Explanation and evaluation in Foucault's genealogy of morality

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Abstract
Philosophers have cataloged a range of genealogical methods by which different sorts of normative conclusions can be established. Although such methods provide diverging ways of pursuing genealogical inquiry, they typically converge in eschewing historiographic methodology, in favor of a uniquely philosophical approach. In contrast, one genealogist who drew on historiographic methodology is Michel Foucault. This article presents the motivations and advantages of Foucault's genealogical use of such a methodology. It advances two main claims. First, that Foucault's early 1970s work employs a distinct genealogical method, which borrows from contemporary historiographic models of explanation to expand the range of objects that are proper to genealogical accounts of historical change. I demonstrate how Foucault modifies two central commitments of Nietzsche by broadening the dimensions of genealogical inquiry and explanation. Second, that historical method has normative relevance for genealogy, insofar as different historiographic choices can lead to different normative conclusions. I motivate this second claim by explaining how Foucault's multidimensional genealogical method expands both (a) the range of objects that are subject to evaluative assessment, and (b) the set of possible prescriptive recommendations that follow from such assessment.
Introduction

Genealogy is traditionally associated with a debunking normative function, but recent scholarship has cataloged a range of other normative conclusions that genealogies can draw. In addition to negative evaluations, genealogies are now also seen to offer problematizing, possibilizing, vindicatory, or ameliorative conclusions.¹ This pluralization of normative upshots has been matched by a pluralization of method: state of nature, real and fictional, hyperbolic, consonant and dissonant, and pragmatic genealogical methods are all offered as legitimate modes of genealogical inquiry.² Often, the method employed bears a non-arbitrary connection to the sort of evaluative conclusion reached. For example, state of nature genealogies typically deliver vindicatory conclusions, and Bernard Williams (2002) thus seeks to vindicate truth’s intrinsic value by appealing to a fictional state of nature in addition to some version of real history. Hence the various normative conclusions reached by genealogy are in fact reached by way of differing methodological means. Different sorts of genealogies, one may say, do different normative things.

However, at least one domain of methodological choices has largely been neglected in recent discussions of genealogy. This is the domain of history in general, and historiographic approaches to historical explanation in particular. By this claim I mean that in recent years, philosophers have either (a) failed to account for how genealogy relates to history, as a distinct academic practice that has, among other aims, that of explaining historical change; or (b) advocated a strict separation between the two methodologies, thus precluding the use of historiographic models of explanation within genealogy. Of course, the idea that there is some important link between genealogy and history extends at least back to Nietzsche, who wrote in On the Genealogy of Morality that he sought “a real history of morality” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 8), and for whom, according to Alexander Nehamas, “genealogy simply is history, correctly practiced” (Nehamas, 1985, p. 246n). Yet while certain philosophers continue to construct genealogies that aim at some version of “real history,”³ another tendency views genealogy as concerned with its own, distinct philosophical problems. Articulating a version of the latter position, Martin Saar has argued that genealogy is in fact “history differently practiced, or, history with a difference that can only be accounted for philosophically” (Saar, 2008, p. 297). On the question of explanation, Saar claims that genealogy eschews traditional historiographic approaches, to instead explain historical transformation foremost in relation to “forces and powers” (Saar, 2008, p. 312). On this view, genealogy and history differ (among other reasons) insofar as they employ competing models of historical explanation.

One genealogist for whom history—as practiced by contemporary historians—was instead important, and who employed a certain historiographic approach to explanation in his work, is Michel Foucault. This interpretation may be surprising to those who hold the consensus view that Nietzsche is Foucault’s only significant influence for his genealogical methodology. However, in multiple texts and interviews, Foucault also avows the impact of contemporary historians on his method and, in particular, notes the influence of the French Annales school⁴ on his understanding of historical change. In addition, recently published work from the early 1970s⁵ reveals a commitment to robust historical explanation, which loosely follows the model of this school. While commentators have identified the influence of historical scholarship on Foucault’s earlier, pre-genealogical works, these more recent publications provide evidence of their impact on his genealogical period, too.⁶

This article will advance two main claims. First, that Foucault’s early genealogies and, in particular, what I term his “genealogy of morality,” are examples of what may be considered multidimensional genealogy. As I explain at greater length below, multidimensional genealogy is distinctive in that it borrows from historiographic modes of explanation to expand the range of objects that are proper to genealogical accounts of historical change. This form of genealogy pluralizes the dimensions of inquiry and explanation so that, in contrast to Nietzsche, forces and powers are no longer the only causes of change. Such dimensions include, for example, economic processes and institutional structures. As I demonstrate below, Foucault’s genealogy of morality explains the emergence of our specifically modern morality as the outcome of a political struggle that is conditioned by the development of industrial capitalism, the political ascendance of the bourgeoisie, and the earlier consolidation of the absolutist state. With this genealogical explanation of morality, Foucault thus provides a modern transcription of Nietzsche’s, which instead
investigates only the archaic and pre-modern bases of morality. I contend that Annales school historians—and, in particular, Fernand Braudel—give Foucault the historiographic tools he uses for such an explanatory account.

The second claim advanced by this article is that historiography has normative relevance for genealogy, insofar as different choices of historical method can lead to different normative conclusions. I shall motivate this claim by explaining how Foucault’s use of multidimensional genealogy expands both (a) the range of objects that are subject to evaluative assessment, and (b) the set of possible prescriptive recommendations that follow from such assessment. In establishing the connection between morality and other practices or historical processes, Foucault illustrates how the critical target of a genealogy of morality may extend beyond morality itself, to those other practices or processes to which it is thus linked (a). And in thereby linking moral beliefs and values to processes beyond the control of individual agents, Foucault allows for prescriptions that call not for individual self-transformation, but instead for social transformation (b). In contrast to Nietzsche, who recommends the revaluation of values on the part of individuals, Foucault’s multidimensional analysis of morality indicates that the overcoming of morality will ultimately require the transformation of those deeper structures and power relations to which it is linked. Such a use of historical methods thereby expands not only the explanatory scope of genealogical inquiry, but also its normative range.

I begin by providing an overview of two commitments that Foucault borrows from Nietzsche (Section 2), before exploring how he modifies these commitments through his appropriation of Annales school methodology (Section 3). I then apply my concept of multidimensional genealogy to a reading of Foucault’s genealogy of morality (Section 4), before arguing for the normative relevance of historiography to genealogy (Section 5). Throughout this article, Nietzsche will stand as a reference point that brings Foucault’s unique historiographic commitments into greater relief.

## 2 | NIETZSCHE

Foucault’s signature statement on Nietzschean genealogy is found in his 1971 essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History” (Foucault, 1998a) and it is here that we shall start. I wish to argue that Foucault borrows two features of Nietzschean genealogy—we will later track how he transforms them both.

