LOOKING BACKWARD TO MOVE FORWARD: LEGITIMATION AND AUTHORITARIAN ORIGINS IN EAST ASIA

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Abstract

Having a 'title to govern' is critical for regime survival. Authoritarian rulers have also attempted to legitimise themselves as justified rulers. Numerous case studies have examined rulers' collective efforts to explain their right to govern (legitimacy claims, or legitimation). This thesis tries to examine how the ruler's seizure of power shapes legitimation capacity in order to gain a thorough grasp of the relationship between legitimation and regime resilience. Using comparative historical case studies of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, this project argues that regimes with indigenous political origins have institutional legacies that are advantageous for engineering legitimation claims, such as strong sub-party organs, effective military and security section control, and collective social norms among political elites during violent revolution. By contrast, an externally imposed political origin lacks these institutional benefits. When rulers face regime crises, these two distinct legitimation claim mechanisms help explain regime resilience or failure. This thesis contributes to the burgeoning literature on authoritarian legitimacy and resilience, and it also expands our understanding of political changes in divergent post-communist countries throughout East Asia.

Statement of Original Authorship

I hereby certify that the submitted work is my own work, was completed while registered as a candidate for the degree stated on the Title Page, and I have not obtained a degree elsewhere on the basis of the research presented in this submitted work

Acknowledgement

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Finally, this study examines the authoritarian regime’s resilience and rulers’ legitimacy. Social science is defined as the study of social phenomena with the goal to comprehend and explain them. However, researchers frequently lose out on individual ‘people’ voices during this procedure. This study is dedicated to all ‘ordinary people’ who have been victimised by authoritarian regimes in Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea.

Chapter 1 - The Political Origin of Authoritarian Resilience

Even the earliest traces of recorded history attest that authoritarian states have always sought to frame their origin in a way that legitimates their rule. Contemporary leaders draw upon and shape the legacies of founding heroes or events. However, although they may censor or manipulate history, they are also enabled or constrained by the historical material available to them. The collective efforts of a ruler to justify their title to rule is defined as *legitimation*, and every ruler has their own core legitimation mode – which is usually supplemented by elements of others, including nationalism or economic prosperity. When a ruler is faced with a legitimacy crisis, such as befell the USSR during the early 1990s, the ruler seeks to adapt their legitimation formula to preserve regime resilience. Some regimes have failed in their attempts at transitioning their legitimation claims, whereas others have succeeded. The following research questions can be raised at this point. Why were some communist countries successful in establishing regime legitimacy while others were not? What is the source of this disparity of legitimation capacity, and can that disparity be generalised as a theoretical model? Finally, is the explanation of this variation in legitimation capacity applicable to authoritarian state systems other than one-party communist authoritarianism?

Focusing on one-party communist systems, this dissertation hypothesises that the origins of political systems structure the legitimation claims that a regime can make far into the future, influence their ability to justify their rule, and thereby have a bearing on their resilience. This research focuses on finding the relationship between the origin of the regime and the capacity of legitimation claims; in other words, how the origins of a regime structured and shaped the capacity of later rulers' legitimation claims over time. Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea are chosen for the comparative case study as an exploratory-diverse case selection strategy. Delving through the comparative case study, this dissertation argues that, *ceteris paribus*, when a communist regime has more indigenous origins (such as when it came to power in a domestic insurgency or movement), the ruler's options to justify its rule – i.e. the legitimation claim – are more diverse because regime had more advantageous institutional legacies from the origin. Such regimes have shown more resilience, even when facing regime crises. However, when a communist regime was imposed by an outside power (e.g. the Soviet Union-backed government of communist Mongolia), the regime's ability to use its origins as material for legitimation claims is more limited, and the local leadership's role is primarily in

the struggle. The collapse of the USSR offered a natural experiment by which to assess the three cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, each of which pursued different pathways of regime survival.

Although the focus of the project is on communist regimes, the argument has more general applicability to other types of authoritarian regimes. The subject of this dissertation has not been addressed much in the literature of comparative politics and authoritarian institutionalism, although it has important implications regarding the resilience system of authoritarian regimes around the world, linking how such regimes seize power and the importance of their rulers' legitimation claims. The share of the world population living in autocracies in 2010 was 48 per cent, but it increased to 68 per cent in 2020, and approximately 34 per cent of the world's population live in autocratising countries as of 2020 (Hellmeier *et al.*, 2021). Thus, the influence of authoritarian regimes is not limited to their own territories, but also extends internationally. For example, the influence of authoritarian regimes in the field of human rights, war, peace and international law has arguably accelerated. Nevertheless, we know little about the resonance of authoritarian legitimation claims and their impacts on regime resilience.

This chapter is structured as follows: first, it reviews the dissertation's argument about the relationship between the origins of a regime and its legitimation capacity, and how it matters for the regime resilience. The empirical strategy for the dissertation will be presented in the following section, which will include qualitative text analysis of legitimation claims and archival work. This section briefly reviews different types of communist party regime origins and differentiated regime durations using all communist regime cases throughout history. Next, the selection of cases and responses to the suggested selection bias were discussed. The final section proposes this research's contribution to the comparative authoritarianism and legitimation literature, and the chapter preview of the dissertation will follow.

The Argument

This dissertation argues that authoritarian regimes with indigenous political origins have institutional legacies that are advantageous for engineering legitimation claims, including sub-party organs, effective military and security section control, and collective social norms among political elites following violent revolutions. They also have a wider variety of narrative options from which to choose as they seek to legitimate their rule. An externally imposed political origin, in contrast, lacks these institutional advantages or narrative options. In short,

the diverse legitimation capacity of the rulers is shaped by their political origin. This argument provides a convincing explanation for why some regimes have a higher legitimation capability than others; that is, when rulers encounter a regime crisis, these two legitimation mechanisms explain how their regimes endure or fail.

Why do political origins matter for regime resilience? If we look to the authoritarian resilience literature, the institutional origin of political parties helps determine whether the regime has a strong ruling party, and this strong ruling party has been recognised as a critical factor in the regime's survival (Smith, 2005). Revolutionary regimes have institutional advantages after seizing power in the regime-building phase (Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020; Levitsky and Way, 2012). On the other hand, the rulers' collective efforts to defend their right to rule and gain legitimacy from the populace are essential for the regime's resilience (Gerschewski, 2013; Kailitz, 2013; Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017; von Haldenwang, 2017). However, the existing literature does not completely analyse the missing link between the institutional framework in the regime's origins and the ruler's capacity for justifying legitimacy. The institutionalists tend to focus on the former, whereas the legitimation scholars tend to focus on the latter. This dissertation aims to combine insights from both by asking what the foundation of the legitimation capacity is, and whether the difference of legitimation capacity can be explained as a theoretical model.

My theory explains these different outcomes through two mechanisms. Political origin is classified into three types: indigenous, external imposition, and mixed.[1] As I explain in Chapter 3, the first, which I label *autonomous legitimation mechanism*, elaborates how institutional legacies from indigenous political origins enhance the ruler's legitimation capacity. The second, the *manufactured legitimation mechanism*, indicates that imposed political leadership simply follows the external power's agendas under conditions of institutional frailty. As a result, citizens' belief in such regimes' legitimacy is likely to be lower than in indigenous origin regimes, due in part to the leadership's diminished political autonomy over time. In regimes with a mixed political origin (i.e. split between indigenous and external imposition), the local leadership shapes the legitimation mechanism. Thus, the legitimation capacity of a regime with mixed political origin depends on the contextualisation of the regime. For example, if the regime were initiated as an externally imposed regime, it could change its legitimation mechanism toward more autonomous legitimation, boosting specific narratives for its legitimation claims.

[1] For more detailed theoretical debate on the political origin criteria and mechanisms, see Chapter 3.

First, in the case of an autonomous legitimation mechanism with an indigenous political origin regime, the ruling party has greater political autonomy and more effectively binds sub-party organs (especially in the case of communist party apparatuses). These multiple layered sub-party organs are generally established during the violent revolution and the process of power consolidation in the state-building. As a result, they function as an effective ruler's messaging vehicle to permeate the society with legitimation claims. Effectively managing the military and security section is critical to the authoritarian regime survival. During a violent revolution of indigenous political origin, the ruler easily monopolises the state apparatus of violence to prevent military coups and suppress dissenting groups. The political landscape provided by the monopoly of state violence grants the rulers autonomy to manipulate various collective narratives for their legitimation claims.

Furthermore, the experience of violent revolution produces shared social norms and collective memory that the ruler manipulates as the source of legitimation. These combinations of institutional legacies of indigenous political origin give rise to such rulers' greater legitimation capacity, and such rulers are more likely to demonstrate diverse types of legitimation claims. When a crisis challenges the regime's existing legitimation claims, the rulers demonstrate successful legitimation formula reconfiguration by showing the regime resilience. For instance, nationalistic discourse in Vietnam and North Korea can be traced back to the anti-imperialist armed struggle in the early regime-building. These usable memories have been deployed as rhetorical options in the legitimation claims of the rulers to continue to recall and justify their entitlement to rule in the last several decades.

Second, the manufactured legitimation mechanism illustrates how an externally imposed regime relies on external powers to justify its regime legitimacy. The externally imposed position of the regime origin undermines the legitimacy of the local leadership. Interest asymmetry among external power, imposed political leader, and targeted populace erodes the ruler's political autonomy. The absence of institutional legacies and higher reliance on the military and security sections under foreign control (e.g. Moscow and the Red Army in the communist party regime examples) create circumstances of dependency regarding legitimation claim. For instance, most Eastern bloc communist regimes followed Moscow's legitimation claims strategy, and were therefore captive to a legitimation formula they did not control.

In short, I argue that, *ceteris paribus*, communist party states with indigenous origins have greater capacity and wider latitude to establish legitimation claims; thus, they should exhibit higher levels of regime resilience. More specifically, communist regime resilience

should depend on the combinations of the regime's origin, rulers' range of options to choose legitimation claims, and intensity of the legitimation claims that reverberate toward the society.

Finally, we ask: is the explanation of this variation in legitimation capacity applicable to authoritarian state systems other than single-party communist authoritarianism? For this generalisability question, I propose evidence from the examination of all communist regimes and descriptive statistics of autocratic ruling party regime data in the conclusion chapter. Other communist regimes and authoritarian ruling party regimes support my theory by demonstrating that indigenous political origin regimes predict longer regime duration relative to external imposition cases.

Methodology and Case Selection

To find evidence for these arguments, this dissertation follows various qualitative research methods. It utilises qualitative text analysis using computer-aided data analysis and archival work. Especially for capturing the options of legitimation claims from which a ruler can choose to aid in regime resilience, the text corpus of legitimation claims are examined using thematic coding of legitimation claims. In addition, to address the capacity of legitimation claims, archival work is conducted with the media data for each case to capture the political landscape. This sub-section will examine the limitations and challenges of research methods in the legitimation claim literature and suggest a detailed research method for this dissertation. Finally, it will discuss the rationale for selecting the cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea to explain autonomous and manufactured legitimation mechanisms and selection bias.

The various challenges of research under authoritarian settings are well known. These include preference falsification and (self-) censorship as well as difficulties in obtaining reliable data (Gerschewski, 2018). To deal with these challenges, this research follows methodological approximation toward capturing legitimacy in authoritarian regimes, utilising the suggestions of Gerschewski (2018). Capturing official claims is a crucial part of understanding how the rulers legitimate their rule, and qualitative fieldwork – particularly archival work – would be worthwhile for examining the level of legitimacy belief among the ruled as well as the degree of claims' resonance within society. The dissertation also considers expanding into various secondary literature on official and popular memories from myriads of narratives, transmitted in many different media, from school textbooks and monuments to public ceremonies to commemorate important past events. This is appropriate because legitimacy belief can be seen as the realisation of the 'historically formed repertoire of cultural

forms and themes' (Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b, p. 23). In doing so, the contextualised analysis between these two sides (i.e. the ruler and the ruled) would reveal systematically how the communist regime origin affects the options available to the ruler for legitimation claims, and to what extent this impact would influence the various outcomes of regime resilience or collapse.

For the data gathering strategy, I conducted historical archival work and qualitative text analysis of the representative text corpus, including official party statements, New Year's addresses, editorial sessions of the ruler and official government documents. For example, in the case of North Korea, New Year's addresses include both retrospective and prospective claims about the regime (Park, Park and Jo, 2015). Among various formats of text corpus for legitimation claims, North Korea's New Year's addresses are a consistent data format with continuity reaching all the way back to the Kim Il-sung era. For this reason, New Year's addresses would serve as a methodical approximation of official claims of legitimacy in autocracies (Gerschewski, 2018). Text analysis of these documents are conducted by NVivo for the transparency of the coding scheme and the reliability of the process for the interpretation of findings. For the triangulation of data on the reverberation of legitimation claims into society, other supplementary datasets (e.g. V-Dem data and Asian Barometer) would be conducted in some cases. The next sub-sections explain how thematic coding of legitimation claims aids in understanding legitimation capacity.

Thematic Coding of Legitimation Claims and Understanding of Legitimation Capacity

Statements containing legitimation claims have been reflected in various type of official documents, including New Year's addresses, communist party political reports, and resolutions or editorials issued by communist party organs. Qualitative text analysis of official claims would serve as a methodological approximation for measuring rulers' legitimation claims, because they reflect rulers' collective efforts to justify their rulership. Thematic coding analysis is a useful qualitative research approach to examine the patterns in the data, adopting a semantic view of the text that evaluates the surface meaning of the data (Braun *et al.*, 2019). Similarly, this method has a practical aspect in terms of providing greater measurement efficiency for latent meaning than a coding way of manifest characteristics (Woodrum, 1984).

To analyse the text corpus of legitimation claims, this dissertation classified them into six types based on Von Soest and Grauvogel (2016, p. 20):

1) *Foundational myths*, which refer to historical accounts used to justify their rules, including wars, revolutions, and independence movements;

2) *Ideology*, which asserts a specific belief system for teleological proclamation;
3) *Personalism*, which emphasises exceptional personality; thus, analysing the position and specific description of the ruler is part of this claim;
4) *Performance* claims, which demonstrate how the regime met citizens' demands by demonstrating welfare, security, and economic proxies;
5) *International engagement* claims, which demonstrate how the regime performed successfully in the international arenas as a means of leveraging domestic politics. For instance, the ruler could use their leading role in national unification, treaties or the UN to justify their rule to a domestic audience; and
6) *Procedure* claims, which represent an adaptation of democratic institutions, including multiparty elections and legislature.

Not only legitimation claims, but also legitimation capacity, are important concepts for capturing how a ruler's claims penetrate society and to what extent the common people and elites believe a ruler's claims. Conceptually, legitimation capacity may be defined as existing on a spectrum of higher and lower degrees; this division depends on the legitimation belief among the people and elite groups and a range of options to choose among the types of legitimation claims. To capture this difference, this dissertation examines the degree of support for the regime as well as cohesion vs. fragmentation among the elites, using various forms of qualitative evidence, including archival work. Thus, concepts, attributions and indicators of legitimation claims and capacity would be summarised as in *Table 1* below.

Table 1. Concepts, Attributes and Indicators of Legitimation Claims and Capacity

Concepts		Attributes	Indicator examples
Legitimation claims	Foundational myth	Historical accounts	War, revolution, independence movement
	Ideology	Teleological proclamation	Belief system
	Personalism	Extraordinary personality	Position, specific description
	Performance	Satisfying citizens' needs	Welfare, security, economic proxies
	International engagement	Role in international arenas as leverage of domestic politics	Unification, treaties, the UN
	Procedures	Adopting democratic institutions	Multiparty elections, legislature
Legitimation capacity	Higher capacity	High legitimation belief, reshaping / fostering legitimation claims	High support rate of regime, elite cohesion, more option to choose legitimation claims
	Lower capacity	Low legitimation belief, failure of reshaping / fostering legitimation claims	Low support rate of regime, elite fragmentation, less option to choose legitimation claims

Source: Author

It could be argued that a higher legitimation capacity indicates a higher support rate among the regime as well as strong elite cohesion, whereas a lower legitimation capacity will be

associated with the inverses of those respective outcomes. More detailed steps of thematic coding analysis are explained in the Appendix.

Archival Work and Expert Survey Data on Legitimacy

Secondary historical research has long been recognised as a useful resource for political scientists, although, inevitably, debates persist between the schools of history and political science regarding how to approach historical records, the objectivity of interference, and the role of researcher in interpreting materials (Lustick, 1996; Elman and Elman, 2001). It is also reasonable to state that 'the conventional wisdom in both history and political science that all empirical observations are filtered through *a priori* mental frameworks, that all facts are "theory[-]laden"' (Levy, 2001, p. 51). Nevertheless, historical research can provide political scientists with the foundation to carefully trace processes and outcomes of socio-political phenomena.

Mindful of the above discussion, this research followed the methodological recommendations of historical institutionalism and qualitative research method literature for avoiding selection bias (Lustick, 1996; Collier and Mahoney, 1996; Goldthorpe, 1991; Hammersley, 1997). To minimise the selection bias of historical accounts in archival work, this research did not rely exclusively on individual historians' or autobiographical accounts – although, at some points, autobiographies were used to scrutinise rulers' legitimation claims. Therefore, this research did not include rulers' autobiographies in the historical narratives of the cases, although they were used as evidence for specific objective for legitimation claims. Triangulation of historical resources is another approach to reduce potential bias (Thies, 2002); thus, this research examined sources from multiple historians using the same historiographical tradition, or from historians working with different traditions for the description of communist party origins in the early stage of state-building in the cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea.

To assess legitimation capacity and to what extent the legitimation claim actually reverberated to the society, it is necessary to analyse legitimacy belief among the people. Ironically, beyond the archival work of support rate of the regime, the qualitative interview research or fieldwork for legitimation belief under authoritarian countries is a highly constrained activity, not only for the researchers but also for the interviewees (Gerschewski, 2018). Qualitative researchers are challenged by ethical issues of fieldwork, including consent of interviewees, the privacy of interviewees in authoritarian regime settings, preservation of fieldwork data, and dealing with trauma (Clark, 2006; Mosley, 2013; Loyle and Simoni, 2017).

Therefore, this research will use V-Dem data on expert survey data of legitimacy and Asian Barometer for testing regime trust; these data will be a methodological approximation for nuanced responses about legitimation belief among the people.[2] Furthermore, evidence from the legitimation text corpus was analysed by NVivo to obtain transparency and consistency of coding outcomes. This research carefully examined these challenges to ensure research integrity.

Case Selection

The issue of case selection is crucial to this qualitative analysis of the legitimation process; Gerring (2017, p. 21) emphasised the importance of case selection rationale in the broader population of theoretical interest. Among various case selection strategies, this dissertation follows an exploratory–diverse case selection strategy. It identifies causal hypothesis of interest, and the causal factors of theoretical interest are included in the background factor for determining whether the causal factor for theoretical interest has a positive, negative or no relationship to the outcome (Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016). This dissertation selects the three cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, using the political origin of each regime as the causative factor to explain variations in later rulers' legitimation capacity and, as a result, in regime resilience. Other background factors include repression, co-optation, and revolutionary independence legacies, all of which serve as the consensus of authoritarian regime durability (Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020; Gerschewski, 2013). This sub-section explains why these diverse cases were chosen for this exploratory study.

Several principles guided my choice of cases. Among various types of authoritarian rule, the one-party regime has indicated long regime durability (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010); thus, analysing communist party regime as an illustration of authoritarian regime resilience would be an apt approach, given the predominance of one-party systems among communist regimes. To analyse the variance of origins of the communist party, it is necessary to specify criteria for defining categories of the difference. In the dissertation, the origins of a communist party regime are defined in three different categories: *indigenous*, *external imposition* and *mixed*. There are many different criteria used in defining regime origin (Levitsky and Way, 2013; Smith, 2005), but this dissertation adopts three main criteria: (1) the existence of communist mass mobilisation from below; (2) the role of charismatic local leadership; and (3)

[2] Most of the data collection for this dissertation occurred during the COVID-19 crisis. In an ideal world, the semi-structured interview with the inhabitants of each case country would be conducted offline. However, due to new research ethics with respect to COVID-19, the study was compelled to change its data gathering strategy.

the degree of interference by the USSR, especially the activities of the Red Army, in the early stage of state-building.

Of course, the division of communist party regime origin may be hard to distinguish, especially in *mixed* cases. More importantly, it may be stated that, historically, most communist regimes were influenced by the Soviet Union to some extent. However, in this dissertation, when it comes to the ruling party's seizure of power in the early state-building stage, most evidently imposing the communist party regime by externality of the power (the Red Army of the Soviet Union) regards as the case of external imposition.

Table 2. Communist Regime Durations and Origins

Continent	Country	Regime start	Regime end	Duration	Regime origin
Europe	Soviet Union	1922	1991	69	Indigenous
Asia	Mongolia	1921	1989	68	External imposition
Asia	North Korea	1948	N/A	72	Mixed
Asia	China	1949	N/A	71	Indigenous
Asia	Vietnam	1954	N/A	66	Indigenous
America	Cuba	1959	N/A	61	Indigenous
Asia	Laos	1975	N/A	45	Mixed
Europe	Albania	1946	1991	45	External imposition
Europe	Bulgaria	1946	1989	43	External imposition
Europe	Poland	1948	1988	40	External imposition
Europe	Yugoslavia	1945	1989	44	Indigenous
Europe	Romania	1947	1989	42	External imposition
Europe	Hungary	1946	1989	43	External imposition
Europe	East Germany	1946	1990	44	External imposition
Europe	Czechoslovakia	1947	1989	42	External imposition
Africa	Congo-Brz	1969	1991	22	Mixed
Africa	South Yemen	1967	1990	23	Mixed
Africa	Ethiopia	1979	1992	13	Indigenous
Africa	Angola	1975	1991	16	Mixed
Africa	Mozambique	1975	1993	18	Mixed
America	Nicaragua	1979	1983	4	Mixed
Asia	Cambodia	1975	1978	3	Indigenous

	Average regime duration (years)	Average regime duration after 1980 (years)
Indigenous	46.71	21.42
External imposition	45.87	9.25
Mixed	28.57	18.28

Source: Coding by author based on multiple sources (Holmes, 1997; Dimitrov, 2013a; Applebaum, 2012; Miller, 2019).
Note: Highlighted countries are cases of the dissertation. Regime duration was calculated as of 2020. 'N/A' indicates that the regime has not ended as of 2020.

Based on the criteria of communist regime origins, we can explore the relationship between the origins of each communist party's path to power and each communist party state's regime duration. Diagnostically, an analysis of specific descriptive statistics is necessary to examine the relationship between the appearance of the one-party communist regime and the permanence of the regime. The descriptive statistics of communist party states' regime

longevity, adopting these criteria of the communist party origins, show that indigenous communist party states tend to achieve longer regime durations compared to the other two categories (see *Table 2*).

Table 2 shows a list of all the world's communist regimes as well as their respective durations and party origin (i.e. indigenous, external imposition, and mixed). Chapter 3 will elaborate further on these categories, but this table helps understand how long-lived indigenous communist party regimes can be and how the external imposition regime route proved to be brittle when the external power (i.e. the Soviet Union) ultimately crumbled. Four of the six longest-lived communist regimes have indigenous origins by this coding, three of which – China, Vietnam, and Cuba – are still in power. The two other contemporary communist regimes – North Korea and Laos – are coded as mixed. No communist regime that was externally imposed survives today.

Cases of external imposition – for instance, the Eastern European bloc, which was a group of Soviet-imposed communist regimes – showed shorter regime lifespans. Fixing the year after 1980 (i.e. the August founding of Solidarity in Poland) when the precursor of the collapse of the USSR greatly increases the disparity in average regime lifespan between indigenous and externally imposed communist parties. In short, there appears to be a correlation between the origins of communist regimes and their longevity.

Again, it is necessary to emphasise that regime duration is conceptually distinct from regime durability (or resilience). Because durability is composed of duration (temporal length) and stability (constant outcome), duration alone is not the best measure of regime durability (Grzymala-Busse, 2011). However, as Dimitrov (2013a, p. 14) demonstrates via the stages of institutional development in communist regimes,[3] delving into the institutional features of the regimes in descriptive terms provides certain empirical premises for the theoretical argument of the dissertation. Thus, this dissertation will build on that insight and explore this relationship by focusing on the nexus of each communist party's historical origins and subsequent legitimation of the regime.

As mentioned before, communist party regimes can be seen as a type of one-party authoritarian regime. Based on the descriptive statistics above, as well as prior quantitative

[3] He qualitatively coded the fifteen communist regime cases according to four stages in the life cycle of communist regimes: a) establishment, b) consolidation, c) mutation, and d) collapse. For detailed information, see Dimitrov, M. K. (2013a) 'Understanding Communist Collapse and Resilience', in Dimitrov, M.K. (ed.) *Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3–39.

findings in the existing literature (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007), it is observed that, on the one hand, the one-party state is an effective format for regime longevity. Among various settings of one-party states, communist party regimes display relative stability regarding regime durability and resilience (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). On the other hand, the nature of each communist party's origin is a strong predictor for regime duration. Those with indigenous origins – which have mass mobilisation from below, charismatic local leadership, and less interference by the USSR in the early stage of state-building – appear more resilient than communist parties with externally imposed origins, even after the collapse of the USSR. It is a common observation that non-imposed communist regimes proved more resilient when the regime faced crises, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union (Brown, 2010). This dissertation helps advance our understanding of why indigenous communist party regimes are more resilient than externally imposed regimes, delving into the relationship between the regime origins and the capacity of legitimation by the rulers when they faced with regime crisis. Although this dissertation focuses on communist party regimes as a type of single-party authoritarianism, it has broader relevance for the study of authoritarian politics in general.

I chose cases that reflect the difference of regimes' political origins and diverse political outcomes to explain the differences in legitimation mechanisms. *Figure 1* demonstrates the difference in the regime duration by communist regime origin. Each regime had a different regime duration, although the differences are not so striking in terms of overall lifespan. However, after applying a cut-off at 1985 – when the USSR introduced political reformation (*Perestroika*) and was challenged by a legitimacy crisis in the world communism rule – the difference in regime duration by political origin shows a critical difference. Based on this descriptive figure, we could infer that, at first, among various explanatory factors, political origins may matter for regime duration. I sought variation in the different political origins in my cases. As a typical case of each category of communist regime origins, Vietnam and North Korea are surviving examples of indigenous and mixed cases, respectively, and Mongolia has the longest regime duration among external imposition cases. Explicitly, Mongolia manifests as an exception to the rule that external political origin drives lower legitimation claim capacity. Despite its relatively long regime duration as the first communist republic to emerge after the Soviet Union, it was indeed fragile when the Mongolian ruler faced a legitimacy crisis following *Perestroika* beginning in 1985. Thus, these cases are selected as the exploratory–diverse case section strategy to build a theoretical explanation of mechanisms between regime origins and legitimation capacity.



Figure 1. Regime Duration by Communist Regime Origins
Source: Author
Note: Asterisks (*) indicate surviving communist regimes. The regimes that collapsed before 1985 are omitted.

My theory descriptively predicts most cases of communist regimes in history regarding regime origins and survivability when faced with crisis. Thus, it can be inferred that specific socio-political mechanisms derived from regime origin (indigenous, external imposition, and mixed origins) explain the differences in regime duration and resilience when facing a crisis. I theorise that a regime's political origins shape the legitimacy capacity of later rulers via the mechanisms of *indigenous* and *manufactured legitimation*.

Vietnam's communist party is defined as having an indigenous origin. The early state-building history of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) involved a series of episodes of national independence as well as a unification movement, and the history of Vietnam's state-building meets the criteria for an indigenous origin of its communist party regime. These include communist mass mobilisation from below (the *Việt Minh*) and the charismatic local leadership of Hồ Chí Minh for a war of liberation against France and, later, the US (Le Hong, 2012; Vu, 2016). Also, the USSR had relatively less interference in Vietnam in its early stage of state-building, compared to other cases, such as the USSR's many satellite states in Eastern Europe.

However, the state-building process of Mongolia followed a different path from that of Vietnam. [4] The communist movement in Mongolia originated from the independence movement against the Chinese Qing dynasty in 1911. During the Russian Civil War, which followed Russia's 1917 October Revolution, the White Russian Lieutenant-General Baron Ungern led his troops into Mongolia in October 1920. The Bolshevik Red Army responded by backing the establishment of a new Mongolian army under the auspices of Mongolia's communist party (which at the time was a minority within the Mongolian government), with whom the Bolsheviks launched a joint operation to declare Mongolia's independence from China on 11 July 1921 (Dillon, 2019).

In the history of early state-building of Mongolia, there is little evidence of communist mass mobilisation from below like what was later seen in Vietnam. The communist activities in Mongolia after independence from the Qing dynasty were carried out in a top-down manner by a small number of activists supported by the Soviet Red Army, rather than on the communist alliance front of the mass movement on a domestic level. For this reason, although Damdin Sükhbaatar was regarded as a foundational leader of national independence, he passed away in the early stage of state-building. Khorloogiin Choibalsan, his successor, played second fiddle to the USSR in Mongolia's achievement of independence. In general, the role of local leadership for state-building in Mongolia was limited (Heo, 2016).

Under the connivance of the Soviet Union, during the rule of Khorloogiin Choibalsan – as in the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule – Mongolian society experienced a socialist revolution, including the imposition of collective farming and the purging of religious forces. The process resulted in a large number of political victims. Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, the next leader of the Mongolian People's Republic, was at the pinnacle of power for 32 years due to social and economic connections to the USSR. Thus, Mongolia was regarded as 'the prototype satellite of the infant Soviet Union' (Dillon, 2019, p. 6).[5]

North Korea, unlike Mongolia's external imposition case, had mass mobilisation from below. For example, there were various communist movements in Korea which included rival factions such as the Soviet faction, the Yan'an faction, the Manchuria faction, and the South Korea faction (Suh, 1967; Suh, 1988). Kim Il-sung's Manchuria faction incentivised public support in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, and due to the intervention of the Soviet

[4] The primary focus of the dissertation is the state in the Outer Mongolia created in 1911, which encompasses the present-day territory of Mongolia (formerly the Mongolian People's Republic).
[5] The phase of 'satellite' relationship with the Soviet Union was first mentioned by Lattimore, O. (2018 [1962]) *Nomads and Commissars: Mongolia Revisited.* Auckland: Pickle Partners Publishing.

Union in appointing local leadership, Kim Il-sung smoothly secured the leading role in Korean's communist state-building, rather than Park Hon-young's South Korea faction. The Soviet Union may have put its thumb on the scales, so to speak, but it did not impose communism singlehandedly.

The role of Kim Il-sung's charismatic local leadership was elaborated throughout his indigenous assertation syncretised in his *Juche* ideology, which included the legacy of anti-Japanese and anti-colonial movements. Along with Kim Il-sung's local leadership, it was clear that the Soviet Union endorsed his leadership of the communist movement in the northern side of the Korean Peninsula among various factions of communist groups (Scalapino and Lee, 1972). Compared to the Vietnam case, the USSR interfered more in North Korea's domestic affairs in the stage of state-building – but less so than is cases where Moscow installed communist party rule in East Europe and Mongolia. Thus, the communist party regime of North Korea is categorised as having a mixed origin. These different criteria on regime cases of communist party origins used in the dissertation may be summarised as in *Table 3*.

Table 3. Criteria for Political Origins of Selected Cases

Case	Origins	Mass mobilisation	Local leadership	Red Army
Vietnam	Indigenous	Yes	Yes	Least
Mongolia	External imposition	No	No (appointed)	Most
North Korea	Mixed	Yes	No (appointed)	Some extent

Source: Author

This dissertation, therefore, focuses on a subclass of the general phenomenon of one-party authoritarian states for contingent generalisation of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea among the East Asian context of communist party regimes.[6] By analysing different origins of communist party regimes, this study will examine how these different cases structured and shaped the capacity of legitimation claims of later rulers. Consequently, to what extent this difference influenced the differentiated track record of each regime after the collapse of the Soviet will be followed. For example, following questions will be discussed: (1) how the CPV changed its legitimation claim mode from ideological mixture of socialism-nationalism to performance, so-called 'responsive' regime after national unification and *Đổi Mới* policy; (2)

[6] Vietnam is geographically categorised as Southeast Asia. However, China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam are included East Asian cultural sphere when grouped under the sociocultural category, not merely geographical features.

why Mongolia failed to reshape its legitimation claims and, by doing so, ultimately democratised after the collapse of the USSR; and (3) how North Korea secured its regime resilience by turning to ideological introversion and repression when the regime faced collective legitimacy challenges. The exploratory–diverse case selection case study is summarised in *Table 4*.

Table 4. Exploratory–Diverse Case Selection Strategy for Selected Cases

Case	Origin	Legitimation	Repression	Co-optation	Independence	Outcome
Vietnam	Indigenous	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	External imposition	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
North Korea	Mixed	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Author

Based on this comparative case study, the dissertation argues that the regime's origins matter for the ruler's legitimation claims for regime resilience. In other words, different communist party origins structured different institutional legacies toward how the rulers could legitimise their title to rule. By doing so, after the regime legitimacy crisis, for instance, the collapse of the USSR, differentiated regime origins showed different legitimation mode change strategies.

Indigenous communist party regimes tended to have more advantageous institutional legacies (i.e. more multi-layered sub-party organs, more control of military and security sections, and revolutionary social norms that included more usable collective memory). These advantageous institutional legacies shaped the *autonomous* legitimation mechanism; therefore, the indigenous nature of a regime's origin indicates a higher legitimation capacity, more cohesive elite cohesion and, ultimately, a more resilient regime. Externally imposed communist party regimes benefited less from such advantageous institutional legacies – thus, it is argued that externally imposed communist party regimes tended to be governed by the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism and, as a result, were more prone to collapse in the face of legitimacy crises.

Using Vietnam as an indigenous case and Mongolia as an external imposition case, this dissertation examines regime origin and ruler legitimation capacity. In terms of the threshold between indigenous and external imposition, the 'mixed' category could be positioned between autonomous and manufactured legitimation claims. Using North Korea's case, the dissertation examines the capacity of legitimation claims and how the mixed communist party regime has reshaped their mode of legitimation claims by tracing rulers' types of legitimation claims.

Addressing Selection Bias

This research, however, also carefully considered the issue of selection bias when the comparative cases were chosen. The problem is that social science bears little resemblance to the controlled environment of clinical trials. Specifically, this problem could manifest itself in at least three ways in the dissertation. One hazard has to do with why China and Russia (formerly the USSR) were not included in the research cases. These two cases are typical of indigenous communist regime origins and indicate different political pathways. It is possible, for example, to conduct paired-comparison research to understand differences in legitimation capacity and how the rulers justify their entitlement to rule when citizens' legitimacy demands have changed. However, because these two countries are so-called 'great power' states in international politics, dealing with China and Russia may require a different approach to understand their legitimation strategies, such as that found in the recent literature on authoritarian promotion and diffusion (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2020; Von Soest, 2015; Vanderhill, 2013). Studying smaller states allows us to better test the role of external imposition and mixed origins in particular.

Second, it remains how we understand legitimacy capacity of the unselected cases in the other communist party regime cases in the world, because analysis of the legitimation process has highly contextualised features. This issue is linked to the generalisability of the argument. In general, proper handling the scope of generalisation and generalisability should be clear in a comparative case study (George *et al.*, 2005; Gerring, 2007; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Leuffen, 2007). However, small-N case studies are based on the theory-driven comparative method, and these studies have a different approach to epistemological and methodological assumptions compared to the case selection process in large-N case studies (Ebbinghaus, 2005). George *et al.* (2005) suggest how to deal with this generalisation challenge in a case study:

> 'Case study researchers often move down the "ladder of generality" to contingent generalizations and the identification of more circumscribed scope conditions of a theory, rather than up toward broader but less precise generalizations' (George *et al.*, 2005, p. 77).

In a similar vein, this project follows the tradition of a theoretically informed case study, which applies a theoretical framework to specific cases to make sense (Gerring, 2004; Lijphart, 1971).

For this reason, this research follows the recommendation of contingent generalisation and provides implications for a snapshot of medium-N study of one-party communist regimes

around the world in the Conclusion chapter. This aims to prioritise the portability of argument over universal generalisability. In particular, using V-Dem data's expert survey on legitimation types, I traced how such authoritarian communist regimes showed different legitimation strategies depending on how each communist party regime originated. Similar to the selected cases, the indigenous communist party regimes showed more resilience in changing legitimation strategy – highlighting performance and ideology – whereas legitimation formulas failed in the external imposition cases following the collapse of the USSR.

Finally, regarding the generalisability of the argument, how we understand the relationship between regime origin and legitimacy capacity for the various authoritarian regime types remain. The dissertation aims to explain the relationship between how to seize power and legitimation capacity based on the different legitimation mechanisms (indigenous and manufactured). Thus, researching in-depth legitimation strategy analysis in all authoritarian cases with contextualisation may be impossible as a single monograph. Therefore, like the other communist party regimes, I provide a supplemental analysis of autocratic regime origins and regime duration in the Conclusion chapter based on the autocratic ruling parties dataset (Miller, 2019). Even though the analysis covers only political origins and regime duration, at first glance the descriptive figures – such as *Figure 1* – suggest that indigenous regime origin types (e.g. revolution and independence) tend to have longer duration than those with external origins (e.g. external imposition). Based on the descriptive analysis, beyond the covered case study of communist regimes in this dissertation, we can infer how advantageous institutional features from the indigenous political origin shape the legitimation capacity in other types of authoritarian regimes. The next section will put forward the contribution of the research and chapter preview.

Why It Matters

This dissertation makes several contributions to current understanding of autocratic regimes' political behaviour. Previous research has analysed political behaviours related to regime resilience of communist and post-communist countries in various ways (Dimitrov, 2013a; Armstrong, 2013; Gallagher and Hanson, 2013; Tismaneanu, 2013; Tsai, 2013). However, there is a lack of literature on explanations for regime resilience and failure of post-communist party regimes in East Asia using party origin and legitimation claim variables, even though both variables have been revealed as significant factors of regime resilience separately in the comparative authoritarianism literature (Smith, 2005; Levitsky and Way, 2013; Kailitz and

Stockemer, 2017). For this reason, this study attempts to explain the relationship between a regime's origins (i.e. a political party's seizure of power) and the regime's claims of legitimacy, which had previously been emphasised individually, and to make a comprehensive explanation of the resilience or failure of single-party communist regimes after the collapse of the USSR.

Concerning surviving communist regimes such as those in China, Cuba, North Korea, Laos and Vietnam, the literature focuses less on comparative perspectives of authoritarian institutionalism and legitimation. In terms of higher regime longevity, Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea cases are not thoroughly examined in the perspectives of comparative legitimation claims to explain regime resilience. It is not desirable to regard the long-term permanence of the Vietnamese and North Korean regimes as simple results, despite their having endured the regime crisis of weakening communist ideology and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is because, when assessing the ruling forms of the rest of the communist countries (except for great power states such as the former Soviet Union and China), the categories of indigenous, external imposition and mixed communist party regime origins matter for regime duration (Holmes, 1997; Applebaum, 2012). Thus, this project covers more on comparative perspectives of authoritarian institutionalism and legitimation in the East Asian context.

Notably, the literature on Vietnam mainly focuses on the tradition of communist revolution against external powers (primarily France and the US) and economic reformation with socioeconomic changes, and especially on how the regime successfully changed the mode of legitimation (Le Hong, 2012; London, 2014; Malesky, Schuler and Tran, 2011; Thayer, 2010; Vu, 2016; Abrami, Malesky and Zheng, 2013). In contrast, the literature on Mongolia emphasises the legacies it inherited as the so-called 'first Soviet satellite state', along with sovietisation of Mongolian society and how the regime managed a relatively smooth political transition to an emerging democracy in the post-communist era (Bilskie and Arnold, 2002; Dillon, 2019; Fish, 1998; Fish, 2001; Fritz, 2008; Ginsburg, 1995; Heaton, 1991; Khalid, 2017; Lattimore, 2018 [1962]; Pomfret, 2000). North Korea, on the other hand, has been treated as a hard case of an ideologically introverted state using a strong repression strategy to maintain regime resilience after the collapse of the USSR (Armstrong, 2013; Byman and Lind, 2010; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020). In this regard, this research would propose a more comprehensive comparative analysis study based on existing individual research achievements above.

Methodologically, this research emphasises conceptualisation and operationalisation of rulers' legitimation claims as well as their capacity as a reverberation into society. The previous generation of authoritarian regimes' legitimation claims provided theoretical explanations for

the concept of legitimacy as well as modes of authoritarian legitimation based on descriptive historical accounts (Beetham, 2013; Di Palma, 1991; Gerschewski, 2013; Mazepus *et al.*, 2016; von Haldenwang, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2016). Using qualitative text analysis and archival work, this research conducts an additional empirical approach based on previous conceptual and theoretical literature concerning legitimacy and authoritarian legitimation.[7] Therefore, this research may be summarised as seeking to offer a careful explanation of the relationship between communist party regime origins and legitimation capacity of later rulers, with a focus on the resilience of authoritarian regimes after the collapse of the USSR. In doing so, this research makes a number of definitional, theoretical, and methodological contributions to the fields of comparative authoritarianism and authoritarian institutionalism.

Chapter Preview

This dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2 begins with the literature review on authoritarian resilience, legitimation claims and communist party survival. During the literature review, various pre-existing explanations about authoritarian resilience are discussed, first showing how regime seizure the power in the early state-building stage is important for understanding authoritarian regime resilience. Furthermore, when the regime faced a legitimacy crisis, how the ruler claimed legitimation (i.e. justification of their entitlement to rule) helps determine regime resilience.

Chapter 3, the theory chapter of this dissertation, covers how this research conceives of institutional legacies deriving from each origin category of the communist party as well as the capacity of their respective legitimation claims. This research theorises that different legitimation mechanisms based on the differentiated types of communist party origins (i.e. *autonomous* legitimation for indigenous parties and *manufactured* legitimation for externally imposed parties). The differences between *autonomous* and *manufactured* legitimation mechanisms manifest in the difference among structures of sub-party organisations, effectiveness in military and security section controls as well as revolutionary social norms and usable memory in both elite groups and citizens in such regimes. Because of these advantageous institutional legacies of *autonomous* legitimation mechanism, the regime could

[7] I conducted this study after becoming familiar with the following references' methodological practices and considerations. For the qualitative text analysis, see Kuckartz, U. (2014) *Qualitative Text Analysis: A Guide to Methods, Practice and Using Software.* London: Sage. For the qualitative field research and archival approach, see Kapiszewski, D., MacLean, L. M. and Read, B. L. (2015) *Field Research in Political Science: Practices and Principles.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

indicate more resilient case, even when they are confronted by a regime crisis. However, many one-communist party regimes from history do not fit neatly within the dichotomous division. Thus, the mixed communist party regime case as a threshold between the indigenous and external imposition cases covers carefully. Mixed cases may be difficult to distinguish as building up one mechanism precisely. Using a two-by-two table of the degree of interference with the Soviet Union and the resonance of the legitimation among the citizen and the elite groups, this chapter explains how mixed-origin regimes' modes of legitimation may be positioned and reshaped.

In Chapter 4, the indigenous communist party regime is analysed using the Vietnam case. First, this chapter will examine how the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) was able to secure the regime before 1975 as well as its behaviour during pre-unification, and after the post-unification legitimacy crisis. Vietnam has been researched as a successful reformation with marketisation, arguing the CPV has reshaped the mode of legitimation claims based on the performance by *Đổi Mới* reformation (Le Hong, 2012). This dissertation, more crucially than previous literature, will trace how the indigenous origin of Vietnam's communist party regime afforded advantageous institutional legacies for its successful legitimation strategy change via qualitative text analysis of various historical sources on the legitimation text corpus, including official CPV party reports from the 1940s to the 1990s.

In order to observe the differences between the *autonomous* and *manufactured* legitimation mechanisms, Chapter 5 deals with the external imposition of the communist party regime through the Mongolian case. To analyse the mechanistic evidence, chapters of this dissertation constructed similar narrative and analytical structures of the cases and in their discussion of structured-focused comparison (George *et al.*, 2005). For this reason, this chapter first seeks to analyse the political history about how the Soviet Union supported the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) at the time of its independence and why its externally imposed communist party regime prompted observers to label Mongolia a satellite state of the Soviet Union. Next, it will examine the main type of the legitimation strategy employed by the ruler of the MPRP while maintaining the regime and will analyse how the MPRP regime responded to the legitimacy crisis triggered by the decline of communist ideology and the collapse of the global communist system through various historical materials and secondary literature. I will conclude this chapter by assessing whether Mongolia's externally imposed regime collapsed due to a reduced capacity to reshape it legitimation claims domestically.

Next, in Chapter 6, as a mixed communist party regime case, I demonstrate a historical analysis of the North Korean regime's origin and the later rulers' mode of legitimation claims.

The North Korea case needs to be approached in a little more detail, as it is neither a complete external imposition from the Soviet Union nor a completely indigenous communist party origin regime. First of all, this chapter analyses both the external imposition and indigenous elements in the political history of North Korea state-building. Then, by analysing the Kim family's claims to rulership, we will look at how North Korea tried to convert itself into the *autonomous* legitimation mechanism when its regime faced a crisis. For analysis of this process of the reshaping legitimation claims, this chapter also conducts thematic coding of qualitative text analysis toward the text corpus of legitimation claims based on the North Korean rulers' New Year's addresses from 1946 to 2019. In particular, I assess the relationship between the origin of the communist party regime and later rulers' legitimation capacity by examining how the *Juche* ideology developed and influenced future generations as a self-evolution of ideological legitimation.

In Chapter 7, I develop systematic conclusions about the origins of communist party regimes and legitimation claim capacity, both in the post-communist context as well as in more generally authoritarian regimes. By doing so, the dissertation will provide answers to the following questions: *Why does political origin matter for the capacity of legitimation claims, and how did the different legitimation claim mechanisms (based on the diverse communist party origins) impact regime resilience after the collapse of the USSR?* Once again, it may be somewhat difficult to draw a generalised conclusion under the assumptions of quantitative research methodology because the analysis of the legitimation of the authoritarian regimes is a context-dependent field subject to the unique historical origins of each country. Nevertheless, this study is significant in that it studied different historical experiences of communist party regimes in the specific geographical context of East Asia. Autonomous and manufactured legitimation mechanisms based on empirically conducted qualitative text analysis are also critical because they can increase the argument's generalisability. In other words, based on this theoretical explanation of legitimation capacity, the scope of empirical studies in authoritarian institutionalism and legitimation can be expanded to include case studies from regions other than East Asia.

'Looking backward to move forward' is also relevant in explaining authoritarian rulers' legitimacy claim capacity. We see how the various origins of communist party regimes shaped their institutional legacies and rulers' legitimacy claim capacity, as well as how this affects regimes' resilience when they are faced with legitimacy crises. Overall, this study will contribute to the understanding of authoritarian resilience and authoritarian rulers' legitimation strategies. Particularly in connection with the recent democratic backsliding and the resurgence

of authoritarian governments around the world (Alizada *et al.*, 2022), research into the political behaviours of authoritarian regimes remains relevant – not only academically, but also normatively and with practical implications.

Chapter 2 - Authoritarian Resilience, Legitimation Claims and Communist Regime Survival

Despite the emerging body of research on comparative authoritarianism and authoritarian institutionalism, there are still definitional, theoretical, and methodological limitations that hinder our understanding. This chapter provides a critical review of the literature on comparative authoritarianism, with an emphasis on legitimation and regime resilience during and after the 'third wave' of democratisation, particularly as it pertains to communist and post-communist regimes. The first section describes a history of comparative authoritarianism, focusing on the development of authoritarian institutionalism as a sub-field of comparative authoritarianism. Issues related to developing an 'institutional turn' in comparative authoritarianism are discussed. The second section reviews explanations for the resilience of communist countries as forms of one-party rule during the third wave of democratisation. The third section critically reviews theoretical research on the conceptualisation of legitimation in authoritarianism. The final section summarises the main points of previous literature and further connects them to the research questions of this project. Previous literature, on the one hand, has revealed that the origins and structures of authoritarian regimes are important drivers of their longevity – and, on the other hand, that the legitimation claims of authoritarian regimes influence their durability. However, we know very little about how these two factors interact with one another. The main task of this chapter will be to argue that it would be productive to bring these two strands of research into contact with one another in order to build theory.

A Short History of Comparative Authoritarianism during the Third Wave of Democratisation

With the collapse of several powerful totalitarian regimes at the conclusion of World War II, the appeal of intense, mobilisational authoritarianism waned in the West. The democratisation of several Western European and Latin American states in the 1970s and 1980s was followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 2005; Huntington, 1991). In the space of a few short decades, it appeared that authoritarianism had suffered major setbacks. To compound these changes, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-Cold War scheme, a newly emerging Western hegemony emerged in the established international media and a growing communication network promoting human

rights and democracy (Levitsky and Way, 2002). These turbulent bursts of reform, which swept across many countries in a relatively short time, were famously termed 'democratic waves' by Huntington, even if the analysis only describes the varied causes of the reforms without elaborating explanations of causal mechanisms (Huntington, 1991; Gunitsky, 2014).

In response to this expansion of democracy, those dictators who remained in power were compelled to find a new political strategy for their survival in light of the ostensible failure of outright authoritarianism – or even totalitarianism – for prolonging their regime. Prominent phenomena of this new strategy of the authoritarian ruler included nominal adaptation of democratic institutions – including parties, elections and legislatures – to neutralise larger groups' threats in the society by beseeching outsider's cooperation (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). Many selected from the 'menu of manipulation' to maintain the appearance of democracy despite a core of autocracy (Schedler, 2002).

Indeed, despite the third wave of democratisation affecting a number of states, authoritarianism worldwide was more resilient than optimists initially assumed. This led to a search for answers to autocracy resilience among researchers of democratisation and authoritarianism. Mirroring the third wave of democratisation, the study of authoritarianism can also be periodised into three spans: totalitarianism, authoritarianism and the institutional turn (Croissant and Wurster, 2013). The rise and decline of regime types and hegemons are diverse in history; for instance, the rise of a (partially) democratic United States during World War I, emerging fascism during the Great Depression, the rise of communism after World War II, and finally the expansion of democracy after the collapse of the USSR (Gunitsky, 2014). In this research, the other side of this last trend is explored, namely *why have some authoritarian regimes been more resilient than others in the third-wave democratisation era*? To answer the question, it is worthwhile to trace the short history of comparative authoritarianism literature to understand how it developed in response to the resilience of authoritarianism. A point of consensus in this research area is that one-party rule is a particularly durable regime format. This insight grew from comparative analysis of regime types as well as the 'institutional turn' of comparative authoritarianism.

Consensus on One-Party Regime Durability

This section investigates empirical findings in the literature of comparative authoritarianism and concludes that there is a consensus that single-party rule is the most durable type of autocracy. First, it briefly outlines previous datasets of non-democratic rule and their limitations for analysing mechanisms of the durability of authoritarian regimes. Next,

theoretical explanations about the strength of one-party regimes are provided alongside common arguments addressing the relative weakness of other regime types – including personal rule, military rule, and electoral authoritarianism – in terms of regime durability. In doing so, we will identify potential mechanisms of one-party regime survival.

Over time, many researchers sought to determine which type of non-democratic regime is more durable in history by constructing typologies to facilitate comparative analysis. Typological work on comparative authoritarianism was influenced by comparative political studies of democracy. Not only duration of regime survival by 'country-year' data, but also questions about political institutions – including how different types of regimes would also influence the broad socio-political outcome in the countries – would become the central research themes of quantitative research using worldwide datasets.

Notwithstanding the enormous efforts involved in gathering empirical data to analyse regime durability, there are still debates among scholars of comparative authoritarianism about the optimal ways to categorise regimes. For example, using country-years for 198 countries from 1946 to 2008, Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) posited three authoritarian categories: military dictatorship, royal dictatorship, and civilian dictatorship. The version of Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman (2012) uses military, monarchy, multiparty authoritarian, one-party authoritarian, no-party authoritarian and other categories with 195 countries from 1972 to 2010. Similarly, covering from 1946 to 2010 and encompassing 154 country cases, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) argued that the relevant types of non-democratic rule were military, monarchy, party and personalist, and it was more comprehensive dataset on not only regime type, but also autocratic breakdown and regime transitions based on 280 autocratic regimes in existing from 1946 to 2010. Unlike the previous dataset, Geddes, Wright and Frantz defined regime start and end date using qualitative examination, and they found that party-type autocratic regimes predominated from 1945 to 2010, followed by personal-type autocracies. In contrast, monarchies were stable, and military regimes increased steadily until the 1980s, after which they became the least common type of autocratic regime. Using additional variables on regime transition, this dataset provided insights into how autocracies collapse and how much violence accompanies the transition.

Despite the additional variables to explain the comparative authoritarianism, most cross-national datasets have certain limitations in understanding the resilience mechanisms of non-democratic rule. Analysis of regime types and their variation in regime survival, along with different social performance, expanded the knowledge of comparative authoritarianism and provided insights into authoritarian regime survival in economic crisis, popular protest,

and other challenges of post-breakdown democratisation. However, there is still space for research into the mechanisms of regime resilience in specific types of authoritarian regimes. Similarly, one common challenge with the typologies, including the GFW dataset, is that they have a different operational definition of hybrid categories, thereby leading to different results in the coding system. Some cases presented are not mutually exclusive and combine certain institutional features of the type of autocracy. For instance, China and Vietnam have tremendous variation in the institutional design and different economic outcomes, but both countries have been coded the same in many cases (Malesky, Schuler and Tran, 2011). For this reason, analysts must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the dataset when making theoretical arguments. It is true that '[t]he choice of [a] dataset is more than a matter of methodology' (Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius, 2013, p. 31). Similarly, which dataset is better depends on the user's intention for the theoretical explanation (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014).

Empirical findings, alongside cross-national datasets, subsequently demonstrate that despite these disagreements, one-party rule proved to be a remarkably durable form of authoritarianism. One-party rule, which can use the political party to strengthen cohesion among elites and marginalise the opposition through elections, has proven to be a strong and durable format of authoritarian regime during the third wave of democratisation (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). There are some theoretical explanations for this empirical pattern in the literature. Since the 1980s, after the Latin American debt crisis, traditional patronage between rulers and elites in developing countries has been weakened; in response, rulers in authoritarian regimes have incentivised the electoral format for the sake of regime durability (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). The other reason is that one-party authoritarianism has features efficiently facilitating mobilisation of mass and bargaining political elites (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). These theoretical explanations may answer the previous questions about why political party institutions matter for the durability of the authoritarian rule.

On the other hand, military rule, which has a long tradition as an authoritarian regime type, would be regarded as a relatively fragile format of authoritarian rule, compared to one-party rule. Why do military officers have interests in intervening politics? To this question, despite no conclusive evidence, military rulers proffer various reasons: favouring or disapproving of existing regime; improving economic performance; national identity; spreading modern values and skills; or because the military as an institution would be the most

developed apparatus in developing countries, civil war crises, or in contexts with profound ethnic conflicts and divisions (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014).

Geddes, Frantz and Wright (2014) further divide the category of military rule into 'military strongman' and 'military institution'. The military strongman is a type of dictatorship by individuals, whereas military institution rule is a regime by a group of high-ranking officers – for example, juntas in Latin America. Empirical findings for these different sub-types of military rule show that military strongman cases are more likely the result of coerced regime ending, such as foreign intervention, coups, and uprisings. However, military institution cases have different outcomes that are more democratised with less coerced endings, such as elections, a pact with soft-liners, and/or the inner reformation of the regime's programme. Regardless of whether there are different pathways, both forms of military rule underscore short longevity among non-democratic rules regimes (Geddes, Frantz and Wright, 2014).

Military rule, in addition, has systematic limitations when it comes to regime durability, especially when the regime is faced with the crisis. The military itself could not be the sole state apparatus for the regime durability. Military regimes in general have to justify their rule on temporary grounds and are not always as good at governing as their strict hierarchies would suggest. Partly for this reason, in general, military regimes have shorter life-spans than single-party regimes (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). To survive, military regimes require cooperation from the pre-existing state bureaucracy, civilian support and acquirement of the civilian allies. For this reason, a political party would be a significant part of the resilience of the authoritarian regime due to the political mobilisation that they can provide. For instance, Latin America military rule reflected a broad alliance of technocrats with a conservative economic ideology and military officers who emphasise national security against leftist internal subversion (O'Donnell *et al.*, 1988).

Personalism or personal rule in non-democratic systems also tends to have a shorter lifespan relative to single-party regimes (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). This is because the politics under personalism is shaped by personal authorities and power rather than institutions. This feature would evoke 'uncertainty, suspicion, rumour, agitation, intrigue and sometimes fear' toward the regime (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984, p. 421). The system prefers the ruler and small factions of allies and clients; by doing so, this personal politics covers cooperation and rivalry only among leaders and factions, rather than for broader social classes (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). Due to the narrow set of backers, the personalist ruler would have less access to accurate information, raising the risk of miscalculations (Kendall-Taylor,

Frantz and Wright, 2017). Furthermore, the question of succession plagues personalist regimes and can breed instability within the elite.

Although electoral authoritarianism was an emerging format of contemporary non-democratic regimes in the 1990s (Diamond, 2002), elections are not guaranteed to have a stabilizing influence on authoritarian systems. A multiparty system in authoritarian regime could be seen as a tool for regime durability using various methods of manipulation. In theory, a wide margin would be expected between the ruling party and the opposition party, allowing the ruler would enjoy the legitimacy of democratic procedure. However, rulers of electoral authoritarian regimes also encounter regime risk during elections, because the elections would be likely to focal points for opportunities to mobilise dissent, compared to one-party rule. For this reason, the regime durability of electoral authoritarianism depends on the capacity of the regime for managing elections in the multiparty system (Croissant and Hellmann, 2018; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Morgenbesser and Pepinsky, 2019).

Depicting this dilemma of the multiparty election under non-democratic rules, students of comparative authoritarianism have focused on the political institutions in the authoritarian regimes of the world. This led to the 'institutional turn' in comparative authoritarianism in the next section.

'Institutional Turn' in Comparative Authoritarianism

1. Competitive Authoritarianism

Notwithstanding the third wave of democratisation, many non-democratic regimes have survived, and some have done so by evolving into 'competitive authoritarian' forms, which adopt democratic institutions including elections, legislatures and judiciaries (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Levitsky and Way (2002) outlined three different pathways of the rising competitive authoritarianism. Firstly, due to domestic and international pressure, the ruler of autocracy would embrace nominal democratic institutions. Secondly, given weak democratic traditions and civil society, as in post-communist countries, new democracies would decay into competitive authoritarianism. Finally, in countries with weak democratic institutions facing political-economic crisis, a freely elected ruler would undermine democratic institutions, ignoring horizontal accountability and highlighting strong vertical accountability of delegative democracy. Similarly, empirical findings from V-Dem data suggest that a leading cause of recent autocratisation – defined as substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy – is this democratic erosion that ruling elites would

engender to mimic democratic institutions while gradually eroding their functions in a 'more clandestine and gradual fashion' (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019, p. 1098).

There are several theoretical explanations about how and why authoritarian regimes try to adopt democratic institutions, including party systems, legislatures, and elections for prolonging their regime stability. Brancati (2014) summarised four potential causal mechanisms of adopting democratic institutions: (1) 'signalling effect' shows the efforts of the opposition are futile via electoral fraud and manipulation; (2) 'information acquisition' explains how empirical findings show that the multiparty system in the legislature tends to result in better economic performance, which could in turn lend legitimacy to the regime; (3) 'patronage distribution of the selectorate theory' in the election situation could guarantee regime stability when the ruler maintains electoral support via the private goods, monopoly of financial and natural resources; (4) it is interpreted as a credible commitment for democratic institutions, which can lead to better economic performance, including international investor of foreign direct investment. For this reason, authoritarian regimes with a legislature under the control of an authoritarian structure, such as Singapore or China, display better economic performance; and (5) adopting democratic institutions can serve a monitoring function for the balance of power via legislature and media, especially checking local politicians for co-optation. In doing so, the upper-level elites also identify corruption and other negative behaviours of low-level elites for transparency.

