East-West Connections:
Review of Asian Studies

Volume 5, Number 1
2005

Edited by
David Jones

A Publication of
The Asian Studies Development Program

The ASDP Association of Regional Centers

Georgia Philosophy Series
&
Oneonta Philosophy Studies

Manuscripts to be considered for publication should be double-spaced throughout, and should be submitted in duplicate with an electronic copy in Microsoft Word and a self-addressed, stamped envelope. All manuscripts should be sent to David Jones, Editor, at the Center for the Development of Asian Studies, Kennesaw State University, #1806 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw, GA, 30144-5591. Email the editor at <djones@ksumail.kennesaw.edu>

Subscriptions rates are $20.00 for individuals, and $60.00 for institutions. Present and future subscribers are invited to make a check payable to the Georgia Philosophy Series and send to: David Jones and the address below.

Title: East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies
Editor: David Jones
Subject: Asian Studies, Asian Studies Pedagogy
Cover Design: Chris Ralston
Typesetting & Layout: John L. Crow/Luxor Media Group, Inc.

Distributed by: Georgia Philosophy Series
#1806 1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA, 30144-5591
Phone: 770.423.6596; Fax: 770.423.6432
Email: djones@ksuweb.kennesaw.edu

East-West Connections:
Review of Asian Studies

Center for the Development of Asian Studies
Kennesaw State University
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591

Georgia Philosophy Series

Georgia Philosophy Series
#1806 1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA, 30144-5591

Asian Studies Development Program

In 1990, the Asian Studies Development Program was established by the East-West Center and University of Hawai`i to assist two and four-year colleges and universities incorporate Asian studies into the undergraduate curriculum.

As part of its goal of improving the long-term capacity of American higher education to teach about Asia, ASDP offers a variety of programs aimed at faculty, curriculum and institutional development, including summer residential institutes in Hawai`i, field seminars in Asia, and U.S. mainland workshops. ASDP provides on-going support for its alumni and other interested educators including the annual ASDP meeting, the ASDP newsletter, an active listserv for alumni and others, a website of undergraduate course syllabi and bibliographies on Asian topics and, more recently, East-West Connections, an annual volume of edited papers from the ASDP national meeting and submissions from outside the conference.

ASDP works collaboratively with institutions committed to developing and sustaining Asian studies programs by advising on strategies for developing Asian studies programs that include building faculty expertise, sources of funding and support from private foundations and government agencies, and the development of library and other resources. Close to 500 colleges and universities throughout the U.S. are involved in the ASDP network, and there are 20 ASDP regional centers that collaborate with each other as members of the Association of Regional Centers.

ASDP has received funding and support for its programs from the Freeman Foundation, the Henry Luce Foundation, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Korea Foundation, the Fulbright Group Travel Abroad Program and ASDP alumni, as well as the East-West Center and University of Hawai`i. Many ASDP alumni are actively involved in ASDP and are integral to its activities and accomplishments.

Elizabeth Buck and Roger T. Ames are Co-Directors of the Asian Studies Development Program.

East-West Center

The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, corporations, and the governments of the region.

Charles E. Morrison is President of the East-West Center.

The University of Hawai'i

The School of Hawaiian, Asian and Pacific Studies (SHAPS) represents the University of Hawai'i's commitment to education and research on Asia and the Pacific. SHAPS has the largest resource facility for Asian and Pacific studies in the world. Established in 1987, SHAPS offers academic programs in Asian Studies, Hawaiian Studies, and Pacific Islands Studies. SHAPS helps to coordinate the efforts of some 300 UH faculty who offer more than 600 courses related to Hawai'i, Asia, and the Pacific. The Asian Studies Development Program works primarily with the centers for Chinese Studies, Japanese Studies, Korean Studies, South Asian Studies and Southeast Asian Studies.

David McClain is President of the University of Hawai`i.

Editor's Note

We are pleased to present our readers with the fifth volume of *East-West Connections*. I am delighted with the contents in this issue that include both content and pedagogical articles on topics stretching across the spectrum of Asian Studies. This issue offers readers articles of social science content as well as from the humanities and the arts. The exhilarating keynote address at the 2004 ASDP National Conference in Kansas City by William Tsutsui, University of Kansas, launches the current issue. We are grateful for his willingness to have it included.

This issue of *Connections* would not have been possible without the hard work of Jeffrey Dippmann, its guest editor.