The first feature is what we may call the causal plurality of historical transformations. According to Nietzsche, the historical development of certain practices or values cannot be reduced to a single cause. Instead, such practices or values continuously develop through history by way of successive transformations and causal “lines of development” (Geuss, 1994, p. 275). In the second essay of his *Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche thus claims that “anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 51). The reason that we have inherited a certain practice or value cannot be reduced to a single cause buried somewhere in the practice or value’s history—contra, for example, the state of nature genealogies offered by Fricker, Craig, or Williams, we would be unable to trace epistemic practices or virtues back to fundamental epistemic needs, and thus also unable to isolate any essential features which “bear the necessity of the origin” (Fricker, 2008, p. 48). Instead, genealogy reveals the plural and temporally discreet causes that have all contributed to the present determination of the genealogical object. In his essay on Nietzsche, Foucault construes the role of genealogy as that of recording the history of successive “substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals.” Rather than some object having a single origin or unitary cause, objects are instead linked to multiple “points of emergence” (Foucault, 1998a, p. 378), which determine their features in varied ways. In reading history as a series of discreet and discontinuous transformations, Foucault thus confirms Nietzsche’s commitment to interpreting historical transformations on the basis of causal plurality.

The second feature that Foucault borrows from Nietzsche involves the primary principle of genealogical explanation. For Nietzsche, historical transformations are foremost explained in relation to the will to power, with the latter serving as a basic genealogical “explanans” (Gordon, 2019, p. 154). Here I agree with Martin Saar, according to whom, in the *Genealogy of Morality*, “the doctrine of the ‘will to power’ plays the role of an explanatory mechanism that makes historical events and changes ‘readable'” (Saar, 2008, p. 306). When diagnosing some historical change,
Nietzsche will accordingly locate the cause of this change in a localized expression of the will to power, which is often articulated through a power struggle.\(^9\) Nietzsche characterizes this principle according to which “a power-will is acted out in all that happens,” as a “major point of historical method” (Nietzsche, 2007, p. 52). Such an explanatory model is perhaps featured most prominently in the first essay of the *Genealogy of Morality*; there, the *resentment* experienced by slaves leads to a desire for revenge, which in turn catalyzes a major revaluation of values and the concomitant increase of slaves’ self-perceived power. The cause of this early transcription of Christian morality is squarely located in the struggle through which slaves acted according to what Brian Leiter qualifies as “prudential or self-interested considerations” (Leiter, 2015, p. 156). Historical transformations are thus explained as outcomes of conflicts between individuals and groups struggling to increase their power and to satisfy prudential aims.

In “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault uses the language of “subjugations,” “dominations” and “forces” to similarly explain historical transformation. The events traced by genealogy are understood as “episodes in a series of subjugations” and indicate “the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power” (Foucault, 1998a, p. 381). Though Foucault mostly avoids the concept of the will to power, his more general emphasis on power struggles indicates his broad conformity with Nietzsche. As in Nietzsche, power struggles provide the primary reference point for genealogical explanation. Here, then, we see an application of Foucault’s basic analytic of power—\(^10\)—which understands power relations to traverse all social phenomena—to the problem of historical transformation. Just as Foucault’s social analysis seeks to demonstrate the inextricable relationship between social practices and relations of power, so his approach to history prioritizes such relations in the explanation of change.

I take it that these two Nietzschean commitments—to causal plurality and to power struggles *qua* principle of historical explanation—adequately capture an important dimension of Foucault’s genealogical method. However, while commentators typically assume that Foucault’s method remains more or less consistent over his genealogical period of the 1970s, it is important to note that distinct genealogical approaches may be found in his *oeuvre*.\(^11\) Influenced in part by historian Paul Veyne, who advocated a strict historical nominalism that eschewed appeals to causality,\(^12\) Foucault’s later 1970s genealogies—found in his 1978 *Security, Territory, Population* and 1979 *The Birth of Biopolitics*—seem to turn sharply away from both of the commitments discussed above. In these genealogies, Foucault no longer seeks causal explanations for the emergence of new forms of power—such as government or biopolitics—while the historical narratives he traces focus less on actual conflict than on discursive transformations in the history of ideas. For the remainder of this paper, I will instead focus on what I term Foucault’s “early genealogical period,” which begins with his 1971–1972 lecture course at the Collège de France, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, and which extends through the publication of *Discipline & Punish* in 1975.\(^13\) I choose this period because of its basic, if qualified, accordance with Nietzsche’s causal commitments, and due to its distinctive use of *Annales* school historiography throughout—a use which commentators have not considered. I also choose it because it covers a series of texts that collectively constitute a “genealogy of morality,” while the latter provides a felicitous point of comparison with Nietzsche’s own genealogy of morality.

Accordingly, I submit that Foucault’s early genealogical period evidences not only a (qualified) commitment to certain Nietzschean genealogical principles, but also to historiographic positions borrowed from the *Annales* school. The latter commitment is manifested in two ways. First, in a set of writings and interviews in which Foucault approvingly describes *Annales* school methodology, and specifically avows its influence on his own thought. Second, in the actual model of historical explanation that his genealogy of morality employs. In the following section, I address the first of these by explaining how the influence of the *Annales* school—and in particular, the influence of Braudel—leads Foucault to modify the genealogical principles he borrows from Nietzsche, and thereby develop his multidimensional genealogical method. In Section 4, I illustrate Foucault’s adherence to a kind of *Annales* school historiography by reconstructing his genealogy of morality along with the mode of explanation employed therein.
BRAUDEL AND THE ANNALES SCHOOL

While the different historians associated with the Annales school each brought their own unique projects and orientations, they were united in their departure from traditional conceptions of history as the mere narrative of battles, treaties, and the deeds of rulers (Flynn, 2005, p. 13). The annalistes instead sought to analyze historical transformations in relation to broader social, economic, and geographical patterns that were more primary than individual human action. It is perhaps the most famous concept—the longue durée—of the most famous Annales historian—Braudel—that most strikingly crystallizes their shared goal of “transcending the individual and the particular event” (Braudel, 1980, p. 10), in favor of analysis of the slow and almost imperceptible mutations of social structures and material conditions over the course of centuries. In what follows, I focus foremost on the methodology of Braudel.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, Foucault repeatedly noted the general intellectual importance of the Annales’ school and often avowed its influence on his own work. Many of these comments were made in the late 1960s, as commentary on his pre-genealogical works such as The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge. The timing of such comments perhaps explains why many commentators only consider the influence of the Annales school on Foucault’s archaeological period, and implicitly disregard its influence on his later work. However, Foucault continues to explicitly—if less frequently—avow its influence into the 1970s, at which point he had already turned to genealogy. There is thus prima facie reason to believe that his genealogical works owe something to the school. This is in fact what I will demonstrate in Section 4, in my reconstruction of Foucault’s genealogy of morality. Here I shall first present the model of causality and explanation which he borrows from Braudel, and which entails a modification of the Nietzschean principles canvassed above.