In a similar way to democracy, elections in authoritarian regimes have various purposes, and they are different from motivations to vote in an election. Elections serve to distribute patronage; for example, in China, the central government could use a local election as the opportunity for citizens to monitor local officials (Brancati, 2014). For this reason, it is a concrete fact that adopting democratic institutions, especially elections, does not guarantee political change or democratisation, although some cases may foster democratisation (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Morgenbesser and Pepinsky, 2019). Likewise, regarding multiparty elections in authoritarianism and regime resilience, the evidence remains inconclusive, and impacts of elections depends on the context or the state capacity; for instance, Croissant and Hellmann (2018, p. 4) identify these contexts as:

> 'international setting, the level of economic development, the specific design of [the] electoral institution, divergent patterns of party building and regime party institutionalisation, domestic threat levels and cohesiveness of elite coalition and the role of opposition tactics and tactical emulation through mechanisms of diffusion'.

This led us to expand authoritarian institution literature to state capacity literature – for instance, how and why electoral authoritarianism controls economic policy near the elections for regime durability and in which conditions state capacity in authoritarian regimes specifies the democratising power of elections (Hanson, 2018; Seeberg, 2018; van Ham and Seim, 2018; Hellmann, 2018).

2. Critical Reflection on the 'Institutional Turn': Returning to Institutional Origins

The study of electoral authoritarianism highlights the strategic adoption of electoral systems to prolong regime durability. Beyond that, the study of the new institutionalism in authoritarian regimes – emphasising institutional manipulation of legislatures, constitutional courts, multiparty elections, non-state media and federalism – provided an understanding of political behaviours among ruler, elite groups and the people (Schedler, 2009; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2005; Smith, 2005).

However, there are also critical reflections of previous literature on comparative authoritarianism. Pepinsky (2014) precisely pinpointed that previous work would only partially explain the central features of authoritarian durability. He divided causal inferences from understanding of authoritarian institutionalism into three stages: (1) origins, (2) authoritarian institutions and (3) political outcome, and argues that previous literature commonly focused on the relationship between authoritarian institutions and their outcome, without shedding light upon the origins of such institutions. To expand such knowledge, he stated:

> '[t]o study the effects of institutions under authoritarianism on authoritarian political outcomes, regardless of the causal mechanisms invoked, researchers need an account of both *the processes through which political institutions from and change* [emphasis added], on the one hand, and the consequences of those process for the outcomes that institutions are thought to explain' (Pepinsky, 2014, pp. 631–632).

Beyond the issues of causal inference, methodological issues also arise. Diverse research methods, not only the quantitative dataset approaches but also qualitative evidence from historical cases for investigating origins of institutions, should be conducted for future research on authoritarian intuitionalism (Pepinsky, 2014). Similarly, the previous quantitative approach of the institutional turn is criticised as having adopted a highly simplistic view of how institutions and organisations matter, using a variety of different causal mechanisms that are left underspecified (Art, 2012). For dealing with this issue, the next research avenue should be focused on how institutions shape behaviour at the micro-level of politics in authoritarian regimes (Art, 2012).

For instance, echoing the previous discussion about the difficulty of capturing hybridity in authoritarian typologies, North Korea features a one-party political structure, personalist elements and hereditary succession, all of which may contribute to regime resilience. North Korean institutional changes may be difficult to trace using the quantitative approach of institutional turn because the researcher may not have full access to reliable data in such an authoritarian landscape (McEachern, 2018). For this reason, this dissertation uses a comprehensive qualitative case study based on the theory-building process of tracing as a primary research method for figuring out the relationship between the origin of institutions and its impacts on legitimation capacity and regime resilience. It contributes more detailed knowledge about the interactions between the origins of regime institutions and the legitimacy claims on which rulers base their authority.

Beyond Pepinsky's criticisms, regarding the origin of authoritarian institutions in causal inferences, there is some literature on the relationship between the origin of institutions and regime durability. The most explicit expression of the idea that regimes' origins – especially material dynamics in the party establishment – help explain variations in their longevity by the contributors to Smith (2005). Furthermore, a recent empirical finding from the autocratic ruling parties dataset, which covers all the world's ruling parties from 1940 to 2015, confirms that different party origins are relevant factors for differences in regime longevity, because cases of revolution and one communist party legacies in the historical background are the most durable. In contrast, cases of gaining power by election are the least durable (Miller, 2019). Along the same line, non-material conditions of party origins – including ideology and norms that increase elite cohesion – are also crucial to the durability of the regime (Levitsky and Way, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2012). The origins of party institutions, therefore, are an important explanatory factor for crystallising the mechanisms of the duration of one-party rule. This mechanism will be further explained in the next chapter to build theory for this dissertation, but re-emerging interest in the origins of authoritarian institutions is a promising trend.

An Alternative Explanation for Resilience: State Repression and Surveillance

A prominent alternative explanation for regime resilience is state repression and surveillance. State repression can be defined as a 'wide variety of coercive efforts employed by political authorities to influence those within their territorial jurisdiction: overt and covert; violent and nonviolent; state, state-sponsored (e.g. militias), and state-affiliated (e.g. death squads); successful and unsuccessful' (Davenport, 2007, p. 3). Although previous literature on state

repression under authoritarianism is relatively thin compared to the study of totalitarian regimes, researchers have found that coercive institutions have various formats in the origins and maintenance of authoritarian regime: the role of fear, violence, intimidation, surveillance and the willingness to repress (Art, 2012; Bellin, 2012). In the Weberian perspective, the ruler would have strategies for addressing behavioural challenges and establishing or maintaining political order – for instance, coercion, normative persuasion, material or symbolic benefits, or neglect. Forty years of state repression literature indicates that the merits and efficiency of punishment are inconclusive; because states react to perceived threats to their power, the outcome of punishment is highly dependent on context (Davenport, 2007).

Similar to this punishment puzzle, the dictator's dilemma is a complicating factor for explaining the relationships between state repression and surveillance for regime durability. Dictators encounter the dilemma of to what extent they should permit the political space for citizen, elites and military. For instance, if the dynamics of political space exceeded the regime capacity, citizen could be changed to protesters, and elites and military institutions could execute a coup. Thus, eventually the regime would become unsustainable (Svolik, 2012). How authoritarian rulers prevent coercive organisations from undermining them is, therefore, a crucial point in this dilemma.

Beyond the dilemma of the dictator, another structural limitation also challenges the ruler. A fundamental problem of a dictator in an authoritarian regime is information imbalance. Because of preference falsification – or citizens not revealing their true beliefs for fear of coercion – the regime cannot reliably assess the preferences of the masses and gauge the extent of support and opposition (Slantchev and Matush, 2020). Therefore, dictators have often miscalculated the costs and benefits of strong coercive institutions (Art, 2012). Sometimes, the dictator is confronted with an organisational trade-off in assessing whether to consolidate the state security apparatus for regime resilience when they are faced with regime challenges (Greitens, 2016; Svolik, 2012). The first option, on the one hand, is a reinforcement of the security section for dealing with mass demonstration among the people against the regime. However, as a counteraction of this policy, the elite group in the security section would be more likely to carry out a coup. On the other hand, in the situation of weak security state apparatus, the possibility of elite fragmentation is reduced. However, in this case, the culmination of mass protest would become intensified. In this organisational trade-off, the various outcomes of this setting would depend on the ruler's threat perception (Greitens, 2016).

Therefore, state repression and surveillance are part of the explanation for the regime resilience of autocracies among multiple factors, but authoritarian regimes cannot rule by force

alone. However, it is a more reliable notion that the dictator's dilemma and context-based threat perception decrease the explanatory power of repression for regime durability. Furthermore, using repression alone is still a high risk to the regimes regarding the cost-benefit analysis. For this reason, the ruler who has the full capacity with confidence to repress the political action of dissenters would take the authoritarian wager by abandoning preventive repression and allowing more open dissent (Slantchev and Matush, 2020). There are also other, less risky strategies available to the ruler for dealing with dissent and challenges to the regime. Thus, considering various conditions above, the ruler would be willing to use alternative mechanisms, including legitimation claims or co-optation process for building elite cohesion and preventing mass protest (Gerschewski, 2013). The selected cases in this study – Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea – have all used state repression to preserve their communist revolutions. Significantly, North Korea's regime has demonstrated far more oppression than Vietnam after the collapse of the USSR and the regime crisis. However, the Vietnam regime has proved to be the most resilient by adapting various other legitimation strategies.

In the next section, regime resilience of post-communist countries is reviewed, given that a subset of these countries have survived long after the third wave of democracy. They survived using a combination of advantages of one-party rule, state repression and surveillance, legitimation claims, and co-optation process, which are facilitated by communist party legacy.

(Post-) Communist Countries and Regime Resilience during the Third Wave

Analysing communist countries is worthwhile for scrutinising how a particular type of one-party rule has survived in terms of durability and resilience in contemporary history. Particularly, after the collapse of the USSR, tracing responses to regime challenges in surviving (post-) communist countries provides insight into the mechanisms of one-party rule's durability with state repression and co-optation process used by the communist party system. First, this section will briefly explore why communism collapsed in the world; next, it will focus on how the surviving communist countries – China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba – have maintained their rule during the third wave of democratisation in the post-communist regime literature.

Many scholars have tried to provide explanatory factors for the collapse of communism. The school of comparative authoritarianism has focused on various factors: (1) agency-based explanation that the Gorbachev factor (Brown, 1997; Brown, 1991; Dahrendorf, 2017), the role of opposition forces (Kukathas, Lovell and Maley, 1991); (2) structure-based explanation that

economic failure (Batt, 1991), competition with the West (Holmes, 1997), imperial overstretch (Kennedy, 1987); and (3) ideological aspect explanation, including the Marxist Corrective (Callinicos, 1991) and legitimation crisis theory (Kontorovich, 1993; Di Palma, 1991; Robinson, 1995). This study pinpoints legitimation crises as crucial contributors to the ebb of communism, which is relevant because the aim of this research is to examine the relationship between legitimation capacity of rulers and one-party rule for the resilience of the regime.

At the end of the Cold War, (post-) communist countries were confronted with serious internal and external challenges to their rule and legitimacy (McAdams, 2017; Holmes, 1997). The endgame of communism would be described as series of political events, including, most prominently, the dissolution of communist regimes in Eastern European countries and thereupon, the collapse of the Soviet Union a few years later (Zubok, 2017). After the death of Stalin, notwithstanding collective efforts of membership countries to reform communism, including 'socialism with a human face' in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union was confronted with a lack of confidence in the legitimacy of its central government, along with the decline of Soviet-type economics (Steiner, 2017; Silvio Pons, 2017).

More importantly, the series of Gorbachev's reforms engendered unintended destabilising effects on the government. A new economic-financial system, for example, was termed as a mixed economy, and *Glasnost* (liberalisation) restricted the communist party's capacity to control both politics and the economy (Zubok, 2017). Albeit in relatively limited forms, freedom of speech and conscience evoked challenges to the legitimacy of the central government, including anti-communist feeling and nationalistic separatism in the Eastern Bloc. Besides, in terms of the international context, not only the sudden collapse of trade relations between Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, but also the pressure of the global economy for foreign capital and institutional demands from the International Monetary Fund exacerbated the legitimacy challenges (Zubok, 2017). For this reason, Kotkin (2008, p. 9) delineates that the failure of communist reformation of the Soviet Union is due to:

> 'elites, and proceeds in terms of structural considerations: a Communist Party generation. Led by Mikhail Gorbachev, profoundly shaped by socialist idealism, which emerged to the fore when the previous leadership finally died off; the worldview and hopes of 285 million people living within the socialist ideological space; the planned economy and its cost-unconscious, oppressively heavy-industrial physical plant; and, especially, the institutional dynamics of the Soviet state and of the Russian state'.

Despite the collapse of the USSR, students of comparative authoritarianism have been interested in (post-) communist countries that survived. They have sought to find out how some

post-communist countries still maintained their rule after the third wave of democratisation (Dimitrov, 2013c; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020). The next section will examine the literature on the resilience of the surviving communist regimes and its implications for the interactions between institutional changes and legitimacy, using the cases of China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba.

Institutional Adaptability and Flexibility: China and Vietnam

This sub-section investigates literature for China and Vietnam as cases of communist regime durability after the collapse of the USSR. Much of this literature points out that these states have maintained their rule by adapting institutional changes and showing flexibility when confronted with legitimacy challenges. This finding provides knowledge of possible mechanisms for how one-party regimes deal with regime crisis, and these cases suggest that institutional adaptability and flexibility of communist party systems are crucial elements for the substantial longevity of the communist parties in China and Vietnam. Firstly, a short history of Chinese regime responses against challenges is reviewed; then, Vietnam's case is examined in a similar vein.

The origins of the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can be traced back to the pre-1949 revolution and the emergence of Mao Zedong and his ideology (Zhu, 2011). However, after the death of Mao, the CCP under Deng Xiaoping made drastic policy adjustments to reassert its authority and to redefine its right to rule. This altered the party's legitimacy foundation by further emphasising rising living conditions, but it also generated tensions and contradictions that came to a head in Tian'anmen Square in 1989. In this sense, after Mao's death, legitimation efforts from strong ideological assertions with party movement and charismatic leadership shifted as personalism faded in favour of performance legitimation and nationalism in China's post-Mao politics (Zhao, 2009).

China's responses toward legitimation challenges followed different pathways compared to the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, unlike the Soviet Union case, in which most political elites did not experience the revolution with deep faith of party ideology, in the Chinese case, top officers were still revolutionary veterans of the CCP revolution in the 1920s. In these conditions, when people raised criticism on Mao's performance and demanded alternative interpretations of Marxism, the government of China repressed these challenges actively by facilitating government-organised campaigns such as the Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign in 1983 and Anti-Bourgeois Liberalisation Campaign in 1987 (Zhao, 2009).

The Chinese government's strategies of policy adaptation required diverse dimensions for acquiring legitimacy from the people (Zhao, 2009). First, the government promoted local reform elites as new leadership – including Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Li Ruihuan – highlighted discourse on moral values, economic performance and defence of national interests. Second, education sectors were co-opted by the government, emphasising patriotic campaigns in university as a vanguard of the national interest. Third, the government tolerated the unorthodox views in academic and other media outlets with limited circulation.

Of course, if there was greater feasibility to challenge the government legitimation process, the state confined the challenge to national interest discourse and de-legitimised these challengers. For example, this adjustment of government policy for legitimation was embodied by the 'three representatives' of CCP under Jiang Zemin: (1) development of China's advanced forces of production, (2) orientation of China's advanced culture and (3) the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people (Zhu, 2011). Besides, Hu Jintao's 'Harmonious Society' emphasised Sinified Marxism that focused on performance-based Confucian culture. These efforts by the government reached out for more inclusive representation, although the party's grip on power was never seriously called into question.

Vietnam is another one-party communist regime that has successfully dealt with legitimacy challenges along with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the USSR. Recent literature on Vietnamese politics has illuminated the political economy and socio-economic conditions during the reformation. However, for a comprehensive understanding of the resilience of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) regime, it is necessary to explain the role of the party, state administrative apparatus, representative institution and mass organisation, and armed forces, police and a multitude of security agencies in Vietnam (London, 2014).

Similarly to the Chinese case, the VCP also encountered a series of legitimation challenges. Before the external changes from the collapse of the USSR, the VCP's regime enjoyed political legitimacy that flowed from its origin as Southeast Asia's first communist state resulting from an indigenous movement dating back to 1945 and a successful vanguard role of mobilising national resistance against foreign domination by, for example, France, Japan, the US and China. This foundational legacy served as a resource when appealing to patriotism and nationalism. The legitimacy of the government, however, was tested by a series of political developments. First, during the Sino-Soviet split, especially after 1960, the ruling group of Vietnam's Politburo followed Mao's line and expelled pro-Soviet factions from the party. Second, expeditiously increasing party membership eroded the quality and distinction of

party ideology and, finally, a post-war economic crisis engendered the informal economy beyond state control in the late 1960s (Vu, 2014).

For dealing with the legitimation crisis, the government of Vietnam provided new legitimation strategies: emphasising economic performance, co-opting dissidents, and using various formats of surveillance. In 1986, using the adjustable policy of *Đổi Mới* (loosely translated as 'renovation' or 'reform'), the VCP sought to deal with these several legitimacy challenges from diverse social actors, including veterans of the southern resistance, communist intelligentsia and mass peasant demonstrations (Thayer, 2010).

Primarily, these opposition groups used petition movement for challenging the authority of the VCP, and the government's responses were generally repressive, including the arrest and sentencing (or in some cases, the co-optation) of prominent leaders in the opposition group (Thayer, 2010). Vietnam's repressive strategy is debated in the literature. Some point out that multi-layers of security apparatus highlighted their efficacy and harshness (Thayer, 2014; Thayer, 2010), whereas others argue that the party-state was substantially or significantly tolerant of dissent by mixing soft strategies, including accommodation, dialogue, and selected concessions (Wells-Dang, 2014; Kerkvliet, 2014). Despite these different understandings of Vietnam's repression strategy, it was revealed that for dealing with legitimacy crisis of the ideology, economic performance and political reform, the government of Vietnam actively engaged in both hard and soft repression.

For dealing with this legitimation crisis, similarly to China, the government of VCP highlighted the pragmatism of Hồ Chí Minh thought and socialist orientation for the emerging market (Thayer, 2010). Emphasis was also given to Hồ Chí Minh and the role of the *Việt Cộng* (the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam) in liberating Vietnam from external domination and securing the country's sovereignty. The smooth operation of succession mechanisms in the national party congress served as a factor in recruiting younger and well-educated candidates for economic development and complex social-political jobs. Furthermore, private business groups in Vietnam, similarly to the Chinese case, have also been co-opted via party structures (Vu, 2014).

These changes can be summarised as the development of accountability mechanisms in Vietnam by strengthening internal and external checks and by improving compliance and the role of elected bodies and even limited expansions to the scope of popular participation in political institutions (Vasavakul, 2014). For this reason, the resilience of the Chinese and Vietnamese communist regimes would be described as involving several factors: (1) economic reform of performance-based legitimation, (2) inclusive attitude of the regimes among reform

losers, (3) some elements of horizontal and vertical accountability for responsiveness and (4) ideological flexibility from dogmatic communism to nationalism and revisionism of thoughts (Dimitrov, 2013a).

Staying True to the Vision: North Korea and Cuba

Literature on the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism often emphasises the declining appeal over time of its ideology (Di Palma, 1991). As mentioned above, while ruling groups in China and Vietnam learned from these cases, they adopted other strategies including co-optation of potential opposition groups, including intellectuals and entrepreneurs, as well as responsive and adaptative attitudes toward other ideological claims such as nationalism (Tismaneanu, 2013). However, other communist parties that survived, namely North Korea and Cuba, were inclined toward more rigid ideological postures. This sub-section reviews the cases of North Korea and Cuba to examine how ideological tenacity and introversion would influence regime durability after the third wave of democratisation.

North Korea has been regarded as the paradigmatic case of ideological introversion as a path to regime survival. Ideology may no longer be regarded as a critical research area in political science since the collapse of communism (Fukuyama, 1989); however, North Korea, as an exceptional case, demonstrates that emphasis on ideological claims can still bolster a polity. In particular post-communist literature, North Korea's *Juche* ideology, military-first policy and *Suryong* systems are prominent cases of evolved versions of traditional communist ideology. Thus, the North Korean case is an appropriate context to study how the ideology of a communist regime can transform its legitimation claims when the regime encounters challenges. For instance, since the 1950s, *Juche* ideology has been a pivotal part of North Korean politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korean claimed 'Our-Style Socialism' by de-linking Euro-socialism and emphasising cultural nationalism, including neo-Confucianism and denouncing foreign powers (Armstrong, 2013).

Along with North Korea, Cuba is another well-known case of ideological introversion in the service of regime durability (Whitehead, 2016). Compared to China and Vietnam's flexible legitimation strategies, Cuba followed a relatively rigid legitimation strategy after the collapse of the USSR (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020). Whereas the core meanings of nationalism and communism were relatively flexible to the ruling groups of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), Cuba indicated that the meanings were more fixed. Since the Communist Party of Cuba (CPC, in Spanish *Partido Comunista de Cuba*, PCC) took the ruling position in 1959, the regime enjoyed legitimacy

stemming from nationalism and patriotic fervour. After the 1990s, gradual adaptive institutional changes underscored adjustment of the internationalist version of communism and Marxism-Leninism, while the tradition of nationalism and sovereignty was still accentuated. Some might argue that in post-Fidel Cuba, de-personalisation and re-institutionalisation of the political structures and other changes in social realities occurred, including diversification of the public sphere, mainly through the use of digital media as well as the liberalisation of travel and migration (Hoffmann, 2016). However, compared to China and Vietnam, the outcome in Cuba remained a fundamentally unchanged status emphasising the orthodox pathway of communism, and these attempts to change do not constitute a significant change in policy flexibility in general (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020).

Among China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba, one commonality in the regime longevity of surviving communist regimes is that they have indigenous political origins and came to power via armed struggle for national liberation against foreign occupation (Dimitrov, 2013a). This indigenous feature could be crucial in explaining how and why the rulers of these regimes enjoy a relatively durable political landscape, insisting their legitimacy to rule in autonomous communist apparatus vis-à-vis Moscow (Jacques, 2000). Furthermore, variation in the lifespans of the founding figures of each regime may have helped shape each regime's paths. Hồ Chí Minh died in 1969 and Mao died in 1976, so in the Vietnamese and Chinese cases the parties could more selectively retrieve the legacies of their founding figures. By contrast, Kim Il-sung lived until 1994 and Fidel Castro survived until 2016. This made it more difficult for each party to distance itself from the legacy of its founding figure until well after the collapse of Soviet Union.

In short, many pieces of literature on the transition and reformation of communist regimes highlight multiple variables and diverse causal mechanisms. Most recent work illuminates institutional changes by the ruler for the durability of the post-communist regimes. There is space for future research to investigate how the dynamics of institutional changes in communist regimes would relate to the specific strategies for achieving legitimacy for the party. These findings lead us to a necessity for a more in-depth understanding of legitimacy and legitimation in authoritarian regimes, which is discussed in the next section.

Legitimacy and Legitimation in Authoritarianism

Legitimacy to rule and legitimation, which are efforts by rulers to acquire legitimacy, are at the core of politics. For instance, Lipset and Lakin (2004, p. 209) state that '[s]table political

systems, even authoritarian ones, cannot rely primarily on force. The alternative to force is legitimacy, a broadly accepted systemic "title to rule"'. On the one hand, we know legitimacy to rule is a crucial part both democratic and non-democratic systems, and the collapse of the USSR and series of the ebb of communist regimes in the world are at least partially due to failures of legitimation. On the other hand, surviving communist countries indicated their durable regime by adopting diverse strategies for newly emerged legitimation efforts: institutional adaptability and ideological introversion. However, these changes lead us to ask a question about conceptual nexus of legitimacy and legitimation in authoritarianism. This section first reviews conceptual debates on legitimacy and legitimation in the literature on authoritarianism. And then, beyond the conceptual debates, how the concept of legitimation in authoritarianism is expanded to other factors for explaining regime durability in the literature. In doing so, we will know that legitimacy and legitimation are emergent concepts in the study of authoritarianism for the explanation of political behaviours by both the ruler and the ruled as well as regime resilience in authoritarian countries (Dukalskis, 2017; Gerschewski, 2013; Gerschewski, 2018; von Haldenwang, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017).

Conceptual Debate on Studying Legitimation in Authoritarianism

Legitimacy literature in political science can be outlined in three different stages: normative and empirical approaches of legitimacy, analysis of legitimacy components, and systemic frameworks to capture legitimation process. First, the normative approach on the legitimacy of the rule focused on 'justification' and 'right' to rule (Peter, 2017). In contrast, Weber's classical approach focused more on empirical analysis of legitimacy. Weber indicated three ideal types of legitimation order: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational order (Weber, 1978).

It could be argued that legitimacy in authoritarian regimes is an oxymoron (Gerschewski, 2018), or researching authoritarian legitimacy also cautions that this would serve a political discursive space for authoritarian regimes, justifying their harsh rule. However, this study will separate the normative concerns, much like the Weberian approach, and will follow the practical approach of the literature of legitimation of authoritarian regimes (Dukalskis, 2017; Gerschewski, 2018). Furthermore, von Haldenwang (2016, p. 3) said:

> 'Although not every political order is legitimate, at least every political order attempt to legitimise itself. From a normative point of view, a political order is either legitimate or illegitimate. From an analytical viewpoint, however, it is more or less successful in procuring legitimacy'.

Thus, for studying legitimacy and legitimation in an authoritarian regime, an empirical approach toward legitimation has been adopted in the literature by evaluating the success or failure of the legitimation process.

Secondly, Beetham (2013) expands the concept of legitimacy more comprehensively via analysis of the elements of legitimacy: a combination of legal validity, moral justifiability and evidence of consent. These observable features of legitimised rule indicate congruence between shared beliefs and public justifications (Marquez, 2016). These analyses on components of the legitimised rule would provide essential insights into the methodological approach for gathering empirical data on legitimacy and the legitimation process by analysing attributes and their potential indicators.

Our understanding of legitimacy in authoritarian regimes has been heavily influenced by Easton (1965) system theory to explain the input and output of the political institutions and feedback process in society. Elaborating on Easton's system theory, von Haldenwang (2016) argues that the process of achieving legitimacy is a dialogical format combined with demand and supply cycles between the ruler and ruled. The process of 'being legitimised' by the ruled is essential to the ruler (von Haldenwang, 2017). This process can be divided into two parts: one is individual members of society and political collectives as the ruled, and the other is representative of the political order as the ruler. In these two groups, there are two cycles of the legitimation process between the ruled and the ruler: the 'supply cycle' and 'demand cycle'. The supply cycle depends on the success of the legitimacy claims, including effective guidance of behaviour, as to whether the ruled will endorse the legitimacy claim. In the demand cycle, the ruled demand certain things from the ruler, and this legitimation process is often dependent on common-good-oriented performance. However, the process of legitimation between the ruler and ruled is not standardised; instead, it is more akin to the dynamics between two actors. For example,

> 'Rulers can also react to legitimation demands by stepping up repression or by offering compensations, without changing the nature of the regime's legitimacy claim. Citizens may oppose a legitimacy claim without voicing alternative legitimation demands' (von Haldenwang, 2017, p. 274).

Thus, it is a significant research area that describes not only these actors and types of legitimation claims, but more importantly, how the dynamics are formed and what conditions in the origin of institutions influence the dynamics over time.

Despite a lack of reliable data on demand and supply cycles as well as a lack of broad consensus on the categories of legitimacy and measurement of sources of legitimacy, a growing

body of literature deals with these concepts of legitimacy and legitimation (i.e. the strategic procurement of legitimacy), for state-building as well as the fragility and legitimation of non-democratic rule (von Haldenwang, 2016).

Using legitimation as a concept for explaining regime durability, the most comprehensive illustration of why some dictatorships are more stable than others is the theory of the three pillars of autocracy: legitimation, repression and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 29). Legitimation can be divided into 'specific support' (including fulfilment of popular demands, such as socio-economic development, social and physical security) and 'diffuse support' (which refers to what the regime actually is or represents in more general and long-term orientation; for example, religious, nationalistic or traditional claims and political ideologies) (Gerschewski, 2013; Croissant and Wurster, 2013; Easton, 1965). Repression, similarly, can be separated into 'high' and 'low' intensities. In the high intensity, '(violent) repression of mass demonstrations, (violent) campaigns against parties, and the attempted assassination or imprisonment of opposition leaders' predominate, whereas in the lower intensity setting, less visible and more subtle ways of coercion would be present, such as physical harassment and intimidation, denial of jobs and educational opportunities, and lack of chance for political rights (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 21). Finally, co-optation is defined as a capacity to cultivate strategic ties between the regime elites and the actors for intra-elite cohesion. It is a process that is made inclusionary via formal channels (e.g. parliaments, party and elections) as well as informal ways (e.g. patronage, clientelism and corruption), and most importantly, three pillars would ideally strengthen each other in a relationship of 'reciprocal reinforcement and complementarity' (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 29). This theoretical foundation has been elaborated by considering more dimensions, such as dividing specific features of each pillar as a hexagonal model (e.g. specific support of legitimation, diffuse support of legitimation, repression of physical integrity rights, repression of civil and political rights, co-optation as compensating vulnerability and co-optation as simulating pluralism) (Maerz, 2018b, p. 6).

However, this project will focus on the legitimation pillar diagnostically and examine how legitimation claims have been impacted by institutional changes of communist party regimes, including complementary effects in repression and co-optation aspects for the resilience of the regimes, rather than fitting merely typological descriptions of each pillar within the cases. This research focuses on legitimation in the tree pillars because legitimation would not only reduce the potential cost of repression and co-optation process but also provide the logic of justification of these practices by state apparatuses. For these reasons, this project

assumes legitimation as a significant element for communist regimes; resilience and aims to understand in further detail how it operates as well as under what conditions it is successful.

In terms of the typology of legitimation mechanisms, Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017) facilitate four types of legitimation mechanisms for comparative analysis: (1) indoctrination, (2) passivity, (3) performance and (4) democratic-procedural. Indoctrination is a mechanism that implants an 'exclusive and omnipresent political ideology' in the ruled, and the passivity mechanism means that the rulers are seeking to foster resignation to their authority among the ruled by showing their power and cohesion to real or potential opponents. For this subtle mechanism, the distraction to political participation is also implemented (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017, p. 259). The performance mechanism is highlighted to fulfil the demands of the ruled; this encompasses socio-economic considerations, which may establish perceived legitimacy among authoritarian regimes if socio-economic proxies are high enough to satisfy the population's expectations (Geddes and Zaller, 1989). Lastly, the democratic-procedural mechanism indicates that nominal adoption of democratic institutions (e.g. legislature, party and, especially, multiparty elections) to prolong their rule and strengthen their legitimacy to both domestic and international audiences (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017).

Similarly, Von Soest and Grauvogel (2017) define six legitimacy claim types: (1) foundational myth, (2) ideology, (3) personalism, (4) performance (5) international engagement and (6) procedures. Furthermore, beyond the typological work of legitimacy claims and authoritarian regime resilience, Maerz (2018b) argues that in the data of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) explaining 62 cases of surviving authoritarian regimes, not only communist regimes but also other formats of authoritarianism could not be summarised particular conjunctional condition in the legitimation, repression and co-optation. For example, in the descriptive comparative case study of Russia, Venezuela and the Seychelles, each polity's legitimation claim strategies – which attempt to improve domestic legitimacy and de-legitimise the opposition as enemies and outsiders using the dynamics of legitimation narrative – are similar. However, their contents of the claims are different; for instance, Russia highlights order, stability, nationalism and anti-Westernism, whereas Venezuela emphasises socialism, rejection of capitalism and anti-Westernism as well (Mazepus *et al.*, 2016).

As in previous examples, research on legitimation and legitimacy requires contextualised backgrounds for the concept of legitimacy, including explanations of different objects of legitimacy. In order to analyse legitimacy claims by the ruler and legitimacy beliefs of the ruled, the range of the broader political community and how people recognise specific regime institutions should be considered (Thyen and Gerschewski, 2018). Rulers of resilient

authoritarian regimes engineer institutional choice and manipulation. Therefore, researchers need to focus on contextual knowledge and discern key elements of context (Schedler, 2009). This dissertation applies this emphasis on the importance of backgrounds for selected cases, identifying detailed mechanisms of legitimation claims and the power of regime resilience.

Studying legitimation and legitimacy in non-democratic settings presents a number of challenges. In the growing literature, large-N text analysis studies may be able to access data on legitimation arguments by the ruler, but actual reverberation of legitimation claims among the ruled are hard to capture using such datasets. On the other hand, many qualitative case studies do not fully elaborate the concept of legitimacy and legitimation without specifically operationalised concepts and measurement strategies to conduct the case study (von Haldenwang, 2016). Therefore, future research on legitimation efforts by the regime for resilience against regime challenges could be usefully conducted with a comprehensive definition of legitimacy and legitimation process and a concrete measurement strategy toward the legitimation process.

Legitimation Claims, Propaganda and Resilience of Authoritarianism

Beyond the conceptual debate on legitimacy and legitimation in authoritarianism, recent literature has focused on diverse social phenomena for understanding political behaviours of the ruler and the ruled in authoritarian regimes, using various methodological approximations of legitimation as their prominent explanatory factors. This section reviews how the legitimation effort from the ruler would have impacts on regime durability by examining the recent literature on authoritarian legitimation.

Legitimation (i.e. the collective efforts of the rulers for attaining legitimacy from the ruled) is often seen as a crucial part of the survival of autocratic regimes. Recent literature has begun seeking to empirically validate this claim. For example, monarchies and communist ideocracies among non-democratic regimes are relatively resilient forms of regimes due to their strong legitimation claims, compared to electoral or personalist autocracies (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017). Whether the nobility or ideocratic elites are devout believers or not is an open question, but strong ideology influences considerably upon improving elite cohesion (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017). A similar example would be found in the China case. In the reformation of contemporary party theory in China, particularly during the Hu Jintao era, legitimation features of ideology – including the normative justification of authority and performance – are reflected in a series of reforms (Holbig, 2013). Thus, ideology would be still regarded as an engineering tool for regime stability in China. This finding is linked to Kailitz

and Stockemer's (2017) argument for why ideocracies that broadly justify their ideological assertions in their legitimation claims are more likely to be a resilient type of non-democratic rule.

Some legitimation claim literature on comparative authoritarianism focuses on specific conditions of legitimation claims strategies by the ruler. Specific conditions for how and when the rulers attempt to implement the legitimation claims are not illuminated entirely in the literature (Dukalskis and Patane, 2019). Single-party regimes more actively engage in claiming legitimacy and de-legitimising their opponents relative to other types of authoritarian regimes (Dukalskis and Patane, 2019). This finding sketches a picture of legitimation claims and mechanisms of one-party regimes (e.g. Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea) for regime durability.

Rulers' efforts to make legitimation claims for regime durability are generally focused on the domestic sphere, but they sometimes also reach into the international political space or react to international developments. Strong legitimation claims by the ruler as well as certain conditions, including less societal connection with donor states, can provoke a 'rally-round-the-flag' effect that contributes to regime resilience, even though many practitioners and policymakers in international development regimes understand economic sanctions as an engineering tool for democratisation in non-democratic regimes (Grauvogel and Von Soest, 2014). Authoritarian rulers also use sanctions as a legitimacy-procuring device by calling on the people to save national sovereignty from a menacing foreign power, labelling it as unjust imperialist infringement (Grauvogel and Von Soest, 2014).

Along with hard and soft repression, the way in which rulers' legitimation claims justify repression is critical to regime durability. Due to the high cost of repression itself, authoritarian rulers would prefer to utilise their legitimation claims to justify repression and thereby diminish its cost. Edel and Josua (2018) found that the frame of rulers' legitimation claims for justifying repression, conducting a content analysis of a corpus of official statements after typical mass repression cases (i.e. Rabiaa al-Adawiya Square in Egypt and Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan). The rulers' frames are similar insofar as they de-legitimise harmful behaviour by the target of repression and illustrate how the dissidents' behaviours endanger key values, including national unity, sovereignty, legality, security and public order (Edel and Josua, 2018). Also, all authoritarian rulers may not follow the same frames, due to different political settings before the repression (Edel and Josua, 2018). Josua (2021) conceptualises justifications of repression and proposes future research on interlinkage between justifications of repression and 'state

communicative capacity', that is, how different degrees of state capacity influence the justifications of repression.

This implication suggests that analysing legitimacy claims is best done contextually, and state capacity should be also considered for the analysis of legitimation because different states' ability to communicate propaganda and political PR strategically makes a significant difference in spreading the rulers' messages to the population (see Brady, 2009, pp. 65–87 for the China case). This idea can be expanded to the main theme of this dissertation, namely that political origins and legacies of party institutions could structure the possibility and capacity of legitimation claims by the ruler in terms of their dynamics and strength.

Recent literature on authoritarian legitimation has shifted its focus from theoretical arguments to empirical evidence to learn how authoritarian rulers used legitimation in the service of regime resilience, applying diverse methodological approaches. The more contextualised single-case study is useful to find out how legitimation, repression and co-optation serve the resilience of the regime. Reciprocal reinforcement among the three pillars could be described as 'autonomous legitimation', and in the Singapore case, legitimation claims from the regime highlighted the performance of governance and community identity with targeted co-optation and less usage of repression strategy (Morgenbesser, 2017). In doing so, the government has enjoyed the outcome of elections under the conditions of fulfilled legitimation. This series of mechanisms are described as an 'autonomous' process for legitimacy, and this tendency would be described as highly path-dependent in the future.

Furthermore, a linguistic analysis of official government texts has been used to find sources of attributes and indicators of legitimation (Maerz, 2018a). In Uzbekistan, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government engineered the concept of *Ma'naviyat* (spirituality) in the society for legitimising their regime (Maerz, 2018a). In doing so, the ideological justification of *Ma'naviyat* is infused with nationalistic claims by the government and emphasises the movement toward restoring a pre-Soviet Uzbekistan, and it replaces of traditional assertions of the government before the rule of the Soviet Union (Maerz, 2018a). Not only Uzbekistan, but also the regime of Kazakhstan has adopted a similar strategy, highlighting relative economic performance and social order. Analysis on the political discourse analysis of two presidents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan indicates that discursive appeals to legitimacy served as a component of authoritarian resilience due to the features of legitimacy, normatively defining the regimes' right to rule and fostering specific modes of reasoning, including nationalistic appeals (Omelicheva, 2016).

The signalling effect of legitimation claims on socio-political reality in authoritarian regimes helps construct the conditions of regime durability. Traditional knowledge about propaganda focused on indoctrination of the people via state media programmes and official government publications. However, it remains to be conclusively established whether the message of the government's propaganda actually is believed and how effective it is for securing legitimacy. It may be that the more people are exposed to propaganda, the more likely they are to become dissatisfied with the discrepancy between social reality and government performance. In China, some evidence suggests that the more exposed a group is to propaganda describing the greatness and glory of the CCP, the more likely group members are to be dissatisfied with the government, but they also are more likely believe that the Chinese government has strong capacity for ensuring political order and they are less willing to express dissent (Huang, 2015). In doing so, governments' legitimation claims by propaganda fall short of the goal of indoctrination but rather serve as an effective tool for signalling regime capacity, maintaining social control, and deterring collective dissent (Huang, 2015). As a component of legitimation claims, this signalling effect by government official claims in propaganda can be linked to the resilience of authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion

Despite the development of comparative authoritarianism, including the 'institutional turn' and the study of 'electoral authoritarianism', previous literature on authoritarianism during the third wave has not sufficiently illuminated the relationship between the political origins of authoritarian regimes and how it shapes their legitimation foundations. Although this literature has been fruitful, these contributions only partially capture the legitimation and resilience of the one-party regime. There is a need to build and expand on this work in the three principal ways. In other words, we know that the origins of authoritarian regimes are important for their longevity and that authoritarian legitimation claims matter, but we know very little about the relationship between these two. This means that theoretically synthesising political origin and legitimation capacity contributes to the literature of comparative authoritarianism and the sub-field of legitimation and justification study.

First, future research can investigate the interlinkage between the political origins and legitimation claims for regime resilience. Each aspect is separately illuminated in the literature, but little attention has been paid to how the origins of authoritarian regimes – especially

communist parties – impact their durability. The aim would be to capture the degree of reverberation of legitimation claims given different political origins of regimes.

Second, for finding empirical evidence, research on legitimation claims and their effect on regime resilience can focus on highly contextualised mechanisms in specific regime cases. Even though typological research of legitimation claims and the 'three pillars' approach of autocracy durability provide useful knowledge about dynamics as typological interpretation in an autocracy, the complementary aspect of these pillars for the resilience of regimes is still not fully elaborated with empirical evidence, including causal process observations (CPOs) or mechanistic evidence. This dissertation conceptualises legitimation mechanisms based on political origins to explain differences in legitimation capacity. By doing so, it analyses the mechanistic evidence from various qualitative text analyses and archival work of official statements, addresses and media coverages in the selected cases.

Finally, despite the large volume of research focused on communist and post-communist countries, including China, Vietnam, Cuba and North Korea, there is a lack of literature on the explanations about regime resilience and failure of post-communist party regimes in East Asia – including Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea – with comparative angles of authoritarian institutionalism on legitimation. Notably, the literature on Vietnam mainly focuses on economic reformation, whereas literature on Mongolia emphasises how the regime achieved a smooth political transition to democracy in the post-communist era.

In short, previous literature provides only a partial understanding of how the rulers strategically use the legitimation claims for the response of regime crisis and how the state apparatus, including repression strategies and co-optation processes engineered by rulers' legitimation claims to prolong their regimes. However, more interestingly, given that a dominant political party is a commonly identified factor for the longevity of authoritarian regimes, the previous literature has not sufficiently elaborated how a regime's political origin – including that of its party institution – had consequential impacts on the variations in political resilience and collapse as outcomes. For this reason, this research handles the scope of question about authoritarianism as: (1) political origins (i.e. how the political party has seized power), (2) how the legitimation claims of rulers have reverberated to the society given that they were shaped by these origins and (3) political outcome as the resilience of regimes. The relationship between the political origins and resonance of legitimation claims receives little attention in the recent literature, and the puzzle remains: what are the motivations and dynamics of this authoritarian institution change and how do legitimation claims shape these possibilities? This project will seek to solve this research puzzle by arguing that the origins of regime (communist

party systems in this case) structure the legitimation claims that a regime can make, far into the future, because the origins and structured options available to communist parties influence their ability to legitimate their rule (i.e. legitimation capacity) and thereby has a strong bearing on their resilience. In the next chapter, the theory portion of this research will cover these rationales.

Chapter 3 - Institutional Legacies of Political Origins and Reverberation of Legitimation Claims

This chapter will propose a conceptualisation of the interactions among political origins (especially communist party setting), capacity of legitimation claims, and regime resilience. On this basis, some light can be shed on three main questions: (1) why are some one-party communist states more resilient than others?; (2) what role do legitimation claims play in the resilience of these regimes?; and (3) perhaps most importantly, how do different regime origins affect (a) the options available to the ruler as it considers its legitimation strategies, (b) the reverberation or resonance of the legitimation claims among different audiences, and consequently how these processes influence regime resilience and failure after the collapse of the USSR?

The chapter argues that institutional legacies of the communist party shape the nature of the resulting regime resilience because different objective party origins either facilitate or limit processes of legitimation, based on the evidence of qualitative text analysis in the legitimation claims text corpus and empirical archival research of the cases. To build the argument, two different legitimation mechanisms are theorised: *autonomous* and *manufactured*. The autonomous legitimation mechanism is defined as positive social interactions between the institutional legacies of political origins and capacities of legitimation claims. In other words, institutional legacies are more of a resource for future legitimation rather than an obstacle. When the political origins of a regime arose mostly indigenously, the charismatic domestic ruler has various institutional incentives for justifying their title to rule based on their party's indigenous political origin. By doing so, legitimacy demands from the people reinforce the position of the ruler for seizing the title to rule in the *autonomous* level.

Manufactured legitimation is the reverse: institutional legacies are more of an obstacle to legitimation rather than a resource. In this vein, despite the ruler's efforts to manufacture legitimation claims, the legitimation belief among the ruled is not sufficient to fulfil the conditions for elite cohesion, and under the systematic conditions, military elites would be more fragmented. All this means that externally imposed regimes must work harder to invent or embellish a positive origin story. For example, during the early stage of state-building in Eastern European and Central Asian communist regimes, the local rulers did not enjoy the latitude given to indigenous cases due to the role of the Red Army in imposing communism

and putting them in power. The ruler, who is regarded as only a weakly legitimate domestic leader, must manufacture their title to rule. Of course, on some level, all rulers of both democratic and non-democratic regimes have sought to promote or design their legitimacy in various ways to maintain power. However, for authoritarian regimes, the origins of their rule become either an obstacle or resource in unique ways given that they cannot rely on procedural legitimacy in the way that democratic regimes can.

In this dissertation, manufactured and autonomous legitimation claims exist at opposite ends of a spectrum. When communist rule is imposed from the outside, the ruler systematically lacks the advantageous institutional legacies for articulating their title to rule due to the imposition of external power (i.e. Moscow). Even if the ruler attempted to impose legitimation claims on the people, the belief in that ruler's legitimacy would be lower than in cases of indigenous political origin; eventually, the regime will face a legitimacy crisis that it may lack the symbolic resources to meet. The theoretical expectation is that an *autonomous* legitimation mechanism emerges when the origin of the communist party is more indigenous, whereas a *manufactured* legitimation mechanism emerges when an external power has imposed the regime's title to rule. Authoritarian regimes can manufacture and distort the objective origins of their regimes via propaganda and censorship, but the more that must be fabricated, the more difficult the task for the regime. The different resilience patterns among one-party communist regimes after the collapse of the USSR are explained as outcomes of different legitimation claim mechanisms.

In the accounts of authoritarian regime resilience after the collapse of the USSR, various alternative explanations were discussed in the previous chapter, including the behaviour of the ruler as an agency approach, fear of repression, co-optation within bogus democratic institutions and mutual reinforce impacts among these for the stability of autocratic regimes (Art, 2012; Bellin, 2012; Davenport, 2007; Gerschewski, 2013; Greitens, 2016; Svolik, 2012). However, this research emphasises the impacts of different political origins and their institutional legacies on ruler's legitimation capacity to ensure regime resilience. This focus on the scope of communist party origin may explain why some communist regimes have enjoyed continued longevity whereas others have collapsed.

This chapter will briefly review the previous theories about institutional factors of the political party for regime resilience, and then suggest a theoretical framework for understanding the importance of communist party origins as they pertain to legitimation, the reverberation of legitimation claims, and regime resilience. Finally, it will propose mechanistic evidence and observable implications based on the suggested mechanisms.

Political Party, Legitimation Claims and Regime Resilience

Analysing political parties as a central explanatory factor of regime resilience has been a recurring theme in comparative authoritarianism research (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008). This research builds on the basic starting point that political parties are important to the survival of authoritarian regimes. It does so by focusing on the interaction between the origins of a particular manifestation of authoritarian parties (i.e. communist parties) and the ways in which those origins shape their future ability to legitimate their rule.

To build this theoretical argument, it is first necessary to inspect existing arguments about the origins of political party construction and how those institutional legacies enable durable regimes. Based on this theoretical background, this dissertation builds a theoretical framework of communist party origins, legitimation claim capacity, and diverse political outcomes to understand political behaviours of rulers and the ruled in (post-) communist regimes after the collapse of the USSR.

Origins of Political Party and Regime Resilience

In the comparative politics literature, there is empirical research on the relationship between party institutions and regime resilience. One of the findings is that different processes of party consolidation lead to differences in regime resilience (Smith, 2005; Hicken and Martinez Kuhonta, 2011; Greene, 2010). For example, under specific conditions – including a higher degree of opposition group power and a lower degree of rents capacity of the ruler to distribute rents for buying coalition – there is more incentive to make a robust one-party system; doing so eventually has an impact on resilience. Empirically, the cases of Indonesia, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau and the Philippines conform to this logic (Smith, 2005).

More specifically, staunch opposition and low access to rents to co-opt potential opponents helps incentivise the construction of a strong party (Smith, 2005). These institutional conditions lead to building a robust party and ruling coalition, which is a crucial resource for resonating legitimation claims among elites. Resonant legitimation claims have a positive impact on elite cohesion, which is an important factor in regime resilience. For example, resonant legitimation claims in society formulate moral uniformity, a sense of purpose, and shared social norms at not only the public level but also among the elite group. The shared social norms and goals serve to expand the legitimacy of the ruler, granting moral uniformity

and a sense of shared mission to the regime. By doing so, elite cohesion is enhanced (Schedler and Hoffmann, 2016). Under these political settings, based on the resonated legitimation claims and elite cohesion, the ruler's strategies for responding to regime crisis would be more assertive, and the regime could have more resilience even in crisis. In contrast, under the reversed conditions (i.e. weak opposition with high rent access) a ruler can build a shallow coalition with little investment in the construction of a political party institution (Smith, 2005). This reversed setting would engender a fragile coalition and weak party, particularly when the regime faces crises. The legacies of these various origins, so the argument goes, shapes the long-term trajectory of the party and thereby influences the resilience of the regime.

In similar logic, a strong ruling party has been regarded as a crucial factor for regime resilience. The crucial point of authoritarian regime persistence in the third wave of democratisation depends on how the ruling party maintains its position as the ruling party and builds broad and sturdy coalitions to marginalise the opposition and facilitate regime cohesion (Brownlee, 2007). The cases of Egypt and Malaysia show how the ruling party preserves broad elite cohesion through party institutions, and how these institutional features would improve regime durability. On the other hand, the cases of Iran and the Philippines indicated that elite rivals not organised in political parties were more prone to factionalism, which fragmented the political elite, leading to electoral defeats and destabilisation of the regime (Brownlee, 2007).

Newly generated data on 134 cases of autocratic ruling parties from 1940 to 2015 confirm that a ruling party stabilises an autocratic regime (Miller, 2019). For example, in terms of the party's origin, parties with 'revolutionary' roots are more resilient than parties with other forms of origin. This is because the ruling party was first organised as a violent revolutionary organisation, which necessitated cohesion and a clear sense of shared purpose, a finding that is compatible with the theoretical expectation of Levitsky and Way (2013). Cases of communist party origins in which the party was organised with international involvement also display relative longevity. In the autocratic ruling parties data, cases of revolution supported by a dictator, support of a dictator solely, and revolution case that party leads an armed takeover of the state are more resilient to regime changes than others by sequencing (Miller, 2019).

These empirical findings provide further research insights about how parties' historical origins have an impact on regime resilience. However, the autocratic ruling parties dataset merged the variance of communist party origin into one type of party origin. Therefore, for more advanced analysis of the communist party case, variations in communist party origins should be considered in a more detailed fashion. Not all communist parties came to power in the same way. Communist party origins can be divided into indigenous, external imposition

and mixed origins, and the socio-political reality of the regime and dynamics of regime duration would be different to each other according to the different origins. In short, plausible explanations about party origin and regime resilience would be based on both theoretical and empirical findings on the impact of institutional factors of the strong party and ruling coalition as well as ruling party and regime duration.

This previous research was more focused on strong ruling party and the dynamics of institutional incentives of the strong political party as an explanatory factor for stable authoritarianism. Beyond the strong and cohesive party, various institutional factors key to regime stability are generated by revolutionary legacies (Levitsky and Way, 2013). Political regimes that originated from indigenous and popular revolutionary backgrounds, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention, tend to be more resilient to regime crisis, compared to other forms of autocracy. Under revolutionary conditions, for example, violent struggles engendered rule by a cohesive party and enabled the party to have a great coercive capacity. Furthermore, revolutions evoked radical social transformation, and by doing so, led to the destruction of independent power centres such as traditional rulers, established churches, the landlord class and other political organisations. Using revolutionary forces, revolutionary regimes more easily penetrate and reconstruct 'title to rule' into the society. Furthermore, leaders with military backgrounds who enjoy the respect of the armed forces and high levels of elite cohesion are less vulnerable to military coups (Levitsky and Way, 2013). The different regime durations of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Poland and China in the late communist period reflect the variances in their political origins and their impacts on regime resilience after the third wave of democratisation (Vladisavljević, 2019). Therefore, for a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between party origins and regime resilience, it is necessary to consider both institutional conditions of the ruler for stimulating strong ruling party for regime resilience as well as other revolutionary legacies.

On the one hand, we know the positive relationship between legitimation claims and regime resilience from the previous literature section (Edel and Josua, 2018; Grauvogel and Von Soest, 2014; Holbig, 2013; Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017; Morgenbesser, 2014). On the other hand, it is found that certain party origins establish beneficial conditions for regime resilience (Brownlee, 2007; Levitsky and Way, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2012; Smith, 2005). The next section will review the missing link between party origins and legitimation claims, which are two important explanatory factors for regime resilience. Focusing on this missing link is a first step in synthesising the interlinkage between political origin and legitimation capacity.

The Missing Link between Regime Origins and Legitimation Claims

The relationship between the origins of regime and resonance of legitimation claims is not sufficiently illuminated in current literature. The puzzle remains: how do regime origins (specifically, the respective origins of various communist parties) interact with the capacity of the regimes to make credible legitimation claims in the future? What options do rulers have to claim their rule and, by extension, how do those options influence the reverberation of legitimacy belief among the people in authoritarian settings? Finally, how do these processes bolster or undermine the resilience of the regime? *Figure 2* sketches in graphic form the basics of this interaction.



Figure 2. The Missing Puzzle Piece between Regime Origins and Legitimation Claims
Source: Author
Note: The plus sign (+) indicates a positive influence.

This dissertation will solve this research puzzle by arguing that the origins of communist party systems structure the legitimation claims that such regimes can make far into the future, because the origins shape the options available to communist parties as they legitimate their rule and, thereby, has a strong bearing on their resilience. In the condition of a more indigenous origin of the political party, the ruler's choices of potential legitimation claims are more diverse and create more space for strategic consideration for regime resilience. Also, the degree of reverberation of legitimation claims is more intense when the ruler is faced with a legitimation crisis, compared to parties with externally imposed origins. By doing so, the party can utilise a higher capacity and latitude for legitimation claims and reverberation helps serve regime resilience.

For the reminder of the research strategy for mechanistic evidence, the detailed research method of the dissertation was discussed in a previous chapter (see Chapter 1, 'Methodology and Case Selection' on page 12). Mainly, this research was conducted as a comparative case study outlet, and for the analysis of the capacity of legitimation claim and mechanisms, a legitimation claims text corpus for each case was gathered in various archival work.[8] A thematic coding approach assisted by NVivo analysed the text corpus of legitimation claims.

Finding the relationship between how the party was formed in specific conditions and subsequent legitimation claim process – including the capacity of a ruler's efforts to justifying their rule – is one of the objectives of the dissertation. Theorising the relationship between regime origins and legitimation claim process, this dissertation is grounded on not only comparative politics literature, but also more broadly on multidisciplinary literature in the social science tradition – particularly when it comes to theorizing collective memory as a source of legitimation. To find the missing puzzle piece, the next section will discuss the theoretical framework on regime origins as well as institutional legacies, legitimation claims and the political outcome.

Theoretical Framework for Regime Origins, Legitimation Capacity and Regime Resilience

Before proposing the theoretical framework, and to help situate the theory, it is worth explaining a few simple premises on which this project is founded.

First, rulers need to justify their rule somehow. Therefore, it is widely recognised that 'stable political systems, even authoritarian ones, cannot rely primarily on force. The alternative to force is legitimacy, a broadly accepted systemic "title to rule"' (Lipset and Lakin, 2004, p. 209). For example, certain shared cultural norms and political cultures impact the way rulers can use legitimation claims for regime resilience. Indeed, this different political culture conditionalises different 'demand' sides of legitimacy, especially the meaning of 'common-good-oriented performance' of legitimation demand from the people, and the rulers followed

[8] For the North Korea case, Korean-language versions of the New Year's addresses are gathered from the Korean Central News Agency and *Rodong Sinmun* (the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea). In the case of Vietnam, series of political reports of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the national party congress, as well as other official documents published by the CPV, will be analysed. Finally, Central Committee Plenums and other party official documents in the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party archive and Wilson Center digital archive were used for the data collection of text corpora for legitimation claims.

the expectation for keeping the position of 'being legitimised rule' (von Haldenwang, 2017, p. 274).

Second, the manipulation of public memory has been a part of the legitimation strategy of all mass-incorporating regimes (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012); thus, by using a broad range of text corpora of legitimation claims, this project also focused on how the ruler re-interpreted a specific vision of the past with the purposive selection of memory shaping. Indeed, memories are always mediated by social interaction. Collective memory 'incorporates knowledge, beliefs, behaviour patterns, feeling, and emotions conveyed and received in social interaction, in processes of socialisation, and in the cultural practices of a group' in the broad concept (Jelin, 2004, p. 9). In this social interaction, the ruler of a regime could engage with specific social frameworks embedded with values and social needs shaped by particular worldviews for their regime.

Third, remembering and forgetting the past – which is a part of authoritarian legitimation practices – is a political process. By doing so, the ruler moulds new collective identities and new principles of political legitimacy out of commemoration (Bernhard and Kubik, 2016a). In other words, the past acquires meaning in its intersection with the present through the act of remembering or forgetting; by doing so, the interrogation of the past is a subjective process (Jelin, 2004), in which the ruler seeks to construct their legitimation claims by inculcating the people with specific visions of the regime's history (Brunnbauer, 2012).

Under these premises, different political origins of communist party regimes structure different capacities of legitimation claims, in terms of options to choose and the intensity of those claims' penetration into the society as legitimacy belief. I theorise the distinct mechanisms of autonomous and manufactured. In this dissertation, the term 'autonomous' refers to mutually beneficial interaction of institutional legacies, which was discussed previously. It has dual meanings: on the one hand, institutional legacies positively shape options and the reverberation of legitimation; on the other hand, it refers to rulers' advantageous position as a result of their higher legitimation capacity. In other words, the rulers are less concerned with manufacture of legitimation claims in the case of external imposition origin because their increased legitimation capacity shapes their claims autonomously to communicate with society. These different capacities of legitimation claims influence political outcomes differently. The theoretical framework of the dissertation is summarised below in *Figure 3*.



Figure 3. The Theoretical Framework
Source: Author

As a reminder of the introduction chapter, this dissertation establishes three different political origins of communist party rule: indigenous, external imposition and mixed. The criteria of defining these three different political origins are defined by the presence of (1) existing communist mass mobilisation from the people, (2) existing charismatic local leadership and (3) existing extensive interference and/or direct control by the Red Army or Soviet Union in the early stage of state-building. Indigenous origins are based on mass mobilisation from the local people, charismatic local leadership during an independence movement or war against other countries, and less direct interference of the Red Army. In contrast, external imposition origin has experience of communist revolution from the small elite groups in the society with the governance and cooperation of the Soviet Union, reduced role of local leadership in this process, and higher interference from the Soviet Union in the regime. A mixed-origin case indicates that both criteria are mixed as a theoretical threshold.

In *Figure 3*, analysing interactive sequencing of the origins of regime, legitimation claims capacity and political outcome is among the central interests of this dissertation. It is also important to remember that the main object of this dissertation is to find the missing link between regime origin and capacity of legitimation claims. It examines how communist party origins may affect the capacity of legitimation claims and its resonance for regime resilience.

In one further step of detail, various options and different intensities of legitimation claims can be theorised along two different pathways: first, the indigenous origin pathway of the autonomous legitimation claim mechanism, in which case the options for legitimation claims are diverse and the intensity of resonance for legitimation claims is strong; and second,

the external imposition origin pathway of the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism, in which case the options for legitimation claims are limited and the intensity of resonance for legitimation claims is weak. The following sections will delve into theoretical explanations about (1) institutional origins; (2) capacity of legitimation claims; and (3) the political outcomes named in *Figure 3*, namely 'responsive', 'ideological introversion' and 'failure of resilience'.

Institutional Legacies in Different Regime Origins

At a theoretical level, specifying which institutional legacies influence the authoritarian regime may be difficult to configure because legitimation (i.e. the diverse efforts by a ruler to justify their rule) is constructed by 'constraints of historically developed, socially transmitted, and culturally framed credibility' (Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b, p. 10). In this sub-section, I will review why regimes with indigenous political origins have advantageous institutional attributes for enhancing the capacity of their legitimation claims. Because the main differences are those between indigenous and external imposition, these two different origins will be discussed more in detail at first; mixed origin – as a hybrid category combining indigenous and external imposition – will be reviewed last.

Indigenous Origins and Advantageous Institutional Factors

This section focuses on the revolutionary legacy of party construction in the early stage of state-building as a prominent explanatory factor of institutional legacies for legitimation claims and regime resilience. The reason for analysing the institutional legacies is because, first, the narrative of communist party origin is strongly associated with a series of communist revolutions and, second, the ruler has incentivised manipulation of the collective memory of such revolutions for legitimation claims.

