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# The Hysteric Rebels: Rethinking Radical Socio-Political Transformation with Foucault and Lacan

Claudia Leeb

## 1. Introduction

The hysteric was an important subject for Jacques Lacan and Michel Foucault, insofar as s/he sheds light on the ways in which knowledge, truth and power converge in scientific discourses. Furthermore, both thinkers turned to the hysteric subject, because s/he exposes the ways in which scientific discourses produce the hysteric subject, “woman,” as a subordinated being. Finally, both thinkers discussed the hysteric subject to find an answer to the question: how we can theorize the political subject, who not only resist but radically rebel against power structures that subordinate us in modern capitalist societies?<sup>1</sup>

Foucault and Lacan are rarely brought into conversation with each other, particularly when it comes to theorizing political subjectivity. One reason for this is Foucault’s own reservations towards psychoanalysis,<sup>2</sup> and the reservations harbored by contemporary scholars who draw on Foucault, who are mostly opposed, if not hostile, to Lacan. These scholars suggest that Lacan, in contrast to Foucault, either operates with a repressive notion of power,<sup>3</sup> conceptualizes the symbolic domain as an all-powerful force,<sup>4</sup> or gives up on the subject altogether,<sup>5</sup> and as such he is (unlike Foucault) of no use when it comes to theorizing political subjectivity.

However, such pitting of Foucault against Lacan misses the ways in which both thinkers theorize subject constitution in relation to discourse, and most importantly, how both thinkers elaborate the hysteric as the political subject who not only resists but transforms power structures in a particular – namely capitalist – society, which is a topic that has so far been overlooked in the literature. Furthermore, both thinkers assist in shedding light on Freud’s classic interpretation of the “hysteric” Dora,<sup>6</sup> as an example of a scientific master discourse on hysteria aimed to discipline her into the norm of the bourgeois, female and heterosexual subject. I show that hysteric symptoms are not the result of an individual pathology, but rather the oppressive societal norms and power structures along the lines of class, gender, and sexuality against which Dora rebelled.

While thinkers have pointed to the ways in which Freud's interpretation of the Dora case spun off into the master's discourse (Verhaeghe, 1999; Mahoney, 20005; Cottet, 2012, Gammelgaard, 2017),<sup>7</sup> these thinkers did not elaborate on the ways in which the hysteric's (Dora's) discourse not only resisted but radically transformed the master's discourse. Also, while some thinkers have foregrounded the ways in which Dora was a victim of patriarchal and heteronormative power structures (Mitchell, 1982; Moi, 1985; Rose, 1985, Gammelgaard, 2017), these thinkers missed the ways in which such power structures were enmeshed in capitalism, which aimed to discipline the hysteric into classed, gendered and sexed norms against which Dora successfully rebelled.<sup>8</sup>

This paper also contributes to foregrounding another dimension of Lacan's thought. While most Lacanian-inspired thinkers suggest that it is the psychoanalytic discourse, and in particular the "psychoanalytic act," that brings radical change about,<sup>9</sup> they have largely ignored is what Lacan had to say about hysteria and the ways it is connected to the psychoanalytic act. This paper shows that the psychoanalytic discourse, which we find on the other side of the master's discourse, unfolds through the hysteric's discourse.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, because the psychoanalytic discourse often spins off into the master's discourse (such as Freud's discourse on Dora), the hysteric's discourse remains the main discourse in a position to radically transform power. Furthermore, while some thinkers who assess Lacan's reading of the hysteric (Dora) point to the ways in which (unconscious) knowledge is on the side of the hysteric (Verhaeghe, 1999, Soler, 2006, Giraldo, 2017), these thinkers do not elaborate on the ways such knowledge can lead to radical change.<sup>11</sup>

In bringing Lacan and Foucault together, I do not aim to cover over their differences. One important difference is that for Lacan, the rebellion of the hysteric is the result of knowledge located in the unconscious, which comes to surface in her/his symptoms, whereas for Foucault the hysteric rebels in her/his knowingly lying about her/his symptoms and with such deception brings down psychiatric power. Furthermore, whereas Lacan is focused on the rebellion of the individual hysteric outside the psychiatric institution, Foucault examines the hysteric's rebellion to psychiatric power within the psychiatric institution, which needs collective rebellion.

While these differences are important, they also point at the ways in which Lacan and Foucault can be fruitfully connected to rethink the hysteric's radical transformation of (psychiatric) power. I show that such transformation implies a potential two-step process: first, one needs to bring the hysteric's unconscious knowledge to light, but then it's another step to use that knowledge to challenge power. Furthermore, challenging power structures must happen on both the

individual and collective level. It is then both Lacan's and Foucault's commonalities and differences that provide us with deeper insights into the functioning of psychiatric power and the hysteric's radical transformation of psychiatric power.

The second section, "Modification of the Place of Knowledge," explains how both Foucault and Lacan elaborate the ways in which modern power has modified the place of knowledge and truth away from the psychiatric patient (the slave) to the psychiatrist (the master). The third section, "The Disciplining of the Hysteric Subject," elaborates the ways in which Freud's psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria returned to the master's discourse that aimed at disciplining Dora into the norm of the female, heterosexual and bourgeois subject. The fourth section, "The Hysteric Rebels," foregrounds the ways in which Dora rebelled against disciplinary power. The fifth and last section, "The Collective Rebellion of Hysterics," outlines the two-step process to challenging psychiatric power.

## 2. Modification of the Place of Knowledge

Foucault outlines the ways in which knowledge, truth and power are intimately connected. Power relations within a society cannot be established and consolidated without the production and circulation of discourse. More specifically, power is exercised through discourses that are associated with truth. In discourse, power and knowledge are joined together.<sup>12</sup> As he puts it: "We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth."<sup>13</sup> As such truth is not something that we find outside of or lacking in power. Moreover, each society has a general "politics of truth," that is "those types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true."<sup>14</sup>

In modern capitalist societies it is scientific discourses that are accepted as truth and through which power is exercised. As an example, once medical discourses established truth on the side of the psychiatrist from the eighteenth century onward, scientific inquiries in the space of the asylum functioned as power-knowledge, whose core aim was not to cure psychiatric patients, but to discipline them into utile-docile bodies; utile, so the psychiatric institution can exploit them for work; and docile, so they won't resist disciplinary power. However, Foucault points out that in psychiatry we find a classical cure, present in the seventeenth and eighteenth century psychiatry, where truth was on the side of the psychiatric patient.

He contrasts the "classical age," where truth was located on the side of the patient, with the cure prevalent in modern capitalist societies, where truth is firmly established on the side of the psychiatrist. As an example, if a patient had a "repelled itch," which implied the

belief that scabies have spread throughout the organism and manifested itself in a number of symptoms, then the technique for curing was to “bring out these famous scabies and treat it as such.”<sup>15</sup> The classical technique for cure was to treat the scabies as real and that could be simply treated, which restored the patient back to health. Here the psychiatrist manipulated reality in such a way that it becomes true.

In contrast, once the psychiatrist functions in the space of disciplinary power in the asylum, she switches to the standpoint of reality. She stops considering the patient from the standpoint of truth, and merely manipulates his judgment. At this point the question of truth of madness at the heart of the classical cure disappears and reappears as the truth “right from the start and once and for all by constituting itself as a medical and clinical science.”<sup>16</sup> Once truth was firmly established on the side of the psychiatrist, two types of scientific discourses—clinical classifications and physiological-pathological discourses—emerged in the space of disciplinary power in the asylum, which underlines the ways in which knowledge turns into a power to define, which is the psychiatrist’s power over patients.

The main aim of these scientific discourses was not to cure people as with the classical cure, where truth was on the side of psychiatric patients. Rather, their main function was to put psychiatric patients to work, which underlines the ways in which knowledge production is connected to capitalist exploitation.<sup>17</sup> As an example, “ergotherapy” implied the practice of putting people to work under the pretext of curing them. As such, the asylum from the 1860s onwards functioned as a means of exploiting people, particularly for farm work, which led to Foucault’s assertion that “the asylum is the reserve army of the farm proletariat.”<sup>18</sup>

In a similar vein as Foucault, Lacan establishes the link between knowledge, truth, and power. Lacan does so via describing discourses—those of the master, the university, the psychoanalytic and the hysteric. Whereas the master’s and the university’s discourses establish and perpetuate power relations in modern capitalist societies, the psychoanalytic’s and hysteric’s discourses allow us to radically transform such relations. The core function of the scientific discourse is to elucidate the master’s discourse. It functions via the master’s command, the modern “categorical imperative”: “Continue. March on. Keep on knowing more and more.”<sup>19</sup> Whatever knowledge the sciences produce does not stand in the service of truth. Rather, its truth stands in the service of modern capitalism which needs scientific knowledge, particularly in the form of technology, to exploit the proletariat in ever more insidious ways. As such the idea of progress implied in the master’s discourse on science was not for the proletarian, whose exploitation intensifies.<sup>20</sup>

However, like Foucault, Lacan asserts a “classical age” by invoking Plato and Aristotle, where we find knowledge that stands in the service of truth as know-how (*savoir-faire*) on the side of the slave (or the psychiatric patient). He shows us *how* the slave’s knowledge was “transmitted from the slave’s pocket to the master’s (the psychiatrist).” The master extracts the slave’s knowledge by asking her/him the right questions, and the slave “answers what the questions already dictate as their response.”<sup>21</sup>

The master exclaims: “Hey, look, get the slave to come over, that little fellow, can’t you see, (s/)he knows.” Although the master makes it known that the slave knows, “but by acknowledging it only in this derisory way, what is hidden is that it is only a matter of robbing the slave of (her/)his function at the level of knowledge.”<sup>22</sup> The fruit of this operation is the creation of the master’s theoretical knowledge (*episteme*), which is also the point where “science was born.”<sup>23</sup> Here like Foucault, Lacan asserts that once knowledge and truth finds itself on the side of the master, the sciences were born.