I submit that Foucault specifically adopts two historiographic principles from Braudel: (a) a descriptive principle of “vertical discontinuity,” and (b) an explanatory principle of “vertical explanation.” Beginning with (a), it is an established point that like Nietzsche, Foucault sought to challenge ideas of historical continuity, and to indicate some of the major points of discontinuity or rupture throughout human history, whether in the history of social practices or systems of knowledge. Such discontinuities are foremost diachronic discontinuities, insofar as they indicate the transformation of a practice across discreet points in time. However, across his work and in his comments on the Annales school, Foucault also refers to discontinuity across different temporal levels of analysis, or what I term “vertical discontinuity.” According to the latter, descriptive principle, historical and sociological analysis can isolate distinct levels of social reality to which specific temporalities or paths of historical development pertain. To each of these levels belongs its own periodization, while between these levels one may find not relations of continuity or synchronicity, but rather discontinuity and asynchronicity. A crucial reference point for such a notion of discontinuity is Braudel’s famous division of historical time into three distinct levels: that of a geographical time (which consists in extremely slow-moving transformations in the relationship between human beings and their natural environment); a social time (which includes gradual changes in economies and forms of social and political organization); and a time that is structured by the actions of individual agents and takes the form of the events of traditional history (Braudel, 1972, pp. 20–21; Braudel, 1980, pp. 27–34). Rather than coding all phenomena in one continuous, temporal movement, Braudel dissociated different layers of such phenomena, and situated each within the specific temporality to which it belongs. Although Foucault does not borrow Braudel’s exact breakdown of levels—for example, he mostly abstains from analysis of geographical changes—I submit that he nonetheless does borrow the idea that historical reality is discontinuous not only horizontally, according to diachronic development, but also vertically, and that to different levels of events pertain discreet temporalities or structures of historical time. Thus, evoking the image of historical time as constituted by various, discontinuous levels, Foucault writes, in a 1972 essay, “History appears then not as a great continuity underneath an apparent discontinuity, but as a tangle of superimposed discontinuities” (Foucault, 1998d, p. 429).

In some of his writings and interviews, however, Foucault establishes a further explanatory aim of genealogy, beyond this merely descriptive aim. Genealogy thus seeks not merely to describe the nature of discreet temporalities, but to also explain the relations between them such that they collectively contribute to historical
transformations. Accordingly, to the descriptive goal of presenting vertical discontinuities (a), one may add a further explanatory goal of providing what we might call “vertical explanations”\(^{17}\) (b): the latter would consist in the explanation of some event or process on one level of historical time in connection to that of another level. Such an explanatory model thus aims to explain how two or more distinct levels causally interact; how, for example, the social organization of peasant life responds to long-term environmental changes, or how changes in prices affect political regimes. Foucault articulates both the descriptive and explanatory aim in the following passage:

It's not a matter of locating everything on one level, that of the event, but of realizing that there is actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects ... The problem is at once to distinguish among events, to differentiate the networks and levels to which they belong, and to reconstitute the lines along which they are connected and engender one another. (Foucault, 1980c, pp. 113–114, translation modified).

The task of historical explanation now consists in explaining how the events of one level enable, constrain, or condition those on another level, or how events on multiple levels interact to produce further transformation. Foucault thus articulates this task as centrally involving “the problem of reciprocal determinations of these layers” (Foucault, 1998c, p. 282). Rather than exploring the mere diachronic or horizontal connections of traditional historiography—how, for example, Event \(T_1\) causes Event \(T_2\)—vertical explanations establish causal connections across multiple temporal dimensions; they may explain, for example, how an event occurring over a certain time span in one temporal layer can interact with another event occurring over a different time span in a different layer, to produce a third event, located on a third layer.

Before clarifying how the principles of vertical discontinuity and explanation modify Nietzschean genealogy, there is one implicit feature of such principles that should be made explicit. This feature involves the hierarchical ordering of historical layers. The various “sedimentary strata” (Foucault, 2010, p. 3) of historical analysis occupy relative positions of causal weight or influence, such that “deeper” levels will often prove to have greater effects than those levels which are more superficial. Hierarchization does not, however, entail causal reduction, as though all phenomena at higher levels can be exhaustively explained by the causal force of lower-level phenomena. Instead, the lower levels may be helpfully viewed as conditions of emergence for a configuration of which they remain part. Thus, if for Braudel, “it is in relation to ... expanses of slow-moving history that the whole of history is to be rethought, as if on the basis of an infrastructure,” (Braudel, 1980, p. 33) he also emphasizes that history will be analyzed not exhaustively qua infrastructure, but as a “constellation,” of which the “depths” are nonetheless the conditioning element: “the problem for anyone tackling the world scene is to define a hierarchy of forces, of currents, of particular movements, and then tackle them as an entire constellation” (Braudel, 1980, 34). Such an approach is perhaps most evident in The Archaeology of Knowledge, in which Foucault comprehensively theorizes the forms of “hierarchy, dominance, stratification, univocal determination, [and] circular causality” that can be established among historical strata (Foucault, 2010, p. 4); it is also evident in The Order of Things, in which the history of the human sciences is analyzed in relation to more foundational epistemes. In the following section, I shall demonstrate that an analogous model of hierarchical ordering is also employed in Foucault’s early genealogical period.

I submit that by thus drawing on Braudel’s historiography, Foucault pluralizes the dimensions of genealogical inquiry and explanation, and sketches the contours of a multidimensional genealogical method. The commitments of the latter will come out most clearly by way of a contrast with Nietzsche. Recall the two primary features of Nietzschean genealogy canvassed above: (a) the causal plurality of historical transformation, and (b) the use of power struggles as the primary mechanism for genealogical explanation. Both of these commitments have now been modified. With the pluralization of the dimensions of genealogical inquiry, historical transformation no longer consists only in the serialized power struggles through which beliefs and values successively transform by way of the forceful imposition of new interpretations of such beliefs and values. Now, historical transformation—while still often occurring by way of struggles—will also include broader social and material dimensionality, in which deeper layers of social
(or geographical) temporality will in some way condition or provoke the transformation. A genealogical inquiry will be seen as incomplete if it does not consider other dimensions such as these. With the pluralization of the dimensions of genealogical explanation, Foucault will also now call attention to those causes beyond the will to power of agents pursuing prudential aims. In extending causality vertically downward, Foucault allows for the possibility that deeper structural patterns may produce non-insignificant effects on the nature of transformations. I suggest that such modifications represent a multidimensional genealogy, to the extent that both genealogical inquiry and explanation now draw on social and material dimensions that exceed Nietzsche’s narrower interpretive focus on struggles.