Indigenous origins of the regime afford more advantageous institutional legacies to facilitate rulers' legitimation claims. *Ceteris paribus*, first, such a regime has more multiple-layered sub-party organs which serve as a communicative channel of legitimation claims of ruler side. Different political origins of regimes determine the capacity of the regime to structure the sub-party organs and the capability to mobilise those organs. Perlmutter (1981) argues that to understand authoritarian regime resilience, it is necessary to focus on institutional arrangements in the structure of the regimes, and many resilience cases indicate a variety of corporatist and praetorian systems for the regime.

For example, in North Korea, strong ties among the leader, the party and the collective crystallised 'neo(-)socialist corporatism'; this feature may help explain the resilience of the North Korean regime after the collapse of the USSR (Cumings, 1993, p. 199). Various sub-organisations under the Workers' Party of Korea, including the Korean Children's Union, Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League, Socialist Women's Union of Korea, Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea and General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, have interwoven the party's rule deep into society (Ministry of Unification, 2018). In particular, the Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Youth League has a paramilitary organisation that includes youth shock troops who are mobilised for massive construction projects (DPRK Today, 2020). Indeed, Kim Il-sung proclaimed that all the people should be allowed to join the party, and for the young people who are not eligible to join the party and other adult groups, there were extensive sub-party organs open to youths, workers, women and peasants. This organisational history indicated that party and extensive sub-party organs had a corporate character and served the regime by constructing concentric circles toward the ruler (Cumings, 1993). These corporatist and praetorian institutional structure with military ethos under the communist regime would positively affect regime resilience.

Not only North Korea, but also other long-lived communist countries, have such broadly structured sub-level party organisations and a paramilitary for the vanguard of the communist party. Legitimation claims from the ruler can more easily circulate across and within the dense network of organisations that the party creates. In doing so, the regime's longevity is facilitated. Notably, regimes with a more indigenous origin would have greater institutional and structural capacity of building these sub-level party organisations, and the capability of mobilisation for the groups would be higher than that of externally imposed regimes. These theoretical explanations would be linked to the relationship between the origination of the communist party and capacity of legitimation claims – and, consequently, the regime's resilience as well.

Second, party rulers in an indigenous liberation struggle can more easily monopolise the security sector in the early stage of state-building due to their own military credentials. In doing so, rulers have more political space for the manipulation of the rule of title, without considering military-driven challenges such as coups. Similarly to the sub-level organisations, the diffusion of the party-military relationship in the communist political system frequently represents a military ethos and ensure that the legitimation claims of the ruler penetrate into multi-layered groups. Institutionalised military ethos and military-party fusion are typical examples of advantageous norms for building elite cohesion in society (Levitsky and Way,

2013; Levitsky and Way, 2012). The resonance of the claims may vary, depending on the extent of sub-level organisations.

Third, not only the regime but also the society as a whole inherits collective norms through the memory of revolution – such as an independence movement against external powers – and this collective memory is powerful material with which to construct legitimation claims. Broadly legitimised collective norms based on revolutionary legacies more than just facilitate elite cohesion due to a shared mission and common set of experiences. They also help justifications for authoritarian rule radiate outward from the party. Without the practice and repetitive actions based on specific ideology and norms, the legitimation claims from the ruler may not be sufficient to communicate to the public. For this reason, specific ideology, as well as norms engendered by revolutionary legacies under indigenous political party origins, help to ensure elite cohesion and provide sources for the ruler to legitimise their rule among the people.

Ideology and norms based on revolutionary legacies are not limited to elite cohesion; they also apply to the formation of collective memory among the people by commemorating and forgetting specific aspects of history. In the literature on collective memory and commemoration politics, cultural and institutional factors help analyse the political form of the regime; it is a process of interpreting a vision of the past to legitimise their rule (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b). As Nets-Zehngut said:

> 'Collective memory is powerfully influenced by the present via two main paths: first, culturally, through the inevitable impact of the culture on the way people view the past. Second, instrumentally, *through the conscious deliberate manipulation of the past for the interests of the present* [emphasis added]. This latter path, also referred to as creating a "usable past", influences the collective memory through activities of various institutions' (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, p. 236).

In a similar point of engineering a 'usable past', a ruler's collective efforts of justifying their rule by the true vision of the past are similar to the purpose of legitimation claims. In other words, analysing memory of politics is the examination of the relationship between memory provider (the ruler) and memory consumer (the ruled) (Verovšek, 2016), and this process is very similar to how legitimation claims function, albeit with a historical emphasis (von Haldenwang, 2017).

Under the situation of enough usable past, efforts of the ruler who justifies their title to rule acquire an effective legitimation claim, and the ruled have more legitimacy belief. This chain of legitimation claim reaction would generate norms and ideology among the society and

ruling elites; eventually, elite cohesion would be thereby strengthened. This mutual reinforcement process will be described as the *autonomous legitimation mechanism*.

External Imposition and Disadvantageous Institutional Factors

Unlike the indigenous origin pathway, when a communist party is externally imposed, it faces more challenges in constructing legitimation claims that resonate. The absence of advantageous institutional factors for legitimation claims weakens the persuasive power of rulers' legitimation claims to the title to rule. Even when rulers try to justify their rule with limited legitimation claim sources, and to imitate sub-party organs like those of the USSR, the outcomes of these rulers' efforts may require more extensive manipulation due to a lower level of legitimacy belief among the people. In terms of the infusion of the party and military monopolising security forces, externally imposed communist regimes rely more on the military and security forces, such as the Red Army or the threat of the Red Army.

Most cases of externally imposed regimes are those involving communist revolution within the ruling elites with assistance from the USSR (Khalid, 2017; Naimark, 2017). With this historical background, there is a lack of usable material to construct a collective memory to incentivise manipulation for legitimation claim that include an independence movement or revolutionary social change. It can be constructed, but there are more challenges because of the objectively external imposition of the regime. In cases of externally imposed regimes, such a lack of usable material for collective memory, as well as primary sources for rulers' legitimation claims, dictates the reduced capacity of their legitimation claims. In short, externally imposed communist regimes have various institutional disadvantages when it comes to the capacity of legitimation claims, compared to indigenous political origin cases.

Mixed Origins and Mixed Institutional Factors

Mixed-origin communist parties occupy the middle ground between externally imposed and indigenously achieved regimes. Such cases display some elements of both but cannot be said to be entirely in one category or the other. They have mixed attributes regarding communist mass mobilisation from below, existing charismatic local leadership, and existing extensive interference and/or control via military intervention from the external power, the USSR.

For example, in the case of North Korea, there was pre-existing mass mobilisation along communist lines against the Japanese Empire. Multiple communist organisations, factions and networks mobilised the people toward the national independence movement (Suh, 1967). However, after Korea achieved independence from the rule of the Japanese Empire, the

USSR occupied the northern half of the Korean peninsula and, from among the communist factions, approved Kim Il-sung as a leader. Kim was locally famous for his role in guerrilla operations against the Japanese Army and as a prominent leader of the communist movement on the Korean peninsula (Suh, 1988). However, his ascent to power was aided by Soviet advisors (Lee, 1963). In North Korea's period of state-building, it could be stated that without support from the USSR, North Korea would not have been able to build a modernised state after independence. However, it is also recognised that compared with typical cases of externally imposed regimes, North Korea had undeniable revolutionary legacies. Thus, North Korea was able to utilise a grassroots style of communist organisations and networks, party-military infusion and military ethos based on guerrilla operations against the Japanese, and collective memories of these legacies for legitimation claims. In other words, the mixed political origin of a communist regime indicates diverse institutional combinations for legitimation claims, depending on the context of its background.

However, it is worth noting that. in theory, compared to external imposition cases, mixed-origin regimes tend to have more resilience in the combination of the capacity of legitimation claim and legitimation belief among the people. This is because the mixed-origin communist regimes had some political autonomy compared to externally imposed cases. For example, in the history of world communism, many indigenous and mixed-origin communist regimes had disputes with the USSR after Khrushchev's Secret Speech in 1956 and formed an anti-revisionist movement (McAdams, 2017). In short, mixed-origin communist party regimes have mixed combinations of institutional factors for legitimation claims, and actual legitimation claim mechanisms would be dependent on the political background of the context of each regime case.

The Different Mechanisms of Legitimation Claims by Regime Origins

Different regime origins drive subsequent legitimation patterns. This sub-section will delve into the middle of the dissertation's theoretical framework (i.e. how different institutional factors based on different political regime origins conditioned the capacity of rulers' legitimation claims). Two main mechanisms of legitimation claims are theorised: *autonomous* (deriving from indigenous political origin) and *manufactured* (deriving from externally imposed political origin). The *mixed* mechanism (a combination of autonomous and manufactured) is also reviewed. This investigation reveals why a communist party's historical origin matters and, more generally, why the political origin of an authoritarian regime is a

strong determinant of its later legitimation claim capacity as well as legitimacy belief among the people – and, ultimately, for that regime's stability.

To begin, it is worth noting that debates about 'mechanistic' causation in the literature are complex, depending on researchers' ontology and epistemology. The literature agrees that explaining a causal mechanism is a critical component of causation arguments in political analysis when the explanation meets the credible standard of research practice (Gerring, 2010; Tilly, 2001; Falleti and Lynch, 2009). However, there is less consensus on the definition of a causal mechanism, the purpose of the mechanistic approach, and whether mechanisms exhibit a law-like property such as deterministic causation (Gerring, 2010; Mahoney, 2001, p. 579). For instance, in the deterministic approach, 'if the mechanism actually operates, it will always produce the outcome of interest' (Mahoney, 2001, p. 580). On the other hand, a mechanism alone could not influence the outcome because 'context plays a radically different role than that played by cause and effect; context does not cause X or Y but affects how they interact' (Goertz, 1994, p. 28). Indeed, because the mechanism interacts with the context, the outcome therefore cannot be determined *a priori* based on knowledge of the mechanisms at work (Falleti and Lynch, 2009).

The literature also debates the generalisability of mechanistic causal explanations. Despite the difficulty of configuring truly universal laws due to some bounding features, a causal mechanism implies a greater applicability than a single-case study as a goal of social science. Even when the immediate focus of research is on a single-case study, the theoretical focus is on a broader class of cases (Gerring, 2010). Tilly (2001) puts limits on this claim when he argues that, because practitioners of mechanistic explanation generally deny the existence of strong and interesting recurrences of large-scale social structures and processes, the utility of seeking law-like empirical generalisation is questionable. He asserts that comparative examination of mechanism and process is critical for expanding our comparative knowledge web. To help explain causal relationship underlying theoretical interests and, arguably, although the disciplinary standards for mechanistic testing are lower than those for covariational testing, plausible causal mechanisms should be empirically tested to the extent that it is feasible (Gerring, 2010, p. 1518).

To address this debated issue, revealing the author's understanding and definition of a causal mechanism helps the dissertation's later sections be more transparent and understandable. A causal mechanism is defined to elucidate the underlying social processes that link inputs and outputs, meaning that it is portable and may operate in different contexts (i.e. probabilistic). However, a mechanism is context-dependent. In other words, a causal

mechanism may result in a variety of different outcomes (i.e. it is not deterministic). Thus, a 'properly contextualised explanation allows us to identify causal mechanisms that are *portable and generalisable yet not so universal or abstract* [emphasis added]' (Falleti and Lynch, 2009, p. 1161). As a result, I take a case-based and mechanistic approach to understand causation, which links a set of causes with the outcome within a case. It is a synthesis of ontological determinism (i.e. something occurs within a case) and epistemological probabilism (i.e. we have varying degrees of confidence in the validity of a causal claim). As a result, our level of confidence may be higher or lower depending on the amount of confirming or disconfirming mechanistic evidence available (Beach and Pedersen, 2018; Beach, 2020). The following sub-sections discuss how the institutional legacies inherited from a regime's origins later shape its ruler's legitimation capacity.

The Autonomous Legitimation Mechanism in the Indigenous Origin

This dissertation defines positive interaction between the institutional legacy of political origins and capacity of legitimation claims as the *autonomous* legitimation claim mechanism.

First, an indigenous-origin regime has more capacity to build multi-layered sub-party organs. Institutional attributes of revolutionary legacy are summarised as multi-layered sub-party organs that incentivise the penetration of legitimation claims into society. These institutional attributes influence the capacity of legitimation claims – that is, the diversity of options to choose and higher intensity of resonance of legitimation claims at both the elite and public levels.

Second, effective control of military and security sectors by communist parties with indigenous origins positively affects rulers' legitimation claim capacity. Under the revolutionary legacy and the cohesive ruling party conditions, tight partisan penetration of the security forces and effective coercive structure made durable regimes (Levitsky and Way, 2013). This explanation of the monopoly of military power via party-military infusion under revolutionary legacy would be linked to the implications of regime durability cases, including China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. All four cases have revolutionary legacy variables, which account for why revolutionary regimes are more resilient. These include: (1) destruction of an independent power centre, (2) strong ruling party and institutionalised military ethos in the political party movement, (3) invulnerability to coups due to party-military fusion and (4) enhanced coercive capacity as a garrison state (Levitsky and Way, 2013). In doing so, genuine control of an indigenous-origin party over the military and security sectors facilitates its ruler's legitimation claims, by less concerning other military crises, because under party control, the

party-military force would be different from the traditional military force may over time boost its power.

Third, under indigenous origin, not only regimes but also the society as a whole have more advantageous norms for facilitating legitimation claims. In other words, there are more usable materials to build collective memory, myths, and narratives for legitimation claims. When it comes to the revolutionary insurgency in the early stage of state-building, the experience of violence from a revolutionary legacy would be a favourable implication for the manipulation of vision of the past in service of legitimation claims. This is because 'the more violent the break with the past, the easier it is to break decisively with the legitimating historical myths of the previous regime and propose new variants of collective memory' (Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b, p. 22). Thus, the collective memory would serve to both legitimatise claims and strengthen elite cohesion by commemorating revolutionary work, including national independent or war against external powers.



Figure 4. The Indigenous Origin Pathway
Source: Author

In short, the autonomous legitimation claim mechanism would be relatively more advantageous to a regime with violent, revolutionary institutional legacies. Therefore, legitimation belief among the ruled is strong enough to catalyse elite cohesion, and this strong legitimacy belief functions as the basis of regime resilience, even when the ruler is faced with regime crisis (see *Figure 4*). The definitional term 'autonomous' has double meanings. To begin, it explains how these institutional legacies of indigenous political origin shape the beneficial landscape of legitimation capacity as reciprocal interlinkages. Second, it demonstrates the status of a ruler who enjoys the benefits of legitimation capacity more free from external

constraints compared to an externally imposed regime in which the ruler manufactured legitimation claims to justify their imposed rule. The case of Vietnam after the collapse of the USSR, for example, illustrates the successful legitimation claim case under institutional attributes of a revolutionary legacy. The next section will theorise as to how an externally imposed communist party performs under weak or absent institutional attributes of a revolutionary legacy.

The Manufactured Legitimation Mechanism in the External Imposition Origin

The manufactured legitimation mechanism has been influenced by three disadvantageous institutional origins. *Ceteris paribus*: first, lesser or merely nominal multi-layered sub-party organs and weak transmission of rulers' claims reduce the capacity of legitimation. Second, incomplete military control by the party and high dependence on external power in the security section during the early stage of state-building decreases the capacity of legitimation claims of the rulers. This feature of the weak relationship between party line and military sector reduces the chance of monopolising coercive power by the domestic rulers and security section. As a result, a schism among military elites will challenge the rulers, thereby expanding elite fragmentation and reducing the rulers' capacity of legitimation claims. Third, the absence of advantageous norms via revolutions or war against external enemies lessen the capacity of legitimation. This external imposition origin with the manufactured legitimation claim could be generated under conditions that lack the chance for socialist or communism mass mobilisation draws, absent charismatic local leadership and interference by an external power such as the Red Army in the early stage of state-building.

First of all, under the external imposition political origin, the ruler's capacity for building multi-layered sub-party organs is limited; the rulers even try to imitate the USSR, the manipulated sub-party organs not exclusively function likewise of the indigenous origin regimes. The less functioning sub-party organs are different from the indigenous origin, regarding the role of transmission of legitimation claims to the society. Even if the link between the rulers and sub-party organs in the society is structured, the flow of the claims and reaction of the claims from the ruled (reverberation of the claims) would be unenthusiastic due to exogenous features of regime origin.

Furthermore, externally imposed regimes have a pseudo party–military infusion that hinders rulers' efforts to justify their rule in several ways. It provokes a schism among military elites due to the lack of a state monopoly on violence (owing to the external power's ability to use violence on the regime's people) including the security section, and in the early stage of

stage-building, the rulers may be highly dependent on the externally imposed power, such as the Red Army. These features increase when there are disputes between professional military officers and political entrepreneurs among military elites. In doing so, the ruler should be seriously concerned by the potential for fragmentation among ruling elites as well as the potential crisis of a military coup, because the justification for their rule is highly based on the patronage relationship with the Soviet Union.

Indigenous-origin regimes' military ethos and adequate control of state violence apparatuses appear as shared social norms throughout society and positively affect their legitimation capacity. However, an externally imposed local ruler's weak grip on the military and security sector may lead to information asymmetry among the party, the military and security sections, and Moscow – which holds the actual power. These complex dynamics under the external imposition origin structure reduce the capacity of legitimation claims of such rulers.

More details will be discussed in Chapter 5 but, for instance, the establishment of the Mongolian military and security sections backed by the Soviet Red Army in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (1939) and, later, most of the key figures responsible for the sections were recruited to rely on Moscow's approval. In comparison to cases of indigenous origin, the Mongolian Revolutionary Party was forced to place much of its military and security sector under Moscow's influence, resulting in the political outcome of the local leader's limited legitimation capacity. Along with the dissolution of the USSR, the long-standing imposed regime faced a legitimacy crisis. This case demonstrates how a ruler's legitimation capacity and regime resilience are affected by an externally imposed regime origin, which results in an ineffective control of the state repression apparatus.

Finally, the lack of beneficial collective memories, including national independence or wars against external powers, and memories of external imposition by foreign powers reduces the resources for the ruler's legitimation claims to justify their rule. Reinterpretation of history is not merely referring the past again, because the ruler's purpose in such reinterpretation is building manipulation of collective memory, which is 'socially framed individual memories and collective commemorative representations and mnemonic traces' (Olick, 1999, p. 336).

Generally speaking, collective memory would be constructed through reminiscences, personal testimony, oral history, tradition, myth, style, language, art, popular culture and the built world (Olick, 1999). On the one hand, collective memory influences usable past, which forms 'present' identity. This identity is also part of the cultural constitution of political identities and activities, and this discursive dimension of politics emphasised: 'political language, symbolism and *claim-making* [emphasis added] as constitutive of interests and

identities' (Olick, 1999, p. 337). On the other hand, rulers – including powerful institutions – assign greater importance to some histories than others and provide narrative patterns and exemplars of how individuals can and should remember them, and stimulate memory in various ways (Olick, 1999). Therefore, authoritarian rulers who want to justify their rule recognise the importance of collective memory and manipulate it for that purpose. For this reason, the lack of beneficial collective memories, including the commemoration of historical events and advantageous norm – for instance, military ethos – is systematically disadvantageous conditions of rulers for legitimation claims, and also these conditions do not provide specific incentive norms or ideological resources for elite cohesion.

In summary, the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism occurs in the non-revolutionary institutional legacies of externally imposed regimes. Thus, legitimation belief among the ruled is not sufficient to facilitate elite cohesion, and under the systematic conditions, military elites would be more fragmented. This lower level of legitimation reverberation and elite fragmentation affect regime failure after the collapse of the USSR, when rulers cannot handle the crises they faced (see *Figure 5*). For example, in Mongolia – as a typical case of external imposition origin – the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party as the ruling party had enjoyed a long regime duration of around 70 years. However, the regime's resilience failed after the collapse of the USSR. It collapsed quickly once its external patron collapsed. Even though it was seemingly resilient because it had survived for so long as the first communist republic outside of the USSR, the source of its resilience was quickly revealed to be external, not internal (Heaton, 1991; Bilskie and Arnold, 2002; Ginsburg, 1995).



Figure 5. The External Imposition Origin Pathway
Source: Author

Mixed Legitimation Claims Scenarios in the Mixed Origin

Because of the complex combination of institutional legacies and their absence of advantageous institutional features, constructing a mixed legitimation claim mechanism may be difficult. For example, the institutional legacies of mixed origins could provide a variety of scenarios regarding legitimation capacity. Therefore, in this dissertation, the mixed legitimation mechanism will be defined as possible *scenarios* under the mixed-origin communist regimes rather than precisely defining it as mechanism analysis. Indeed, regarding the degree of independence of the regime and resonance of legitimation claims, it could be summarised that there are two types of mixed-origin legitimation claim scenarios at the theory level: 'type I' (lower degree of regime independence and higher resonance of legitimation claims) and 'type II' (higher degree of independence of the regime and lower resonance of legitimation claims among the people).

Table 5 shows different dynamics of state autonomy and how they could be compatible with the resonance of legitimation claims. The autonomous legitimation claim mechanism of indigenous origin is associated with higher state autonomy and stronger resonance of legitimation claims, whereas the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism is associated with lower state autonomy and weaker resonance of legitimation claims.

Table 5. Positioning of Mixed-Origin Scenarios

		Degree of regime independence	
		Higher	Lower
Resonance of legitimation claims	Higher	***Autonomous*** Legitimation Mechanism 1) External force controlled 2) Charismatic local rulership	Type I (Mixed origin)
	Lower	Type II (Mixed origin)	***Manufactured*** Legitimation Mechanism 1) External force's intervention 2) Weak local rulership

Source: Author

Note: Potential scenarios of legitimation mechanism transitions are 'Type I to Autonomous' or 'Type I to Manufactured', depending on the status of local rulership and political environment.

As a hybrid case, the mixed-origin communist regime has two possible scenarios. *Ceteris paribus*: on the one hand, under the 'type I' scenario, the rulers may not fully capture the state apparatus for legitimation claims. However, the rulers are based on the charismatic and reputable leadership, or the people may legitimate them for specific reasons (i.e. as a national independent movement leader). In this case, legitimacy belief among the people would be firm and resonance of legitimation claims would be high, and the regime would acquire

legitimacy for their rule. On the other hand, under the 'type II' scenario, the ruler might capture the state apparatus effectively with some assistance from the external power (in this case, the USSR). However, the alienation between the ruler and the people will be increased due to the background of external imposition; or the local leadership may not enough to be legitimised ruler; or, due to atrocious repression, people's belief in the ruler's legitimacy may be reduced.

Due to these composite factors concerning the relationship between state autonomy and legitimation claim resonance, it is difficult to use the scenarios to predict the political outcomes of mixed-origin communist party regimes. Again, because the various combinations of institutional legacies under the mixed-origins influenced the two factors, it is crucial to recognise the context of history in the early stage of state-building.

The Different Political Outcomes of the One-Party Communist Regime by the Mechanisms

The above sections investigate how indigenous and external imposition political origins condition the capacity of legitimation claims for regime resilience via *autonomous* and *manufactured* legitimation claim mechanisms. Ways of legitimising a regime's rule would be dependent on the different understandings of regime challenges and different capacities to legitimise their rule, based on the institutional legacies. The reason for diverse political outcomes in post-communist regimes following the collapse of the USSR is that 'communist successor parties and politicians face a different set of issues when it comes to self-definition and credible self-presentation than descendants of the anti-communist opposition or new actors' (Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b, p. 25). For instance, Vietnam embodied a responsive one-party communist regime whereas North Korea manifested ideological introversion, similar to Cuba. Finally, Mongolia represented the failure of resilience after the collapse of the USSR.

However, it is also recognised that regime stability does not have a fixed status, and that potential of revolutionary regime resilience depends on institutional changes due to the ageing of the revolutionary generation (Levitsky and Way, 2013). Over time, the historical memory of the party's origins – as well as the materials available to the regime to justify its rule – will change as they confront new realities. To deal with that issue in this research, later chapters will trace the cases of Vietnam, North Korea and Mongolia to three different stages: (1) building (i.e. institutionalised mechanisms of political origins of the communist party regimes and leadership succession); (2) maturity (i.e. the regime's rule is consolidated and serious internal threats are eliminated); and (3) crisis (i.e. the collapse of the USSR, which triggers different coping strategies and utilises renewed conflict, including anti-imperialism discourse for domestic political reasons). An example of stage 3 is North Korea's aggressive

nuclear posturing in the 1990s and 2000s would be explained as an effort to re-create an atmosphere of conflict as the regime's founding generation died off (Levitsky and Way, 2013, p. 14).

To recap, the dissertation focuses on (1) what is the role of legitimation claim in authoritarian regime resilience and (2) what are the relationships between communist party origins and capacity of legitimation claims for regime resilience after the collapse of the USSR? It is crucial that the sequence of regime origins and how regime institutions – including legitimation claim capacity – were elaborated, and eventually that its influence on political outcomes were examined to improve comprehensive understanding of authoritarian institutions and their impact on regime resilience (Pepinsky, 2014).

For this reason, this dissertation considers the importance of sequence for comprehending the resilience mechanism of communist party states. Indeed, clearly delineating periodisation is critical for temporal analysis, just as selecting and theoretically defining the temporal baseline and boundaries of political events in order to match periodisation to the level of analysis is essential for the analysis of causal mechanism and process (Grzymala-Busse, 2011, p. 1280). By delving into the sequence of (1) difference stages of communist party origins, (2) how the rulers legitimised their rule and (3) regimes' political outcomes after the collapse of the USSR, this sub-section follows the final objective of the research: *how different communist party origins structure the capacity of legitimation claims and political outcomes*. The next sub-sections will be reviewed how rulers' higher capacity of legitimation claims enabled them to maintain their title to rule after the collapse of the USSR.

As a premise, this argument is not based on deterministic causal inference. The goal of this dissertation is to conduct 'theory-building process tracing' analysing the causal mechanism between the cause and outcome. The analytical focus will be a theory-focused approach using mechanistic evidence (or evaluation of causal process observations) (Beach, 2020). Each empirical chapter addressing Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, respectively, provides mechanistic evidence of the interlinkage between political origins and legitimation capacity. Later chapters evaluate the relevance of the suggested autonomous and manufactured mechanisms based on the mechanistic evidence from various qualitative text analyses and archival work. In short, among the various causation arguments of autocratic stability, the argument of the dissertation provides a credible explanation focused on political party origin, legitimation claim capacity and regime resilience, which was not fully illuminated in the previous literature.

Regime Resilience under Autonomous Legitimation Claim Mechanism

During and after the collapse of the USSR, many single-party communist regimes faced regime crisis in various dimensions – economically, via decreasing trade with the Soviet Union and other communist regimes, and politically, via legitimation crises (McAdams, 2017; Kotkin, 2008). Surviving single-party communist regimes – including China, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Laos – have shown their own survival strategies (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020). Theoretically, these countries may exemplify the 'three pillars of autocratic stability': legitimation, repression and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013); however, this section will discuss how the autonomous legitimation claim mechanism constructs regime stability.

First, under autonomous legitimation, stronger legitimation claims from the ruler engender strong legitimacy belief and reverberation among the people. Of course, it should be noted that the relationship between legitimation claims and legitimacy belief is not an arithmetically linear relationship, and researchers have sought to determine their exact definitions and relationship (von Haldenwang, 2017; Gerschewski, 2018). However, in theory, it is feasible that the more the capacity of legitimation claims is increased by various options to choose from the ruler's strategic choices as well as by utilisation of sub-party organs and networks in the society, the more legitimation claims would penetrate and construct the social reality. By doing so, the people believe claims of the ruler more readily, and eventually, the legitimacy belief and reverberation among the people would be enhanced (Morgenbesser, 2017).

Second, higher capacity of legitimation claims from the ruler and enhanced legitimacy belief generates higher elite cohesion, which is regarded as a prominent factor in regime resilience (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017). The elites in society also align themselves with the reverberated legitimation claims, and the claims would be common norms of not only the people but also the elites. I used the concept of reverberation from Rosa and Wagner (2019) discussion of 'resonance' to explain how firmer legitimacy beliefs among elite groups reverberate to society and how shared social norms reinforce elite cohesion. They elaborate the concept of resonance, stating:

> 'In the form of the capacity for sympathy and empathy, [resonance] generates and signals demand for interaction and cooperation and thus social capital (as the ability to establish and maintain resonate relationships makes one sympathetic and attractive in social contexts). […] [the] capacity for resonance is not simply a consequence, but also a cause of the ability to accumulate social, economic, cultural, and bodily capital' (Rosa and Wagner, 2019, p. 38).

Thus, increased social capital positively affects one's sense of resonance with the world, but the capacity of resonance also positively affects the accumulation of social capital. In terms of understanding the legitimation process, it could imply that the ruler's legitimation efforts would be more effective in the presence of a firmer legitimacy belief. By applying the concept of resonance to the legitimation process, we can view it as a mutually reinforcing relationship between legitimation efforts and legitimacy belief. In other words, increasing rulers' legitimation efforts via the institutional advantages of indigenous political origin positively shape the legitimacy beliefs among the collectives of society.

As mentioned previously, usable collective memory is one of the institutional advantages of indigenous political origin. Recalling collective memory through revolutionary legacies resonates with the revolutionary factions (later the founding elite group) and with the whole society. Again, collective memory functions as a shared social norm that guides the behaviour of elite groups and society. For example, North Korea's higher level of legitimation claims (i.e. *Juche* ideology) and strong legacies of its communist revolution have determined the *modi vivendi* of North Korean elites and common people alike (Choi, 2013; Kim, 2013b). In this way, strong legitimacy belief among the collectives fosters elite cohesion and contributes to regime stability.

Therefore, we may state that regimes with indigenous political origins benefit from advantageous institutional factors that enhance the capacity of legitimation claims; based on a large volume of empirical evidence for the relationship between higher legitimation claims and regime resilience (Edel and Josua, 2018; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2015; Holbig, 2013), indigenous-origin communist party regimes tend to be less vulnerable. Both the autocratic ruling parties data (Miller, 2019) and descriptive statistics of communist party regime duration support this relationship (see *Table 2* in Chapter 1).

Regime Failure and Manufactured Legitimation Claim Mechanisms

Under conditions of manufactured legitimation stemming from external imposition, the process of regime weakness may appear as follows: the regime's weak legitimation foundation is unable to secure loyalty amid an unexpected crisis, which results in elite fragmentation and, potentially, regime collapse (Schedler and Hoffmann, 2016). This sub-section will examine how the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism may be linked to these processes.

First, a lack of legitimation claim capacity from the ruler under the external imposition political origin would decrease the actual capacity of the claim to penetrate into the society and secure legitimacy belief and reverberation among the people. As discussed above, the weak

infrastructure of sub-party organs in the case of external imposition and lack of resources for such regimes' legitimation claims – in particular, foundational myths and charismatic national leadership for the early stage of state-building – contribute to a lower level of legitimacy belief. Many externally imposed single-party communist regimes in Eastern European had short durations (see *Figure 1* in Chapter 1), especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In many cases, local regime collapse was triggered by legitimacy crises like that of the USSR (Pipes, 2001).

Second, the lower level of legitimacy belief that results – as well as the ruler's reduced legitimation claim capacity – provoke elite fragmentation. There are various political reasons for elite fragmentation in both authoritarian and democratic transitions. In the same way that elite cohesion is a prominent factor in strengthening regime resilience, elite fragmentation greatly contributes to a regime's vulnerability (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017).

In short, under the external imposition political origin, legitimation claim capacity is lower than under indigenous political origin – and the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism has been based on the disadvantageous institutional factors of the external imposition origin. Many cases of descriptive statistics of communist party regime duration corroborate this relationship.

Mixed Origin and Different Pathways about Regime Resilience and Failure

Various mixed-origin communist regime cases have followed different pathways toward either regime resilience or failure. This is because mixed-origin regimes do not fully share the weakness of institutional factors of legitimation claims or the full advantage of institutional legacies in indigenous origins regimes. For this reason, they either collapsed quickly – or, if they survived, they followed an idiosyncratic pathway like that of North Korea or Cuba.

It is hard to generalise exactly how mixed-origin regimes followed the political outcome after the collapse of the USSR. However, one of generalised findings is that, as per the discussion of communist regime duration in Chapter 1, the average regime duration of mixed-origin communist party regimes exceeds that of externally imposed communist regimes by nine years. Even more striking is the fact that, after 1980, mixed-origin communist party regimes survived, on average, twice as long as externally imposed communist regimes. These descriptive statistics confirm that a mixed origin is strongly associated with greater regime resilience compared with external imposition. The political outcome of the mixed origin could be affected the various context. For example, North Korea case showed that how the country would survive by ideological introversion; and as a mixed case, regime resilience history of

the Lao People's Revolutionary Party is different to the North Korea case by demonstrating Vietnam's reformation pathway.

Due to the complexity of the generalised notion about the political outcome of mixed-origin communist parties, this dissertation preferentially highlighted the difference between autonomous and manufactured legitimation mechanisms. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the importance of analysis of mixed-origin communist scenarios is enfeebled. Instead, it will be dealt with a more context-based explanation about the relationship between the legitimation claim capacity and the legitimacy belief in the mixed origin by using North Korean case that a still survived mixed communist origin regime after the collapse of the USSR. In short, mixed-origin communist party regimes tended to outlast externally imposed communist party regimes, reflecting broadly context-based political pathways.

Predictions about Regime Origins and Legitimation Claim Capacity

The objective of the dissertation is particularly interested in a specific set of practices – referred to as *autonomous* and *manufactured* legitimation claim mechanisms – in the various origin types of communist regimes and their resulting legitimation claim capacity. The above explanations suggest that, *ceteris paribus*, communist party states with indigenous origins have higher capacity and latitude to make legitimation claims – and, thus, that they should exhibit higher levels of regime resilience. More specifically, communist regimes' resilience should be dependent on combinations of their origins, rulers' options to choose among legitimation claim strategies, and the intensity of legitimation claims' reverberation within society. This logic informs a transparent evaluation table of mechanistic evidence in the process tracing for the suggested mechanisms (see *Table 6* on page 85).

For these reasons, this dissertation should see the different types of the communist party origination and the variance of legitimation claims with different political outcomes after the collapse of the USSR among Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea with a comparative perspective.

Again, the dissertation does not intend deterministically that all indigenous communist cases indicate prolonged regime survival, nor that all external imposition cases are undoubtedly destined toward the democratisation pathway. Similarly, it does not insist that all indigenous cases of communist party origin reformed more responsive governance after the collapse of the USSR like Vietnam did, nor that all mixed cases converted to ideological introversion like North Korea did. Rather than these over-generalisations, it argues that differences in

communist party origins structure the capacity of rulers' legitimation claims regarding options to choose and degree of reverberation of the claims to the society. These different capacities of legitimation claims affect the different pathways of communist regimes after the collapse of the USSR. By structuring the exploratory-diverse case selection strategy, this dissertation highlights that the diverse sets of interlinkage between communist party origin and legitimation claim capacity are the crucial explanatory factor for regime resilience and failure among the multi-causality factors under post-communist regime resilience literature.

Table 6. Transparent Evaluation of Mechanistic Evidence in the Process Tracing

Theoretical level Part of a causal mechanism	• Description of activity associated with a part of a causal mechanism Political origins shape later rulers' legitimation capacity. Different legitimation capacity contextualises regime resilience.
Proposition level Empirical fingerprint of activity, and theoretical evaluation (certainty and uniqueness)	• Description of proposition about empirical fingerprints • Theoretical evaluation of proposition: do we have to find it (theoretical certainty), and if found, are there alternative explanations for finding the proposition (theoretical uniqueness)? Indigenous communist regime has advantageous institutional legacies for legitimation capacity, so it demonstrates regime resilience when it faces legitimacy crisis after the collapse of the USSR. Externally imposed communist regime lacks these institutional legacies for legitimation capacity. Thus, it failed the regime resilience along with the legitimacy crisis after the collapse of the USSR.
Actual sources and source-critical evaluation	• Description of actual source of observation (e.g. statement by actor in interview, or extract from archival document) • Empirical evaluation of observation: what does the observation mean in context? Can we trust it? Legitimation claim text corpus from official party reports and New Year's addresses Expertise survey on legitimation in V-Dem data and Asian Barometer Wilson Center Online Archive and the Nexus Advance UK news media data

Source: Author utilised the evaluation table from Beach and Pedersen (2018).

The next chapter will examine how different communist party regime origins in the early stage of state-building engineer the capacity of rulers' legitimation claims. Moreover, to what extent the impacts influenced later regimes' resilience will be investigated using indigenous origin case of Vietnam, external imposition case of Mongolia, and mixed origin case of North Korea, which indicated three top tiers of higher longevity of regime duration cases, excepting Russia and China as great powers, after the collapse of the USSR.

Chapter 4 - Indigenous Origin of the Communist Party Regime: Reformation of Vietnam before the Collapse of the USSR

'[T]o be patriotic is to develop socialism; to develop socialism is to be patriotic. […] This fusion would lead to unification and to the favourable development of socialism in all of Vietnam. In our contemporary world, this path is inevitable; nothing can prevent it from taking place'.

Phạm Văn Đồng

Premier and a Politburo member, *Học tập*, August 1958, pp 6–17

'[…] [Our strategy] was different from and even contrary to Chinese and Soviet [models]. It is our distinctive product. […] This is [also] distinctively Vietnamese. Only Vietnamese people with Vietnamese experience on Vietnamese [soil] can devise and employ [those tactics]'.

Lê Duẩn

Comrade Lê Duẩn's speech at the Central Committee Plenum, January 1968

'The new [thinking] give primacy to people. The all-around and harmonious development of people is made the most important goal […] Encouraged by the CPSU's Twenty-seventh Party Congress and perestroika, Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress has raised the spirit of reform and employed the critical spirit of Marxist philosophy to look squarely at the truth, access the truth, and speak the truth'.

Nguyễn Văn Linh

General Secretary of the CPV, *Tạp chí Cộng sản* II, November 1987

Why are some one-party communist states more resilient than others? What role do legitimation claims play in the relative resilience of regimes? How do different communist party regime origins affect the strategies of the regime as it considers its legitimation strategies? To deal with these research questions, this chapter turns to Vietnam. In the theoretical language of this dissertation, Vietnam is a case of a communist party regime with an indigenous origin that helped result in an autonomous legitimation mechanism. These foundations helped leaders in Vietnam legitimate the party's rule amid changing circumstances.

Most regimes, both democratic and authoritarian, have a core legitimation mode supplemented by combinations of other legitimation claims. When the regime is faced with a legitimacy crisis, the ruler may try to shift legitimation strategies. If the reshaped set of claims is successful, the core legitimation mode serves to make the regime more resilient through an autonomous legitimation mechanism. This pathway is more easily travelled by a political regime with indigenous origins. If the trial of a new (different) legitimation claim fails, the regime may collapse. As discussed in Chapter 1, after the collapse of the USSR, most now-defunct communist party regimes followed this pathway; an imposed legitimation formula could not sustain the regime when the prospect of Soviet coercion was removed (Brown, 2010; Pipes, 2001; Smith, 2014; Steiner, 2017; Zubok, 2017). The manufactured legitimation mechanism resulting from externally imposed regimes proved brittle in the face of a serious challenge.

Unlike the collapsed communist party regimes in the world, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) regime has shown its long regime resilience by enacting political reformation before and during the collapse of the USSR. Various literature has already analysed the reasons and process of this regime resilience by emphasising collective rule among the higher Politburo in the CPV, vertical accountability by highlighting people's petitions in the name of improving governance, and manageable political competition in the election of candidates preliminarily despite a golden rule of one-party rule that has not changed (Kerkvliet, 2014; London, 2014; Vasavakul, 2014; Wells-Dang, 2014; Abrami, Malesky and Zheng, 2013).

However, this dissertation highlights legitimacy crises and responses as crucial matters underlying these various reasons for regime resilience. This is because, without consolidated responses against legitimacy challenges, other measurements would be worthless. By doing so, the regime could easily fail to be resilient. On the contrary, by adopting marketisation and globalisation, Vietnam's communist party regime has proven the opportunity of the communist

one-party regime to manage legitimacy challenges for a long time (Le Hong, 2012; Thayer, 2010).[9]

Based on the comparative case study research design along with Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, this dissertation argues that communist party regime origin (more generally authoritarian political origin) matters for the capacity of legitimation claims and, by extension, regime resilience when the regime is faced with the crisis point of the crumbling of world communism and the collapse of the USSR. More specifically, among the menu of legitimation claims available to the ruler, the regime with more indigenous communist party origin has more capacity to choose legitimation formulas and more likely enjoys longer regime duration.

For the historical tracing of the political origins in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), I consult various political and historical literature focusing on the origin of the communist party regime and how it seized power through independence from the French colonial rule to the independent people's republic. To maintain methodological consistency and so supplement the historical analysis, I also utilise textual evidence to triangulate the historical literature and to avoid potential selection bias (James Mahoney, 2003; Mahoney, 2004; Thies, 2002). To discuss the capacity of legitimation claims for the Vietnam case, I gather series of the CPV's Party Congress reports as a full English translated version by the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), documents of the Central Committee (*Trung ương Đảng khóa*) and National Congress (*Đại hội Đảng*), and conduct a thematic coding analysis of this text corpus for legitimation claims.

Under the hindered conditions for gathering information on legitimacy belief among the people in authoritarian settings, this multi-triangulation approach is worth using as a methodological approximation (Gerschewski, 2018).[10] First, V-Dem data of expert surveys on the legitimation process will be used as supplementary data (Coppedge, 2019; Tannenberg *et*

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[9] The People's Republic of China is also seen as a typical case of how an indigenous communist party regime successfully transformed its legitimation claim by accepting the market economy to secure the legitimacy of its rule after the collapse of the USSR. However, as the case selection rationale explains in the introduction chapter, along with Russia, because China is considered a great power state, I exclude it from the comparative case study. In order to generalise the theoretical implications of this study, I briefly illustrate legitimation claim capacity among other communist party regimes in history, including China, in Chapter 7. For detailed historical context about the Communist Party of China's legitimation, see Weatherley, R. and Zhang, Q. (2017) *History and Nationalist Legitimacy in Contemporary China: A Double-Edged Sword.* London: Palgrave Macmillan, Kane, J., Loy, H. and Patapan, H. (2011) *Political Legitimacy in Asia: New Leadership Challenges.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[10] This project was initially designed as substantive field research and archival work. However, under the COVID-19 situation, the feasibility of traditional field research and research ethics issues have posed challenges to conducting the project. Therefore, the author conducts qualitative text analysis based on thematic coding of legitimation claims with various types of supplementary data on legitimation claims.

al., 2019). Second, to contextualise the political landscape background at each phase of the analysis, various archival data at the Wilson Center and the Nexis Advance UK data are consulted comprehensively as secondary data.[11] Last, I examine how the CPV's legitimation claim reshaping has succeeded after the collapse of the USSR, by reviewing the perception of corruption, accessibility to – and accountability of – the government, and regime responsiveness in the Asian Barometer 2005 Survey data.[12]

The primary objective of the chapter in using historical analysis is to reconstruct the history of the CPV's evolving legitimation claims by tracing each critical juncture of regime crisis: (1) pre-unification, (2) post-unification and (3) the *Đổi Mới* reformation. Therefore, this chapter focuses only on the modern history of Vietnam from French colonial rule and independence movements in the 1860s to the *Đổi Mới* reformation period in the mid-1980s and the late 1990s to explain how the CPV had reconfigured its legitimation formula when the party leaders recognised a legitimacy crisis. For this reason, the historical analysis focuses on the significant events to explain the positive institutional legacies of the indigenous political origin for higher legitimation capacity rather than describing all political history of the CPV chronologically. A detailed explanation about the sequence of the *Đổi Mới* reformation itself, especially the marketisation process and relationship between the party and the private areas, would be beyond the objective of the dissertation project (For instance, how communist ideology affects the political history of Vietnam, see Vu, 2016; for the detailed process of political reform and changing the CPV politburo, see Elliott, 2012; for the comprehensive Vietnam's history chronologically, see Kiernan, 2017; for the contemporary challenges of the SRV's one-party rule, see Kerkvliet, 2019; Schuler, 2021).

The Vietnam case provides credible mechanistic evidence to evaluate the autonomous legitimation mechanism of indigenous political origin and regime resilience introduced in Chapter 3. Also, this chapter will contribute to expanding knowledge about the strategy of the CPV for regime resilience for the readers and practical implications of how the CPV will respond to Vietnam's future legitimacy crises.

This chapter will first review the history of how the CPV seized power in the state-building stage. To justify the regime's political origin as an indigenous communist party origin,

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[11] https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org and https://advance.lexis.com

[12] Data analysed in this chapter were collected by the Asian Barometer Project (2005–2008), which was co-directed by Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received major funding support from Taiwan's Ministry of Education, Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office (www.asianbarometer.org) is solely responsible for the data distribution. The author appreciates the assistance of the aforementioned institutes and individuals in providing data. The views expressed herein are the author's own.

the early history of the CPV and how these institutional legacies could contextualise the autonomous legitimation mechanism will be delved into.[13] The following sections are a series of analyses for how the CPV has successfully reshaped its legitimation claims strategy. The phases of legitimation and reshaping points are: (1) 'pre-unification' stage (from independence movement from the French colonial rule to the unification), (2) 'post-unification' stage (from unification to legitimacy crisis) and (3) the *Đổi Mới* reformation stage. For the empirical analysis on legitimation reshaping by the CPV, qualitative text analysis on the aforementioned corpus is conducted. The last section will summarise this legitimation reshaping and how political origin matters for legitimation capacity and regime resilience.

Historical Legacy of the Indigenous Political Origin of the Communist Regime in Vietnamese State-Building

Communist regime origins enable and constrain later rulers' capacity for making successful legitimation claims. This section reviews the indigenous communist regime origin of Vietnam, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) after independence from the French colonial rule and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) after unification after the Second Indochina War. It traces the origin of the communist movements in Vietnam and argues that these indigenous origin and institutional legacies positively affected the later party leaders' legitimation capacity by adopting an explanation of the autonomous legitimation mechanism.

In this dissertation, recall from Chapter 3 that indigenous communist regime origin is defined according to three criteria:

> *1) existing previous communist mass movement from below,*
> *2) abundant political autonomy of local leadership during the state-building stage, and*
> *3) absence of direct Red Army control and interference from Moscow along with the creation of the local regime.*

The difference with Vietnam is evident in contrast to the case of Red Army influence and limitation of local leadership during the state-building in the Mongolian People's Republic analysed in Chapter 5, which can be seen as an extreme example of an external imposition

[13] The Communist Party of Vietnam has changed names several times. Various factional groups in Indochina were merged into the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930. During the First Indochina War, the party changed its name to the Worker's Party of Vietnam (WPV) in 1951. At the Fourth Party Congress 1976, the WPV was merged with the People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam into the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).

political origin (for the detailed debate on the criteria of political origin, see Chapter 3).[14] This section will analyse these institutional legacies in the state-building process of the Vietnam.

Independence from the French Colonial Rule: The Creation of the DRV With Indigenous Communist Party Regime

The beginning of the analytical units of the historical period in this chapter dates back to the Vietnamese and Indochina peninsula under French colonial rule in the 1860s. After the Second Opium War with China in 1860, the French needed a strategic base, and Saigon became a new outpost base city (Goscha, 2016, p. 57). After the French army defeated the Vietnamese guards in 1862, Tự Đức, the fourth emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty of Vietnam, surrendered the three eastern Cochinchinese provinces. Vietnam areas were divided by French colonial rulers into three territories: the colony of Cochinchina and the Protectorates of Annam and Tonkin. The French Colonial Empire established the new colonial state of French Indochina in 1897 by annexing the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1863 and Laos in 1893 (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 296–299; Goscha, 2016, pp. 60–68, 70–81).

At the same time in Vietnam politics, Franco-Vietnamese collaboration and advocates of national liberation and social revolution were separated into several factions' political activities. In particular, many political organisations were organised in the late 1920s, influenced by revolutionary nationalism (Huỳnh, 1986). Among these colonial political landscapes, traditional Confucianism lost its influence because it was seen as an outdated principle of social rule after the fall of the previous traditional Nguyễn dynasty. Socialist ideas, by contrast, provided a theoretical pathway for nationalistic intellectuals who longed for national liberation from the external rule of the French Colonial Empire and modernisation of the nation (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 301, 349; Vu, 2016, p. 31; Goscha, 2016, p. 137).

The colonial policies in Vietnam changed transitorily with the establishment of a progressive domestic political landscape in France. The Popular Front government in France in May 1936 shifted to a less repressive political environment in Vietnam (Vu, 2016, p. 79). The Blum government appeared to be open to significant reform when it announced the dispatch of a Special Inspection Commission for the Colonies. During its short lifespan, the Popular Front introduced some major social reforms, including the approval of a labour code

[14] Of course, it may be difficult to find a single case of absolute independence from the Soviet Union because the mainstreams of socialist revolution and world communism originated from the USSR. Nevertheless, as I discussed in Chapter 3, this operational definition is composed of trichotomous (indigenous, external imposition, mixed) with threshold features.

and increased workers' salaries. However, the Popular Front failed to implement any significant political reform and neither expanded representative institutions for the Vietnamese nor created the Indochinese federation (Goscha, 2016, p. 155).

Under these conditions, the notion of achieving self-reliant independence for Vietnam without colonial collaboration was strengthened among Vietnam's nationalistic elites. Indeed, for the nationalistic elites, Marxism-Leninism and the Russian Revolution became an attractive milestone of the liberation of Vietnam against the imperialists. In this background, looking at the influx of communism as a political system in Vietnam from 1917 to 1930, we can see that the political activities of Hồ Chí Minh and the official process of the creation of communist organisations in Vietnam were closely related (Neville, 2018).[15]

With the assistance of the Communist International (Comintern), Hồ Chí Minh was sent to China in 1924 to organise Vietnamese communist movements, train party officers, and coordinate it with other Asian communists and anti-colonialists. Also, through mobilising graduates of the Communist University of Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow, the Comintern played a role in organising human networks for the organisation, including training leaders and supporting youth organisations.

At that time, Hồ selected the founding members of a new party and founded the League of Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth (VARY, *Thanh Niên*), which was the first communist organisation in Vietnam (Duiker, 1972).[16] In Annam in 1926, the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party (*Tân Việt*) was formed and changed its name to the Indochinese Communist League in 1930. In Hanoi in mid-1929, the Communist Party of Indochina was formed by the radical sector group in the VARY (Huỳnh, 1986). In late 1929, the Comintern sent an order for the end of factionalism. To do so, Hồ Chí Minh amalgamated the Vietnamese factions and formed the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1930. After the creation of the CPV, the Comintern ordered that the party change its name to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) to reflect more international movement of communism in other areas, including Cambodia and Laos, although their communist recruitment was less than that of Vietnam (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 364–365). In particular, Comintern's support was strengthened in the 1930s than in other times,

[15] His real name is Nguyễn Sinh Cung, and his aliases include Nguyễn Ái Quốc and Lý Thụy. He has more than 160 aliases and pen names for the independence movement and the communist movement. In this chapter, 'Hồ Chí Minh' was used to maintain consistency.

[16] The aims of VARY were deliberately kept general to appeal to a broad audience: national revolution, the overthrow of the French and restoration of independence through the organisation of an anti-imperialist front of all progressive factions in Vietnam. See Duiker, W. J. (1972) 'The Revolutionary Youth League: Cradle of Communism in Vietnam', *The China Quarterly*, (51), pp. 475–499.

providing resources for the ICP and guidelines on international affairs (Vu, 2016, p. 89). As such, during the early influx of the communist movement in Vietnam, it was influenced by Comintern like other communist regimes in the world.

However, it is worth noting that Vietnamese communist leaders had both independent attitudes and ideological allegiance to Moscow. For them, the Soviet leadership was not a dominant force, and the status of Vietnam was not simply inferior or subordinate within the entire Soviet camp. Vietnam's national independence with a socialist identity was complementary because the Vietnam Revolution considered itself to be a part of the world revolution (Vu, 2016, p. 92). These points featured indigenous communist party characteristics of the ICP compared to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The former was much more independent than the latter.

France's influence on the Indochina Peninsula decreased after World War II. As soon as the Japanese Empire was defeated, the ICP, a unified communist party armed with socialist theories, sought to establish an independent People's Republic, especially in Northern Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV). However, with British help, the French had already reoccupied Cochinchina and continued to occupy their forces there (Goscha, 2016, pp. 227–238). Therefore, the DRV launched the people's war via a paramilitary coalition, named the League for the Independence of Vietnam (*Việt Minh*), to seek a united anti-imperialist front (Tanham, 2019).

Unification of Nation after the Second Indochina War: The Creation of the SRV

The First Indochina War against French colonial rule ended with the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, and Vietnam was divided into the North and the South by the accords of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Goscha, 2016, pp. 282–294).[17] Then, through the national election, establishing the unification government was estimated, but on 26 October 1955, Ngô Đình Diệm established South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam). However, South Vietnam had weak legitimacy of rule due to its colonial legacies and ties with France and the US, Catholic cronyism in the regime, and corruption (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 407, 410; Goscha, 2016, pp. 297–314).[18] Also,

[17] According to a telegram on 11 March 1945 from Zhou Enlai to Hồ Chí Minh for the Geneva Conference, it can be seen that China was also deeply involved in the division of Vietnam and the future direction of North Vietnam. See 'Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Hồ Chí Minh (excerpt)', 11 March 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949–1976, vol. 1, p. 358; Xiong, pp. 12–13. Translated for CWIHP by Chen Jian. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121142

[18] Comparing the differences of legitimacy between North and South Vietnam would be worth researching. In this dissertation, however, I would like to limit the scope of analysis to the perspective of North Vietnam. The objective of the dissertation analyses the relationship between political origin and its impact on legitimation

unlike North Vietnam, the Diệm regime has been relatively lukewarm and passive in enacting land reform, which was an important matter for most people at that time, and abolished villagers' traditional right to vote in local elections (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 406–407).

Amid such political unrest in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or *Việt Cộng*) fought a guerrilla movement against the Diệm regime based on the southern mountains and rural areas, calling for land reform and the unification of all of Vietnam through the completion of the socialist revolution in South Vietnam. The *Việt Cộng*'s propaganda was skilful and hit its mark, and the growing power of the *Việt Cộng* was shown by its very ubiquity; they promised a social revolution to the people of Vietnam (Devillers, 1962, p. 18; Girling, 2016 [1969], p. 142). As a reaction, in the course of the Diệm regime's brutal crackdown on the *Việt Cộng*, indiscriminate oppression of peasants lowered popular support for the South Vietnam regime and severely shook the legitimacy of the regime (Kiernan, 2017, p. 420).[19] Various testimonies attested to the superiority of DRV regime legitimacy compared to that of South Vietnam among ordinary people.[20] Through the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973, the Second Indochina War ended. Following the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which had already consolidated support in South Vietnam, annexed Saigon to the DRV on 30 April 1975. With the fall of Saigon, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was born as a united independent socialist country on 2 July 1976 (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 443–451).

Based on this brief historical background of Vietnamese state-building, the DRV (later the SRV after unification) communist party regime has an indigenous political origin according to the typology of the dissertation:

> *1) presence of grass-roots socialist-communist movements, including various fronts;*

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claims. For further exploring the political context of South Vietnam under the Diệm regime, see Latham, M. E. (2006) 'Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation-building in South Vietnam', *Third World Quarterly,* 27(1), pp. 27–41, Goscha, C. (2016) *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam.* London: Penguin Random House.

[19] The US military and the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) favoured large-unit engagements, and they were less concerned about the guerrilla war in the villages. Their large-unit conventional war frequently devastated the homes and lives of the Vietnamese. By doing so, the guerrilla insurgency was fuelled via increased recruitment from peasants with grievances against the US and the ARVN. See Kiernan, B. (2017) *Viet Nam: A History from Earliest Times to the Present.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[20] 'They were drawn mostly from the peasant milieu, and they lived and worked in the countryside. The Communist cadres were constantly reminded that they must stay close to the people, and live and work among them. Another habit instilled into the Communist cadres was that they must keep away from the corrupting influence of the cities. In a sense, the Communist leaders and cadres had replaced the Confucian mandarins' Thien, T. T. (1967) 'Vietnam: A Case of Social Alienation', *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* 43(3), pp. 455–467.

2) Hồ Chí Minh's secured political autonomy in Vietnam; and
3) lack of direct imposition of Soviet Red Army in the state-building.

The following sub-section will discuss how the CPV's indigenous political origin provided advantageous institutional legacies to later rulers' legitimation claim capacity.

Advantageous Institutional Legacies for the Autonomous Legitimation Mechanism

From 1920 to 1954, Vietnam experienced two revolutionary processes: first, a cultural transformation of the educated elite and a distinct grassroots upsurge of local activism, and second, a nationwide protest provoked by colonial injustice and material deprivation (Duiker, 1981, pp. 5–46). Based on this historical background, 'the communist movement that rose to dominate the country's political feature was not cause of either phenomenon but to some extent a product of each, as well as both an agent and beneficiary of their powerful combination' (Kiernan, 2017, p. 344). This sub-section analyses how indigenous political origins had been beneficial vehicles for the legitimation claims of the later rulers of the CPV in terms of:

1) utilities of sub-party organs for transmitting the ruler's claim to society,
2) effective military and security section control, and
3) collective social norms resulted from the violent revolutionary pathway of the state-building of the DRV.

With these legacies, the later rulers could have a higher capacity of legitimation claims; in other words, they can more easily claim legitimacy and reshape the legitimation mode as the autonomous legitimation mechanism.

Tactical Mobilisation of Sub-party Organs and Roles of the Việt Minh and the Việt Cộng

Advantageous institutional legacies based on the indigenous political origin construct significant conditions for the rulers' legitimation capacity. One of them is, *ceteris paribus*, already existing sub-party organs, which were incentivised as a tool of transmitting messages between the party and the whole society of the state, served as a speaker of the regime's legitimation efforts (Perlmutter, 1981; Cumings, 1993).

As discussed above briefly in the DRV's political origin, the WPV had a strong legacy of communist organisations built up in the Vietnam and Indochina areas. The presence of socialist-communist groups before the official initiation of the WPV made fertile ground for the socialist revolutions, especially regarding land reform. Since the time of French colonial rule, inequality in Vietnam's land distribution had been regarded as a national social issue. The leaders of communist movements pre-emptively prioritised land inequality and independence

of the nation against imperialists in their political agendas (Moise, 1976). Communist groups had secured national appeals and the legitimacy to rule, promising radical land reform (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]).[21] This legacy of organisational resistance originated from grassroots resistance movements against French colonial rule. In particular, the village unit's high cohesion, due to the Confucian tradition of performing ancestral rites, was advantageous to organise and elaborate networks of communists in the local areas (Kiernan, 2017, pp. 326–332). The communist organisations actively mobilised in northern and central Vietnam, because both the hierarchy of village life and its sense of solidarity remained more substantial than in the more landlord-dominated, proletarianised, and individualised southern rural economy areas (Kiernan, 2017, p. 331).

Higher-ranked Politburo members in the ICP utilised various fronts tactically for spreading their legitimation efforts to Vietnamese society. During the August General Uprising in 1945, the ICP contained an estimated 5,000 members, and by late January of 1949, the recruitment drive had pushed the party's ranks up to 155,000 (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2001b, pp. 120–121). Many new party memberships came from participating in mass organisations, including the *Việt Minh*, and the National Salvation Association (*Hội cứu quốc*). The local party branch was the pinnacle of power in any DRV-controlled community (Holcombe, 2020, p. 63). By doing so, in the early stage of the DRV, the ICP effectively controlled local administrative committees, which was the regime's primary political structure in the villages to seize power and challenge the opposing group, the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Holcombe, 2020, p. 40).

