Schopenhauer’s World: The System of
The World as Will and Presentation I

El mundo de Schopenhauer:
el sistema de El mundo como voluntad y representación I

Jens Lemanski
FernUniversität in Hagen

Resumen: En los últimos años, la investigación sobre Schopenhauer ha sufrido un cambio en la interpretación de su obra principal, El mundo como voluntad y representación, a partir de (1) una instrucción normativa y lineal, que guía al lector del idealismo al misticismo, al pesimismo y a la nada y a (2) descripciones libres e independientes del mundo con todos los fenómenos (como el idealismo, el misticismo, la nada, etc.). Así, el trabajo principal de Schopenhauer se ha convertido en un enfoque empírico o baconiano —algo así como una «cosmografía filosófica»—. Este cambio fundamental de interpretación pone radicalmente en tela de juicio lo que Schopenhauer entiende al caracterizar su obra principal como «sistema orgánico». El presente artículo intenta dar una respuesta a esta pregunta, revisando los indicios auto-reflexivos, metodológicos y metafilosóficos que Schopenhauer da en el primer volumen de su «Mundo» («Voluntad y Representación»).

Palabras clave: sistema, El mundo como voluntad y representación, Schopenhauer, filosofía, mundo.

Abstract: In recent years, the research on Schopenhauer has shown a change in the interpretation of his main work, The World as Will and Presentation, from (1) a normative and linear instruction which guides the reader from idealism to mysticism, pessimism and nothingness to (2) value-free and independent descriptions of the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness etc.) in it. Thus Schopenhauer’s main work has become an empirical or Baconian approach—something like a «philosophical cosmography»—. This fundamental
change of interpretation radically puts into question what Schopenhauer means by characterizing his main work as an «organic system». The present paper attempts to give an answer to this question, reviewing the self-reflexive, methodological and metaphilosophical hints which Schopenhauer gives in the first volume of his «World» («as Will and Presentation»).

**KEYWORDS: system, The World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer, philosophy, world.**

1. **Introduction**

In each of these four Books», Arthur Schopenhauer writes in the preface to the first edition of his main work The World as Will and Presentation I (= WWP I), «on account of the necessary treatment of relevant details, one needs to be particularly careful not to lose sight of the main thought or progression of the entire exposition» (WWP I, p. 11). With the death of Schopenhauer’s last «apostles» and «evangelists» —he referred to his adherents in that way— the apprehension that the reader of his system could lose sight in it has proved to be well founded. For far too long, the philosophical research on Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been engaged in the details of the system: the interest was primarily focused on idealism, epistemology, Kantian influence, metaphysics, pessimism and religious topics. Because of concentration on these special topics, a world-wide prejudice on Schopenhauer’s philosophy has been formed: To this day, every student knows that Schopenhauer is regarded as one of the most influential proponents of pessimism and world-negation; but there is no thorough study which can help in finding an answer to the question of what the «organic system» of WWP I is, about which Schopenhauer speaks (p. 10).

In recent years, however, the interpretation of Schopenhauer in research has begun to change. A detailed overview of the current status of research was delivered by De Cian, Segala

---

1 The following abbreviations are used for Schopenhauer’s writings:

- **BM**: On the Basis of Morality
- **EFR**: On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason [i.e. Schopenhauer’s Early Fourfold Root, 1813 edition]
- **GBR**: Gesammelte Briefe, 2nd ed. by A. Hübser (München: Bouvier, 1987)
- **FW**: On the Freedom of the Will
- **MR**: Manuscript Remains
- **PP I, II**: Parerga et Paralipomena
- **VC**: On Vision and Colours
- **WN**: On the Will in Nature
and Lemanski and will not be discussed here\(^2\). Just one short remark: there are many historical arguments as well as textual references for the view that Schopenhauer’s philosophy does not support pessimism, denial of life etc. But what are the main thought and the progression of his entire exposition? One of the most important historical arguments for this new kind of interpretation can be called the absolute-book-argument and it has been advanced by Hans Blumenberg\(^3\). The argument says that, in the age of Enlightenment, there are many works like Schelling’s *On University Studies*, Fichte’s *Characteristics of the Present Age*, Alexander von Humboldt’s *Cosmos* as well as Schopenhauer’s *WWP I* which were intended to replace the bible by writing those «absolute books» in which all facts and phenomena of the world are described. According to Theodore Sider, their ambitions were «to write the book of the world»\(^4\). Textual support for this absolute-book-argument can be found in Schopenhauer’s emphatic words: «The world, the world, you donkeys! is the problem of philosophy, the world and nothing else!» (HN IV/1 p. 302, also WWP II, p. 213)

However, this already underlines that Schopenhauer’s empirical or realistic approach can be inspiring for today’s philosophy of the world:\(^5\) For although Schopenhauer takes a representational theory for granted, his project can be attributed neither to epistemology nor to philosophy of language. In this article, one of my main theses is that Schopenhauer can be seen as a pragmatist who established a conceptual schema in order to help people to orient themselves in the world. *WWP I* is not an epistemological, not a metaphysical, not an aesthetic nor an ethical writing (these topics are the content of the four books), but it is a philosophical cosmography of which epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics are a part, because they are a part of the mental, social and physical world.

