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Neither a person – neither an imperson.
Towards the nonduality of Self

Robert Lehmann

If you want to speak about non-dual Self, you must start with the obvious: You cannot do it. If you try to speak about it, you quickly come to the realization that you can't. You cannot speak *about* it – you can speak *from* it, though.

And this simple recognition addresses, as we know, a deep methodical problem for every non-dual philosophy – it is methodical because it concerns the path that leads towards it. But it is not, as it is sometimes stated, an empirical problem. It is not a problem of a somewhat mystical or religious experience.

The Problem is not that certain individuals may have had an indescribable experience of nondual self, and others may not – that is impossible. Nobody ever had an experience *of* non-dual self. For the very same reason, you cannot speak about it.

Self is no experience at all – at least if we understand an experience as something that occurs in the traditional structure of *someone* experiencing *something*. At the core of every non-dual philosophy lies a deep skepticism towards this dualistic approach and the unavoidable emphasis of an objectivation of Self.

0. The *personal* and the *impersonal*

After all, the contemporary as well as the traditional interest in a non-dual philosophy seem to stem from a suspicion towards the consequences of a philosophy that fluctuates between two hardened, if not to say dogmatized positions, namely an objective and a subjective approach to the World.

Whereas subjectivism focuses on the engaged Self and its capacities to grasp and alter the world around it, objectivism is concerned with a highly disengaged viewpoint. According to the established criticism subjectivism will lead into a kind of idealistic monism, objectivism into a naturalistic dualism. Both approaches leave the Self enclosed. Dualism simply creates an unbridgeable gap between the Self and the World, Monism is bound to reduce the World to a purely subjective or even solipsistic reality.

Now, looking more closely this is not just a problem that occurs in

the realm of academic philosophical reflection. We do not only encounter the tension between a dualistic and a monistic intuition on the field of ontological speculation.

In a pre-theoretical sense, a structural interdependence between a monistic and a dualistic tendency seems to guide our everyday experience as well: On the one hand, we cannot help, but experience a material World as outside of ourselves, whereas our thoughts, emotions and so forth belong to the so-called inner realm. But this natural dualistic inclination is at the same time crossed by a deep rooted but rarely fully conscious conviction, the conviction: *that I am the center of the universe*. Nothing exists without me being there witnessing its existence.

As soon as you question this conviction with the common sense, that you're not at all the center of the Universe but a tiny part among others *in* it, you are already missing the simplicity of this egocentric-everyday monism.

The structural tension between these two figures of an *egocentric monism* and a *mundane dualism* prepares the stage for the drama that we tend to call a Person. Our personal mode of orientation is created around the silent conviction, that *everything happens to me*. Yet, at the same time, the dualistic structure of experience, the objectivation of Self and the thing experienced evoke an atmosphere in which nothing seems more evident, than the existence of an outside world opposed to the private room of my memories, feelings, thoughts, and so on.

If we acknowledge this suspenseful setup of the personal ego, its dramatic nature depending on the tendencies of a naïve dualism on the one hand and an egoc monism on the other, we can see that this setup simultaneously creates at the premise for its own transcendence:

On their own, both structural elements tend to transcend the personal standpoint, they together make possible.

Whereas the dualistic and the monistic tendencies in their paradoxical tension, constitute the stage for a person's engagement on their own, they enable two approaches, that deny, if not erase the personal sphere of human existence. Hence, we are inclined to call to call them impersonal forms of orientation.

The tendency of the naïve dualism and its materialistic bias is deeply connected to the impersonal understanding of the universe as a live-and-meaningless ensemble of material, governed by indifferent natural laws. The dualistic tendency shares in this sense a road with the development of the scientific worldview.

The tendency of the egoc monism and its idealistic bias has a fun-

damental connection to the religious Idea of an *unio mystica* in which the personal *principium individuationis* is dissolved into an impersonal Oneness, which is nearer, closer, more intimate than the self itself. The monistic tendency finds its purest expression in the vulgar interpretations of negative theologies in Europe and the Advaita-Traditions in India.

If the tension between the dualistic and the monistic tendency establishes the stage for the person, and if these tendencies, on their own, strive towards impersonality, then the structure of the person by nature embodies its own abolition.

But now, since the idea of a non-dual Self is famously connected to the idea of transcending one's own personal ego, does one of these impersonal paths lead then to an understanding of non-dual self?

Considerable doubt is in order.