Along with the establishment of the DRV, Hồ Chí Minh established the United Citizens of Vietnam Association (*Hội Liên hiệp Quốc dân Việt Nam, Liên Việt*) to replace the *Việt Minh*, which was a united front group.[22] In particular, the party report (Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập, hereinafter VKDTT) described the *Liên Việt* as 'a united bloc that combined parties, factions and segments of the population who are not affiliated with a party or faction but who have one common goal: the betterment of the nation' (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2000, p. 70). Through

[21] However, it is worth noting that the party's goal was to implement socialism, which meant changing the way the peasants worked from a private and backwards method to a collective and progressive one. Ultimately, the party leaders hoped to eliminate private property, not build an agricultural sector based on small farmers. See Holcombe, A. (2020) *Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

[22] Initial participating organisations are the *Việt Minh*, Association for the Study of Marxism-Leninism (*Hội nghiên cứu chủ nghĩa Marx-Lenin*), Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (*Tổng Liên đoàn Lao động Việt Nam*), Vietnam Women's Union (*Hội Liên hiệp Phụ nữ Việt Nam*), Vietnam Youth Union (*Hội Liên hiệp Thanh niên Việt Nam*), Democratic Party of Vietnam (*Đảng Dân chủ Việt Nam*), Socialist Party of Vietnam (*Đảng Xã hội Việt Nam*), Vietnam Nationalist Party (*Việt Nam Quốc dân Đảng*), and Vietnam Revolutionary Allied Society (*Việt Nam Cách mệnh Đồng minh hội*). At this time, the ICP had dissolved into secret, and Politburo members participated openly in the *Việt Minh* or Association for the Study of Marxism-Leninism.

strategic choice to reduce communism's revolutionary rhetoric and collective approval by prominent communist revolutionaries, the party leaders sought to appeal to the public for the legitimacy of unification, to counter South Vietnam and external powers like France, and to secure the legitimacy of the DRV's rule (Holcombe, 2020, p. 46).[23] According to Trường Chinh (Trường, 1960, pp. 88, 159–164, 210–211), the success of the *Việt Minh* depended on four factors: Vietnamese national unity (the 'moral' advantage as a sacred war of liberation) and three material conditions: (1) the organisation of (mountain) resistance bases, (2) the mobilisation of the Vietnamese peasantry and (3) the transformation of guerrilla fighting into mobile warfare. By doing so, he highlighted the importance of the *Liên Việt* front for the people's war.

Under the socio-political landscape, the WPV had utilised sub-party organs, which were regarded as transmitters for delivering the party's messages to the grassroots level in Vietnamese society. Various trade union movements, craft unions, and collective actions in rural sectors across Vietnam have reciprocal developed ties to the WPV's leaderships. Based on these sub-party organs' roles with firmer legitimacy belief among the ordinary Vietnamese, the WPV has been able to successfully claim the title to rule.

Effective Military-Security Section Control and Mobilisation for the People's War

Indigenous political origin facilitates shared experience of collective behaviour, including violent movements. In this process, the political party easily monopolises the military-security section that controls the state apparatus of violence (Levitsky and Way, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2012; Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020). The indigenous communist party origin with violent revolutionary insurgency means the communist party regime has a stable relationship with these two state apparatuses. In addition, using these state apparatuses, later rulers could

[23] For instance, due to the works of Trường Chinh, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and other party leaders back in Vietnam, Hồ Chí Minh's political power in the DRV had improved markedly. Chinh left his readers with the following advice on the United Vietnam Association (*Liên Việt*); '[d]o not be suspicious; do not be bitter. We must follow the model of Chairman Hồ and be lenient and generous of spirit. Do not unify here and split apart there. We must follow the model of Chairman Hồ and be sincere and thoughtful'. See Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2000) *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập (VKDTT) Vol.8 1945–1947*. Hanoi: Chính trị Quốc gia - Sự thật. Available at: https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/book/van-kien-dang-toan-tap/van-kien-dang-toan-tap-tap-8-88. Hồ Chí Minh addressed on the occasion of the inauguration of the congress to merge the *Việt Minh* and the *Liên Việt* in 1951. He highlighted steady progress on the road to democracy; the cardinal task (the patriotic emulation) to avoid useless waste of force; and that the parties, organisations and prominent personalities within the front must be closely united, cordially help one another, sincerely learn from one another's merits and criticise one another's shortcomings to progress together. See Hồ, C. M. (1951) *Address on the Occasion of the Inauguration of the Congress to Merge the Việt Minh and Liên Việt*. Selected Works of Hồ Chí Minh Vol. 3. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/1951/03/03.htm (Accessed: 21 Aug 2021).

effectively control the regime's messages justifying their rule with monopolised state violence. Genuine control of the party over state violence under indigenous origin helps legitimate the ruling party, because the party-military force prevents elite fragmentation by less concerning other military crises (i.e. military coup) and suppressing dissent groups. During a people's war under indigenous political origin, the institutionalised military ethos expands the ruler's political autonomy and mass mobilisation. Thus, a people's war benefits the rulers as a vehicle of mobilisation to spread their legitimation claims.

In a broad point of view, the international political environment surrounding Vietnam ensured that Vietnamese leadership directly controlled the military-security sector. Unlike in other Eastern European Soviet satellite countries, as well as Mongolia and North Korea, where the Soviet Red Army highly intervened directly in domestic politics, the Soviet Union merely supported Vietnam's communist movement, becoming its main supplier of aid, including military equipment, by the end of 1968 (Brown, 2010, p. 344). The absence of Red Army occupation in Vietnam may be due to geographical distance as well as Moscow's intended strategy; during the late 1950s, Khrushchev sought to restore the Sino-Soviet relationship and reactivate the US-China conflict in Southeast Asia by shifting the responsibility of Vietnam issue to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Thornton, 1974). Similarly, China's aid to Vietnam during 1965–1969 was substantial, from military equipment to Chinese troops; and leaders of the CCP supported the CPV as 'brotherly comrades' (Hồ and Zhou, 1968; Le and Mao, 1970; Jian, 1995, p. 385).[24] As a result, the absence of a direct Soviet Red Army presence provided the basis for expanding the political autonomy of Vietnamese leadership and the opportunity to strengthen the party's control over the military-security apparatus. This institutional condition established more straightforward responses of the party to regime crisis by exclusively managing the state violence apparatus when the regime endeavoured to reshape its legitimation mode.

In the domestic context of Vietnam, the DRV's triumphs over two imperial powers (France and the US) enhanced the party's control of the state violence apparatus. The leaders of the Vietnamese communists defined the First and Second Indochina Wars as people's wars

[24] During the *Tết* Offensive, Zhou Enlai proposed that the Vietnamese organise additional field army corps to carry out operational tasks far from home bases. Also, Mao Zedong advised Lê Duẩn not to fear the US. See 'Discussion between Zhou Enlai and Ho Chi Minh', 7 February 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, '77 Conversations'. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112172 and "Discussion between Mao Zedong and Le Duan," 11 May 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, '77 Conversations'. Translated by Anna Beth Keim. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113033.

and thereby secured their legitimacy to rule. General Giáp commented about the people's war of liberation:

> '[it] was essentially a people's national democratic revolution carried out under armed form and had twofold fundamental task: the overthrowing of imperialism and the defeat of the feudal landlord class, the anti-imperialist struggle being the primary task. […] Our [Communist] Party continued [in the early 1940s] to do its utmost to step up propaganda and agitation among the people, *to gather all patriotic forces into the Việt Minh, to build guerrilla bases, set up revolutionary armed forces and make preparations for armed insurrection* [emphasis added]' (Giáp, 1961, pp. 11, 35).

As practical measures for effective control of state violence, since 1946, the ICP leadership reorganised political forces into one centralised agency for a more vigorous surge of repression against domestic rivals. For instance, the former Traitor Elimination Honour Guards (*Đội danh dự trừ gian*), the National Salvation Police (*Cảnh sát cựu Quốc*), and the Special Investigative Units (*Đội Trinh Sát*) were merged into the Vietnamese Public Security Bureau (*Việt Nam Công an vụ*). Also, the head of this new significant police apparatus was a member of the ICP Politburo named Lê Giản (Holcombe, 2020, p. 39).

The party leadership not only controlled the military-security sector effectively but also strengthened paramilitary features in the fronts, the *Việt Minh* and the *Việt Cộng*, through the two Indochina Wars. According to Tilly (1993) thesis on war and the modern state (which contains his famous quote: 'war made the state, and the state made war'), the DRV's state-building process and the unification of Vietnam could be described as a typical case.[25] The *Việt Minh* effectively elaborated its capacity of operations to be funded by extracting resources (money and recruitment) from newly occupied villages (Taylor and Botea, 2008). Similarly, the *Việt Cộng* had important sources of income from volunteer contributions, the liberation of victory tax, extortion, and production enterprises. They sold war bonds to South Vietnamese peasants to raise additional money. The coercive power to extract by state apparatus increased the regime's financial status dramatically throughout 43 years of wartime (Taylor and Botea, 2008, p. 40). Creating military power tended to promote territorial consolidation, centralisation, differentiation of the instruments of government, and monopolisation of the instrument of coercion. These features are all the fundamental state-making processes; in executing them,

[25] Also, the DRV's state-building is a classic example of the revolutionary seizure of power. All the factors of success were operating at the decisive moment: the break-up of the enemy regime and the demoralisation of its supporters; the ardent desire of the people for independence; the existence of widespread mass poverty and disconnect; the organisation of an effective political and military instrument; and an experienced, flexible and skilful leadership. See Girling, J. L. S. (2016 [1969]) *People's War: The Conditions and the Consequences in China and in South East Asia. Routledge Library Editions: Modern East and South East Asia* London: Routledge.

Vietnam's indigenous and violent revolutionary pathway positively influenced the DRV rulers' legitimation claim capacity. In other words, these organisational features advanced the DRV rulers' legitimation capacity in reshaping legitimation messages when the rulers needed to reduce potential military and security crises.

Shared Social Norms Based on the Sufficiently Usable Collective Memory

Finally, indigenous origins provide material to construct a usable collective memory. These shared norms may be resources for elite cohesion and reminisced collective memory, which the later ruler may utilise for their legitimation formula (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017; Levitsky and Way, 2012; Halbwachs, 2020 [1952]; Verovšek, 2016). For instance, ethnonationalism and triumph over imperialists and external powers during the independence movement and unification process are potential sources for legitimation claims in indigenous political origin regimes.

The DRV's violent revolutionary pathway of state-building not only provides benefits of state apparatus regarding organisational features, as discussed above, but also incentivises non-material resources for shared social norms, including nationalism against external powers such as the French colonial rule and the US, unification of the Vietnamese nation, and social progress based on the socialist idealism for the party elites' legitimation claim (Le Hong, 2012; Thayer, 2010). For instance, Hồ Chí Minh's 'Appeal to the Entire Nation to Carry Out Resistance War', broadcasted over the radio in 1946, portrayed how the people's war could generate shared social norms. In the statement, Hồ declared:

> 'Men and women, old and young, regardless of religious creed, political affiliation, or nationality, all Vietnamese must stand up to fight the French colonialists and save the Fatherland. Those who have rifles, use rifles, Those who have swords, use swords. Those who have no swords, use spades, hoes, or sticks. Everyone must oppose the colonialist and save his country!' (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2000; Holcombe, 2020, p. 57)

These social norms were merged into a war mentality that incentivised party members with higher loyalty and nationalistic discourse. Thus, 'socialism is patriotism' discourse was diffused to ordinary Vietnamese.[26]

[26] This influence of socialism still has a significant impact on the value orientation of the general public in Vietnam, and even after the collapse of the USSR, socialism is recognised as a core value of independence, happiness, and prosperity of the nation in the convergence between traditional and Western cultures. See Nguyen, Q. (2016) 'The Vietnamese Values System: A Blend of Oriental, Western and Socialist Values', *International Education Studies*, 9(12), pp. 32–40.

In terms of collective memory to engineer legitimation claims, remembering the accomplishment of the party leadership of the WPV and triumph over two imperial powers had provided legitimation claim resources that Nets-Zehngut (2012) defined as 'usable' memory sources for the regime. For instance, the *Việt Cộng* propagated socialist revolutionary agendas to poor peasants for expediting their grievances, by denouncing the South Vietnam regime's pro-imperialism, to make people join the *Việt Cộng*. Therefore, two periods of nationwide warfare helped the DRV facilitate state-building (Taylor and Botea, 2008; Ahram, 2011) and enhanced the ruler's legitimation capacity along with Vietnamese ethnonationalism, based on relatively long-standing political community legacies and the promulgation of a unifying national ideology (e.g. nationalism against imperialists, completion of socialist revolution for the unification of the nation).[27]

Overall, combinations of these institutional advantages of sub-party organs, effective military and security section control, and shared social norms originating from indigenous political origin have shaped the political landscape of the DRV to grant the rulers great political autonomy to claim their legitimacy as autonomous. This autonomous legitimation mechanism contextualised a strong legitimacy belief among the people, due to widely shared social norms and elite cohesion. Consequently, based on these conditions, political results during regime crises were more resilient than in a manufactured legitimation mechanism where the regime's political origin came from external imposition. The following sections will delve into how the DRV (later the SRV) utilised legitimation claims and responded to the regime crisis, adopting the autonomous legitimation mechanism lens. For the empirical evaluation of the process tracing of the autonomous legitimation mechanism and higher legitimation capacity of the CPV (formerly the WPV), the following sections were divided into three-time phrases: (1) pre-unification, (2) post-unification and (3) the *Đổi Mới* reformation.

Legitimacy of the WPV in the Pre-Unification Period

This section analyses how the Workers' Party of Vietnam (WPV) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) had utilised a legitimation formula from the republic created in 1954 to the unification in 1975 after the Second Indochina War. Like the anti-imperial movements of communist groups in Vietnam, the WPV had incentivised nationalism for unification and

[27] Vietnam became a coherent political community at least a millennium ago when Chinese rule ended in the tenth century. For the detailed pre-colonial history of Vietnam, see Kiernan, B. (2017) *Viet Nam: A History from Earliest Times to the Present.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

socialist ideals for social progress. Hồ Chí Minh's charismatic leadership also continued to amalgamate these legitimation claims. Sometimes, the political leadership of the WPV emphasised the difference in political identity between themselves and South Vietnam's Diệm regime by criticising the inferior legitimacy of the South Vietnamese regime. These differences were exemplified by land reform to solve the landlord-peasant conflict and efforts to clean up the vestiges of imperialism. In other words, the DRV, which gained legitimacy as an independent republic against France, had consistently made the primary objectives of its title of the rule to complete the socialist revolution in North Vietnam, liberate South Vietnam, and establish a unified socialist people's republic in Vietnam. In this process, the DRV's indigenous political origin constructed an autonomous legitimation mechanism, which is not unilaterally following Moscow's legitimation formula during the post-Stalin period, but rather justifying the DRV's legitimation strategy.[28]

The WPV's Urge for Nationalism toward One Vietnamese Nation-State

Vietnam has been considered a homogenous political community ethnically and linguistically, with a tradition of establishing an independent political community since the 10th century.[29] This politico-historical feature led the DRV regime to consistently emphasise 'proto-nationalism' to reconstruct a unified Vietnamese nation-state as an ultimate national mission.[30] The WPV's task of national unification was to be shared among the Vietnamese as a social norm, and party leadership sought to mobilise historical experiences with the Vietnamese political community; by doing so, the WPV secured the legitimacy of its rule.

The DRV's political leadership sought to incorporate patriotism and nationalism into socialist ideology before founding the republic. The WPV leaders sought to package Marxist ideas to be consistent with popular nationalism. In other words, they recognised that 'to be patriotic is to develop socialism' (Vu, 2016, p. 138). For example, the class struggle within the nationalist struggle redefined patriotism and justified the ongoing revolutionary line of Vietnam. Before 1957, patriotism (*chủ nghĩa yêu nước*) and proletarian internationalism (*tinh*

[28] In the case of the Mongolian People's Republic, which has the characteristic of an externally imposed political origin, most of their legitimation claims passively followed changes in Moscow's political situation. These differences are evident in de-Stalinisation in the 1950s and the political reform period in the late 1980s. See Chapter 5.

[29] Today, 87 per cent of the SRV population are ethnic Vietnamese and Vietnamese-speaking.

[30] Proto-nationalism is defined as 'a bounds of national movements for mobilizing certain variants of feeling of collective belonging which already existed, and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations'. See Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992) 'Popular Proto-nationalism', in Hobsbawm, E.J. (ed.) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Canto.* 2 ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 46-79.

thần quốc tế vô sản) were different concepts, but after 1957, these concepts continued to converge. In particular, true patriotism is 'love for the motherland with consciousness of class', and it defended the WPV regime, claiming that the practice of true patriotism was possible only under the leadership of a Marxist-Leninist armed vanguard party (Vu, 2016, p. 139). Similarly, Phạm Văn Đồng, Premier and a Politburo member, stated at *Học tập* in August 1958:

> '*To be patriotic is to develop socialism; to develop socialism is to be patriotic* [emphasis added]. […] This fusion would lead to unification and to the favourable development of socialism in all of Vietnam. In our contemporary world, this path is inevitable; nothing can prevent it from taking place' (Vu, 2016, p. 140).

During the First Indochina War, the anti-colonial nationalistic features of the communists united several existing nationalist political forces. Hồ Chí Minh successfully created the New Cultural Program, which theoretically merged the communist and nationalist independence lines. This was to promote nationalistic identity and mobilise support from the general public of Vietnam (Duiker, 1995; Young, 1991; Lockard, 2000). For this reason, Hồ Chí Minh argued that all class prejudice, all interparty competition, and all religious and racial envy must be cleared from the road of the Vietnamese people's development, and under the flag of a united Vietnam, the nation's citizens had seen the form of broad-based people's unity (Holcombe, 2020, p. 46). As Girling (2016 [1969], p. 118) argues, 'the Vietnamese communists were not *acting* as communists, but as nationalists; they were the embodiment of the desires of the nation'. One episode illustrates the tactical concealment of Communism:

> '[comparing South Vietnam officers' punitive demands], the *Việt Cộng* cadre was barefooted and dressed in black like every other peasant. They made tax demands, but they were meticulous about paying for goods and lodging. *They did not talk Communism, or Marxism, but exploited local grievance* [emphasis added]' (Warner, 1964, p. 32).

It would be worth noting that for standing up and delivering public appeals against the French reactionaries, the party leaders wanted greater effort to seem the *Việt Minh* as less a tool of the Communist Party by inviting all popular figures, older religious leaders and wealthy locals not affiliated with any party (Holcombe, 2020, p. 65).

Since the establishment of the DRV and until the unification of Vietnam in 1975, the WPV leaders appealed to unified national-state formation rhetoric that combined dramatic victories against France and the US and anti-imperial confrontations. The more participation in the wars, the more patriotic social norms penetrated into the Vietnamese society, and under this backdrop, the legitimacy belief of the Vietnamese toward the DRV regime became stronger.

Therefore, the efforts to construct a unified Vietnamese nation-state provided fundamental justification for the WPV's rule in the DRV.

The Economic Mobilisation and Promise of Socialist Ideals for Development of Nation

Socioeconomic conditions strongly influence political attitudes, and economic development – which provides what the public want and expect from their ruler – is an essential dimension of regime performance, efficacy and legitimacy in both democratic and socialist regimes (Marks *et al.*, 1992; Holbig, 2008; Le Hong, 2012; Holbig and Gilley, 2010; Zhu, 2011). Given the precedent of many socialist countries, the main legitimation modes used by the leader were socialist ideology, personalistic cults, and economic development programmes; even the extent of the claim varied case by case (White, 1986; Rigby and Feher, 1982). The visible outcome of the economic development programme was an important key driver of the socialist system. Thus, apart from the debate on the validity of the statistics, most communist leadership repeatedly preached hopeful messages about economic growth and future prospects under the regime.[31]

Along with the unification of the nation, promises of socialist ideals, including the prosperity of ordinary people, incentivised the social contract between the Vietnamese people and the WPV. However, the actual economic situation in the early days of the DRV was far from the ideal goal of socialist development. In particular, the DRV, which is located in North Vietnam, where the disproportionately economic development of the French colony, compared to South Vietnam where the more prosperous area, faced major economic obstacles in food growth and transportation restrictions. This perception developed into a critical logic in which party leaders emphasised that improving people's lives is a significant factor in national unification. For this reason, the resolution of the Central Committee cadres meeting stated: 'If we want to have the people enthusiastically participate in the resistance war and support the resistance-war [g]overnment [the DRV], we *must pay special attention to improving the people's quality of life* [emphasis added]' (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2000, pp. 181–182).

To address overcoming economic weakness, party leaders implemented various economic revival programmes. Their perception was clear: if production was not increased and transportation was not maintained, the entire economy of North Vietnam might be absorbed by

[31] Analysing empirical indicators of socioeconomic development and evaluating the feasibility of national statistics in an authoritarian setting would be beyond the scope of this study. Instead, by analysing the logic of the ruler's legitimation efforts, this repeated emphasis on economic development in party rhetoric can be a useful example of how much the ruler focuses on socioeconomic growth.

South Vietnam and the French camp, and the people's material wellbeing could belong to the enemy's economic sphere (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2001a, pp. 30–31). For instance, Hồ Chí Minh encouraged the slogan 'Vietnamese people use Vietnamese goods' and implemented the Patriotic Emulation Campaign. The movement was a mass mobilisation that fixed Vietnamese daily life under the leadership of the party-state. It was a self-enrichment movement to benefit the Vietnamese nation with spiritual characteristics by insisting 'try hard to work quickly, work well and work beautifully' (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2001a, p. 75). Party cadres intensively managed this campaign and emphasised the labour norms in everyday life. The Vietnamese people were allocated production targets, and party officials formed a supervision group and established a reward and punishment system by the performance of the emulation movement (Holcombe, 2020, p. 73).[32]

Another campaign was the 'directive on the purchase of rice for Hồ Chí Minh', decided in the party's Central Committee in early August 1949. Party leaders campaigned to encourage the compatriots, especially those who lived in inter-zone areas, to sell rice voluntarily to the government because 'our soldiers have to eat porridge and then go fight the enemy' (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2001b, p. 265). This directive for the new DRV regime was carried out at every village level through the inter-subdistrict party branch. Furthermore, local governments competed for patriotic emulation and awarded certificates containing praise from Hồ Chí Minh to donors who completed the rice donation registration document (Holcombe, 2020, p. 81). This mass mobilisation worked because the DRV acquired the autonomous legitimation mechanism with advantageous institutional legacies from its indigenous political origin.

This voluntary economic mobilisation system was strengthened into a wartime economic mobilisation system through legislation. In Hồ Chí Minh's opening report to the party Central Committee, he made it clear that '[o]ur resistance war is a revolutionary war, a people's war' and legalised the general mobilisation law for human, material, and intellectual resources for victory (Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam, 2001c, p. 186). The DRV, thus, established a totalitarian-wartime economic mobilisation system under the status of a 'special legal regime'

[32] For instance, the emulation bureau is responsible for managing and pushing forward the emulation movement; the inspection bureau is responsible for observing the emulation work to draw lessons to fix weaknesses and mistakes in a timely fashion. It will help the emulation bureau manage the campaign; the judging bureau is responsible for judging the accomplishment of the emulation campaign. The bureau also needs to set the regulations for rewards and punishments in a just and enlightened manner. See Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam (2001a) *Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập (VKDTT) Vol.9 1948*. Hanoi: Chính trị Quốc gia - Sự thật. Available at: https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/book/van-kien-dang-toan-tap/van-kien-dang-toan-tap-tap-9-89, Holcombe, A. (2020) *Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

(Holcombe, 2020, p. 86). It can be seen that Hồ Chí Minh's authority was engineered in the campaign to encourage economic development. The next sub-section will examine in greater detail how his authority became a prominent source for legitimation claims by the DRV before the unification of Vietnam.

Hồ Chí Minh's Charismatic Authority as an Amalgamation of Nationalism and Socialism

Hồ Chí Minh can be evaluated as an appropriate example of the active role of local leadership in state-building in the conceptual criteria on indigenous political origin, which this study defined. The influence of Hồ Chí Minh on the establishment of the DRV and his political legacies on the process of unifying Vietnam is significant. Indeed, the charismatic indigenous leadership in the WPV helps explain why the WPV could have the legitimacy of title to rule in Vietnam after independence from French colonial rule.

As previously analysed in the indigenous political origin of the DRV (later the SRV), Hồ Chí Minh played a significant role in process of expanding communist movements to the Indochina Peninsula and the creation of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP), merging various fragmented communist factions. His role was to theoretically link anti-colonial nationalism at the base of the Vietnamese people to communist movements and spread them nationwide. For instance, the Hồ Chí Minh Labor Youth Union (later Hồ Chí Minh Communist Youth Union), organised by him in 1931, had served as transmitters of the communist movement in Vietnam, and this youth organisation had played an essential role in recruitment for the ICP and spread the party's direction and values throughout Vietnamese society.

The amalgamation of nationalist and socialist ideas was a crucial resource for mass mobilisation in the early state-building of the DRV. Hồ Chí Minh also devoted himself to this theoretical mutation. In an August 1956 *Pravda* article, Hồ' wrote:

> 'In a wider meaning, in the struggle for national reunification, the Viet Nam Workers' Party has never isolated itself from the fraternal parties, in its whole practice, *it has proved that genuine patriotism can never be separated from proletarian internationalism* [emphasis added], and that the fraternal alliance between all fighters for a common cause – liberation of mankind, building of a classless society, peaceful co-existence and lasting peace – is unshakable. […] *The Viet Nam Workers' Party has recorded big results in the creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the Vietnamese reality* [emphasis added]. Our people scored great victories during and after the war, in the consolidation of the completely liberated North, and in the political, economic and social spheres. Besides, the Party could unite in the Viet Nam Fatherland Front all patriots struggling for independence and national reunification through peaceful means' (Hồ, 1956, 11, 17 paragraphs).

Hồ Chí Minh's personality cult was one of the DRV's most important mobilisation tools since the ICP's seizure of power in 1945. As a great national and communist leader for the Vietnamese, Hồ Chí Minh's personality cult has persisted to the present day (Holcombe, 2020, p. 33). The party strengthened its media control, suppressing other interpretations of Hồ Chí Minh, and through various newspapers, the party preached how he devoted his life to Vietnam's communism and unification of the nation. In addition to explaining of these achievements, episodes in the media emphasising public adoration and intimacy were spread nationwide in Vietnam (Holcombe, 2020, pp. 30–33). For instance, the party's main newspaper, *National Salvation* (*Cứu quốc*) propagated Hồ Chí Minh's supposed qualities of intelligence, charisma, courage, confidence, determination, simplicity, kindness, and accessibility. Also, episodes of his life portrayed him as always wearing common, plain and simple clothes even when attending formal ceremonies in Hanoi, and for his personality cult, selling series of Hồ's photos had a significant impact on Vietnamese society (Holcombe, 2020, p. 32).

Although various reasons may explain why he did not follow the personality cult likewise other communist regimes (Pham, 2021, p. 45; Brocheux, 2007), the combination of his shorter lifetime and that he pursued collective rule by the Politburo played a major role in keeping his position in not only the symbolic icon of the WPV regime but also the father of DRV.[33]

For these reasons, although other Stalinist (personalist) systems in communist countries in the world faced legitimation challenges initiated by Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation, the WPV of the DRV faced negligible fallout from the criticism related to the personality cult (Dror, 2016). According to Hồ's August 1956 article in *Pravda*, a few months after Khruschev's famous 'Secret Speech', the response of the Soviet-initiated criticism of Stalinism and personalism remained fairly immediate and perfunctory:

> 'We must admit that the personality cult has also existed to some degree in Viet Nam, both inside and outside the Party. *Though it has not led to serious errors, yet*

[33] Despite 'a profound study of it [collective leadership] has spotlighted many short comings', Hồ commented that 'the resolution of Ninth plenary session of the Central Committee of the WPV also emphasised the great significance of the principles of collective leadership in the building and consolidating of the party' by following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. See Hồ, C. M. (1956) *Consolidation and Development of Ideological Unity Among Marxist-Leninist Parties*. Selected Works of Hồ Chí Minh Vol. 4. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ho-chi-minh/works/1956/08/03.htm (Accessed: 21 Aug 2021). After Hồ died in 1969, Lê Duẩn followed the collectivised leadership because he wanted to secure the succession issue by ensuring security one's position of authority. Lê did not need to the personality cult of himself because he already had *de facto* and *de jure* power and authority as the General Secretary of the WPV. See Pham, T. H. (2021) *Re-examining the Cult of Personality: A Comparative Cross-national Case Study of Kim Il Sung, Mao Zedong, and Ho Chi Minh.* Thesis, Georgia State University [Online] Available at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_theses/87/ (Accessed: 10 Sept 2021).

> *it has limited the initiative and fighting spirit of the active elements and of the people* [emphasis added]. We have found manifestations of the personality cult both in leading central and local organs; to overcome these shortcomings, we have decided to improve ideological work in the Party and among the people. […] The Viet Nam Workers' Party considers the criticism of the personality cult as an eloquent proof of strength, and a great victory of the CPSU and of the world revolutionary movement' (Hồ, 1956, 19,22 paragraphs).

Figure 6 summarises legitimacy trend changes of the DRV before unification and the same period of the USSR in the V-Dem dataset. Both regimes emphasised ideological legitimation, although they differed by degrees in the extent of the claim. Unlike Moscow, where higher frustration in the personalist legitimation of Stalin's rule from 1924 to the release of Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' in 1956, personalist legitimation only very slightly decreased in the DRV. However, it should be known that insisting on the leadership as legitimation calling in the DRV is a stable point to some extent, but it is not the most critical component. Regarding rational and legal legitimation, the USSR is higher than the DRV in the extent of the ruler's claim. Nevertheless, the difference is not more considerable than their performance legitimation. Unlike the USSR, the DRV regime continued its emphasis on performance – for instance, promising economic development as a socialist ideal.



Figure 6. Legitimation Claims of Vietnam and the USSR during the Pre-Unification
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019).

Although geopolitically distant, the two countries remained broadly aligned ideologically. This fact makes Vietnam's party leadership not regarded as a nationalist group (Vu, 2016, p. 116). However, the WPV's leadership was not just blindly following the Soviet Union in order to obtain material support. Sometimes they did not hesitate to voice politically independent stances against Moscow, which is evidenced in conflicts between Vietnam and the Soviet Union on several political lines. For instance, unlike Moscow, during de-Stalinisation period of Khrushchev's rule, the WPV's leadership openly kept their distance from Moscow, insisting that the WPV had a collective rule, thus no political issues such as the personalistic cult existed (Vu, 2016, p. 135).

The WPV leaders effectively eschewed Moscow's influence when they felt necessary. Because the WPV's political origin is indigenous, they had a solid enough domestic base to deviate from the Soviet Union. For this reason, after the Sino-Soviet split, Lê Duẩn, the General Secretary of the WPV during the Second Indochina War, strongly urged the WPV to have an independent mindset (*doc lap tu chu*). It emphasised that the WPV should not mechanically imitate the policies of other parties, even that of Moscow, and that this spirit is an essential element in support of proletarian internationalism (Vu, 2016, p. 188).

In summary, before the unification period of the DRV, the legitimation formula of the DRV had focused mainly on ideology and performance. These two types of legitimation claims were not separate, because the higher-ranking Politburo members continuously sought to merge the political discourse of nationalism and socialist ideals for the development of a socialist revolution in North Vietnam. The ultimate goal of these political efforts was to build a revolutionary base in North Vietnam, evoking a socialist revolution in South Vietnam and a fully unified independent state. Under the configuration, the roles of Hồ Chí Minh provided abundant resources for collective memory to legitimise the ruling group. Unlike Stalin and other rigidly personalistic cult cases in one-party communist regimes, as a local ruler of indigenous communist party origin, his practice in the communist movements in Vietnam and Indochina area influenced the collective rule of the WPV Politburo.

Vietnam's unification became an opportunity for the revival of national communism.[34] However, after the unification of Vietnam, the WPV (later renamed the CPV) regime faced new challenges of a legitimacy crisis. The next section will discuss how the CPV responded to these challenges for the chaining legitimation formula.

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[34] National communism identified the cultural idea of nationalism and the economic concept of class struggle as objects that can be solved simultaneously, not as elements in opposition. See Zwick, P. (2019) *National Communism.* New York: Routledge.

Legitimacy Crisis of the CPV in the Post-Unification Period

Since unification in 1975, Vietnam has taken an attitude to strengthen its independent stance as the mainstay of the communist revolution in Southeast Asia and surrounding diplomatic relations (Vu, 2016, p. 176). This ideological characteristic is well illustrated by the fact that the party changed its name from the Workers' Party of Vietnam (WPV) to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and its nation's name from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). Although recognising the support of the Soviet Union and China during the Vietnam War, Lê Duẩn emphasised self-reliance, insisting that each socialist country has its own position and interests. He stated at the Central Committee Plenum in January 1968:

> '[…] [our strategy] was different from and even contrary to Chinese and Soviet [models]. It is our distinctive product. […] This is [also] distinctively Vietnamese. Only Vietnamese people with Vietnamese experience on Vietnamese [soil] can devise and employ [those tactics]' (Vu, 2016, p. 195).[35]

So, unlike the Mongolian People's Republic, which the Politburo of the CPV regarded as an underdeveloped country, the SRV did not participate in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and had only observer status. Indeed, 'victorious Vietnam was bloated with hatred for imperialism and with pride in its revolutionary vanguardism in Southeast Asia' (Vu, 2016, p. 232).

However, this ideological strengthening resulted in the isolation of the unified SRV in international affairs due to the invasion of Cambodia in 1978, the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, and the US trade embargo since 1964. As a result, shortly after the unification of the nation, the SRV's status as a triumphant potentate of the world Communist revolution reverted to the condition of a Soviet-aided state and, eventually, the SRV fully joined the COMECON on 27 June 1978. Since then, economic policy became increasingly dependent on partners in Eastern Europe through low-wage labour and plantation economic development rather than independent spirit (Vu, 2016, p. 212; Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]). Under the political

[35] For example, Hồ Chí Minh asked Mao Zedong for help to build a road along the border to South Vietnam; Mao agreed. See 'Discussion between Mao Zedong and Hồ Chí Minh', 16 May 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, '77 Conversations'. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113059. Also, China recognised the Soviet Union as supporting North Vietnam to expand Moscow's influence and was wary of Soviet control over North Vietnam. Thus, China competitively supported North Vietnam. See 'Discussion between Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and Hồ Chí Minh', 17 May 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, CWIHP Working Paper 22, '77 Conversations'. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113061.

climate of crisis, this section deals with the legitimacy challenges facing the SRV in the post-unification period.

Domestic Legitimacy Challenges after Unification

Triumphant after the Second Indochina War, the CPV's Politburo carried out rapid collectivisation programs, including forced migration, to achieve the party's development plan. In other words, the post-war unification process was realised to consolidate the victory of communism rather than trying to reconcile the compatriots. Overall, re-education of the South Vietnamese began and became a major social factor in additional mass migration.[36] This led to farmer layoffs and reduced agricultural production. This independent revolutionary line of the CPV also affected the suppression of overseas Chinese and forced them into the northern Delta and South Vietnam. This measurement had a significant impact on Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and the Sino-Vietnamese War (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]). As such, the domestic legitimacy crisis had been expanded and reproduced internationally.

Rehabilitation policy toward former employees and military officers of the South Vietnamese (Saigon) regime had become a problematic agenda. At that time, Vietnamese people in southern areas were afraid that they might be subject to retraining of a punitive nature because they had sympathised with Diệm regime of South Vietnam, and Saigon's public sentiment among student groups collectively rejected CPV rule. Patriotic and already decrepit party leaderships regarded the victory of the Second Indochina War as a triumph of the values of Marxism and Leninism (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]). In short, the goal of unification itself was helpful to the CPV, regarding legitimation, but the socio-political reality of the SRV after unification created a new legitimacy crisis for the Party.

Legitimacy Challenges from International Relations after Unification

In addition to the domestic political crisis, the CPV faced a legitimacy crisis caused by political changes in international relations after unification. Since the 1970s, the CPV's independent revolutionary line had criticised China's Cultural Revolution, and the SRV invaded and occupied Cambodia in 1978, which was then under a pro-Chinese regime. Indeed, the Vietnamese communists had long been involved in nation-building in Laos and Cambodia to

[36] From 1976 to 1980, 4 million people were eligible for migration, half of which moved to the southern regions of 1.5 million hectares, particularly the highlands and the Mekong Plains in the Midwest of Vietnam. The migration program also included moving nearly 1 million mountain minorities from hillsides to lowlands to prevent deforestation and soil erosion by slash-and-burn farming.

communise with the rest of Indochina (Goscha, 2016, pp. 424–430). Chinese backlash against this invasion provoked the Sino-Vietnamese dispute of 1979. During this period, Vietnam gained more power from the views of those who believed in the development of self-reliance, namely the argument to rapidly extend traditional communist methods to areas in South Vietnam (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]).

In particular, Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1978 prompted the US and other Western countries to apply economic sanctions on the SRV. In other words, after unification, the SRV regime became increasingly isolated from the international community. During this process, the SRV's opponents flowed into other Southeast Asian countries as refugees; this refugee crisis also worsened the legitimacy of the CPV's rule (Le Hong, 2012).[37]

Furthermore, signs of the overall decline of world communism and the crisis in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which emerged from the 1980s, challenged the CPV regime's political environment. Especially after unification, the planned economy as a whole, which blended nationalism and socialist values, did not have more a greater impact to economic development than predicted, so even though the official statements from party reports and messages of the CPV Politburo claimed traditional ideological legitimation, the messages had limited to change the ordinary Vietnamese people's legitimacy belief. Beyond simply providing material growth and welfare benefits to the people, the CPV leadership would need to present and identify new governing agendas to overcome ideological limitations that cannot explain of the changing world, while maintaining the SRV's revolutionary line. For this reason, Lê Duẩn reported the failure points of the CPV regime at the Central Committee report to fifth the CPV Congress:

> 'We failed to fully realize the difficulties and complexities of the advance to socialism from a primarily small-production economy; we failed to fully realize the dimensions of the economic and social upheavals following a prolonged war; we failed to fully appreciate the difficulties and complexities in overcoming our weaknesses in economic and social management; we failed to fully foresee in international developments which are unfavourable in some respects. Therefore, we have shown subjectiveness and hastiness in setting a number of targets too great in scale and too high in speed concerning capital construction and production development, especially at the outset. Hastiness is also apparent in our organizing

[37] According to overseas estimates, 88,736 people, or 243 per day, fled Vietnam between March and December 1978, while 160,000 people fled China by and in North Vietnam. This move immediately led to the mass exodus, so-called 'boat people'. In just 18 months, from March 1978 to July 1979, at least half a million Vietnamese turned their backs on their homeland, which more than 20 per cent of those who chose asylum came from North Vietnam. See Langlet, P. and Quách, T. T. (2017 [2001]) *Introduction à l'Histoire Contemporaine du Viêt Nam: de la Réunification au Néocommunisme, 1975–2001 (베트남 현대사: 통일에서 신공산주의로 1975–2001).* Translated by: Youn, D.Y. Seoul: Zininzin.

> too large cooperative farms in some regions, in our planning and starting the construction of number of project while lacking data from surveys and studies and lacing adequate preparations' (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1982, p. 6).

Recognition of these shortcomings served as an opportunity for the CPV's party leaders to acknowledge that the SRV's legitimacy faced a crisis point, and they needed to respond to demands of the ruled in order to preserve regime resilience.

Ostensible Efforts to Justify the CPV's Rule and Temporal Legitimacy Crisis of the SRV

Since unification in 1975, the SRV has shown steady legitimation patterns in ideology, performance, the person of the leader, rational-legal legitimation (see *Figure 7*). Among these types of legitimation, ideology and performance were prominent features of justifying the CPV rule; likewise, many communist regimes highlighted ideology and developments following socialist ideals. Beyond the descriptive account, it should be noticed that V-Dem expert survey data on legitimation can be used as an indicator of the relative strengths of each type of legitimation claim a ruler has pursued to justify their title to rule.



Figure 7. Legitimation Claims of Vietnam and the USSR during the Post-Unification
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019).

However, technically, *Figure 7* alone would be limited in its capacity to determine whether the ordinary Vietnamese people actually supported the CPV's rule of the SRV with legitimacy

belief. Because the legitimation process is understood as the interactive concept between the legitimacy claim from the ruler and the demands of the general public, for understanding the legitimation claim mechanism, it is crucial not only to analyse what the rulers said about themselves but also to examine whether the ruled believe the legitimacy claims and support them (Gerschewski, 2018; von Haldenwang, 2017).

As discussed above, Vietnam's post-unification period had brought about regime crisis due to simultaneous domestic and international problems. In other words, *Figure 7* illustrated how the CPV leadership ostensibly maintained ideological and performance legitimation during the post-unification era. Dissolution of legitimation process (that is, discrepancy between what the ruler said and what the people demanded for legitimacy belief) had aggravated the SRV's regime crisis. This division was a significant opportunity for division between CPV Politburo members into moderates, who need to take more consideration for keeping traditional legitimation claims, and radical groups who need to break through the crisis in pursuit of radical socio-political reformation of the SRV (Vu, 2016, pp. 258–264; Elliott, 2012, pp. 29–38).[38]

Since the mid-1980s, Gorbachev's political reform policies caused legitimacy challenges in Moscow and in communist countries around the world. Unlike the case of the Mongolian People's Republic, which was mimicking the USSR's pattern of legitimation, Vietnam showed a different pattern change for claiming its legitimacy. For example, in the case of the Soviet Union, the emphasis on ideology was reduced, whereas the CPV further highlighted it along with a strengthening of performance legitimation. The unique point is that both countries have reduced their personalistic cults, but the emphasis on rational-legal legitimation has increased in Vietnam compared to the USSR.

Overall legitimation claims of the CPV after unification became less effective, and the SRV faced a regime crisis. As a response to the crisis, the Politburo of the CPV tried to shift legitimation claim strategy toward marketisation and a series of political reformations pre-emptively (a later section will delve into this). In other words, immediately after the Second Indochina War and unification, the new ruling government of the SRV was well aware that balanced state management should replace the measures implemented for the public in the

[38] For example, Nguyễn Văn Linh replaced Trường Chinh as Party General Secretary at the Sixth Congress and gained a reputation as a resolute reformer, and the leader who had put Vietnam back on a sustainable track. However, it is misleading to conclude that all 'reformers' had the same agenda, or that all reformers were also political 'liberals'. The main concern was regime preservation and salvaging the *status quo*. The relevant labels would be 'primarily nationalist-' and 'primarily regime preservation-oriented'. See Elliott, D. (2012) *Changing Worlds: Vietnam's Transition from Cold War to Globalization.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

wartime communist system. Moreover, since then, the moral authority of the CPV has also been well aware that they must rely on economic growth and development of the people's well-being rather than forced patriotism and strong discipline under wartime management (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]).

In short, the SRV's indigenous political origin regime had identified their own legitimation pattern with a careful modification for their needs when the regime faced a critical juncture for regime resilience; because the CPV regime in the SRV was not seen as externally imposed, the party had the flexibility to adjust in line with domestic needs and higher legitimation capability. In contrast, the externally imposed regimes retained the logic of the external force legitimation pattern. In particular, this process of reshaping the legitimation formula appears in times of regime crisis, as seen in the next section, which will analyse how the *Đổi Mới* reform process contextualised the CPV's legitimation formula reshaping from the late 1980s.

The CPV's Reshaping Legitimation Strategy in the *Đổi Mới* Reformation

Research on the SRV's political reform and the period of socioeconomic changes concurrent with the collapse of the Soviet Union offers various explanations, including internal occurrence and external influence of reform, depending on its emphasis (London, 2009, p. 143; Fforde and De Vylder, 2019, p. 143; Beresford, 2008; Fforde, 2019; Elliott, 2012, pp. 26–29).[39] The purpose of this study is not to trace reformation procedurals chronologically, but to examine how the CPV promoted political reform by securing justification of the title to rule.

The impact of Gorbachev's reform policies, the deaths of the first generation of revolutionaries, and the re-emphasis on Lenin's New Economic Policy provided a new political environment for the CPV leadership after unification (Vu, 2016, p. 245). Through this, the SRV was able to resolve the Cambodian issue, re-establish diplomatic ties with China, lift the US economic sanctions, and join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with diplomatic efforts such as recovering the bodies of missing US service members from the Second Indochina War (Goscha, 2016, pp. 439–442). Vietnam's reform policy has shown

[39] Adam Fforde and Stefan de Vylder pointed out that three political currents appeared to motivate the reform measures: (1) intense pressures from technocrats and pro-market reformists for a 'final solution' to the DRV model, based upon the political collapse of hard reform socialism after the 1985 currency debacle; (2) support from rising commercial interests within the state sector, to which reform meant even better access to economic benefits; and (3) support from southern liberals who wished to see a return to the pre-1975 system. Additionally, developments in the international arena no doubt contributed to the political mood. See Fforde, A. and De Vylder, S. (2019) *From Plan to Market: The Economic Transition in Vietnam.* New York: Routledge, London, J. D. (2009) 'Viet Nam and the Making of Market-Leninism', *The Pacific Review*, 22(3), pp. 375–399.

institutional acceptance of the market economy, but it must be clarified that it does not allow political pluralism in the form of multiparty elections. In other words, it was political reform and innovation within the communist party rule, the CPV.

In 1986, the CPV's Sixth Party Congress marked the opening of the *Đổi Mới* era. It would be worth noting the relationship between the demographic change in the party leadership at the Party Congress and the political climate of Vietnam. At that time, 1,129 representatives were relatively young, and 48 per cent of all representatives had joined the party after 1975. The final resolution of the Party Congress was characterised by the relaxation of proletarian dictatorship in socio-economic management as well as ideological and cultural struggles (Thayer, 1987). The position and role of the National Assembly pledged to revive the country's rule of law. The resolution promised realistic management in the economy and guaranteed jobs for the Vietnamese people (Thayer, 1992). Three historic leaders, Lê Đức Thọ, Phạm Văn Đồng and Trường Chinh, retired from the party's Politburo in 1986 and from the government of the SRV in 1987. This replacement of the three leaders evidenced the transition to 'new communism' (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]). Therefore, it can be summarised that Vietnam's political reforms focus on restoring its status and increasing overall welfare, preventing the more radical overthrow of the regime, and sticking to traditional values for national interests (Elliott, 2012, pp. 14–15). The CPV had the autonomy to make these ideological moves by virtue of its independence born out of its indigenous origins.

From Identity-Based Legitimation to Non-Identity-Based Legitimation of the CPV

The CPV's efforts to overcome the post-unification legitimacy crisis led to new changes in legitimation claims that had been used until after independence from France as the DRV. Efforts to introduce various market-related policies, which had been experimentally implemented before, now began in earnest. Indeed, the resultant economic growth from embracing marketisation within a communist regime has not always guaranteed regime stability; it even weakens the centralised party state within various contextual factors influenced by economic changes in post-communist regimes (Kurtz and Barnes, 2002; Crawford and Lijphart, 1995; Walder, 1995). This is because the acceptance of the market system has led to the emergence of periodic economic fluctuation and left behind groups in the economic reformation, and the international economy can be severely influenced by external economic crisis (Vuong, 2014;

Tsai, 2013; Abrami, Malesky and Zheng, 2013).[40] The CPV's marketisation policies also had to be approached cautiously because they could generate a new conflict structure in the relationship between local party leaders and central government (Jandl, 2014).

Even though these elements of instability in adopting marketisation evoked factional competitions among the Politburo of the CPV regarding the degree and speed of policy reformation, they resolved to shift from identity-based legitimation toward non-identity legitimation claims, mainly emphasising performance via marketisation and rational-legal process in the new governance of the regime to respond to the SRV's legitimacy crisis.

Like their Sino-Soviet counterparts, the CPV changed the centrally planned economy to a market-oriented economy based on supply and demand (Goscha, 2016, p. 437). As the centralised planned economy and collectivisation retreated, a new method of agriculture industry management was developed. In 1983, land redistribution was carried out for low-income families in the South. Previously, each household had brought all its harvests to the government firms and waited for redistribution, but after the reform, only a certain amount – predetermined by contract – was delivered to the firms, and the rest of the harvest was taken to their respective homes. At the same time, the family economy, which was engaged in economic activities through household gardens, was encouraged as a subsidiary economy and guaranteed the right to freely trade surplus rice (Langlet and Quách, 2017 [2001]). In the 1980s, the SRV government admitted that state-run companies had failed, and since 1987, it has decided to abolish or divide these collective farms and entrust them to family management or joint venture management.[41] Through the Foreign Investment Act, enacted in 1988, Vietnam appealed for investment from capitalist countries. The extent of acceptable political reforms by the CPV, for example, are a pilot program of direct elections for 500 communal people's communities in four provinces, democratic reform and good governance, and efforts by the CPV to contract the broad policymaking coalition by enhancing the competitive selection process and vertical accountability (Abrami, Malesky and Zheng, 2013; Thayer, 2010).

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[40] Payrolls that failed to reflect inevitable price hikes and price fluctuation led to speculative tendencies at the end of 1985, poverty and anxiety about inflation, and hoarding before New Year's Day 1986. As a result, inflation exceeded 700 per cent, with state-run stores forced to redistribute some essential food products at fixed prices in early 1986. In 1988, the inflation rate was still 300 per cent. See Vuong, Q. H. (2014) *Vietnam's Political Economy in Transition (1986–2016).* Stratfor-The Hub: International Perspectives. Austin, Texas: Stratfor Worldview. Available at: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/vietnams-political-economy-transition-1986-2016 (Accessed: 12 Aug 2021).

[41] Phạm Văn Đồng conceded to Western reporters in 1983 that 'waging a war is simple; running a country is difficult'. He had to admit that their failing socio-economic policies, and not just war and international isolation, were also responsible for their troubles. See Goscha, C. (2016) *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam.* London: Penguin Random House.

The previous section reviewed the SRV's crisis of legitimacy after unification. These legitimacy challenges in Vietnam have led to a swift reshaping of the legitimation strategy of the CPV. *Figure 8* describes political changes in the Soviet Union and reflects whether the CPV leadership attempted various transitions to pursue the title to rule for the regime. In the late 1980s, in the Soviet Union, on the one hand, Gorbachev's reform policies reduced the emphasis on ideology and personal leadership as legitimation claims, according to the V-Dem data of expert survey on legitimation claims. On the other hand, performance and rational-legal legitimation were more strongly emphasised beginning a few years before the Soviet Union collapsed. This changing trend is also found among many Eastern European and Central Asian communist regimes, including the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), which Moscow strongly influenced.



Figure 8. Legitimation Claims of Vietnam and the USSR during Political Reformation[42]
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019).

Vietnam's legitimation claim strategy differs from that of the Soviet Union in that it had increased performance and rational-legal legitimation claims since the mid-1980s and

[42] It is worth noting that the discussion of legitimation claim from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 to the 2000s is outside the scope of the study. The critical point of this figure is to analyse the change in patterns of legitimation claim between two countries from the political reformation era in the mid-1980s to the end of the Soviet Union.

emphasised performance, but its breadth of change and transitional attitude were stark. This is unusual because it is different between an indigenous political origin with an autonomous legitimation mechanism and an external imposition case with a manufactured legitimation mechanism like the MPR. In particular, the emphasis on rational-legal legitimation in the late 1980s far outpaces the emphasis on ideology, and in the early 1990s, it can be reaffirmed that emphasis on performance to justify CPV rule far outpaced the emphasis on ideology. This descriptive figure reaffirmed the reshaping legitimation claim previously analysed through various official statements of the Politburo of the CPV.

Return of Nationalism for the Legitimation Claim of the CPV after Đổi Mới Reformation

In order to systematically analyse the reshaping of legitimation, we can also delve into the 'communism / nationalism' approach advocated by Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2020). Using the core concepts of communism and nationalism, the semantic text analysis would be valuable to understand divergent political outcomes in post-communist countries (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020).[43]

Figure 9 shows the frequency with which terms related to communism and nationalism, respectively, were used on a decade-by-decade basis. The figure provides the political history of Vietnam and the moments of the regime crisis examined in the previous sections. After the establishment of the communist party in Vietnam since 1940s officially, The party leaders adopted a strategy to emphasise nationalistic sentiments while reducing the communist stance for the establishing the independent republic (DRV). This is exactly in line with the flow shown in the 1950s in *Figure 9*.

Since then, application of communist policies, such as land reform in the DRV and efforts to communise Vietnam through unification, were in line with the trend of the 1960s and 1970s, which are shown in *Figure 9*. The division of the communist world and the decline of world communism, which began in the 1980s, served as an important opportunity for the CPV to reshape its legitimation, which it had maintained for about five decades. This is illustrated by the reversal of the nationalism term usage from the 1980s to the 1990s in *Figure 9*.

[43] They defined communism-adjacent concepts as 'Marxism/socialism/revolution', 'party', solidarity/equality', and 'planning/ownership'. For the nationalism-adjacent concepts, 'independence/sovereignty', 'performance/ prosperity/development', 'stability/order', and 'culture' were allocated. See Dukalskis, A. and Gerschewski, J. (2020) 'Adapting or Freezing? Ideological Reactions of Communist Regimes to a Post-Communist World', *Government and Opposition,* 55(3), pp. 511–532.



Figure 9. Changes of Communism and Nationalism Terms in the Text Corpus[44]
Source: Author
Note: Weighted percentage indicates the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted.

To sum up, after reunification, the SRV faced a legitimacy crisis due to changes in the political climate at domestic and international levels, and the CPV's leadership made efforts to secure the ruling party's legitimacy in line with Gorbachev's reformation. The reshaping of the CPV's legitimation consisted of emphasising nationalism and socioeconomic performance, thereby reducing communist overtones and securing the one-party rule. In the Eighth Party Central Committee on documents at the Ninth National Congress of the Party in 2001, remembering collective memory terms were still frequently referenced to stoke nationalism: 'century of two bloody wars and hundreds of armed conflicts', 'victory of the glorious resistance wars for national liberation', 'intelligentsia, the young generation, women, war veterans, revolutionary elders', 'Vietnamese Fatherland Front (*Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc Việt Nam*)'.[45] Indeed, without the indigenous political origin legacies, the CPV leaders could not use these narratives of several decades ago. Thus, the successful change to the emphasis on legitimacy

[44] I explain detailed information about data gathering from the text corpus in the qualitative text analysis in the next section.
[45] The Vietnamese Fatherland Front was founded in February 1977 as an umbrella group of a mass movement by the merger of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front of North Vietnam (*Mặt trận Tổ quốc Việt Nam Bắc*), the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (the *Việt Cộng)* and its urban front, named the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces. It inherits the tradition of the *Việt Minh* and the *Việt Cộng*.

had been made to the institutional legacies of the CPV regime: independence through violent revolution process without the Red Army imposition, the establishment of a unified republic via nationwide warfare, and significant local leadership in this process for acquiring political autonomy and legitimacy. This successful legitimation reshaping not only maintains regime resilience, but also made Vietnamese people feel higher trust and satisfaction in the government and political party (The Asian Barometer Survey, 2005).[46] The next section will analyse how the CPV regime reshaped the legitimation mode empirically via qualitative text analysis.

Qualitative Text Analysis of Legitimation Claims of the CPV Regime

As discussed in the theory chapter, legitimation claims feature interactional behaviour between the ruler and the ruled (von Haldenwang, 2017). Analysis of legitimation reshaping requires details of what the ruler said. This empirical section discusses how the CPV have claimed their title to rule by delving into a text corpus to analyse legitimation claims. As a supplementary analysis of legitimation reshaping, the CPV's official documents were collected, including those of the Central Committee (*Trung ương Đảng khóa*) and the National Congress (*Đại hội Đảng*).[47] A total of 238 English-translated documents covers the period from the 1930s to the 1990s, encompassing (1) pre-unification, (2) post-unification and (3) *Đổi Mới* reformation.[48]

For dealing with this text data, a deductive approach to thematic coding is applied. This approach has the capacity to utilise existing themes in the literature for new targeted text corpus data (Jackson and Bazeley, 2019; Kuckartz, 2014; Saldaña, 2015). For the deductive thematic coding, the following legitimation claim typology is used: (1) foundational myth, (2) ideology,

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[46] The average of trust in the political party is 3.61 (4: a great deal of trust, 3: quite a lot of trust), and the average satisfaction with government is 1.57 (1: very satisfied, 2: somewhat satisfied). Other state apparatuses (e.g. courts, national-local government, parliament, civil service, military, police) are also ranked higher in trust, exceeding 3.5. See The Asian Barometer Survey (2005) *The Asian Barometer Survey (the Second Wave)*. Taipei: Hu Fu Center for East Asia Democratic Studies, National Taiwan University. Available at: http://www.asianbarometer.org/data/data-release (Accessed: 24 Aug 2021).

[47] The CPV provides various official documents related to the party's work at the 'party document data' (*Tư liệu văn kiện Đảng*) in their web archive. Researchers used 'complete party documentation' (Văn kiện Đảng toàn tập, VKDTT). However, the original file of the VKDTT on the party's archive has an encoding issue in the PDF file to conduct qualitative text analysis. For this reason, this research excluded VKDTT from the text corpus because using the Central Committee and the National Congress documents provides a sufficient size for the text corpus of legitimation claims. See https://tulieuvankien.dangcongsan.vn/van-kien-tu-lieu-ve-dang/index

[48] Using original language would be recommended for the validity of the analysis. However, the Vietnamese language has characteristics of an ideogram, so it would be limited in analysing frequency tests as morpheme units. To solve this issue, I used automated English translation through Google Translate as a methodological alternative and examined the extracted sample text with a native Vietnamese graduate student to validate the automated translation. As a nuanced tone of legitimation claim, I determined that the automated English translation is sufficient to proceed with qualitative text analysis via NVivo as a supplement analysis for this chapter. The number of translated documents allocated during the pre-unification period is 71, the post-unification period is 50, and the *Đổi Mới* reformation period is 117.

(3) personalism, (4) performance, (5) international engagement and (6) procedures (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2016). This approach expands our knowledge on the CPV's legitimation formula empirically and contributes to expanding the literature methodologically.

This section first reviews descriptive statistics of thematic coding outcome in a macro manner. Next, to narrow down, the thirty most frequently appearing keywords in the coded ideology and performance themes are analysed to trace how the emphasis points of the CPV's legitimation claims were reshaped by different periods (pre/post-unification and *Đổi Mới* reformation).

Table 7. Coding Scheme of the Text Corpus of the CPV's Legitimation from the 1940s to the 1990s

Legitimation claims	Sub-themes	Absolute coding number			Percentage coverage[49]		
		pre	post	Đổi Mới	pre	post	Đổi Mới
Foundational myth	Colonial, France	428	86	26	1.09	0.14	0.03
	War, enemy, popular front	1610	376	173	3.14	0.74	0.26
Ideology	Communism	42	28	12	0.16	0.05	0.03
	Marxism-Leninism	108	100	146	0.31	0.29	0.36
	Party	1063	654	759	2.4	4.3	2.05
	Planning, ownership	260	557	380	0.52	1.52	0.52
	Revolution	428	297	114	0.9	0.38	0.27
	Socialism	372	714	552	0.77	0.97	0.58
	Solidarity, equality	101	136	234	0.27	0.2	0.29
	Nationalism	491	636	628	1.8	2.25	1.37
	Independence, sovereignty	138	137	234	0.45	0.33	0.38
Personalism	Extraordinary of leadership	64	508	49	0.03	0.94	0.39
	Hồ Chí Minh's thought	93	140	284	0.67	0.5	0.57
Performance	**Development, prosperity**	575	478	1338	1.36	0.57	2.07
	Economy	295	423	611	0.79	1.13	1.33
	Education, culture, art	324	822	1320	0.65	1.35	1.88
	Science, technology	125	218	1088	0.2	0.46	1.87
International engagement	Denounce South Vietnam	179	3	6	0.34	0.01	0.01
	International organisations	147	84	190	0.3	0.21	0.22
	Friendship, socialist group	29	47	90	0.07	0.1	0.2
	Threaten from imperialism	173	49	46	0.4	0.07	0.04
	Unification	71	26	11	0.3	0.06	0.02
Procedures	**Anti-corruption, Bureaucracy**	83	113	310	0.14	0.21	0.69
	Election, participation	243	198	393	0.66	0.63	0.99
	Stability, accountability	78	128	381	0.32	0.39	0.83

Source: Author
Note: Author coded sub-themes based on the thematic coding process. For more details, see Appendix. Bold sub-themes indicate meaningful increase rate during Đổi Mới reformation.