Lacan furthermore points out that between the classical master and the modern master, the capitalist, we find “a modification in the place of knowledge.” In modern capitalist societies “capitalist exploitation effectively frustrates (her/)him of (her/)his [the proletarian’s] knowledge by rendering it useless.”<sup>24</sup> Here we are confronted with a scenario where the proletarian is not simply exploited, but she “has been stripped of his function of knowledge.”<sup>25</sup> For Lacan, what “justifies both the attempt and the success of (a proletarian) revolution,” is that the proletarian’s knowledge is not only robbed from her, but returned to her in the form of a “tyranny of the master’s knowledge”, which the master uses to intensify her exploitation.<sup>26</sup>

The psychoanalytic’s and hysteric’s discourses find themselves on the other side, or at the opposite side of the master’s and university’s discourses, and both of these discourses allow us to not only resist but transform power relations in modern capitalist societies. However, although the analyst’s discourse is situated at the opposite site of a wish or “at least any declared” wish for mastery, it can easily spin off into the discourse of mastery.<sup>27</sup> The spinning off of the psychoanalytic discourse into the master’s discourse is the result of this “desire for knowledge,” which Lacan finds prevalent amongst psychoanalysts. However, such desire to know does not lead to knowledge, but to “the overwhelmingly outrageous things one hears from psychoanalysts.”<sup>28</sup>

With such desire for knowledge we are also confronted with the “I-craziness”<sup>29</sup> in psychoanalysis, which is, according to Lacan, the result of the conversion of Freudian psychoanalysis into ego-psychology in the Anglo-American context. The psychoanalytic discourse of the autonomous ego managed to insert itself into American society,

“where this discourse of a solidly autonomous ego undoubtedly promised attractive results.”<sup>30</sup> The problem with such results is, however, that the psychoanalytic discourse spun off into the master’s discourse, which effaced the Freudian discourse.

We can see that the Freudian discourse, in particular his discourse on hysteria in relation to the Dora case, also returned to the master’s discourse. This is connected to two reasons. First, Freud desired to obtain whole knowledge about hysteria, which we find in his lamentation that Dora’s breaking off of the analysis with him after three months left him with an incomplete “fragment of an analysis.” Nonetheless, Freud maintains that “if the work had been continued, we should no doubt have obtained the fullest possible enlightenment upon every particular of the case.”<sup>31</sup>

Freud’s desire to gain the “fullest possible enlightenment” about hysteria or to “know it all” led to his outrageous interpretations about the Dora case that aimed at disciplining “woman” into the norm of the female, bourgeois and heterosexual subject. The second reason that Freud’s discourse spun off into the discourse of mastery is a result of his discourse being implicated in the university or scientific discourse. Such desire to know it all is also connected to his placing the psychoanalytic discourse in the service of science. In the beginning of “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, he argues that it is “a physician’s duty” to publish the secrets of his hysteric patients to put them to “scientific use.”<sup>32</sup>

The mastery in the psychiatric (psychoanalytic) discourse on hysteria produced what Lacan calls a master signifier—the “hysteric woman.” The master signifier allows one “to notice how something that spreads throughout language like wildfire is readable, that is to say, how it hooks on, creates a discourse.”<sup>33</sup> As an example, at the level of the university, the master signifier is related to the production of a thesis that “gives your name weight.”<sup>34</sup> Once you have managed to make yourself a name, then saying something different from what you said in your thesis does not matter, since your thesis, as a master signifier, is pinned onto your name.<sup>35</sup>

The master signifier “hysteric woman” hooked onto and created the scientific discourse on hysteria. That signifier certainly spread like wildfire through language and burned down a few trees here and there—in particular insights that it was not only women that could be classified as hysterics, but also men. Mark Micale (2008) provides a historical account of such “tree burning.”<sup>36</sup> Whereas the medical discourse on hysteria in the eighteenth century did not make a sharp distinction between male and female hysteria, male hysteria was suppressed from the nineteenth century onwards, which went hand in hand with a new focus on “male rationality.”

Here hysteria became a chiefly female affliction that served to reinforce the bourgeois hierarchy between men and women. Also, Freud initially studied neurosis through hysteria in men, and his first two public presentations after his return from Charcot (who studied hysteria in Paris) to Vienna dealt with male hysterics.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, Freud was dealing with his own neurosis, which in his correspondence with Fliess he classified as hysteria.<sup>38</sup> However, in his later work on hysteria he suppressed male hysteria in his published work but it refinds itself in his unpublished works, including talks, correspondence, and his personal life. Lacan also repeatedly asserts that there are also male hysterics, and contemporary thinkers point at the centrality of male hysteria in current far right politics.<sup>39</sup> Nonetheless, no matter what their claims about hysteria, and what I outline in this paper by, for example, referring to the hysteric as a s/he, the master signifier secures that hysteria is chiefly associated with woman.

However, the master signifier, “is already shot through, woven through, with what, to be sure, does not yet emerge from it, namely, the signifying articulation.”<sup>40</sup> That the master signifier of the “hysteric woman” could hook onto the discourse of hysteria is the result that this signifier was already woven through a signifying articulation where the signifier woman, in opposition to man, is associated with madness. Furthermore, any woman who might rebel against disciplinary power has been and continues to be easily labeled as a hysteric, which underlines the ways in which scientific classifications are, in the case of hysteria, a form of power that aims to keep patriarchal and capitalist power relations intact, and are used as a tool (albeit an unsuccessful one) to strike down any rebellion of woman.

### 3. The Disciplining of the Hysteric Subject

In *Psychiatric Power*, Foucault’s 1973-’74 lecture-course-based book, Foucault points out that what remains hidden behind the juridical subject as the bearer of individual rights, is the subject “as a subjected body held in a system of supervision and subjected to procedures of normalization.”<sup>41</sup> Disciplinary power, which is the modern form of power, is the particular modality by which political power reaches to the level of bodies.<sup>42</sup> The central property of such power is what he terms its “subject-function,” which means that only because the “body has been ‘subjectified,’ that is to say, that the subject–function has been fixed on it...something like the individual appeared.”<sup>43</sup> The individual subject does not pre-exist but is a result of subjection to disciplinary power. Disciplinary power is “applied and brought to bear” on the body, on its actions and movements, as well as its discourses.<sup>44</sup>

Similar to Foucault, Lacan foregrounds the “signifier function” of the master’s discourse.<sup>45</sup> The master’s discourse produces the subject



via what he calls the “double function of the signifier.” The signifier, he argues, “functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in question to no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to *function*, to speak, as a subject.”

<sup>46</sup> Like Foucault, Lacan links the signifier function of discourse to the master’s knowledge production—the subject emerges via the signifier in a “battery of signifiers,” which implies “an already structured field of knowledge.”<sup>47</sup> Beyond Foucault, Lacan points out that the “subject-function” not only produces the subject, it, in the same movement, also produces the unconscious. “There [in the double function of the signifier], strictly speaking,” argues Lacan “is the temporal pulsation in which is established that which is the characteristic of the departure of the unconscious as such—the closing.”<sup>48</sup> The closing refers to the closed signifier and the solidification of the subject into the signifier.

In *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*, Foucault points out that from the eighteenth century onward we are confronted with strategies of knowledge and power that produced the figure of the “hysterical woman”: “The feminine body was analyzed—qualified and disqualified—as being thoroughly saturated with sexuality.”<sup>49</sup> The outcome was a “hysterization of women’s bodies” that became integrated into the sphere of medical practices solely via their pathology.<sup>50</sup> Both the figure of the mother, who had to produce and guarantee the life of the children, and the negative image of the “nervous woman,” constituted the most visible forms of hysterization. It assured the disciplining of the body into the norm of a feminine, bourgeois, and heterosexual subject.

Here we are confronted with what Foucault calls the “deployment of sexuality,” which emerged in the eighteenth century and which superseded the “deployment of alliance.” Whereas the latter functioned based on the law (rules what is forbidden and permitted) and a system of marriage and kinship ties through which names and possessions were transmitted, the former is concerned with the sensation of bodies and the creation and the penetrating of bodies, through which a continual extension of control not only over bodies (disciplinary power) but also over populations (bio-power) is engendered.

Besides the figure of the “hysterical woman,” three figures of knowledge and power emerged in the eighteenth century that guaranteed the deployment of sexuality: the figure of the “masturbating child,” which implied a dangerous sexual activity of children that needed to be taken charge of; the “Malthusian couple,” which aimed at the control of the population through socializing procreative behavior; and finally the figure of the “perverse adult,” where all sexual behaviors were either assigned to be normal or pathological, and a corrective technology was sought for those anomalies through the psychiatrization of perverse pleasure.

The deployment of sexuality first developed on the fringes of the family, but then it gradually focused *on* the family. The family – via the husband-wife and parent-child axes, and other relatives – ensured that the systems of alliance are imbued with new tactics of power. The family drew its outside support from doctors, educators and later psychiatrists, priests and pastors. Although Foucault points at the ways in which the deployment of sexuality is tied to the economy, insofar as disciplined bodies produce and consume, Deleuze and Guattari outline such tie to a specific, namely capitalist, economy in more detail.