Both paths can be defined as the negation of what their original tendencies make possible. In their radical form, both impersonal tendencies show their dependence on the personal consciousness by having to negate it. Thus, creating behind their back a new dualism of personality and impersonality.

Today I want to talk about why it is nevertheless crucial to understand the relationship between personal and impersonal modes of being when it comes to a non-dual philosophy, that is not just concerned with an ontological, but with an existential challenge as well.

In the following I would like to discuss two approaches of non-dual philosophy, in which this existential point and at the same time the methodical difficulties, it evokes, present themselves: The Advaita Vedānta of Adi Śaṅkara and the Philosophy of Keiji Nishitani.

1. Two Maps

But before I'll go into the philosophical architecture of non-dual philosophy let me start with a methodological remark by briefly revisiting a primal scene of western philosophy:

In Plato's dialogue, which bears his name, Menon confronts Socrates - not without pride - with the famous eristic proposition that declares the search for knowledge to be a quite futile endeavor:

Man cannot seek what he does not know, for he then does not know what he must seek; but at the same time man cannot, after all, seek what he knows, for any search would then be superfluous.¹⁾

Socrates famously rejected this sophistical figure because it could

only appeal to indolent and soft-hearted people who saw it as permission for philosophical idleness. Instead, he introduces the doctrine of *anamnesis*.

For today I don't want to talk about the Socratic solution though, not about the optimistic epistemology it might imply, nor about an incorporeal and therefore immortal soul.

I am just concerned with the tension of Menon's dilemma. This tension obviously arises not just from the concept of knowledge, but likewise from the idea of seeking. One of the requirements for the tension, Menon's sentence confronts us with, is the very notion of seeking. – the tenseness towards a goal.

And it is not too much of a stretch if we may imagine this search as a treasure hunt. More or less conscious of what we seem to lack, we come into possession of a map. Most likely it is an old, crumpled, yellowed parchment.

On this map is a dotted line that shows the way from a familiar spot through tolls and dangers to a place marked with an X – if only because it is so far away. If you manage to identify the dotted line with an actual path ahead of yourself and are brave enough to start walking and face the dangers, eventually you may come to the spot marked with an X – where you will start digging.

This is a picture, that is as familiar as it is comforting, because it appeals to the hero in us. And especially in a modern Western culture whose motto may well be *per aspera ad astra*, the heroic motivation of the search, is as important as the search itself.

But now I will invite you to imagine a somewhat different treasure map. This map may be old and weathered as well, but it is also quite confusing. You will find a dotted line on it, that starts from a familiar spot, shows a way through tolls and dangers, and is even likely to cross into the unmarked areas of the map – *here be dragons*. What makes this map confusing, though, is, that it eventually leads to a place marked not with an X, but with an I – or to be more precise – to a spot marked with an I am – and so it seems, that it leads right back to the most familiar place, where you started your journey.

As an image for a philosophical search such a map seems to be worse than the first one. For the simple reason that it renders philosophical endeavors *both* futile *and* superfluous. In order to understand the journey towards the nonduality of Self this second map may come in handy, though. Because it enables us to see the difficulty, such a philosophy encounters. A problem that I like to call the *necessary redundancy of*

seeking.

What makes this journey to self-realization so seemingly trivial is in part the aforementioned tension. If we look at this map from the standpoint of personality the tendency of naïve dualism pulls us towards the journey, and the egocentric monism has already won the race. But the I of egocentric monism is not the I am the map is leading to and yet in a sense it is not something else.

This problem deeply relates to another: The problem of *winning through losing.*

The insight to be gained in the context of a non-dual philosophy is not a propositional augmentation but a diminishing of obstacles, that must lead to a fundamental change in perspective. That is the reason why non-dual philosophies come to us through traditions that are concerned with the liberation and salvation of man, and are therefore often classified as spiritual or religious, rather than philosophical. It is the intimate change of heart, the *metabolé, periagogé, the metanoia, the tankai*, the conversion that is attributed to religious experience, that gives us a hint of the necessary redundancy of seeking.

The most beautiful metaphor relating to this hint I know comes from Zen: The gateless gate²⁾. On the quest of liberation, the seeker stands before a gate unconquerable. After passing it, it vanishes. And you can't find your footprints in the sand, because after passing this barrier, it becomes obvious, that you've never moved one inch. Nevertheless, it took a long journey to get there.