[49] The frequency comparison of thematic coding among different periods must consider not an absolute value but rather relative position of emphasis, because numerically each period has a different length of a year. To reduce the effect of different absolute numbers of legitimation text corpus among periods, percentage coverage is referred by in the coded themes.

Macro Perspective of the CPV's Reshaping Legitimation Claims

Each legitimation claim theme has specific sub-categories of the coding scheme as follows (see *Table 7* above). Unlike North Korea (Chapter 6), the procedures legitimation theme is also added because it was one of the meaningful changes in Vietnam along with the performance theme. There are some distinctive features in the sub-themes of legitimation. References to communism were considerably lower than socialism in the ideology legitimation claim theme. Emphasis on Hồ Chí Minh was continuous, even after *Đổi Mới* reformation. Like other post-communist countries, criticising corruption and side effects of bureaucracy increased steadily.



Figure 10. Thematic Coding Outcome of Legitimation Claims in the CPV's Text Corpus
Source: Author

Before unification, the legitimation claim was dominated by ideology and foundational myth, which are identity-based legitimation strategies (see *Figure 10*). Among non-identity-based legitimation strategies, performance was developed in the text corpus of legitimation claim in Vietnam. After unification, the change in legitimation formula was summarised as increasing ideology, performance and procedure legitimation claims, whereas the foundational myth was decreased. This pattern is similar to that of the V-Dem expert survey data, which continuously maintains the legitimation formula after unification. As discussed in the previous

section, during the *Đổi Mới* reformation period, legitimation reshaping appears, in which identity-based legitimation is reduced dramatically and non-identity-based legitimation is emphasised. The coverage percentage of ideology legitimation reduced by about half compared to before reformation, whereas the performance and procedure legitimation doubled. These changes are also consistent and compatible with the findings from V-Dem data.

So far, the CPV's legitimation claim has been reviewed as a macro perspective. The following sub-section contains a more in-depth analysis of the frequency of the words used in ideology and performance legitimation themes as a micro perspective. This analysis will contribute to understanding the nuanced changes in the specific themes.

Micro Perspective of the CPV's Reshaping on Ideology and Performance Themes

The thematic analysis could be elaborated as a narrowing-down level, by analysing the frequencies of referenced words in the coded sentences in the ideology and performance themes. *Figure 11* represents the top thirty most frequently appearing words within a coded sentence of ideology terms.[50] During the three periods, the top ten most referenced words do not differ much. However, the frequency with which the word is used and the relative usage varies considerably in different periods.

Before unification – except for 'party' in the ideology legitimation theme – the words 'nations', 'people', 'committees', 'must', 'works', 'organs', 'develops', 'masses', 'country', 'members' are distributed.[51] Notably, only during this period alone are there references to 'wars' and 'enemy'. As previously discussed, it can be inferred that party leaders had utilised the masses and organs for their legitimation along with antagonistic terms for other nations. In the post-unification period, 'product', 'nations', 'economy', 'people', 'economic', 'must', 'organize', works', 'stating', and 'committee' were popular in the ideology legitimation theme. This indicates that Vietnam's communist party actively introduced development agendas, including land reform and planned economy after unification. The frequency of 'building', 'develops', 'central, 'plans', and 'socialism (socialist)' is also highlighted. In the *Đổi Mới* reformation period, the top-ranked words in the frequency analysis associated with ideology legitimation theme include 'develop', 'people', 'nations', 'economics', stating', 'product', 'country', 'committee', 'organize', 'social', 'policies', 'central', and 'implementation'. This

[50] In all subsequent frequency analyses of this sub-section, finding matches include stemmed words with three minimum lengths via NVivo and apply stop words.

[51] For the concise analysis in the y-axis scale in the weighted percentage, I exclude the keyword of 'party' because 'party' appears to be number one in all periods – although its frequency decreases during the *Đổi Mới* reformation.

list of frequently used words in the ideology legitimation themes corroborates how much party leaders have been ideologically defending the one-party system and emphasising economic reformation.

Figure 11. Top Thirty Words Frequency in Ideology Legitimation Theme of the Text Corpus
Source: Author
Note: Weighted percentage indicates the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The words are indicated in alphabetical order.

This pattern also appears in the top thirty most frequently used words in the performance legitimation theme by the same method of analysis (see *Figure 12*). 'Party', 'develop', 'people', 'must', 'works', 'committees', 'products', 'nationalism, and 'organs' are distributed in the pre-unification period. Frequency of objective terms, including 'cultural', 'economy', 'education', and 'technology' also ranked. Antagonistic terms, including 'wars', 'revolutions', 'forcing', and 'enemy' are represented in the same manner of ideology legitimation term. This result confirms that party leaders enthusiastically engineered nationalist discourse for the performance legitimation claim before the unification period.



Figure 12. Top Thirty Words Frequency in Performance Legitimation Theme of the Text Corpus

Source: Author

Note: Weighted percentage indicates the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The words are indicated in alphabetical order.

Figure 12 implies that after the DRV was established, party leaders duly mobilised nationalism to develop a national economy, increase production, and establish a centralised economic system. Some of the words that represent the higher frequency usage in the performance legitimation theme in the post-unification period are 'develops', 'products', 'economics (economy)', and 'people'. References to 'plans', 'social (socialist)', and 'central' would infer how the CPV's leadership follows the process of implementing socialist development ideals to the newly unified country after the Second Indochina War. Finally, the trend of a socialist planned economy was reshaped after the *Đổi Mới* reformation period. It highlighted the state-led economic system by using the terms 'develop', 'economic(s)', 'people', 'product' along with 'implementation', 'managing', and 'central'.

Through qualitative text analysis, I conduct a thematic coding analysis as a supplementary analysis for Vietnam's legitimation claim. In doing so, I review how the CPV leadership specifically reshaped its legitimation claim. To sum up the semantic outcomes of the analysis, there is overall continuity between the pre- and post-unification periods. However, as seen in the previous section, various social conflicts and international relations changes since unification have brought a severe legitimacy crisis to the SRV. In response to these challenges,

party leaders succeeded in adjusting the legitimation claim formula they have used for more than fifty years. By analysing the frequency of the words in the themes of ideology and performance legitimation claims in a micro manner, the essence of the new legitimation claims can be inferred as that of revitalising the people's economy and applying new economic policies (so-called 'marketisation') within the CPV's rule. The CPV regime's indigenous political origin enabled the flexibility of legitimation reshaping for responding to the legitimacy challenges. This finding confirms the dissertation's central argument: that political origins influence later rulers' legitimation capability and, consequently, regime resilience when regimes face the critical juncture of a regime crisis. This finding is also compatible with the post-communist regime literature and reformation of Vietnam in terms of how the CPV has changed its strategy for stable rule (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020; Fforde and De Vylder, 2019; Le Hong, 2012; Vuong, 2014).

Conclusion

Vietnam's history was recorded as an example of an indigenous communist party regime origin that established an independent nation through combined anti-imperialistic nationalism and communism. In this process, two nationwide 'people's wars' against world powers lent national dignity to the Politburo of the WPV and the ordinary people in Vietnam. The competent political leadership of local figures and the lack of direct involvement of the Red Army from Moscow in the state-building stage of the DRV created a political condition for Vietnam's political system to expand its political autonomy. This indigenous political origin of Vietnam and institutional legacies that derived from that origin improved the CPV's future legitimation capacity and contributed significantly to securing the legitimacy of the WPV's collective rule before unification.

After unification, however, the CPV regime's legitimacy was threatened by various changes in the domestic and international political landscape. Although the CPV's top leaders acknowledged the assistance of the Soviet Union and China during both Indochina Wars as well as the unification process, the SRV pursued its own revolutionary path.[52] The ensuing Cambodian issue, Sino-Vietnamese War, and US sanctions challenged the rule of the CPV in Vietnam.

[52] One example is that the Chinese shipped 2,800 tons of goods to the DRV from April to September of 1950. This was enough to feed, over a six-month period, roughly 30,000 people – or the equivalent of two military divisions. See Holcombe, A. (2020) *Mass Mobilization in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 1945–1960.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

To cope with this legitimacy crisis in the post-unification period, the CPV leadership attempted political adventures that modified and transformed the legitimation claims they had used from national independence through the process of unification over fifty years. They gradually attempted marketisation and capitalism-related institutional reform and opened the door to diplomacy with the US and, more broadly, to the rest of the world through diplomatic ties with the US, which had long been the object of national hostility.

We can see from this that an indigenous political origin in itself does not allow later rulers to maintain a fixed level of legitimacy. However, it did permit a level of adaptability in response to the political crisis deriving from changes in the domestic and international political landscape. No less important than securing a firmer level of legitimacy to maintain regime stability, legitimation capacity (that is, how much the ruler can reshape, transform and apply the legitimacy claim for regime stability to cope with the changing political environment) is significant for regime resilience.



Figure 13. Different Generational Effect over Legitimation Capacity in Vietnam
Source: Author
Note: (a): ideology, (b): person of leadership, (c): performance, and (d): rational-legal legitimation
The arrow's colour reflects the extent of legitimation claim in V-Dem data (e.g. 3–4 in black, 2–3 in dark grey, and 1–2 in light grey). The Vietnamese case demonstrates that indigenous political origin could change and foster the legitimation formula in different generations.

The capacity of legitimation claims derived from indigenous political origin and the CPV's reshaping of legitimation claims are summarised in *Figure 13*. In an indigenous political origin regime, the institutional legacies facilitate the achievement of higher legitimation claim capacity; thus, at an autonomous level, what the ruler declared in the legitimation claims and what the general public demanded, and as well as their legitimacy belief in their rulers' legitimacy, were harmonised. In doing so, the indigenous political origin regime could acquire an autonomous legitimation mechanism that grants rulers advantageous institutional legacies for justifying their regime. Under these circumstances, the legitimation strategy resources available to choose and utilise are much more diverse than those available to regimes with externally imposed origins.

This higher capacity of legitimation plays a major role in developing and asserting the logic of new legitimation when the regime is faced with a crisis. As seen in Vietnam's example of the indigenous communist party origin regime: (1) there was an indigenous communist movement, and (2) the party was not bound and tethered to the USSR, meaning the rulers of the CPV could enjoy the latitude to be able to strategically choose legitimation formulas to cope with various political changes. For instance, the collective experience of triumph in the wars against France and the US; anti-imperialistic nationalism; the narratives of unification, regarded as an unquestionable ultimate task; and the socialist ideals for happiness and economic growth of Vietnamese people provided favourable advantages for the future rulers to justify their rule and respond to potential regime crises.

In conclusion, as an indigenous communist regime, Vietnam has shown a higher degree of reverberation of legitimacy and higher independence of national authority. Under these conditions, when the CPV regime faced a legitimacy crisis after unification that coincided with the crumbling of world communism in the 1980s, the CPV's senior Politburo members had more capacity to strategise using non-identity-based legitimation claims, especially performance and procedures. Primarily, the adoption of marketisation is not the only reason for the SRV regime's longevity. The more important factor is that, when the ruler faced a legitimacy crisis, their capacity to reshape alternative modes of legitimation became more crucial for the SRV regime's resilience after the collapse of the USSR.

Chapter 5 - External Imposition of the Communist Party Regime: Democratisation of Mongolia after the Collapse of the USSR

'We shall unite ourselves and devote our lives and property to the work of uniting the minds of the people […] the aim is more rights and privileges for the common people. After eliminating the sufferings of the people, they should be allowed to live in peace, and like any other nation the Mongol people should develop their strength and talents'.

***Khorloogiin Choibalsan**,*
Speech at a meeting of workers in the city of Ulan Bataar, 23 June 1941

'Taking the aforementioned into consideration, and with the aim of further strengthening of defence capabilities of the MPR, the CC MPRP and the Government of the MPR are turning to the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government with an insistent request to consider the question of providing a battle unit (formation) from the Armed forces of the USSR and maintaining it on the territory of the MPR at the cost of the Soviet Union, having supplied it with modern powerful military equipment and arms, housing, as well as cultural facilities, amenities and all other necessary items'.

Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal,
Letter to the Soviet leadership in 1965

'The truth is that as well as our success and achievements, our main shortcomings and omissions are in many ways linked with the activities of Tsedenbal. He had used illegal methods to remove political opponents. There had been virtually no discussion of organisational and ideological work for some 30 years, and this had created an "unhealthy" situation in the party'.

Jambyn Batmönkh,
Speech to the MPRP Central Committee Plenum in 1988

A regime's political origin (i.e. how it seized power) influences later rulers' legitimation claim capacity and regime resilience. As we have seen in Vietnam and its Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), an indigenous communist party regime has more capacity to reshape legitimation claims in response to potential regime crises. This partly explains why Vietnam has maintained its regime so far by reforming its communism system concurrently with the collapse of the USSR via its *Đổi Mới* policy. In the preceding chapter, we analysed how political origins affect subsequent rulers' legitimation capacity, focusing on the institutional advantages of the types of indigenous political origins. In contrast to this, as a typical case of externally imposed political origins, Mongolia's political history and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) have shown how the regime was fragile in terms of its ruler's legitimation capacity when it faced the crumbling of the USSR.

The Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), with its long history of external imposition from Moscow, is a unique case in the history of global communism (Brown 2010, pp. 78–79). The literature on Mongolian politics and comparative post-communism has focused on Mongolia's rapid democratisation and economic transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Bilskie and Arnold, 2002; Fish, 1998; Fish, 2001; Ginsburg, 1995; Heaton, 1991; Heo, 2016). Compared to the literature on Vietnam, political science research on Mongolia has been scarce in terms of the volume of the literature and range of the topics, despite the uniqueness of the MPR's political origin as the first communist party regime constructed by the Communist International (Comintern).[53] The MPR's failed regime is the opposite of Vietnam's CPV, which has a communist party regime with strong indigenous origins.

In this chapter, I ask a series of questions about the relationship between the regime's origin and later rulers' legitimation claim capacity, as well as how the relationship influences regime resilience when the regime is faced with a crisis. In this study, the crumbling of the USSR due to the decline of the international communist movement is defined as a critical juncture of the Mongolian regime crisis. Thus, the main objective of this chapter is to answer the question: *how does an externally imposed communist regime, a so-called satellite state, respond to legitimacy challenges*? Additional questions will follow, namely, to what extent the Soviet Union's external imposition constructed the capacity of legitimation claims of the MPR's rulers; what types of legitimation claims the imposed rulers from Moscow used for nearly seven decades; and how the legitimation formula by the later ruler of the MPRP failed

[53] Indeed, there are very few studies of Mongolian state-building history conducted with a comprehensive analysis of both Western and Soviet literature without Mongolian scholars. See Morozova, I. Y. (2009) *Socialist Revolutions in Asia: The Social History of Mongolia in the 20th Century.* Abingdon: Routledge.

to respond to the challenge of the USSR's collapse. By answering these questions, as case of an externally imposed communist regime that ultimately broke down, I argue that the origins of the party's seizure of power shaped and structured the legitimation claim capacity of later rulers as they faced unpredictable crises in the future. Ultimately, this legacy meant that the party's legitimation proved unable to transcend the regime's greatest challenge.

To analyse more than seventy years of political history, it is necessary to define the scope and limitations. The unit and period of analysis are to be defined between 1921, the founding of the Mongolian People's Republic, and 1989, when the one-party communist system collapsed due to the Mongolian democratisation movement. In the dynamics of the MPR's democratisation process, there are various agencies and different political roles (Bruun and Odgaard, 1996; Fritz, 2002; Pomfret, 2000). The detailed process of the democratisation of the MPR, factors for the democratic transition, and evaluation of the quality of Mongolia's democracy are beyond the scope of this chapter's objectives (for detailed literature, see Landman, Larizza and McEvoy, 2006; Fish, 1998; Ginsburg, 1995; Ganbat, Tusalem and Yang, 2008; Sabloff, 2002; Aagaard Seeberg, 2018). In the chapter, instead, I focus more on how the MPRP failed to maintain its system, based not on a chronological explanation about democratisation in Mongolia, but rather on the framework established in the theoretical chapters of this dissertation. Specifically, the main focus will be on the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism and its institutional legacies. Meanwhile, to explain the failure of the MPRP's legitimacy formula as the USSR collapsed, critical junctures of political events will be described – for example, prominent groups arguing for democratisation of Mongolia and how the ruler of the MPRP responded to the legitimacy challenges.

The data used to answer these questions consists of legitimation indicators from the V-Dem dataset (version 11.1); multiple secondary literature on early Mongolian political and social history; and the official documents of the CC of MPRP including resolutions, letters, and conversations from the digital archive of the Wilson Center and Nexis Advance UK data from 1920 to 1990, which are used as primary documents for the legitimation claim mechanism analysis.

I want to stress that I do not aim here to offer an over-generalised causal argument; all externally imposed cases in world communist history followed the MPR and experienced relatively smooth democratisation process after the collapse of the USSR. However, as a guideline for the descriptive statistics of all communist party regimes' duration around the world (in Chapter 1), we could draw a tentatively generalised inference that in externally imposed cases – including many Eastern European states, which displayed shorter regime

duration – most regimes proved unable to meet the challenge of the USSR's collapse (Holmes, 1997; Dimitrov, 2013c; Applebaum, 2012). As Brown (2010, pp. 78–79) notes, as the first communist regime outside the Soviet Union, Mongolia was in many ways a precursor to many of the dynamics of imposed communism in Eastern Europe. Therefore, because it is a case with an exceptionally long regime duration among the externally imposed cases, analysing the political origins of the MPR and the capacity of legitimation claims provides elaborated explanations for identifying the relationship among regime origin, legitimation capacity, and regime resilience.

This chapter is composed of the following sections. The first section briefly reviews the historical background of the MPR as an externally imposed communist regime. It then analyses how the rulers of the MPR used a legitimacy formula based on instructions from Moscow. By tracing the regime's political history and its relationship with the Soviet Union, we can show how an externally imposed communist regime *manufactured* its legitimation mechanism, which was accompanied by a lower institutional advantage for the capacity of legitimation claims. Following the format of the previous empirical chapter, a more detailed analysis of a legitimacy crisis will be provided in the last section. The last section will focus on the USSR and investigate how Batmönkh, the last General Secretary of the MPRP, failed to change the legitimation formula amidst the crumbling of the USSR and succumbed to calls for democratisation from Mongolian civil society in 1989. His legitimation capacity was ultimately constrained by the imposed origins of Mongolian communism. By doing so, this chapter will contribute to our understanding of authoritarian regime resilience and post-communism literature by illuminating why the MPR failed to reshape its legitimation formula before and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it sheds light on the previously under-appreciated relationship between regime origins and subsequent rulers' legitimation claims capacity for regime resilience as a factor in explaining regime resilience.

Historical Legacy of the External Imposition of the Communist Party in Mongolian State-Building

The main argument of this research is that the origins of communist party regimes structure the legitimation claims of their rulers far into the future, and that these legitimation claims impact regime resilience. This section will analyse, as a case of an externally imposed regime, the early history of Mongolian communist state-building – especially the origins of the MPRP's

seizure of power supported by Moscow.[54] Closely tracing the main features of the communist movement in Mongolia when they acquired independence from the Qing dynasty shows how a small, Soviet-supported Mongolian communist group consolidated power to establish the Mongolia People's Republic (MPR). Additionally, the political condition for structuring legitimation claims in the early stage of state-building in Mongolia will also be discussed.

The aim of this section is not to provide a detailed chronicle of the early MPR; instead, it will focus on reviewing the history of the MPR's state-building in light of the concept of external imposition and the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism. This section first examines the external imposition of Soviet-style communism in Mongolia. Despite the apparent desire of Mongolian politicians for self-reliance in the pursuit of power, it is clear that the Soviet Union terminated such aspirations. The chapter will then discuss how substantive interference by the Soviet Union shaped the institutional structure of the MPR, given that this institutional similarity continued in the form of dependency on the Soviet Union by later rulers of the MPRP (Rossabi, 2005). It will thereby argue that Mongolia's case is a regime with an externally imposed communist party origin. Substantial Soviet control and its influence on the newly created state meant that many institutional legacies of the early MPR regime were intended to serve Moscow's interests.

Independence from Qing, Bogd Khanate, and External Imposition by the Soviet Union

To analyse the relevance and political influence of the Soviet Union's founding of the MPR, it is necessary to look at the political situation in Mongolia at that time. The present-day region of Outer Mongolia was under the rule of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911).[55] Internal divisions and interventions by Chinese warlords, the Imperial Japanese Kwantung Army, and White Russian commanders in Manchuria have shaped political landscapes of Outer Mongolia in general. Also, various nomadic groups were striving for political independence in Mongolia (Rossabi, 2005). After the collapse of the Qing in 1911, Mongolians had the opportunity to regain independence via the establishment of the Bogd Khan government in 1911 (Nakami, 2005). The Kiakhata Agreement between Russia and representatives of the Bogd Khan government as well as China was held in September 1914, and Mongolia's independence was

[54] An external-imposition origin communist party regime is defined in this research as having: (1) lower degree of existence of mass mobilisation of the communist movement at a grassroots level (in other words, it is born of a top-down communist coup); (2) a limited role for indigenous leadership; and (3) greater interference by the Soviet Union – for example, Red Army intervention in the early stage of state-building.

[55] Mongolia under Qing rule (Манжийн үе) was the rule of the Qing dynasty over the Mongolian steppe from the 17th century to the end of the dynasty.

finally resolved in 1921 through careful behind-the-scenes manoeuvring by Moscow, which was by then under Bolshevik control (Nakami, 2005). Therefore, the Soviet Union's influence on Mongolia was deeply related to the initial stage of the independence process.

In the early stage of Mongolian state-building, interference by the Soviet Union was well described in the 'open letter from the nobles and monks of Outer Mongolia to the representatives of the Russian government', which stated:

> 'We would like to establish an independent small state and elevate the Bogd [the spiritual leader of Outer Mongolia's Tibetan Buddhism] to the throne, trusting him to rule over the faith and the state […] we ask you to take this into consideration and to render indispensable assistance and protection' (Rosenberg, 1977, p. 12).

At that time in Outer Mongolia, the vested interests and economic power were attributed to lama monks and temples represented by a small number of traditional aristocrats (nobles, called *noyon*) and Tibetan Buddhism (Batbayar, 2005, pp. 355, 357; Dillon, 2019, p. 77). In this domestic political situation, the fact that these groups also wanted to cooperate with the Soviet Union to cope with China and other foreign powers suggests that the Soviet Union's influence was vital to control the political situation in Outer Mongolia.

The Soviet Union's influence on Mongolia can be seen in the first independent state-building and appears throughout the time period as strategic interventions in the Mongolian communist movement. Early Mongolian revolutionaries readily embraced the Bolsheviks' tactics for capturing power with an extensive state apparatus that permeated and controlled all layers of society (Ristaino, 1991, p. 184). These communist pioneers had the chance to connect with White Russian émigrés, revolutionaries and Buryat public activists, and to peruse the Soviet press, whereby they learned about events in Russia.[56] At the beginning of 1921, they were devoted to the dictates of the Far Eastern Secretariat, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI). Under the leadership of the Comintern, the Mongolian People's Party (and later the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party) took shape in Mongolia by merging the two political groups in Urga (later Ulaanbataar) on 25 June 1920 for the struggle against the Chinese and imperialism (Ewing, 1978).[57] The Comintern contemplated the Red

[56] Buryat are the northernmost of the major Mongol peoples, living south and east of Lake Baikal. By the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), their land was ceded by China to the Russian Empire.

[57] The name of the party was the Mongolian People's Party. After 1924, following the Comintern's recommendation, the party's name was changed to the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. In 2011, the party's name changed again to the Mongolian People's Party; there also existed another MPRP as a newly independent small party in 2010. The two groups are the Union of Revolutionary Youth (URY) and the Dottodyg Hamgaalakh Gazar, or Internal Defence Office (IDO). The first was initiated by Kh. Choibalsan, and the second by the Buryatian communist E. Rinchiono. The two groups had completely different goals and characters, but revolutionary and repressive activity in 1921–1924 united them, demonstrated most tellingly by Soviet and

Army's assistance as a deciding factor in the complete defeat of R.F. Ungern-Sternberg (a leader of anti-Bolshevik 'White' Russians) and the MPP's accession to power in Urga. In the next section, we examine how these externally imposed communist party origins shaped later rulers' capacity to justify their title to rule.

Manufactured Legitimation Mechanism in the MPR

In Chapter 3, I argue that communist regimes with externally imposed origins suffer from a relative paucity in advantageous institutional legacies compared to indigenous regimes and, to a lesser extent, mixed-origin regimes. Thus, externally imposed communist party origins lead to decreased regime resilience because they limit the legitimation claim options available to the ruler and undermine the appeal of legitimation claims in society. In contrast to cases of indigenous origins (e.g. Vietnam), I examine how external imposition (or Soviet intervention in internal affairs) makes a difference in the capacity for later rulers' legitimation claims. For example, the MPR has a nomad society's peculiarity (Lattimore, 2018 [1962]; Campi, 2013), so this contextual factor influenced to hard to build sub-party organs as like other communist regimes. Also, due to the legacies of the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, the local party did not exercise effective control over the military and security services, whose operations were directed by the Soviet Union (Bawden, 2013, pp. 323, 339; Dillon, 2019, pp. 92–93). Ultimately, local Mongolian leaders did attempt to assert independence through nationalist social norms so that self-sustaining nationalism would be at the centre of the political autonomy. However, the Soviet Union denounced these actors as right-wing opportunists and purged them (Batbayar, 2005, p. 357).

This sub-section examines how the legacies of this externally imposed origin and its institutional settings created *manufactured* legitimation mechanisms that resulted in reduced capacity of the rulers to articulate and disseminate effective legitimation claims. As mechanistic evidence, I suggest that under the manufactured legitimation mechanism, legitimacy challenges in times of regime stability were relatively less critical, and the ruler will keep pace with the external power's strategy by mimicking it. During regime crisis, however, the lack of legitimation capacity to make legitimation claims is more likely to reduce the ruler's autonomy; thus, the externally imposed regime is ultimately more fragile. The following sub-

Comintern advisers who stood behind both organisations' ideology. See Morozova, I. Y. (2009) *Socialist Revolutions in Asia: The Social History of Mongolia in the 20th Century.* Abingdon: Routledge.

section points discuss more detailed explanations for the institutional legacies of the MPR and the MPRP, structured by the manufactured legitimation mechanism.

Nomad Society and Weak Sub-party Organs in the MPRP

Social control through various sub-party organs is a common phenomenon in many communist regimes; such multi-layered organs contribute to authoritarian regime durability (Perlmutter, 1981; Cumings, 1993). The MPRP, which sought to emulate the Soviet model, created a numerous such mass organisations in imitation of similar organs already existing in the USSR. Examples include the Mongolian Revolutionary Youth League (MRYL), founded in 1921, and for even younger children, the Sukhe Bator Mongolian Pioneer Organisation was established in 1925 under the management of the MRYL. The MRYL was a youth vanguard organisation that became an essential resource for supplementing military power and party base.[58] League sponsorships align the ideological, educational and cultural standard with the MPRP's goals (Ristaino, 1991, p. 191). There were also a Mongolian-Soviet Friendship Society, the Mongolian Women's Committee, and Mongolian trade unions encompassing various professions.[59]

However, the mere existence of such sub-party organs did not guarantee the political autonomy of the local leader's legitimation of the MPRP. Until the death of Choibalsan, the MPR appeared to be laying the foundation for a socialist republic without the capitalist stage, but nomadic traditions imposed limits on the fundamental structural changes that were possible in Mongolian society. The MPRP's social composition in 1948 indicated that 54.1 per cent of Mongolian population were nomads, 41.2 per cent officials, and only 4.7 per cent workers. Furthermore, regarding the educational level of the MPRP Eleventh Congress's participants in 1947, 51.5 per cent of the delegates were illiterate (Morozova, 2009, p. 121). Still, the peculiarity of nomadic society hindered the mobilisation of communist ideology and accompanying modernisation of Mongolian society (Campi, 2013; Lattimore, 2018 [1962]). These demographic characteristics of the MPR demonstrate that in the early stage, a small

[58] The MRYL's membership was between the ages of 15 and 18, reaching 235,000 in 1986. The Sukhe Bator Mongolian Pioneer Organisation served children ages 10 to 15, and the membership was 360,000 in the late 1980s. See Ristaino, M. R. (1991) 'Government and Politics', in Worden, R.L. and Savada, A.M. (eds.) *Area Handbook Series: Mongolia: A Country Study*. Washington DC: Federal Research Division, pp. 171–218.

[59] In the CC of MPRP resolution in 1980, there were phrases using these sub-party organs to demonstrate the Mongolian people's revolution, the significance of the fraternal friendship between the MPR and the Soviet Union, and international assistance from Moscow and other CMEA countries. See The MPRP Central Committee (1980) *Politburo Resolution on 60th Anniversary*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/41b65975-fd66-4a59-a86f-6e1a252f5d5d/?context=1519360 (Accessed: 10 Feb 2021).

number of leaders executed the communist revolution, rather than a grassroots social movement from below as seen in indigenous communist party regimes. These nomadic social legacies make a difference in sub-party organs regarding the transmission of legitimation claims compared to indigenous-origin regimes. This factor is clearly different from Vietnam's CPV rule, which actively utilised sub-party organs and North Korea's multi-layered sub-party organs, which controlled society and spread the legitimation claims.

Foreign-derived Military and Security Sections in the MPR

A party monopoly on military and security power makes for a tight partisanship structure and ultimately a long-lasting regime (Levitsky and Way, 2013); however, the origin of the MPR's military and security section was highly dependent on the Soviet Union. For instance, the origin of the Mongolian secret police (later the Ministry of the Interior) was created by Stalin in 1936, and he wanted to recreate an equivalent of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or so-called NKVD, in the MPR. The first head of the Mongolian secret police was Choibalsan, whom Stalin, in 1936, compelled to purge Prime Minister Genden, who did not obey Moscow's order to liquidate lama ministries in Mongolia. After that, Choibalsan became Minister of the Interior, Minister of War, Minister of Foreign affairs and, finally, in March 1939, Prime Minister (Batbayar, 2005, p. 359).

Regarding the origin of the MPR military force, supported by the Soviet Union, it was started by a Treaty of Friendship in 1921, signed by Moscow and Ulaanbaatar. Later, Soviet troops were dispatched to Mongolia in 1936, and the Mongolian military was trained by Anatoly Ilyich Gekker (Soviet military advisor) and Vasily Konstantinovich Blyukher (the Commander of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern Special Army). During the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, Soviet forces and the Mongolian units won a decisive victory against the semi-autonomous Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchukuo in 1939 (Christian, 2017b, p. 393). In contrast to the case of Vietnam, where the communist party-controlled military and security services grew out of a home-grown violent revolutionary origin, the MPR had less effective control of these state apparatus, and the Soviet Union tended to interfere with them to serve their own interests. Thus, MPR rulers had to work with manufactured legitimation mechanisms.

The Mongolian government was not able to act autonomously without Moscow's approval. Either Stalin's Moscow, or the Mongolian party under instructions from the Soviet authorities, carried out trials and executions of those labelled 'traitors' and 'counter-revolutionaries' (Kaplonski, 2008). By effectively appointing the leadership of the MPRP, Soviet influence interfered with Mongolia's domestic affairs, as be seen in cases of replacing

and purging political opposition to Soviet interests. Indeed, for most of this period in MPR, nobody in the Mongolian local leadership held the real authority to guide the political direction of the MPR; rather, Stalin and his agents from Moscow and Irkutsk did (Dillon, 2019, p. 74). For example, Kliment Voroshilov was appointed People's Commissar for Military Affairs in the USSR in 1925 and worked in Ulaanbaatar as a Special Commission from the Comintern. The Comintern team selected Khorloogiin Choibalsan as Commander-in-Chief of the Mongolian People's Army in 1936 and made him the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (later Prime Minister) in 1939. His Russian educational background and ideological fidelity to Soviet communism made him the most suitable local leader for Moscow's interests. His successor, Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, was also appointed – and, eventually, removed from power and forced to retire – by Moscow.

Absence of Indigenous Violent Revolution in the MPR and Weakly Shared Social Norms

The absence of an indigenous social revolution deprives the regime of collective memories, making the MPR's job of crafting convincing legitimation claims more difficult. Violent revolutionary regimes have stronger ruling parties with shared norms, including nationalism resulting from the movement, and these shared social norms positively affect regime durability; this relationship has also been empirically corroborated in recent literature (Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020; Levitsky and Way, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2012). However, in the MPR, it was commonly accepted that political leaders who were not loyal to Moscow's rule and insisted on nationalistic autonomy were quickly purged and denounced by the Soviet Union as right-wing opportunists. For example, at the Seventh Congress of the MPRP, held from October to December 1928, Dambadorj, the MPRP party leader, was removed by Moscow under such pretences (Batbayar, 2005, p. 357; Heo, 2020b).[60] Thus, local leaders' pursuit of political autonomy was contrary to Moscow's interests. Moreover, this prevented nationalism from becoming the centrepiece of the political environment, despite the strong nationalism among many ordinary Mongolians regarding their traditional culture and religion. In short, the Soviet Union had a thorough influence on both the appointment and exclusion of political leadership in the MPR. This externality (higher degree of interference by the external power)

[60] When Dambadorj and other dissenters were expelled as rightists and the Comintern-drafted programme was ratified, the Mongolian people organised a large-scale uprising involving several thousand armed rebels. The MPR government repressed the rebels using the regular army and tanks from May to July 1932. See Boldbaatar, J. (2005) 'The Mongolian People's Republic: Social Transformation and Its Challenges (1945–90)', in Adle, C., Palat, M.K. and Tabyshalieva, A. (eds.) *History of Civilizations of Central Asia: Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century*. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, pp. 353-361.

was an essential factor in determining the structural limitations of the later rulers' legitimation strategies. Without Soviet backing, Mongolia's communist regime was limited in the legitimation claims it could offer to justify its title to rule.

Unlike communist revolutions that emerged as revolutionary regimes in cases of indigenous communist party origin, Soviet intervention in the MPP influenced the implementation of forced radical communism policies such as the collectivisation of nomadic society system, industrialisation, urbanisation, and various foreign policy process including social and cultural influences as well. Indeed, beginning in 1928, the Comintern pushed the younger Mongol leaders into a leftist experiment involving a dramatic expansion of the state sector, collectivisation of livestock herds, and attacks on lamas and aristocrats (Batbayar, 1999, pp. 356–357).[61] The Comintern document labelled 'Letter 2452' ordered the MPRP to follow the radical collectivisation programme and attack monastic institutions and the feudal aristocracy's power base (Morozova, 2009; Bawden, 2013). Herders became workers and large numbers of animals were no longer privately owned. After the failure of radical collectivisation by the leftists in the Comintern as well as the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Stalin became personally involved in Mongolian affairs (Batbayar, 1999, p. 358).

However, this top-down approach of radical collectivisation negatively impacted the economic situation and legitimacy of the MPRP for governing the newly independent modern republic. For example, the extreme leftist group's forced collectivisation efforts in the late 1920s and early 1930s led to a sharp decrease in the number of cattle, a Chinese economic blockade led to a shortage of commodities, neglect of social norms and persecution of the aristocracy and lama clergy led to general dissatisfaction with the new regime. Therefore, Okhtin, the Comintern representative in Mongolia, received a telegram directive from Moscow that included the following phrases: 'push the leftists away'; 'instead of them, promote to ministerial positions people capable of launching the new course'; 'the renewed Mongolian Central Committee had to publicly declare that it had made mistakes in the sphere of domestic politics (economy, religion)' (Morozova, 2009, p. 79). From then on, the political direction of the MPR was dictated by the ruler of the Soviet Union and mirrored changes in Soviet Union policy. Due to the absence of a communist movement from below, social structure changes and collective social norms did not occur. These disadvantageous institutional legacies shaped the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism for MPR rulers.

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[61] According to a government report, the number of lama priests was reduced from about 100,000 to 75,000 during 1930–1931. See Baabar (2010) 'The Great Purge', in Sneath, D. and Kaplonski, C. (eds.) *The History of Mongolia*. Leiden: Global Oriental, pp. 1001–1011.

To summarise, until 1990 the MPR was always described as a 'satellite' of the USSR. Mongolia was more independent than the non-Russian Soviet republics but less autonomous than the Eastern European states that were also sometimes referred to as 'satellites'. Not only the first stage of state-building of the MPR, but also the external influences from the USSR affected later domestic politics of the MPR. The result of the military and diplomatic manoeuvring was to give the USSR even more influence over the MPR, and '[t]he definitive choice having been taken in 1921, all logic was on the side of Mongolia's continuing loyalty to Russia' (Bawden, 2013, p. 329).[62] Indeed, from 1929 on, the MPR was reliant on the USSR for all foreign trade, military supplies and training, higher education facilities, and medical aid. The National University (founded in 1942) and various levels of schools heavily repeated Marxism-Leninism, adopting authoritarian teaching methods based on those of the Soviet Union (Rossabi, 2005). Reproducing the Soviet model in the newly independent republic, the Politburo of the MPRP had sought permission from many Soviet advisers, the Comintern, and later, Stalin. The Soviet Union also made many political decisions in the area where state violence was used to maintain its regime. These institutional legacies have also been influential on later rulers of the MPR, who have thus followed the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism, which prevents them from asserting their own 'title to rule' without the backing of the Soviet Union (external power) in their claims of legitimacy.

This section examines and reviews the initial setting of institutional legacies for legitimation claims after independence from the Qing and construction of the MPR. The next section will empirically discuss how the leadership appointed by the Soviet Union asserted their regime's legitimacy before the collapse of the USSR. By doing so, we will understand how the externally imposed political origin limited their capacity of legitimation claim, as the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism.

Legitimation Claims of the MPRP before the Collapse of the USSR

How to justify the title to rule is a crucial aspect of authoritarian regime stability. In stable authoritarian regimes, legitimation claims (i.e. the collective efforts and roles of the rulers for the justifying the title to rule) have features of a self-reinforcing relationship with other strategies for regime resilience, such as repression and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013). The

[62] The relationship between Mongolia and the USSR is represented by the Zaisan Memorial mural, which depicts Soviet support for the revolution of 1921 led by Sükhbaatar, the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army by the Soviet Red Army in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol on the Mongolian border in 1939, and other defining moments.

mutually reinforcing mechanism indicates path dependence in this relationship in the sense that previous developments shape the options available to current rulers. These choices of legitimation claims become particularly salient in moments of regime hardship or crisis. Which legitimation claims are chosen depends on various factors: (1) the ruler's perceptions of regime crises, (2) the ruler's intentions for the claims in light of the crisis and (3) the domestic and international political context that surrounds the rulers.

The behaviour of MPRP leaders showed how external imposition by the patronage relationship to the Soviet Union limited their options for claiming legitimacy. This section aims to conduct an empirical investigation of these legitimation claims, using two leaders of the MPRP before the demise of the Soviet Union for mechanistic evidence. During the Choibalsan era (1939–1952), legitimation followed Stalin's instruction, focusing mainly on communist ideology and the personality cult of Choibalsan as a national hero against China and Japanese imperialism. During the subsequent Tsedenbal era (1952–1984), mirroring the political landscape in Moscow's de-Stalinisation, there was retrenchment of the personality cult, reflecting the patron's legitimation claim patterns. To distinguish a ruling period strictly, the Batmönkh (1984–1990) regime is also included in the MPR regimes before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, in the next section, I analyse in greater detail how the Batmönkh regime responded to the regime crisis catalysed by the Soviet Union's deterioration. From these two examples of the Choibalsan and Tsedenbal regimes, we will see how the Soviet Union constrained Mongolian leaders' legitimation capacity as a significant feature of externally imposed communist regimes.

Mongol Stalin in the MPR: Personality Cult Legitimation under Choibalsan (1939–1952)

In the previous section, we have roughly traced how Choibalsan was able to seize the peak of power in the MPR, explaining the external imposition of Soviet-style rule in Mongolia. The power of Choibalsan in the MPR and the MPRP can be attributed to the Soviet Union's endorsement of a local rulership that could be counted on to serve Moscow's interests. As the vanguard of Soviet instructions, Choibalsan was deeply involved in the radical left wing of the MPR, supervised by the Comintern (Baabar, 2010).

There are virtually no studies in Western literature that focus exclusively on the observable implications of Choibalsan's legitimation claims. However, we can obtain a methodological approximation of what the ruler said about his legitimacy through regional expert survey data (Gerschewski, 2018). Furthermore, it is possible to evaluate the legitimation claims' observable implications via the fieldwork data using a variety of secondary literature

on the social history of the early MPR (Morozova, 2009; Kaplonski, 2004; Kotkin and Elleman, 1999). Moreover, using Nexis Advance UK data, this research accessed regional, national and international newspapers and country reports related to the MPR and the MPRP between 1912 and 1990.[63] Although it was not a large enough sample of representative legitimation text corpus for thematic coding text analysis such as that undertaken in the cases of Vietnam and North Korea, additional reports and resolutions of the MPRP CC Plenum and Congress were examined qualitatively to triangulate the response in the multiple regional experts survey data from the V-Dem institution used below.

In the late 1920s, Choibalsan forcibly expropriated the nobility's livestock and distributed it to collective farms. However, most partisan managers were destitute herders (*arads*) who lacked the skills and experience to effectively manage the farms.[64] Overlooking this circumstance, mass collectivisation was introduced throughout Mongolia with heedless enthusiasm (Rosenberg, 1981). In fact, regarding MPRP members' professional background, as late as 1934, only 17 out of 242 delegates to the Ninth Party Congress were industrial workers; thus there was no sizeable Mongolian bourgeoise or intelligentsia. Furthermore, the MPRP's membership decreased from 15,000 in 1928 to 12,000 in 1929 due to a series of purges initiated by the radical experiment of the MPRP. In order to increase the number of party members, the MPRP lowered party membership criteria; as a result, by 1932, the MPRP had swelled to 42,000 members – 80 per cent of whom were illiterate (Christian, 2017a, pp. 421, 423). These demographics indicate that the MPRP at the time was an externally imposed case of communist rule – meaning that it was a top-down-style communist coup that lacked its own capacity to run Mongolian society as a socialist regime.

In Mongolian society, where a self-sustaining communist movement from mass mobilisation was absent, Choibalsan's legitimation claims were based on his appointment by Soviet powers representing Stalin. Indeed, having seized power in Mongolia under Stalin's personal aegis and cultivating a similar personal cult, Choibalsan was often referred to as the Mongol Stalin (Soucek, 2000, p. 299). For instance, in Mongolia's independence from the Qing dynasty and subsequent formation of an independent state, Choibalsan – who appeared as a leading figure with Sükhbaatar – grew his power in the MPRP by aligning with the interests of

[63] In particular, during the Tsedenbal era (1952–1984) and Batmönkh era (1984–1990), BBC Summary of World Broadcasts provides original texts that can be used as primary data.
[64] The term *arads* still applies to ordinary herders in contrast to wealthy herders, or more recently to other social groupings such as workers and intelligentsia. See Rosenberg, D. M. (1981) 'The Collectivization of Mongolia's Pastoral Production', *Nomadic Peoples,* (9), pp. 23–39.

Moscow (Morozova, 2009). Also, by linking his early association with Sükhbaatar and depicting himself as the saviour of Mongolia from Japanese invasion at the Battles of Khalkhin Gol (with the support of the Soviet Red Army) Choibalsan established himself as a patriot hero who saved the Mongolian people.[65]

When Choibalsan sought the personality cult in Mongolian society, he was careful to not outshine Stalin. Indeed, in Mongolia, Stalin's cult was even more prevalent than Choibalsan's own (Dillon, 2019, p. 99). Nevertheless, the following process shows that Choibalsan reproduced the Stalinist model of personalist legitimation. First, he developed his cult through a campaign to promote elementary education. For example, only one Mongolian elementary school existed in 1921, but 122 schools had been established by 1930, and in 1940, 331 were in operation. Through modernised primary education, he introduced Mongolians to Soviet history and the sacred classics of the revolutionary era, establishing the translation and publication of *the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (written by Stalin) as the MPRP's most important ideological goal (Kalder, 2018, p. 91). Similar to Stalin, he published selected works and *the History of the Mongolian People's Revolution*, manoeuvring the collective memory of the Mongolian people.[66] This personality cult also appeared in the literary magazine *The People's Cultural Road*, which was first published in 1938 and mainly dominated by 'poems praising the Marshal Choibalsan'; writers who opposed this personal cult vanished from print (Kalder, 2018, p. 93).

After all political rivals had been removed, the personality cult of Choibalsan began in earnest. The Tenth MPRP Congress in 1940 was a tipping point for the MPR, because all manifestos and resolutions were already approved by Choibalsan and Tsedenbal. The unanimous approval of the CC of the MPRP propagated the 'theory of non-capitalist development under the banner of Marxist-Leninist teaching' (Morozova, 2009, p. 103). The personality cult of Choibalsan was also well represented in Tsedenbal's letter of 10 March 1949, addressed to the CC of the MPRP. In the letter, Tsedenbal criticised his bibliography in *the*

[65] Interestingly, images of Choibalsan and Sükhbaatar are different. Sükhbaatar is represented by his traditional uniform of deel tunic and jacket as commander-in-chief, and is very much the image of an old-fashioned herdsman-warrior. However, Choibalsan appears as a modern leader with a marshal's uniform in the Soviet style with the commander of Soviet troops in Mongolia. See Dillon, M. (2019) *Mongolia: A Political History of the Land and Its People.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

[66] Choibalsan managed to fill four volumes with official pronouncements and words delivered at party congresses; there are 'Letter to Mongolian Youth About the Soviet Lands 7 November 1923', 'The Eleventh Anniversary of the Death of Lenin and National Independence of Mongolia', 'The Great Celebration of the Revelation and the Politics of the New Course', and 'Speech at a meeting of workers in the city of Ulan Bataar 23 June 1941'; see Kalder, D. (2018) 'Publish and Perish: Lessons in Literature and Revolution from a Sycophantic Mongolian Dictator', *World Policy Journal*, 35(2), pp. 88–93.

Reading Book for Arats, because of inappropriate and resplendent words praising himself as 'outstanding', 'distinguished' and 'deserving recognition'. He determinately proclaimed with adulation for Choibalsan;

> 'It is improper to extol every leading worker as a 'leader' and 'respected leader'. […] There is one leader in our party, the people, and the country. He is Comrade Choibalsan. Comrade Choibalsan, together with the fearless Sükhbaatar, founded out party and State. […] *Such a ruling party as our must have one leader. He is Comrade Choibalsan* [emphasis added]' (Tsedenbal, 1980).

As V-Dem survey data shows (see *Figure 14*), with the introduction of the communist regime in the independent republic in the early 1920s, the emphasis on ideology was strengthened, and legitimation claims by Bogd Khan fell sharply.[67] The regime's legitimation claims were greatly influenced by the Soviet Union – more specifically, by Stalin – and closely tracked Soviet trends, with the partial exception of performance. In Mongolia, Soviet-inspired radical collectivisation from 1925 was applied partly with performance legitimation, albeit without considering the outcome of the productivity.



Figure 14. Legitimation Claims before the MPRP and Choibalsan Era in Mongolia
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019, p. 21).

[67] See the Appendix for more details about the V-Dem legitimation claim data.

For Choibalsan, Stalin's authority was an essential factor in providing the legitimacy that underlay the MPRP regime. Crucially, he seized control of Mongolia's domestic politics after Stalin appointed him as the Minister of Interior. His attitude toward the Soviet Union and Stalin can be seen in a 22 January 1944 conversation with Stalin,[68] during which Choibalsan asked permission to support Ospan, the Kazakh leader who kept Chinese forces in check in the Altai and Xinjiang region, as the MPRP's Prime Minister (Radchenko, 2009). He also re-requested that weapons be provided to support the army of the MPRP, which corresponds to the military policy of MPRP. In this conversation, Stalin praised Choibalsan as the leader of not only Outer Mongolia but also Inner Mongolia (Stalin and Choĭbalsan, 1944). This evidence indicates that Choibalsan relied on Stalin's direct assistance and approval for the MPR's foreign and military policies.

As a *de facto* country, the MPR declared its independence from China in 1921. However, under the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance in 1945, during the referendum implemented on 20 October 1945 to confirm Mongolia's intention to become independent – calling for a referendum on Mongolia independence – all voters voted in favour with 98.47 per cent turnout, and in 1946 Chiang Kai-shek's government formally recognised Mongolia's previously *de facto* independence (Soucek, 2000, p. 229).[69] During the referendum, the state's massive propaganda campaign encouraged anti-Chinese nationalism or patriotism that had suffused the Mongolian revolution since 1911. Choibalsan engineered legitimation by emphasising his experience as a patriot and saviour of the nation against the Qing dynasty. By remembering the 'usable past' and historical events of collective memory for legitimation (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, p. 236), Choibalsan secured his rule and consolidated the regime until his death.[70]

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[68] 'Stalin's Conversation with Choibalsan', 22 January 1944, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Lkhamsurengiin Bat Ochir, 'Stalin, Choibalsan naryn 1940-uud ony uulzaltuud'?, Khudulmur?, No 148. pp. 166–167. Original translated by Sergey Radchenko https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209765

[69] The poster informed Mongols that they were invited to vote for or against the statement: 'I am a citizen of the Mongolian People's Republic, and it is my sincerest wish to be constantly ready to guard the independence of our country with body and mind. I salute the independence of my country' Dillon, M. (2019) *Mongolia: A Political History of the Land and Its People.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

[70] Collective memory is powerfully influenced by the present instrumentally, through the conscious deliberate manipulation of the past for the interest of the present. This path, also referred to as creating a 'usable past', influences the collective memory through activities of various institutions. See Nets-Zehngut, R. (2011) 'Origins of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: Changes in the Historical Memory of Israelis/Jews 1949–2004', *Journal of Peace Research,* 48(2), pp. 235–248.

Keeping Pace with Moscow: Change of Legitimation under Tsedenbal (1952–1984)

Tsedenbal was the longest-serving leader of the MPR. Like his predecessor Choibalsan, Tsedenbal was Russian-educated and had been endorsed by the Soviet leadership. Having a Russian wife and being Choibalsan's second-in-command since 1940 were crucial points for in the Soviet calculus to make him the next local leader of the MPRP.[71] Indeed, Tsedenbal had been the number-two man in the previous regime, so he was closely linked to the Stalinist culture of purging and authoritarianism as well.

The change in Tsedenbal's rule and legitimation formula was also closely related to de-Stalinisation in Moscow. During the de-Stalinisation era, after Khrushchev's 1956 'Secret Speech' revealed a number of Stalinist-era evils, and in the ensuing partial de-Stalinisation, political leadership in the MPRP and intelligentsia were aware of dissent within the party. Tsedenbal effectively silenced and condemned internal critics as misguided intellectuals, right-wing opportunists, and counter-revolutionists who corrupted the social agenda (Dillon, 2019, p. 107; Radchenko, 2006). Tsedenbal's political oppression mainly targeted intellectuals, and the typical punishment was prolonged exile. Political oppression methods were no longer as inhumane as those of his predecessor (Morozova, 2009, p. 137). Tsedenbal followed Moscow's political agendas, bringing the militaristic and Stalinist past into line with post-Stalin economic planning.

Regarding performance legitimation, economic development was a significant priority of the Tsedenbal administration. In general, socioeconomic performance has been regarded as the core of sustaining legitimacy as the social contract in communist regimes (White, 1986, p. 463). By establishing the model of Soviet industrialisation with Soviet aid, various modern facilities were introduced in Mongolia, including a major power station, radio broadcasting plant, veterinary services, hospitals, kindergartens, a postal service, theatres, and cinemas. During the 1960s, the discourse of economic development used by Tsedenbal was that Mongolia had somehow managed to bypass the stage of capitalism (in Mongolian, *kapitalizmyg algasch*) and had leapt from its feudal past directly into a socialist present and future; this assertion constituted the central justification for the collectivisation programme (Steiner-Khamsi and Stolpe, 2006). The Mongolian-Soviet economic patronage relationship at the time was illustrated in Tsedenbal's 1956 dialogue with Anastas Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Tsedenbal continued to ask for

[71] There was a popular feeling that his wife, Anastasia Tsedenbal-Filatova, who was close to the Brezhnev family, accrued personal power in the MPRP. See Dillon, M. (2019) *Mongolia: A Political History of the Land and Its People.* London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

mitigation of unpaid loans, various supplies, and extensive support of Soviet workers for the MPRP, and Mikoyan advised that Moscow will provide aid to the MPRP, but added that the MPRP should not depend on the Soviet Union or China in the long term and should secure its own labour (Tsedenbal *et al.*, 1956).[72] Furthermore, the MPRP and MPR resolution of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) session in 1979 indicated that Tsedenbal's loyalty was 'first of all, with the great Soviet Union' and that fraternal socialist countries were their main economic and foreign policy priorities (Batmönkh, 1979, p. 1; Tsedenbal, 1979; BBC Monitoring Service, 1980).

During the Tsedenbal era, economic performance indicated fluctuation in development and differed between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Beginning in the 1950s, the Tsedenbal regime sought to expand agricultural production in the Mongolian steppes via a 'Virgin Lands' programme supported by Moscow as mirrors the language of Khrushchev's own 'Virgin Lands' campaign in the USSR (Rossabi, 2005, p. 7). Ultimately, however, agriculture productivity declined due to higher dependency on fertilisers and equipment from the Soviet Union. Total grain output in 1980 was less than in 1965. In the 1970s, Soviet aid helped build the industrial city of Darahan and the copper mines of Erdenet, and by the early 1980s, there were at least 32,000 Soviet workers in MPR (Christian, 2017c, p. 483). Meanwhile, interviews with prominent democratic reformers showed that collectivisation, urbanisation and industrialisation supported by Moscow and Eastern Europe had translated into economic progress by the 1980s (Rossabi, 2005, p. 34).[73] Industry and trade experienced substantial expansion. In 1960, 61 per cent of the employees were engaged in the agricultural sector, but by 1985 only 33 per cent of the employees earned their income in that sector (Asian Development Bank, 1992, pp. 20–21).[74]

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[72] 'Excerpts from Tsedenbal's diary on his conversation with Soviet leader Anastas Mikoyan on Soviet economic cooperation and aid to the People's Republic of Mongolia (Fragments)', 24 February 1956, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Budyn Sumya (ed.), Gerel Suuder: Yu. Tsedenbalyn Khuviin Temdeglelees (Light and Shadow, From Yu. Tsedenbal's diary) (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn Khevleliin Kombinat, 1992), pp. 91–94. Translated by Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110480

[73] Interviews, T. Erdenebileg (Grandson of Tömör-Ochir, a leading communist official purged in 1962; prominent democratic reformer), Ulaanbaatar, 21 June 1998; H. Hulan (Leader among the democratic reformers; member of the Khural, 1996–2000, chair of the Social Welfare Subcommittee of the Khural, 1996–2000), Ulaanbaatar, 26 May 1998. See Rossabi, M. (2005) *Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

[74] During the 1976–1980 period, with Moscow's aid, approximately 150 national-economic projects were constructed, and scores of industrial and agricultural enterprises were started. See Tsedenbal, Y. (1981) *The Report of the Party Central Committee to the 18th MPRP Congress*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/371c59fa-cef1-4cfc-8a12-62f556061a16/?context=1519360 (Accessed: 10 Feb 2021).

However, higher reliance on the Soviet bloc's economy made the MPR vulnerable to the economic and political convulsions plaguing the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Nixson *et al.*, 2000, p. 120). The gradual disintegration of the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s and the collapse of one-party rule in Mongolia in 1990 resulted in considerable economic turbulence (Rossabi, 2005). In the early 1960s, the industrial sector's contribution to gross national product (GNP) rose to 38 per cent, supported by the CMEA. The Trans-Mongolian Railway linked Moscow, Ulaanbaatar, and Beijing; average life expectancy rose from 32 years in 1921 to 65 years in 1979. This development of socio-economic indicators indicates how Tsedenbal emphasised performance legitimation for justifying the title to rule for a long time.

Tsedenbal also considered other performance legitimation claims, such as making education a high priority and emphasising the modern Soviet medical system (Dillon, 2019). He was also active in lobbying for Mongolia's entry to the United Nations in 1961 and establishing full diplomatic relations with the US in April 1973 (although these were not finally established until 1987). These efforts indicated how he sought to highlight the international engagement legitimation claim as well.

Social, economic and cultural changes, as well as a loosening Soviet grip on domestic affairs in the MPR, helped explain a growing interest in Mongolia's past. With a partial relaxation in censorship, traditional Mongolian themes began to reappear within Mongolian culture. Comparing the Choibalsan era – when officials were criticised for displays of traditional nationalism and purged as rightist opportunists – Tsedenbal rehabilitated the ultimate figure of Mongolian tradition and nationalism, arguing:

> 'As an individual, Chinggis Khan was an exceptionally talented man. With his wars, he proved himself to be a talented military commander. He had a progressive role in uniting the Mongolian people. Chinggis Khan was inarguably an important statesman, an able commander and the founder of Mongolian statehood' (Tüdev and Jambalsüren, 2016; Dillon, 2019, p. 110).

For example, his open and public praise of Chinggis Khan was the forerunner of modern Mongol nationalism. In 1962, the 800th anniversary of the birth of Chinggis Khan was celebrated (Christian, 2017c, p. 486). Tsedenbal spoke positively of the Bogd Khan's role in history and advocated the preservation of his palace as the Bogd Khan Palace Museum. The changes in these policies can be evaluated in two ways. First, the benefits of borrowing the charisma of an indigenous historic figure can be seen as an attempt to overcome the imposed communist origin by finding a truly usable past. Second, accepting Mongolian traditional culture to a certain extent may help strengthen the legitimacy of the regime among those who

doubt the merits of communism. Given Tsedenbal's strong purge of opponents who criticised the personality cult during de-Stalinisation, whom he accused of aggravating nationalistic sentiment and anti-party agitation, as well as his strengthening of relations with Moscow (Radchenko, 2006), it is fair to state that by adopting nationalistic discourse, Tsedenbal sought to improve the legitimation belief among the Mongolian people toward his rule.

The Sino-Soviet conflict was the main regime crisis during the Tsedenbal regime, which made attempts to diversify diplomatic relations with China and other countries, including the Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation of 1952. Tsedenbal even requested that the Chinese government send 20,000 Chinese workers to settle in Mongolia and work in Mongolian factories (Pisarev, 1954).[75] However, after the Sino-Soviet conflict, the MPRP established a more solid relationship with the Soviet Union. According to the Mongolian Politburo Resolution and a letter from Tsedenbal on 1 December 1965, he requested additional Soviet military units to be stationed on Mongolian territory and reinforce the defence capabilities of the MPRP (Tsedenbal, 1965).[76] The Sino-Soviet split culminated in armed conflict between Chinese and Soviet troops on their shared border in 1969, and the Soviet Union stationed large numbers of troops in Mongolia during the 1970s. Until the 1980s, there was no loosening of the Soviet grip on the MPRP's foreign policy, when the tensions with China were high (Batmönkh and Tsedenbal, 1982).

In 1969, Soviet troops returned to Mongolia. Tsedenbal's negative attitude toward China and friendly stance toward Moscow were also well reflected in the 1971 memorandum of conversation with the Head of the Delegation of the Worker's Party of Korea on the 50th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Revolution (Tsedenbal and Jeong, 1971).[77] In the speech to the CC of MPRP Plenum in 1983, Tsedenbal still prioritised the economic and defence potential of the socialist community – and especially of the Soviet Union – in

[75] 'Record of Conversation with the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Comrade Tsedenbal. (fragments)', 29 November 1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF: fond 0111, opis 36, papka 235, delo 3, listy 57–58. Obtained and translated by Sergey Radchenko for CWIHP. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110479

[76] 'Mongolian Politburo resolution and letter to the Soviet leadership requesting Soviet troops be stationed on Mongolian soil to defend against possible attack', 1 December 1965, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mongolian Revolutionary People's Party Archive (Mongol Ardyn Khuvsgalt Namyn Arkhiv): fond 4, tov'yog 28, kh/n 173b, khuu. 35–37. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko. The resolution was written in Mongolian and the addendum in Russian. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110036

[77] 'Memorandum of Conversation between the First Secretary of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Head of Delegation of Korean Worker's Party on the 50th Anniversary of the Mongolian People's Revolution', 15 July 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, fond 3, dans 1, kh/n 122, khuu 1–14. Obtained and translated by Onon Perenlei and Sergey Radchenko. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115201

Mongolia's foreign policy, and only briefly referred to the principled line of improving and developing a relationship with China based on peaceful coexistence (Tsedenbal, 1983, pp. 3–4), adding that developing a normal relationship with China 'depends on whether the Chinese side renounces the fallacious line and practices of Maoism' (Tsedenbal, 1981, p. 3).