Thus my philosophical-cosmography-argument is a systematic extension of Blumenberg’s historical absolute-book-argument. In order to support my thesis systematically, I will focus in this article on the main thought and progression of the entire *WWP I*. What are the topics in this book? How were these topics arranged? What is the structure of the whole system and which is its objective? After a short overview about the current state of research (sect. 2), I will examine the Prefaces (sect. 3), book I-IV (sect. 4-7) of *WWP I* and consider the results (sect. 8).

---


2. THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH IN THE SYSTEMATIC STRUCTURE OF WWP I

Even a cursory glance into the bibliographies about Schopenhauer’s works reveals an extensive list of publications concerning his systematical approach. However, on closer analysis, almost all titles cannot deliver what they promise. Here, some examples recorded in chronological order: in 1857, Rudolf Seydel published a monograph with the title *Schopenhauers philosophisches System* in which he almost exclusively discusses inconsistencies and contradictions in Schopenhauer’s philosophy and he only treats the question of whether they endanger the systematic character of *WWP I*. William Caldwell in 1896 published a study under the title *Schopenhauer’s System in its Philosophical Significance*, presenting a very unique interpretation of the main topics of *WWP I* in relation to other philosophers, especially Hegel and von Hartmann. But there is no hint concerning the systematic character. Not only the title of Otto Jenson’s *Die Ursache der Widersprüche im Schopenhauerschen System* but also the content claims that the author of this dissertation is not really interested in the systematic approach. He states that the person Schopenhauer was more an artist than a scientist, and therefore all contradictions in his main work which are mentioned in the scientific research are unimportant to the author.

Up to the year 1960, it seems to me that the phrase «Schopenhauer’s system» played no significant role in book titles, paper sections or even sentences in the scientific community; rather, it seems as if we could substitute «(Schopenhauer’s) philosophy» for «system». At first, Gerhard Klamp seemed little mindful of the function of the term «system» in Schopenhauer’s main work. Klamp wrote an article about the architecture in Schopenhauer’s oeuvre and tried to extract the systematic character by focusing on the relationship 1) between the four books within the *WWP I*, 2) between *WWP I* and *WWP II*, 3) between *WWP I & II* and the four monographs (*FR, VC, WN* and *BM* together with *FW*), and 4) between the aforementioned works and *PP I & II*. Klamp’s pioneering work is very valuable to us because he was the first one who deals with the systematic topic and makes the obvious fact, that *WWP I* is the systematic centre of Schopenhauer’s whole oeuvre, explicit. However, as with almost every pioneering work, there are many problems in detail: Klamp does not advance his arguments on any textual basis and does not reflect on his premises. Let me discuss a small number of key elements concerning our topic: Klamp focuses on the relationship 1) between the four books within the *WWP I* and he uses the implicit premise that book IV contains the «im-

---

pressive closing passage» («eindrucksvolle Schlusspartien»)\(^{10}\) of the system, so that book III is an introduction («Vorschule»)\(^{11}\) to it. Following the contemporary research on Schopenhauer’s term «organic system»\(^{12}\), there is no evidence for this premise. Thus, since Klamp’s study, concerning the relationship 1) between the four books within \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\), is based on a false premise, then the results of the study are unfounded. Today, researchers on Schopenhauer’s system are convinced that all books in \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\) are equal even if they are not independent\(^{13}\). For example: It is possible that one can find important premises in book III for an argument in book IV, but this does not make book III an introduction to book IV.

These key elements show that Klamp has been doing research on the systematic character of Schopenhauer’s work within a paradigm which is different from ours. In Klamp’s paradigm Schopenhauer is considered one of the most pessimistic and mystical authors and \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\) is regarded as a normative and linear instruction, guiding the reader from idealism (book I) to mysticism and nothingness (book IV). In the last two decades, as mentioned above, this picture has become a prejudice, but now \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\) is regarded as value-free and independent descriptions of the world with all phenomena (like idealism, mysticism, nothingness) in it. Today, however, our problem is twofold: First, no one has continued Klamp’s research, so that still today researchers as well as students have to use his article. Furthermore, a cursory glance into current books about Schopenhauer shows that «(Schopenhauer’s) system» is sometimes used once again as a synonym for «philosophy» etc. Second, Klamp has outlined that he has just examined the external construction \([äußerer Aufbau]\), but not the inner one \([innerer Aufbau]\)\(^{14}\). For that reason, I will focus on the inner construction of \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\) by following the premises of the contemporary research on Schopenhauer. To enable the reader to understand the contemporary reading of Schopenhauer’s system which is founded in \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\), I will give an overview of the content of each of the four books and the Prefaces I, II and III; in order to do that, I will collect and analyse the passages in which the author reflects upon his system.

3. Prefaces of the \(W\)\(W\)\(P\)\(I\)

Even in «continental philosophy» it can be taken for granted that books have a special topic and are written for a specific reason. But after 200 years it is not always easy to find answers

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 85.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 83.


\(^{13}\) Cfr. ibid., pp. 16-31.