Here I do not wish to suggest that Nietzsche neglects to consider any preconditions for the struggles found in his genealogy of morality. As Geuss, for example, has noted, the success of the slave-revolt in morality in some way requires the prior existence of a priestly class which could in turn support the revolt (Geuss, 1997, p. 11). Nonetheless, Nietzsche maintains that it is still the will to power—acting by way of historically available resources—which foremost explains historical transformation, whereas Foucault de-emphasizes power struggles, to equally accommodate the explanatory contributions of other social and material dimensions. As we will see below, Foucault claims that modern morality ultimately emerges as a response to material changes in eighteenth and nineteenth century political economy, whereas an analogous model of explanation—travelling from non-agential, material transformation all the way to moral transformation—is not applicable to Nietzsche. Admittedly, in merely modifying—and not, for example, abandoning—the principles of causal plurality and power struggles qua explanatory mechanism, Foucault does remain close to Nietzsche in important ways. Nonetheless, the former has clearly widened the scope of genealogical inquiry, by incorporating social domains that had previously been the reserve of historians.

If at this point in my article I have successfully shown that Foucault engages with the Annales school and at least commits in principle to certain Braudelian elements of historiography, I have two further claims to establish. First, that Foucault in fact employs this quasi-Braudelian historical method in his genealogy of morality (Section 4). Second, that his choice to do so has significant normative implications, which are applicable to other genealogies, too (Section 5).

4 | FOUCAULT’S GENEALOGY OF MORALITY

I submit that a number of texts written by Foucault in the early to mid-1970s may be collectively read as a “genealogy of morality.” These include, notably, Discipline & Punish, which was published in 1975. But they also include Foucault’s 1972–1973 lecture course at the Collège de France, The Punitive Society, which may be justifiably read as preparatory notes for the more famous book (Harcourt, 2015, p. 299). Resources for Foucault’s genealogy of morality are also present in other lectures and interviews of the period, such as “Truth and Juridical Forms,” a series of lectures Foucault presented in Rio de Janeiro in 1973, and a 1972 interview, “On Popular Justice” (Foucault, 1980a; Foucault, 2000b). I consider all these texts together—and not just Discipline & Punish—because they provide varying but complementary perspectives on the emergence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of what Foucault calls a disciplinary or punitive society. While commentary on The Punitive Society (which received its English translation only in 2015) is still relatively sparse, discussions of Discipline & Punish typically focus less on morality, than on the normalizing technologies of the body that fall under the heading of “discipline.” Yet Foucault argues that morality is also an important means of ensuring discipline, while this argument is developed most extensively in The Punitive Society and the other texts of the early 1970s. That these texts should in fact be read as providing a genealogy of morality is a claim I shall presently defend.18

What is the nature of the morality for which Foucault provides a genealogy? To begin, it is the set of moral values and beliefs that is pervasive within the disciplinary society—that social order which produces obedient subjects through disciplinary strategies of control in institutions such as the school and the prison, and within society more broadly. Above all, it refers to a historically novel set of attitudes toward law, property, theft, crime, and criminality, through which penalty is reinterpreted in moral terms. Whereas earlier social norms had in fact condoned
certain forms of illegal behavior, this new moral code characterizes illegal behavior as specifically wrong or blameworthy. Foucault is thus concerned with a system of valuation in which “there is a junction of the moral and the penal,” or which consists in a “moralization of the penal system” (2015, p. 107). Rather than morality and penality representing separate realms—such that legally impermissible behavior need not entail morally impermissible behavior—modern, disciplinary morality holds that illegal behavior is constitutively immoral. Foucault contends that penality has not always had such a moral hue, and that the innovative character of modern morality lies precisely in its application of moral judgments to what had previously been an autonomous social sphere.

Accordingly, Foucault’s genealogy of morality investigates the historical conditions of such a moral transformation. To provide the barest of reconstructions, Foucault believes that this new moral order ultimately results from a historic “redistribution of illegalisms” (Foucault, 1995, p. 85). Under the Ancien Régime, the lower classes had participated in forms of illegalism that were tolerated—and even sometimes encouraged—by the ruling classes. Rather than the object of moral sanction, violations of the law were recognized as an ingrained feature of social life, which often benefited not just the poor, but also various fractions of the elite. However, by the end of the eighteenth century, the emergent capitalist reorganization of industrial and agricultural production had rendered bourgeois wealth and property newly vulnerable to theft. Within new factories and warehouses, machines and goods were subject to working class sabotage and appropriation; in the countryside, the enclosure of previously common land transformed peasants’ continued use of such land into threatening usurpations of private property. This novel threat to their consolidating wealth leads the bourgeoisie to “redistribute” the regime of illegalisms, such that the “illegalism of property” now practiced by the popular classes is cast in morally negative terms. In addition, the expansion of industrial production requires a disciplined and dependable labor force that resists the temptation to “dissipation,” and to which a corresponding “huge campaign of worker moralization” is launched (Foucault, 2015, p. 260). By such means, the ascendent bourgeoisie reorients the moral space of illegalism, so that the illegalism practiced by the popular classes is morally condemned—while the form of illegalism peculiar to the ruling classes, which involves not theft but the evasion of law, escapes such condemnation. It is thus here, at the end of the eighteenth century, that Foucault locates the dramatic emergence of a type of morality that continues to ensure obedience today.

Foucault thus attributes an important social function to modern morality: it upholds the interest of a dominant social class. He contends that it does so by dividing the poor against itself, through an artificial division between: (a) the class of “delinquents” and “criminals” who engage in criminal activity and are judged by society to be morally reprehensible; and (b), the working class, which instead adheres to the “allegedly universal moral categories” of the bourgeoisie, and whose obedience wins them general social approval. By thus dividing the latter from the former, modern morality pre-empts the possibility of solidarity between the working and “criminal” poor—between the “proletariat” and the “non-proletarianised people,” to use Foucault’s own categories (Foucault, 1980a, p. 15)—and wins the allegiance of the working class to a nonetheless unequal social order. By itself, this “moral ideology of the bourgeoisie” (Foucault, 1980a, p. 21) is insufficient to ensure domination—the technologies of normalization documented more extensively in Discipline & Punish remain, perhaps, more important to that end. However, in providing specific moral motivations for compliance with the law, such moral strategies constitute an important element of that broader disciplinary order.

In its broad contours, such a genealogy appears clearly Nietzschean in form. Foucault traces modern morality back in history to its emergence in a struggle characterized by the pursuit of prudential and apparently non-moral ends. As in Nietzsche, modern morality on this account springs from a revaluation of values: certain practices (forms of illegalism) long considered at least morally permissible are reinterpreted and given a novel, negative moral value. While Foucault will not attribute this revaluation to a “will to power,” he does think that it serves the prudential ends of a specific social group against those of another. At this point, the key divergence just lies in Foucault’s alteration of the social composition of the revaluation: in Foucault’s genealogy of morality, it is not the less powerful class that imposes its moral code on the more powerful (as in Nietzsche’s construal of the slave revolt in morality), but rather, the more powerful consolidating its domination of the less powerful. Like Nietzsche, Foucault further places this transformation within conditions of causal plurality. While such details were not glossed in my reconstruction above,
Foucault also contends that the specific content of modern morality is determined by the action of multiple agents and groups, each struggling in pursuit of its own aims; such agents and groups include Quaker and Methodist reform societies, philosophers and political figures who sought penal reform, and early advocates and theorists of policing. If morality remains a class project, and if such groups represent only varying fractions of the bourgeoisie, nonetheless morality's layers of meaning are successively given through numerous struggles and attempts to impose new “interpretations.” At first blush, then, Foucault's genealogy of morality appears like a modern transcription of Nietzsche's, remaining close to the latter in form.

