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MEMORY AND THE SCOPE OF PERSONAL FORGIVENESS

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1. The Standard Account

What are we doing when we forgive someone? What happens when we, ourselves, are forgiven? On a standard philosophical account, forgiveness requires letting go of the negative emotions and attitudes associated with being wronged by someone, e.g., moral anger, resentment, or disappointment. Accordingly, if Claude betrays Sylvia's confidence and Sylvia forgives him, she foregoes anger and commits to overcoming it in the future. Now, Sylvia may be less likely to confide in Claude in the future. That is to be expected and is compatible with forgiving him. Persistent anger and vengeance are not.

Notably, on the standard account, forgiveness is not achieved by overcoming blame-feelings in any manner whatsoever. For example, Sylvia cannot forgive Claude just by taking a pill to delete her painful memories, even if doing so eliminates her anger. Genuine forgiveness requires overcoming hard feelings in the right way (and for the right reasons). If forgetting were sufficient for forgiveness, then someone who suffered severe memory loss would thereby forgive a multitude of possibly grievous – unforgivable? – wrongs. The total amnesiac would forgive all. A sufficiently violent blow to the head would be forgiven almost as soon as it was delivered, but a glancing blow wouldn't be. These and other absurd consequences tell loudly against the wishful view that forgetting is forgiving. On the standard account, forgiveness is not achieved by pills, head injuries, or idly letting memories fade. On the contrary, forgetting impedes forgiveness by obscuring the moral reality that forgiveness is essentially fitted to meet. According to the standard account, a would-be forgiver must fully acknowledge the wrongdoer's wrongdoing as such, however difficult or easy, rare or common, forgiveness may be as a result.

Responses to wrongdoing that bypass this acknowledgement may be said to be ignorant in that respect. In a seminal essay, Hieronymi (2001) points to others. She says:

> If you try to forgive by saying to yourself, 'look, these things happen all the time,' or 'I just can't get upset by this,' then you are giving up on either the seriousness of the wrong, saying it doesn't rate being worked up about, or the worth of the wrongdoer, saying in effect that she is not worth the emotional difficulty. If you say to yourself, 'you really can't expect any better of her,' you are not forgiving the offender, but rather adjusting your expectations of her, lowering her moral standing. If you try to forgive by thinking, 'who am I to be angry about this; my hands are far from clean,' then you are giving up on your own worth saying that your past wrongdoings somehow either undermine your ability to protest such treatment or

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> make legitimate the mistreatment you received, in effect forfeiting your claim against being wronged, and so, in some sense, condoning her action.
>
> *(Hieronymi 2001: 531)*

An ignorant response may enable us to overcome hard feelings and generally get along, but is not thereby a form of forgiveness. If Sylvia responds to Claude's violation of her trust by deciding it was no big deal (minimizing), that he could not help it (excusing), that it was ultimately the right thing to do (condoning), or by refusing to think about it (ignoring), she is not forgiving him for what he has done. Now, those judgments might be correct. Perhaps what Claude did was insignificant, or he was drugged, or his revelation saved Sylvia's life. For Sylvia to reach these conclusions, however, is for her to determine that forgiveness is unnecessary. Forgiveness makes sense only to the extent she thinks Claude did something wrong.[1] To forgive Claude, Sylvia must acknowledge the wrongness of the wrong done, which means acknowledging his moral agency and her moral value, and *nonetheless* forgive him. Is this rare? Or common? Regardless, forgiveness is otherwise unintelligible.

Philosophers disagree about many matters – e.g., whether forgiveness should wait on an apology, whether love demands it, or whether only victims can forgive. It is striking, then, how many converge on the view that forgiveness requires acknowledgment. Agreement about this seems stronger than any agreement about forgiveness's affective requirements. Although Pettigrove (2012), for example, denies that would-be forgivers must initially feel things – like anger or resentment – he keeps to the idea that forgivers must acknowledge the wrongdoing as such. As cool as forgiveness may be, on his analysis, it cannot be blind. MacLachlan's (2009) expansive pluralism, too, keeps to this requirement. Although she denies that forgiveness "necessitate[s] the (eventual) end to angry feelings," MacLachlan (2009: 200) is sure that "it makes no sense to say, 'I forgive you, and I think you did nothing wrong'."