\(^{14}\) Klamp, «Die Architektonik im Gesamtwerk Schopenhauers», \textit{op. cit.}, p. 82.
to the question of what the specific reason was for writing the Critique of Pure Reason, the Science of Knowing, the Ages of the World or the Phenomenology of Spirit. However, in the case of Schopenhauer the research has found an explicit answer to this implicit question, since Schopenhauer writes in the Preface to the First Edition: «What is to be communicated through it [sc. WWP I] is a single thought. Nonetheless, despite all efforts, I could find no shorter way to communicate it than this entire book» (WWPI, p. 9). And this entire book is structured in the form of an «organic system» in which «every part sustains the whole just as much as it is sustained by the whole, none is the first and none the last, the whole thought gains in distinctness by the way of each part, and even the smallest part cannot be fully understood unless the whole is already understood in advance» (pp. 9-10). But is the communication of the single thought a convincing answer to the question of why Schopenhauer has written WWP I? Would we, for example, believe a biographer who claimed that Schopenhauer had a single thought and began thereupon to write such a book? No one becomes a philosopher and writes a book like the WWP I because he had simply sat down and was suddenly surprised by one single thought. If Schopenhauer’s speech about the «single thought» is not an insignificant metaphor, we have to ask what he was thinking about. Altogether, I suggest that either the question does not fit the answer or that one is or both are incomplete.

Most researchers who are dissatisfied with the answer pursue the strategy of finding the content of the single thought. Until a couple of years ago, researchers tried to find this content in the form of a proposition within the WWP I. For the newer research, Volker Spierling’s answer seems to be satisfying enough. He argued that the organic system is the exposition of the single thought and since the entire book represents this system, the single thought can be nothing else than the sum of all propositions in the WWP I.

As for me, I can say that I am satisfied with this answer, but I am not satisfied with the whole strategy; for if Spierling is right, then the answer to the question «why has Schopenhauer written the WWP I» can only be that the author has thought the entire book (in one single thought) —and this answer is not only a truism but also a quasi-tautology—. But let us keep this Spierling-argument in mind and focus on the connection between the question and the answer.

In the entire Preface I there is no evidence for a question regarding the content of WWP I. But in the first sentence of this preface we can find the question to which the statement of purpose is the answer: «How this book should be read in order that it may possibly be understood: it is my intention to state that here» (p. 9). After establishing this objective, Schopenhauer speaks about the «one single thought», «the organic system» and comes to the following

---


conclusion of the question how this book should be read: «It is self-evident that, under such circumstances, the only advice for penetrating the thought set forth is to read the book twice [...]» (p. 10). In this quote «such circumstances [solche Umstände]» relates to the single thought and to the organic system. Therefore neither circumstance answers the main question (how this book should be read). Rather they provide advice for becoming able to give an answer (to read the book twice).

The research on the single thought as well as the introductions to the WWP I are an indication that this pattern of question, argument and answer in the Preface I was previously unknown. As a result, most readers had the unrealistic expectation of finding a single thought in the book. But the entire Preface I treats the question how WWP I should be read: After the advice to read the book twice, Schopenhauer explains (1) that the book offers «four points of view on the one thought» which is an argument against the normative and for the descriptive reading, (2) that the author treats the reader as a philosopher, (3) that (E)FR is the «introduction» (Einleitung) to WWP I (p. 11), (4) that the reader has to read the first chapter of VC, and (5) that she should have made «acquaintance» with Kant and Plato (p. 12). The rest of the Preface I (pp. 13-15) deals with the general issue of dealing with books and can thus be seen as a continuation of the main question.

Preface II does not pursue a unified subject. Most topics like the truth (pp. 17-19), the criticism of the philosophy professors (pp. 25-30) are unimportant to our topic. Solely the middle section (pp. 20-25) continues the main question of Preface I since there is some advice about how to read the second edition and especially the supplementary volume II (WWP II). The very short Preface III updates readers on how PP I & II are now being used as amendments to WWP I. Therefore all three Prefaces are mainly answers to the same question which can be found in the first sentence of Preface I. A further consequence is that none of the three Prefaces gives an answer to the topic of the book. And since book I also opens in medias res with epistemological and especially idealistic topics, all of this opens the floodgates to misinterpretations17.

4. BOOK I: COGNITIVE FACULTIES (PRESENTATION)

Book I is divided into sixteen sections. It is very helpful that the edition of WWP I by Richard E. Aquila provides in brackets a general indication of the section’s content. To my knowledge, there is no other English or German Edition of WWP I which offers such a service. Notwithstanding the convenience to the reader, these indications present a little problem: Aquila has

---

often tried to indicate every topic of the section. Although the reader knows what to expect, the little more detailed indication conceals the systematic character. I suspect that the systematic character becomes increasingly clear by focusing on the main topic. In this case, the content of the sections is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§§</th>
<th>Main Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Time &amp; Space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Matter = Causality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Reality of the External World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Levels of Cognizance (plants, animals, intuitions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Materialism &amp; Idealism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Reflection &amp; Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Language (Logic &amp; Dialectic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-13</td>
<td>Excursus: Relationship between Cognizance &amp; Reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>Philosophy of Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Practical Reason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before I start to explain this table, it would be better to speak about another topic. Concerning the contents, book I is divided in two parts: part one extends from § 3 to 7 and relates to cognizance (Verstand) which is synonymous with «intuitive presentation»; part two extends from § 8 to 16 and relates to reason (Vernunft), which is synonymous with «abstract presentation». At the beginning of § 3, Schopenhauer writes: «We will later consider these abstract presentations in their own right, but begin by speaking exclusively of intuitive presentation» (WWP I, p. 35). The «later consideration» takes place at the very end of § 7: «But first we need to consider the class of presentations that pertains to human beings alone, the material for which is concepts and the subjective correlate of which is reason, just as the presentation so far considered was understanding and sensibility, which are also attributable to all animals» (p. 67).

