Philosophical reflection on ethical value may be motivated in a number of ways. One common origin can occur when we observe that we often do not agree with people around us in their ethical commitments, and begin to puzzle how to make sense of that fact. Most of us have some strong beliefs as to ways our world can be a morally better or worse place: we agree for instance that the world is a better place for having less slavery in it than it used to. That is to say, we think slavery is a bad — a *morally* bad — thing. Similarly, most of us agree that the world is better off for our being in time to grab a small child out of the path of a speeding automobile than it would be if we came a moment too late. Saving a child from death or grave harm is a good — *morally* good — thing. The idea that the world includes ethical values like the goodness and badness of such things seems unproblematic when we focus on issues on which most of us agree. Yet our confidence that the world contains such values wobbles when we turn our attention to more controversial issues.

Consider the ethical values we express through voting for political candidates. Often we support such candidates because we believe they best represent morally good things and oppose morally bad things. Yet we hesitate to think that the world would be better off for *compelling* others to vote in the same way. We hesitate in part because we recognize that others in good faith can disagree with us; we think we ought to tolerate not only each other but (to some degree, anyway) our differing values and practices. But if our respect for these ethical values is a response to such values as part of an objective, shared, public world, how is it that others do not or cannot apprehend and respond to them as we do? That anvils are heavier than feathers is a fact of the objective, shared, public world, and it is no accident that nobody can mistake that fact without manifesting some serious mental defect. If ethical values are really elements of that objective world, how is it that there can be so much disagreement about them?

The fact that people disagree about ethical values thus can be one motivation for reflection on them. A second motivation may come from our understanding of the natural world in which we live. Advances in physics, chemistry, biology, and other sciences in the past two or three centuries have enriched not only our understanding of, but our ability to shape, the natural world. Yet these sciences accord no place to ethical values in their picture of the cosmos. At one point there seemed no alternative to understanding complex organisms like ourselves as the product of design — God’s design — and thus as having some purpose. Many have thought that achieving that purpose might be among the high-

est of ethical values. But evolutionary theory explains not only the fact that we are here at all, but also our complexity, without any appeal to purpose or design, God’s or otherwise. It instructs us that everything about us is just the upshot of the causal give-and-take of natural selection. Natural selection has no purpose and so neither do we. But without such purpose, this anchor for understanding ethical value too has been lost to us. We seem to live in a world which, so far as the best of our science can tell, doesn’t include ethical values. What does that say about the nature of those values? Are we fundamentally mistaken in thinking there are such things? Skeptics or nihilists about ethical value urge an affirmative answer to that question, but their view is not the only one remaining available to us.

Realism

Realists about ethical value insist that, appearances to the contrary, ethical values are constituents of the world every bit as much as atoms or the gravitational force. Ethical values are, in a word, real. There are several varieties of realism.

One variety takes ethical values to be as much present in the world as the physical phenomena we interact with, without themselves being physical or “natural” phenomena. Non-naturalists claim that ethical values are properties of natural things in the world, but are themselves not natural properties. The idea of a property being “non-natural” can sound a bit mysterious, but the air of mystery persists only if we insist on thinking about properties as having to be physical properties, like size, shape, and so on. If we think about the ways we ordinarily attribute value properties to things — bad to slavery and good to feeding the hungry, for example — it is plain that such properties are in one sense very ordinary and not mysterious at all. G.E. Moore, who made this sort of approach famous in the early 20th century, argued that we should take the property good to be a simple property of things (that is, a property that cannot be analyzed into further component properties, as for instance the natural property yellow is simple) that is not natural, in the sense that it is not accessible by the natural sciences. Any attempt to understand the property good as merely some natural feature of the world, he claimed, was doomed to failure.

Moore’s version of realism is a bit different from perhaps realism’s earliest and most radical form. In his dialogue Republic, Plato lays out a view which may be construed as a robust form of non-naturalist realism. Plato maintained that there are really two worlds, and we are denizens of both of them. One is the world of material substance, which we detect with our senses. Things in this world are always coming into and going out of existence; their transience entails that we can really have no knowledge of them. The only reality that is stable and not in flux is the world of Ideas, which we know by the use of reason. In this world the Idea of Good has pride of place. It is, Plato claims, only because of this Idea of Good that anything else even has being or existence. Things in the world around us which we call “good” are so (if we are right) only because they somehow “participate” in
this Idea. On Plato’s view, then, ethical value is not only real, it is more real than anything that science can contemplate.