If one believes that forgiveness is generally good, then forgiveness is at least one phenomenon that affirms a link between knowledge and goodness. Debates about this link, e.g., about whether virtue requires some kind of knowledge (or not), date back to the ancients. That knowledge sometimes enables goodness is clear: one who learns medicine can heal and save lives. Since the standard account requires forgivers to acknowledge wrongdoings, it may also provide modest support for a link.

2. The Explicit Memory Imperative

Of course, much depends on what it means for a forgiver to acknowledge a wrongdoer's wrongdoing as such. And the room for disagreement is largely unmapped. In what follows, I advance what I call the explicit memory imperative (EMI). Here, I advance the strongest possible formulation of the imperative: forgivers must explicitly remember the wrongdoer's wrongdoing as such.[2] Three features merit emphasis. First, explicit remembering includes both episodic memories and beliefs about the past that are present to consciousness. Sylvia might replay the scene with Claude, recalling the place, occasion, people's reactions, and so on. Or, if Sylvia was not there at the time, she might bring to consciousness that Claude violated her trust. Second, a would-be forgiver must remember (present tense) the wrongdoing. It is not enough to have remembered the wrongdoing at some point in the past. If Sylvia explicitly remembered the event five years ago and it hasn't since crossed her mind, then her explicit memory is not appropriately connected to any present change in her attitude toward Claude. The memory does not figure in. And it must. Third, false memories or quasi-memories of the past will not do. This is not to deny the selectivity, narrativity, or subjectivity of memory. But it is to deny that we can be forgiven for things we did not do.

Below, I defend the EMI against common objections. The first objection, often raised by non-philosophers, is that forgiveness requires forgetting the past. The second objection is that we can and do forgive what we do not remember, not only past wrongdoings but also wrongdoings in the future. If we could forgive wrongdoings in advance, the EMI would be false for the simple reason that we humans cannot remember the future. After treating these two objections, I explore refinements to the EMI and suggest a way forward.

3. Objection: Forgiveness Requires Forgetting

Blustein (2014: 111) defines rumination as "repetitive thinking about the causes, consequences, and symptoms of one's negative affect," noting that one might ruminate about wrongs suffered or committed, how they feel, or the consequences of feeling that way. Blustein reasons: since rumination is connected to heightened negative emotions like anger, and persistent anger is incompatible with forgiveness, it follows that forgiveness requires putting a stop to rumination. In Blustein's analysis, interrupting rumination is a kind of forgetting. Rightly noting that the word "forgetting" is ambiguous, he reasonably defines it as reducing the (relative) accessibility of memory to consciousness. Accordingly, if focusing on the present or future keeps a ruminator from thinking about past wrongs, it is conducive to forgiveness. "Forget and (or so that you can) forgive," he adds (Blustein 2014: 124). Blustein does not recommend deleting or obliterating memories but just making them less accessible to consciousness.

However, Blustein oversimplifies the nature of the obstacle even in the special case of the ruminator. What makes ruminative memories a barrier to forgiveness is not their accessibility. Consider Breonna, whom Isaiah left stranded at the airport after promising to pick her up. If Breonna thinks and talks about Isaiah's broken promise for months on end, it is reasonable to doubt that she has forgiven him or is ready to do so. In the typical case, forgivers do not repeatedly revisit their memories of being wronged. Forgive and forget is the usual order of things. It is also thought by some to be the divine order of things. As Volf (2006: 132–35) notes, Christian theologians from Gregory (of Nyssa) to Rahner have claimed forgiveness requires forgetting, an idea also confirmed by the Hebrew Bible, wherein God promises to "forgive… and remember their sin no more" (31: 34).

The relationship between divine and human memory is beyond this chapter's scope. But note that Breonna may be a philosopher who writes about forgiveness and frequently reflects on this example from her life. She may be an artist, and the event may figure into her creative work. Breonna may be lovingly interested in Isaiah's whole person and sustain this attitude while continuing to reflect on his actions. Or, like real-life Nima Veiseh, Breonna may have a highly superior autobiographical memory (HSAM). "Some say forgive and forget, but since forgetting is a luxury I don't have," says Veiseh, "I need to learn to genuinely forgive" (Robson 2016). These possibilities suggest that what presents an obstacle to forgiveness, even in the particular case of the ruminator, is not the high accessibility of their memories but the affective attitude that so often accompanies high accessibility.[3] And if forgetting need not follow forgiveness, there is less reason to think forgetting must precede forgiveness. As Volf also notes, we find even in Dante the view that "the redeemed can forget their sins only after they have faced their sins' reality unadorned" (2006: 142).