2. Advaita Vedānta – either a person or an imperson

A philosophy based on a turn of experience and a radical change of perspective has always had a remarkable methodological problem: it can only convince if it *invites to* if not initiates participation. The conceptual distinctions it gains must not already presuppose the successful change of perspective but must seduce towards it.

The scholastic sources of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta seem to be able to meet this demand only to a limited extent. On the one hand, this may be due to the traditional dogmatics of the *śruti* ('that which is heard' i.e. the four Vedas), which must see in the Upanishads a direct breath of the Absolute and is therefore more concerned with a coherent interpretation of their content, less with a mediation of the procedures that make this content insightful.

On the other hand, the turn of experience that the non-dual Vedānta claims, is so radical that even a philosophy that wants to seduce towards it, not just talk about it, must provide a map of the path to follow – as redundant as is it might be. Such a map and its systematic symbolism could most readily be provided in the form of an ontology and would, as every map, be confronted with the annoyance that the map *is not* the territory.

However, if one understands Śāṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, as it is often read, as an attempt to correspond to the religious dogmatics of the Upanishads by an ontological monism, one misses the point.

If one opts for a purely ontological reading of Vedānta, one must get the impression that it cannot redeem what it claims. Namely, that the realization of absolute reality is gained by an insight in which not only the distinction of subject and object loses its validity, but in which Brahman as self-luminous and self-appearing consciousness becomes aware of itself as the One without a second.

The corresponding ontology of such an ultimate non-dual substance, however, is confronted with the difficult task of acknowledging the world of everyday experience and the changing life of its inhabitants. The traditional solution, as is well known, is to declare the phenomenal world a mirage. And thus, it seems to settle into an illusionism that is bound – at least on its surface – to a new dualism between the world and the supreme reality beyond it.

Regardless of the many possible interpretations, it is clear: *brahma satyaṁ jagannmithye* – Brahman is real, the world is false.³⁾

But not only the phenomenal world, also the personal self is a misunderstanding. Just as *māyā* denotes the force that makes us believe that the inconceivably complex CGI Movie, we call World, is real, *avidya* denotes the form of self-deception that produces the natural standpoint of myself as a physical being, emotionally and rationally intertwined with an outside world, who experiencing itself irrevocably as the sovereign center of living presence.

Following the Chandogya Upanishad, Śāṅkara distinguishes, thus, between a personal self, the *jīva*, and an impersonal self, the *ātman*.⁴⁾ And it seems that oneself is experienced as either one or the other. Either oneself is stuck in the natural misunderstanding of being a willing, suffering, engaged individual among others; or I realize my own groundless and placeless reality as that detached self-luminous witness, that is – in essence – identical with the supreme brahman.

Either oneself is experienced as a *personal entity* or as an *impersonal one-*

ness.

Both forms of self-understanding have their own ontology, and western and eastern thinkers alike tend to focus on the ontology of the impersonal oneness. But already the popular characterization of this ontology as monism, that regards brahman as an absolute substance falls short. The negative element within the label *a-dvaita* (non-dual) can be turned into the affirmative position of monistic philosophy only at the expense of philosophical imprecision. An ontological monism too quickly disposes of the difficulty that it cannot acknowledge that my 'own' self is deprived of true ontological representation. Because it is I, who must accomplish this monism first.

Śaṅkara is well aware of this difficulty: he gives here the story of the perplexity of a child. After a successful river crossing a child is asked to confirm the presence of the ten attendees. And so, he starts counting. In doing so the child always ends up with a sobering nine. Only the hint of the master: "My boy, you are the tenth" reveals to the child the so obvious confusion.⁵⁾ In the same sense, an ontological monist may murmur slightly embarrassedly about an all-encompassing Oneness until someone tells him, "But You are the One who is present now."

In this respect, the term *advaita* is to be recognized as evidence of phenomenological probity. It considers that theoretical representation begins in a state of duality and requires consummation to enter a monism - whose metaphysical principle is not 'unity' (*ekatva*) but 'non-duality' (*a-dvaya*). The space of negation, which is spanned by the *alpha privativum*, is a working space. Within this space, it is necessary to consider the fact that the search for knowledge, salvation or deliverance necessarily begins in the living role of the *jiva*, that is, as a personal self. The movement of privation can thus be interpreted as a form of suspension in which a monism expresses itself, not merely comes to ontological display.

