art can go beyond the creative subject, be evaluated by other subjects, and take its place in the dialectical processes of other subjects. Thus, what makes a difference in creativity in art is not the objects themselves that are privileged, but the encounters of the subjects.

Underlining that emotion and wanting are central to the object design of the creating subject, Kandinsky presents the work of art as a design experience. Kandinsky's theory of style, developed by highly objective and rational criteria, says that different forms arise from the same internal thoughts and goals. After all, the role of the subject as a designer vis-à-vis the object is to reveal his spiritual life on a geometrical, uniformist, universal plane. Opposing such a stance, David Hume sees the object of art as the result of subjective psychological processes and attributes a strong subjective purposive to the subject's mode of creation.

In contrast to Hugeous criticism, a response can be given that feeds especially on Fichte's idealism. According to Fichte, creativity in art is ultimately based on the metaphysics of the subject, since the plane of the object independent of the subject cannot be conceived. What we necessarily experience is the material of the design of the self. When designing an object, it is possible that the power of imagination is performing infinite combinations. However, when design becomes objectified, it becomes finite, seemingly infinite. Now the object is the finite object of the end-of-the-box imagination. But other subjects who follow the object can still have unlimited imaginations on the finite object. This is like the infinity unfolding of the seemingly finite art object. In response to this basic thesis, Schelling says that the world of nature is at least as real and important as the world of the self. In reality, it is nature that gives consciousness what consciousness reproduces. Nature is the objective. It is known from the beginning; Nature is eternal. But by limiting itself, consciousness presents itself to itself as something different from nature. According to these statements, conscious and unconscious production are together in art. In knowledge, the subject, the object, the conscious and the unconscious are identical. Schelling attaches importance to intuition. Aesthetic intuition shows the reality of the unity of the conscious, the unconscious and the ideal. From this point of view, as May points out, it is possible to say that Schelling recognizes the self in the stage of creating and creating creativity, that is, aesthetics, within the framework of this whole system of thinking.

When we move on to Hegel's view of art, another great representative of German Idealism, we see that the I, which was preceded in Schelling's philosophy, is linked to genius and creativity. The thinker emphasizes that natural talent should be developed through the ability to produce, and especially through reflection. Within the framework of these sentences, when we consider the close connection of creative activity with art, we can conclude that people can be educated in this direction. However, according to Hegel, the rapid flow of imagination does not produce any work of art. The artist is obliged to describe what has accumulated in him within a certain framework. Only the artist can adapt these forms and appearances to suit his own purpose. In order to ensure that the external is intertwined with the mental, that is, the form, the mind, the prudence and the emotions must invoke its depths. The exuberant life of the artist is very important for him in the process of creation. Hegel finds the artist's material, which he shapes through emotion, as his own self. The reason why the artist internalizes the object he produces is that he is charged with his own emotions in that object. Hegel is of the opinion that in order for the work of art to gain objectivity, an inspiration in which the subject emphasizes himself would be poor. However, there may be a connection between Hegel's discourse and the inspiration that fills the theme and the particular characteristics, because in the artist himself, his characteristics are present as a whole. Therefore, it may be possible to see in an art object the reflection of the characteristics of the subject in the whole both at the stage of inspiration and after its completion.

The education and development of man's not only sensory but also mental aspect seems to be very important for the world he will design. Since the irrational processes of perception and thinking, that is, the aspect of emotion, will be in cooperation with the mind, the relationship of these concepts to believing may need to be examined. Because believing can be considered a key point between perception and reason, in the process of making sense of it. Man's individual, political freedom can be closely related to the process of believing. Schiller's aesthetic education, the harmonization of the processes of sensuality and reason, tried to solve

the opposition, which he called the impulse of form and sensation, which constitutes the focus of psychology, with the concept of the game impulse, and argued that aesthetics could be passed with this impulse.

When we think in this context, we can say that aesthetics is in the middle of the living space of subjects. Beyond just enjoying and liking, it may be possible to see from Schiller's window that the indispensable concepts such as politics, freedom, state and morality, which constitute the roof of humanity, are the basis of the building. Starting from Schiller's impulse for sensation and form, the examination of the concept of impulse, which also forms the framework of psychology, can be important in terms of creation and creativity.

Within the scope of these statements, it may be possible to speak of creative activity in fantasy, where the control of the mind is not completely abolished. If we consider Locke's statements, we can say that the creation of complex ideologies is actually the work of both active and passive consciousness. Because the subject can consciously abstract form from objects, it can also come face to face with a ready-made and complete object image formed by abstraction from the unintentional unconscious. The subject can consciously create an object imagination from different objects placed in front of him. A piece of wood can form an image of a table, from two chairs. Accordingly, it can reach the whole by placing the legs of the chair on the lower part of the piece of wood. This example can be shown as a simple creation-design example. On the other hand, with the same example of abstraction, the table can be transformed into an object of artistic creation. On the other hand, in dream-like situations that are seen as passive, the subject passively watches the objects he has encountered before, in the words of the science of psychology, by bringing them from the unconscious. In his dream, the subject can imagine a world under the sea, and when he wakes up, if he is an artist, he can embody this dream by reflecting it on his art. Again, the dream, which is shaped according to the individual characteristics of the person, is a part of his creative feature. Again, if we remember that May has a dimension of the unconscious that lies outside of life, we can think that the conscious and the unconscious are a whole and are in continuity. Accordingly, both 'dream' and fantasy seem to be one of the important parts of creation and creativity as a whole.

When we look again at the contrast of Schiller's impulse for sensation and form in the context of all this narrative, it is possible to see that the sensory impulse is completely different from the real world with dream and fantasy, and the dream world, which is consistent in itself, sometimes tends to interpret what it senses according to this world. But the impulse of form comes into conflict with the impulse of sensation at this point, the logical limit of the mind.

The other, who evaluates a work of art, in his encounter with the object, may transcend the boundary of "being as it is"; it can multiply it. The individual characteristics that the artist transfers to his object can be evaluated by other subjects in the space where they are shared with uploads within the scope of their own characteristics. In this case, the work of art may have the property of proliferation.

The influence of creation and creativity and its consequent art and object on culture is undeniable. We can say that the artist is someone who is aware of what is happening around him in this sense. "The artist walks with life, with reality, and makes up steps for them. The



artist is the one who acts in advance, who has a premonition, who shapes the things he foregives.

The object of art can be compared to an object that stands between two subjects in the external world, as well as an object that multiplies and carries out dream transfer from one mind to the other mind in the context of meaning-making. The object that emerges from the artist's design and imagination may have the property of 'multiplying' or 'decreasing' as a result of the viewer's own meaning. This can be seen as a result of the logical inferences that the viewer establishes with the art object. Accordingly, the multiplication of an art object by exceeding the design of its creator with the meaning of its viewer can also be evaluated below the limits of the design determined by the artist and the object can decrease. Within the framework of these judgments, the viewer can make decisions about the object of creation.

When we look at art and its objects from past to present, we see that different subjects have built different original works. In all activities of both architecture and art, it may be possible for us to observe the play and imagination of these subjects and combine them with our own imagination. Since the earliest known history of mankind, the creative activity of subjects has overflowed from the cave walls, objectified in various ways, forming the cultures of communities. When we look at creative activity from the perspective of 'play', it may be possible to come across the same activity when we dig the foundation of cultures. The objects of creative subjects also seem to be closely related to the transformative power of art, faith, science, and the world-life design in this context.

The proximity of world-life and design ideas to each other has led to the rethinking of subjective idealism in terms of the role of creativity in art by integrating with technology in our age and leaving the competence of art to technology.

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