But discomfort that the world might contain anything so bizarre as “non-natural” properties — let alone a world of Ideas — motivates scepticism that that is the right way to conceive of ethical values. After all, how could we know about such things on that picture? We have a ready model for knowledge from the sciences: there is nothing plainer than our knowledge, and our knowledge that we know, of shoes and ships and sealing-wax, and that pigs do not have wings. But by hypothesis ethical value would stand outside those ways of knowing.

*Ethical naturalists* are realists who see this problem as providing its own solution. Whereas non-naturalists claim that there are ethical values as part of the world, even though they are not themselves natural phenomena, ethical naturalists insist that ethical values *are* natural phenomena — they are constituted by facts or properties in the familiar, sensible world; there is nothing “non-natural” about them. But there are different varieties of ethical naturalism as well. One type takes as its point of departure the way natural features of the world and values intersect in unproblematic, non-moral cases. Suppose you have a lawnmower. If its blade is sharp and it cuts grass well, you would think it is a good lawnmower; with a dull blade or some other defect in performance, it would be not such a good lawnmower. In saying that the mower is good or not so good, you are attributing a value property to it. But what is that value property, other than something constituted by its capacity to do what it is intended to do (namely, cut grass)? There’s nothing to that value beyond the familiar, physical, properties of the lawnmower; we don’t need any spooky “world of Ideas” or “non-natural” properties to make sense of the way a lawnmower can be good. Our first sort of ethical naturalist would extend this model quite generally into the ethical realm. Just as a lawnmower that cuts grass poorly is a bad lawnmower or a plant that can’t absorb water is a bad plant, a human being that can’t coexist peacefully with other people (say) is a bad person. Ethical value, on this picture, arises in the ordinary ways that natural things can have values. Since we are natural things, we can have these value properties as well.

Another sort of ethical naturalist draws our attention instead to close *parallels* between the way we think of ethical value and the way science contributes to our knowledge. Science proceeds, in large part, by providing theories that *explain* elements of our experience. We know that unobservable entities such as sub-atomic particles exist because they feature in the best explanations of phenomena we *can* observe. But ethical values feature in explanations in just the same way. It is the *badness* of slavery which explains people’s opposition to it. We should think this badness is real, this sort of naturalist will insist, because the kind of property necessary to do this explanatory work will be something we can see to be *independent* of our attitudes about it (that is, slavery is bad whether we think it is or not; it was bad throughout the many generations of human society in which people
thought it was unobjectionable: they were simply wrong), and which is something which

can shape our thought and conduct (for example, societies that accept slavery simply will

not thrive as do societies that reject it, not just because people resist it, but because its bad-

ness itself has implications for the working of human relationships and cooperation). Be-

cause ethical values can feature as parts of the best explanations of our experience of the

world, we should regard them as real in just the same way we take other things that ex-

plain our experience (subatomic particles, the Big Bang) to be real.

All realists — naturalist or non-naturalist — will have responses to the two prob-

lems which launched our inquiry. Consider first the problem of moral disagreement. Real-

ists will insist that the fact of such disagreement shows us precisely nothing about the exis-

tence of ethical values; such values are really part of our world, and people can be wrong

about these features of the world just as they can be wrong about any others. By way of

argument by analogy, they might point out that for centuries people were in deep dis-

agreement over how the earth fits into the world: do the sun and other heavenly bodies

orbit around it, or is the earth itself in orbit? Today, of course, there is little disagreement

about this, but that is a relatively recent development. However controversial the question

might have been at one time, however, there’s no doubting there is a real matter of fact

about the physical relations between the earth and the sun. Some people were right about

it, and some people were wrong about it. At most the disagreement reflects something

about the difficulty of arriving at evidence that can be universally persuasive, rather than

reflecting anything about the reality that that evidence points to. Similarly, what our moral

disagreements point to is at most how difficult it may be to arrive at evidence about ethical

value that is universally persuasive; they need show us nothing about the reality of that

value. Indeed, realists will suggest that we consider our convictions that

toleration

of others

holding views with which we disagree as an excellent example of a value that really is part

of the world.