Phenomenologist Ricoeur seems to go beyond Blustein in asserting that all of us – i.e., not only the ruminator – must forget to forgive. "Forgiveness pairs up with forgetting: is it not a sort of happy forgetting?" he asks. But Ricoeur goes on: "Even more fundamentally, is it not the figure of reconciled memory? Surely" (2006: 285). Importantly, then, Ricoeur does not construe remembering and forgetting as opposites. He reiterates this in the epilogue of the same work:

> And our celebrated duty of memory is proclaimed in the form of an exhortation not to forget. But at the same time and in the same fell swoop, we shun the specter of a memory that would

> never forget anything. We even consider it to be monstrous. Present in our mind is the fable of Jorge Luis Borges about the man who never forgot anything, in the figure of Funes el memorioso … Could forgetting then no longer be in every respect an enemy of memory, and could memory have to negotiate with forgetting, groping to find the right measure in its balance with forgetting … Could a memory lacking forgetting be the ultimate phantasm…?
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> *(Ricoeur 2006: 413)*

Several ideas are in play in the work. Among them, that memory devoid of forgetting is repulsive, an excess that is fictionally possible in Funes and perhaps approximated by real-life hyperthymesiacs. Ideally, then, memory and forgetting are balanced on the fulcrum of the present. The second idea is that memory without forgetting is not remembering at all, but is a re-living of the sort experienced in flashbacks. Likewise, forgetting without memory is not forgetting but oblivion. Ricoeur additionally suggests that memory is forgetting simply to the extent memory is selective. To remember is to forget. On any reading, crucially, Ricoeur emphatically opposes amnesia (or amnesty) as a mode of forgiveness. Instead, forgiveness requires what is both and between memory and forgetting, what Elshtain (2003: 43) called "knowing forgetting."

The view that forgiveness requires forgetting seemed a direct objection to the EMI, according to which forgiveness requires the explicit memory of wrongdoing. That objection is offset if memory and forgetting are not construed as opposites, as in Ricoeur. But the objection is not wholly neutralized unless the forgetting that forgiveness purportedly requires is also compatible with explicit remembering. The EMI requires not only accessibility to consciousness but actual access that figures into the change that is forgiveness. The forgiver must have the wrongdoer's wrongdoing directly in view.

The EMI invites us to shine a light on the past rather than relegate it to the shadows. Accordingly, forgiveness does not require a change in what the forgiver sees. It requires a change in how she sees. Allais, for example, says that forgiveness "essentially involves a view of the wrongdoer as a person: it is a change in the way you affectively see her" (2008: 66). Accordingly, a villainous wrongdoer may be recast as one fallible human among others or "as better than her wrong actions indicate her to be" (2008: 68). Crucially, coming to see the reality of the wrongdoer's wrongdoing in a different light does not require minimizing, excusing, condoning, or denying it. Nor does it require averting one's eyes.

4. Objection: Forgiveness in Advance

Philosophers sometimes use the phrase "proleptic forgiveness" to refer to a forgiveness that comes before and is not conditioned by an apology, even if it anticipates or hopes for an apology. That is not the sense in which I use the phrase here. By proleptic forgiveness, I mean forgiveness issued in advance of wrongdoing or possible wrongdoing. Whether Jesus' kiss meant that Judas was forgiven in advance for his betrayal is a theological matter beyond the scope of this chapter (Cornell 2017). But if someone could forgive their partner for infidelity before the infidelity occurred, this forgiveness would be proleptic. If forgiveness can be proleptic in this way, then the EMI is false for the simple reason that we humans do not remember the future.

There are at least two reasons to doubt the intelligibility of proleptic forgiveness, so understood. The first is that proleptic forgiveness lacks an appropriate object. On the occasion that Jim seems to forgive Alex for infidelity before it occurs, there is nothing yet in existence for him to forgive. There may be related things to forgive: Alex's past affairs or present traits. Forgiving Alex for these is intelligible but not proleptic. By contrast, Alex's future infidelity exists only as an object of thought, however inevitable it may seem. It is in this sense that there is nothing for proleptic forgiveness as such to forgive.