However, Foucault also appeals to broader historical processes and structures, and thereby goes beyond Nietzsche's primary focus on struggles. In thus identifying multiple dimensions of genealogical analysis, he employs Braudelian principles of vertical discontinuity and explanation that are not found in Nietzsche. To reiterate my intentions, I am here seeking to argue that the historiographic commitments Foucault outlines in his more methodological comments, canvassed in Section 3, can be found to structure his genealogy of morality itself. Such commitments come out most clearly through careful attention to the structure of explanation employed by Foucault in accounting for the emergence of morality. Even if Foucault does not explicitly distinguish between multiple levels of social and historical analysis, I submit that such levels can nonetheless be identified in his genealogy. It is by first identifying and separating these levels that an explanation moving from one to the other—and thus demonstrating their causal interconnection—becomes possible.

One such level is a moral level. It refers foremost to those moral attitudes, practices, and struggles that concern the law. On this level, Foucault places the long history of popular and elite illegalisms, along with the historically variable moral standards vis-à-vis law, illegality, and those subjects who break the law. Another level that is implicit in Foucault's genealogy is a political economic level. This level concerns the social organization of production, forms of labor, and changing property regimes. While this sort of political economic level remains absent in Nietzsche—Nietzsche does not, for example, discuss the slave revolt in morality against the backdrop of economic changes—it is given great causal weight in Foucault's genealogy. For it is foremost the changes associated with nascent capitalism that provoke the development of an illegality of property on the part of the popular classes, which, in turn, provokes the subsequent moralization of penality. That Foucault does not run these two levels together can be seen in this attribution of causality to the political economic level, at the expense of the moral level. Absent the sudden transformation within the political economic level, there seems to be little reason that morality would have changed. Accordingly, the transformation in moral schemes receives its first impetus from a set of structures and practices heterogenous to morality as a distinct sphere. Foucault here provides a vertical explanation to the effect that socioeconomic transformation reorients previously stable social and legal relations, creating pressures and incentives that lead—by way of struggles and further mediating factors—to a transformation of morality. That Foucault considers the political economic dimension central to the story of modern morality is evident when he writes, in surprisingly programmatic terms, “The history of morality should be organized entirely by this question of the location and movement of wealth” (Foucault, 2015, p. 108).

This relationship of the political economic to the moral level of analysis provides one concrete illustration of the causal connection between distinct dimensions of historical analysis. It also demonstrates how Foucault's explanation of the emergence of morality will appeal to developments outside of a delimited sphere of moral practices. Yet Foucault's genealogy reveals other levels of analysis beyond those of the political economic and the moral. One such level is an institutional level, which refers to the historical temporality of institutional forms of political power. Foucault provides an analysis of this dimension when he describes the preconditions for the successful imposition of modern, moralized penalty. To impose its program, the bourgeoisie ultimately required political power, from which it had been excluded under the pre-revolutionary absolutist state. Yet when this class does take hold of power, it does not create ex nihilo a novel state apparatus to fit its needs. Instead, it inherits the already-existing absolutist state, whose history does not begin with the political ascendency of the bourgeoisie, but rather extends back to the gradual consolidation of state power through the late Middle Ages. Foucault accordingly locates an important temporal discontinuity between political power and institutional forms: while 1789 represent a dramatic rupture in the social
composition of state power, this rupture is not mirrored in the form of the state itself, which instead largely persists in its pre-revolutionary form. The time of political institutions here moves more slowly than that of revolutions, as the political rise of the bourgeoisie is conditioned by this older state form. Although his analysis of modern morality privileges the late eighteenth century, Foucault here draws attention to a longer, institutional periodization, in which he locates its further conditions of emergence. The “tangle of superimposed discontinuities” that Foucault theorizes in “Return to History” is thus illustrated in this multidimensional genealogy of morality, in which distinct moral, political economic, and institutional temporalities overlap and intersect to uniquely produce the morality we have inherited today.

I do not want to overstate the extent to which Foucault is following exactly in the footsteps of the Annales school or those of Braudel. His overview of political economy remains undeveloped in relation to his much richer description of morality, while in place of Braudel’s category of geographic time, he may be seen to substitute his own conception of “institutional time.” Though Foucault would occasionally label himself not just a philosopher but also a historian, he also distanced himself from claims of historical exhaustiveness (Foucault, 2000a, p. 223). Nonetheless, Foucault constructs a genealogy of morality with significantly greater historical nuance and complexity than that found in Nietzsche, while he does so by drawing on—if not fully adopting—some of the historiographic commitments of the annalistes. Insofar as his genealogy of morality presents a “history of the present,” then Foucault is able to indicate that our own morality embodies not just (contra Nietzsche), a certain relation of forces, but also a broader social order constructed on the basis of structures, processes, and institutional histories. Though morality indeed results in part from a forceful revaluation of values, it is further conditioned by those patterns of historical temporality first identified by “the historians.” As I shall now argue, Foucault’s pluralization of the dimensions of genealogical inquiry is relevant not only to the historical accuracy of genealogy; it is also relevant to genealogy’s normative ambitions.

5 | NORMATIVE RELEVANCE

Here I seek to show that by pluralizing the dimensions of genealogical inquiry, Foucault also expands genealogy’s normative range. In contrast to Nietzsche, Foucault’s genealogy of morality allows for the evaluation of practices beyond those of morality itself, while the resulting prescriptions will not be limited to prescriptions for individual self-transformative action, but may also include prescriptions for broader social transformation. I shall motivate this characterization by briefly illustrating the narrower evaluative range of Nietzschean genealogy, before turning to Foucault.