It is only under this consideration that the abstract ontology of oneness and the differentiation of being in either a personal or an impersonal mode loses its dualistic pull and is exposed as a methodical tool. If we do not realize the *raison d'être* of our personal condition and get instead hooked on the ontology of an impersonal monism, we are bound to ignore the existential space, that Śaṅkaras *Vedānta* provides.

3. Keiji Nishitani – *neither* a person *neither* an imperson

Someone who is not only aware of the existential dimension of non-dual

philosophy, but also provides us with an expression for its demands is Keiji Nishitani.

The pull towards an ontological monism and its hidden illusionistic dualism of a personal and impersonal self is only as strong as our insistence on the field of consciousness which Nishitani rightfully identifies as the locus of separation between subject and object. And as such this field is also the stage for the person, constituted by the pre-theoretical tension I spoke of at the beginning: the fundamental tension of naïve dualism and egoic monism.

The beauty of Nishitanis philosophical approach in in *shūkyō to wa nani ka* is that he offers a way of breaking through this personal field of consciousness without neglecting the personal sphere or creating a hiatus towards an impersonal sphere of being.

Instead, he offers an attitude of thinking that is at the same time grounded in the simple world of everyday events and in a place of non-dual reality.

This is possible thanks to a way thinking in which, as Nishitani puts it, the *real* self-awareness of reality *happens* – a thinking in which we do not just come to know reality but *realize* it – make it real.

In order to do that, we must, as it is well known, break through the field of consciousness. Or to be more precise, we will allow for another field – *the field of nihility* – to show itself underneath the very ground of our personal being. Although this field is ever present – it is an unavoidable companion of the reality of modern man.

For this field to show a turnaround is unavoidable. It may come about as turning away from the fleeting things of the world, as turning towards the fleeting existence of one's own life. It may happen as a slowly gapping abyss of meaninglessness in the mechanic triviality of an everyday reality, as a deepening effect of certain existential moods, and so on. Howsoever, *nihility* shows through the cracks in the field of consciousness “when things are *nullified* and become unreal or deactualized” – But Nishitani makes it clear that, when he says “that things are deactualized or made unreal” he does not mean that they are transformed into illusory appearance: „*They are deprived of the character of external actuality.*”⁶⁾

And with the external actuality deactualized the dualistic tendency of everyday experience already loses its grip. As such the tendency of egoic monism becomes disproportionally strong. The result is a consciousness in such a hypertrophic state of self-centeredness that it either pushes through until it collapses, or it goes nuts. Either way with external actuality internal actuality becomes nullified as well.

But although deactualized on their own terms the tension between the dualistic and the monistic tendency is still in place. And with it the fleeting stage of the personal drama. But this empty stage is now a place without orientation, a place without an outlook, nowhere to go, nowhere to leave. The field of nihilism seems to arch into a dome and as such is still something that out of the corner of your eye has the index of a “thing” outside of self.

This field of nihilism, as Nishitani makes clear, is therefore „essentially a transitional one.”⁷⁾

And it is this transitional place where the actual existential conversion must take place, the *tenkai* with the whole being. The transition from nihilism to *sūnyatā*.

This transition may happen through a thoroughly negation of nihilism itself.

But already the Buddhist notion of the Great Death erasing the clinging to being, nihilism and the negation of nihilism alike considers that the moment at which self-negation becomes double negation, turns into absolute self-affirmation and comes to rest in the field of *sūnyatā*, is not conceptually available. The realization of absolute reality can therefore not be represented in an ontological conversion, at most it can be expressed in an existential one.

This is not a casual difficulty; it shows the structural limit of any abstract ontology of non-dual self. One reason for this difficulty can be found in the problem of the Necessary Redundance of seeking. As Nishitani points out in *The Standpoint of Zen*:

"The self of the field that transcends the dimension of consciousness and intellect is a self of which it can only be said that it is. And this *being simpliciter of the self* lies from the very beginning at the bottom of the self which one is conscious of or reflects on intellectually. (···) But although we say that this self is there from the very beginning, it comes to be manifest for the first time when the dimension of self-consciousness and intellect has been penetrated and swept aside. It is in this sense that we return to our own self which was there from the beginning."⁸⁾

When Nishitani speaks about transcending the dimension of the intellect it is not something that comes from the outside of reasoning – it is not irrational – it stems from the very core of reason itself. But it is obviously futile to represent that what's transcending reason through reason. So, the “being simpliciter of the self” is not just what is revealed

when the bottom drops out of the egocentric self, it is also the horizon that shows the necessity for the very bottom of reason and representation to drop, and to allow for the immediate self-realization of reality.