Realists may divide a bit more in response to our second concern. What exactly they

have to say about the relation between the natural world and ethical values depends on

the form of realism in question. Naturalists will insist that ethical values pose no problem

for our understanding of the natural order because ethical values are part of the natural

order and indeed are necessary to explain how we experience it as we do. Suppose, for ex-

ample, that we think (as some utilitarians do) that it is right to maximize happiness. Then,

if we can point to a situation in which happiness is, as a matter of natural fact, being

maximized, we will have pointed to the presence of an ethical value. There is no problem

for ethical values arising from our best science because these are just two different ways of

thinking about the same thing, namely the order of natural facts.

Non-naturalist realists will take a different tack. Here they will insist that, though

science does indeed inform us about the natural world, there is no reason to think that

what science describes is all there is. Just because science does not afford us the tools to get
a grip on goodness, rightness, or other ethical values, does not mean there is nothing there to know or understand. The mistake, from the non-natural realist’s perspective, is thinking that if there is something there to know, science is the only credible way of getting at it. There is, this realist will argue, simply no reason to think this is so (and indeed that is a claim that cannot itself be substantiated by science!).

This strategy does blunt the force of that second concern, but it leaves another in its place for the non-natural realist. Suppose we grant that science is not the right tool for understanding ethical value. Nonetheless, we do aspire to ethical knowledge; we seek tools for sorting true from false ethical claims, and the like. If science is not to be our method for arriving at such knowledge, what is? What sort of account can the non-naturalist realist give us for how we can test claims of knowledge about ethical value, if science is not part of it?

The difficulty in mounting a persuasive response to this question may suggest that, if we are going to be realists, we at least ought to go for some form of naturalism, since at least we would not face this sort of epistemological hurdle. But the non-naturalist realist will argue that there are worse problems to be had by trying to make sense of ethical values as natural facts. Some of these are technical problems in understanding how the meanings of the terms we use in thinking about or describing ethical values come to have the meanings they do. But the deeper problem, the non-naturalist will insist, is that ethical values and non-natural (or normative) facts seem pretty clearly to be not the same things as natural facts. It is one thing to say this act maximizes happiness, and quite another to say this act is right. The former (if true) points out some natural facts about the world, but by itself imposes no demands for action upon us; by itself it gives us no reason to act. The latter, however, purports to do just that: saying that an act is right just is saying something about what we have reason to do, namely, that we have reason to perform that act — we ought to do it, we should do it, and so on. The non-naturalist realist denies that the latter can ever be fully captured in language that adverts only to natural facts about the world.

These difficulties with realism motivate some thinkers to give up thinking that ethical values are part of the world at all. Obviously we think and speak of them, but we aren’t (on these other views) referring to parts of the world at all — natural, non-natural, or otherwise — in the way that we are when we speak of ships and kings and sealing wax. Instead, we are doing something else. Let us now turn to irrealist conceptions of ethical value.

Irrealism

Given the trouble in understanding how ethical values might fit into the natural world, or how we might know of them if they are somehow part of the world non-
naturally, one plausible line of thought is that we should abandon the attempt to think they exist at all. What are we to think instead? Something like this: ethical values are reflections of our attitudes toward the world. Things that happen affect us in different ways: some we like, others we hate; some charm us, some repel us. What we do, on this way of thinking, is to project these attitudes out onto the world and the things that provoke them. When something repels us, we start thinking of it as having a value of (say) being repulsive, when in fact that “value” is just a matter of our own attitudes toward it. Saying of something else that it is “evil” is, likewise, a matter of projecting onto the “evil” thing the attitude or response we have to it. What is not happening is what the realist claims: that we are responding to some feature or property of the world. Things in the world don’t have ethical value or properties; they simply are the objects of attitudes we project.

As in the realist case, there are variants of this approach. What these variants have in common, however, is a sort of “quietism” about the problems we began with. They will not try to solve those problems; they will accept that they are problems, but insist that these problems should not trouble us.

This is most clear in thinking about the concerns that faces us because science can make no place for ethical values in the natural world. The irrealist responds: of course not! There’s nothing there to be made a place for. In fact, we misunderstand what ethical values are if we look around in the world (natural or otherwise) to find them. The only place such things exist is in us, and rather than looking outwards for them, we must look inwards.