The primary object of evaluation, in On the Genealogy of Morality, is “morality.” Though “morality” does not designate a single entity, the morality of which Nietzsche is foremost critical refers basically to the values, beliefs, and affective structures peculiar to nineteenth century Christian morality. In examining the emergence of the latter, Nietzsche does not neglect its connection to other social practices—think, for example, of the link he establishes between creditor-debtor relations and guilt. However, the archaic historical dating of such practices—and the fact that Nietzsche mostly neglects to consider how the massive social transformations of subsequent centuries (and millennia) may have further transformed the nature of morality—indicates that he thinks it is coherent to analyze morality as a persisting set of values, beliefs, and affects that are somewhat insulated from other social changes. Though he may also oppose the broader, aspirationally democratic social order of modernity, he believes he can largely get to the explanatory root of this order by way of a historical examination of moral practices and their attendant power struggles. Put differently, Nietzsche certainly believes that morality is tied to a broader social and cultural order, which itself enforces a kind of moral coercion on the individual. However, in his genealogy of morality, the methodological prioritization of just one level of analysis—at the exclusion, for example, of independent analyses of economic practices or political institutions—entails that moral practices and struggles will be explanatorily prior to this order. For such methodological reasons, Nietzsche’s critique of morality remains, finally, a critique of morality.
The focus of evaluation on the sphere of moral practice, along with the standard for this evaluation, entail that the resulting normative prescription is restricted to individual action that aims at self-transformation. This evaluative standard has been cashed out by commentators in concepts such as human flourishing or the will to power. Typically, these concepts are predicated of individuals, such that Nietzsche's concern is with analyzing the deleterious effects of morality on flourishing or the will to power as experienced by human individuals. More specifically, Nietzsche is concerned with the effect of morality on “higher” individuals, because it is the latter who are, due to their own potential greatness, most constrained by morality. If the standard of critique is determined in relation to such individuals, and if the object of the critique is morality (as abstracted from broader historical processes), then Nietzsche’s prescriptive upshot is the revaluation of values on the part of higher individuals. By thus revaluing their values, individuals will be able to liberate themselves from those moral commitments or orientations that prevent them from flourishing. And as foremost a psychological and affective phenomenon, morality just is the sort of thing values, individuals will be able to liberate themselves from those moral commitments or orientations that prevent them from flourishing. And as foremost a psychological and affective phenomenon, morality just is the sort of thing that individuals can cast off—or the sort of thing to which one's attachment can at least be weakened (Leiter, 2015, p. 23). Accordingly, Nietzsche's genealogy (a) focuses evaluative assessment on a sphere of morality that is explanatorily primary to broader social practices and historical processes; and (b) offers a prescriptive recommendation to reevaluate values, the addressees of which are individuals acting qua individuals. Evaluation foremost targets the set of modern moral practices, and prescription motivates the self-transformation of individual agents.

Foucault expands the normative range of both of these domains. Beginning with evaluation, we may immediately note that Foucault's genealogy does not limit evaluation to morality as such. Instead, it extends its evaluation to practices outside the ambit of morality simpliciter, because Foucault maintains that such practices historically condition morality in essential ways. The very content and function of morality can only be explained by appeal to practices or historical developments that are not immediately moral, and so the evaluation of morality will also ultimately extend to such practices and developments. By providing a vertical explanation of morality that traces its development to distinct economic transformations and institutional structures, Foucault has shown that morality cannot be the root—or the sole root—of all broader problems or social pathologies. I shall explain Foucault's evaluative strategy below, but will first concretely illustrate why he thinks the separation of morality from other social spheres is untenable on analytical grounds.

Accordingly, Foucault maintains that the history of morality reveals a deep imbrication of the latter with the two other historical levels canvassed above: those of political-economic and institutional transformation. To begin with the first of these levels, we have seen that Foucault understands the emergence of morality to be causally connected to the development of capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. There is a co-constitutive relation here: morality is in part constitutive of the modern capitalist social order, because it contributes to the behaviors of obedience and respect of property required for production and capital accumulation. But capitalism is in part constitutive of morality, because it sets the parameters for forms of action that are to be understood through moral concepts—for example, property rights, which are required for capitalist development, entail a moral framework in which the violation of such rights is considered immoral. I take it that this sort of thought motivates Foucault's claim that "morality does not exist in people's heads; it is inscribed in power relations" and his suggestion that "power"—which should here be read to include morality—"is, in fact, one of the constitutive elements of the mode of production and functions at its heart" (Foucault, 2015, pp. 113, 231). That Foucault also views morality to be imbricated with institutional structures is made evident in his identification of a “linking together [of] morality, capitalist production, and the State apparatus” (Foucault, 2015, p. 112, italics added). If a key premise of the historical argument is that the state provides the political mechanisms by which bourgeois morality is imposed and maintained, then the state will be viewed as an essential support for modern moral practices, such that the latter come to depend on the former. Hence analysis of morality, as a genealogical object, necessarily spills into analysis of such broader historical domains. On a genealogical level, the examination of morality simpliciter is analytically untenable.

Foucault's broader evaluative perspective follows from this analytical claim. Just as the analysis of morality cannot be pursued in isolation from that of other practices, so the critical evaluation of morality must also extend to such practices. If Foucault's genealogy demonstrates that morality just is, in part, a mechanism for protecting an
unequal social order, then the critique of morality must also extend to a critique of this social order. Without consideration of other social spheres, the evaluation of morality would remain incomplete, unable to account for the full range of effects for which morality is responsible. (Thus it would be strange to question the negative moral interpretation of theft, without also questioning the unequal distribution of property which the negative interpretation justifies and supports. And also, strange to question the moralization of penalty more generally, without questioning the judicial institutions and discourses that sustain this moralization.) By training his genealogical eye on other historical levels, Foucault thus renders features of the latter as candidates for evaluation in a way that is often precluded by genealogies which instead isolate just a single concept or practice. This is not to say that every object of genealogy is always in fact connected to some other object, such that a critique of the former entails a critique of the latter. One may, at least in principle, imagine certain genealogies whose scope remains so narrow and focused that it does not require recourse to other historical domains. However, in his pluralization of the dimensions of genealogical inquiry, Foucault indicates a means for extending analysis and evaluation among those objects whose history does in fact indicate broader entanglement with other domains. And for Foucault, morality is certainly such an object.

How does Foucault motivate his genealogical evaluations? While long a controversial question in scholarship on Foucault, I think its most satisfactory answer can be found through an application of Matthieu Queloz’s (2022) recent elaboration of “pragmatic genealogy.” Of relevance here is Queloz’s suggestion that genealogies are not dyadic in structure, but rather triadic: genealogies connect not just some (a) higher element to its (b) lower origin, but also address (c) a specific audience or addressee. The normative consequence of this structure is that “genealogy is not intrinsically vindicatory or subversive, but vindicatory or subversive for someone.” Queloz expands: “There is a normative division [of] labour between the genealogy and the addressee: the addressee offers up an evaluative outlook, and the genealogy channels these values and revises the addressee’s understanding of how they are realized” (Queloz, 2022). Such a pragmatic reading of Foucault is illuminating because it reconciles two opposing interpretive tendencies in Foucault scholarship, which either claim (a) that Foucault pursues a normatively robust species of “debunking” genealogy, or (b) that Foucault’s genealogies are normatively neutral and seek to “problemitize” current practices by revealing their conditions of emergence, rather than condemning (or vindicating) such practices.24 A key problem with the former position is its apparent reliance on the genetic fallacy; an important reservation regarding the second follows from the observation that the terminology employed in Foucault’s genealogies (“domination,” “repression,” “subordination”) seems to imply a strongly normative reading. In contrast, an application of Queloz’s concept of pragmatic genealogy enables an interpretation such that Foucault’s genealogy of morality does not provide a self-motivating or independent evaluation of morality, even if his genealogies ultimately allow for certain evaluative conclusions made by the addressee. I shall now indicate how such a pragmatic interpretation might work.