Their conceptualization of “schizoanalyses” challenges the psychoanalytic idea of the Oedipal triangle as universal, and re-conceptualizes it as a historically specific result of capitalist privatization of the nuclear (or Oedipal) family, where reproduction is segregated into the domestic or private sphere and production in society at large, and whose primary effect is to replicate capitalist social relations in and through the family. The family does so by serving as a relay for the construction of subjectivity that is primed for the capitalist economy. It curbs desires and thereby produces specifically ascetic and self-denying subjects that are conducive to capitalist social relations.

In Holland Eugene’s analyses of schizoanalyses (2002), [s/he] points out that the Oedipal family fosters the production of a heterosexual subject, insofar as the core models for adult love are parental, and hence heteronormative. The heteronormative pressure in capitalist families assures the production of subjectivities in their children along reproductive and productive roles, which renders subjectivities not defined by (re-) production as “scandalous to ascetic, Oedipal-capitalist subjectivity.”<sup>51</sup> The four figures of power and knowledge central for the deployment of sexuality are core to securing the production of such a subject.

In the case of Dora, the deployment of sexuality took place in her Oedipal family, which drew support from the outside, here the psychoanalyst Freud. In 1900 Dora’s father, a wealthy, but permanently sick Austrian manufacturer, brought his rebellious eighteen-year-old daughter Dora to Freud to cure her “hysteric symptoms.” The chief motivation for her father to seek outside support in disciplining his daughter was to stop her from openly objecting and thus endangering his love-affair with Frau K., whom Dora appeared to sexually desire herself.

Dora’s homosexual desires, together with her not showing any signs of desiring to marry, but instead focusing on her studies, endangered the reproductive role a bourgeois woman had to play in capitalist society, and it was Freud’s task to secure the deployment of sexuality and discipline Dora into the norm of the female, bourgeois and heterosexual subject. In such a task, the figure of the “hysteric woman,” but also, and more hidden from view, the figure of the “perverse adult,”

played a key role. However, Freud's tasks could not be completed, as exactly a year later Dora had broken off treatment with Freud, causing Freud great frustration.

Although Foucault points out that Freud's psychoanalytic discourse contributed to the deployment of sexuality, he never took a closer look at the ways it functioned in Freud's clinical practice and his texts, which I will pursue in my reading of the Dora case and others of Freud's essays on hysteria.<sup>52</sup> At the end of "General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks" Freud explains:

In general, the hysterical attack, like every form of hysteria, in women recalls to action a form of sexual activity which existed during childhood, and had at that time a pronounced masculine character. One may often observe that it is just those girls who in the years before puberty showed a boyish character and inclinations who tend to become hysterical at puberty. In a whole series of cases the hysterical neurosis is nothing but an excessive over-accentuation of the typical wave of repression through which the masculine type of sexuality is removed and the woman emerges.<sup>53</sup>

In Freud's discourse on hysteria we can see what Foucault determines the "new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization," which take hold of humans as living bodies. At the same time the girl is disciplined into the norm of the bourgeois woman, or as Freud puts it, "woman emerges," the hysteric symptom emerges as all those aspects the girl needs to repress to become a woman—everything stereotypically associated with the signifier "man," and her desire for another woman, which means that becoming a woman necessitates at the same time becoming heterosexual.

Freud provides us with the valuable insight that the hysteric symptom is an expression of repressed (sexual) desires when she emerges as a (heterosexual and bourgeois) woman. The problem, however, is that he is not aware that such becoming functions in the space of disciplinary power. His own scientific discourse is implicated in the subject-function of the master's discourse, insofar as he calls the forms of repression the girl has to undergo as "typical," which all girls must go through to become "normal" women, and which we find merely "accentuated" in the female hysteric.

Furthermore, his characterizations of girls that depart from the norm of femininity as "boyish" and women with homosexual desires as a "masculine type of sexuality" are implicated in the master's discourse that aims to discipline the girl into the "normal" heterosexual subject. And although Freud explains in "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality" the "bisexual" nature of the hysteric symptom and that when aiming to resolve the symptom the psychoan-

alyst confronts two unconscious sexual fantasies, “of which one has a masculine and the other a feminine character”,<sup>54</sup> it is the woman whose homosexual desires (her unconscious “masculine” sexual fantasy) are accentuated and who thus departs from the “‘norm’ of the heterosexual woman, who gets classified and with that pathologized as a “hysteric.” Freud’s psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria itself spun off into the master’s discourse, and as such contributed to, according to Foucault in the *History of Sexuality: Vol. 1*, “a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality” from the eighteenth century onward that produced homosexuality as a perversion.<sup>55</sup>

Dora, a young woman of an “independent character,” spent much her childhood with the K. family and their children, who were friends of her family. Frau K. was also the lover of Dora’s father. At the age of fourteen Dora was sexually attacked for the first time by Herr K. In a moment where his wife was gone, he put down the shutters and pressed Dora into a corner and kissed her against her will while at the same time pressing his “erect member against her body”.<sup>56</sup> Although “neither of them ever mentioned the scene”, Dora, from now on, avoided being alone with Herr K., and refused to go on an expedition with him which was to last for several days.<sup>57</sup>

Herr K. attempted a second sexual attack when Dora was sixteen, during a walk on the lake, with she was alone with him. Shortly before the second incident Dora learned from the governess of the K.’s children that she was raped by Herr. K. After Dora became aware what Herr K’s intention was, because he used the same statement before he raped the governess — “you know I do not get much out of my wife,” she “did not let him finish what he had to say, she gave him a slap in the face and hurried away.”<sup>58</sup> Whereas Dora was silent about the first incident, she told her parents when it happened the second time, and demanded that they break off the relations with the Ks.

Her father had a talk with Herr K. who said that nothing of this sort happened and that his sexual attacks merely existed in the fantasies of the inappropriately sexually active Dora — blaming the victim — which Dora’s father readily accepted in order not to endanger his love affair with Frau K. Dora’s father furthermore sent his daughter to psychoanalysis with Freud, in hopes that she would “come to her senses” and stop demanding that he break off the relations with the Ks and especially Frau K. In his interpretation of the Dora case, we can see in more detail how Freud’s discourse on hysteria was implicated in the master’s discourse that aimed to discipline Dora.

Before we turn to Freud’s interpretation of the Dora case, it is noteworthy that we find some aspects where his psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria seems to challenge disciplinary power. For example, he points out that “the perversion most repellent to us, the sensual love of a man for a man, was not only tolerated by a people so far our supe-

riors in cultivation as were the Greeks, but was actually entrusted by them with important social functions."<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, he points out that each of us in our sexual life "transgresses to a slight extent—now in this direction, now in that—the narrow lines imposed upon him as the standard of normality."<sup>60</sup>

Although Freud mainly talks about the love between men as connected to the superior cultivation of the Greeks (and not the love between women), he does seem to be aware that heterosexuality has to do with a certain "standard of normality," that we often transgress, because it is forced upon us. Furthermore, at a certain point he also asserts that Dora's preoccupation with the love affair between her father and Frau K. "lays concealed a feeling of jealousy which had the lady as its *object*—a feeling, that is, which could only be based upon an affection on Dora's part for one of her own sex."<sup>61</sup>

We learn that Dora, when she visited the Ks, used to share a bedroom with Frau K., and that she had been Frau K.'s confidante and advisor with difficulties of her married life. During these times she also discussed and read forbidden books (about sexuality) with Frau K. Dora, argues Freud, furthermore had praised Frau K.'s "'adorable white body' in accents more appropriate to a lover than to a defeated rival."<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, Dora felt betrayed by Frau K. who told Herr K. about her reading of those forbidden books to protect Frau K.'s love affair with Dora's father, and who in turn then used it to blame Dora for Herr K.'s sexual attacks.

At the turn of the century, Freud's admission of homosexual desires between women and men certainly challenged the master's discourse. However, although Freud acknowledged that hysteric symptoms were the result of repressed homosexual desires, he at the same time contributes to upholding the "standard of normality" by further suggesting that the "formation of the hysterical symptoms draw their strength not only from repressed normal sexuality but also from unconscious perverse activities."<sup>63</sup> Insofar as heterosexuality, for Freud, remains "normal" and homosexuality "perverse," Freud's discourse on hysteria returns to the master's discourse that functions in the space of disciplinary power whose aim is to turn Dora into the norm of the female, bourgeois and heterosexual subject.

Furthermore, he asserts that the girl's homosexual desire is a "common precursor of a girl's first serious passion for a man. Thenceforward, in favorable circumstances, the homosexual current of feeling often runs completely dry," but it might be revived if the "girl is not happy in the love for a man."<sup>64</sup> Although Freud assumes a girl's homosexual desires to be in the realm of normalcy, in "favorable circumstances" a girl gives up such desires and turns to her "true" love object—the man. Furthermore, her desire for a woman is only kindled when things do not go so well with the man—a discourse of

the master, which aims to discipline girls into the norm of bourgeois, heterosexual femininity. Such master's discourse resounds in contemporary interpretations of the Dora case study.<sup>65</sup>

Furthermore, Freud's dominant interpretation of the Dora case — that all we are confronted with is a (repressed) love story between Dora and Herr K. (and Dora and her father) — represses the love between two women, Dora and Frau K., into the unconscious. Freud repeatedly asserts that Dora's "no" (to Herr K.'s second sexual attack) signifies the desired "yes"<sup>66</sup> When Dora vehemently opposes Freud's interpretations in her analyses, he takes this vehemence as an indicator of the vehemence with which she has repressed her sexual desire for Herr K., to whom she secretly wishes to be a better wife than Frau K. (who refuses to have sex with him).