Although the older Schopenhauer (of the 2nd ed.) incorporates §§ 1-7 of WWP I into the first half of book I in WWP II (WWP II, p. 2), which deals with cognizance (Verstand), I suggest that the younger one (of the 1st ed.) ought to have incorporated only §§ 3-7 into cognizance: My first argument for this suggestion can be found in the quote of § 3 (given above). There, for the first time, a distinction between cognizance and reason is given. My second argument concerns at first the beginning of § 1: «“The world is a presentation to me” —this is a truth that applies to every living and cognizant being—. However, the human being alone can bring it to reflective abstract consciousness» (WWP I, p. 31); in the first sentence after the bullet, the universal intuitive cognizance is mentioned, in sentence two the abstract reason, but both are in reference to the pseudo-quote «The world is a presentation to me». In WWP
I, p. 32.4 «abstract or intuitive» are also mentioned together. Therefore § 1 is neither among cognizance nor does it belong to reason. The distinction does not begin until § 3.

Proof of this can be seen in the beginning of § 7: «In them, we have proceeded neither from the object nor from the subject, but from presentation, which contains and presupposes both; for division into object and subject is its first, most general, and most essential form. Thus we have considered this form first as such, and then (although in the main with reference to the introductory treatise) the others subordinated to it, time, space, and causality, which pertain only to the object» (p. 56, also p. 66.18-33). In this quote either §§ 1-3 or (E)FR could be meant by the «introductory treatise». However, it is clear that Schopenhauer reflects here upon the beginning of his system and it seems to be obvious that it starts with the presentation which disintegrates afterwards into subject and object (§ 2, WWP I, p. 34) from which time, space (§ 3) and causality (§ 4) will be deduced. Thus, cognizance does not begin until § 3.

As important as §§ 5-7 may be for understanding Schopenhauer’s philosophy, these sections have no systematic relevance. The second part of book I starts with § 8. This sections takes up the role of an introduction and demonstrates that, so far, only the intuitive cognizance has been treated. From there the rest of book I deals with the abstract and reflexive reason (Vernunft), which «has one function: concept-formation» (p. 71). Because of this function, § 9 deals with language, first with logic (pp. 71-79), then with dialectic (p. 79-83). It should also be mentioned in passing that very important amendments on Logic and Dialectic are to be found in VN I, pp. 259-385 and MR III, pp. 725-755. However, at the beginning of § 10 Schopenhauer reflects for the first time upon the threefold division of the passage concerning reason in book I (WWP I, p. 83, 22-26) and repeats this at the beginning of § 14 (p. 96, 13-15) and § 16 (p. 120.12-16). Together, these passages make clear that there are three parts of reason: 1. language (§ 9), 2. science (§§ 14-15), 3. practical reason (§ 16). That §§ 10-13 are excursions which deal with the relationship between cognizance and reason is not only shown by the fact that these sections do not fit to any of the three parts, but also by the fact that Schopenhauer stresses in § 14: «I now return to further discussion of science as, next to speech and thoughtfully aware action, the third advantage that reason provides to humanity» (emphasis by the author; the better translation might be: «I now return to further discussion of science as the third, beside speech and thoughtfully aware action, advantage that reason provides to humanity»). Therefore the system of the first book of WWP I underlies the following diharetic structure — a mostly dichotomic but sometimes also polytomic division of concepts which was popular in (early) modern philosophy at the latest since Petrus Ramus

In our tree, the appendix (§§ 5-7) is highlighted because it has just an argumentative but not a systematic relevance. The excursus (§§ 10-13) is therefore highlighted since it does not belong to reason; but it could not be placed between § 7 and 8 by Schopenhauer because it needs the information and arguments of § 9. The branches of this tree can be refined further, and we can give some examples: § 9 can be separated, as we have seen above, into logic and dialectic; the excursus can be separated into psychology (§ 11), ethology (§ 12) and humor (§ 13)—as Kant claimed (CpR Bviii), these topics are already typical supplements to the classical logic in the 18th century—. § 14 divides the sciences by their method of subordination (like zoology, botany, physics, chemistry, etc.) or of coordination (like history).

The very important § 15 continues the topic of philosophy of sciences («Wissenschaftslehre», cfr. chap. 12 of WWP II) but deals with mathematics and philosophy, in neither of which are subordination and coordination essential. This section is important to us because it reveals at the end an answer to the question of what the claim of Schopenhauer’s philosophy is. Only now, one learns what the content of WWP I is. Schopenhauer says that philosophy cannot be a deductive enterprise, deriving facts from logical forms, even if some examples can be found in the writings of Spinoza et al. (WWP I, p. 118). In contrast to these claims, Schopenhauer writes about his own attempt, beginning with the words «The present philosophy at least […] asks…» («Die gegenwärtige [sc. Philosophie] wenigstens sucht…»). From this phrase up to the end Schopenhauer reflects upon his own philosophy. Here is not the place to provide a full interpretation of this passage. To set the scene: Schopenhauer’s philosophy will deliver «all of the manifold things in the world, incorporated into a few abstract concepts according to their essence» (p. 119) Thus WWP I «is a complete replication, as it were mirroring, of the world in abstract concepts» and Francis Bacon was the precursor of this empirical approach (p. 119). Thus, it is understandable why Schopenhauer is considered since Matthias Koßler to be an empiricist philosopher rather than an idealist19.