4. *neither – neither*

It is the breakthrough to this *being simpliciter of the self* – that which cannot be any simpler – that is the condition for a new reading of the relationship between personal and impersonal in which the impersonal is no longer a derivative of the personal nor its hidden opposite.

And it would be tempting to follow Nishitani's own way of thinking in *shūkyō to wa nani ka* and to start with the problem of religion and modern science. It is indeed much to take away from his complex and sensitive narrative, in which man experiences himself in self-evident dependence on the will and plan of a God and as part of a harmonic cosmos, just to find himself thrown into a life- and meaningless universe governed by indifferent, impersonal laws.

But then the concept of the impersonal easily remains an exclusive element of the scientific worldview and is bound to the impersonal orientation that stems from the mundane dualistic tendency and its materialistic bias.

The advantage of this derivative notion of the impersonal is that it opens an insight into the notion of personality by showing how intimate we connect personhood with the notion of vitality and life, whereas the impersonal belong to the sphere of the insensitivity and death.

Nishitani's notion of the non-duality of life and death conveyed in the double exposure photograph is well known. As is the structural equivalence of the non-duality of life and death to the non-duality of being and nothingness: The *u soku mu*, “being at once nothingness” or “being-sive-nothingness” – as we find it translated with a somehow remote Latin equivalent.⁹⁾

With this reformulation of the famous beginning of the Heart Sutra Nishitani obviously does not mean a late synthesis of being and nothingness in the realm of a somehow progressive dialectic. Moreover: “(T)he primary principle of which is to transcend all duality emerging from logical analysis, the phrase *u soku mu* (“being-sive-nothingness”) requires that one take up the stance of “soku” and from there view being as being and nothingness as nothingness.”¹⁰⁾

Since it is not within my capabilities to talk about the background

of Nishitani's notion of *tachiba* (standpoint) in Nishida's understanding of *basho* (place), I must content myself with the seductive power of the metaphor of a stance or standpoint in the context *śūnyatā*. From here it is easy to argue that the notion of a standpoint of *soku* may just be a convenient way of talking. Beyond the practical confinement of a philosophical stance there is no standpoint of *soku* – who would be standing there – nor is there a non-standpoint.

Imagining you are falling in a void. When there is still something to hold on to, be is even the void itself, the fall is experienced as a fall. – In *śūnyatā*, there are no reference points to hold on to – floating and falling become indistinguishable. What happens in and as *śūnyatā* is bottomless openness – a positionless position more stable than any Archimedean point.

And since the *being simpliciter of the self* is nothing else than the self-realization of *śūnyata*, Nishitani seems to find a somewhat deeper expression when it comes to the non-duality of personality and impersonality.

From a so-called standpoint of soku reality is as well being as nothingness and, according to the logic of sokubi – at the same time neither nothingness nor being. For the non-duality of personality and impersonality Nishitani thus creates the double Chiasm “*impersonal person or personal imperson*” (非人格の人格、或は人格の非人格; hijinkakuteki jinkaku aruiwa jinkakuteki hijinkaku).¹¹

So, to come back to the title and with it to the end of my contribution I would like to illustrate the *aruiwa*, the “*or*”, of the double chiasm as a tipping point. A tipping point that allows for the existential conversion in form of the *happening of self-emptying of person and imperson alike*. Hence it is not a standpoint that could be expressed in an *as well as* or *neither ... nor*.

The paradoxical standpoint of the interminable movement of self-emptying needs to be held in abeyance. The suspension of the tipping point of Nishitani's chiasm might therefore best be expressed in analogy to another Latin expression: *neque – neque: neither a person – neither an imperson*. It expresses a movement that knows neither reference nor halt – the two negations never just come to rest in a simple affirmation, nor can they represent it. And jet through their very moving relationship, they express it.