Such interpretation contradicts his insight that the hysterical symptom is the result of a "psychic trauma,"<sup>67</sup> and nothing else but a "memory-symbol of the operation of certain (traumatic) impressions and experiences."<sup>68</sup> At a certain point he even states that "the experience with Herr K. — his making love to her and the insult to her honor which was involved — seems to provide in Dora's case the psychic trauma which Breuer and I declared long ago to be the indispensable prerequisite for the production of a hysterical disorder."<sup>69</sup>

Although Freud admits here that Herr K. traumatized Dora, he at the same time minimizes such trauma by calling his sexual attacks as nothing more than "making love." He furthermore contributes to normalizing male sexual violence against women by reading normal reactions (Dora's migraine headaches and coughing) to her traumatization, as "hysterical symptoms" — hence it is the woman who ends up with a "hysterical disorder" and the man remains in the realm of normalcy. However, Freud explains that there are hysterical persons who do not express their fantasies as symptoms, "but consciously realize them in action and thus imagine and actually bring about assaults, attacks, or sexual aggressions."<sup>70</sup> It is surprising that he did not make the link to Herr K. who, with his sexual aggressions against Dora and the servant girl, seems to be the true hysteric in the Dora case.

Freud's concern with Dora's "honor" in the above citation also underlines the ways his discourse of hysteria was implicated in a discourse that aimed to discipline Dora. Such disciplinary discourse also surfaces in his assertion that there was nothing wrong with Herr K.'s "making love" to her and that Dora's telling her parents about the second sexual attack was nothing else but a "morbid craving for revenge. A normal girl, I am inclined to think, will deal with a situation of that kind by herself."<sup>71</sup> As such, keeping silent and accepting male sexual violence was (and continues to be) the norm for a girl from a bourgeois household.<sup>72</sup> Insofar as Freud reads Dora's not keeping silent about male sexual violence as pathological, his discourse contributes to disciplining her into the norm of bourgeois femininity.

The centrality of class disciplining in Freud's master's discourse on hysteria is also salient to Freud's remarks about Herr K.'s rape of the governess. He tells us that Herr K. "had made violent love to her and had implored her to yield to his entreaties, saying that he got nothing from his wife."<sup>73</sup> Although Freud admits that there was violence involved in Herr's K's sexual attack on the governess, he normalizes such violence by calling it "violent love," which is a contradiction in itself. He furthermore normalizes Herr K's sexual attack on Dora, by suggesting that her slapping him in the face was nothing else but an expression of her jealousy and her revenge that he already had another lover.

Furthermore, Freud provides Dora with the following interpretation: "'Does he dare,' you said to yourself, 'to treat me like a governess, like a servant?'"<sup>74</sup> Here Freud's discourse on hysteria returns to the master's discourse insofar as behind his concern for Dora's "honor" as a bourgeois girl, in this interpretation, lurks his normalization of the bourgeois master's male violence against the slave girl, who exploits domestic servants sexually.

Also, Freud argues that Dora summoned up an exaggerated infantile love for her father, expressed in her jealousy of the love affair between her father and Frau K., as a means "to protect herself against the feelings of love (for Herr K.), which were constantly pressing forward into consciousness."<sup>75</sup> However, what is pressing forward into consciousness is Dora's homosexual desire for Frau K., which Freud aims to keep repressed with the argument that she aimed to keep her her sexual desire for Herr K. at bay by summoning up an exaggerated infantile sexual desire for her father.

Furthermore, what Freud also aims to keep repressed is that Dora's father was not the "strong man," which he reiterates with statements such as that her father was "the dominating figure in this circle, owing to his intelligence and his character as much as to the circumstances of his life"<sup>76</sup> Rather, Dora's father was a "castrated man", insofar as he was severely ill during most of Dora's childhood, and it is doubtful that Dora summoned up a supposedly "natural" infantile sexual desire for him, or that he could sexually satisfy his lover, Frau K.

Although Lacan, in his later writings, pointed at the ways in which Dora's desire for a woman plays a role in hysteria, this was not always the case. In Lacan's early work, although he regarded Dora's fascination with a painting of the Madonna at a visit of the Dresden museum as an expression of homosexual desire, he dismissed such desire, as well as Dora's homosexual desire for Frau K., as noting else but a "regression."<sup>77</sup> He becomes more critical of Freud's interpretation of the Dora case in his late works. Here he points at Freud's uncritical acceptance of Herr K.'s male violence towards Dora, and locates Dora's homosexual desire for Frau K. at the center of hysteria. Also,

instead of dismissing Dora's admiration for the Madonna painting, as he did in his early works, he explicitly links it to her love for Frau K,<sup>78</sup> and states that Freud's use of the Oedipus myth (the "natural" sexual attraction between father and daughter) is unsuited for grasping the hysteric's discourse, because in the case of Dora we are confronted with the "castrated man" — her sick father.<sup>79</sup>

However, Lacan's suggestion that Dora's love for Frau K. is nothing but revenge for the sexual violence she encountered from Herr K., shows that he is not so far apart from Freud's assertion that women only turn away from the "normal" path of heterosexual desire, when things do not go well with the man. Moreover, Lacan asserts that the psychoanalyst had only to listen what the hysteric was saying: "I want a man who knows how to make love," which implies that hysteria is a result of the "castrated man", who is unable to make love to the woman.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps, if Lacan would have listened closer he could have heard something else the female hysteric was saying: "I want a woman, because *she* knows how to make love."

#### 4. The Hysteric Rebels

This section outlines the ways in which the psychoanalytic act unfolds via the hysteric's discourse, and it is such discourse which brings to light the hysteric's unconscious knowledge, which rebels against the master's knowledge. Since the psychoanalytic discourse with its desire to know easily spins off into the master's discourse, as I showed in the previous section, all we are left with is the hysteric's discourse as a promise for rebellion. This section elaborates the rebellious moments in Dora's discourse.

To begin with, the psychoanalytic act, which for Lacan leads to radical change, does not occur outside of power structures. Rather, the psychoanalytic act "can only be an act in a context already replete with everything involving the signifier's effect... There can be no act outside a field which is already so completely articulated that the law is located within it."<sup>81</sup> The psychoanalytic act is *not* something that exists outside the signifier and the symbolic order. Rather, it challenges power from *within* the symbolic order and the signifier. Here Lacan comes close to Foucault's argument that "where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, and rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power."<sup>82</sup>

*L'envers*, the title of Seminar XVII, translated as "the other side" of psychoanalysis, also has the meaning of "underside" and has connotations with the unseen.<sup>83</sup> What we find on the underside of the psychoanalytic discourse is the hysteric's discourse. The hysteric's discourse, which is instigated in psychoanalysis, brings to light and makes us see what the master's discourse has made unseen — the knowledge we find in the unconscious.



Psychoanalysis manages to not only resist but to radically transform the master's discourse, because the psychoanalyst's discourse "takes shape with" the hysteric's discourse.<sup>84</sup> What this means is that the psychoanalyst institutes a "hysterization of discourse" to access the knowledge that is not known, because it is unconscious.<sup>85</sup> It might seem counterintuitive to talk about a knowledge we do not know. However, as Lacan puts it, it is "not at all self-evident that all knowledge, by virtue of being knowledge, is known as knowledge."<sup>86</sup>

Although we do not know this knowledge of the unconscious, we find in the unconscious a "perfectly articulated knowledge for which strictly speaking no subject is responsible. When a subject happens to encounter it all of a sudden, to come upon this knowledge (s/)he was not expecting, good God, (s/)he – (s/)he who speaks – finds (her/) himself very confused indeed."<sup>87</sup> However, it is not the subject who articulates this knowledge. Rather, the knowledge of the unconscious "speaks all by itself."<sup>88</sup>

It speaks to us in the form of an "obstacle, the limit, or rather the hard road on which we lose our bearings, and were we find ourselves blocked."<sup>89</sup> In contrast to the master's (and the university's) discourse that is based on the idea that it can "form a closed whole,"<sup>90</sup> the unconscious reveals itself in the limit of this wholeness. Here the master loses his bearings and we are confronted with the "eruption of the entire phase of lapses and stumblings."<sup>91</sup>

The psychoanalyst, under artificial conditions, induces the hysteric's discourse through free association. She says to whoever is about to begin analysis: "Off you go, say everything that comes into your head, however divided it might be," and thereby instigates the subject-supposed-to-know.<sup>92</sup> The transference<sup>93</sup> is founded on the fact that the analyst tells "me (the person being analyzed), the poor bastard – to act as if I knew what it was all about."<sup>94</sup> This "saying-no-matter-what" leads to the production of a swarm of random signifiers, which "bear upon this knowledge that is not known."<sup>95</sup>

The psychoanalytic discourse, which unfolds via the hysteric's discourse, bears upon this unconscious knowledge, because it allows us such knowledge and with that truth beyond the lies of the master's discourse to come forward. As a result, the "hysterization of discourse" allows the "*Wo es war, soll Ich werden*," which means that it brings the unconscious knowledge to the level of the I, which challenges the master's discourse that pretends to know it all.<sup>96</sup> In other words, with the hysterization of discourse the psychoanalyst aims to get the subject to the point where the subject "knows everything that (s/)he does not know even as (s/)he knows it. That's what the unconscious is."<sup>97</sup>

As I have demonstrated, Dora's hysteric symptoms were due not to individual pathology, but rather to oppressive societal norms and power structures along the lines of class, gender, and sexuality. Power

structures that discipline subjects leave marks on bodies. What was the most subjective experience, suffering expressed in symptoms, was at the same time the most objective moment. What Lacan shows us is that psychoanalysis, when proceeding via the “hysterization of discourse,” can lend a voice to such suffering, and thereby allow the unconscious knowledge in the service of truth to appear.