In spite of a number of obstacles, including going through the tenure and promotion process during the time of putting this issue together, Jeff was able to somehow pull it all together. With the exception of the final task of organizing the final manuscript for the printer, he was in charge of every aspect of getting this issue into your hands. Although he now knows this is no small task, he has once agreed to be the 2006 guest editor. This issue reflects favorably on Jeff's talents as a scholar, professor, and colleague. I am grateful for his commitment and diligence.

Under the guidance of Ronnie Littlejohn, *Connections'* Book Review section continues to provide a valuable service to our readers. We are grateful to Ronnie for his service.

This issue would not be possible without the cooperation from contributors, generosity from its editors and support from our patrons, the ASDP staff (Betty Buck, Roger Ames, Peter Hershock, Virginia Suddath, Grant Otoshi, and Sandy Osaka), and the ASDP Association of Regional Centers. ARC director Joseph Overton has been a long time friend of *Connections* and the architect of many valuable opportunities in Asian Studies for faculty members and students. We continue to appreciate the support from Charles Morrison, President of the East-West Center.

My thanks also goes out to John L. Crow, the production editor for this issue, for bringing Jeff's work to fruition and to Chris Ralston for the artwork for the cover design. To facilitate the production of *East-West Connections*, it is necessary to work closely with the hosts of the ASDP National Conferences. For our last issue, Michele Marion and her colleagues at Paradise Valley Community College in Phoenix were most cooperative as were Carolyn Kadel and her colleagues at Johnson County Community College in Kansas City for this 2005 issue. Working with such pleasant and organized people has made my job as editor of *Connections* much easier.

As the journal has evolved over the years, we continue to cultivate a special venue for publishing in Asian Studies.

—David Jones

East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies
Volume 5, Number 1 (2005)

Contents

Guest Editor's Note

It has been my sincere pleasure to act as guest editor for this, the fifth volume of *East-West Connections*. My own relationship with ASDP and the Association of Regional Centers (ARC) dates back to 2001, and since that time I have been most fortunate to meet, work with and develop lasting friendships with numerous new colleagues. This edition has truly been a labor of love, as each of you within the ASDP family has contributed to my life in countless ways. I especially want to thank Joe Overton, David Jones, Ronnie Littlejohn and Betty Buck for their sagely advise, constant encouragement and professionalism. With their assistance, this volume and my life are much richer indeed. In similar ways, I am grateful to all my friends among the ARC Directors for their collegiality and constant support.

Many of the papers gathered in this volume reflect the proceedings of the 10th Annual Conference of ASDP, held at Johnson County Community College in March 2004. The success of this conference is directly attributable to the tireless work of Carolyn Kadel, whose organizational skills and good humor made my job as program chair considerably easier. On behalf of all of us in ASDP, I want to thank Carolyn and her staff for an outstanding and seamless meeting.

This volume has truly benefited from the wealth of talent among ASDP members. I am pleased to have worked on a volume that brings together the exceptional work of individuals within a variety of disciplines such as Sociology, Economics, English, Art History, History and the usual suspects among Philosophers. Their inclusion reflects the tremendous job done by Betty Buck, Roger Ames and Peter Hershock in fulfilling their mission of infusing Asian Studies across the curriculum. It is gratifying to note and acknowledge the high quality of work being produced by the ASDP alum. I look forward to working together in the future as we strive to deepen our students' understanding of and appreciation for Asian cultures.

Again, my sincere thanks to all who have contributed to this volume in countless ways, including those who served as peer reviewers and consulting editors. I hope that readers will benefit from and be enlightened by this volume as much as I have.

In This Issue

William Tsutsui's keynote address examines the fifty year history of the Godzilla phenomenon within American popular culture. As he notes, little scholarly work has been done in this area and this essay argues that the Godzilla films can provide us with valuable insights into Japanese and American culture since World War II. By exploring the fun of Japanese monster movies, and leaving aside sophisticated theoretical pretensions, Tsutsui's contribution provides a basic historical and cultural context for understanding the Godzilla phenomenon while elucidating valuable lessons about postwar Japan, U.S.-Japanese relations, and the perils of modernization amidst a Cold War climate.