More to the point, there may never be anything for proleptic forgiveness to forgive. What is anticipated may not occur. Alex may have second thoughts or get in a traffic jam, or the other party may not show. How can someone be forgiven, proleptically or otherwise, for something they did not do?[4] It is one thing to be forgiven for something that is not ultimately wrong; it is another to be forgiven for something that did not even occur. Suppose an older Jim believes Alex had an affair and also believes he forgave her. If Jim learned that Alex did not have an affair, he would cease to believe he forgave her for the affair. Jim would come to deny the truth of the statement, "I forgave Alex for the affair." Likewise, the proleptically forgiving younger Jim will come to reject this statement if the affair never occurs. Although the perspective of fully informed forgivers is not decisive, it gives us reason to doubt the intelligibility of proleptic forgiveness.

Infidelity cases highlight a second reason why proleptic forgiveness is especially problematic. Jim may be surprised by how deeply he resents Alex's affair. If Jim forgave the affair in advance, no satisfying description of this situation is available. One unsatisfying option is suggested in the work of Wonderly (2021), who defends the possibility of "un-forgiving," a more or less justified way of taking back forgiveness after it has been given. If un-forgiveness is an option, then Jim might un-forgive Alex after he forgives her. However, little on this approach prevents Jim from re-forgiving and un-forgiving Alex again (and again), a possibility that would significantly change the meaning and role of forgiveness. A second and equally unsatisfying option endorses an opposing principle, that "forgiveness, once truly granted, cannot be taken back" (Scarre 2016: 933). Accordingly, if Jim proleptically forgave Alex, he does not have the option of taking it back. True forgiveness is forever. Jim's forgiveness remains "a done deal" (Scarre 2016: 933) even if his anger deepens and he seeks revenge. This possibility, too, would significantly change the meaning and role of forgiveness. Although this dilemma is not unique to proleptic forgiveness, proleptic forgiveness intensifies it.

Finally, the intuitions that motivate a defense of proleptic forgiveness are perhaps better captured by the idea of preparation for forgiveness. Unlike proleptic forgiveness, preparation for forgiveness does not conflict with the EMI. Accordingly, Jim is better understood as preparing to forgive Alex or as being disposed to forgive her. As with many kinds of preparation, it may turn out that Jim's preparation was unnecessary or unsuccessful.

5. Refining the Explicit Memory Imperative

According to the EMI, the total amnesiac cannot forgive, and anyone who fails to explicitly acknowledge wrongdoings cannot forgive. But exactly how much and how well must we explicitly remember? What of those whose explicit memories are incomplete or partly false? In other words, what about humans? What is within our power to forgive, and what is beyond it?

Imagine that Martin is an adult victim of child abuse. On the standard account, if Martin has no memory or knowledge of the abuse, he is in no position to forgive his abuser. From his perspective, there is nothing to forgive. Imagine, however, that Martin remembers some things and has forgotten or mis-remembers others. He remembers his father yelling at him and shoving him. But he cannot remember for how long his father withheld food. Martin has forgotten that his father locked him in the closet. He never knew his father was the person who destroyed his school project, and he falsely remembers that his father killed his pet frog. The abuse Martin suffered may be unforgivable, and he may not want to forgive his father. But if Martin wants to forgive him, for what can he forgive him? All of the abuse? Only some of it? Here, the question is as much philosophical as psychological.

At one extreme, the EMI might allow that we can forgive a wrongdoing even if the only thing that we explicitly remember (or get right about it) is the bare fact of its existence, i.e., that someone wronged us in some way. Accordingly, we may forgive we-know-not-whom for we-know-not-what.

The expressions "whoever you are, I forgive you" and "whatever you did, I forgive you" aspire to forgiveness of this ultra-generic and unlimited sort. Often, of course, those who use these expressions do not actually mean to forgive anyone for any trespass whatsoever; it would make a great difference to them if they were to discover that the wrongdoer was a trusted friend rather than a stranger, or that the offense was serious rather than slight. But, at this extreme, it is possible for us to forgive without ever knowing or realizing what or whom we forgive, so long as we explicitly remember that we were somehow wronged by someone.[5] Accordingly, Martin remembers far more about the abuse than forgiving it requires. Martin may forgive his father for the totality of the abuse, which includes locking him in the closet and destroying his school project, and Martin may do this in spite of the fact that he is wrong about the frog and much else besides. He might be wrong about everything but still succeed in forgiving whatever there was to forgive.