The psychoanalyst can only instigate the hysterization of discourse that allows the knowledge of the unconscious to come to light if she “limits (her/)himself to half-saying,”<sup>98</sup> which means “that it cannot be said completely, for the reason that beyond this half there is nothing to say...Here, consequently discourse is abolished.”<sup>99</sup> Half-saying (*me-dire*), which implies an incomplete interpretation of the signifiers that the analysand produces, abolishes the master’s discourse that aims to say and know it all, and instead, allows knowledge in the service of truth come to light. The problem with Freud’s discourse on Dora was that he failed to limit himself to this half-saying, and instead aimed to say and know it all, which as a result, implicated him in the master’s discourse of science.

However, as Judy Gammelgaard (2017) points out, Freud assumes two different positions toward the objects of his studies: in the one, he is the humble scholar who has great tolerance for not-knowing (or, I would add, half-saying). In the other, including his position toward Dora, “he aimed to find an original core, the moment of historical truth, missing from the patient’s story, in order to create a whole and complete story out of the fragment of life and suffering the patient was able to narrate. This discourse of mastery, however, seemed from time to time to collapse forcing Freud to realize that there might not be any kernel of truth.”<sup>100</sup>

Gammelgaard further points out that while Freud, in certain passages of the text, admits and laments his loss of control, in other passages, he “was endeavoring to fill the holes, striving toward completeness because he had encountered the limits of his self knowledge.”<sup>101</sup> However, knowledge is not so much located on the side of the psychiatrist and the conscious, as Gammelgaard seems to suggest, but on the side of the hysteric, and the unconscious, and it is this knowledge which tells a truth that makes Freud’s discourse of mastery collapse.

Instead of listening to the hysteric’s discourse, as Lacan points out, Freud substituted the “Oedipus complex, for the knowledge that he gathered from all the mouths of god, Anna, Emma, Dora.”<sup>102</sup> However, the good news is that the hysteric’s discourse exists “whether there was psychoanalysis or not,”<sup>103</sup> which means that even if there is no psychoanalysis, or we are confronted with a psychoanalysis that spins off into the master’s discourse, the hysteric’s discourse exists, and is ready to expose the falsehood of the master’s and the university discourse.

The hysteric is “a precious object... in this context of discourse.”<sup>104</sup> The hysteric is a precious object, because “qua *object petit a*, (s/)he is the fall, the fallen object, fallen as an effect of discourse, which in turn is always broken as some point.”<sup>105</sup> *Object petit a* is the historically contingent unconscious fantasy object that covers over the moment of what Lacan calls the “real”. The real does not refer to any “reality”, but tells us that we can never reach such a reality. The real exposes that there is “a fault, a hole” in any attempts to fully articulate what hysteria is all about.<sup>106</sup> Insofar as the hysteric is the “fallen object” qua *object petit a*, s/he stands for the real, and exposes the obstacle or the limit in the master’s discourse on hysteria, which breaks its subordinating power.

Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* challenged Lacan’s (alleged) naturalization of the Oedipus complex, which they conceptualize as a specific historical construct.<sup>107</sup> However, they also draw on Lacanian psychoanalyses, since for them “Lacan was the first...to schizophrenize the analytic field.”<sup>108</sup> For them such schizophrenizing is located in the Lacanian real.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, they consider Lacan’s *object petit a* as a precursor of what they term “desiring-machines,” which are productive forces capable of not only resisting but radically transforming power.<sup>110</sup> As Guattari puts it, *object a* is nothing else but “a vanishing point, an escape, precisely, from the despotic character of the signifying chains,” that at the end liquidates the “totalitarianism of the signifier.”<sup>111</sup>

Although *object a* is not the real itself, as Deleuze and Guattari seem to suggest, but rather the unconscious fantasy object that aims to cover over the moment of the real, the hole in any w/hole discourse, *object petit a* is qua the “fallen object,” the hysteric’s discourse, the object that escapes the despotic character of the master’s discourse on hysteria, and which at the end liquidates the totalitarian signifier concealed in the figure of the “hysteric woman.” Here the hysteric’s discourse turns into a desiring-machine that radically transforms psychiatric power.

The hysteric discourse points at this “logical obstacle” in the master’s discourse, and with that exposes that knowing it all is impossible. In this precious moment at the limit of the master’s discourse, the knowledge of the unconscious “delivers what is effectively the truth of everything that has been believed to be.”<sup>112</sup> Here the master’s discourse breaks down, and we are confronted with the truth that the master’s discourse made us believe falsehoods that functioned in the service of disciplinary power.<sup>113</sup>

As such, for Lacan, “the desire to know is not what leads to knowledge. What leads to knowledge is... the hysteric’s discourse.”<sup>114</sup> The master’s discourses on hysteria robbed the hysteric of her/his knowledge by rendering it useless and situating it firmly on the side of the psychoanalyst or psychiatrist. Lacan’s situation of knowledge on the side of the hysteric challenges such historical operation, and gives back

to the hysteric what the master's discourse aimed to do away with—the knowledge, which we do not know because it is located in the unconscious, and which the hysteric via her/his symptom expresses.

The knowledge of the unconscious that emerges in the moment of the limit or the obstacle of the master's discourse refers to the "double function of the signifier" where we find the two moments of the unconscious. In the first moment, the unconscious emerges in the moment of subjection to a closed signifier, as all those elements the master's discourse denies. In this first moment we are confronted with a subordinated subject. In the second moment, the unconscious emerges in the "the obstacle, the limit" of the master's discourse, the moment of the Lacanian real. In this second moment, the master's discourse breaks down, and the hysteric as political subject with the capacity to rebel emerges.<sup>115</sup>

Insofar as the hysteric symptom expresses what should remain repressed—knowledge in the service of truth, it threatens to expose the falsehood of the master's discourse. As Lacan puts it, "what we can see in our own time—the law is being called into question as a symptom."<sup>116</sup> Dora's physical symptoms expressed the male violence she was subjected to, and the repressed homosexual desire for another woman (Frau K.) and those "boyish" aspects of her femininity she had to repress to become a woman. As such, her symptoms exposed and challenged the law of bourgeois femininity and heterosexuality established by the master's discourse.

As Lacan puts it, "the more your quest is located on the side of truth, the more you uphold the power of the impossibles...The subject supposed to know scandalizes, when I am simply approaching the truth."<sup>117</sup> Freud's master's discourse on hysteria was located on the side of the master's truth insofar as he aimed to uphold the power of an impossible "whole" scientific discourse. Dora, however, scandalized the truth of the master, which aimed to discipline her into the norm of bourgeois, heterosexual femininity. Not only did she share a bed with another woman (Frau K.) whom she desired sexually, she also showed no intention to marry, which was expected for a bourgeois girl, and instead was absorbed by her work.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, she scandalized because she refused to accept the "norm" of the bourgeois woman, who accepts male sexual violence against her.

As Lacan points out, "the subject himself, the hysteric, is alienated from the master signifier as he whom this signifier divides—'he,' in the masculine, represents the subject—he who refuses to make himself its body."<sup>119</sup> Dora, the female subject, also refused to make herself the master's (Herr K's) body. Dora refused to submit herself to the second sexual attack of Herr K. and "did not let him finish what he had to say, she gave him a slap in the face and hurried away."<sup>120</sup> Dora also refused to make herself the body of the discourse on the norm of bourgeois,

heterosexual femininity. Instead of keeping quiet about the sexual attack of Herr K., she did *not* keep quiet and told her parents about his attempted second sexual attack.

Indeed, Dora demanded that her family break off relations with the K.s. Furthermore, throughout the analysis she expressed her disapproval and anger at her father's joining Herr K.'s cover-up scheme in order not to endanger his love affair with Frau K. Also, after Dora broke off analysis, in a last visit to the K.'s, she "drew an admission of the scene by the lake which he (Herr K.) had disputed, and brought the news of her vindication home to her father. Since then she had not resumed relations with the family."<sup>121</sup> Dora did not rest until the falsehood of the master's discourse was exposed as false.

Freud explains that the hysteric symptom only expresses itself when we encounter "somatic compliance," which means that the unconscious mental process will only appear as a symptom when it finds a physical outlet. However, Lacan points out that "the hysteric is not a slave" of the master and as such she is not complying with anybody. Rather, "she, in her own way, goes on a kind of strike. She doesn't give up her knowledge. She unmasks, however, the master's function, with which she remains united, by emphasizing what there is of the master in what is the One with a capital 'O.'"<sup>122</sup>

Certainly, Dora did not give up her knowledge that stood in the service of truth—that she was repeatedly sexually attacked by Herr K. Her discourse unmasked the master's function in Freud's psychoanalytic discourse on hysteria, the discourse of the One, which contributed, much like Herr K.'s and her father's discourse, to cover the truth of sexual violence against women that was rampant in bourgeois households. As Freud characterizes her, Dora had "developed into a mature young woman of very independent judgment, who had grown accustomed to laugh at the efforts of doctors, and in the end renounce their help entirely."<sup>123</sup>

Dora certainly laughed at Freud's repeated assertion that her "no" to Herr K.'s sexual attack signified the desired "yes," that she was supposedly jealous of the governess who was raped by Herr K., and that she summoned up an infantile love for her father to keep her love for Herr K. repressed. Dora, throughout the three months of analysis, responded to Freud's interpretations of the incident "with a most emphatic negative."<sup>124</sup> Her unconditional "no" to Herr K.'s sexual attacks and her unconditional "no" to Freud's interpretations of the incident unmasked that Freud's discourse on psychoanalysis returned to the master's discourse.