Accordingly, we might say that Foucault’s genealogy of morality, while not immediately normative, in fact operates under the assumption of the normativity. Put differently, we might propose that this genealogy generates evaluative conclusions, but that it does so only on the basis of the prior normative commitments of its addressees. Here, the normative structure of genealogy would adopt the following conditional form, as described by Queloz: “if you care about the lower element, then you should care about the higher element” (Queloz, 2022). As applied to Foucault’s genealogy of morality, this conditional might look like the following: “if you care about social domination, then you should also care about morality.” The specific critical thrust would follow from the manner in which the addressee “cares” about social domination. If he or she is in fact opposed to domination, then the genealogy would generate a negative evaluation of that morality, which it has shown to in some way uphold domination. On this account, for Foucault’s genealogy to assume normativity means that it will not independently motivate critical concern for domination; however, it will motivate a normative link between domination and morality, such that a prior concern for the former will be shown to entail a concern for the latter. One advantage of this construal is that it makes sense of Foucault’s repeated claim that his work provides “instruments” or “tool boxes” for those already involved in political struggles (Foucault, 2000a, p. 236; Foucault, 1996a, p. 149). In such formulations—which he offers in numerous interviews—Foucault seems to in fact assume some set of basic, normative commitments on the
part of his addressees, to which his work responds by illustrating the full set of practices which deserve, given such commitments, further critical evaluation.

It is on this point—the full range of practices that are subject to evaluation—that Foucault diverges slightly from Queloz. The latter's conditional formulation of genealogical normativity certainly applies to a figure like Nietzsche, for whom the genealogical object is construed more narrowly. However, Foucault's historiographic nuance entails an extension of the formulation, “if you care about A, then you should care about B.” If, for Foucault, domination = A, and morality = B, we will also need C = capitalist property relations, and D = certain institutional structures, to capture the entanglements of these latter three phenomena: as we have shown above, morality cannot be insulated from such other practices, and so an evaluation of morality must extend to them as well. Accordingly, the conditional form of Foucault's critical strategy might look like the following: “if you are opposed to A (domination), then you should be opposed to B (morality), and if you are opposed to B (morality), then you should be opposed to C (capitalist property relations) and D (certain institutional structures).” This argumentative structure highlights the evaluative continuity Foucault establishes between such different levels of social analysis. Though evaluation is not independently motivated, the addressee’s prior normative commitments are able to trigger negative evaluations that extend beyond morality as such.

Foucault not only extends genealogy's normative range in the domain of evaluation; he also does so in the prescriptive domain, by enabling prescriptions that are not limited to individual self-transformation, but instead call for social transformation. Such prescriptions follow from Foucault's multidimensional analysis of morality. In showing that morality cannot be isolated as a narrowly psychological phenomenon—that it does not (only) exist “in people's heads”—he indicates that the overcoming of morality will likely also require transformation of those structures, processes, or power relations to which it is linked. Such an argument—which advocates for social transformation on the basis of the social (and not merely psychological) nature of morality—is presented in the following passage, partly quoted above: “The conclusion to be drawn ... is that morality does not exist in people' heads; it is inscribed in power relations and only the modification of these power relations can bring about the modification of morality” (Foucault, 2015, p. 113). Here we see that a Nietzschean strategy will be insufficient: the revaluation of values by an individual cannot fully free that individual from the harmful effects of morality, because such effects are tied to social practices outside the strictly moral sphere. For example, overcoming one’s negative apprehension of theft will not itself resolve the unequal distribution of property that the moral condemnation of theft seeks to protect. In fact, any individual action will only achieve limited success in addressing the latter structural or social problems to which morality contributes. Though in his later work Foucault advocated for apparently individualist “practices of the self,” his earlier genealogy of morality instead offers social transformation as the most effective means for countering the harmful effects of morality.

To be clear, I do not wish to argue that Foucault directly prescribes social transformation. As we have seen above, his genealogy does not independently generate normative conclusions, so it likewise does not independently generate those normative conclusions that take the form of prescriptions. Nonetheless, by way of the prior commitments of its addressees, it does still indirectly enable certain prescriptions. Thus, the prescription for social transformation should be seen as the upshot of a genealogy which demonstrates the unavailability of individual action as a solution to the problems of concern to such addressees. However, that Foucault indirectly offers this sort of collective prescription not only follows from his suggestion that individual action is unavailable as a solution, or from his genealogical illustration of the structural basis of morality. It also emerges as an inference from the numerous examples of collective action that he catalogs across his genealogy of morality. Contrary to pessimistic readings of Foucault, which hold him to foreclose the possibility of social transformation, a close reading of his early 1970s genealogy reveals numerous examples of transformative political struggles, such as wide-scale refusals to work, pervasive theft of private property, and prison revolts. Such examples often take an explicitly collective character, gravely threatening the social order and, in particular, “bourgeois wealth.” In fact, Foucault locates a primary danger of the new illegalisms of the nineteenth century in their specifically collective (or non-individualist) form: “what makes the [new] illegalism of dissipation more dangerous than [the older illegalism of] depredation is that it can more easily take
collective forms: in the first place, it is an illegalism that is easily spread” (Foucault, 2015, p. 191, 190). The apparent upshot of such passages is the idea that it is foremost action on such models that is sufficient to challenge the power relations of which morality is part. In contrast to other commentators, I would stop short of claiming that Foucault straightforwardly endorses such forms of action.26 As we have seen, such immediate evaluative and prescriptive judgements are beyond the normative scope of Foucauldian genealogy. However, in drawing attention to those socially transformative struggles which have challenged power, Foucault encourages his addressees to draw prescriptive conclusions of their own.

In both evaluative and prescriptive domains, then, Foucault’s historiographic commitments help to expand the normative range of genealogy. By examining the connection of moral practices to other social spheres and historical levels, Foucault allows for assessments and recommendations that extend beyond the moral practices themselves, and thus hit a wider array of evaluative targets. Foucault employed a quasi-Braudelian explanatory model to trace morality back to its complex historical conditions, thereby concluding that the appropriate prescription would differ in kind from that offered by Nietzsche. Not individual self-transformation, but only broader social transformation would be adequate to change the unequal structures of which morality was a constitutive part. This approach likely retains relevance for other genealogical projects, too. Admittedly, genealogy can pursue any of a perhaps infinite number of objects, while most objects will not have any significant connection to the kinds of historical processes and structures examined by Foucault. Similarly, prescriptions for individual action will be wholly appropriate to many of the problems analyzed therein. Yet if many social practices today are responsive to individual action, many others—including many of the most pernicious—surely require recourse to the forms of collective action and social transformation that a broader ranging analysis can motivate. Foucault’s multidimensional genealogy indicates one way to pursue such an analysis.