Likewise, the problem of conflicting values doesn’t go away but loses its urgency on this way of thinking. The fact is that people have varying attitudes toward things, including things we find abhorrent (child abuse, say, or slavery, or …). This ought not to surprise us, and it ought not to induce us to wonder how such people could be going wrong in detecting genuine ethical values, since there are no such values. At bottom people simply have different attitudes, and the different ethical values they take there to be are simply reflections of these differing attitudes. The mystery is dissolved.

Does that mean we must condone those who have such attitudes or accept abhorrent practices? Not at all. Our attitudes toward such practices are that they should be condemned. When we say that such attitudes or practices are abhorrent or ought not to be accepted, we are simply giving our attitudes voice, but that doesn’t mean there are not genuine ethical values at work, since such attitudes are precisely what such values consist in. The irrealist is as comfortable as the realist in making the judgment that we should condemn slavery or injustice. Are we tempted to say more? Are we tempted, for instance, to think, “Yes, but we should condemn these things, and those who accept them should not!” The irrealist can say that too. In fact, it is very difficult to find something the realist wants to assert about the morality of practices, or the practical significance of values, that the irrealist cannot likewise assert. The two camps differ as to the explanations of what makes
those claims true, when they are true (and even what it means to say of them that they are true). The realist claims that such judgments are true in virtue of lining up somehow with genuine ethical values, and the irrealist denies that there are any such things in the world to line up with. But that fact, the irrealist insists, cannot bar us from making all the moral judgments we are used to making, and on insisting on their truth in some different sense.

A different irrealist approach takes us much the same way. Existentialists maintain that it is turning things around to suppose there are ethical values “out there” which it is up to us to detect and respond to properly. To think this is to suppose there is some “blueprint” for what we are like, or ought to be like, which it is our function to fulfil or realize. And this is false. What we ought to become, or what values we ought to realize, it is up to us to determine, to bring into existence. The existentialist slogan for this position is that “existence precedes essence,” which means that our essence — what we are or should aim to become — follows from what we make of ourselves. Our bare existence is the starting-point, not some planned-out picture of what we are or ought to be like. This is a more radical picture of our place in the world, and of the task of creation of ethical values, than the “projective” view characterized above. On the existentialist picture, ethical values are more a matter of will for us than they may be on the projectivist picture. The projectivist may think we actually have very little control over, or play very little voluntary role in, the establishment of the attitudes that are the basis for projection. So there are different views as to exactly how values which don’t strictly speaking exist in the world come to play the roles in our lives and practice that they do. The central point of agreement between these two forms of irrealism, however, is just on this crucial claim that ethical values are not to be found as part of the world outside us at all.

Some of the technical problems in understanding how our moral language comes to have the meaning it does afflict irrealists as well; in fact, the difficulties cited earlier for naturalist realists reflect deep disagreements on these issues between those realists and irrealists. But a different, and perhaps deeper, concern for irrealism arises directly from its conception of us, of the world we live in, and of what to make of ethical values in consequence. The realist will insist that, if the irrealist is right, we live in a very different world than the one we imagine we do, if (as seems plausible) when we make claims about what is good or bad, right or wrong, we take ourselves to asserting something about what the world is like, not just what we are like.

The irrealist must accept that this is true, but then will reply that this fact need make no great difference. After all, it does not matter to our senses of humor if we realize that, when we find something funny, we are not in doing so tracking a feature of the world, “funniness” (or “humorous value”), which we are accurately detecting and responding to. Even if we recognize that we are just projecting onto the world our reactions to some things as being funny, that need make no difference to us in practice. Things that are funny amuse us even so. Likewise, the irrealist claims, we can recognize that when we make
ethical judgments, we are not in so doing tracking some feature of the world which we are accurately reflecting and responding to, without any great loss to our ethical practice. Evil things will merit our condemnation even so.

The realist will resist this analogy. Not a lot rests on what we find funny. But much does rest on our judgments about what is good or bad, right or wrong, and it cannot help but influence our attitudes about these things, and the ethical values we think they bear, to see our attitudes as disengaged from the real facts about the world around us, as they must be if the irrealist is right. At the very least there is a sort of instability in simultaneously seeking an accurate grasp of what is good and what is bad as though it were important in the ways we think it is, while thinking all the time that in doing so we are but tracing the contours of our own sensibilities. So, at least, the realist will argue.