Attempts to fully articulate hysteric discourses are "impossible (which) is precisely what gives us the risk, the barely glimpsed opportunity, that their real, if I can put it like this, breaks out."<sup>125</sup> Being situated in the moment of limit, in the moment of the real, the hysteric

(Dora) allowed the real of their (Freud's and Lacan's) discourses on hysteria to break out. Such "breaking out" exposed the impossibility of fully articulating what hysteria is all about, and showed that any attempts to know it all leads to a scenario where psychoanalytic discourses return to the master's discourse.

The discourse of the hysteric also unmasked that Freud was likely motivated to avoid being shown to be wrong, insofar as he located knowledge on his side, and (mis-) took himself to be the generator of knowledge and her merely the subject to be studied. Dora exposed not only the castrated status of her father, but also Freud's status as the "castrated master." As Freud himself puts it, Dora's breaking off analysis after only three months and rejecting any of his interpretations was a "great defect"<sup>126</sup> and demonstrated "the helplessness and incapacity of the physician."<sup>127</sup> However, in an attempt to regain his status as the master, Freud quickly announced that Dora broke off analysis to take revenge on him, as she had taken "revenge on him (Herr K.), and deserted me as she believed herself to have been deceived and deserted by him."<sup>128</sup> At the end it is all a heterosexual love story, this time between the hysteric and the castrated psychoanalyst, and the homosexual love between Dora and Frau K. is fully suppressed. Such "love story" exposes something else: behind the master's discourse we find anxiety, here the anxiety that the scientist and the knowledge he produces remains with holes.<sup>129</sup>

Dora not only rejected the Freud's master's discourse on hysteria (his normalizing interpretations), but also broke off the analysis after three months, which Freud laments throughout the book. As he puts it, because "the treatment was not carried through to its appointed end, but was broken off at the patient's own wish when it has reached a certain point," he was left with an incomplete "fragment of an analysis."<sup>130</sup> The hysteric's discourse exposed the impossibility of Freud's discourse on hysteria, which forestalls any wholeness, and leaves the master, who desires to know it all merely a fragment. Being left with a fragment generates a certain anxiety that makes Freud want to obtain impossible whole knowledge, and as a result the psychoanalyst's discourse returns to the master's discourse. However, what the master does not know and the hysteric knows, is that it is in this fragment, in the hole of the w/hole, where knowledge in the service of truth reveals itself.

## 5. The Collective Rebellion of Hysterics

The points, knots, or focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a definite way, inflaming certain points of the body, certain moments in life, certain types of behavior.<sup>131</sup>

In contemporary literature we encounter a debate on the status of the subject in Foucault's work. Thinkers on the one side suggest that Foucault's idea of the subject as emerging in the moment of subjection to discourse, implies that he aimed to get rid of the subject altogether, which does not allow us to theorize transformative agency.<sup>132</sup> Thinkers on the other side, such as Amy Allen (2008), suggest "that the subject is the general theme of his (Foucault's) research."<sup>133</sup> Foucault certainly does not give up on the subject, and the subject remains the general theme in his work. However, because we do not find in Foucault's work a theoretical concept akin to the Lacanian real, it remains difficult within his theoretical framework to envision political subjectivity. The subject we encounter in Foucault's theoretical framework, who emerges in the moment of subjection to discourse, seems to be the subjected subject and not the political subject who not only resists, but transforms (psychiatric) power.

In *Security, Territory, Population* (1978), Foucault foregrounds that with the "art of conducting," a new form of power emerged that implied a "mode of individualization by subjection (*assujettissement*)," with the chief aim of exploiting subjects."<sup>134</sup> Although Foucault points out the ways in which power based upon conduct led to specific forms of resistances, which he calls "counter-conduct,"<sup>135</sup> he makes clear that counter-conduct was *not* a revolution that led to a radical transformation of society. Rather, its chief aim was to be conducted differently by other leaders towards other objectives. As such, in its essence counter-conduct merely "maintains or guarantees exploitation."<sup>136</sup>

In *Psychiatric Power* Foucault further suggests that disciplinary power comes up "against those who cannot be classified, those who escape supervision, those who cannot enter the system of distribution, in short, the residual, the irreducible, the unclassifiable, the inassimilable. This will be the stumbling block in the physics of disciplinary power."<sup>137</sup> For example, those school pupils who cannot be disciplined by schools expose the limit of school discipline, and "delinquents" are the "inassimilable, irreducible group" in relation to police discipline.<sup>138</sup> However, at the same time Foucault introduces those "stumbling blocks" to disciplinary power, he also asserts that for such appearances supplementary disciplinary or "recovery systems" are introduced – such as a school for the "feeble-minded," or the "underworld" as a disciplinary system for those who escape police discipline.

Insofar as recovery systems are engaged in the never-ending work of reestablishing the rule, rebellion, and with that, socio-political change, do not appear. The Foucauldian ideas of "stumbling block" and "counter-conduct, insofar as they do not allow us to envision rebellion, are different from the Lacanian real, which refers to "the impossible. Not in the name of a simple obstacle we hit our heads up against, but in the name of the logical obstacle of what, in the symbolic,

declares itself to be impossible. This is where the real emerges from."<sup>139</sup> In this "logical obstacle" in the symbolic order, the hysteric emerges as a political subject who exposes the impossibility of the master's discourse and successfully rebels against disciplinary power.

However, there is something else in Foucault which promises rebellion. He asserts that the "residue of all the disciplines, those who are inassimilable to all of a society's educational, military, and police disciplines" are the mentally ill.<sup>140</sup> In other words the mentally ill are for Foucault inassimilable to modern society's disciplinary apparatus. They are not a "simple obstacle we hit our heads up against," but the "logical obstacle" Lacan points at with the moment of the real in the physics of disciplinary power that refuses to be assimilated by any "recovery systems."

Here, in a striking similarity to Lacan, Foucault asserts that the subject that not only resists but transforms modern disciplinary power, is the *hysteric* subject. Like Lacan, who calls the hysteric's discourse the "underside" of the psychoanalytic (master's) discourse, Foucault calls the hysteric "the militant underside of psychiatric power," who not only resisted but rebelled and with that radically transformed psychiatric power.

He introduces the hysteric subject as a political subject in relation to discipline by psychiatric power, and what has entered psychiatric literature as the "problem of simulation." Simulation, according to Foucault, did not simply mean that the hysteric deceived the doctor with an illness or symptom. Rather, as he puts it, "the way hysteria simulates hysteria, the way in which a true symptom is a certain way of lying and the way in which a false symptom is a way of being truly ill. All this constituted the insoluble problem, *the limit*, and ultimately, the failure of nineteenth century psychiatry that brought about a number of sudden developments."<sup>141</sup>

Like Lacan, Foucault situates the hysteric at the moment of the limit in the psychiatric discourse on hysteria, which brought down psychiatric power by reintroducing the question of truth that the psychiatrist had firmly located on her side. To further explain, Foucault himself simulated a discussion between the psychiatrist and the hysteric. "Psychiatry said more or less: I will not pose the problem of truth with you who are mad, because I possess the truth myself in terms of my knowledge, on the basis of my categories, and if I have a power in relation to you, the mad person, it is because I possess this truth."<sup>142</sup> Psychiatry that had knowledge and truth firmly established on its side via scientific classifications, did not want to pose the problem of truth with the hysteric, because it is the location of truth on the master's side (the psychiatrist) that secures the power over the servant (the hysteric).

However, Foucault continues,



[A]t this point madness replied: If you claim to possess the truth once and for all in terms of already fully constituted knowledge, well, for my part, I will install falsehood in myself. And so, when you handle my symptoms, when you are dealing with what you call illness, you will find yourself caught in a trap, for at the heart of my symptoms there will be this small kernel of night, of falsehood, through which I will confront you with the question of truth."<sup>143</sup>

Foucault explains that the hysteric's simulation of hysteric symptoms brought back the question of truth, insofar as it exposes the falseness at the heart of the psychiatric classifications, whose core aim was not to cure patients but to put them to work.

Simulation led to the crisis of psychiatry around 1880, when the psychiatrist Charcot found out that all the symptoms he was studying were a result of his patients' simulation. As Foucault points out, the "untruthfulness of simulation, madness simulating madness, was the anti-power of the mad confronted with psychiatric power."<sup>144</sup> Instead of considering hysteria as the great illness of the nineteenth century that had disappeared, for Foucault it was nothing more than "the process by which the patients tried to evade psychiatric power; it was a phenomenon of struggle, and not a pathological phenomenon."<sup>145</sup>

Both thinkers, Foucault and Lacan, situate the hysteric at the limit of the master's psychiatric discourse that exposed its falsehood, and that the master's discourse on hysteria is not all-powerful. However, there is also a central difference. Foucault suggests that the hysteric in her/his "untruthfulness of simulation" knowingly lies about her/his hysteric symptoms, which undermines psychiatric power. Lacan, in contrast to Foucault, thinks that hysteric symptoms expose the knowledge in the service of truth that has been repressed as a result of master's discourse, and there is a way of doing psychoanalysis via the "hysterization of discourse," that helps bring unconscious knowledge to light. Once this knowledge comes to light, it threatens the master's discourse that caused the repression in the first place.