Figure 15. Legitimation Claims: Tsedenbal Era in Mongolia
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019, p. 21).

The 32 years of Tsedenbal's rule can be summarised as largely following Moscow's political trend. Throughout the de-Stalinisation period and under Khrushchev's rule (1953–1964), Tsedenbal kept a close eye on Moscow's changes and followed suit by reducing the emphasis on personality cults. Ideological legitimation still prevailed during the Tsedenbal era; even in 1981, he continuously highlighted the basic revolutionary transformation activities that the linkage with the Mongolian people and their unshakeable loyalty to Marxist-Leninist teaching. He emphasised '[Mongolian people] constant study of the richest worldwide historical experience of the great Leninist party' (Tsedenbal, 1981, p. 9). He sought to diminish the personality cult of his predecessor after the 1956 Secret Speech and de-Stalinisation initiative in the USSR, took steps to ease political oppression (at least, by authoritarian standards), and emphasised the economic performance of the planned economy and mineral industry infrastructure under Soviet support. Socially and culturally, he showed an attitude of

accepting some of Mongolia's previously banned traditional culture and nationalism for the sake of legitimation (see *Figure 15* above).

However, in an extensive framework, these changes are not indicative of an autonomous political decision, but are rather a pure reflection of Moscow's socio-cultural changes. Indeed, during de-Stalinisation, Tsedenbal successfully prohibited opponents' sharp criticism of the Choibalsan era – thus, for him, the main reason for reducing personalism did not derive from the domestic political atmosphere but instead sought to follow trends in Moscow. Therefore, the MPRP remained constrained in its legitimation claims due to its externally imposed origins. When the MPRP annual congress met in 1981 to elect the Politburo, Central Committee, and Secretariat, more than 80 per cent of the members were new. Three years later, Tsedenbal was forced into retirement in August 1984 as Premier in a Soviet-sponsored move; Jambyn Batmönkh became the next General Secretary of the MPRP.

As we have seen through the legitimation claims of two leaders of the MPRP, we have traced that the *manufactured* legitimation claim mechanism appears in this externally imposed communist party regime. During the Choibalsan and Tsedenbal eras, the MPR followed the Soviet system and patterns of legitimation claims. The USSR also suppressed potential nationalism among political opponents, which hindered the MPR's self-sustaining political autonomy. This manufactured legitimation claim mechanism has lower legitimation capacity compared to the autonomous legitimation mechanism in regimes with indigenous political origin. Until the collapse of the USSR, Mongolia faced virtually no critical legitimacy risks due to steady support from Moscow. However, when the external power (the USSR) faced its own regime crisis, Mongolia's externally imposed origin regime also faced a regime failure due to the legitimacy crisis. How the manufactured legitimation claim mechanism contributed to the MPR's regime failure in the face of a regime crisis will be explored in the next section, which examines the Batmönkh period.

Legitimacy Crisis and Democratisation after the Collapse of the USSR

In the previous sections, I examined how the regime origin (in Mongolia's case, external imposition) shapes the rulers' legitimation claim capacity through two Mongolian leaders who ruled when the regime was relatively stable. To understand the relationship between regime origin and legitimation capacity when rulers are faced with acute regime challenges, such a moment of acute regime crisis should be investigated. As an externally imposed communist party regime, the MPR's failure stemming from the collapse of the Soviet Union – as well as

responses to demands for democratisation from civil society and progressive youth groups – are essential to understand how the regime's fragility resulted from its externally imposed political origins. By examining these factors, this section reveals how the previous legacy of external imposition influenced Batmönkh**,** the last leader of the MPR, and resulted in reduced political autonomy and scope to reshape the ruling party's legitimation claims.

Following the USSR's collapse, Mongolians rejected the socialist model of the USSR that their country had adhered to since 1924.[78] They began to embrace a market economy, political pluralism, and greater emphasis on Mongolia's pre-Soviet history, traditional culture and religion (Heaton, 1992; Barkmann, 1997). As I noted before, a wider evaluation of Mongolia's political climate or democratic consolidation would be beyond the research question. I stress that this section focuses on the failure of the MPRP's regime resilience by analysing responses of the MPRP Politburo toward the various groups eager for democratisation – specifically, elite fragmentation after Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* during the mid 1980s and the failure to reproduce subsequent generations of effective revolutionaries in the MPRP Politburo.

Perestroika and Glasnost: Legitimation Change under Batmönkh (1984–1990)

The Soviet Union's détente with China was an inexorable change for Tsedenbal, who held a stubborn policy line against China. When he visited Moscow in 1984 for medical treatment and vacated the leadership in MPR, Batmönkh and other political opponents in Ulaanbaatar overthrew him with Moscow's collusion and active assistance, proclaiming that Tsedenbal could no longer hold the positions because of his poor health (Dillon, 2019, p. 113; Rossabi, 2005, pp. 6–7; The MPRP Central Committee, 1984; Batmönkh, 1984).[79] That year, the Soviet Union replaced Tsedenbal as the local leader of the MPRP with Batmönkh, who was an academic economist and university administrator. Batmönkh emulated Gorbachev's Soviet *Perestroika* in Mongolia. He is famous for his role in Mongolia's transition to democracy as Soviet power unravelled between 1989 and 1991. Today he is respected for resolutely refusing to use force to keep the MPRP in power and for overseeing the Politburo and government's resignation in March 1990 (Dillon, 2019). When we examine the process of the longest-serving

[78] In 1921, as a result of the Mongolian people's revolt, the Mongolian people declared independence from the Qing dynasty, and the MPR was proclaimed in 1924. Between this time was the rule of the Bogd Khanate.

[79] He was stripped of all his political honours, his membership of the MPRP was rescinded, and he only avoided a trial because of his failing health. His remaining years were spent in a flat in Moscow, where he died in 1991. See Rossabi, M. (2005) *Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

local leader resigning and the selection of a new leader of the MPR, we can determine whether the MPR, as an externally imposed political origin, still is constrained by the USSR.

Similar to previous local leaders, Batmönkh's legitimation features a *manufactured* legitimation claim mechanism that is forced to passively accept the changing Soviet situations. Within the scope of Moscow's permission, he sought a multi-pillar foreign policy after normalising diplomatic relations with China while keeping a close relationship with Moscow; this strategy was the foundation for Mongolia's future foreign policy (Batchimeg, 2006; Enkhsaikhan, 2014; Batbayar, 2003; Batmönkh, 1986, p. 4). Under Batmönkh, but following the lead of the USSR, relations with China gradually improved. His pursuit of foreign policy diversification and non-alignment can be seen in his talks with Kim Il-sung in 1986.[80] What is also important here is that Soviet influence still played a meaningful role in the policy of MPR. Batmönkh stated:

> 'We try to maintain good relationships with our neighbouring countries. […] *Since the people's revolution triumphed in our country, Mongolia, we have maintained* [a] *good, fraternal relationship with the USSR. We, our party, government, and people attach great importance to this relationship. Our relationship with other fraternal countries is also successfully developing* [emphasis added]. […] Our government warmly received Comrade M.S. Gorbachev's initiative in Vladivostok to normalize relations with the PRC. […] we agreed to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia in order to establish trust between countries and create a healthy atmosphere for all on the Asian continent. […] From this position [,] we support the non-aligned movement' (Kim and Batmönkh, 1986).

From these points, it is seen that the Soviet Union still influenced the politics of the MPR, and also that the Batmönkh regime was restricted by its externally imposed political origin for its legitimation formula used to justify its title to rule since the MPR's founding some 60 years before.

As General Secretary of the USSR, Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* policies changed to other Soviet blocs. The MPRP Politburo is also undeniable to the acceptance of the Soviet' political situation (Gorbachev and Batmönkh, 1985; The MPRP Central Committee, 1986). Under the political changes in the communist world in the mid-1980s, Batmönkh publicly stressed the unchanging leadership of the Soviet Union, the time-tested indissoluble alliance, and fraternal friendship between the MPR and the Soviet Union:

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[80] 'Record of Conversation between Comrade J. Batmunkh and Kim Il Sung,' 20 November 1986, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, fond 3, dans 1, kh/n 173, khuu 123–164. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Sergey Radchenko and Onon Perenlei. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116671

> ‘The preparations by communists and working people in the Soviet Union for the 22nd CPSU Congress are being followed with lovely interest in Mongolia. *The innovative approach of the CPSU to the problems of the further improvement of developed socialism give a fresh stimulus to the activities of our Party too and is an inspiration to the Mongolian working people* [emphasis added]’ (Gorbachev and Batmönkh, 1985, p. 3).
>
> ‘The Soviet Union and socialist countries have a creative, new approach to resolving the urgent tasks facing them at the present crucial stage. […] The idea put forward by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev for a comprehensive approach to the problem of ensuring security in Asia presupposes precisely such unity of efforts by the Asian States and a joint search for ways to strengthen peach in the reason’ (Batmönkh, 1986, pp. 3, 5).

Emphasising the MPR’s ties and solidarity with Moscow and Gorbachev, portraying a decisive factor for the MPR’s future, the same is true in speeches by several lower and regional party committees (Altangerel, 1986, p. 1). This shows that the legacy of external imposition was still present in the legitimation claims of the MPRP Politburo at both national and regional levels.

The ideas of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* had already attracted the attention of the younger generation of aspiring Mongolian leaders. The first pro-democracy demonstration was organised by the newly formed Mongolian Democratic Union (*Mongolyn ardchilan kholboo*, MDU) at the Youth Cultural Centre in Ulaanbaatar on 10 December 1989 (Fritz, 2008, pp. 770–779). Their aims were the end of ‘bureaucratic oppression’ and insisting on a commitment to implement Gorbachev’s ideas of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* (their Mongolian equivalents being *uurchlun baiguulalt* and *il tod*) (Fritz, 2008, p. 768).

Political liberalisation began in December 1988, when Batmönkh officially denounced Choibalsan’s personality cult and great purge, as well as ill-treatment of the Tsedenbal regime (Batmönkh, 1988). The speech encouraged the formation of pro-democratic opposition.[81] Batmönkh supported Gorbachev’s programme of reform and had begun to implement changes in the structure of the bureaucracy to make it less old-fashioned and more transparent, calling the program ‘*Oorchlon Shinechlel*’ (literally: ‘change to the new world’) (Heo, 2020a). In 1989 he had created a commission to analyse the repression of the 1930s and the responsibility for

[81] Since then, many articles reflecting on Choibalsan’s legacies have been published in the national daily *Unen* about the dangers of personal cult, violation of human rights and democracy. See BBC Monitoring Service (1988) *Reflections on the Good and Bad Points of Choybalsan*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d757555e-613d-4d14-ae29-d7667ef1eb40/?context=1519360 (Accessed: 26 Feb 2021).

the thousands who had been killed, and to rehabilitate those who had been purged (Dillon, 2019; Batmönkh, 1988, p. 2).

Political changes from the Soviet Union and economic stagnation based on the aid-based structure challenged the Batmönkh regime's performance legitimation. Traditionally, Mongolia's economy had encountered severe problems in the 1960s, due in part to disastrous weather. Another economic plan approved in 1966 concentrated on attempts to transform the nomadic style of herding into a ranch-style system that the government believed would be a more stable method of managing livestock (Dillon, 2019). Although the initial Soviet-style collectivisation imposed on Mongolia in the 1930s had been an unmitigated disaster, more realistic systems were introduced later (Rosenberg, 1981), and the programme of industrialisation and urbanisation on the Soviet pattern had led to a stable economy, albeit one without substantial growth. Most Mongols achieved only a low standard of living, but there was little abject poverty. Aid and trade ceased abruptly immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the extent of Mongolia's previous dependence on the USSR was immediately apparent (Rossabi, 2017; Goyal, 1999). The MPR's economic and social problems, including stagnation and the prospect of aid falling and lower productivity from the CMEA countries, continuously challenged the MPR's legitimacy (Alan, 1990).



Figure 16. Legitimation Claims: Batmönkh Era and after the Collapse of the USSR
Source: Author-composed, based on the V-Dem data (Tannenberg et al., 2019; Coppedge, 2019, p. 21).

In the second half of his term in office, along with the decline of global communism, highlighting personal leadership as the justification for rule had reduced dramatically, while efforts to ensure performance and procedural justification were emphasised (see *Figure 16*). These changes can be seen as a common phenomenon in most communist regimes pursuing reformation (Brown, 2010; Tismaneanu, 2013; Zubok, 2017; Dimitrov, 2013a).

In the next sub-section, I examine how Batmönkh's legitimation capacity was insufficient to reflect the needs of the second generation of the Politburo of the MPRP, who were direct beneficiaries of Gorbachev's policies when they studied abroad in Eastern Europe and Moscow. In particular, the legitimation claim's lower capacity is to be investigated through the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism formed by the institutional legacies shaped by the external imposition of communism.

Insufficient Legitimation Capacity and Rapid Democratisation

The previous sub-section explains that the political liberalisation process in the MPRP in the late 1980s triggered by Gorbachev also significantly impacted Batmönkh's legitimation claims. Responding of the changes, the MPRP professed the will for policy changes (*Oorchlon Shinechlel*), but it did not shift to reform until December 1989. The MPRP was the only legal political party, and the government still violated human rights and manipulated media in Mongolia. The secret police, security guards, and troops remained intact, and informal state repression continued (Rossabi, 2005, p. 10). Due to this procrastination, on 18 December 1989, pro-democracy groups submitted a petition to the *Khural* (parliament) for the funding of public organisations supporting the reconstruction process of the MPRP.[82] The MPRP cautiously permitted the Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU) to organise its activities within the constitution's framework and existing laws (CBS Morning News, 1990). Moreover, the MPRP called on the CC of MRYL to convene for renewing the Congress's charter based on the tasks advanced by the MDU (BBC Monitoring Service, 1990c). In short, the Politburo of the MPRP followed their own phase of political liberalisation and reformation.

However, on 14 January 1990 in the square outside the Lenin Museum, up to 5,000 demonstrators gathered and called for the trial of Tsedenbal and urged a faster pace of

[82] There were the Democratic Socialist Union, New Progressive Union, Mongolian Social Democratic Party, Mongolian National Democratic Party, Free Labour Party and Mongolian Green Party. These sub-groups eventually merged as the Mongolian National Democratic Party (*Mongolyn undesnii ardchilsam nam*, MNDP) in October 1992.

Perestroika, including the rehabilitation of politicians purged during Choibalsan and Tsedenbal eras and evoked Chinggis Khan's spirit (The Associated Press, 1990a). The demonstrators were young, educated and had access to publications from the Soviet Union and the West. Many members of the MDU were children of *nomenklatura* families, who studied in Central or Eastern Europe and Moscow, and they returned to Mongolia with ambitions for political reformation. They may have remembered or been one generation removed from the coercive collectivisation of the late 1950s, but they had little personal experience of the Great Purge of the 1930s. They also had well-developed professional and corporate identities (Ginsburg, 1999, pp. 258–259). This rapid influx of political reformation results from the 'diffusion' driven by higher linkage with the Soviet Union (Fritz, 2008, p. 768; Doorenspleet and Kopecký, 2008). The MDU's primary demands were to create a genuinely independent *Khural* (parliament) based on free elections, to separate the ruling party from the government (as a multiparty election system), and to honour Chinggis Khan's memory as a hero of the Mongolian history or as an alternative to the Soviet Union.[83] The organisation of MDU had branches in several of the cities and provinces, and the number of supporters was over 60,000 in the month before its formal creation (BBC Monitoring Service, 1990b). According to the speech by Sosorbaram, the member of the Mongolian Democratic Association (known as the MDU) Coordinating Council in the MDU Constituent Congress in 1990, the democratic group has dissatisfied with the slow pace of the MPRP's reform programme. He argued:

> 'The ruling party regards reconstruction as a slow evolution and has thus begun the Perestroika with economic renewal. The party and state leadership has consistently adhered to the stance that the key forces of carrying through these reforms are ministries, factory administrations and primary party organisations. *We perceive all these as the main reason of the overall slow rate of the reconstruction process* [emphasis added]' (BBC Monitoring Service, 1990e, p. 1).

The flow of democratic movement expanded through solidarity of religious and trade union groups which had resentment against the inequality of payment between Mongolian and Russian workers. There were hunger strikes by local people and monks from *Gandan* (the only monastery permitted to operate in Mongolia). Sympathy strikes arose among workers in

[83] The MDU's slogans were 'freedom of the press', 'destruction of the command bureaucratic system' and 'the establishment of genuine people's power'. Political demands were the main focus but other material situations in which social inequality and issues of ecology and the protection of the environment were also part of the programme of the MDU. See BBC Monitoring Service (1990a) *Demands Raised at 21st January MDU Rally*. London: The British Broadcasting Corporation. Available at: https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3cd83271-b3e7-489a-946f-e9a1adbf8dba/?context=1519360 (Accessed: 23 Feb 2021).

Erdenet and Darkhan and Moron, mining and industrial cities created by the Soviet Union (Rossabi, 2005, pp. 11–17).

Regarding anti-Moscow sentiment, Alivin Bira (pro-democracy activist) said in an interview that 'we're fed up with Communism. It's… we've had enough. The communists must go home; the Russians as well' (CBS Morning News, 1990, p. 1). Similarly, Sanjaasuren Zorig (general coordinator of the MDU) insisted that 'to our mind, the command and administrative method, red tape and Stalinism, which took deep roots in our country in 1930s, continue to hold strong even today. Therefore, it is very important to do away with them' (BBC Monitoring Service, 1990d, p. 1). This resentment indicates that over the past 70 years, Mongolian leaders had failed to establish a sufficiently autonomous legitimation claim and were restricted by the externally influenced origin.

Within the ruling MPRP, there was a growing body of support for the reformers' demands, but the party was split, and the regime's response was indecisive. Furthermore, an obdurate faction advocated deploying the army and police to suppress the demonstrations in Ulaanbaatar, using as an excuse the sporadic outbreaks of violence that had occurred despite the determined non-violent stance of the leadership of the MDU. However, the brutal suppression of the Chinese democracy movement in Beijing's Tian'anmen Square on June 1989 was still fresh in the minds of Mongolia's political elite, so the MPRP general secretary, Batmönkh, firmly rejected the use of force to maintain its authority. He declared that the party needed to renew itself if it were to be able to deal satisfactorily with the political crisis (Rossabi, 2005, pp. 22–23).[84] However, in the MPR, with its legacies of externally imposed political origin, it was difficult to advocate a new legitimation formula (e.g. change or foster legitimation claims) on its own to overcome the regime crisis, unlike a regime with an indigenous political origin and an autonomous legitimation mechanism. This procrastination of political liberalisation illustrates how vulnerable the MPR's *manufactured* legitimation mechanism is when faced with a regime crisis.

Members of the government and the Politburo of the MPRP were not sitting on the side-lines to deal with the regime legitimacy crisis. They attempted to negotiate a compromise, but

[84] According to Batmönkh's widow, Mrs Daariimaa, in 1990 another faction insisted on using force toward democratic protest. However, Batmönkh finally resigned saying that Mongolia's population was already low, so it should avoid causalities and not hurt the next generation for our future. She also said that Batmönkh himself was considering retirement due to his old age, so he had no reason to dwell on his position. Dumaagiin Sodnom, Prime Minister, also stated that Batmönkh 'refused to use repression and stepped down on his own because he had no desire for his honour'. See Heo, M. H. (2020a) 'Mongolia's Reform Policy "Oorchlon Shinechlel" and Political Change: Another Reference for North Korea?', *The Korean Journal of Area Studies*, 28(3), pp. 233–260.

the protesters remained adamant in their demands for fundamental changes. Conscious of the disastrous impact of the military suppression of the Tian'anmen protests and pressed by the Soviet government to avoid a violent end to the demonstrations, the MPRP backed down. On 9 March 1990, Batmönkh announced his resignation and that of the entire membership of the Politburo in a statement that was broadcast on radio and television. He stressed the MPRP's task 'is to build human and democratic socialism on the soil of Mongolia. It is important to renew our party leadership with younger people who are clever and constructive and for *Perestroika'* (The Associated Press, 1990b, p. 1). The hunger strike was ended, and the demonstrators left Sükhbaatar Square. Multiparty elections would be held on 27 July 1990; the first-ever open elections in Mongolia.

To sum up, along with the demise of global communism, the economic crisis in the Eastern Bloc and Gorbachev's reform, the MPR also faced regime crisis as the one-party system that had survived for more than 70 years. This sub-section reviews how a regime crisis exposed the limitations of *manufactured* legitimation mechanism, which had its legacies in the external imposition of the communist regime. This interaction had a significant impact on how the Batmönkh regime could legitimise itself as the Soviet Union encountered its own crisis. Seemingly, his pragmatic reformative legitimation claims aligned with the post-Stalinist society led to diversifying foreign policy, criticising the personality cult of the previous regimes, and emphasising performance and procedural legitimacy. Nevertheless, there is a restriction by the externally imposed political origin, which is forced to accept Moscow's wave of changes. Thus, Mongolia case differed from cases with *autonomous* legitimation mechanism in which local leadership was able to reshape (or foster) the legitimation formula pre-emptively during, and in parallel with, the decline of the world communism. This basis allows us to evaluate how political origins shape later rulers' legitimation capacity and regime resilience when the regime faces a crisis. The MPR case indicates that the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism of an externally imposed political origin is less autonomous in the claims and restricted by the patron (the USSR) even in the use of the state repression, which ultimately led to elite fragmentation in the case of the Batmönkh regime. As a result, the regime ultimately collapsed.

Conclusion

The history of the MPR began with Soviet intervention, and the rise and fall of the MPR coincided almost exactly with that of the Soviet Union. Since its establishment as an independent republic in 1921, Mongolia's leaders were under Moscow's influence and

countenanced internal interference by the Soviet Union rather than asserting their own political autonomy between the Soviet Union and China.

More substantial external imposition of communist party origin can lead to significant differences from those with indigenous communist party origin in the legitimation mechanism by which leaders claim legitimacy to maintain their regimes. This is because it could not utilise the advantages of various institutional legacies derived from indigenous political origins: (1) having multi-layered sub-party organs, (2) effective military and security sections controls by the communist party and (3) shared social norms and usable collective memory by the original communist movements and independent movement for the legitimation sources. Its externally imposed origin limits its ability to claim the legitimacy of regimes, compared to the mixed or especially indigenous origin regimes. Hence the common label applied to Mongolia as a Soviet 'satellite' regime.

These restrictions also affect the weak resilience of the regime. In the case of MPR, the diffusion of the Soviet Union's political reform policy introduced into the MPR and the Politburo of the MPRP was not sufficient to cope with the changing demands of the ruled within the existing political system and, consequently, the MPR regime collapsed. In particular, the MPR represents the limitation of the externally imposed political origin that fails to present the autonomous and pre-emptive legitimation formula. I trace nearly 70 years of the political history of the MPR and legitimation types throughout V-Dem survey data, the Nexis Advance UK data, and various historical literature on the state-building of the MPR.

Political intervention of the Soviet Union in the MPR began with the selection and exclusion of Mongolian leaders from the early establishment of the regime, and the selected local leaders actively embraced the Soviet model. By doing so, many state apparatuses that laid the foundation for state institutions in the newly independent one-party communist state relied on Moscow's instructions among various economic, military, and foreign policies in the MPRP. All three Mongol leaders – Choibalsan, Tsedenbal and Batmönkh – were established by the Soviet Union's interest, and their degrees of political freedom (autonomy) were constrained and manipulated by the Soviet leaders. They argued for the regime's legitimacy through socialist welfare policies provided by economic aid from Moscow and CMEA that they had not experienced previously, but their legitimation claims were ultimately unsuccessful, especially when the regime faced the prospect of political liberalisation in the late 1980s.



Figure 17. Different Generational Effects over Legitimation Capacity in Mongolia
Source: Author
Note: (a): ideology, (b): person of leadership, (c): performance, and (d): rational-legal legitimation
The arrow's colour reflects the extent of legitimation claim in V-Dem data (e.g. 3–4 in black, 2–3 in dark grey, and 1–2 in light grey). The Mongolia case demonstrates that the external imposition origin could not change and foster the legitimation formula in different generations, and it is only highly dependent on the external power's legitimation.

Meanwhile, this excessive reliance on the Soviet Union intensified the MPR's regime crisis when the Soviet Union's power and the Eastern Bloc economy declined during the 1980s. Even during the regime crisis, the influence of the Soviet Union remained relevant to the domestic politics of the MPR. When Batmönkh had to make a significant decision regarding the end of one-party communist rule in the MPR that had endured since the 1920s, the decisive factor is derived from the influence of Gorbachev's *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* policies. After China's Tian'anmen Square protests in 1989, the instruction of the Soviet Union against physical repression had a significant impact on Batmönkh's decision. Regarding generational effects of the external imposition of the communist party regime toward the legitimation strategy, it can be summarised that the majority of the MPR's legitimation formula involves an infusion of Moscow's one. By doing so, the external imposition regime has less capacity to legitimise its title to rule than one with indigenous origins, and they could not change or foster the legitimation formula pre-emptively, especially when the regime was faced with a crisis (see *Figure 17*).

As a case of the regime's externally imposed origins, I examine the MPR's regime resilience failure as political outcomes of the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism, which initiated differences in the later rulers' legitimation capacity, shaped by the political origin. As previously noted, we cannot categorically state that all external imposition cases of the communist party regimes in history followed the democratic transition as in Mongolia's example. The more focused analysis in this chapter is that even later rulers who had long emphasised ideology and personalism through more than 60 years of the communist system, beginning in the mid-1980s when the USSR's power declined, the later leader had not easily overcome the crisis of legitimacy and failed the change of legitimation formula efficiently to fulfil the demands for the political reformation. As seen in the previous chapter, this is in stark contrast to Vietnam's case of indigenous political origins.

There is a limit to the analysis's content and depth in its numerical calculation of regime duration in discussions of regime origin and regime resilience, compared to other chapters that conducted qualitative text analysis of the text corpus of legitimation claims. However, this chapter analyses the MPR's political history based on regime duration and evaluates the different local rulers' limited legitimation capacity based on qualitative analysis of various primary and secondary resources about MPR's political history. This chapter contributes to expanding our knowledge about to what extent political origin matters for legitimation capacity of later rulers and regime resilience.

Chapter 6 - Mixed-Origin Communist Party Regime: Ideological Introversion of North Korea after the Collapse of the USSR[85]

*'Indeed, in the past year, our party and people have solidified our revolutionary base by carrying out policies of **Juche (self-reliance)** in ideology, self-reliance in politics, self-reliance in in the economy, and self-reliance in national defence'.*

***Kim Il-sung**,*
New Year's Address 1967

*'**Songun (military-first)** is the life of the fatherland and the people and the dignity of our people. We must continue to hold on to Juche's ideology and line as the leading guidance of the party and revolution'.*

***Kim Jong-il**,*
New Year's Address 2007

*'The challenge of the hostile forces continues, and the situation is quite tense, but we will carry the red flag of the revolution high and continue unswervingly along the path of **self-reliance**, **Songun**, and socialism, and make a responsible effort to safeguard the peace and security of the Joseon (Korean) Peninsula and the world'.*

***Kim Jong-un**,*
New Year's Address 2016

[85] A previous version of this chapter was presented at the Political Studies Association Annual International Conference 2019: Politics and Policy in Southeast and East Asia Specialist Group under the title 'Does the Legitimacy of Authoritarian Regimes Really Matter? Revisiting Legitimacy in the Study of North Korea'.

The origins of a political regime (i.e. how it comes to power), matters for the capacity of the regime to legitimate its rule in the future. As we have seen in the case of Vietnam and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), an indigenous communist party origin regime, they had more capacity for reshaping legitimation claims after the regime faced a crisis. As a result, Vietnam has maintained its regime so far with a reformed communist system. In contrast, as a typical case of external imposition, the political history of Mongolia and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) has shown the regime's fragility in terms of legitimation of the ruler after the collapse of the USSR. We analyse how political origins affect the capacity of later rulers' legitimation, focusing on the institutional advantages of the types of political origins in the preceding chapters.

Meanwhile, the case of North Korea is often regarded as having very distinctive features in terms the regime characteristics and duration. The regime resilience of North Korea has been the subject of research by many political scientists (Dukalskis, 2016; Dimitrov, 2013a; Saxonberg, 2013). Nevertheless, the following questions remain: unlike Vietnam – as a case of indigenous communist party origin, which reshaped its legitimation to performance-based socio-economic reformation – why did North Korea turn to ideological introversion after the collapse of the USSR? This chapter investigates North Korea as a mixed-origin case of communist party rule that included personalist dynamics of legitimation claims by Kim Il-sung in the state-building stage. Next we will discuss, via qualitative text analysis of the New Year's addresses and joint editorials of North Korea, how ideological legitimation claims have been institutionalised, affecting later regimes' resilience. In the final analysis, we will examine how, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the mixed origins of communist party regime have constrained its rulers' capacity of legitimation claims through in-depth analysis of North Korea's socio-political situation.

This chapter does not insist that all mixed-origin communist party states followed North Korea in turning toward 'ideological introversion' after the collapse of the USSR. Instead of such an overgeneralised and deterministic argument, it argues that, due to the features of mixed-origin communism, Kim Il-sung's legitimation was institutionalised, and when later rulers faced regime crisis, they tended to follow pre-generational examples of legitimation claim types from among the options they could choose. As an often-quoted example, for dealing with the economic crisis and preventing military coups, Kim Jong-il incentivised *Songun* (military-first) ideology, utilising his father's legacy of guerrilla activity against the Japanese Empire. In other words, the more general and persuasive argument in this dissertation could be reiterated thusly: *the origins of the party's seizure of power shape and structure the legitimation claims*

of rulers as they face unpredictable crises in the future. I examine the suggested mechanism through various mechanistic evidence from the three different generations of Kim rule in North Korea.

This chapter is composed of the following sections. The first section briefly reviews the historical background of state-building in North Korea as a mixed-origin communist regime. It then analyses how *Juche* ideology emerged after the Korean War, de-Stalinisation, and the 'August Faction Incident', all of which are examined using historical sources. By tracing the legacy of Kim Il-sung's *Juche* ideology, we can find that even a mixed-origin communist party regime could transform its institutional feature of externality toward an '*autonomous*' legitimation claim mechanism like that of indigenous communist party countries. More detailed analysis of legitimation capacity in the second section will investigate how ideological legitimation claims by Kim Il-sung had been institutionalised and continued to influence later regimes, envisaging a mutually re-enforcing system among legitimation, repression and co-optation. Finally, to evaluate the suggested mixed legitimation mechanism outlined in the theory chapter, we empirically examine to what extent legitimation claims of North Korea have evolved and been consolidated after the collapse of the USSR, along with the legacy of mixed origins of the communist party. The chapter conducts a qualitative text analysis of representative text corpora, namely North Korea's annual New Year's addresses, something akin to Pyongyang's 'state of the union' address. In doing so, this chapter will contribute to our understanding of authoritarian regime resilience and post-communism literature by illuminating why North Korea's legitimation claims changed to ideological introversion after the collapse of the USSR. In doing so, it sheds light on the previously under-appreciated relationship between the regime origins and their subsequent legitimation claims for the regime resilience.

Historical Legacy of the Mixed Origin of the Communist Party in North Korean State-Building

The main argument of the research is that the origins of communist party regimes structure the capacity of ruler's legitimation claims, and that these legitimation claims impact regime resilience. As a mixed-origin regime case, in this section, the early history of North Korea state-building, especially the origin of the communist party regime's seizure of power, will be

analysed.[86] By tracing the main features of the communist movement in North Korea from 1945, when independence from the Japanese Empire was achieved, to the 1960s in the post-war construction era, it closely examines how Kim Il-sung entrenched his power after independence from the Japanese Empire and to what extent the Soviet Union supported him in consolidating communist power in North Korea. Additionally, the political condition for structuring legitimation claims in the early stage of state-building in North Korea will be discussed.

The aim of this section is not to provide an exhaustive description or chronicle of early North Korea. Rather, it will focus on reviewing the history of North Korea's state-building under the light of the concept of mixed communist party origin. This section is composed such that first, it examines indigenous features for the autonomous legitimation mechanism in North Korea. Next, elements of the external imposition of the Soviet are discussed. Finally, how the *Juche* discourse actualised the autonomous legitimation mechanism in North Korea is analysed. By doing so, it will argue that the North Korea case is a regime with a mixed-origin communist party that used *Juche* ideology, which is not only a practical tool for defeating factional enemies but also a mechanism of social control based on a specific epistemological view of their ruler and ideal society. Features of self-reliance and nationalism in the *Juche* ideology shifted the externality of regime origin (influence of the Soviet Union) to a more *autonomous* legitimation mechanism even before the collapse of the USSR. These factors had a significant influence on the regime's resilience insofar as future leaders could not stray too far from this legitimating formula without risking undermining their power.

Indigenous Features for Autonomous Legitimation Mechanism in North Korea

Like many communist movements in Asia and Africa, the communist movements on the Korea peninsula had an anti-colonial and nationalistic character – in Korea's case, due to the specific context of subjugation by the Japanese Empire. Before reviewing North Korea as such, it should be noted that there was a previous generation of communist movements, both on the Korea peninsula and nearby via Korean diaspora communities in China, Russia, and Japan. As

[86] A mixed-origin communist party regime is defined in this research as having: (1) some degree of existence of mass mobilisation of the communist movement at a grassroots level; (2) a semi-autonomous role for indigenous leadership; and (3) some extent of interference by the Soviet Union – for example, Red Army intervention in the early stage of state-building, but not direct and lasting imposition. Specifically, when clarifying precise criteria, it may be difficult to draw a clear line between 'external imposition' or 'indigenous communist party origin'. Some cases, such as North Korea, featured significant elements from both poles. For this reason, the research follows the threshold of the two categories as a mixed-communist party origin.

an antithesis of colonial rule, many liberal intellectuals and nationalists who eagerly wanted independence from Japanese colonial rule engaged with the idea of communism. Even though some of them may not have had a deep commitment to the principles of communism or international communist movement, they recognised it as a useful ideology for opposing imperialism (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 63). Some nationalists voluntarily participated in the communist movements to incentivise assistance from the Soviet Union for independence, especially in the armed struggle for Korean independence (Kwon, 2003, p. 286). The aim of the research is not a detailed description of dynamics among the factional groups of the previous generation of communist movements in Korea.[87] Here we are only tracing critically related historical factors and seeking to understand the early history of North Korean state-building.

The first group with the label 'communist' in Korea was founded in Seoul in 1925 as 'the Korean Communist Party' (KCP). KCP members held four rounds of party-building events, but their power in the political arena was minimal due to the vigilance and persistent control of the Japanese imperialist police (Kwon, 2003, p. 287). Like many other cases of early communist countries, factional divisions within communist groups in Korea and nearby Manchuria competed against each other for hegemony of the communist movement in the social revolution against the Japanese Empire ruling. Each faction sought to secure from the Soviet Union the title of approved power (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 67).

The history of Korean communism and the history of early state-building in North Korea can be summarised as tracing which communist group achieved state-led hegemony. For example, significant factions after the independence from the Japanese Empire could be listed as Soviet, Yan'an, South Korean, and Manchurian (Gap-san). Looking at the composition and characteristics of each faction, we can see how Kim Il-sung was able to emerge as a national leader in North Korean society with the help of the Soviet Union, which is one criterion in defining communist party origin. The Soviet Union helped Kim Il-sung attain power; however, most historians agree that this was not purely an imposed revolution and that there was a significant role for local political actors in the combination of populist nationalism and revolutionary socialism for building the DPRK as a communist state (Armstrong, 1995; Kim, 2013b; Armstrong, 2013, p. 110; Person, 2019).

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[87] About the relationships and conflict among early communist groups in Korea, see Armstrong, C. K. (2004) *The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950.* New York: Cornell University Press, Scalapino, R. A. and Lee, C. S. (1972) *Communism in Korea: The Movement.* Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

First, the Soviet faction was composed of Koreans in Central Asia and Primorsky Krai, northeast of the Korean Peninsula. In October 1937, most Koreans living in the Far East of the Soviet Union were forced to relocate to a barren part of Central Asia under Stalin's ethnic deportation plan (Gelb, 1995). The Soviet faction members were second-generation Korean immigrants born in Soviet territory and educated in the Soviet system. From among the Korean immigrants, during 1945 to 1948 Soviet government agencies sent former school teachers and medium-level officials to the DPRK (Lankov, 1999, p. 45). Thus, these transplants were not only devoted to the Soviet Union but also part of the main group in the state-building of North Korea, using their professional backgrounds. In the early days of national construction, Kim Il-sung actively utilised this Soviet faction as professional technicians who performed the main functions of national institutions and industries (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 318).[88] After the Korean War, however, they were purged from the North Korean leadership by Kim Il-sung who was emphasising 'self-reliance' amid factional strife (Lankov, 1999).

Among the Korean communists who worked abroad, there were not only Soviet Koreans, but also the Yan'an faction, which worked for the Communist Party of China (CPC) during that country's revolution. They were called Yan'an faction due to pro-China communists following Yan'an, where the leadership of the CPC was located, and they were mainly military veterans who participated in the Chinese Revolution (Lankov, 1999, pp. 44–45). Under the doctrine of the Soviet Union (i.e. one nation and one party), many armed independent guerrilla groups in the area near the China-Korea border smoothly joined the CPC and gained military experience during the Chinese Revolution (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 170). Their trained military experience served as a basis of the foundation of the Korean People's Army (KPA). Moreover, this faction organised the New People's Party of Korea in 1946 and was merged into the Workers' Party of North Korea (forerunner to the WPK) (Jeong, 2012).

It is worth noting that there was another armed independence force operating on the border between China and the north side of Korea. They were called the Manchuria (Gap-san) faction and had poor conditions in human resources and theoretical bases in the communist movement, compared to other factions (Lankov, 1999, p. 45). The most significant resources

[88] Early on, North Korea made efforts to enhance its scientific and technological prowess across industries. Early North Korean industries were dominated by the Soviet Union's scientific and technological influence. Founded in December 1952, the role-sharing system between the National Academy of Sciences and its affiliated research institutes is a copy of the Soviet model. However, the Soviet influence in the field of science and technology also began to deteriorate after the August 1958 sectarian violence and subsequent deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union, prompting North Korea to pursue its own line in terms of science and technology. See Kang, H. J. (2007) *History of Science and Technology in North Korea I (북한 과학 기술 형성사).* Seoul: Sunin(선인).

were the presence of the unique, charismatic figure of Kim Il-sung and a strong elite cohesion, built up by guerrilla warfare with him against the Japanese Empire. Indeed, the Manchuria (Gap-san) faction was a small group of the independent armed group in Manchuria. They conducted a series of guerrilla and partisan movements in the Manchuria and Jiandao areas. Kim Il-sung was a leader of this group, and his staunch colleagues, who engaged in guerrilla warfare, become mainstream in the party ranks in the nation-state-building in North Korea after independence from the Japanese Empire. Without the assistance of the Soviet Union, which occupied the northern portion following Korea's partition in 1945, it was hard to understand how this small and weak faction could have become the central group of the communist party of North Korea. Furthermore, these features of the guerrilla group in the North Korean political leadership had constructed a specific feature of political culture and uniqueness of the nation itself (Haruki, 2018; Haruki, 2002). How the impacts of guerrilla legacies toward legitimation claims of the Kim Il-sung will be analysed later in this chapter.

Table 8. Factions of Communist Groups in North Korean State-Building

Faction name	Base of operations	Leading figure	Features	Extinction
Soviet	Russia	Alexei Ivanovich Hegai	Higher officers, technicians, born in the Soviet	August Faction Incident in 1956
Yan'an	China	Kim Tu-bong	Military veterans via the Chinese Communist Revolution	
South Korea	South Korea	Park Hon-young	Communist theorists	After Korean War in 1955
Gap-san	Manchuria	Kim Il-sung	Small guerrilla band	Disputation within succession in 1967

Source: Author

Unlike other factions' traits (i.e. military-based legacies of struggle against the Japanese Empire), the South Korean faction had quite different features. Geographically, they originated in South Korea, and in the setting of the ideological position of the communist movement, they worked together with communist study groups in Japan. At that time in South Korea, ideas of communism largely came from younger students who had studied in Japan, and the most distinguished members of the South Korean faction tended to be Marxist theorists and intellectuals in the media industry. These features of membership in South Korea faction are more like those of 'study groups' rather than the armed independent paramilitary character of the other factions (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 53). After independence from the Japanese Empire and stationing of US military forces in the southern portion of Korea, the power of

South Korea's communist faction declined due to repression, and their political space also decreased. Some of them fled to the North. In addition, the emerging leadership of Kim Il-sung, by leading the Interim People's Committee and constructing the first central government in early 1946, along with the formation of the first government in South Korea separately in August 1948, the South Korean faction declined drastically its hegemony of communist party and communist nation-state-building in North Korea (Park, 1996a). The communist factions are summarised in *Table 8*.

Again, understanding more detailed information and timelines of factional disputes is not the primary aim of the research. However, it is useful to know the political landscape of communist movements of Korea before the end of the Japanese Empire. After independence from Japanese rule, the Allied Powers were stationed in Korea; the US in the southern area and the USSR in north (Cumings, 2010). Legacies of pre-generational communist movements in Korea indicated that there were existing communist movements from below before the imposition of rule by the Soviets in the division of 1945. The configuration of North Korea as a mixed-origin communist party is based on this fact. Indeed, in the southern part of the peninsula, including *Jeju* Island, there were significant leftist guerrilla uprisings against the US-supported rule until the Korean War began in 1950 (Cumings, 2002; Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 262).[89] In the next section, how the early regime of North Korea was influenced by external power (i.e. the Red Army) and under the specific condition of the Korean War, and how Kim Il-sung expanded his political autonomy in an attempt to build indigenous autonomous legitimation mechanisms will be discussed.

External Imposition by the Soviet Union, Korean War and Post-War Development

The early political leadership of North Korea had a combined nature that synthesised various communist groups. The coalition, consisting of the Soviet, Yan'an, South Korea, and Manchuria (Gap-san) factions, quickly implemented land reform and socialist policies under Soviet control after the partition of the two Koreas (Park, 1996a). There were various explanations about why Kim Il-sung emerged as a leader, not only of the communist party of Korea but also of the emerging political entity in northern Korea (Suh, 1988). Prominent candidates of previous generations in the communist groups had mostly died out already or

[89] Famous events are the Autumn Harvest uprisings of the Kyoung-sang and Cholla provinces (southern part of South Korea) and the General Strike in other regions of People's Committee in 1946. See Cumings, B. (2002) *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947.* New York: Cornell University Press.

else vanished under the aggressive police apparatus of the Japanese Empire. In addition, the Soviet Union definitively chose the young candidate, Kim Il-sung, who was experienced in the Soviet realm rather than other influential candidates such as Cho Man-sik, a renowned nationalistic Christian leader in North Korea, or Pak Hon-yong, an advanced Marxist theorist in the South Korean faction (Scalapino and Lee, 1972).

In 1950, the Korean War changed the political, cultural, and economic situations of the two Koreas. Initially, the war was planned by Kim Il-sung for the unification of two Koreas, supported by the Soviet Union, in the form of a blitzkrieg. However, the plan failed due to the intervention of U.N. forces. As a result, the Korean War shifted against North Korea, which lost nearly all of its territory before Chinese military intervention in late 1950 shifted the balance again. The blitzkrieg war plan of Kim Il-sung failed, and three years later the war was halted by a ceasefire in July 1953 at roughly the same place where the peninsula had originally been divided after the fall of the Japanese Empire (Park, 1996a; Scalapino and Lee, 1972). Because the purpose of this study is not to deal with the Korean War in detail, we would like to focus on the implications of the Korean War regarding legitimation claims and how Kim Il-sung manipulated the legacy of the Korean War and post-war development for legitimising his rule.[90]

For Kim Il-sung, the Korean War was a prominent event, not only in its attempt to unify the Korea peninsula with military power but also as part of the completion of state-building itself. By doing so, under the banner of preparing a war for the unification of the nation, he centralised his authority in the political landscape of North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union. Also, in terms of elements of collective memory utilised by the ruler, this war experience provided abundant non-material resources for legitimation claims of 'just war' for the unification of the Korean Peninsula against foreign powers, namely the US. Various interviews on mass mobilisation in North Korea for the Korean War substantiate the idea that the mode of preparation for war actually served to consolidate Kim Il-sung's power in both his political party and in society as a whole under the monolithic view of the ruler (Kang, 2018).

[90] For more detailed histories of the Korean War, see Cumings, B. (2010) *The Korean War: A History*. New York: Random House Publishing Group, Haruki, W. (2018) *The Korean War: An International History*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Park, M. L. (1996a) *The Korean War: The Outbreak and its Origins Vol. I : The Fatal Decisions and Outbreak of the Conflict (한국전쟁의 발발과 기원 I)*. 2nd edn. Seoul: Nanam, Park, M. L. (1996b) *The Korean War: The Outbreak and its Origins Vol. II : The Origins and Causes of the Conflict (한국전쟁의 발발과 기원 II)*. 2nd edn. Seoul: Nanam.

How Kim Il-sung's legitimation claims used to this repertoire will be examined analytically in the next section.

With economic aid from the Soviet Union and China following the armistice agreement in 1953 and the relative success of the centrally planned economy since 1956, Kim Il-sung was able to succeed in the post-war restoration project in a relatively short time compared to South Korea. As a result, comparative economic indicators from the 1960s and 1970s confirm that North Korea was an economically more affluent society than the South (Scalapino and Lee, 1972). The questionable credibility and transparency of North Korea's state statistics on economic growth is another matter, but according to CIA estimates, the economy of North Korea at that time had indeed recovered to a relatively high level, compared to that of South Korea (United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1972, p. 5), even if it fell short of the economic conditions at the time of Japanese colonial rule (Park, 1996b). This can be said to be the result of the rapid application of the Soviet Union's planned economic model, which had already been active in heavy industries in the North Korean region since the Japanese colonial era, as well as aid from the communist world. The relative success of the post-war economy in the 1960s–1970s constitute material conditions for the economic performance legitimation of Kim Il-sung.

Juche: An Attempt at Autonomous Legitimation Claim Mechanism in North Korea

The fact that Kim Il-sung was selected for leadership by the USSR, as well as the receipt of selective aid during the division of Korea in 1945, are conspicuous indicators of an externally imposed origin for North Korea's communist party. Nevertheless, as we discussed in the previous section, the North Korean case does not fit in the typical case of external imposition of communist party origin such as Mongolia or the Eastern Bloc countries in Europe.

After liberation from Japan, the international political environment of division by the US and the USSR naturally formed favourable political and social conditions for establishing the communist regime in North Korea. Many opponents of communism fled to the South, and South Koreans sympathetic to the communist movement flowed into the North. Except for party organisations, all students, autonomous and security organisations were given the status of 'social organisations' and these groups were used as intermediaries for the WPK to gain control of the masses. North Koreans were obliged to join various social organisations segmented by gender, age, and occupation. There were many instances of overlapping subscriptions to five to six social organisations, and multiple subscriptions have also helped secure finances for the WPK through the collection of membership fees (Kim, 2018). Under

these structural conditions, the North Korean government was able to quickly lead the communist revolution by controlling North Korean society through a corporatist approach with diverse and multi-layered social organisations in addition to the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) (Cumings, 1993).

The origin of the communist regime in North Korea is, therefore, the result of a link between the previous generation's self-sustaining independence movements and the international communist movement to escape from Japanese imperialism (Kwon, 2003). This fact supports the idea that the origin of communist rule in North Korea does not have a purely Soviet client-state nature. In other words, these mass communist movements in North Korea facilitated the mass mobilisation of sub-party organisations. This mass mobilisation helped engineer the North Korea revolution, because, after the division of the two Koreas, many dissident South Koreans relocated to North Korea; meanwhile, landowners, Christians, and those who collaborated during the Japanese colonial era moved to South Korea.

After the Korean War, Kim Il-sung's process of consolidating his power can be seen in the process of establishing *Juche* ideology. In a time of conflict between China and the Soviet Union, he preached an independent and self-reliant governing ideology accompanied by a series of political purges. Political changes in the international communist movement after the death of Stalin in 1953 gave Kim Il-sung the initiative for expanding the regime's autonomy. Since 1960, the dispute between China and the Soviet Union served as an important opportunity for Kim Il-sung to pursue his own line along with the rapid post-war restoration process. Through his insistence on *Juche* ideology in 1955, Kim Il-sung sought to solve various political problems with this monolithic view (Lankov, 1999). By asserting the *Juche* idea, we can say that the North Korean leader had come to assert his rule with a self-fulfilling governing ideology and to take complete control of the national system and society. This fact implies the process of transition from a Type-I mixed-origin communist party (low regime independence with high legitimation capacity) to *autonomous* legitimation mechanism, as pointed out in this study. In other words, the degree of intervention of outside forces (influence of the Soviet Union) may vary depending on the leader's capabilities and, in some cases, can be transformed into the *autonomous* legitimation mechanism. By analysing *Juche* ideology during the de-Stalinisation era, the next sub-section will discuss how Kim Il-sung effectuated his regime's autonomy.

Kim Il-sung first invoked the concept of *Juche* in his speech on 28 December 1955: 'About the Elimination of Doctrines and Formalism and the Establishment of *Juche* in Ideology Projects'. After this period, the government actively used self-reliance and self-reliant

discourse in addressed and party-based media outlets. Aiming at the Soviet faction within the party, Kim Il-sung criticised the intrusion of pro-Soviet doctrines into the WPK's business and claimed, '[w]e need to know the history of *Joseon* [Korean dynastic kingdom lasted five centuries], know the geography of *Joseon*, and know the customs of the Korean people' (Kim, 1963, p. 430). Excessively emphasising the *Juche* speech of 1955 as evidence corroborating the significant turning point of Kim Il-sung toward empowering nationalism – or an entirely new political ideology – may be criticised because its importance was emphasised retroactively by the WPK (Myers, 2006). Indeed, *Juche* was simply a supplement to Marxism-Leninism when it was first introduced, but the doctrine quickly evolved to become the main legitimation claim for the regime's resilience (McAdams, 2017, p. 415). From this perspective, this research focuses on why and how Kim Il-sung emphasised *Juche* as an instrumental tool for justifying WPK's rule as legitimation claims against factionalism and the crisis of de-Stalinisation (Lankov, 1999), rather than identifying how much he genuinely believed his own discourse.

Through his emphasis on *Juche*, Kim Il-sung was able to be freer from the responsibility of the Korean War; he was distancing himself from the war responsibility and giving himself an additional source of legitimacy. After the Korean War, he professed himself to be the chief propagator and the defender of the Korean revolution by initiating rehabilitation and reconstruction of North Korea. He held the Sixth Joint Plenum of the Central Committee in August 1953, restructured the WPK, and constituted the new Political Committee of the Central Committee. In April 1954, through the general party election, he changed various positions in the local party organisation (Suh, 1988). Furthermore, he emphasised *Juche* as a major tool in cleaning up and purging factional relations within the leadership that continued after the war. For example, the Soviet and Yan'an factions were purged, and the most crucial point was the purge of South Korean communist leadership due to the failure of the rear guerrilla front during the Korean War.

After Stalin died on 5 March 1953, Khrushchev's speech, the so-called 'Secret Report' to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, was a watershed moment in the communist world. Khrushchev denounced the personality cult of Stalin and the bloodletting of the purges (Smith, 2014, p. 12). The leaders of China, Romania, Albania and North Korea retrieved a convenient rationale for maintaining their title to rule by legitimising themselves as both 'torchbearers of the class struggle and defenders of national dignity' (McAdams, 2017, p. 409). Kim Il-sung tried to dissociate himself from Moscow and Beijing, under the *Juche* discourse, and navigated a 'political[ly] astute course, balancing China against the Soviet Union, while obtaining aid from both' (Radchenko, 2014, p. 148).

In September 1961, only twenty-eight out of eighty-five full members of the Central Committee were retained from the preceding congress five years earlier, reflecting Kim Il-sung's successful removal of most of the members of the Soviet and Yan'an factions. Similarly, in 1967, political rivals in the same Manchuria (Gap-san) faction, who criticised Kim Il-sung's *Byungjin* (two-track) line for national development, including Pak Geum-cheol, Ri Hyo-soon, Kim Do-man, were also purged under accusations of spreading bourgeois ideas, revisionism, and feudalism.[91]

Under the context of de-Stalinisation, *Juche* was a means to consolidate power and weather the storm of global communism's deterioration, including the post-Stalin Sino-Soviet conflict and Khrushchev's movement to downgrade Stalin. During this political change in the communist realm, Kim Il-sung had established the monolithic ideological framework of *Juche*. So, his creation of the *Juche* ideology indicates that North Korea was not as dependent on external powers, including the Soviet Union, for the accomplishment of socialist North Korea is a convincing statement (McAdams, 2017, p. 415).

The primary sources of legitimation in *Juche* are guerrilla legacies against the Japanese empire, teleological discourses on socialist nationalism and unification of the nation. In 1967, Kim Il-sung presented the four basic principles of self-reliance in *Juche*: (1) self-reliance in ideology, (2) self-reliance in politics, (3) self-reliance in the economy and (4) self-reliance in national defence in his speech: 'About Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' (Kim, 1982). Under the condition, for Kim Il-sung, the August Plenum and series of the joint Sino-Soviet party intervention in September in 1956 was not serious factional disputes or crisis of foreign influence in the domestic politics, and then Kim followed the more indigenous course (Person, 2019). In this point, it would be supported that the origin of the WPK was not merely one of Soviet imposition, but rather one of mixed origin.

During the Sino-Soviet split, Kim Il-sung engineered *Juche* discourse as a political ideology, and this legitimation effort for the title to rule allowed him to establish a degree of state autonomy, which contributed to the relative resilience of the DPRK after the collapse of the USSR (Lankov, 2007). Therefore, it can be seen that Kim Il-sung actively utilised *Juche*

[91] For the detailed information, see 'Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.203, TOP SECRET, 13 June 1967', 13 June 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116707 and 'Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No. 76.279', 3 August 1967, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Eliza Gheorghe. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116713.

discourse as not only a system of social control but also as a means of transitioning to charismatic indigenous leadership to move closer to the features of an indigenous-origin communist regime. This position change of North Korea implies that a mixed-origin communist party regime, depending on the leader's propensity and the political climate, can also try to redirect itself toward the stage of *autonomous* legitimation mechanism, which is structured under conditions of higher ruler legitimation capacity with higher independence of the regime (see *Table 9*). In short, the starting point of communist party construction was the Type I case of a mixed-origin communist party; the DPRK indicated its relative longevity of the regime by attempting institutionalised ideological legitimation.

Table 9. Transition of North Korea's Legitimation Capacity

		Degree of independence of the regime	
		Higher	Lower
Ruler's legitimation capacity	Higher	***Autonomous*** Legitimation claim Mechanism 1950s – *Juche* ideology Post-war development 1960s – The Sino-Soviet Split	Type I (Mixed origin) 1945 – The division of Korea 1946 – Provisional government 1948 – DPRK was declared
	Lower	Type II (Mixed origin)	***Manufactured*** Legitimation claim Mechanism

Source: Author

Consequently, the North Korean regime's communist party has a mixed origin, as shown in the combination of assistance from the Soviet Union for the enthronement of Kim Il-sung alongside the significant anti-colonial communist movements that pre-dated the Red Army's arrival in North Korea. Furthermore, Kim Il-sung's power throughout the Korean War and post-war situation, as well as the process of solidifying North Korea's *Juche* ideology, indicated that Kim played up the independence of North Korea even while still relying on economic aid from the Soviet Union and China (Lankov, 2007). The next section discusses how Kim Il-sung's *Juche* ideology engineered his legitimation claims and how the claims structured later regimes, envisaging mutually reinforcing systems of legitimation, repression and co-optation.

Institutionalised Ideological Legitimation and Stability of North Korea

Legitimation claims are crucial elements for regime stability when used in combination with repression and co-optation, and legitimation has features of a self-reinforcing relationship toward repression and co-optation strategies of the ruler (Gerschewski, 2013). The mutually

reinforcing mechanism indicates the presence of path dependence in this relationship in the sense that previous developments shape the options available to current rulers. These choices of legitimation claims become particularly salient at moments of regime hardship or crisis. The choice of legitimation claims depends on various factors: (1) the ruler's perceptions of the regime crisis, (2) the intentions of the ruler for the claims in light of the crisis and (3) the political context – both domestic and international – surrounding the rulers. North Korea's past as a mixed-origin regime had shaped these factors when the regime faced difficulties many decades later. The objective of this chapter is to conduct a careful investigation of these legitimation claim changes by a country with a mixed-origin communist party and how the mixed origins of the regime have constrained its rulers' legitimation claims.

Thematic Coding of Legitimation Claims of North Korea

Legitimation claims could be analysed empirically with both quantitative and qualitative text analysis or survey research as a methodical approximation (Gerschewski, 2018). This research follows qualitative text analysis tradition to capture the more nuanced tone of the various forms of legitimation claims from the rulers. In contrast, quantitative text analysis – including traditional content analysis – may be useful in the approach of coding a massive text corpus with a dictionary-based text analysis. However, this approach focuses more on the morphological meaning of words rather than revealing the particular meaning of sentences and the context (Kuckartz, 2014, p. 33). It thereby limits the contextual research to multi-dimensional legitimation claims of the ruler. Thematic coding analysis of qualitative text analysis is a useful approach to examine the patterns in the data with a semantic view of the text, which evaluate the surface meaning of the data (Braun *et al.*, 2019; Braun and Clarke, 2006).

This section will focus on New Year's addresses and joint editorials from 1946 to 2019 under the regimes of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un to examine the patterns of legitimation claims they used. Since the 1950s, North Korea's annual New Year's addresses and discourses of *Juche* have saturated the public sphere as a means to uphold legitimacy (Dukalskis, 2017). Among various formats of text corpora for legitimation claims, New Year's addresses provide continuity of data format among the rulers. Also, New Year's addresses include both retrospective and prospective claims about the regime (Park, Park and Jo, 2015), thus clearly representing the ruler's intentions for the regime throughout the series of addressed. For these reasons, carefully analysing the representative text corpus generated by the rulers would serve as a methodical approximation of official legitimacy claims in autocracies

(Gerschewski, 2018). It will be thus be understood that the institutional legacies of a mixed-origin communist party influenced the later rulers' capacity of legitimation claims. To check the actual legitimacy belief among the public and triangulation of the legitimation claims, this research used primary materials, and other secondary interview data from North Korean refugees is also investigated.

For the data of thematic coding, the New Year's addresses are gathered from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and *Rodong Sinmun*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the WPK. To preserve the originality of text corpus analysis, the Korean-language versions of the statements are used. For the merits of comparative analysis of legitimation claims with other cases of Vietnam and Mongolia, this dissertation follows the typology of Von Soest and Grauvogel (2017). Initial coding themes of legitimation claims are: (1) foundational myth, (2) ideology, (3) personalism, (4) performance, (5) international engagement and (6) procedures, following the typology of von Soest and Grauvogel. However, in the North Korea case, a procedural mechanism that emphasises democratic procedures, adopting a nominally multiparty system, legislature, and ostensibly free and fair elections for justifying legitimised rule, is hard to identify. For this reason, these five main mechanisms – foundational myth, ideology, personalism, performance, and international engagement (excluding procedures) – are conducted for main themes of thematic coding in the qualitative text analysis.[92]

In contrast to the previous chapters' analysis of expert surveys on legitimation from V-Dem data, this chapter uses thematic coding as the primary analysis. Unlike the other chapters, North Korea's legitimation claim text corpus provides continuous and consistent official statement data over 70 years. Therefore, I apply thematic analysis to the sentence-level coding process, resulting in more contextual and semantic meanings for the legitimation claims. To triangulate the empirical findings, I consult with the V-Dem data.