At the opposite extreme, the EMI might be refined in a way that requires us to explicitly remember everything about the wrongs that we wish to forgive. Accordingly, it is within Martin's power to forgive his father only for what Martin wholly and 100% accurately remembers about his past. Accordingly, Martin can at most forgive his father only parts of the abuse, e.g., for shoving him, but cannot forgive him for withholding food or destroying his school project. Moreover, on this view, Martin may not even be able to forgive his father for shoving him if Martin does not also recall that he suffered a concussion as a result, or if Martin falsely remembers that he had a bloody nose, and so on. Even at this exacting extreme, however, Martin need not remember or be right about such details as dates or times or the color of the walls. He need not remember such details, at least, unless they are somehow morally relevant. Martin and other would-be forgivers must entirely and accurately remember all of the relevantly wrong-making features of the wrongdoer's wrongdoing.

Notice that the more Martin needs to know before he can forgive, the lower the risk is for inadvertent forgiveness, and the smaller the role is for something like un-forgiveness. If Martin cannot forgive his father for withholding food or destroying his school project, for example, then un-forgiveness won't be needed when Martin finally finds out about these things and becomes furious once again. On the preceding analysis, Martin didn't forgive his father to begin with. Likewise, un-forgiveness will not be needed when Jim is outraged to learn that Alex's latest affair was just the latest in a long series. Since Jim didn't know about this morally relevant (relational) property of Alex's latest affair, he didn't forgive her in the first place. Un-forgiveness has no work to do if forgiveness hasn't yet occurred. There still might be a role for un-forgiveness in the event that a forgiver underestimates their resentment and desire for revenge, but it will be curtailed.

The first refinement of the EMI has us forgiving too much and inflates the need for something like un-forgiveness. Although the second refinement almost entirely dispenses with the need for un-forgiveness, it drastically narrows the scope of what we can forgive. It has us forgiving too little, if we even manage to forgive anything at all. Any plausible middle path will need to rule out the possibility of inadvertent forgiveness while allowing us to forgive what we (explicitly) remember only incompletely and imperfectly.

And there are many paths to try.[6] For example, we might say that Martin can forgive all and only those wrongdoings that fall under a specific category (abuse), provided that Martin has an explicit memory of enough wrongdoings in that same category. Accordingly, Martin can forgive his father for the school project because he remembers the yelling, shoving, and so on. Likewise, Jim can forgive Alex for all affairs by virtue of having an explicit memory of the most recent one. Again, any plausible refinement must rule out inadvertent or accidental forgiveness. Any refinement that allows Jim to inadvertently forgive all of Alex's affairs by forgiving one affair also allows too much. And any refinement that allows Martin to inadvertently forgive all abuses by forgiving some abuse allows too much. It is not enough that the other abuses are in the same category or cluster as the abuses that forgivers want to forgive. Forgivers must actually want to forgive the other abuses.

Yet, Martin may not know exactly what he wants to forgive, especially when it comes to unknown abuses. For example, Martin might not want to forgive unknown abuse if the abuse was sexual. Or he might not be inclined to forgive the abuse if it lasted four years rather than two. Appealing to dispositions or counterfactuals can help to clarify what the forgiver does and does not want to forgive. Accordingly, if Martin would not forgive his father for sexual abuse if he were to find out about it, then Martin does not (intend to) forgive him for this now. If Jim would not forgive Alex for the other affairs if he were to find out about them, then Jim does not (intend to) forgive her for these other affairs now.

Conversely, if Martin would forgive his father, then Martin does (intend to) forgive him now. And if Jim would forgive Alex, then Jim does (intend to) forgive her now. Here we see the limits of an appeal to counterfactuals. Suppose Jim does not know about the series of infidelities, but that he would forgive Alex if he were to find out about them. It follows from the present approach that when Jim forgives Alex for her infidelity, he thereby forgives all of it. Jim forgives the affairs not (only) counterfactually but actually. Suppose that, after forgiving Alex, Jim actually learns about the affairs. If already forgave Alex for these affairs, then he cannot forgive her for them now. At most, he can renew his forgiveness. Likewise, and somewhat paradoxically, if Martin would have forgiven his father (before he found out about the sexual abuse), then he cannot forgive his father when he actually does find out about it. At most, he can renew his forgiveness.