One explanation for that difference is that Foucault works with a conceptualization of simulation that is derived from every-day usage, rather than psychoanalytic insight, which does not allow him to see the unconscious at work in simulation. Simulation in hysteria, as Freud explains in "General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks", points at the ways in which the symptom can be aimed at a certain person, and the symptom may be put off or disappear until this person is within reach, which "gives an impression of conscious simulation," although unconscious processes are at play.<sup>146</sup>

As an example, the girl who found out that her parents lavish their care onto her and not her siblings when she produces an illness, will

also produce an illness when she is an adult woman who finds herself stuck with an exploitative and inconsiderate husband, as a means to make him care for her.<sup>147</sup> The symptom may vanish “at a single blow, apparently of its own accord, but really because it has been deprived of its most powerful motive,” such as when the situation has been changed by an external event, when a period of time has elapsed, or consideration for some person has vanished.<sup>148</sup>

One reason why Foucault did not operate with a notion of the unconscious in his reading of the hysteric’s symptom is that he did not think that psychoanalysis can function as an “underside” of psychiatric power. Nonetheless, Foucault’s idea of genealogy as an “insurrection of subjugated knowledges,” points at some idea of the unconscious.<sup>149</sup> He characterizes such subjugated knowledges as “anti-sciences” that have been disqualified as inadequate by scientific knowledge as “located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.”<sup>150</sup> Insofar as the insurrection of hysterics was for Foucault the anti-power of the mad that confronted and brought down psychiatric power, the hysteric’s knowledge refers to the knowledge “beneath” or at the underside of the psychiatric sciences that has been pushed into the unconscious once the psychiatrist had established truth firmly on her side, and which, once it has come to light, radically transforms psychiatric power.

There is another explanation for the difference between Foucault and Lacan. Foucault points out that “I think we can say that the psychiatrist, as he will function in the space of asylum discipline, will no longer be the individual who considers what the mad person says from the standpoint of truth.”<sup>151</sup> That the psychiatrist in the space of the asylum discipline will no longer consider the hysteric from the standpoint of truth is also connected to the specific power dynamics between the psychiatrist and his patient in the psychiatric institution. As Asti Hustvedt (2011), points out Charcot’s hysterics were generally women from the working classes, who were diagnosed as being “sick”, and who faced “healthy” male doctors from the bourgeoisie.<sup>152</sup> However, similar to Foucault, Hustvedt points out that these women were not passive victims of male, bourgeois power, but agents of their own diagnosis and cure. These women took on a new identity as “ideal hysterics” (Foucault’s “knowing lies”), which they learned from sketches of ideal types of hysterical attacks that were on display everywhere in the asylum, and from doctors’ reactions.<sup>153</sup>

This new identity helped these women not only to avoid further punishment (such as being transferred to the wards where they faced harsher working and living conditions), but also allowed them to have a “career” in the asylum which was foreclosed to them outside the hospital, and won them the never-before-had attention of doctors, medical students, staff and the public.<sup>154</sup> In such classed and gendered power

dynamics, where truth is firmly established on the side of the psychiatrist, simulation of symptoms was perhaps the only way for these women to have agency.

While Dora was also confronted with the gendered power dynamics between herself and Freud, she herself was from the bourgeoisie and educated, which mitigated some of the power dynamics. Also, she encountered Freud not in the space of the asylum, but *outside* of it, where truth is perhaps not as firmly established on the side of the psychiatrist. Freud, to a certain extent, considered Dora from the standpoint of truth, insofar as he acknowledged some of her own insights into her symptoms and repeatedly referred to her superior intelligence. Although in the end he dismissed her insights in order to remain the master of knowledge, his psychoanalytic treatment initiated her hysteric's discourse, which allowed Dora to openly rebel against Freud's disciplinary discourse on hysteria and quit analysis when she had enough of his false interpretations.

However, the institutional setting of the asylum, where truth is firmly established on the side of the psychiatrist, seems to foreclose the possibility of the psychoanalyst bringing the hysteric's knowledge to light in the service of truth. Furthermore, hysterics in the space of the asylum could not just quit the asylum's power over them. Their conscious simulation of hysteric symptoms was perhaps the chief (and only) means by which they could make their lives under such power more bearable, which, however, in the end radically challenged psychiatric power when it was revealed that they were just faking hysteric symptoms.

However, the conscious simulation of hysteric symptoms in the space of the asylum as outlined by Foucault is not necessarily contrary to an understanding of hysteric symptoms as an unconscious expression of disciplinary power, as we find it outlined in Lacan, but rather points at two different localities where different strategies are needed to bring down power.<sup>155</sup> Furthermore, radical transformation of (psychiatric) power implies a *potential* two-step process, which unsettles an easy unconscious/conscious and inside/outside psychiatry binary. First, one needs to bring unconscious knowledge via the "hysterization of discourse" to light; but then it takes another, second step to use that knowledge to challenge power.

The collective simulation of the ideal hysteric in the space of the asylum does not exclude the presence of hysteric symptoms that speak an unconscious truth, which, in changed circumstances—as with the admission of psychoanalysts that locate truth on the side of the patient—allow the unconscious knowledge to appear that speaks the truth about classed and gendered power in the asylum. Such knowledge in the service of truth can then be used, perhaps with the assis-

tance of symptoms as “knowing lies,” to bring down psychiatric power in the asylum.

There remains another central difference between Foucault and Lacan. Lacan seems to suggest that it is the individual hysteric, or the one in analysis, who goes through the hystericization of discourse that incites the psychoanalytic act. Dora is an example of an individual woman who rebelled against psychiatric power that aimed to discipline her into the norm of female, heterosexual bourgeois subjectivity. However, Foucault makes clear that the anti-power of madness that brought down psychiatric power was the result of collective agency.

As Foucault points out, it is the personnel (wardens, asylum doctors and medical subordinates) surrounding the hysteric “who, together with the patients, with greater or lesser degree of complicity, constructed this world of simulation as resistance to psychiatric power.”<sup>156</sup> They provided Charcot, who himself never examined hysterics, with observations often falsified by simulation. As such, simulation implied a collective character, which was ultimately a “weapon in the struggle with psychiatric power.”<sup>157</sup> Thus, in the space of the asylum, the bringing down of psychiatric power is the result of a collective effort, which led to a “great simulator’s insurrection” that “spread throughout the asylum world in the nineteenth century, which bogged down psychiatrists.”<sup>158</sup>

Again, such difference does not necessarily make Lacan incompatible with Foucault. Rather, it is the result of the specific location of the hysteric. Whereas for Dora, who was located outside the psychiatric institution, rebellion on an individual level was enough to challenge the power of the individual psychiatrist, for hysteric subjects located within the psychiatric institution, collective rebellion seems to be central to transforming psychiatric power. However, it is both individual and collective agency that is needed to not only resist but radically transform (psychiatric) power.

To conclude, both Lacan and Foucault shed light on the ways in which knowledge, truth and discourse is linked to power, and both thinkers demonstrate how the scientific discourse on hysteria aimed to discipline woman into the norm of the female bourgeois subject. Furthermore, both thinkers, albeit in somewhat different ways, show us that we must turn our attention to the hysteric subject, insofar as s/he points at the moment of the limit in psychiatric power, which is when the hysteric as a political subject who not only resists but radically transforms power emerges. Lacan outlines the ways in which hysteric symptoms betray the effects of modern disciplinary power, and shows us how the hysteric’s discourse brings back knowledge in the service of truth that has been repressed into the unconscious, and, once it is made conscious, allows us to not only contest but rebel

against disciplinary power. Foucault adds to this observation that in the psychiatric institution only a conscious lying about hysteric symptoms and a collective effort makes it possible rebel against the master signifier of hysteria that continues to plague women today. A psychoanalyst must be careful in helping to assist the hysteric discourse, for at times Freud, and even Lacan, reinforced the master's discourse in their treatment of the hysteric.