Descriptive Statistics of Thematic Coding Outcome

Again, the unit of thematic coding analysis is the sentence – rather than specific terms or phases, as in other automated text analyses. This is because in the Korean language, each letter has various meanings depending on context, and capturing a more accurate meaning requires a sentence-level analysis. Each legitimation claim has certain sub-categories of the coding

[92] For the detailed explanation about justification of code and procedurals of finalisation for sub-thematic coding, see the Appendix of codebook for legitimation claim.

scheme as follows (see *Table 10*). It should be noted that the frequency comparison of coded thematic coding among rulers' New Year's addresses and joint editorials needs to consider not absolute values, but rather the relative position of emphasis, because numerically, Kim Il-sung ruled for more years than Kim Jong-un. To reduce the effect of the different absolute numbers of legitimation text corpora among the rulers, average coverage percentage is referenced by calculating the mean of the coverage percentage in the coded sub-themes in the New Year's addresses and joint editorials.

Table 10. Coding Scheme of the Text Corpus of North Korean Legitimation from 1946 to 2019

Legitimation claims	Sub-themes	Frequency of coded sentence			Average coverage percentage		
		KIS	KJI	KJU	KIS	KJI	KJU
Foundational myth	Revolutionary legacies	169	157	36	3.2	6.4	4.0
	Baekdu descent	2	39	28	1.0	1.9	4.7
Ideology	*Juche* ideology	540	1370	461	11.2	51.8	49.1
	Nationalism	219	384	135	4.5	14.3	12.9
	Songun	-	490	99	-	18.5	12.2
	Ideological struggle	35	31	11	1.6	1.7	2.1
	Triumph of ideology	462	135	47	8.5	5.2	5.0
Personalism	*Suryong* system	74	532	107	5.5	23.4	12.3
	Loyalty to ruler	27	253	84	2.1	10.5	9.0
	Personal character	-	-	18	-	-	2.9
Performance	Economic development	1574	556	282	29.0	18.1	29.6
	Enhance Party governance	294	267	134	5.3	10.0	14.3
	Science and technology	270	125	85	5.2	4.3	10.1
	Education, culture, art	144	98	57	3.1	3.7	6.2
	Armament development	160	15	16	4.3	0.8	2.0
International engagement	Unification of nation	626	111	88	11.6	4.4	8.4
	Denounce South Korea	271	67	36	4.8	2.8	4.4
	Threat from Imperialism	346	142	55	6.5	5.5	6.4
	Socialist friendship	283	45	13	6.0	2.1	1.6
	Nuclear restraint	38	15	20	3.9	1.0	3.3

Source: Author
Note: Average coverage percentage indicated the mean of coverage percentage in the coded sub-themes in the New Year's addresses to normalise the different numbers of New Year's addresses among the rulers.

In *Table 10*, the frequency of a coded sentence indicates how many times the theme is mentioned in the addresses of the text corpus, whereas the next column – average coverage percentage – indicates the mean of coverage percentage of the coded sub-theme in the New Year's addresses for the ruling duration. Using coverage percentage rather than the frequency of coding is important for normalising the bias of different absolute numbers of New Year's addresses between two rulers. In the New Year's address of Kim Jong-un, for example, *Baekdu* descent, as a sub-theme of foundational myth legitimation, was mentioned fewer times than in

his father's addresses. However, as regards the actual coverage percentage, Jong-un has used it more than twice as often as his father so far, due to the need for highlighting himself as the legitimised ruler in the early succession period after 2012.

Figure 18 indicates a time-series analysis of legitimation claims of North Korea, and it provides specific implications for how the regime of North Korea was able to maintain its regime after collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Just as most communist regimes have used the performance of economic development as the basis of the legitimation claim, North Korea has adopted an attitude of emphasising economic development during the post-war recovery period after the Korean War and the revitalisation of the planned economy in the 1970s. The actual living standard index was higher than that of South Korea at that time (Scalapino and Lee, 1972; United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1972, p. 5). However, we can see that the performance of the planned economy has become relatively weak since the 1980s. As can be seen in the case of most communist regimes, the inflexion point for North Korea's legitimation claims is after the Soviet Union's dissolution in the 1990s. Since the 1990s, references to economic performance have also been strengthened not by objective indicators, but rather by declarative meanings. Such comments are on the rise again in the 2000s.



Figure 18. Thematic Coding Outcome of the North Korean New Year's Address Text Corpus
Source: Author

Similarly, what is unique in terms of ideology legitimation claim is the inflexion point of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. We can see that Kim Il-sung emphasised the triumphal achievements of socialist ideology along with the achievements of post-war restoration in the 1960s–1970s, while also emphasising the independent line of 'our-style socialism' and the idea of self-reliance ever since the fall of the communist movement in Eastern Europe and around the world. Especially with the advent of *Songun* (military-first) politics, the emphasis on ideology was expanded. However, in the Kim Jong-un era, the ratio of performance claims has increased as much as ideology legitimation.

Interestingly, international engagement themes showed that higher continuance because the New Year's address referred to South Korea and friendship with other socialist countries only perfunctorily (Park, 2020). Insistence on North Korea's position in international relations, which promotes goodwill among socialist countries, emerged from the beginning and reached its peak in the 1980s. The discourse of North Korea was that it is not a small communist country between the Soviet Union and China, but instead adopted a self-reliant and independent line. By doing so, they insisted that the North Korean regime is a socialist industrialised model for other newly independent Asian countries. Since the 1990s, however, due to the influence of 'our-style socialism' and *Juche* ideology, conventional rhetoric on friendly, good-neighbourly relations with new communist countries, rather than international communism, has become the main focus.

North Korea is often classified as a country of personalistic rule, which emerged in the mid-1960s during the formation of a one-person system. Thus, we can see that after Kim Il-sung's death, there is a particular emphasis on ensuring regime stability. Highlighting personalistic rule similarly indicated the same pattern when the early days of Kim Jong-un's rule after the death of Kim Jong-il.

Therefore, this thematic coding outcome provides both the general trend of legitimation claims and comparative interpretation about the legitimation claims, based on descriptive statistics. The next section will examine more detailed legitimation claim trend changes. By doing so, we could understand how the institutional features of North Korea's mixed-origin communist regime influenced the legitimation claims of its rulers and to what extent the institutional conditions of the communist party's mixed origins and Kim Il-sung, the founder of the DPRK, structured later rulers' capacity of legitimation claim for regime resilience.

Emergence of Juche and the Vicissitudes of World Communism in Kim Il-sung Era

North Korea's ideological legitimation has had a significant impact on maintaining the regime's stability, especially since the breakup of the Soviet Union. In this section, we aim to precisely examine how ideological legitimations have contributed to the stability of the North Korean regime by penetrating North Korean society through qualitative text analysis of the thematic coding outcome for legitimation text corpus as time-series data (see *Figure 19*).



Figure 19. Ideological Legitimation Sub-set of the North Korean New Year's Address Text Corpus

Source: Author

As a central political ideology for the legitimation claim in North Korea, '*Juche'* (self-reliance) is a significant factor in the resilience of the regime. This forceful ideology highlights self-reliance based on a xenophobic nationalism and cults of personality surrounding the Kim family. It also has political-religious features such as the *Suryong* (literally, 'the great leader') system that reveres Kim Il-sung as the eternal president (Byman and Lind, 2010). The reason for reviewing *Juche* ideology is that even though North Korea's communist party has mixed origins, North Korea has beneficial institutional features for the ruler's legitimation capacity because Kim Il-sung engineered *Juche* discourse as an indigenous legitimation claim. Due to the ideological legitimation claims, collective norms about the memory of revolutions were continuously re-constructed and facilitated elite cohesion, sharing its mission and standard set

of experiences. These revolutionary norms and sharing of past experience served to expand the capacity of the ruler's legitimation claims.

It is important to look at how *Juche* has been institutionalised in analysing the stability and resilience of the North Korean regime. This is because – as we discussed in the previous section – through Kim Il-sung's *Juche* ideology, North Korea sought to move toward the institutional advantages of the *autonomous* legitimation mechanism, even though it began as a mixed-origin communist party regime. Broadly speaking, legitimation is one part of autocratic stability along with repression and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013), and the different communist regime origins condition and shape subsequent leaders' legitimation strategies. Since Kim Il-sung's *Juche* discourse emerged in the mid-1950s, the discourse had been engineered as a strong legitimacy belief and source of elite cohesion. It served as: (1) an element of revolutionary and guerrilla-style norms against Japanese colonial power for legitimising title to rule for several decades, (2) a resource for the effectiveness of military and control of political opponents after 'the August Faction Incident' in 1956 and (3) a justification for the construction of sub-party organs. These features collectively influenced the resilience of North Korea, even after the collapse of the USSR. This section will be examine how the DPRK, as a mixed-origin communist regime, worked to overcome its non-indigenous origins by building robust institutions for its legitimation messages to penetrate society.

Juche ideology, at a glance, appears to be just a nationalistic repertoire of rulers like many other newly independent countries in the world. However, *Juche* ideology laid the foundation of the *Suryong* system, which involves religious features. Basically, *Suryong* means 'the great leader of the masses and the labourers, and [it] plays the role of uniting the people' (Kim, 2008). Due to the shared legacy of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese colonial power, the leadership of North Korea shared a military style political culture, and *Suryong* would be easily understood in the context of North Korean society. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, Kim Jong-il incentivised *Suryong* theory that the people are a socio-political organism, with the *Suryong*'s role as the brain, and the WPK as the blood vessel between the *Suryong* and the public as the biological organism (Park, 2002).

As a pseudo-religious claim, *Juche* ideology shared the experience of guerrilla legacies with the public. As we discussed in Chapter 3, religious claims are based on non-material factors for building up strong party institutions and elite cohesion (Way, 2011), and elite cohesion is a crucial element for authoritarian resilience (Schedler and Hoffmann, 2016). In doing so, it would be stated clearly that the religious features of *Juche* ideology had facilitated the resilience of North Korea. In this sense, the cult of personality as the *Suryong* system creates

a sacralising politics that serves as an 'ersatz religion'. Its emotional appeal, firmly bound to a nation's core ideas through, for example, canonisation, pilgrimage, rituals or schooling ideology, can increase loyalty to the regime (Pollard, 2010). This process leads to unquestionable dogma, messianic heroism, and total discipline in the regime (Riegel, 2007).[93] Its particularistic features aim to transcend the influence of external forces on North Korea. Similarly, amalgamating nationalism with religious claims creates a distinctive national, cultural, linguistic tradition capable of engendering intense loyalty (Linz, 2004). Indeed, shared norms of the legacy of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese colonial power, as well as the Korean War against the US and other external powers, have been valuable resources in this amalgamating nationalism. Kim Il-sung continued to emphasise learning and practising the specific methods and styles of the anti-Japanese guerrilla tradition under the name of recultivating tradition:

> 'Few of the children of revolutionaries have experienced this revolutionary ordeal. Most of our comrades have never experienced revolutionary trials because they are young. For comrades who have not participated in the revolutionary struggle and have never experienced revolutionary trials, learning the revolutionary tradition is a matter of great urgency. Some intellectuals are saying that they don't know what to study when they can read 'The Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Partisan Participants' as if they were reading a novel. This is not right. *To learn the memoirs is to learn the truth contained in them, the appearance of revolutionaries, their business methods, their invincible spirit of struggle, to turn them into your bones and flesh, to revolutionize yourselves toward working class* [emphasis added]' (Kim, 1983, p. 430).

The Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Partisan Participants, which began publication in 1959, became required reading for students as well as all North Korean people in the late 1960s. This cult of personality with nationalism is well-illustrated in the education system in North Korea, which highlights Kim Il-sung's guerrilla experience in Manchuria during the colonial rule by Japan. In other words, emphasis on revolutionary legacies expanded to lower levels of schools under the name of 'revolutionary traditional culture', including further emphasis in school, reading clubs, lectures and discussion sessions. According to defectors' testimonies, North Koreans had to live in the myth of anti-Japanese guerrilla groups, reading their memoirs as though they were the Bible (Kang, 2018, p. 69).

[93] For the discourse analysis of Kim Il-sung as a modern myth, see Yun, H. S. (2021) 'The Kim Il-sung Discourse as a Modern Myth: The Classical Mythic Format and Ego-Oriented Modernity', *North Korean Review,* 17(2), pp. 76–92.

In short, North Korea, even though it has a mixed-origin communist party, also had beneficial institutional inheritances for the ruler's legitimation claims capacity in terms of revolutionary social norms of guerrilla struggle against the Japanese colonial power and the Korean War against external powers, including the US. These revolutionary social norms function as shared norms for elite cohesion and legitimation claim sources, including ideological and foundational myth. Precisely how the justification of ruling power could be influenced in these legacies will be analysed empirically in the last section of this chapter using the case study of the '*Chollima* movement'.

Ideological Introversion of the Kim Jong-il Era by Songun Ideology

To understand how Kim Jong-il instituted ideological legitimation, we must consider the nature of the regime crisis he was facing as well as the perceptions and usable resources at his disposal to deal with the crisis. The collapse of the USSR and the ensuing collapse of the communist Eastern Bloc created a dire economic situation that was aggravated by a series of natural disasters, leading to mass starvation in North Korea (Haggard and Noland, 2007). Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il faced catastrophe as both continued to prioritise regime security over economic policy (Smith, 2015). The period of the mid-1990s (most especially, from 1994 to 1998) is now described as 'the Arduous March', and the main question for Kim Jong-il was how to respond to this regime challenge and thereby ensure his regime's resilience.

The event is called a 'march' because this slogan was adopted to express the intention of overcoming the crisis in a way that echoed Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese guerrilla activities. The origin of this story comes from an anecdote in which anti-Japanese fighters led by Kim Il-sung marched for more than 100 days from late 1938 to early 1939 in Manchuria, suffering from severe cold and hunger while evading the Japanese military's punitive operations. On 1 January 1996, the *Rodong Sinmun*, the WPK's main newspaper, appealed in a joint editorial for the New Year, saying, '[l]et's overcome the difficulties with the spirit of 'the Arduous March' by recalling the tearful hardships and indomitable mental strength of the anti-Japanese partisan guerrilla movement that fought against the Japanese military by sharing food during the great scarcity' (Rodong News Agency, 1996).

In theory, the ruler could choose types of legitimation strategies based on political calculation. From among various options of legitimation claims – ideology, personalism, foundational myth, performance and international engagement – Kim Jong-il had elected to emphasise 'ideology' and 'personalism', which fall under 'identity-based legitimation' in the typology of Von Soest and Grauvogel (2017). For instance, during the hereditary succession,

he had a necessity to legitimise himself as the successor. So, using a personalist legitimation claim, he institutionalised the *Suryong* (Eternal President) system and sought to legitimise himself as the rightful successor as the son of the *Suryong*. Along with this institutionalisation of personalism for a smooth succession process, he also engendered the ideological legitimation option of *Songun* (military-first) politics. As discussed above, he prevented the influence of military section on party politics while concurrently serving crucial functions of military apparatuses (Woo, 2016).

The question still remains of why Kim Jong-il emphasised 'personalism' and 'ideology' legitimation claims rather than switching the legitimation claim dramatically toward that of performance, as Vietnam did. Here, it should be noted that institutional legacies of the mixed-origin communist party and initial legitimation claims of Kim Il-sung have had a considerable impact on the later rulers. As a mixed-origin communist party regime, North Korea was highly dependent on the Soviets in terms of economic relation, not only during the post-Korean War reconstruction periods, but also afterwards (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, pp. 527–533). Due to this high economic dependence on the Soviet Union, the economic impact of its collapse – as well as that of the communist blocs – was much higher in North Korea than in indigenous-origin communist countries.

Under the regime crisis, first, the prolonged rule of Kim Il-sung had strengthened personalism (individual worship) in the realm of North Korean society. This individual worship has become an important element of the social and political ideology that controls North Korean society. Since 1956, *Juche* ideology already formulated the strong institutionalised ideological legitimation and justified social control mechanism, including *Songbun*. If the personalism and ideological legitimation claims are completely eliminated, the foundation of the ruling ideology that has justified the rule of the Kim bloodline so far will be shaken.

Second, when Kim Jong-il faced the regime crisis, the first generation of revolutionary veterans still remained. For him, the discourses of anti-guerrilla movement and the Korean War for the unification of Korean peninsula against the external power were still usable resources for engineering his title to rule. As we can see in the comparison case of China and the USSR during the 1980s, whether there exists a revolutionary generation in communist countries makes a significant difference in the behaviour of the Politburo and the capacity of the repressive apparatus to respond against a regime crisis (Zhao, 2009). In theory, the specific interpretations of the vision of the past could be manipulated as a source of legitimation (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b). Instrumentally, the collective memory is powerfully influenced by the present 'through the conscious deliberate manipulation of the past

for interests of the present' (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, p. 236). To mobilise this collective memory, Kim Jong-il continuously reproduced the collective reminiscence of revolutionary fervour by strengthening the war readiness of the entire North Korean society. For instance, in the New Year's Address of 1996, in the same year that the 'Arduous March' slogan first appeared, he made repeated and emphatic use of military terms:

> 'The struggle of our party and the people, carrying the red flag of the revolution high, is a struggle to strengthen the socialist political ideology and economic and military position, the three major position of our-style socialism, as *the bastion of unbeatenness* [emphasis added]. If we strengthen our socialist position in the three areas of ideology, economy and military, nothing is impossible for us and we have nothing to fear' (Rodong News Agency, 1996).

In a similar vein, statements related to *Songun* (military-first) politics also made conspicuous use of military terminology. The points he emphasised are the roles of the military section as a vanguard in the WPK and mobilisation of the people to follow militant rule for the security of their socialist society. Moreover, he used the retrospective aspects of Kim Il-sung and his legacies of the *Chollima* movement (mass mobilisation after the Korean War):

> 'Comrade Kim Jong-il's activities of leading the socialist forces wisely are consistent with the military-first revolutionary order. Kim Jong-il's unique method of command is to strengthen the revolutionary line with the People's Army as the core and to push ahead with socialist construction with the revolutionary military spirit as the weapon. It is the noble fruit of Comrade Kim Jong-il's military-first revolutionary order that the great reality of the People's Army performing its role as the main force of the revolution and the army and the people being united to protect socialism. […] The undying achievement of *Suryong* on the road to founding is the eternal treasure of the construction of a great and prosperous nation. Following the decree of *Suryong* that contracted self-reliance, self-defence and autonomy of the socialist homeland on the vacant lot via *Chollima* Movement, we must follow the decree of Comrade Kim Jong-il for *the second battle of Chollima movement* [emphasis added]' (Rodong News Agency, 1999a).

Finally, the change of legitimation claims in communist countries after the collapse of the USSR were conditioned by not only the degree of usable collective memory, but also by the longevity of the charismatic founding figure's rule. Comparing ideal types of reactive cases (ideologically freezing) and proactive cases (adapting to change), there was a strong tendency in the difference of ruling time of the founding figures among North Korea, Cuba, China and Vietnam that longer ruling of the founding figure countries indicated ideologically freezing cases (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020). Collectively, these factors may explain why North Korea pursued 'ideological introversion' to secure regime resilience before, during and after the collapse of the USSR (Armstrong, 2013, p. 100).

Staying True to Vision or Developing New Legitimacy Discourse in the Kim Jong-un Era

This sub-section will analyse the changes of Kim Jong-un's legitimation claims in comparison to those of Kim Jong-il. The general trend in thematic coding of legitimation claims in the text corpora of New Year's addresses indicates that under the Kim Jong-un era, the use of foundational myth and personalism has decreased, whereas performance and ideology maintained relatively high prominence among the other legitimation claims (see *Figure 18* on page 181). First, we will briefly review the changes in personalism, foundational myth and international engagement legitimation themes under the Kim Jong-un era. Then, the trend change in ideology and performance legitimation themes will be elaborated as a main focus of this sub-section's analysis.

Personalist legitimation has decreased in the Kim Jong-un era, except in 2012 when, after the death of Kim Jong-il, the frequency of personalism – including references to the *Suryong* and descriptions of Kim Jong-il's extraordinary leadership – reached the highest frequency in the entire period from 1995 to 2019. The average amount of references to personalism is decreased; however, this does not entirely signal the end of personalist legitimation claims, because when North Korea regime is faced with a severe regime crisis, Kim Jong-un also may have the possibility of emphasising the family line to justify his title to rule – a strategy he found expedient during the first year of his rule. Despite the emphasis on personalism during his first year of succession – in the *Rodong Sinmun* New Year's joint editorial of 2012 and New Year's address of 2013 – since 2017, Kim Jong-un has changed the priority of his addresses to focus on the North Korean people first rather than Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il:

> 'It has been a long tradition of our people to offer their best wishes to the great Comrade Kim Jong-il every year and embark on the march of the New Year. The presence and the image of the great Comrade Kim Jong-il like the sun was a banner of victory and a source of mental strength that gave our people the faith and will of victory. Now, our 10 million military-people are on a magnificent march toward a strong revival of the new '*Juche* 100 year' [*Juche* calendar] following the beloved leader Kim Jong-un's decree, which turned great sorrow into a thousandfold force and courage' (Rodong News Agency, 2012).[94]

> 'We celebrate the New Year of 2013 with great aspirations and faith in the ultimate victory after spending brilliantly the 2012 year embellished with special events in

[94] Reference from 2012 is the joint editorial published 1 January 2012, titled 'Let 2012 Shine as a Year of Triumph with the Glory of the Great Comrade Kim Jong-il'. The population of North Korea was estimated at over 24.8 million that year, but '10 million military people' has appeared in propaganda as a rhetorical term. Since 1997, North Korea has used the *Juche* calendar based on 'Juche 1' as the year of Kim Il-sung's birth.

> the history of our motherland. First of all, I would like to express my deepest respect and New Year's greetings to Comrade Kim Il-sung and Comrade Kim Jong-il, who are the parents of the nation and the eternal sun of *Juche*, with the constant reverence of all the soldiers of the Korean People's Army and the Korean people' (Rodong News Agency, 2013).

Even in 2018, Kim Jong-un did not start his speech with the usual New Year's greeting used by his predecessor; rather, he started by greeting the general public – an unusual move. Furthermore, in 2019, even the usual salutes to his predecessor were not mentioned in the preface of his New Year's address, and his unusually sincere inner feelings were captured in the New Year's; such intimacy had been absent from his father's New Year addresses. The other difference in style compared to his father is that he straightforwardly referred to 'repentant expression' about the delay in economic development in his New Year's address:

> 'In this meaningful place where I look back proudly on the great year of the great year of the great people's proud miracle, I offer my deepest greetings of the glory and blessings of the hopeful New Year to the entire Korean people who have been through the unprecedented ordeal in history, sharing joy and pain together with the WPK, ideology, meaning and will, and sharing life and death […] As I stand here at the beginning of the year, I feel heavy with anxiety about how to hold our best people in the world who firmly believe in me and enthusiastically support me with one mind. *I've spent the past year with regret and remorse that I've always had in mind, and my abilities have not kept up, but this year, I'll work harder and do my best to make up my determination to find more work for the people* [emphasis added]' (Rodong News Agency, 2017).

This change in the rhetoric under Kim Jong-un would reflect a general trend of change in the official legitimation claim. The average number of references to the 'foundational myth' theme is decreased. In other words, in 2012 (the year of Kim Jong-un's succession and the beginning of his rule), the New Year's joint editorial contained an exceptional emphasis on personalist themes. Such themes appeared less often in the following years, yet – excluding the outlier of 2012, when such themes were deliberately emphasised in maximal terms – overall there was no meaningful indication of a generally decreasing trend in the use of the foundational myth relative to ideology or performance legitimation claim themes. Generally, after the first phase of the succession ended, the amount of personalist narratives is decreased. Between Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, the difference in foundational myth emphasis is relatively small; however, the difference in personalism emphasis is significant; this change implied a one of tentative evidence on a trial basis of Kim Jong-un for legitimation strategy change from 'identity-based legitimation' to 'non-identity-based legitimation claims'.

Regarding foreign policies in the international engagement legitimation theme, the rulers of North Korea had a specific pattern in their New Year's addresses. In a situation where internal and external situations are difficult, North Korea's internal and external policies are defensive, and its goals are diminished. Conversely, in a case where internal and external situations are favourable, North Korea's internal and external policies are offensive. Especially in the case of North Korea's unification and South Korea policy, the narrative volume increases in the offensive expansion phase, and specific demands for the change of the status quo are raised. In contrast, in the defensive and atrophic phase, the narrative volume is reduced, and it tends to be a brief and mundane summary of existing platitudinous arguments (Park, 2020). Therefore, the frequency of the international engagement theme showed relatively consistent numbers in the New Year's addresses.

Under the Kim Jong-un era, the reason for the increase in international engagement messages is likely due to the summit conference with South Korea after 2018, and negotiation with the US for denuclearisation as well as the nuclear restraint issue being highlighted. Since Kim Il-sung began issuing New Year's addresses 1946, the rulers of North Korea continuously mentioned solidarity among other communist states by highlighting the significance of North Korea's status in the global communist movement. In the past, under Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, the connection between the people and other world media was very limited, and the WPK controlled the influence of information for regime stability. However, due to advanced technology and increased connection between the North Korean people and the outside world in both informal and formal ways, opportunities for accessing international media have increased, and the North Korean people have learned how the international media portrayed themselves and how the North Korean regime has controlled information. Despite the controls of the regime on the media, there are also uncontrolled news flows by merchants in the black market (in North Korea, *Jangmadang*) of the secondary society in post-communist countries (Song, 2013). Under the changing situation, how the ruler behaves in the international political arena will play a more crucial role in gaining legitimacy to rule.

Regarding ideological legitimation claims, there were dynamic changes in the sub-sets of claims. Generally, *Juche* ideology ranked higher in the Kim Jong-il era, except from 2003 to 2009. In those years, *Songun* (military-first) politics discourses were emphasised more than any ideological sub-sets of legitimation claims. As path-dependent effects, the usage of *Juche* ideology presented higher in Kim Jong-un's early stage of regime succession as well. However, one of the featured changes in the Kim Jong-un era is that the trend of *Juche* ideology relatively decreased later, while nationalism legitimation claims overcame any other sub-set of

ideological legitimation claims in terms of the frequency of thematic coding in the New Year's addresses.

Among the nationalism legitimation claims, the practice of highlighting 'Kim Jong-il's patriotism' was routinely referenced in Kim Jong-un's New Year's addresses. He legitimised his title to rule by justifying himself as the only recognised successor, insisting that Kim Jong-il's patriotic actions should be carried out continuously as the nation's foremost policy. He stated in 2013, 'We need to focus on the firepower of the party project in order to transform the party project into a *Hwaseon* [frontline]-style as in the 1970s and thoroughly implement Kim Jong-il's patriotism in practical activities' (Rodong News Agency, 2013).[95]

Emphasising nationalistic discourses, Kim Jong-un claimed that Kim Jong-il's patriotism as a code of practice in *Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism* (set of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il ideologies). The core of Kim Jong-il's patriotism is to learn and practice the noble examples shown by Kim Jong-il. The practices can be summarised in his views toward 'nation', 'people' and 'future generation' (Kim, 2013a). For him, the leader is synonymous with the nation, and patriotism is loyalty toward the leader. Improving people's lives and enhancing the superiority of North Korean-style socialism are the will of Kim Jong-il. For future generations, this work of improvement must be accomplished, despite any hardships that may come at this point. In doing so, on the ideological basis of mobilisation, Kim Jong-un continues to refer to 'the 1970s' and emphasised the spirit of the times. Indeed, the 1970s of North Korea were a time when Kim Jong-il succeeded in absolute loyalty, and Kim Jon-un seeks to re-enact the mobilisation system of fifty years ago (Jeon, 2013). Whereas there is a higher proportion of *Juche* ideology and nationalism, the emphasis on *Songun* (military first) decreases steadily, and other traditional notions about ideological struggle and the triumph of ideology decreased as well, except when North Korea sought to develop its missile program in 2017.

Among the types of legitimation claims, the performance legitimation claim also indicated a relative difference in the two rulers. Along with the ideology legitimation claim, performance legitimation claims became more frequent in the New Year's addresses. Roughly, it could be stated that the ideology legitimation claim had been ranked first, followed next by the performance legitimation claim. In 2017, the performance legitimation claim greatly exceeded the ideology legitimation claim. In general, the gap of frequency between ideology and performance legitimation claims in the New Year's addresses (see *Figure 18* on page 181).

[95] In a literal sense, *Hwaseon* means the frontline in combat. *Hwaseon* style in the political project means that party officials encourage the public to actively engage in production activities while directly promoting 'heroism' in the field of production.

Analysis of detailed sub-sets of performance legitimation claims may reflect the change of legitimation strategy between the two rulers. Official claims had emphasised self-reliance in the economy under *Juche* ideology. Claims of economic development have increased steadily, and during the years of 2011 and 2012, the use of the economic development theme as a performance legitimation claim reached its peak. Kim Jong-un also has prioritised improving the economic status of the people by advancing science and technology with impacts of education. Although the regime announced a five-year plan in 2016 and has sought to fulfil this plan within individual industries, including electric power generation, mining, metalworking, chemistry, and transportation, it is an incontrovertible fact that North Korea continues to economise on electric power and household consumption expenditure, so claims of economic growth remain nothing more than banal national propaganda. Without empirical datasets of economic indicators in North Korea, triangulation of economic growth would be hard to confirm. Therefore, it would be fair to say that, regardless of whether there has been true success in economic development, it is more important that claims of economic development itself are increasingly represented (see *Figure 20*).



Figure 20. Performance Legitimation Sub-set of the North Korean New Year's Address Text Corpus
Source: Author

In the thematic coding result of performance legitimation claims under the Kim Jong-un era, *Byungjin* (advancing side by side as two-track) would have enough importance to be considered in analysing the change of legitimation claim strategy. Developments in economy and armament were already highlighted in the messages of the New Year's addresses since Kim Il-sung. However, after Kim Jong-il's *Songun* ideology and policies, references to development of both economy and armament increased – in combination with references to nuclear missiles. In 2018, Kim Jong-un described this two-track development as the *Byungjin* line of the WPK and continuously praised the accomplishment of the line under the economic sanction: 'I pay my highest tribute to the heroic Korean people who firmly believed in our party's line of *Byungjin* and pushed us with absolute support and power, despite the difficult lives of sanctions and blockade that threaten our survival' (Rodong News Agency, 2018). For him, this claim of the *Byungjin* line was also a strategic way to take economic initiatives through the phased nuclear negotiation in the future.



Figure 21. Top Thirty Most Frequent Words in the Economic Development Theme
Source: Author

Again, it is difficult to empirically analyse the banal discourse on economic growth, which has been repeatedly advocated, with statistical data that has not been specifically verified.

However, we can distinguish the difference between the Kim Jong-il era and the Kim Jong-un era by identifying what was emphasised and highlighted through the examination of linguistic modifiers in the context of the sentences related to economic growth. Practices of economic development in the performance legitimation claims had existed in the mundane promises on industries since the era of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung. However, during the Kim Jong-un era, expressions of 'people's economy' and highlights of 'productive', 'people's lives' and 'construction of socialism' increased the ranks in the usage of the economic development sub-theme. While expressions of 'of workers', 'to the people' and 'technicians' newly emerged in the New Year's addresses (see *Figure 21* on page 194).[96]

This mere changing rank of modifiers may not be irrefutable evidence for the change in discourse of economic development in the performance legitimation claim. However, as a methodological approximation, given the difficulty of gathering data in authoritarianism research, this difference of modifiers related to economic development in North Korean rulers' New Year's addresses may suggest fresh evidence of mutation between Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un in the usage of economic development discourse as performance legitimation. Furthermore, the specific narrative context in the New Year's addresses may help to find a feasible explanation for the reshaping of performance legitimation claims. For instance, Kim Jong-un has emphasised the diversification of commodities, especially highlighting the needs of the younger generation. A series of landmark construction campaigns, including *Ryomyong* New Town and *Mirae* Scientist Street, are also typical indicators of performance legitimation claims (Jung and Kang, 2020).

Under the Kim Jong-un era, science and technology development discourses have also been highlighted in the New Year's addresses to leverage economic and armament development: 'Scientists have driven economic development and improvement of people's lives by solving scientific and technological problems in building a socialist power and completing research tasks in high-tech fields' (Rodong News Agency, 2018). For dealing with the co-optation of scientists, education is also continuously mentioned. Especially as regards the missile test programme in 2017, the efforts of scientists and high technologists were celebrated in 2018 New Year's address: 'I also send my warm comradeship to our defence

[96] This outcome is a result of word frequency test in the NVivo. The weighted percentage means the frequency of the word relative to the total words counted. The weighted percentage assigns a portion of the word's frequency to each group so that the overall total does not exceed one hundred percentage. The rule of the Korean stop word is adopted. For the detailed Korean stop word, See Kil, H. H. (2018) 'The Study of Korean Stopwords List for Text Mining', *URIMALGEUL: The Korean Language and Literature,* 78, pp. 1–25.

scientists and the military labour class who have fought for a year to prove that the Party's central ideas and resolutions are tasks, truths, and practice before the world' (Rodong News Agency, 2018). By doing so, Kim Jong-un sought to reshape the legitimation claims of his regime to include more of a performance-based legitimation claim by positioning himself as a developmental dictator. However, North Korea's capacity to achieve these ambitious aims has been limited by the system its ruler inherited.

To improving the performance of the regime, Kim Jong-un has continuously prioritised the educational sectors and advancing science; therefore, since 2016, the youth group was mentioned as a newly emerged front-line group using the same logic of *Songun* politics with which his father, Kim Jong-il, underscored the military group as a vanguard of the WPK. Indeed, scientists and high technologists have been regarded as a crucial group not just for economic growth as a functional approach but also as patriots, indoctrinated by the party in New Year's addresses since 2014. In 2012, an important year for Kim Jong-un as his first year in power, he said 'We should actively promote scientists and technologists as the nation's precious wealth and guarantee their scientific research conditions at the highest level' (Rodong News Agency, 2012).

Legitimation claims reduce the cost of co-optation of political opponents or future generation (Gerschewski, 2013). Kim Jong-un continuously provided clear signals to newly emerged youth and scientist groups for co-optation and consequently the resilience of the regime. The WPK still sought to indoctrinate these groups with nationalistic legitimation claim that these chances (i.e. the devotion their lives to the country) are given by the party for the development of the nation.

Beyond the insistence on economic growth as a performance legitimation claim, the responsiveness of the ruling party toward the needs of the people was also highlighted in recent New Year's addresses since 2016. Many economic growth claims are prospective perspectives, and among them, production of the basic necessities for children was highlighted in 2015; in 2017, the focus was on not just production for basic level of consumption but also more diversified production for the people's preference. Along with the economic foundation of performance, for the ruler, it is crucial that the ruling party signals to the people that it is ready to respond to them to improve their lives as a functioning and stable state. In this context, Kim Jong-un requested capacity building among the party's mid-level officials:

> 'We must follow the WPK forever in ideology, breaths and steps, carrying the blood-stained heart of all its members and its workers along with the party. Party organisations and state agencies should realise that importance of people, respect for the people and love for the people in politics and fully regarded the needs and

> interest of the people. By doing so, the organisations take responsibility for the political life and material and cultural life of the people and consequently take care of them until the end. Party organisations should hold the people's hearts and unite the vast masses to the head of the party, and intensify their struggle against the [corrupted] bureaucratism and corruption that destroy the unity among the members' (Rodong News Agency, 2016).

In general, among survived communist countries, China and Vietnam were regarded as performance-based legitimation cases, and North Korea and Cuba have implemented ideology-based legitimation to maintain regime resilience (Armstrong, 2013; Tismaneanu, 2013). However, Kim Jong-un's request to the party's mid-level officials in the capacity building of governance indicates that there is a tentatively emerging new type of performance-based legitimation in the form of responsiveness of party rule under the Kim Jong-un era. For example, since 2016, he has criticised corrupt bureaucracy and has exerted power on party officials to improve responsive performance for direction and control under the party rules.

However, the newly emerged example of North Korea for responsive governance in performance legitimation claim is different from the vertical accountability in China and Vietnam (Dimitrov, 2013b), because the ideological features of the WPK still prevail in North Korea. In the 2013 New Year's address, for instance, the relationship between the party and the people is characterised as that of 'mother and son', and the people should follow 'step, voice, and breathing', and finally as 'same blood line'; the comments of the relationship between party and the people have been represented in every New Year's address since 2013 (Rodong News Agency, 2013).

The next section, through a case study of the *Chollima* movements during the Kim regimes, will discuss how institutionalised ideological legitimation shaped the political reality of North Korea for several decades. By doing so, we may comprehensively understand how the institutional legacies of mixed-origin communist party influenced its rulers' legitimation capacity, and to what extent later rulers utilised the previous rulers' legitimation claim strategies as well as the limitations of such strategies based on legitimacy belief among the public.

Chollima Movement: Mobilised Collective Memory and Legitimation

To understand the consolidation process of mutually reinforcing and path-dependent features of institutionalised ideological legitimation claims in North Korea, empirical evidence of the legitimation claims from the later rulers and observable implications from their claims should

be investigated. The previous section gave an overall prospect for how North Korean leaders have justified their regime since Kim Il-sung, and particularly after the collapse of global communism. In this section, we will delve into the *Chollima* movement to see how legitimation claims in North Korean rulers' New Year's addresses that are based on the collective memory of revolutions in North Korean history have been applied to North Korean society by changing the daily lives of ordinary people in economic and political aspects. For the analysis, New Year's addresses and various secondary literature are used, including publications of the North Korean authorities. By doing so, this section reveals how the previous legacy North Korea's mixed-origin communist party influenced later rulers in terms of their options to choose legitimation claims.

Mobilised Collective Memory and Chollima Movement of Kim Il-sung

Relating to the identity-based legitimation claim involving foundational myth, ideology and personalism (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017), historical events have been engineered to serve as elements of the legitimation process. In this point, understanding collective memory is a crucial part for rulers who want to incentivise specific views of the past to justify their rule and obtain the consent of the ruled. For this reason, collective memory has been a focused of research, not only in transitional justice but also in authoritarian politics and post-communist countries as well (Müller, 2002; Jović, 2004). Not only the regime but also the society as a whole inherits collective norms throughout the memory of revolution, such as an independence movement against external powers, and this collective memory is potent material out of which to construct legitimation claims.

Ideology and norms based on revolutionary legacies formulate the rebuilding of collective memory among the people, by selectively commemorating and forgetting specific aspects of history. It is a process of interpreting a vision of the past to legitimising one's rule (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Bernhard and Kubik, 2016b). As Nets-Zehngut said:

> 'Collective memory is powerfully influenced by the present via two main paths: first, culturally, through the inevitable impact of the culture on the way people view the past. Second, instrumentally, *through the conscious deliberate manipulation of the past for the interests of the present* [emphasis added]. This latter path, also referred to as creating a 'usable past,' influences the collective memory through activities of various institutions' (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, p. 236).

In a similar point of engineering a 'usable past', a ruler's collective efforts at justifying their rule include sharing the true vision of the past. In other words, analysing memory of politics is the examination of the relationship between memory provider (the ruler) and

memory consumer (the ruled) (Verovšek, 2016), and this process is qualitatively similar to how legitimation claims function, albeit with a historical emphasis (von Haldenwang, 2017). Kim Il-sung also called for the justification of the regime by sanctifying the history of the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and the communist revolution in North Korea. A typical example of this is the *Chollima* movement.

The *Chollima* movement was a mass mobilisation movement in North Korea, similar to China's Great Leap Forward in 1958–1960 (Li and Seo, 2013). It began in 1957 for the post-Korean War reconstruction. The core of the movement was the mass mobilisation of the population for economic growth and achievement of the five-year economic plans, which sought to secure food, clothing, and housing for the population.[97] With the adoption of the five-year plan for the development of the people's economy (1956–1961) and recovery of the post-war economy at the Third Congress of the WPK in Pyongyang in April 1956, rural construction based on self-reliance began in earnest. At a time when the party atmosphere was in disarray due to factional strife, Kim Il-sung decided to push for the *Chollima* movement as a popular campaign to increase production and reduce the internal crisis of regime (Kim, 2001). The *Chollima* movement was also essential in the process of overcoming the Soviet Union's unilateral withdrawal of its support for steel, which was essential to the first five-year plan (Kang, 2007). The withdrawal was caused by a clash between the Soviet leadership and North Korea, which insisted on a heavy industry priority policy. The Soviet Union, which was dissatisfied with this policy, reduced its aid to North Korea by more than 50 per cent since 1956 from the three-year period of post-war restoration (Park, 2013). In 1956, the *Chollima* movement began in earnest with Kim Il-sung's field guidance at the *Kangson* Steel Works (afterward named the *Chollima* Steel Complex) (Scalapino and Lee, 1972, p. 1077).

Public mobilisation is needed for the government-led planned economy, and as a pre-emptive measure, Kim Il-sung pushed for the reorganisation of subordinate party organisations after the sectarian conflict of August 1956. In the Third Congress of the WPK in 1956, the WPK strengthened party members' ranks by focusing on anti-Japanese revolutionary fighters who inherited the glorious tradition of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle (Lee, 2006).[98]

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[97] For the detailed information, see 'A Report from Iwankow Boleslaw, Attaché of the PRL Embassy, on the Five-Year Plan in North Korea', 18 June 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111202

[98] The North Korean Workers' Party, which started in 1946 with 366,000 members, went through the Second Party Congress (725,762 Party members, 29,765 cells) in 1946, and secured 11,64,945 party members and 58,259 groups in the Third Party Congress in 1956. This represents a 60 per cent increase in the number of cells in the

In the process, the party certificate exchange project was carried out, and even lower-ranking party officials were taken over from the central party structure, depending on the level of involvement in the revolutionary struggle (Lee, 2006). This resulted in the strengthening of the WPK organisations, whose orders were carried out to the bottom, which is the basis for the nationwide popular mobilisation of the *Chollima* movement.

North Korea's self-reliant economy policy has sought to build an autarkic structure, but such a planned economy is highly vulnerable to external shocks. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the socialist economy in the early 1990s, raw materials such as oil and soft coal were not imported. As a consequence of the external shock, there was a severe disruption in food production in agriculture, and this crisis spreads to other industries, which eventually led to a substantial economic crisis called the Arduous March (Park, 2013).[99] The process of organising a 'priority of the ideology' in North Korean society, which has been forced into mass mobilisation projects for a long time, has already been internalised. North Korea's economic leaders' strategies and incentives for economic revitalisation fell short of resolving the economic crisis. According to the statistics from North Korea – even if the reliability of the data is less than ideal – total industrial output in 1961 was 2.6 times higher than in 1956. This can only be achieved by 21.5 per cent annual growth in industrial production during this period (National Academy of Sciences, 1960). However, because the *Chollima* movement was an extensive source of growth that was subject to the law of diminishing returns, its growth rate was bound to slow over time.

For this reason, in 1962, self-reliance in the economy and self-defence in national security were formulated internally and externally, but since 1963, the shortage of resources began in earnest due to the dual policy of economic and defence construction known as *Byungjin* (Park, 2013). In order to solve this problem, the production increase was carried out through mass mobilisation. In *The Worker*, the official journal of the WPK, there were a series of arguments to achieve economic goals through mass mobilisation, along with the *Chollima* Working Team movement since 1968. The mass mobilisation method, which emphasises increasing production and savings through the public, has been actualised as 'Three Revolutions Team movement', '70-day Battle' and 'Revolutionary Red Flags movement'.

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second congress. See Lee, J. C. (2006) 'Reorganization of the Korean Workers' Party Sub-organization (1950–1960)', *The Journal for the Studies of Korean History,* 23, pp. 269–306.

[99] At that time, the country was heavily dependent on foreign trade, with a 70 per cent stake in trade between socialist countries. Significantly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist market became a fatal external factor for North Korea's economy, as it was importing crude oil and coke, which are considered primary strategic materials, from abroad.

However, the more that 'speed wars for production' are emphasised, the more sporadic the results become. Thus, the volatility of production is bound to increase, and the planned economy is bound to become unreasonable (Park, 2013).

Table 11. Evaluation Project for the *Chollima* Working Team

Evaluation form	Specific form	Assessment content	
Social incentives	Propaganda	Propaganda in factory housing district through breaking news, wall newspaper and factory newspaper Using mass rallies, such as lectures, reporting sessions, and learning sessions, praise in public	
	Flag conferment	Individual	Record in a book of eternity
		Working group	Award of flag of victory
		Workplace	Award of the tour of honour
	The others	Remind innovators to send them to rest areas and to guarantee movie theatres first	
Material incentives	Prize money and goods	If the production plan is exceeded, the entire output will be awarded as a collective prize	

Source: Author utilised the table from Kim (2001, p. 232).

Beyond the simple production-increasing movement, the *Chollima* movement has a functional aspect of attempting political-economic mass mobilisation based on the legitimation of the rulers. The *Chollima* movement was expanded into the *Chollima* Working Team movement and was passed down to the systematic activities of the lower unit. By doing so, the *Chollima* movement also strengthened the ideological elements that emphasised communist culture in North Korean society (Suh, 2005). The *Chollima* Working Team mobilised the public with a more mature incentive system (see *Table 11*).

In the full text of the regulations on the conferment of the title of '*Chollima* Working Team' and the textbook for membership, it is easy to see how the rulers of North Korea have considered the movement as not only a means to economic revitalisation but also as an ideological legitimation tool linked with North Korea's legacies of guerrilla and revolution. It was designed for the purpose of controlling the daily lives of the North Korean people against the regime crisis:

> 'The purpose of the *Chollima* Working Team movement is to achieve and exceed the national people's economic plan, to create constant innovation in production and construction by actively introducing modern science and technology and advanced experience, *to inherit the party's brilliant revolutionary tradition, to protect the Party's policies and Comrade Kim Il-sung's teaching to the end, to keep the Party's principles politically and ideologically, to love the group and comrades in daily life, and to possess a noble communist state and society* [emphasis added]' (The General Federation of Trade Unions of North Korea Publishing House, 1964, p. 347).

> ‘By carrying out a project to cultivate Marxist-Leninist principles and *the revolutionary spirit of an anti-Japanese partisan in a planned manner* [emphasis added], everyone is firmly armed with revolutionary class consciousness in communist ideology, always devoting all of himself to the party's worker class at anytime, anywhere, *with the legitimacy of revolutionary feats and the faith in victory, and fighting with devotion* [emphasis added]’ (The General Federation of Trade Unions of North Korea Publishing House, 1963, p. 337).

Therefore, through the progress of the *Chollima* movement, we can examine how the legitimation of Kim Il-sung was implemented throughout North Korean society. The movement began in the early stage with workers and clerks at the centre. It was marked by the participation of farmers and students in the latter phase, encompassing workplaces, factories, schools and social organisations from all everyday life (Kang, 2018). As such, Kim Il-sung's rule was able to penetrate not only the ruling ideology but also the entire areas of society and the lives of residents, including *Juche* education, *Juche* music, *Juche* architecture, *Juche* literature, *Juche* sports, and *Juche* medicine. From the end of 1958 to the first half of 1959, all factory enterprises, cooperative farms, and schools across the country were equipped with ‘the History Laboratory of the WPK’ and there was extensive study of WPK literature and Kim Il-sung's papers related to the revolutionary tradition and *Juche* discourse in the micro-level structure in the North Korean society (Kang, 2018, p. 68).[100]

Later Rulers’ Chollima Movements: Revival of the North Korean Belle Époque

Two later rulers also are linked by the *Chollima* movement’s legacy. When facing a regime crisis that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, Kim Jong-il recalled the *Chollima* discourse and how it was a reflection on previous mass mobilisation that impacted North Koreans’ everyday lives. In 1972, the movement was called the General Line of Socialism Construction. Following Kim Jong-il’s visit to the *Sungjin* Steel Complex, the second *Chollima* movement launched in late 1997. After the Arduous March, state focused its propaganda on building a strong and prosperous nation (*Kangsongtaeguk*). Kim Jong-il lauded the second *Chollima* movement in his New Year’s address in 1999 for responding to a succession of difficulties, including severe economic and food shortages since 1993, the fall of communist countries, and economic sanctions imposed by Western powers (Rodong News Agency, 1999b).

[100] In this regard, it could be stated that the idea of *Juche* in North Korea is not a political system, but rather a belief system in society and a way of life for its people. For an analysis of *Juche* ideology as belief system, see Park, H. S. (2002) *North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom.* London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.

The DPRK initiated a 150-day battle in 2009 to construct a *Kangsongtaeguk* by 2012, Kim Il-sung's 100th birthday; therefore, the third *Chollima* movement pushed grand innovation and readiness by increasing production in all sectors. The 2009 *Chollima* movement was ideologically identical to the original *Chollima* movement, pushing mobilisation, economic growth, and the reinforcement of the planned economic system. When external restraints, such as economic sanctions, make it more difficult to achieve economic goals, North Korean authorities acknowledged these difficulties. Kim Jong-il repeatedly contended that North Koreans should remember and carry on the tradition of his father's *Chollima* movement legacy:

> 'The whole nation should once again create a boom in leapfrogs with the momentum of the whole nation *riding on the Chollima during the post-war period, and our Kangson worker class should take the lead at the call of this era* [emphasis added]' (Rodong News Agency, 2008).

During the regime's crisis, Kim Jong-il's relaunch of the *Chollima* discourse altered the government's description of North Korean society. According to North Korea propaganda, on 4 January 2009, a 100,000-strong crowd in Pyongyang chanted, 'Let us create a new revolution on all fronts of socialist construction in the early days of the *Kangson*!' (Rodong News Agency, 2009d). The mass rally extended throughout the country. Artists and performance groups from throughout the DPRK were invited to *Kangson* to show their support for the *Chollima* Steel Complex. Ordinary citizens were urged to send scrap metal and other commodities to the steel companies (Rodong News Agency, 2009a; Rodong News Agency, 2009b; Rodong News Agency, 2009c). The state claimed that the movement's accomplishments extended beyond the *Chollima* Steel Complex. In the first fifteen days of 2009, the company produced twice as much steel as it did in the same period the previous year, while thermoelectric station output increased by more than 1.4 times (Kim, 2009).

The *Chollima* movement was transformed into many derivatives throughout the Kim Jong-un regime. To emphasise self-reliance in the early days of succession, the spirit of *Gangwon-do* was promoted throughout the country, and a large-scale ski resort was built in *Masikryong* near *Wonsan-gun, Gangwon-do*, in just a few months (Hong *et al.*, 2021). The term '*Mallima*' initially appeared on 22 April 2015 during a visit to the Wonsan Nursery School, and the '*Mallima* movement' was introduced at the Seventh Party Congress (Hong *et al.*, 2021, p. 77).[101] Kim Jong-un devised a five-year economic development plan by instilling in the people

[101] *Chollima* refers to a mythical flying horse that could travel 1,000 *li* in a single day (literally, 'one-thousand-li horse'). *Mallima* literally refers to a horse that can travel ten times the distance of the *Chollima.* It is depicted in North Korean state media as a movement that makes the whole country seethe with a struggle for new standards,

‘the great *Mallima* spirit’ and ‘the *Mallima* Speed movement’, thereby propagating the great *Baek-du* road, which began in 2016 (Kim, 2016). However, the economy in 2020 did not meet expectations, and as of March 2021, the phrase ‘*Chollima*’ replaced ‘*Mallima*’.

The intention of Kim Jong-un’s engineering collective memory and the *Chollima* movement legacies frequently expressed current messages to ordinary North Koreans. Kim Jong-un stated in a letter to participants attending the Eighth Congress of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea on 27 May 2021:

> ‘All the working class and other trade union members, as their predecessors did in the post-war reconstruction period and the *Chollima* days, must make intensive and devoted efforts at the sites of production and construction and at the posts of scientific research and civilization creation, racing against time. Only then can we bring about great innovations in socialist construction and turn our people's ideals and dreams into reality by the time set by the Party and on the stage desired by it.
>
> Our working class should carry forward in today's revolutionary advance the spirit and mettle of their predecessors in the post-war reconstruction period and the *Chollima* days who, filled with extraordinary revolutionary enthusiasm to advance faster towards socialism and communism true to the call of the Party and the leader, rejected passivity and conservatism, and worked legendary miracles in the history of our economic construction on the strength of mass heroism’ (Korean Central News Agency, 2021).

The manipulated collective memory, which had already been endorsed by the North Korean people, is consistently ‘remembered’ in accordance with later rulers’ legitimation strategy. For more than 50 years, North Korean rulers have led workers to read ‘Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Fighters’ to discuss how to implement the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance exercised by anti-Japanese guerrilla fighters in their own lives. To counter the regime crisis caused by the economic crisis, North Korean leaders sought to gain a basis for legitimacy from the anti-Japanese guerrilla movement and the legacy of its post-war recovery results, now considered the ‘North Korean Belle Époque’ of the 1970s, a common denominator of collective memory in North Korean society.

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records and miracles and helps develop the overall economic construction amid exchange of successes and experience and keen competition to outpace an advanced unit. See Korean Central News Agency (2019) *Mallima Speed Movement Serves as Mighty Driving Force for Building Economic Giant: Rodong Sinmun*. Pyongyang: Korean Central News Agency. Available at: https://kcna.kp/kcna.user.article.retrieveNewsViewInfoList.kcmsf#this (Accessed: 4 Dec 2021).

Conclusion

Since achieving independence from Japanese colonial rule and being divided by two superpowers after World War II, the North Korean regime has endured under the Kim family's rule for more than 75 years. In terms of regime duration, North Korea ranked among the highest not only in all ex-communist countries but also in the world's surviving communist ruling party regimes, including China, Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. As discussed above, North Korea has a mixed-origin communist party deriving from: (1) already-existing pre-generation of revolutionary communist movements from below, including guerrilla resistance against the Japanese rule and various socialist union movements; (2) charismatic local political leadership of Kim Il-sung; and (3) relatively consistent interference of the USSR in the early stage of state-building. Based on the historical analysis, we delved into these institutional legacies constructed by the communist party's mixed origins, which influenced later rulers' capacity for legitimation strategies: ideological, foundational myth, personalism and performance. This confluence of circumstances facilitated North Korea's long-term regime duration with stable resilience.

Tracing the process of emerging *Juche* discourse as a source of legitimation claims, this chapter examines how the *Juche* ideological legitimation has served the regime's repression and co-optation strategies to bolster its resilience. Indeed, the *Juche* ideology justified not only Kim Il-sung's title to rule but also that of his successors, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un. Unlike the indigenous communist party origin and *autonomous* legitimation mechanism in the example of Vietnam, the later rulers of North Korea had a limited capacity to reshape the ideologically institutionalised legitimation claim toward other approaches of legitimation claims after the collapse of the USSR. As an ideological introversion case – like Cuba – North Korea represents the result of long-term path dependency of ideological and personalist legitimation claims. This difference of communist regime origin is a key condition to explain why North Korea did not radically change its ideology when other surviving communist party countries sought to diversify their legitimation claims.

This chapter analyses North Korean rulers' legitimation claims through qualitative text analysis to empirically identify and track the regime's efforts at legitimation. Based on New Year's addresses from Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, thematic coding of legitimation claim provided a snapshot of the trend of legitimation claim of the two rulers. The evidence from the thematic coding analysis suggests tentative implications of legitimation claim changes. Under the Kim Jong-un regime, ideology and performance-based legitimation claims are continuously

increased, and international engagement is also highlighted due to recent political landscape changes, including summit meetings with South Korea and the US. However, the emphasis on personalism and foundational myth has decreased. Of course, North Korean ruler's New Year's addresses are no magic mirror, and we must caution against overgeneralising the results of semantic analysis based on them (Park, Park and Jo, 2015). However, the New Year's addresses also included both retrospective and prospective perspectives of rulers' legitimation claims to 'be legitimised' by the ruled. That is why the WPK and party-based media outlets emphasised, in every New Year's address, the importance that the many sub-party organs of North Korea-managed study groups must propagate the main points of the New Year's messages.

Due to the North Korean regime's mixed origins, it has lower legitimation capacity than that of an indigenous-origin regime. Under the options available to them, later rulers have continuously engendered the initial option of identity-based legitimation claim used by the founding figure, Kim Il-sung: ideological claims. They had a limited capacity of convincing new legitimation claims compared to indigenous origin regimes. For this reason, even though non-identity-based legitimation claims, especially the performance legitimation formula, *Kangsungdaeguk* (strong and prosperous nation), have been emphasised recently under the Kim Jong-un regime, these efforts at reshaping the legitimation claim may not be able to penetrate into North Korean society in the absence of considerable changes in the material conditions and everyday lives of its people.

Metaphorically, this process could be described as a genetic algorithm in that the first generation of North Korea's legitimation claim had consolidated and evolved but only within a limited scope with ideological and personalism along with the performance legitimation. Thus, later rulers primarily engendered the original structure of legitimation claims when they were faced with various regime crises. Kim Il-sung's *Juche* (self-reliance) ideology has been institutionalised as the basis of identity-based legitimation claims by later rulers: in the form of the *Songun* (military-first) and *Suryong* (eternal President) systems by Kim Jong-il and *Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism* (set of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il ideologies) by Kim Jong-un (see *Figure 22*).



Figure 22. Different Generational Effects over Legitimation Capacity in North Korea
Source: Author
Note: (a): ideology, (b): person of leadership, (c): performance, and (d): rational-legal legitimation.
The arrow's colour reflects the extent of legitimation claim in V-Dem data (e.g. 3–4 in black, 2–3 in dark grey, and 1–2 in light grey). The North Korea case demonstrates that the mixed-origin regime could foster and evolve the legitimation formula in different generations, but it would be worth noting that this finding is very context-sensitive.

As regards performance legitimation during the Kim Jong-un era, the analysis shows repeated rhetorical claims for development and prosperity for *Kangsungdaeguk*, looking back to the 1970s – the so-called 'North Korean Belle Époque'. There are new features of the performance legitimation claims: first, by requesting from basic needs to diversified production for people's demands; and second, by using anti-corruption and criticising hindrances in the relationship between the party and the people for penetrating its rule into the people, tentatively making space for 'responsiveness' features in the performance legitimation. However, it is still not at the same level of horizontal and vertical accountability seen in Vietnam and China. Furthermore, there was a reverberation of calls for co-optation in the New Year's address through which youth and scientist groups also are underscored as co-optation members as the future 'selectorate' of Kim Jong-un's regime. Despite these attempts at new types of performance legitimation, as seen in the *Chollima* and *Mallima* discourse under Kim Jong-un, it is reasonable to assert that the identity-based legitimation claim remains relevant to Kim Jong-un's message.

The mixed-origin communist party regime resulted in limited legitimation claim capacity being available to later rulers, compared to regimes with indigenous political origins, and later rulers emphasise specific legitimation claims under the limited scope. Based on the limited scope – in the case of North Korea, ideological legitimation claims – later rulers legitimised their title to rule under the institutional legacies of the communist party's mixed origin and legitimation claim formula of the founding figure, Kim Il-sung. This has resulted in a regime that has proved exceptionally resilient against regime crisis. The North Korean case (institutionalised ideological legitimation attempting autonomous legitimation mechanism) has greater regime resilience than the external imposition political origin case of manufactured legitimation mechanism as in Mongolia. This coherent explanation about origin structure of communist party regime and autonomy of later rulers in pursuing varied legitimation strategies may help to understand the missing link between regime origins and rulers' legitimation capacity for regime resilience.