Here, we can see that my systematic philosophical-cosmography-argument agrees with Blumenberg’s historic absolute-book-argument: if Schopenhauer tries to describe all facts and phenomena of the world in one book, then this book is nothing less than a competing alternative to the Holy Bible which had the same importance before the Enlightenment. «So as nonetheless not to lose itself in an endless multitude of individual judgements» (p. 118), WWP I has to avail itself of abstraction, and thus the «summa of judgements» provides a «harmony, by virtue of which they in fact coalesce into the unity of a single thought» (p. 120).

Now we can piece together the puzzle to answer our question of sect. 3 concerning what Schopenhauer was thinking about in order to find the main or «one single thought». He thought about the world and his one single thought consists of the insight that the world, according to the title, represents itself as will and presentation. And this one single thought can only be communicated in four books with the «summa of judgements» in it. Thus the Spierling-argument seems to be correct but Preface I can only be fully understood after reading § 15. And now it should be clear why the former research has seen Schopenhauer as an idealist (since he began in § 1 with an idealistic view on the world) and why Schopenhauer is regarded today as an empiricist or hermeneutic (since the idealistic view of the world is just one of «four points of view» on the mental, social and physical world).

5. BOOK II: METAPHYSICS (WILL)

A first look at the main topics of book II shows no obvious diharetic structure like book I:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>Main Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Meaning of the Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Twofold View</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Characterology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21, 22</td>
<td>Will as Thing in Itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Principium Individuationis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Philosophy and Etiology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-27</td>
<td>Levels of the Objectification of Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Teleology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Summary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But the importance of the knowledge regarding the systematic structure of book I can be seen in the first sentences of § 17. There Schopenhauer reflects upon «abstract» and «perceptual presentation» and focuses on the «real meaning» and the «images» of the perceptual presentation which «acquire an interest that lays claim to our entire essence» (WWP I, pp.
131-132). This means that both parts of book I are seen together since they form our entire essence in the form of intuition and conceptual reflection; but to ask for the meaning of the presentation is to ask «whether this world is nothing more than a presentation […] or whether it is something else besides, something else beyond that, and what it might be» (p. 135). But to my knowledge the hermeneutic term «meaning» is not mentioned in any index on Schopenhauer, although it is the main topic of the entire book II, as Schubbe found out.

This can also be proven by the main structure of book II: In § 17 all sciences of § 14-15 are classified anew (p. 132f.) by the criteria «morphology» (geology incl. mineralogy, botany, zoology) and «etiology» (mechanics, chemistry, physics, physiology) and Schopenhauer claims that etiology «must leave constantly unexplained the inner essences» (p. 134, also p. 161, p. 182). But in § 18, he reveals that the meaning and inner essence can be found in the metaphor of the Will. § 19 explains that there is a «double cognizance that we have of our own body», once in the form of direct object (presentation) and once in the form of an indirect one (will). The meaning of the presentation is thus clearly marked out, as we can see in Schopenhauer’s words at the end of the section: «But that which has so far been set forth in a preliminary and general way, we would now more thoroughly and explicitly establish, ground, and develop in its entire compass» (p. 143). Because of this quote, we can say that §§ 17-19 are an answer to the question concerning the meaning and inner essence of the presentation and that §§ 20-29 can be seen as a development of the former sections.

Although most of these later sections have an argumentative function, only §§ 25 to 27 are systematically important since they are referring to the four levels of the objectification of will (p. 173, also p. 197): 1. humans (highest level), 2. animals, 3. plants, 4. «inorganic realm» (lowest level). Some information which is important to the systematic character of \textit{WWP I} can also be found in § 26: «For what in the actual world are inseparably united as its two sides, will and presentation, have been torn apart by these two Books [sc. book I § II], so as the more distinctly to take cognizance of each in its isolation» (p. 176, also p. 158, 10-11). In this quote we can find support of the philosophical-cosmography-argument (that the world is the topic of \textit{WWP I}) and with the help of this quote we can thus further complete the diharetic tree:

---

The tree has not yet been completed but the principle of the «world» (on top of the scheme) illustrates what it means that the book is a complete replication of the world since the conceptus summus «world» contains all other concepts of the book (conceptus inferiores) just as the «real» world contains all (other) things\(^{21}\). It is also interesting to see in the image that all objectifications of will relate to one or more corresponding sciences of morphology through which the taxonomy of all four objectifications can be clarified in detail. For example: the inner essence of humans is character (WWP I, p. 167) and the science which examines this essence is «characterology». While this is only sketched out here, it will be detailed in book IV. Before we deal with this topic, it would be good to examine the structure of book III.