## Notes

1. When I use the term "rebellion" I mean more than the (Foucauldian) term "resistance." Whereas resistance to power does not necessarily imply to radically transform power structures, rebellion aims for and achieves such radical transformation of power.
2. Foucault rarely mentions psychoanalytic thought, and when he does it is usually in a rather fleeting way and mostly dismissive as nothing else but another power-knowledge regime that produces subjects as subjected beings. Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978), 5, 119.
3. See for example, See Lynne Huffer, *Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 158; Lois McNay, "Subject, Psyche and Agency: The Work of Judith Butler," *Theory, Culture and Society* 16 (1999), 175–193.
4. See for example Nancy Fraser, "Against Symbolicism: The Uses and Abuses of Lacanianism for Feminist Politics," in Nancy Fraser, ed., *Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis* (New York/London: Verso, 2013); Vicky Kirby, *Judith Butler: Live Theory* (London/New York: Continuum, 2006); and Judith Butler, *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
5. See for example Joel Whitebook, *Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory* (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1995).
6. Sigmund Freud, *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (New York, NY: Touchstone Books, 1977).
7. Paul Verhaeghe, *Does the Woman Exist? From Freud's Hysteric to Lacan's Feminine* (New York: Other Press, 1999); Patrick Mahony, "Freud's unadored and unadorable: A case history and interminable," *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, 2005, Vol. 25, Issue 1, 27–44; Serge Cottet, *Freud and the Desire of the Psychoanalyst* (London, UK: Hogarth Press, 2012); Judy Gammelgaard, "Why Dora Left : Freud and the Master Discourse" , *Studies in Gender & Sexuality*, 2017, Vol. 18, Issue 3, 201–211.
8. Furthermore, while some thinkers hinted at the rebellious moment in hysteria, such as Jan Goldstein, who provides us with a microhistorical account of the mid-1820s case of the "hysteric" Nanette Leroux from a Foucauldian perspective, and she sees in this case a "postrevolutionary female restlessness and malcontent" (73), this remains a moment and is not at the center of her analyses. Jan Goldstein, *Hysteria Complicated by Ecstasy: The Case of Nannette Leroux* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

9. The psychoanalytic act unfolds in the moment of the real, or what I call the limit in the master's discourse.
10. When Lacan invokes the idea of the "psychoanalytic act" for the first time, he also starts elaborating on the hysterics discourse. See Jacques Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Book XVII*, ed. J.A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg (New York/London: Norton & Company, 2007), 32.
11. Colette Soler, *What Lacan Said about Women: A Psychoanalytic Study*, trans. J. Holland (New York: Other Press, 2006); Macario Giraldo, "Grant Me the Knowledge of What I Want Because All I Know Is That I Want: A Lacanian View of Hysteria," *Psychoanalytic Inquiry*, Feb/Mar 2017, Vol. 37 Issue 2, 95–101.
12. Foucault, *History of Sexuality I*, 100.
13. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & other writings 1972–1977*, trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 93.
14. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 131.
15. Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power* (New York: Picador, 2006), 129.
16. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 133.
17. Ibid., 128.
18. F Ibid., 127.
19. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 105.
20. Ibid., 79.
21. Ibid., 22.
22. Ibid., 22.
23. Ibid., 23.
24. Ibid., 32.
25. Ibid., 149.
26. Ibid., 32.
27. Ibid., 79.
28. Ibid., 23.
29. Ibid., 80.
30. Ibid., 73.
31. Sigmund Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905)", in *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, ed. P. Rieff, (New York: Touchstone Books, 1997), 1–112, 6.
32. Ibid., 2.
33. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 189.
34. Ibid., 191.
35. Ibid., 191.
36. Mark Micale, *Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008)
37. Micale, *Hysterical Men*, 242.
38. M Ibid., 259.

39. Jason David Myres reads the emergence of the idea of “post-truth” as a symptom of a masculinized discourse on hysteria, which has more to do with an anxiety regarding the desire for truth than its presence or absence in public discourse. See “Post-truth as Symptom: The Emergence of a Masculine Hysteria,” Jason David Myres, *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 2018, Volume 51, Number 4, 392–415.
40. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 153.
41. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 57.
42. *Ibid.*, 40.
43. *Ibid.*, 56.
44. *Ibid.*, 55.
45. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 21.
46. Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis: Book XI*, ed. J.-A. Miller and trans. A. Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 207.
47. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 13.
48. Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*, 207.
49. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality I*, 104.
50. *Ibid.*, 104.
51. Eugene Holland, “On Some Implications of Schizoanalysis”, *Strategies*, 2002, Vol. 15, No. 1, 27–40, 34.
52. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality I*, 158.
53. Sigmund Freud, “General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks (1909),” in *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, 123–124.
54. Freud, “Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality (1908),” in *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, 113–119, 118.
55. Foucault, *History of Sexuality I*, 101.
56. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 23.
57. *Ibid.*, 21.
58. *Ibid.*, 39.
59. *Ibid.*, 43.
60. *Ibid.*, 43.
61. *Ibid.*, 52.
62. *Ibid.*, 54.
63. *Ibid.*, “”, 44.
64. *Ibid.*, 53.
65. For example, Jean-Michel Rabate (2013), suggests that what Dora was “looking for in Mrs. K was less an object of same-sex desire than an insight into how a woman could become an object of desire.” At the end it is not the female subject’s desire for the woman, but how the woman can make herself an object of desire for man that is at stake. Jean-Michel Rabate, “Lacan’s Dora against Levi-Strauss”, *Yale French Studies*, Rethinking Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009), 2013, No. 123, 129–144, 139.

66. Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria", 51. A justification which men continue to use until today to justify "date rapes."
67. Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria", 18.
68. Freud, "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality", 117.
69. Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria", 20.
70. Freud, "Hysterical Phantasies and Their Relation to Bisexuality", 116.
71. Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria", 87.
72. Moreover, Freud suggests that Dora identified with the governess who also did not keep quiet and had told her (the governess's) parents about the incident.
73. Freud, "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria", 97.
74. *Ibid.*, 98.
75. *Ibid.*, 51.
76. *Ibid.*, 12.
77. Jacques Lacan, *Le séminaire IV: La relation d'objet* (Paris: Seiol, 1994). Cited in Jean-Michel Rabaté, "Lacan's Dora against Levi-Strauss", 140.
78. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 204, 74.
79. *Ibid.*, 204, and 101.
80. *Ibid.*, 204.
81. *Ibid.*, 125.
82. Foucault, *History of Sexuality I*, 95.
83. Russell Grigg "Translator's Note", 9-10, in Jacques Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis: Book XVII*, ed. J.A. Miller, trans. R. Grigg (New York/London: Norton & Company, 2007), 9.
84. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 198.
85. *Ibid.*, 33.
86. *Ibid.*, 30.
87. *Ibid.*, 77.
88. *Ibid.*, 70.
89. *Ibid.*, 31.
90. *Ibid.*, 30.
91. *Ibid.*, 30.
92. *Ibid.*, 107.
93. Freud explains that transferences are fantasies that are aroused and made conscious during analysis, and that "replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it in another way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment." Freud, *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, 106.
94. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 52.
95. *Ibid.*, 34-35.
96. *Ibid.*, 53.



97. *Ibid.*, 113.
98. *Ibid.*, 53.
99. *Ibid.*, 51.
100. Gammelgaard, "Why Dora Left", 202.
101. *Ibid.*, 206.
102. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 99.
103. *Ibid.*, 33.
104. *Ibid.*, 34.
105. *Ibid.*, 34.
106. Jacques Lacan, *On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Book XX: Encore! 1972–1973*, Bruce Fink (trans.) and Jacques-Alain Miller (ed.) (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 28.
107. However, as Harris Raptis points out, Lacan already gave up such a conception in 1960, and it was nowhere in sight in his reading of the Dora case. Harris Raptis, "From the Freudian Oedipus to the Lacanian Phallus and Beyond: The Object a as a Desiring Machine," in *Schizoanalysis and Ecosophy: Reading Deleuze and Guattari*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, (London, Bloomsbury, 2018), 163–178.
108. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* trans. R.Hurley, M. Seem, and H. R. Lane (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 363.
109. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 52–3.
110. *Ibid.*, 83, 309.
111. Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy, Texts and Interviews 1972–1977*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. D. L. Sweet, J. Becker, and T. Adkins (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 79 & 81.
112. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 30.
113. In an earlier study on hysteria, Monique David-Menard similarly reads the hysteric symptom as embodying an aspect that eludes symbolic representation and is "plugged into the real" (180). However, there is also an important difference. David-Menard suggests that the hysterical symptom repeats or continues a gesture associated with a traumatic event in which some part of the subject's body was foreclosed from the representational forms that the subject used to organize the scene and give it meaning. In short, for her "the hysteric has no body, owing to a lack, in her history, of symbolization of the body" (103). In contrast, my reading suggests that the limit of the master's discourse, which aims to discipline the hysteric's body by construing it as a lack, is exposed by the hysteric's unconscious knowledge, which allows her to assume a "real" body. Monique David-Ménard, *Hysteria from Freud to Lacan: Body and Language in Psychoanalysis*, trans. Catherine Porter, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
114. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 23.
115. Jacques Lacan *Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–1960*, trans. D. Porter (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1986), 54.
116. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 43.

117. Ibid., 187.
118. Freud reads this again as a “revenge” for being deserted by Herr K. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 110.
119. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 94.
120. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 39.
121. Ibid., 11.
122. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 94.
123. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 16.
124. Ibid., 51.
125. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 173.
126. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 108.
127. Ibid., 110.
128. Ibid., “”, 109.
129. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 144.
130. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 6.
131. Foucault, *History of Sexuality I*, 140
132. See for example: Linda Alcoff, “Feminist Politics and Foucault: The Limits to a Collaboration,” in *Crisis in Continental Philosophy*, eds. Arlene Daller and Charles Scott (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990), 76.
133. Amy Allen *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 23.
134. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population* (New York: Picador, 2007), 184–185.
135. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 209.
136. Ibid., 196.
137. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 53.
138. Ibid., 53–54.
139. Lacan, *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, 123.
140. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 53–54.
141. Ibid., 135, emphasis mine.
142. Ibid., 136.
143. Ibid., 136.
144. Ibid., 136.
145. Ibid., 137.
146. Freud, “General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks (1909),” 122.
147. Freud, “Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria”, 37.
148. Ibid., “”, 38.
149. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 81.

150. *Ibid.*, 81–82.

151. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 132.

152. Asti Hustvedt, *Medical Muses: Hysteria in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2011), 46.

153. Hustvedt, *Medical Muses*, 49.

154. *Ibid.*, 37.

155. That is, Foucault's observations of the Charcot case, such as hysteria being merely simulation, are about resisting oppression in the form of psychiatric power within the asylum.

156. Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 137.

157. *Ibid.*, 136.

158. *Ibid.*, 138.