Chapter 7 - Conclusion

Looking backwards at a regime's political origin is critical for understanding subsequent rulers' legitimation capability. This concluding chapter briefly reviews the main finding of the dissertation, draws out its implications for scholarship and policy, and identifies questions raised by the findings that suggest directions for future research. Also, this chapter suggests extending its core argument, whereby the theory can be generalised to other communist cases not addressed in this comparative case study, as well as to other non-communist authoritarian regimes. This chapter concludes that political origins have a significant influence on the legitimation capacity of later rulers and, consequently, on regime resilience. The fact that, worldwide, far more people live under authoritarian regimes than under democratic regimes – a proportion that in recent times has only increased – compels us to consider the wider importance of this dissertation's argument.[102] Through tracing the regimes' political origins, we can infer why some authoritarian regimes have shown resilience.

This chapter is composed as follows: first, it briefly overviews the main finding of each chapter in the dissertation. Based on the autonomous and manufactured legitimation mechanisms, I analysed how divergent communist party origins differently affected the legitimation capacity of later rulers and regime resilience. Second, I discuss how this main finding contributes to scholarship, both theoretically and methodologically, as well as the ways in which it communicates to other existing literature. Third, I briefly address extending the argument to other communist regime cases that were not included in the comparative case study, as well as other autocratic regime cases. Fourth, I examine the policy implications of the dissertation's argument for understanding the contemporary political landscape of the selected cases (Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea). Fifth and finally, remaining questions and directions for future research are considered.

Main Findings

Why did some one-party communist regimes prove more resilient than others after the collapse of the USSR? What role does legitimation claim play in the resilience of these surviving

[102] The share of the world population living under autocratic regimes in 2010 was 48 per cent, but by 2020 it had increased to 68 per cent. See Hellmeier, S., Cole, R., Grahn, S., Kolvani, P., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S. F., Pillai, S. and Lindberg, S. I. (2021) 'State of the World 2020: Autocratization Turns Viral', *Democratization*, 28(6), pp. 1053–1074.

regimes? How do different communist party origins affect the capacity of the party regimes as they consider their legitimation strategies? This dissertation is composed of seven chapters, including this concluding chapter, which seek to answer those questions, and this section briefly summarises the main findings of each chapter.

Chapter 1 introduced the concept of authoritarian regimes' political origins. It presented research questions on the relationship among origins of the communist party, legitimation claims, and regime resilience. The chapter explained the empirical strategy of comparative case studies with an exploratory-diverse case selection strategy encompassing indigenous origins (Vietnam), external imposition (Mongolia), and mixed origin (North Korea). While mapping the lifespan of all communist regimes, the relationship between political origins and regime duration was represented with a macroscopic perspective.

Chapter 2 outlined a literature review on authoritarian resilience, legitimation, and communist party survival. Key findings are that legacies of party origin shape strong ruling party institutions and correlate with regime duration by fostering elite cohesion (Smith, 2005; Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020; Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017). Legitimacy was a critical component in a regime's title to rule (Lipset and Lakin, 2004), and legitimation (i.e. collective efforts by the ruler to maintain legitimacy) is a crucial element of authoritarian regime resilience (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017; Gerschewski, 2013). Following the demise of the USSR, the remaining communist regimes shared a common feature: they were effective in maintaining legitimacy to rule via various approaches (Dimitrov, 2013a; Kotkin, 2008; Silvio Pons, 2017; Steiner, 2017; Zubok, 2017). However, the theoretical explanation of the relationship between how a regime seizes power and its subsequent legitimation capacity was recognised as not having been thoroughly examined, even though, theoretically and empirically, there is evidence that each factor positively affects regime duration separately. This dissertation explored the missing link of '(communist) party origin' (more generally, authoritarian regime origin) and 'legitimation capacity of the ruler' to answer the research questions.

Chapter 3 built the theory of the dissertation. It specified how we should understand the relationship among the political origin of regimes, legitimation capacity, and regime resilience.[103] Under the autonomous legitimation mechanism, the institutional legacies of a

[103] I suggested a theoretical framework for these factors, using two main mechanisms to explain the relationship. The *indigenous* legitimation mechanism is derived from the indigenous political origin of the communist party regime, which is characterised by: (1) existing grassroots and communist mass mobilisation, (2) existing political autonomy of local leadership and (3) less direct interference by the Red Army in the early state-building stage. The absence of these features is defined as the *manufactured* legitimation mechanism. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.

regime's indigenous political origin benefited later rulers' legitimation claim capacity, providing them with more options to choose from usable collective memory.[104] Under the manufactured legitimation mechanism, the externality of the regime origin hindered later rulers' legitimation capacity. These differences determined the conditions of regimes' divergent political outcomes after the collapse of the USSR: regimes that followed autonomous legitimation mechanism successfully reshaped the main legitimation mode by responding to the changing world, whereas those that mimicked Moscow crumbled together with the USSR. In other words, external imposition regime cases based on the manufactured legitimation mechanism experienced rapid – and fatal – political changes by failing to reshape their legitimation strategy.

Chapter 4 examined the autonomous legitimation mechanism case. I showed that the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has advantageous institutional legacies for legitimation claim resources that derive from its indigenous origin. Before unification, the Workers' Party of Vietnam (WPV) incentivised identity-based legitimation claims, including ideology, nationalism with socioeconomical development via completing the Vietnam Revolution and the unification of the nation. The CPV's legitimacy challenge after unification and its successful reshaping of the main legitimation mode from ideology to non-identity-based legitimation are one of the typical cases of a responsive pathway among surviving post-communist regimes. Without an indigenous political origin and the institutional legacies derived from it, it would have been difficult for later rulers to maintain high legitimation capacity when the regime was faced with a legitimacy crisis. In short, the indigenous communist party origin had an advantageous institutional legacy for the capacity of legitimation claim. This strong legitimation capability aided the WPV in effectively shifting their legitimation mode and preserving the CPV's one-party regime.

In contrast, Chapter 5 demonstrated how the external imposition of a communist party regime helps explain the manufactured legitimation mechanism. Unlike regimes with indigenous origins, externally imposed communist party regimes suffered from a lack of advantageous institutional legacies. Due to the higher externality and lack of political autonomy, the local leadership in externally imposed communist regimes manufactured the legitimation efforts under Moscow's authority. I discussed how Mongolia's local leadership relied heavily on the USSR for its legitimation rather than securing their own way of political

[104] In an indigenous communist party regime, the regime has more multi-layered sub-party organs, more effective control on military and security sections, and more advantageous social norms via the revolution and homegrown independence movements. See Chapter 3 for the detailed discussion.

autonomy.[105] To respond to changes in legitimacy demands, the ruling group of the MPRP failed to reshape its message due to the influence of the manufactured legitimation mechanism. The externally imposed origins of Mongolia's communist party limited the options available to later rulers, so it collapsed quickly alongside the USSR.

The case of a mixed-origin regime is depicted in Chapter 6. The term 'mixed origin' refers to a situation in which the regime is founded through external imposition, but subsequently follows one of legitimation mechanisms based on the ruler's competence.[106] To explain the stability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) I examined the process by which its regime changed legitimation mechanism features toward being more autonomous by tracing institutionalised ideological legitimation of the Kim family's rule. North Korea, as a mixed-origin case, demonstrates that even though a regime may begin with higher externality and a lack of political autonomy, political agency (local leader) may advocate a more independent line, thereby securing political autonomy. Of course, this process should be considered within the context of the international political landscape, because as the external power's grip on the mixed-origin regime weakens, the political space of the mixed-origin regime's local leader may be expanded, as was the case during the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. North Korea demonstrated that a mixed-origin regime has a higher legitimation capacity than one with an externally imposed political origin. However, compared to Vietnam, it is reasonable to conclude that a mixed-origin regime is associated with lower legitimation capacity compared to one with an indigenous political origin in terms of pre-emptively 'reshaping' the mode of legitimation.

To summarise the mechanistic evidence of the comparative case study, regime origin (i.e. how the regime seized power) and its institutional legacies structured the capacity of future legitimation claims. Based on a regime's origins, its rulers follow specific legitimation mechanisms (autonomous/manufactured), and these variances contributed to different political outcomes for those regimes. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, a more indigenous political origin facilitates a higher capacity for later rulers' legitimation claims, compared to an externally imposed origin. This provides the answer to the research question (i.e. why some countries proved more

[105] In particular, along with Gorbachev's political reforms, greater reliance on political and economic ties to the USSR, as well as the ascendancy of a second generation in the MPRP Politburo who studied in the Eastern European Bloc and Moscow, provoked legitimacy challenges to MPRP rule. See Chapter 5.

[106] As discussed in Chapter 3, there are some cases in which it would be difficult to clearly distinguish between indigenous and external imposition cases to explain the legitimation mechanism, because the legitimation mechanism is not static; rather, it is flexible, depending on the will of the local leadership. See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.

resilient than others in the post-communist era, and how legitimation helped shape those results) by revealing the missing link between regime origin and legitimation for regime resilience. The following section describes how this argument contributes to existing scholarship.

Contributions to Scholarship

This section describes this dissertation's three contributions to scholarship, namely: (1) enhancing understanding of the missing link between political origins and legitimation capacity to explain regime resilience in the authoritarian legitimation literature; (2) providing a comparative perspective to understand resilient and fragile communist party regimes in East Asia; and (3) methodologically, by proposing qualitative text analysis of text corpora of legitimation claims to advance the empirical study of authoritarian legitimation. By doing so, the dissertation helps us to understand that rulers justify their rule in various ways but that they must do so within the parameters available to them, and that these confines, in turn, derive largely from a regime's political origin and institutional legacies.

First, this dissertation has sought to advance our knowledge of political origins, legitimation capacity and regime resilience, particularly in East Asia. In theoretical terms, the dissertation comprehensively explains the relationship among party origin, legitimation claim, and regime resilience. The novel theoretical explanation builds upon important findings in the previous literature. In addition to repression and co-optation, there are two factors in the research that explain authoritarian regime resilience: one is party origin (Smith, 2005; Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020; Miller, 2019) and the other is legitimation (that is, rulers' collective efforts for maintaining legitimacy) (Gerschewski, 2013; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017). The dissertation investigated how a regime's political origins contextualise later rulers' legitimation capacity, showing that positive institutional legacies are derived from indigenous origin. Notably, it proposes a novel research topic in the study of authoritarian legitimation: analysing crystallised factors for legitimation capacity and theorising how the difference of legitimation capacity would be materialised with the two mechanisms. Summarising the findings of previous literature, this dissertation proposes filling the missing link between political origins and later rulers' legitimation capacity with the evidence of a systematically selected comparative case study.

Second, this dissertation presents a comparative perspective on understanding legitimation and regime resilience in the communist party regimes of East Asia. Using a mixture of legitimation claims and regimes' origin as an explanatory factor within East Asia

countries in a comparative framework is a novel approach in the literature on authoritarianism. Most Western literature on post-communist analysis has a long history based on Eastern European cases. However, a comparative case study using the cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea (i.e. within an East Asian context) has received scant attention in the literature, especially using legitimation as an explanatory factor to explain regime resilience – even though communist regimes in East Asia have outlived their European and Central Asian counterparts.[107] Many studies of authoritarianism have touched briefly on these cases or folded them into small- and middle-N studies with other authoritarian states. Therefore, this dissertation has the strength to systematically analyse East Asian (post-) communist regime resilience and failure.

Finally, this dissertation makes a methodological contribution in methodology to empirical research on authoritarian legitimation literature. This methodological contribution makes it possible to understand how different communist party regime origins affect a regime's strategies as it considers its legitimation strategies.

Authoritarian legitimation literature may be analysed as different generations, and this dissertation has followed the traditions of the study, providing detailed empirical evidence on the relationship between party origin and legitimation capacity based on the text corpus of the legitimation claims.[108] Beyond that, methodologically, this dissertation advances authoritarian legitimation research by conducting qualitative text analysis to adopt legitimation claim typology to the text corpus of legitimation claims based on regimes' official statements. Indeed, because researching legitimation in the authoritarian setting remains a challenge for researchers, another methodological approximation is suggested (Gerschewski, 2018). To develop methodological approximation, qualitative text analysis on legitimation claim text corpus is essential to comprehend what von Haldenwang (2017, p. 274) referred to as the 'supply cycle of legitimation' for effective guidance of behaviour.

This dissertation conducted a legitimation analysis using various types of official documents from Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea to evaluate mechanistic evidence for the suggested legitimation mechanism. In the cases of Vietnam and North Korea, I conducted a

[107] There are five surviving communist regimes after the collapse of the USSR: China, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos and Cuba; of these countries, three are in East Asia and exemplify either indigenous or mixed (i.e. moving toward autonomous legitimation mechanism pathway) cases.

[108] For instance, the first generation of authoritarian legitimation literature focused on building a theoretical basis of conceptual and typological contributions. Based on that theoretical groundwork, the second generation of the authoritarian legitimation literature provided a detailed case study with descriptive analysis. It is logical to analyse a ruler's legitimation strategies descriptively because legitimacy and legitimation are highly contextualised in the given historical and social structures. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion.

qualitative text analysis of legitimation claims based on the legitimation typology of the authoritarian rule of Von Soest and Grauvogel (2017).[109] The analysis of Mongolia's case was augmented with secondary data that can estimate the legitimation claims, as well as the Nexis Advance UK data and V-Dem data. In particular, by conducting original-language analysis with thematic coding on more than seven continuous decades' worth of North Korean New Year's addresses as a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQD, NVivo), this dissertation's novel data contributes empirical data to authoritarian legitimation literature.

Qualitative text analysis of legitimation claims using a structured legitimation typology expands the scope of future research topics in the authoritarian legitimation literature. For instance, using the sub-themes of ideology and nationalism, we can examine authoritarian rulers' messaging toward ordinary people at the micro-level (Lee, forthcoming). To what extent the people actually believe the ruler's message is another factor of legitimation. However, using qualitative text analysis, as this dissertation does, we can trace how the ruler has shaped the specific messages to justify their title to rule. Sometimes, claiming legitimacy to rule is contextualised, and many latent meanings of the statements obscure our understanding of rulers' intentions. For this reason, it would be beneficial to conduct detailed qualitative analysis on the nuance, tone, and underlying meaning of the legitimation text corpus. In that case, the qualitative text analysis conducted in this dissertation helps us to understand the ruler's political discourse.

This section has focused on the dissertation's contributions to scholarship. The following section will discuss the extent to which this dissertation's core argument can be extended to other cases of authoritarian regime types – that is, beyond the selected case studies.

Extending the Argument: Beyond the Case Studies

In the following pages, I will discuss the generalisability of this dissertation's main argument to other authoritarian regimes. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I conducted a comparative case study: Vietnam as an indigenous communist origin, Mongolia as an externally imposed communist origin, and North Korea as a mixed communist origin. However, in history, several communist party regimes were not included in the case study and geographically outside of East Asia. To extend the argument and assess the validity of the theoretical explanation of this dissertations'

[109] For identity-based legitimation, foundational myth, personalism, and ideology are composed, whereas performance, international engagement and procedures are formed as non-identity-based legitimation. See Von Soest, C. and Grauvogel, J. (2017) 'Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule', *Contemporary Politics*, 23(3), pp. 287–305.

core argument, I briefly discuss: (1) the political origins of other communist party regimes and legitimation formula reshaping, including that of China; and (2) non-communist authoritarian regimes' origins and their implications for legitimation claim mechanisms. By doing so, we may address the issue of generalisability in the comparative case study, as well as access the external validity of the research design as a middle range of theorisation by evaluating the theory's capacity to travel in a preliminary approach.

Before delving into details, I emphasise fundamental points, similarly to Gerring and Cojocaru (2016) referred. Because the following sub-sections are intended to tentatively test the scalability of the application of the dissertation's argument, the analyses do not offer the same strictness of causal inference that quantitative research does (e.g. confidence interval).[110] Rather, these sub-sections can provide descriptive accounts for 'inferential advantages over the large-sample setting' in future research (Gerring and Cojocaru, 2016, p. 415).

Addressing China and Plausible Explanation towards a Medium-N Study

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has an indigenous communist party origin like that of the SRV.[111] Thus, the state-building process of the CCP and its experiences of the violent revolutionary pathway during the struggle for independence from Western powers since the Opium Wars in the middle of the 18th century and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1938–1945) and the Chinese Civil War (1927 to 1949) would categorise the CCP regime as an indigenous communist party regime (Brown, 2010, pp. 178–193).[112] The CCP Politburo also showed their independent revolutionary line against Moscow during the Sino-Soviet dispute (Brown, 2010, pp. 313–331) and, especially, in the personality cult of Mao Zedong, whose ideological interpretations of communism, the personalistic cult also constructed the strong legitimation mode of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Pham, 2021).

After the unmitigated disaster of the Great Leap Forward, the CCP's title to rule needed reshaping. In the PRC, changing legitimation modes after the collapse of the USSR would provide important implications of the autonomous legitimation claim mechanism presented in this dissertation. Since Mao Zedong's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping – the third paramount

[110] A large-N cross-case research design is also required for the quantitative study that includes all cases of communist and authoritarian regimes in history. Thus, it was decided not to discuss the large-N research design in this conclusion.

[111] The official name is the Communist Party of China (CPC).

[112] The legitimacy struggle between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) would be interesting for understanding contemporary international relationships between the two countries. In this dissertation, I limited the scope of analysis to the PRC for practicality.

leader of the PRC from 1978 to 1989 – emphasised economic reform by adopting marketisation under the control of the CCP (the so-called 'Opening of China') programme, much like what the CPV did during Vietnam's *Đổi Mới* reformation period (Bernestein, 2013). China's main aims were similar to those of the SRV (i.e. successfully reshaping legitimation strategy by claiming performance legitimation claims), such as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' and a socialist market economy (Tsai, 2013).

However, after the economic reformation, the new policy measures became a potential threat to the PRC due to the unemployment rate and complaints from citizens left behind (Dimitrov, 2013b). In order to overcome this legitimacy crisis, the CCP Politburo emphasised nationalism in the early post-Tian'anmen era (Holbig, 2011).[113] Because of over-reliance on a particular legitimation mode (e.g. performance legitimation), it would be challenging to handle diverse legitimacy demands from citizens, and performance legitimation may be fragile in the external economic crisis. In short, as discussed above, the PRC case showed another successful legitimation mode reconfiguring when the regime faced a critical juncture. The new institutional adaptation also indicated ideological discourse reconstruction. During the 1970s, communism in the PRC was defined by revolutionary appeal; however, since the 2000s, the ideological discourse has radically shifted due to the emergence of nationalism with more societal dimensions (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020, pp. 523–526). This is because the institutional legacies derived from indigenous political origin benefit later rulers' legitimation capacity.

Expanding the discussion to a broader scope of analysis of medium-N communist party countries from history, *Figure 23* depicts 22 communist party countries with their legitimation claim trend change from the V-Dem expert survey data (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019).[114] I allocated regime origins among the countries based on the criteria established in this dissertation: indigenous, externally imposed, and mixed origins. Generally, regression lines of the legitimation claim for several decades in the indigenous communist countries indicate steady reshaping of the legitimation mode after the collapse of the USSR. The primary changing trend

[113] There are victim and anti-foreigner narratives in the details of the PRC's nationalistic discourse. Notably, utilising nationalistic discourse does not always positively affect the ruler. For instance, the CCP was also faced with the unintended adverse effects of latent resentment over the CCP's mistreatment of the Chinese Nationalistic Party (*Kuomintang*, KMT) veterans after the war and accusations of a cover-up over the KMT's essential contribution in defeating Japan versus the CCP's lack thereof. See Weatherley, R. and Zhang, Q. (2017) *History and Nationalist Legitimacy in Contemporary China: A Double-Edged Sword.* London: Palgrave Macmillan.

[114] In Chapter 1, ***Table 2*** indicates the list of communist party countries along with regime duration and political origin. Among the countries, I excluded Yugoslavia (which is a more indigenous communist party regime origin) from *Figure 23* of this chapter, due to omitting Yugoslavian data from the V-Dem dataset when I merged it into the datasets.

was dramatically increasing performance and rational-legal legitimation, and it showed a gentle but steady downward curve in ideology and personalistic cult. After the end of the Soviet Union, these indigenous-origin countries successfully reshaped their legitimation mode as regards increasing performance and rational-legal legitimation. As discussed in Chapter 4, they had sufficient alternative legitimation resources to mobilise as well as higher legitimacy belief among the ordinary people derived from the advantageous institutional legacies of an indigenous communist party origin.



Figure 23. Regression Results of the Communist Regimes' Legitimation Changes
Source: Author merged the individual countries' legitimation surveys based on Tannenberg *et al.* (2019).
Note: For the list of countries, see Chapter 1, *Table 2* on page 17.

Similarly, in mixed-origin countries, performance and rational-legal legitimation increased, showing regime longevity like that of an indigenous-origin country. In the mixed-origin regime, specific features of regime on the legitimation mode are different. For instance, North Korea, as an extreme case, manifested a higher identity-based legitimation strategy for more than seven decades. However, Laos – also of mixed political origin – has shown a somewhat more subtle pattern among the post-communist regimes than what Dimitrov (2013a, pp. 19–34) explored: reducing the influence of ideology and personalistic cult, keeping higher performance legitimation, and proposing rational-legal legitimation along with institutional adaption.

In contrast, the countries with externally imposed communist party origins showed a distinctively a similar pattern to that of the USSR and collapsed along with it. These countries showed increased performance and rational-legal legitimation tentatively, by keeping pace with Moscow. For instance, discussed in Chapter 5, the MPPR showed legitimation mode patterns similar to Moscow's for about seven decades. However, these efforts were not sustained; they manufactured the legitimation mechanism based on Moscow's change and lacked legitimation capacity for reshaping or fostering specific modes of legitimation when they faced a legitimacy crisis. Thus, beyond the comparative case study, this descriptive analysis on the existing communist party countries' legitimation regression lines sufficiently supports the main argument of the dissertation (i.e. that indigenous political origin begets an autonomous legitimation claim mechanism, thereby enabling the indigenous origin regime to successfully reshape its legitimation mode after the collapse of the USSR (or other legitimacy crisis)). In contrast, in cases of external imposition, the rulers merely followed Moscow's legitimation trend, thus following the manufactured legitimation mechanism. These variances resulted in divergent political outcomes following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Non-Communist Regimes: Other Autocratic Ruling Party Regime Cases

Let us now consider the political origins of diverse forms of authoritarianism. The argument of this dissertation is also compatible with a broader scope of authoritarian regime contexts. A strong ruling party in the early stage of state-building (or when the regime is started) matters for regime duration. More empirically, party origin and how the party seized power differentiate the divergence of autocratic ruling party duration (Smith, 2005). Among 479 total autocratic regime lifespans from 1940 to 2015 in the autocratic ruling parties dataset from Miller (2019), communist, elite coalition, independence, and revolutionary party origins ranked higher in terms of ruling party regime duration (see *Figure 24*).

Only elite coalition origin has a longer party ruling duration except for communist origin. As discussed in the theory chapter, elite cohesion is one of the crucial factors for regime resilience, and resilient authoritarian regimes that overcame regime crisis shared the common feature of higher elite cohesion rather than fragmentation among elites. As discussed previously, institutional legacies facilitate the autonomous legitimation mechanism, with shared social norms benefiting and sustaining elite cohesion because shared social norms serve as a *modus vivendi*.



Figure 24. Party Origin and How Each Party Gained Power by Autocratic Ruling Party Age
Source: Author utilised Miller (2019) autocratic party origin dataset.

In the same vein, independence and revolutionary political origins among authoritarian ruling parties are associated with a relatively long duration of the party's rule. This supports the idea that the violent revolutionary pathway provides strong ruling party institutions in the early state-building stage (Lachapelle *et al.*, 2020), and also that these legacies provide later rulers with usable memory to manoeuvre foundational myth or personalistic cult legitimation claims in response to contemporary political discourse.[115] Furthermore, the higher legitimation capacity of the rulers in the independence and revolutionary political origins may serve to destroy the old power structure. This allows regimes to benefit from a structure that grants them greater longevity.

We can expand our knowledge of authoritarian ruling party duration to move the scope of analysis to the process of the seizure power. In terms of how the autocratic party came to power, the combination of 'dictator-supported' (i.e. the dictator anoints an existing party) with 'revolution' resulted in the longest ruling party lifespan. Indeed, the combination of roles of the dictator (c.f. distinguished local leadership) and revolution is a crucial element of the ruling party average duration. This result may be interpreted using the analytical approach of this

[115] For a detailed discussion of collective memory as usable memory for the rulers' collective behaviour to justify rule and politics of memory, see Chapter 3.

dissertation in terms of the ruler's legitimation capacity. For instance, the ruler may be more to choose likely foundational myth and personalism, or even specific ideology legitimation claim. Experiencing revolution as a means of power seizing is associated with increased likelihood that a ruler may utilise foundational myth and nationalistic discourse for the legitimation process.

In contrast, 'foreign-imposed' (party installed by a non-communist foreign power) and 'dictator-created' (new party imposed by a sitting dictator) ruling party cases were associated with relatively short authoritarian regime duration. Under the conditions established by such origins, later rulers had little freedom to engineer options of legitimation compared to the former case of the combination of 'dictator-supported' and 'revolution'. When the ruling party gained power via election or collaboration with the election, ruling party duration also tended to be relatively short. This may be due to power-sharing in the election process, which may more easily provoke elite fragmentation than in the absence of election conditions. These variances, as discussed above, are summarised in *Table 12.*

Table 12. Positioning Seizure of Power in Autocratic Parties and Legitimation Mechanisms

Ruler legitimation capacity	Degree of regime independence: Higher	Degree of regime independence: Lower
Higher	**II: Autonomous legitimation mechanism** Dictator-supported/Revolution Dictator-supported Revolution	**I** Logical remainder
Lower	**III** Election Coup Revolution / Election Military Dictator-created	**IV: Manufactured legitimation mechanism** Communist-imposed Foreign-imposed / Election Foreign-imposed

Source: Author
Note: This position is based on the ideal types of legitimation mechanism. Thus, beyond the legitimation mechanism, quadrants I and III could have dynamics by the specific cases, and the more important aspect is quadrants II and IV for implying two legitimation mechanisms to the autocratic regime's seizure of power.

In short, among non-communist regimes, the authoritarian regimes originating as elite coalitions, independence movements, and revolutions ranked highest in regime duration. This observation indicates that specific advantageous institutional legacies affect rulers' capacity of legitimation. Independence movements and revolutions are typically based on mass mobilisation, and such events infuse solid social norms among the elite coalition and common people alike. These relatively abundant legitimation resources benefit rulers in their efforts at

building legitimation capacity. Moreover, in the broad scope of an authoritarian regime to explain how the seizure of state power occurred, dictators matter like the local indigenous leaders who had political autonomy in the dissertation's conceptual definition. When the dictators appointed the existing party as the ruling party and revolution breakout, the authoritarian regime survived longer than other ways of gaining state power.

This supplementary analysis beyond the selected case studies attests to the generalisability of the dissertation's main argument. The relationship between regime origins and means of seizing state power subsequently contextualised regime duration. We can infer that the institutional legacies deriving from elite coalition, independence and revolution function in much the same way that indigenous-origin political regimes impact the differentiation of legitimation capacity, although this dataset on autocratic ruling party duration itself may not directly target the aspect of the ruler's legitimation capacity.[116] This section has described the generalisability of the dissertation's main argument to a broader scope encompassing various authoritarian regime origins beyond those of the selected case studies. In the next section, I present policy implications from the selected cases – Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea – based on the dissertation's findings.

Policy Implications towards the Selected Cases

In this section, I discuss how the dissertation's main argument furthers our understanding of the contemporary political landscape of three selected cases – Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea – which have been regarded as (post-) communist regimes or communist-experienced regimes. Because each country features unique policy implications, I discuss them in turn, case by case, based on the findings and the dissertation's main argument. This approach enables us to infer the capacity of legitimation among the recent rulers as well as the potential pathway of legitimation claim reshaping and its limitation.

[116] As explained in Chapter 3, this dissertation dealt exclusively with cases of communist party origin. For theorising the origin of authoritarian regimes more generally, expanded theoretical consideration would be needed. Of course, various types of autocratic ruling party durations and regime origins are compatible with the dissertation's main argument. Therefore, criteria may be re-calibrated to define indigenous authoritarian regime origin as follows: (1) existing mass mobilisation by state apparatus, (2) existing distinguished authoritarian ruler(s) and (3) less interference from external power for securing internal political autonomy. The absence of these features may indicate an externally imposed authoritarian regime. Future research would cover these conceptual definitions to expand the scope of analysis.

Vietnam and New Legitimation Challenges from Civil Society

To explain the regime resilience of the CPV's one-party rule in the SRV, Kerkvliet (2014) relied on the differentiation between hard and soft methods of repression. Additionally, the co-optation process in the SRV legislature is one of the explanatory factors for its long regime duration. The legislature has conventionally been viewed as a signalling instrument between the citizen and the sovereign in authoritarian regimes. In the case of the Vietnam National Assembly (VNA), the CPV's authorities structured the VNA to indicate authoritarian dominance and legitimacy by displaying overwhelming regime successes in voter turnout, destroying opponents, and shifting blame for policy failure to the legislature (Schuler, 2021). Indeed, the legitimation efforts of the CPV's politburo should be regarded as a more important factor than mere repression or the co-optation process because legitimation is the basis of autocratic sustainability and reciprocally provides the logic of repression and co-optation (Gerschewski, 2013).

Vietnam is one of the typical cases of responsive legitimation reshaping to highlight performance and procedural legitimation. Successful legitimation changes led to higher regime support among the Vietnamese after the collapse of the USSR and during the early 2000s (The Asian Barometer Survey, 2005). Unless the economic situation worsens due to external market fluctuations and the effectiveness of the performance legitimation decreases, the SRV's legitimation stance is expected to be maintained (see *Figure 25*).



Figure 25. Legitimation Claim Patterns of the SRV in 1991 and 2020
Source: (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019)

Meanwhile, new legitimacy demands have recently emerged among Vietnam's civil society, who have challenged the CPV's one-party rule, previously a mainstay of Vietnamese politics (Kerkvliet, 2019; Malesky, Abrami and Zheng, 2011; Wells-Dang, 2014). Since the 1990s, public political criticism has spread throughout Vietnam society, and it can be divided into three themes: (1) villagers protesting and appealing against corruption and land expropriation; (2) civilians opposing China's incursion into Vietnam and criticising China-Vietnam ties; and (3) dissidents opposing the party-state dictatorship and advocating for democracy (Kerkvliet, 2019). In response, the CPV has used 'grassroots democracy' since 1998 in an attempt to regain its diminished legitimacy and ability to govern in the countryside, which has resulted from the decay of the party-state apparatus, loss of control over local institutions, and tensions in state-peasant and cadre-peasant relations (Nguyen, 2017).

For dealing with the newly emerged legitimacy challenge after Vietnam's political reformation, we can assess whether the ruling group of the CPV suggests a new reshaping of legitimation that favours a nationalist approach. Among the identity-based legitimation typology, nationalism as part of ideology had been used for justifying the title to rule. The power of defining the meaning of nationalism and measuring the scope of nationalism toward Vietnamese society belonged exclusively to the CPV for a long time. The CPV's Politburo will reformulate the relationship between the state apparatus and the civil society, taking care to ensure that the opposition group cannot evoke serious legitimacy challenges to the CPV regime; new changes may include the expanding vertical and horizontal accountability of the CPV's rule.

Therefore, future legitimation reshaping by the CPV may emphasise nationalistic discourse as well as the performance and procedures legitimation mechanism. The point is how the CPV's leaders perceive the current regime crisis, evoked by legitimacy challenges, and respond to them by reshaping or fostering legitimation claims. The disparity between legitimacy demands from the people and legitimation efforts by the ruler may generate a crisis of legitimacy. Therefore, how the political leadership of the CPV decides to respond to changing legitimacy demands (e.g. multi-party election and horizontal accountability as exists in other democratic systems) is a critical point for evaluating the future legitimation strategy.

Mongolia and the Failure of Liberal State-Building as a Manufactured Legitimation Mechanism

The Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) stands out in the history of world communism in that it was the first communist regime after the USSR and first communist regime on the Asian

continent. Despite the MPRP's long regime duration, the externally imposed communist party origins hindered its rulers' legitimation claim and regime resilience after the collapse of the USSR.

After the collapse of one-party communist rule following the fall of the USSR itself, Mongolia's democratic group initially gained legitimacy. However, democratisation did not continue as successfully as it had started because Mongolia's new democratic regime failed in its efforts at economic reform and did not fully control the state apparatus. Beyond that, the new democratic regime could not manage the sprouting legitimacy demands of various social groups after the political changes (Dillon, 2019; Rossabi, 2005). Now, Mongolia is regarded as a democratic country by various data-gathering organisations and watchdogs.[117] Mongolia is considered a country that has maintained a relatively stable democratic system whose administration has continued to use rational-legal and performance legitimation as the main strategy of justifying its title to rule (Fish, 1998; Pomfret, 2000) (see *Figure 26*).



Figure 26. Legitimation Patterns of the MPR in 1991 and 2020
Source: (Tannenberg *et al*., 2019)

Based on the MPR case in the dissertation, we can infer that the degree of political autonomy needed to govern a country in the wake of external imposition status may take a long

[117] MPR is indicated as 'modestly more democratic' in V-Dem data, 'full democracy' in Polity IV, and 'free' in the Freedom House score after the collapse of the USSR.

time; thus, rulers' legitimation claim capacity and efforts to reshape legitimation claims may lag in various external conditions due to prolonged reliance on the manufactured legitimation mechanism. This leads us to extend the theory to other, non-communist regimes and even externally imposed Western liberal state-building cases. For example, in Afghanistan, US policymakers spent some twenty years trying (and failing) to build a resilient indigenous government from the outside (i.e. via external imposition). Nevertheless, Afghanistan's complex political history as well as long periods of factional conflicts in domestic and international relations surrounding the territory of Afghanistan resulted in a manufactured legitimation claim mechanism.

In the case of the Ashraf Ghani regime of Afghanistan, the regime was created by the heavy influence of Western powers, including the US, and it had a manufactured legitimation mechanism.[118] Based on this notion, we can infer that securing a stable regime in the newly emerged political entity that has been imposed by external powers tends to result in weak legitimation capacity. Thus, the local leadership manufactured the legitimation mode from the external power. Under the patronage relationship between the regime and the external power, the local ruler could enjoy regime duration and resilience with aid from the mother state. However, when the external power (in this case, the US) withdraws political, economic, and military support from the newly imposed regime, the regime becomes extremely fragile and is unlikely to endure. Therefore, whether communism or liberal peacebuilding, for sustaining the regime in the state-building and developmental approach, policymakers must also carefully consider the capacity of legitimation claims among local rulers and contextualise institutional legacies in the specifically targeted countries.

North Korea and Ideologically Extreme Case

North Korea has often been referred to as an extreme case in comparative politics literature; thus, a careful approach is prudent to draw any generalisable implications, given that many other cases may not follow the extreme case of North Korea's 'ideological introversion'. Indeed, specific ideological analysis of previous North Korean rulers (e.g. *Juche* and *Songun* ideology)

[118] According to V-Dem expert survey data on legitimation, during the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), the Afghanistan leadership's legitimation strategy changed dramatically regarding rational-legal legitimation and performance from 'not at all' to 'to a large extent but not exclusively'. Instead, highlighting ideology and the person of the leader for legitimation remained 'to some extent but it is not the most important component'. See Tannenberg, M., Bernhard, M., Gerschewski, J., Lührmann, A. and Von Soest, C. (2019) *Regime Legitimation Strategies (RLS) 1900 to 2018*: Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem). Available at: https://v-dem.net/media/publications/v-dem_working_paper_2019_86.pdf.

is sufficiently researched in the literature. Thus, policymakers may find it hard to conduct specific policy implications under the 'big umbrella' concept of the ideology. Thus, beyond the ideological approach as a one-size-fits-all style to understanding North Korean politics, analysing rulers' legitimation – and more specifically, how the ruler manoeuvred the justification for their rule – may provide specific practical implications for policymakers.[119]

North Korea's evolution of ideological legitimation claims (or, in this dissertation's terms, the 'institutionalised' ideological legitimation) had path-dependent features from previous rulers' legacies. North Korean rulers fostered legitimation claims when they confronted the legitimacy challenge and regime crisis, including succession. Kim Il-sung emphasised *Juche* ideology, defending against the August Faction Incident, and when he died, Kim Jong-il promoted *Songun* ideology, justifying his rule and ensuring control over the military and security state apparatuses. Lastly, after his own succession, Kim Jong-un emphasised performance legitimation and a tentative transition toward collective governance in the WPK (Frank and Park, 2012), continuously invoking *Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism* (set of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il ideologies) as well as Kim Jong-il's patriotism.



Figure 27. Legitimation Patterns of the DPRK in 1991 and 2020
Source: (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019)

[119] As a response to criticism of the one-size-fits-all style of ideological approach, anthropological literature has focused on the institutional evolution of *Juche* ideology and how its non-static features have shaped North Korean politics and society. See Kwon, H. I. and Chung, B. H. (2012) *North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, Suh, J. J. (2012) 'Making Sense of North Korea', in Suh, J.J. (ed.) *Origins of North Korea's Juche: Colonialism, War, and Development*. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, pp. 1-32.

From a macroscopic point of view, the North Korean rulers' legitimation formula has changed little since the dissolution of the USSR and is expected to maintain a strategic stance that has provided the regime resilience so far (see *Figure 27* above). This consistency and longevity validate the Kim family's adoption of an ideological-legitimation path dependency.

The frequency of legitimation claims over seven decades of New Year's addresses shows a positive association between regime crisis and the emphasis of ideology in rulers' legitimation claims. In other words, during the crisis of Kim Il-sung's rule, ideological claims of *Juche* were strengthened, and throughout the transition to Kim Jong-il's rule, ideological claims were emphasised even more. Taking this fact in reverse, we may forecast the leader's awareness of the regime crisis indirectly by observing the frequency of legitimation claim in the ruler's discourse. These potential signs may be evidence for a comprehensive understanding of authoritarian rulers' behaviour for policymakers.

North Korea has survived two familial transitions within a one-party communist regime, despite each ruler having faced severe regime crises.[120] Since *Juche* ideology was invented during the Kim Il-sung era, institutionalised ideological legitimation strategies have been utilised for more than seven decades. Even though Kim Jong-un's regime has highlighted new non-identity-based legitimation strategies such as performance, anti-corruption, and improving party institution capability, the path-dependency of ideological legitimation strategy has maintained momentum. As a result, if North Korean citizens' legitimacy belief in the *Baek-du* lineage system is weakened, or if legitimacy demands are not raised, there will be no major changes in the legitimation mode such as those seen in Vietnam and China. Furthermore, because North Korean rulers have traditionally responded to legitimation demands with repression and social control, this momentum is predicted to continue. Thus, it would be fair to state that it will take a considerable amount of time for a regime of such self-reliant political ideology to change internally and externally because the institutionalised ideology has already influenced the social control mechanism and everyday lives of North Korean people as social norms for a long time.

[120] Cuba is analogous to the DRPK in that it is also a case of strong ideological freezing. It has the Cuban Revolution with political autonomy of local leadership embodied by Fidel Castro, and experienced no direct Red Army intervention from Moscow. However, recently, after the end of the Castro brothers' rule, the new regime tried to change strong ideological legitimation to non-identity based legitimation. The new ruling figure, Miguel Díaz-Canel, was from the younger generation of the Cuban Revolution who did not experience the violent revolutionary line. For the further discussion, see Dukalskis, A. and Gerschewski, J. (2020) 'Adapting or Freezing? Ideological Reactions of Communist Regimes to a Post-Communist World', *Government and Opposition,* 55(3), pp. 511–532.

This section has sought to provide policy recommendations drawn from the selected cases of Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea, adding the contemporary legitimation strategies of these countries. In the next section, I will briefly present the remaining questions and directions for future research.

Remaining Questions and Directions for Future Research

This dissertation structured the scope of analysis with defined criteria on political origins and theory-driven cases to explain the relationship between party origin, legitimation capacity of the rulers, and regime resilience. The next section presents a more detailed account of the remaining questions and future research avenues in the following order: (1) clarifying the effects of legitimation claim on legitimacy belief, and (2) unpacking legitimation reshaping of a future regime crisis.

Clarifying the Effects of Legitimation Claim on Legitimacy Belief

Many experts have traditionally studied how the continuation of authoritarian regimes varies based on the types of regime and socio-political characteristics (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014; Hadenius, Teorell and Wahman, 2012; Miller, 2019).[121] As discussed in the previous section, legitimation capacity may be an explanatory factor for regime resilience. Therefore, for the elaboration of authoritarian regime resilience analysis, rulers' legitimation efforts may be included in the quantitative analysis. Based on this variable, we can infer the authoritarian regimes' future resilience, potential types of legitimation mode based on regime origins, and which legitimation modes the previous rulers have utilised so far. To use this legitimation capacity variable for quantitative research, it will be necessary to employ data beyond that which can be gathered from the existing expert survey dataset – this will be a challenge, and text analysis is one way to overcome it.

One aspect of the legitimation process is how much the ordinary people believe the legitimation claim. In theory, for the detailed analysis as the quantitative research, legitimacy belief could also be operationalised systematically. However, this approach is more complicated than operationalising legitimation claims of the ruler using the typological work in the dissertation, and it would be different from simple 'regime support' (Gerschewski, 2018).

[121] For further discussion, see Chapter 2.

General survey research is a useful starting point but is limited by broad concepts and other confounding factors, including the problem of preference falsification (Kuran, 1995).

Despite hindrances, field research and targeted survey research would be followed by careful consideration of the authoritarian setting bias in the research areas for gauging legitimacy belief among ordinary people (Gerschewski, 2018). For example, Whiting (2017) investigated how the CCP's legal construction in rural regions enhanced regime legitimacy as well as legal consciousness. Operationalising legitimacy belief as trust in government, Whiting employed a mixed-method approach that included a quasi-experiment, original panel data, and qualitative evidence from interviews to reveal the causal mechanism for the CCP's rural legitimation efforts. As an example, in the future, a carefully constructed mixed-method research strategy is needed for the study of legitimacy and legitimation in authoritarianism.

Unpacking Legitimation Reshaping of Future Regime Crisis

Some in the social sciences attempt to use analytical tools to predict the emergence of social phenomena to better understand the world (Dowding and Miller, 2019; Blyth, 2006; Hay, 2017). Analysing authoritarian regime stability and possibilities of collapse have been important topics among students of authoritarianism (Hadenius and Teorell, 2006; Wahman, Teorell and Hadenius, 2013; Kailitz, 2013). In this dissertation, I adopted a mainly retrospective approach to examine the what a ruler said about their title to rule, using official statements as the text corpus of legitimation claims. Based on this analysis, the discussion can proceed to examine the causal process of how mistreated legitimation produces declining legitimacy to govern as well as the consequences of regime failure.

Based on the important elements of the dissertation's thesis, it is necessary to elaborate conceptualisation of the legitimacy capability and advance its operationalisation in order to analyse and predict the continuity of an authoritarian regime. Thus, the following questions are raised by the dissertation: How do the sources of legitimation and the ruler's ability to formulate specifically the legitimation capacity interact? How can the legitimation potential be operationalised more explicitly for the quantitative approach measurement? These questions lead to further research puzzles. Will these successful legitimation trends (for example, nationalism in ideology, performance, and rational-legal legitimation claims) continue in the future? Why did the failed regimes not use the formula in the same way – in particular, why could not the Soviet Union have responded like China and Vietnam as regards legitimation? Furthermore, is having many legitimation sources (e.g. usable commemorative memory) always helpful to the ruler? These research questions will be addressed in future research.

This section began by identifying the remaining questions and putting forward future research avenues. It went on to suggest that the advancing operationalisation of legitimacy belief and various methodological approximations may be elaborated for further research. The next section concludes the discussions of this chapter.

Conclusion

This dissertation systematically unpacks the relationship among political origins, legitimation capacity and regime resilience. By focusing on a regime's political origins using the classes of indigenous, external imposition, and mixed, this dissertation has argued that regime origins are significant in shaping later rulers' legitimation capacity, consequently contextualising regime resilience. It offers a more nuanced understanding of surviving communist party regimes' legitimation strategies as well as the consequences of weak legitimation capacity based on the consequences of externally imposed political origin. Based on the dissertation's core argument, we may infer how more recent authoritarian rulers have sought to justify their title to rule (and thereby preserve legitimacy) and to what extent institutional legacies have shaped the contemporary political landscape. *Indeed, the reason for looking backwards to an authoritarian regime's origin and its institutional legacies is to move forwards to understand the regime's current legitimation capacity and evaluate its rulers' legitimation capacity.* Focusing legitimation capacity of the ruler is important task for understanding the political origin of authoritarian resilience. Such understanding is necessary for countries that have recently experienced autocratisation, as well as for the billions of people who continue to live under authoritarian rule, because the nature of autocratisation appears to be changing, and autocratising countries are founded across all regions of the world (Alizada *et al.*, 2022).

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Appendix

Communist Regime Duration and Origins

Country	Party name	First year in Power	Last year in Power	Regime origin
Soviet Union	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	1922	1991	Indigenous
Mongolia	Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party	1921	1989	External imposition
Korea North	Workers' Party of North Korea / Workers' Party of Korea	1948	N/A	Mixed
China	Communist Party of China	1949	N/A	Indigenous
Vietnam	Vietnam Workers' Party (VWP) / Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)	1954	N/A	Indigenous
Cuba	26th of July Movement / United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution / Communist Party of Cuba	1959	N/A	Indigenous
Laos	Lao People's Revolutionary Party	1975	N/A	Mixed
Albania	Communist Party of Albania / Party of Labour of Albania / Socialist Party of Albania	1946	1991	External imposition
Bulgaria	Bulgarian Communist Party	1946	1989	External imposition
Poland	Polish United Worker's Party (PZPR)	1948	1988	External imposition
Yugoslavia	Communist Party of Yugoslavia / League of Communists of Yugoslavia	1945	1989	Indigenous*
Romania	Romanian Workers' Party (PMR) / Romanian Communist Party (PCR)	1947	1989	External imposition
Hungary	Hungarian Communist Party / Hungarian Working People's Party / Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party	1946	1989	External imposition
Germany East	Socialist Unity Party of Germany / Party of Democratic Socialism	1946	1990	External imposition
Czechoslovakia	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia	1947	1989	External imposition
Congo-Brz	Congolese Party of Labour	1969	1991	Mixed
South Yemen	National Liberation Front / Yemeni Socialist Party	1967	1990	Mixed
Ethiopia	Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia / Ethiopian Workers' Party / Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front	1979	1992	Indigenous*
Angola	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola	1975	1991	Mixed
Mozambique	Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO)	1975	1993	Mixed
Nicaragua	Sandinista National Liberation Front	1979	1983	Mixed
Cambodia	Communist Party of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge)	1975	1978	Indigenous*

Note: The asterisk (*) indicates exceptional cases of indigenous political origins regimes, needed a further explanation for the evaluation of political origin.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia's indigenous political origins were based on the role of Josip Broz Tito and his independent position. Among the Eastern Bloc countries, Yugoslavia is known for its independent political path (i.e. partisan, guerrilla, revolutionary background of Tito, and unprecedented open defiance of Moscow). However, when its charismatic leader died, Yugoslavia lost regime stability and succumbed to ethnic and factional disputes. It was split up into Bosnia and Herzegovina and other Yugoslavia's successor states.

Ethiopia

In 1992, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) established a de facto one-party rule regime among multiparty systems. After 1992, the EPRDF seized power, and several international democratic databases classify Ethiopia as an authoritarian regime.

Cambodia

Pol Pot founded the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge, in the 1960s. The Khmer Rouge seized power in 1975 and established Democratic Kampuchea. However, Pol Pot's reign was cut short by the Cambodian-Vietnamese War of December 1978 to September 1989, which toppled his regime almost immediately but continued to smoulder as a low-intensity insurgency. The classification of the Khmer Rouge case in Democratic Kampuchea as an indigenous political origin regime may be controversial. It is indisputable that Vietnam and China supported in establishing and consolidating the Khmer Rouge. However, as a combination of the local leader factor (Pol Pot) and Khmer nationalism with an autarky system in the early state-building of Democratic Kampuchea, I coded the Cambodia case as an indigenous political origin. Pol Pot's regime may well be history's purest example of ruling through sheer terror, raw violence, and (most uniquely of all) utter disregarded for any notion of 'legitimacy', accountability, or so-called 'progress'. For Pol Pot, the legitimacy claim might be regarded as lesser priority for attaining power through repression rather than through implementation of legitimation claim. This case indicates how contextual factors, contingencies, vagaries of fortune can produce striking deviations from the dissertation's framework.

V-Dem Data

In this chapter, I used V-Dem survey data for the supplementary analysis of legitimation claims in the MPRP. In the V-Dem survey data, observations for legitimation indicator with fewer than three coders per country-date have been removed. The code categories consist of ideology, a person of the leader, performance legitimation and rational-legal legitimation. Each type has a specific question about the regimes' legitimation strategy. Responses are 0: Not at all, 1: To a small extent, 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component, 3: To a large extent but not exclusively, and 4: Almost exclusively (Tannenberg *et al.*, 2019; Coppedge, 2019).

Type of legitimation claims	Question
Ideology	To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations such as socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?
Person of the leader	To what extent is the chief executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father of mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)? ● The chief executive refers to the head of state or the head of government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.
Performance legitimation	To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?
Rational-legal legitimation	To what extent does the current government refer to legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place? ● This question pertains to legal norms and regulations, for instance, as laid out in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. election) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes – as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasise their rule-boundedness – may score high on the question.

Sequence of Thematic Coding for Legitimation Claim Mechanisms

In the thematic coding analysis, the first stage is conducting the first cycle of preliminary coding from a text corpus of legitimation claims; this is followed by the second cycle with the final codes. In the process, *a priori* theory-based categorisation is applied, following the typology of legitimation claims in the literature (von Haldenwang, 2017; Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2016). During these code cycles, researchers utilise the reflexive process of analytical memos for interpretive explanation (Saldaña, 2015; Jackson and Bazeley, 2019). This intuitive aspect of finalising code provides an in-depth analysis of the text corpus of legitimation claims (see *Figure 28*).



Figure 28. Sequence of Thematic Coding for Legitimation Claim Mechanisms
Source: Author elaborated from Kuckartz (2014, p. 70).

Following the sequence of the coding process, this dissertation focused on how the different political origin types among the communist party regimes in Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea affect the capacity of the rulers' legitimation claims. The capacity of legitimation claims operationalised options of legitimation claims which the rulers incentivised as well as the degree of claims' reverberation into society. Thus, the aim of the dissertation is to reveal how this variance in political origin influenced the reverberation of legitimation claims into society, by evaluating the degree of regime support from the ruled as well as elite cohesion or fragmentation. To this end, the research traced the different political outcomes of selected single-party communist states – Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea – after the collapse of the USSR.

For the text corpus of legitimation claim, for example, North Korea case, the New Year's addresses are gathered from the Korean Central News Agency and *Rodong Sinmun* in their original Korean-language version. In the case of Vietnam, the series of the political report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the National Party Congress, as well as other official documents published by the Communist Party of Vietnam, were analysed. Finally, Central Committee Plenums and other party official documents of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party archive and Wilson Center digital archive were also included in the data collection. For the theory-based categorisation, this research follows the typology of legitimation claims by Von Soest and Grauvogel (2017). Coding themes of legitimation claims are: (1) foundational myth, (2) ideology, (3) personalism, (4) performance, (5) international engagement and (6) procedures.

In the identity-based legitimation themes, the **foundational myth** is a theme wherein historical accounts are regarded as a significant factor for their relationship to the legitimacy of power in the present. For example, war, revolution, and liberation movements can provide strong solidarity, and these have functioned as compelling legitimation narratives for the origin of regime authority (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017). As a collective identity and belief system, the **ideology** theme is defined as a 'regime's teleological proclamation of an official belief system against which all political behaviour is assessed' rather than as narrow and simplistic political ideologies (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017, p. 290). The **Personalism** theme refers to the legitimacy mechanism based on extraordinary personalities and leadership abilities of specific individuals. Rulers who insist on personalism could be the position that fulfils specific missions and achievements, including stability, prosperity, or hereditary succession.

Among non-identity-based themes, the **performance** theme focuses on how to satisfy citizens' needs, especially socioeconomic demands such as welfare, security, economic stability, and equal redistribution of wealth. Due to these demands, economic proxies – such as economic growth rate, inflation and unemployment – become central to the ruler's legitimation claims. In communist regimes, socio-economic performance is one prominent legitimation source; and, after the decline in the influence of communist ideology that coincided with the collapse of the USSR, communist regimes' most crucial legitimation mode has been regarded as providing social and economic benefits for its citizens (Le Hong, 2012; White, 1986). Thematic analysis of legitimation claim in this project also supports the socialistic social contract based on this performance-based legitimation is crucial for justifying title to rule.

The **international engagement** theme concerns 'how political leaders leverage their county's role in international arenas as tools in *manufacturing domestic legitimation* [emphasis

added]' (Von Soest and Grauvogel, 2017, p. 291). Examples include reactions against international sanctions and structural arrangement of international regimes. Externalising domestic legitimation to these international engagements may bolster the ruler's legitimacy in the name of defending the country from external threats.

Finally, the **procedures** theme is a newly emerged approach that encompasses the nominal adoption democratic institutions – including multiparty election and legislatures – to prolong regime duration. Interestingly, for methodological reasons, a considerable volume of quantitative research literature has focused on this 'institutional turn' in comparative authoritarian regimes due to the relative ease of collecting such data for empirical analysis (Pepinsky, 2014; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). However, in the cases of this study, especially, there are no cases for adopting genuine democratic institutions. Vietnam highlighted the extent of procedure for vertical and horizontal accountability toward the relationship between the ruler and the ruled after the economic reforms in 1986 (London, 2014; Malesky, Schuler and Tran, 2011; Thayer, 2010; Vu, 2014; Abrami, Malesky and Zheng, 2013). In the case of Mongolia, after a series of democratisation movements in 1989, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party faced a regime crisis; ad in 1990, Jambyn Batmönkh, the last General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, resigned. Subsequently, Mongolia adopted multiparty elections in 1992 (Heo, 2016). Thus, the procedure theme in the research would be infrequently coded compared to other legitimation claim mechanisms.

Codebook for Legitimation Claims

Legitimation claims	Sub-themes	Datum
Foundational myth	Legacy of anti-Japan colonialism	죽어도 살아도 내 나라,내 민족을 위하여 만난을 헤치며 싸워 승리한 **항일혁명선렬들의 필승의 신념과 불굴의 기개**가 오늘 우리 천만군민의 심장마다에 그대로 맥박쳐야 합니다.
	Baekdu descent	《모두다 **백두의 혁명정신으로** 최후승리를 앞당기기 위한 총공격전에 떨쳐나서자!》라는 구호를 높이 들고 전체 군대와 인민이 10 월의 대축전장을 향하여 힘차게 달려나가야 합니다.
Ideology	*Juche* ideology	**김일성-김정일주의기치따라** 새로운 주체 100 년대를 **주체혁명위업완성을** 위한 승리와 영광의 년대로 빛내여나갈수 있게 되였습니다. 우리 당은 세상에서 제일 훌륭한 우리 인민에게 의거하여 **우리 식, 위대한 장군님식으로** 이 땅우에 사회주의강성국가, 천하제일강국을 보란듯이 일떠세울것입니다.
	Nationalism	100% **우리의 힘과 기술, 지혜로** 과학기술위성제작과 발사에 성공한것은 **태양민족의** 존엄과 영예를 최상의 경지 올려세운 대경사이며 천만군민에게 필승의 신심과 용기를 북돋아주고 조선은 결심하면 한다는것을 뚜렷이 보여준 특대사변이였습니다.
	Songun (military first)	우리는 위대한 **선군의** 기치를 높이 들고 군력강화에 계속 큰 힘을 넣어 조국의 안전과 나라의 자주권을 믿음직하게 지키며 지역의 안정과 세계의 평화를 수호하는데 기여하여야 합니다.
	Ideological struggle	**우리 제도를 좀먹는 이색적인 사상과 퇴폐적인 풍조를 쓸어버리기 위한 투쟁을** 강도높이 벌려 적들의 사상문화적침투책동을 단호히 짓부셔버려야 합니다.
	Triumph of ideology	위대한 김일성-김정일주의가 앞길을 밝혀주고 당의 두리에 천만군민이 굳게 뭉친 일심단결의 위력이 있는 한 **우리의 승리는 확정적입니다.**
Personalism	*Suryong* system	김일성동지와 김정일동지는 우리 인민이 수천년 력사에서 처음으로 맞이하고 높이 모신 **위대한 수령이시며 백두산대국의 영원한 영상이시고 모든 승리와 영광의 기치이십니다**.
	Personal character	또 한해를 시작하는 이 자리에 서고보니 나를 굳게 믿어주고 한마음한뜻으로 열렬히 지지해주는 세상에서 제일 좋은 우리 인민들을 어떻게 하면 신성히 더 높이 떠받들수 있겠는가 하는 근심으로 **마음이 무거워집니다**.
	Loyalty to ruler	모든 당원들과 인민군장병들, 전체 청년들과 인민들은 우리의 운명이시고 최고뇌수이신 경애하는 김정일동지를 정치사상적으로, **목숨으로 견결히 옹호보위하여야 하며** 오직 김정일동지만을 **절대적으로 믿고** 혁명의 천만리길을 억세게 걸어나가야 한다.
Performance	Economic development	**경제강국건설은** 오늘 **사회주의강성국가건설위업수행에서** 전면에 나서는 가장 중요한 과업입니다.
	Science and technology	새 세기 산업혁명의 불길을 세차게 지펴올려 **과학기술의 힘으로 경제강국건설의** 전환적국면을 열어놓아야 하겠습니다.
	Enhance Party governance	**일꾼**들은 인민의 요구, 대중의 목소리에 무한히 충실하여야 하며 **언제나 인민을 위해 헌신하는 인민의 참된 심부름꾼**으로 살며 일하여야 합니다.

	Education, culture, art	우리가 건설하는 사회주의강성국가는 전체 인민이 높은 **문화지식과** 건강한 **체력**, 고상한 **도덕품성을** 지니고 가장 문명한 조건과 환경에서 **사회주의문화생활을** 마음껏 누리며 온 사회에 아름답고 건전한 생활기풍이 차넘치는 **사회주의문명국입니다**.
	Armament development	국방부문의 과학자,기술자들과 로동계급은 억척의 신념과 배짱으로 **국방과학의** 첨단을 돌파하여 **선군조선의** 위력을 떨치고 **국방력강화에** 크게 기여하였습니다.
International engagement	Unification of nation	**조국통일문제는 우리 민족끼리** 힘을 합쳐 자주적으로 풀어나가야 합니다.
	South Korea	**남조선의** 반통일세력은 동족대결정책을 버리고 민족의 화해와 단합, 통일의 길로 나와야 할것입니다.
	Threats from Imperialism	지난해에 국제무대에서는 주권국가들의 자주권과 인류의 생존권을 위협하는 **제국주의자들의 간섭과 전쟁책동이** 끊임없이 계속되였습니다.
	International friendship (socialist countries)	우리는 앞으로도 자주, 평화, 친선의 리념밑에 우리 나라의 자주권을 존중하고 우리를 우호적으로 대하는 **세계 여러 나라들과의 친선협조관계를 확대발전시키며** 지역의 평화와 안정을 수호하고 **세계의 자주화를 실현하기 위하여 적극 노력할것입니다**.
	Nuclear restraint	국제무대에서 힘에 의한 강권이 판을 치고 정의와 진리가 무참히 짓밟히고있는 오늘의 현실은 우리가 선군의 기치를 높이 추켜들고 **핵억제력을** 중추로 하는 **자위적국방력을** 억척같이 다지고 나라의 생명인 국권을 튼튼히 지켜온것이 얼마나 정당하였는가 하는것을 뚜렷이 실증해주고있습니다.
	Relationship with the US	우리는 **조미** 두 나라사이의 불미스러운 과거사를 계속 고집하며 떠안고갈 의지가 없으며 하루빨리 과거를 매듭지고 두 나라 인민들의 지향과 시대발전의 요구에 맞게 새로운 **관계수립을** 향해 나아갈 용의가 있습니다.