Paul Dunscomb also examines Japanese popular culture, but from another important angle. In *Dogs, Demons and Dai-guard*, he evaluates the highly successful anime series, "Terrestrial Defense Corporation Dai-Guard" [*Chikyû Bôei Kigyô Dai-Guard*]. Using the question "what are we [the dai-guard] fighting for" as his starting point, Dunscomb argues that the series primary theme can be taken as a powerful critique of contemporary Japan's typical patterns of cooperation and corruption between corporations, bureaucracy and politicians. Utilizing the privatized nature of the dai-guard, he demonstrates that for many in Japan, the only alternative to deal with critical societal problems is by fighting for the sake of our fellow human beings is through private action.

Sawa Kurotani applies a sociological perspective to the contemporary Japanese practice of collecting souvenirs (*omiyage*) for associates at home while traveling in the United States. As she convincingly demonstrates, the purchase and subsequent distribution of *omiyage* in Japan serves an important sociological function in that it helps to solidify and clearly demarcate the distinctions between self and the other, the haves from the have-nots, and the national identity of the past and present self and other. In addition, Kurotani significantly advances our understanding of relations between Japan and the United States as it relates to popular consumerism and the shifting attitudes among Japanese as to what *Amerika* represents.

Bonnie Melchior offers us insight into the comparisons and contrasts between *King Lear* and the Japanese film classic, *Ran*. In her analysis of the film and its parallels with the Shakespearean play, Melchior identifies the subtle colorings added by its director, the legendary Kurosawa, and the resultant shift from an individualistic to communitarian perspective. In addition to the obvious arena of human relations, she discerns such a shift in the world of nature as well, clearly elucidating the ways in which Kurosawa adapted the Japanese vision of the human as but one aspect of the world's total unity.

Jun Li analyzes Jean Toomer's 1923 work, *Cane*, focusing primarily on its aesthetic quality. She does so through a consideration of Toomer's use of the images of dusk and the color purple. By informing her analysis of these images through

Chinese aesthetics, she offers us a unique and highly nuanced interpretation of how the images result in a different appreciation for the text than might be had by a Western reader.

Lawrence E. Butler argues that American museums must begin a concerted effort to update their practices in preserving, identifying and exhibiting Asian collections within their possession. Working from his experience in both Art History and participation in the ASDP Institute on the Silk Road, he surveys the state of museum exhibitions, pointing out both the problems and promise of bringing Silk Road exhibits into line with those of other cultural exhibits. In particular, Butler decries the decontextualized nature of Silk Road exhibits, and offers suggestions on how to rectify the situation.

Michael Martin takes a philosophical perspective on the contemporary problem of preserving cultural artifacts in light of the recent rise of terrorist attacks upon such pieces. Using the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas as his starting point, Martin examines the arguments for and against international regulation of collecting, preserving and exhibiting important cultural artifacts. In contrast to increasing numbers of scholars and organizations calling for the cessation of archaeological digs and preservation of artifacts outside the country of origin, he offers an ethical theory that judiciously balances the interests and concerns of collectors, preservationists and everyone concerned with the welfare of the world's cultural treasures.

Dennis Arjo compares traditional childrearing practices in China and the West in so far as they relate to the philosophical and religious views of human nature. Arguing persuasively that a society's norms for training and educating its youth rest firmly on its assumptions concerning human nature, Arjo juxtaposes the western sensibility of autonomy with the Chinese belief in community. Analyzing the works of Aristotle, Kant, Confucius and contemporary theories of education, he demonstrates how the modern conception of individual's being the "masters of their own destinies" flies in the face of traditional views and has created its own set of new problems concerning childrearing. In addition, he offers suggestions for how we might incorporate the Confucian emphasis on familial and communal identity into contemporary practices.

Richard H. Thompson explores the realities of identity formation and maintenance for Asian American children. Incorporating a fascinating series of interviews with university students, he offers us a preliminary exploration of the pressures faced and strategies used by Asian students who have to navigate two different cultural worlds, that of their Asian parents and American culture. As Thompson demonstrates, the most critical factor for these students is deciding how best to retain their traditional relationship with parents while at the same time acculturating themselves to a very different set of expectations within American society.

Xiao Hong and Li Chenyang examine the phenomenon of Asian Americans' low representation of leadership positions and propose a provocative hypothesis on ethics and leadership. A comparison of traditional justice ethics, feminist care ethics, and Confucian Jen ethics reveals some important similarities between feminist care ethics and Confucian Jen ethics. Drawing upon these similarities, they suggest that Asian Americans, especially those with a Confucian heritage, may be disadvantaged in their pursuit of leadership positions.