These kinds of puzzles are familiar to philosophers and not a reason to be discouraged. What we succeed in thinking about, speaking about, and doing does not depend only on what we know. One who is ignorant of the chemical structure of water can succeed in thinking about H20. One who knows little can talk about a lot. Without knowing it, one can tip over a plant or block an entryway. The world we occupy and the knowledge held by our communities variously extends the reach of our minds, language, and action. But exactly how far our reach extends and how it does so is a matter for debate. That the scope of (explicit) memory and personal forgiveness, in particular, extends beyond what we know is to be expected. Here, too, further inquiry is needed to provide an account of how far it extends and how it does so.

What have we forgiven? For what have we been forgiven? Is it possible to worry too much about details? Too little? We live out these questions daily, and much depends on how we answer them. As Elshtain (2003: 51) points out, victims of wrongdoing may especially care about the explicit memory of details: "What happened-when, where, how: we should never underestimate how important this is to survivors." Details often matter to those who seek forgiveness, too. True, some offenders simply want the victim's blame-feelings to stop, for life to go on as before, by whatever means. But at least some offenders wish for the victim to know what they forgive and, nonetheless, to forgive. If a knowing-forgiveness is hoped for, being forgiven by someone who barely remembers what happened will not bring as much healing. Being forgiven by someone who knows about only one of several affairs will not ultimately heal. Being forgiven by third parties and proxies will not ultimately heal. And what ultimately heals may reveal the very nature of forgiveness. In whatever way the EMI is refined, this refinement has consequences for how we ought to go about the work of forgiveness and what we accomplish when we do it.

6. The Value of Forgiveness

The foregoing is neutral on the matter of the desirability, appropriateness, or value of forgiveness. If forgiveness is a good thing and requires knowledge, it follows that some good things require knowledge. However, this chapter leaves ample room for the fact that responses to wrongdoing grounded in ignorance or nescience may reduce suffering or promote greater goods. In all-too-common circumstances, responses such as denying, ignoring, excusing, minimizing, or condoning may be adaptive, justified, or best. After severe trauma, Brison (2002) notes, acknowledging how one has been wronged may shatter one's worldview, relationships, and sense of self, and may painfully compound injuries. More broadly, those who feel powerless may ignore or accept wrongdoing if a protest is dangerous or impossible. Yet others may ignore wrongs done to them because the wrongs are insignificant or simply because they wish to move on.

According to Nietzsche (1887), forgetting is "no mere *vis inertiae*," but an active force without which there would be "no hope, no pride, no *present*." Forgetting, too, may be the only or only practical course available to us. As with ignoring, excusing, minimizing, or condoning wrongdoings, forgetting wrongdoings enables people to get along, move on, or just survive whole. Driver, in the course of defending "virtues of ignorance," maintains that "it is good to forget harms when remembering them does no good and, indeed will harm oneself or others" (2001: 32). Like other modes of not-knowing, forgetting might be best. However, even when forgetting is adaptive, justified, or best, it is not a form of forgiveness. More strongly: to the degree forgetting obscures wrongdoings as such, it also obstructs forgiveness.

Notes

1. Wrongdoers may be responsible for only some part or aspect of a wrongdoing. It is for this part or aspect that we can forgive them.
2. On a weaker formulation, EMI is the thesis that explicit remembering is required to realize an ideal that is approximated by non-ideal or imperfect forms of forgiveness. On a still-weaker formulation, EMI is the thesis that explicit remembering is required for in importantly distinct kind of forgiveness (among other kinds) that has importantly distinct ends. My own view is neutral between these formulations.
3. True, someone who thinks of nothing besides being wronged cannot forgive because there is no time to think about anything else (including forgiveness). However, since any repetitive thought presents the same obstacle, the content is irrelevant. It is for the same reason that someone who can think only about the pilot light on the stove cannot forgive. In this case, the obstacle is not repetitive thinking *about wrongdoing* but repetitive thinking simplicter.
4. Alex can be forgiven for what is actual: that she tried or wanted to have an affair, that she is presently steadily disposed to having such affairs, and so on.
5. According to what is sometimes called Russell's principle, by contrast, a person cannot think about an object unless they know which object it is that they're thinking about. As Evans (1982) puts it, the person must have a "discriminating conception" of the object.
6. Thanks to the editor for suggesting these possible strategies and for generally thoughtful and helpful comments.

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