The function of this tipping point becomes clearer when we see that Nishitani not only entertains a concept of impersonality that stems from the mundane dualism, and its intimate connection to modern science but also recognize the impersonal orientation that stems from the egoic monism, and its connection to the so-called mystical elements of reli-

gion. Here the concept of the impersonal is not used in the usual sense found in its materialistic or pantheistic meaning, here “the omnipresence of God is encountered existentially as the absolute negation of the being of all creatures and presents itself as an iron wall that blocks all movement forward or backward.”¹²⁾

When the person is pushed into the corner of the omnipresence of God and the usual escapism to acknowledge his presence everywhere but in myself is out of the picture, then “God must be encountered as a reality omnipresent in all the things of the world in such a way as to be absolutely immanent as absolutely transcendent. It must be an impersonally personal (or personally impersonal) encounter, in which God’s reality is realized as impersonally personal (or personally impersonal). Gods’ reality must be conceived of on a horizon where there is neither within nor without.”¹³⁾

This horizon where there is neither within nor without, is the I am the second treasure map leads to, the *being simpliciter of the self* – the only Self you can never not be, because it is “the ultimate realization and expression of nonobjectifiable – and, in that sense, elementally subjective – nothingness.”¹⁴⁾ This horizon is radically on the near side, “more so”, Nishitani insists: “than what we normally regard as our own self.”¹⁵⁾

A philosophy concerned with a way towards non-dual Self needs to provide a certain pressure to ignite the existential urgency a seemingly redundant journey requires. But it must happen in a fashion that is compelling without indulging in an existential emphasis or in an imperative to be followed.

Thus, Nishitanis Chiasm is not an epitheton or a *description for* but at once an *expression of* and an *invitation to non-dual Self*. As an expression it invites the inevitable superfluity of philosophical endeavors, as an invitation it expresses their chance of a new beginning.

Abstract:

A non-dual ontology of Self shares the difficulty of any systematic order: it has presuppositions that it cannot represent within its system. For most theoretical concerns, this problem is trivial. For the non-dual philosophies of Śankara and Nishitani, on the other hand, it points to a central aspect: their thinking rests on a radical turn of experience whose existential dimension cannot be represented in their propositions but can very well be expressed. Along the relationship between *personality* and *impersonality*, the contribution will trace this expression and thus point to the fruitful superfluity of a non-dual philosophy that can be exhausted neither in theory nor in practice.

1) See: Meno 80d-e.

2) The name of a famous collection of 48 koans published around 1228 CE and attributed

to the Chinese chan-monk Wu-men Hui-kai.

- 3) See: Śaṅkara, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, § 20. In: Chaitanya, P.: *Śaṅkaras Vivekachudamani*. Devanagari Text & Translation. Revised and Edited, with an Introduction & Notes by Satinder Dhiman. Burbank 2012. In sloka 20 of a famous poem called *brahmajñānāvalimālā* ('Chain of Brahma Knowledge'), traditionally attributed to Śaṅkara but unlikely to have been written before the 12th century, we find an addition to this central doctrine that points to a more radical non-duality of the Self: *brahma satyam jagannmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ* – brahman is real, the world is false, jīva is nothing but brahman.
- 4) jīva - 'living being, life' (*√jīv* – to live, alive), *ātman* - 'self'. In Sanskrit *ātman* has a primarily self-referential meaning: 'oneself, itself'. Probably not least the central position of this expression in the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta that followed them, has led to a substantive translation of the reflexive pronoun 'self' to be translated as a substantive. For this problem and further clarification of the distinction between personal and impersonal Self see: Robert Lehmann, *Stiller Zeuge – Bewegtes Leben. Selbstbewusstsein in Phänomenologie und Advaita-Vedānta*. Freiburg i.Br. 2019, 311-337 und 392-426.
- 5) See: Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, I.xviii.190. In: Sengaku M.: *A thousand teachings. The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara*. Albany, N.Y. 1992, 192.
- 6) Keiji Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*. Translated with an Introduction by Jan van Bragt. University of California Press 1982, 109. Abbreviated in the following as RN.
- 7) RN 137.
- 8) Nishitani Keiji, *The Standpoint of Zen*. In: *The Eastern Buddhist* Vol. 17, No. 1 pp. 1-26, 6.
- 9) See: RN 74. Although van Bragt gives a comprehensive introduction to his translation in which he addresses the important role of *soku* ('at once'; see p. xxx) he does not discuss in detail his motives for choosing the term *sive*. As an original expression for a disjunction, it certainly alludes here to the monistic figure of Spinozas *Deus sive Natura*
- 10) RN 97.
- 11) See for example: RN 41.
- 12) RN 40.
- 13) RN 41.
- 14) RN 73.
- 15) RN 97.

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