6 | CONCLUSION

This article has sought to establish two main claims. First, that Foucault’s genealogy of morality draws on contemporary historiography to expand the scope of genealogical inquiry, to include objects not analyzed in Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality. I have shown, in particular, how Foucault appropriates and modifies two central commitments of Nietzsche by drawing on a model of historical explanation, found in Braudel, which interprets historical transformations according to complex causal connections between different layers of social practice and historical time. Second, that this multidimensional inquiry broadens the scope of genealogical evaluation and prescription. I have shown how Foucault’s explanation of the emergence of morality entails negative assessments of social practices beyond morality simpliciter, and enables prescriptions for social transformation that are specifically indexed to such practices. In pursuing this second aim, I have sought to indicate the normative relevance of historiography more generally to genealogy. Simply put, different sorts of explanations lead to different evaluations and different prescriptions. This is not an argument for one genealogical method at the exclusion of all other methods, but instead an illustration of the important normative relevance of different explanatory models (while one might also acknowledge that even an apparent disavowal of historiography or “real history” represents a historiographic choice with normative implications of its own). If a drift in recent genealogical work has been away from history, this article may be viewed as nudging genealogy back in a historical direction.27

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ENDNOTES
1 For accounts of problematizing, possibilizing, vindicatory, and ameliorative genealogy, see, respectively: Koopman (2013), Lorenzini (2020), Williams (2002), and Haslanger (2012, p. 372) and Queloz (2021, pp. 201–211). The last account is in fact a gloss of the genealogy found in Fricker (2007, pp. 109–128).
3 See, for example, de Beistegui (2018), Erlenbusch-Anderson (2018), and Koopman (2019).
4 L’École des Annales refers to the successive generations of historians affiliated with Annales d’histoire économique et sociale, a journal founded in 1929 by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, and which dramatically transformed twentieth century French historiography. I return to this school briefly below.
5 In what follows I focus foremost on Foucault’s The Punitive Society, his 1972–1973 lecture course at the Collège de France, which appeared in English translation in 2015; the French version appeared only in 2013.
6 Examples of Foucault’s pre-genealogical works include The Order of Things and The Archaeology of Knowledge—first published, respectively, in 1966 and 1969. The two major works of Foucault’s genealogical period are Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume 1—published, respectively, in 1975 and 1976. See, Foucault (1994), Foucault (2010), Foucault (1995), and Foucault (1978).
7 For a discussion of Fricker’s distance on this point from both Foucault and Nietzsche, see Lorenzini (n.d.).
8 It may be noted that agreement with the view that Nietzsche is pursuing causal explanations does not necessarily entail a commitment to the view that his genealogies aim at real history. Instead, one can contend that Nietzsche’s genealogies provide fictional origin stories, while nonetheless maintaining that such origin stories are construed in causal terms. The latter option seems to track the position sketched by Saar, according to whom Nietzsche’s genealogies provide “hypothetical scenarios in which a specific origination or emergence is told in terms of causal processes related to power” (Saar, 2008, p. 308). For a more developed defense of this sort of causal interpretation—in the context of a broader discussion of Nietzsche’s naturalism—see Janaway (2007, pp. 34–53).
9 Nietzsche neatly articulates this conflictual articulation of the will to power in the following passage from The Will to Power: “[I]n the history of morality a will to power finds expression, through which now the slaves and oppressed, now the ill-constituted and those who suffer from themselves, now the mediocre attempt to make those value judgments prevail that are favorable to them” (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 216).
10 For the most famous statement of his analytic of power, see Foucault (1978, pp. 92–102).
11 For an account that more extensively details the differences between two such approaches during Foucault’s genealogical period, see Lichtenstein (2020).
12 See, for example, Veyne (1997) and also (1984, p. 91), where the author provocatively suggests that the “problem of causality in history is a survival of the paleoepistemological era.”
16 On this basic aim, see, for example, Revel (2010).
17 I borrow the spirit of this term from Braudel: “History accepts and discovers multidimensional explanations, reaching, as it were, vertically from one temporal plan to another” (Braudel, 1972, p. 16).
18 Such a genealogy should be distinguished from what Foucault calls, in a 1983 interview, a “genealogy of ethics.” The latter analyzes the changing ethical relationship of the subject to him- or herself, rather than the function of morality in ensuring obedience within disciplinary society. See Foucault (1997a, p. 266). Another commentator who has noted that The Punitive Society offers a “genealogy of morals” is Bernard Harcourt (2015, p. 290, Harcourt, 2018, p. 380). In The Punitive Society, Foucault himself uses the terms “history of morality” and “genealogy of our morality” (2015, p. 108, 102n), and in an interview from 1975, even claims: “If I wanted to be pretentious, I would use ‘the genealogy of morals’ as the general title of what I am doing” (1980b, p. 53).
19 Whereas the English edition of Discipline & Punish translates “illégalisme” as “illegality,” I translate the former as “illegalism,” to remain closer to the original French. For an extended discussion of the importance of the concept of illegalism in Foucault’s thought, see Feldman (2020).
One such agent is Patrick Colquhoun (1745–1820), who was a Scottish merchant and founder of England’s first police force. Foucault suggests that in Colquhoun’s writing, “we see the appearance of what will determine Western morality.” He then colorfully adds, “unfortunately, when we teach morality, when we study the history of morals, we always analyze the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and do not read this character, who is fundamental for our morality” (Foucault, 2015, p. 108).

While causal language remains relatively muted in *Discipline & Punish*, Foucault’s earlier texts and lectures employ more straightforwardly causal formulations. Consider, for example, Foucault’s unambiguous identification of the force which “activated” the emergence of discipline (and modern morality): “What activated the great renewal of the epoch was a problem of bodies and materiality, it was a question of physics: a new form of materiality taken by the apparatus of production, a new type of contact between this apparatus and those who make it function; new requirements imposed on individuals as productive forces” (Foucault, 2015, p. 261).

Foucault provides a condensed overview of this process in Foucault (2015, pp. 147–148). For a more extensive overview of the continuities between monarchical and bourgeois political and judicial forms, see Foucault (2019).

On this point, see Geuss (1997).

For the seminal elaboration of the latter interpretation, see Koopman (2013).

For a condensed treatment of this theme, see Foucault (1997b).

See, for example, Vásquez (2020, p. 957), where the author argues that Foucault makes a “quite evident effort to ‘valorize crime’” and that he offers an “illegal, criminal call to break the law” (Vásquez, 2020, p. 957).

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