It would be nice to find a way to reconcile the realist’s reassurance that ethical values are really a part of the world we live in with the irrealist’s ready solutions to questions about how we can know of them. A third approach, constructivism, claims to do just this.

Constructivism

Constructivism is, at first blush, less easy to make sense of then either the forms of realism or the forms of irrealism we have considered. The idea, however, is this. The constructivist agrees with the realist that ethical values really are part of the world. The constructivist does not agree with the irrealist, that is, that the world really has in it no ethical values of the sort to which we suppose our ethical judgments to be corresponding. However, the constructivist disagrees with the realist as to the nature of these values, and how they come to be, and agrees with the irrealist that an important part of that story is played by our dispositions and responses to the world in which we find ourselves. Whereas the realist wants to insist that ethical values are part of a timeless ideal world, or part of nature, the constructivist denies that there are or would be any ethical values were it not for us — some essential task we play in constituting or “constructing” such values. What exactly this role is, and the details of the picture, vary between versions of constructivism.

On some readings of Kant’s account of ethical value, he is an exemplar of constructivism (but his view is in any event complex, and this is a contentious point). First, some background. Like Plato, Kant distinguishes between two worlds, the world of sense and the world of understanding. Unlike Plato, however, Kant does not claim that the latter is somehow more real or knowable than the former (in fact, just the opposite). Instead, the contrast between these two worlds that matters is this: the natural world (the “world of sense”) we know to be governed by natural laws. Gravity, for instance, dictates how two masses will be attracted to each other any place, any time, without exception. The natural laws of cause and effect govern without exception in the world of sense.
But, Kant argues, we cannot help but see ourselves as not governed by natural law in the same way. We know that we can choose the principles or laws we act upon: when our desires pull against what we know we ought to do, we know we can choose between these courses of action and be governed by our knowledge of moral principles. This is because we are capable of being governed (or better: governing ourselves) by rational laws — rules we impose on ourselves in virtue of our rationality. Kant thinks there is no ethical value in being governed by exceptionless natural laws, but there is value in choosing to be governed by moral principles. The “world of understanding” is the world governed by these principles, so ethical value is properly understood as having its home there, rather than in the world of sense. However, we belong to both worlds, so there is another sense in which ethical value is in the natural world in virtue of the choices we make in it.

Kant’s constructivism consists in his claim that ethical value isn’t something that by its very nature attaches to things in the world, or possible actions, or anything of that sort. Instead, ethical value comes to be in the world through the acts of willing we engage in when acting — through the ways we exercise our capacity for rational choice. When our wills are determined simply by the material incentives we have as part of the natural world (our desires, passions, and the like), there is no ethical value. After all, that is just the playing-out of natural laws. Just as there is no ethical value in (say) a mother bird feeding her chicks (that is just what mother birds naturally do), there is no ethical value in “doing what comes naturally” to us either. But, as noted above, we can instead choose to have our wills governed by rational principles, and when we do that, ethical value is constituted. Thus, there really is ethical value in the world, but it comes to be because of our choices as rational agents.

Constructivism is best-known through work, not in ethical value per se, but in the closely-related field of political theory. John Rawls, following Kant in thinking constructivistically about justice, held that just principles for political societies really are part of the world, but not in virtue of some timeless fact or feature of nature or some non-natural reality. Instead, he held, principles of justice are instituted in virtue of a certain sort of choice we can exercise in thinking rationally together about the fundamental principles of society. If we do this in a certain specified way, in which we impose a sort of “veil” of thought upon ourselves, so that we are ignorant of what we are like as individuals and what particular spot in society we occupy, we will settle on two principles of justice in particular. What these are doesn’t matter for our purposes here; what matter is Rawls’s view that these principles really do exist in the world just in virtue of being the objects of our willing and choice (provided we choose under the proper circumstances). There are no principles of justice as constituents of the world prior to and independent of our working these principles out through deliberating about them as moral agents.