Devona Ensmenger, Josh Goldstein, and Richard Mack review and analyze the history, current practices and outlook for recycling and waste disposal in Beijing, China. Waste collection, recycling and treatment policies evolved significantly as the Republican period gave way to the Socialist era, followed by the post-Maoist reforms. These changes were driven by the pressures of both ideology and pragmatism. Over the last decade, the volume of solid wastes has been increasing at rates in excess of the 10% annual rate of economic growth; continuing increases in GDP will likely exacerbate China's burgeoning trash problems. In this article, current practices of recycling and waste disposal, covering the entire collection chain, are documented and related to population migration, consumption patterns and government policy. The analysis closes with a discussion of future alternatives and their likelihoods.

Xiufen Liu critiques contemporary feminist theory as it has been applied to Chinese women. Using the traditional Chinese practice of footbinding as her primary example, she argues that we must not impose western formulations of gender relations and the role of women onto Chinese society. Specifically, Liu puts forth the dual thesis that the creation of the image of Chinese women as nothing but victims of Confucian patriarchy in both the Chinese and Western feminist discourse is designed to further other ideological purposes and political agendas respectively and that the interpretation of footbinding as the sheer victimization of women by male sadism has distorted the meaning and function of that custom by neglecting the complex details of the traditional social milieu which gave rise to the practice.

James Peterman also addresses the issue of feminism in China in his essay, *Does China Need A Feminism with Chinese Characteristics?* He begins by arguing that western conceptions of gender relations are incompatible with Chinese/Confucian norms, especially given the importance of relationality in the formation of the self, and the emphasis on the group's superiority to the individual. Peterman then proposes a different form of feminism for China, one that takes into account these factors and retain harmony within the traditional family structure.

Keith W. Krasemann argues that as teachers and scholars associated with the Asian Studies Development Program and its various activities, we are all interpreters of Asia. Interpretation is ongoing in our own emerging understandings of Asia and

in our communications with one another, our students and the general public. "Asian Studies and Interpretation" is a beginning attempt to call attention to the centrality of the process of interpretation in Asian Studies and introduces hermeneutics as a method that can be fruitfully applied to all aspects of research, writing, teaching and learning about Asia. Since many cross-cultural misunderstandings occur, hermeneutics is presented as a way for bridging cultural gaps in our post Cold War world.

Shudong Chen concludes this volume with a paper that discusses philosophical and pedagogical issues on cross-cultural dialogues as reflected in an incident that actually occurred between a friend of his and his philosophy professor. Initially started with various thought-enriching implications of ASDP 2003 On-line Conference, particularly through David Jones/John Culliney's paper on Daoism and chaos theory, the paper suggests how to deal with this incident and related issues with regard to the possibilities of (1) understanding the indispensable mediation of teacher as "sagely" and his/her potentially infinite ways for role-playing through reassessing the mediating ethos of the te in "aesthetic composition"; (2) perceiving dynamic *wuwei* and participatory absence; (3) appreciating fluidity of our being, language, and understanding; (4) activating synaesthesia and authenticating silence: thinking "the unthinkable and teaching the impossible."

Contributors

Dennis Arjo received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of California, Santa Barbara and is currently an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Johnson County Community College. His main areas of interests are Philosophy of Mind and Moral Psychology, to which has been added an interest in Comparative Philosophy, spurred by his attending an ASDP Summer Infusion program in 2003.

Lawrence E. Butler is Associate Professor of Art History and Art History Program Coordinator at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. A specialist in medieval and Islamic art, he was trained in Byzantine and Islamic architecture. Over the past several years, his teaching and research interests have expanded eastward along the silk and spice routes to East and Southeast Asia. He participated in the ASDP's 1996 NEH seminar on the Chinese classics and the ASDP's 1997 field study on the Chinese Silk Road.

Shudong Chen is author of *Henry James: The Essayist Behind the Novelist* (Mellen 2003), and a Chinese native, who came to the U.S. in 1990. He received both his Master's (1992) and Doctorate (1998) in English from the University of Kansas. He has taught courses in the Humanities at Johnson County Community College, Overland Park, Kansas since 1999. Professor Chen's interest in cultural comparison has deepened through his participation in various ASDP sponsored conferences and summer seminars since 2000. He is particularly interested in

cultural phenomena that reflect subtle but vital differences beneath well-observed similarities *and* essential but overlooked similarities behind noticeable differences. He is now concentrating on these phenomena through his second book project, which includes essays, such as "Henry James and the Tao – Thinking for New Millennium and New Millennium Thinking."