6. BOOK III: AESTHETIC (PRESENTATION)

Book III has some similarities to book I: First, it is also titled «Presentation» and continues this aspect on the world; second, the systematic structure can be seen by looking at the main topics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§§</th>
<th>Main Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30-32</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-38</td>
<td>Contemplation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39, 40</td>
<td>The Sublime and the Stimulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41, 42</td>
<td>Idea &amp; Beauty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Architecture &amp; Art of Water-Conduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Art of Gardens, Landscape Art, Sculpture of Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-47</td>
<td>Sculpture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>History Painting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49-51</td>
<td>Poetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A quick glance at the table reveals the similarity between book II and book III: From §§ 43 to 52 each art corresponds to one of the objectifications of will or to the will itself. In book II Schopenhauer began with the will in itself and developed the four objectifications top-down (from the highest to the lowest level). Now, in book III, he begins bottom-up with the lowest level of arts to the highest one.

\(^{21}\) Gabriel, M., Warum es die Welt nicht gibt, pp. 96 ff. is careful to ensure that the real world contains all other things (except of the world) since the world cannot be both containing and contained by itself (see also Plato, Parm. 138b2-4; Arist. Phys. IV 3, 210a25).
In my opinion this image illustrates the most interesting structure in *WWP I* because not only does it connect book II with book III but it also connects the middle books of *WWP I* with the middle works of Plato: Esp. in Smp. 210a-212a and Rep. 508a-511e four levels are mentioned together with a «fifth element», the idea or the *anhypotheton*²². Since Schopenhauer connects Kant’s thing in itself with Plato’s idea in § 31 and 32, the will as thing in itself has the status of the idea. And since music is «an image of the very will» (*WWP I*, p. 308), as a «fifth element» it corresponds to will. All other levels or ideas of arts are organized top-down from the «fifth element» or bottom-up to it.

But the sections concerning the arts in correspondence to the levels of objectification is just one part of Schopenhauer’s aesthetics. Book III is divided in three parts, as Schopenhauer wrote at *WWP I*, p. 243.38-244.10 (§ 38), p. 245.23-24 (§ 39) and p. 254.30-34 (§ 41): If we compare these passages, we will see that §§ 33-38, dealing with contemplation and the genius, relates to the «subjective side of aesthetic», that §§ 39, 40, dealing with the sublime and the stimulating, are a «particular modification of this subjective side» and that §§ 41 and 42 are the objective side of aesthetic. At the end of § 42, Schopenhauer writes: «We will now go through the arts individually […]». This quote opens the third part about which we have reported.

Here, we have to speak about Klamp’s thesis that book III is the introduction to book IV, because in the former the «serious doctrine [ernste Lehre] of the denial of the will for life»²³ should begin. First of all, this thesis is much too broad, since Klamp can only mean the subjective part of Book III in which even the affirmation and denial of the will to life are mentioned. That this interpretation has no textual basis can at first be seen by *WWP I*, p. 315

---


where Schopenhauer repeats that his philosophy is «nothing other than a complete and accurate replication and pronouncing of the essence of the world in most general concepts». Thus there is no reason why the denial of the will is more serious than, for example, the affirmation of the will for life. Schopenhauer himself speaks about the «seriousness» not due to the denial but rather due to all «actions of human being» because this subject «concerns everyone immediately» (p. 321, also p. 319). On the contrary, we can find at the end of the first section of book III an anankastic conditional, which is important for understanding the descriptive philosophy concerning contemplation and negation. The argument there is:

| (1) | Ideas are not subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground. | \[ \Lambda = \neg \beta \] |
| (2) | The subject or individual cognizance is subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground. | \[ \gamma = \beta \] |
| (3) | “If, therefore, Ideas are to become objects of cognizance, this can only occur with the nullification of individuality in the cognizant subject.” (212) | \[ \Lambda = \gamma \rightarrow \gamma = \neg \beta \] |

The anankastic conditional in (3) takes the form «If it should be…, then must». But in the entire \textit{WWP I} there is not an indication that the subject or recipient of the book has to fulfill the antecedent. Schopenhauer says furthermore about \textit{WWP I} that he left everyone «to his own discretion» («Jedem sein Thun anheimgebend», GBR, 343)\(^{24}\). But if the subject wish that the Ideas become objects of cognizance, then the consequence has to be fulfilled. Thus there is no evidence for Klamp’s linear interpretation between book III and IV, unless the overall principle of interpretation has been presented by the anankastic conditional.