What can constructivists say about the two problems for ethical value with which we began? For the most part, their responses will look similar to those of the realist. At
least the sort of constructivists who focus on our *rationality* as the basis for “constructing” ethical values will insist that the values so constructed hold for all human beings, insofar as we are rational. That is to say, there will be facts about ethical values, and some people will get those facts right, and others wrong. Just as the realist insists, the fact that there is disagreement doesn’t begin to show that there aren’t facts of the matter. It’s just that the constructivists’ story about how those facts *are* facts will differ from the stories offered by realists, in that they will include a crucial role for human rationality.

The way those stories differ matters for the second question, how we can make sense of things like ethical values even though science leaves them out of its picture of the world. If constructivism is right, these values are in the world in part because of the operation of our rational capacities, and the study of those capacities, *as rational*, is not the subject of the empirical sciences. Instead, the empirical sciences *depend* in part on those very capacities, as scientists weigh evidence, compare the comparative satisfaction of different explanations for events and processes, adjudicate between competing theories, and so on. Here scientists, like other people, are using their rational capacities to make inferences and draw conclusions. This is one sort of operation of our rational capacities that isn’t itself an object of empirical study (though related things like, say, what our brain is doing when we conduct these operations might be). So the constructivist would insist that it is not the case that all there is in the world is what scientists study.

Constructivism has attracted much attention in recent years, but really it is only a particular version of a way of thinking about ethical value as a kind of property things in the world can have, but only in virtue of our being in the world. The way that some have proposed we think about value as part of the world is on the model of the way we can think of colors as being part of the world. That is, we know that the yellow of a banana (say) is not *simply* a property of the banana. Creatures without the sort of color vision we possess will not see the banana as yellow, nor will we except under normal lighting conditions. The banana’s yellowness is what John Locke called a *secondary quality*, in that this property it has doesn’t depend on just features of the banana itself but also on our sensibilities. The project of construing ethical values on a similar model seems to “split the difference” between realist and irrealist camps. On the one hand, on the “response-dependence” model (as this approach is called, since on it the properties in question depend for their existence and nature on our responses to the world) insists with the realist that ethical values really are part of the world. The badness of slavery is really a feature of the world, just as is the yellowness of the banana. But on the other hand the response-dependence theorist agrees with the irrealist that these values are not somehow *already* out in the world, waiting for us to encounter them. If that is what we take ethical values to be, our attempts to find them will fail. The response-dependent theorist will claim that this approach thus benefits from the virtues of each approach, while the critic may complain that it is vulnerable to the problems which beset both! But, as constructivism illustrates, it
Another promising path to explore in understanding how ethical value could be part of our world, and what it might be like.

Further reading

The earliest, and perhaps still the strongest and starkest, version of realism about ethical values may be found in Plato’s Republic (available in many translations, collections, and online). G.E. Moore’s modern version of non-naturalist realism may be found in his Principia Ethica (Cambridge University Press, 1903); a later exponent of a similar view is in W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Ethical naturalism is defended, more recently, by Philippa Foot in her Natural Goodness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); a similar approach may be found in Rosalind Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999). A succinct formulation of the second variety of ethical naturalism may be found in a paper by Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” in Philosophical Review vol. 95 (1986), pp. 163-207; a more extensive defense in David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Irrealism’s greatest historical spokesman is David Hume, who, in A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), set out the case for seeing values as projections of our sentiments in a way that philosophers have been adopting and refining since. Exemplary contemporary versions of this approach may be found in Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), and in a collection of essays in which Simon Blackburn has developed his own version of projectivism, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford University Press, 1993).


Kant’s best-known work on ethical value, and the one in which many of the ideas discussed here are prominent, is his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (many editions). Also, his Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1956), develops many of these ideas further, and sometimes in ways differing from the Groundwork. An excellent development of Kant’s ideas along the lines suggested here may be found in Christine Korsgaard’s Sources of Normativity (Cambridge, 1996). Korsgaard has a lucid exposition of constructivism about ethical value in her paper, “Realism and

Rawls’ constructivism is developed in *A Theory of Justice* (Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999), and in a series of followup papers, among which the best on this point may be “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory” and “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” both in *John Rawls: Collected Papers*, ed. Freeman (Harvard University Press, 1999). The point that normative entities like ethical values are found not only in morality but also in science itself is made by Jean Hampton, in *The Authority of Reason* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998).