7. BOOK IV: ETHICS (WILL)

The non-normative tendency of book III is continued in book IV, as Koßler has shown\(^{25}\). Although the subject of book IV relates to practical philosophy, Schopenhauer states that «all philosophy is always theoretical, in that it is of its essence always to proceed purely contemplatively […] and to inquire, not to prescribe. […] Just as it was the aim of the preceding three Books to accomplish this from other points of view, with the generality peculiar to philosophy, so is human action to be considered in the same manner in the present Book […]

\[ \begin{align*}
(1) & \quad \text{Ideas are not subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground.} \\
(2) & \quad \text{The subject or individual cognizance is subject to the Principle of Sufficient Ground.} \\
(3) & \quad \text{“If, therefore, Ideas are to become objects of cognizance, this can only occur with the nullification of individuality in the cognizant subject.” (212)}
\end{align*} \]

---

\(^{24}\) See also Lemanski, «The Denial of the Will-to-Live in Schopenhauer's World», \textit{op. cit.}

\(^{25}\) \textit{Cfr.} Koßler, \textit{Empirische Ethik und christliche Moral, op. cit.}
Here, Schopenhauer’s ambitions go along with modern world-philosophers like Sider who also said: «The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be»\(^{26}\). As these passages of Schopenhauer thus show, the beginning of § 53 is evidence for the new interpretation of Schopenhauer’s main book, and this descriptive interpretation opens up a new perspective on the main topics of book IV:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§§</th>
<th>Main Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Affirmation &amp; Denial of the Will for Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Excursus I: Necessity of the Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-59</td>
<td>Excursus II: Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Affirmation of the Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Egoism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Temporal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63, 64</td>
<td>Eternal Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65, 66</td>
<td>Good &amp; Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Excursus: Compassion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Denial of the Will for Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>(Excursus) Suicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Excursus: Freedom of the Will</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Excursus: Ontology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For some readers, this table has quite a few surprises. Let us examine little by little and more closely this table: In § 54 Schopenhauer says that he «would regard life precisely in a philosophical manner» (p. 326) and notes that there are two attitudes to life: the affirmation and the denial (p. 336f.). Hence, the purpose of book IV is to «depict both sorts of phenomena and bring them to the level of distinct rational cognizance […]», but not to prescribe or recommend one or the other» (p. 337). Here, at this passage (pp. 337.25-31), Schopenhauer indicates that he will speak about the necessity of the will and life before he proceeds to the discussion in question. In WWP I (p. 362, 21 and p. 381, 35) he speaks of a «Dazwischentreten» (transl. heterogeneous with «intervening» and «insert») which signifies that §§ 55-59 are two excursuses.

Although these sections are excursuses, it seems to me as if they would connect book IV with topics of the former books. Let me stress that in 3 hypotheses: 1) Book IV is a theoretical view of practical reason and ethics and seems therefore to continue the topic of book I, § 16. 2) In § 55 Schopenhauer argues that «ethic» is another word for «character». Thus, book IV —more precisely speaking— deals with «characterology» and seems therefore to continue

\(^{26}\) Sider, *Writing the Book of the World*, op. cit., p. 266.
the topic of book II, § 20 (in § 56 [p. 362, 19-30] and § 58 [p. 376, 7-16] we find also a connection to book II [p. 207, 34-37] regarding a special question). 3) Whereas researchers might once have been thought of a purely pessimistic Schopenhauer, a close reading shows that in book I and III Schopenhauer, for example, talks about «harmony and unity» (p. 120) and that «the world as presentation is the most delightful and the only innocent side of life» (p. 318, also p. 422, 19-23). In contrast to this, the so-called «pessimistic side» can first and foremost be seen in the «battle for life and death» within the will, on which the author reflects in § 56 (p. 363, 22-31, referring to § 27 (pp. 187-196). The fact that the world is poor, is in \textit{WBP I} not a fact given by Schopenhauer, but rather a fact which Schopenhauer deduces from Dante in § 59 (p. 380), which is just part of the excursus. Thus \textit{WBP I} gives no reason to focus exclusively on Schopenhauer as a pessimistic author, except for the bias of the researcher.

After the excursus, the first part of book IV starts. This part extends from § 60 to 67 and deals with the affirmation of the will. Similarly to book II, Schopenhauer asks about the «Bedeutung» (p. 382, 4; p. 415, 29; p. 418, 13: „significance“, better: «meanings») of the affirmation and the denial of will. His method can be described as «consequentialist» since he infers the ethical principle of the affirmation or denial (consequence) from the observable actions (antecedent\textsuperscript{27}). Schopenhauer reflects on his consequentialist view on p. 337, 18, p. 354, 2-10, p. 356, 22-31 and uses this method in the first part of book IV by pp. 400, 35-401, 4, p. 434, 3-6. While in research this method remained unconsidered, there have been many studies on compassion with reference to § 67. But § 68 opens with the words «After this digression regarding the identity of pure love with compassion, […]» indicating that § 67 was also an excursus and not a main issue of the system.

After the excursus, the last part of book IV starts with § 68. This part consists of only § 68 (and perhaps § 69) which resumes «the thread of our interpretation of the ethical significance [Bedeutung] of action» (p. 438; also p. 448, 1-4; p. 461, 34-37) and deals with the denial of the will. That this part is the «end», «last» or «final» one (German: \textit{letzte Teil}, \textit{zuletzt}), Schopenhauer indicates at p. 418, 13, p. 434, 32 and p. 438, 28. In this part, Schopenhauer repeats the empiricist approach of his philosophical cosmography (p. 444, 11-19; p. 445, 2-7) and the resulting consequentialist method (p. 444, 2 4-33), which enables him to infer the moral meaning of the denial of the will for life from the deeds and actions of a saint.

It is difficult to say whether the last part of book IV ends at the beginning of § 69 or § 70: At the beginning of § 69, Schopenhauer speaks of the «now […] adequately depicted [\textit{nunmehr… binlänglich dargestellten}] denial of the will for life» (p. 462); but at the beginning of § 70, he also speaks of «our now concluded depiction [unsere ganze nunmehr beendigte Darstellung] of that which I call denial of the will» (p. 467). Since the content of § 69 says

that suicide is not a form of the denial of the will, I would prefer to classify § 69 as an excur-
sus, but the «now» (nunnehe) in both quotes left the question concerning the end of the last
part ambiguous. It is however certain that § 70 and 71 are supplements to the system because
they deal with a «seeming contradiction» (p. 467, 8; p. 474, 9) and an «objection» (p. 474, 19).
Thus there is no textual basis for a linear interpretation from idealism to mysticism and
nothingness because § 1 is just an introduction and § 71 a supplement of the system. This
can also be seen in V N I and V N IV in which Schopenhauer does not start with the phrase
«The world is a presentation to me» and does not end with «nothing».

8. Conclusion

We have seen that Klamp’s pioneering work has to be completely revised. There are sometimes
many more relationships within WWP I than he has seen, and sometimes there are fewer. I
think that it would be important for current research 1) to test my results, 2) to concentrate
on the structure of the single sections within WWP I and 3) to focus on the definitions in
WWP I, which I have not done here.

1) For example, our systematic overview shows no textual evidence for Klamp’s thesis that
book IV contains the «impressive closing passage» of the organic system, so that book III is
an introduction to it. However, book IV is subject to an anankastic conditional similar to the
one for book III: If someone will affirm or deny his will to live, then he must act in a specific
manner. Since we just see the way in which one acts, we can now, with the help of Schopen-
hauer’s conceptual scheme, determine each act to a specific ethical class. To this end, Schopen-
hauer appears to be a pragmatist who helps his reader to orient themselves in the world. With
reference to this premise of interpretation, my approach has corrected Klamp’s results con-
cerning the inner and external construction of WWP I. However, a lot more research work
is required before we can fully understand the structure within WWP I and the relationship
between WWP I and the other works of Schopenhauer.

2) To understand the function of a section within the organic system it seems to be im-
portant to understand the structure of the section itself. § 68 contains, for example, one of
the most difficult structures within WWP I: at first, Schopenhauer describes the deeds and
the saint’s way of life. Interrupted by many excursuses, which I am not able to describe in
detail here, this part reaches up to p. 448.18. The second part is a «depiction […] of ethical
precepts» (p. 448) like the imitatio-christi-doctrine or «love for one’s neighbor with utter ren-
nunciation of all self-love» (p. 451) among Hindus. The third and last part starts at p. 452, 21
and Schopenhauer says that he «would only add a little to the general characterization of their
[sc. deniers] state». Thus this part is a supplement to the first one. There are many sections
like this one which are very difficult to understand because Schopenhauer just reflects on
their structure, method and function in sub-clauses, which are normally ignored.
3) Following Kant’s maxim that «if we have the original and primitive concepts, it is easy to add the derivative and subsidiary, and so to give a complete picture of the family tree» (CpR A82/B108), I have not added such trees in sect. 6 and 7. If we would like to give a complete picture of the WWP I’s family tree, we would likely find definitions in the lower part of the picture. It is an advantage of Lütkehaus’ Edition that in all parts of texts, which were originally in Antiqua, are italicized, and all parts of texts, which originally had a wide tracking, are small capitals. In WWP I most small capitals mark the definiendum. For example, a brief look into § 13 would reveal that Schopenhauer marks the definition of «laughter» (Lachen), «wit» (Witz), «foolishness» (Narrheit), «pedantry» (Pedanterie), etc. These definitions would be the basis of the diharetic ontology of WWP I and offer the reader a conceptual scheme of demarcations with which she is able to find her way through the world. While for most people «laughter», «wit» or «foolishness» are one and the same, for people who are familiar with WWP I it is easy to deduce the differences out of the world with its principle «presentation» and «will». If a book tries to replicate the whole world in abstract words then it cannot fail to define the most abstract being in the world: ontology. Thus the function of § 71 can only be seen by focusing on the definitions within it, i.e. «that which is» (das Seiende) and nothing (Nichts) with all its derivative concepts. At a time well before the internet and also in a time of an overwhelming diversity and density of information it was and is useful to classify the intuitive world in those abstract concepts. Thus, it should be a noble task of research to focus on the upper and lower and on the macroscopic as well as microscopic structures of Schopenhauer’s system.

In my opinion, most confusion within Schopenhauer research lies in the method of using every work or even every word we have from the philosopher to work on specific systematic problems. We are debating whether Hübscher’s edition or Lütkehaus’s so called «Ausgabe letzter Hand» is the best one, but we do not see that Schopenhauer’s own revisions are problematic contortions of the original content. Schopenhauer himself was aware of this problem and does not have many additions in WWP I. Thus the current issues of WWP I are among the best texts we have of Schopenhauer in relation to most of his other works. But if we compare it with perhaps WWP II we get more information but also more problems which result from the author’s own misinterpretation (cfr. i. e. sect. 3) and especially the fact that he became more and more embittered. Because of the pejorative comments of the older Schopenhauer, the reader gets a false impression; because WWP I is not simply a matter of the pessimistic world, but rather the entire world —the world of will and presentation, which is of battle as well as of harmony—.