Paul Dunscomb is assistant professor of East Asian History at the University of Alaska Anchorage, and Deputy Director of UAA's Regional Center of the Asian Studies Development Program. He has an MA from the State University of New York at Albany and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas. He is a specialist in modern Japanese history focusing on the domestic political aspects of the Japanese intervention and occupation of Siberia, 1918-1922. His work has, or will, appear in the Military Review and the Journal of Japanese Studies. His interest in Japanese popular culture has led him to numerous academic projects including presentations on Japan's role in the creation of global culture and serving as conference reporter for "In Godzilla's Footsteps: Japanese Pop Culture Icons on the Global Stage," Lawrence, Kansas, October 2004.

Devona Ensmenger, now a graduate of Central Washington University, was a Lancy China Scholar in 2002 when she completed the research for the article in this volume of *East-West Connections*. She has recently been working for the Department of Fish & Wildlife, State of Oregon and for an environmental consulting firm.

Josh Goldstein is an assistant professor of history at University of Southern California. He has a broad range of interests in China, as attested by his acclaimed book on classical Chinese opera, *Drama Kings: Re-Constructing Peking Opera 1860-1937*, and his article on trash recycling in this volume of *East-West Connections*. Professor Goldstein holds a PhD in Asian History from the University of California San Diego.

Andrea Kempf is a Professor/Librarian at Johnson County Community College in Overland Park, KS. She is an alumna of the East-West Center's Asian Studies Development Program and a long time book reviewer for *Library Journal* and *Persimmon: Asian Literature, Arts and Culture*. In 2000 she was selected the Library Journal Fiction Book Reviewer of the Year.

Keith W. Krasemann is Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies and Director of the Regional Center for Asian Studies Development Programs at College of DuPage. He was a visiting Fulbright Professor in China. Currently, he has three books in print – *Business Ethics: Problems, Principles, Practical Applications*, second edition, *Quest For Goodness: An Introduction to Ethics*, second edition, and *Questions for the Soul: An Introduction to Philosophy*, fourth edition. In addition, he has published numerous articles and delivered over fifty presentations. His educational background includes two doctorate degrees from Pacific Western

University and Northern Illinois University; master's degrees from both DePaul and Northern Illinois universities and a bachelor's degree from the University of Wisconsin – Oshkosh.

Sawa Kurotani received a Ph.D. in anthropology in 1999 from the University of Colorado, Boulder. She was a Rockefeller postdoctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in 1999-2000, and is currently Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Redlands. Her main research and teaching interests center on globalization, Japanese national identity and gender. Her first book, *Home away from Home: Japanese Corporate Wives in the United States*, is also forthcoming (Fall, 2005) from Duke University Press. Her current ethnographic project is on the impact of long-term economic recession on the Japanese middle class.

Li Chenyang is professor of philosophy at Central Washington University where he also chairs the philosophy department. He earned his BA and MA in Philosophy from Peking University and his Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut. His research interests include Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, and value theory. Among his publications are *The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy* (1999), and *The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender* (ed., 2000), and numerous articles in international journals such as *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, International Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia, Philosophy East & West, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Journal of Value Inquiry, Journal of Applied Philosophy*, and the *Review of Metaphysics*. He has also published a book in comparative philosophy and many articles in Chinese.

Li Qingjun is Associate Professor of English, School of Foreign Languages, Zhengzhou University, Henan Province, P.R. China. Since 1986 she has offered a number of courses to English major students such as English Intensive Reading; English Interpretation; Tourism English; Audio & Video English: Family Album, USA; and BFT English (the required test for Chinese administrative personnel going abroad). She was awarded the *Excellence in Teaching* Prize of Zhengzhou University in both 1995 and 1996. In 2000, she was Visiting Scholar for Chinese Cultural Studies at Middle Tennessee State University, USA. Presently, she is doing graduate work in English and teaches Chinese in the Foreign Language Department, Belmont University, Nashville, TN.

Richard Mack is a professor of economics at Central Washington University and a member of the Asia-Pacific Studies faculty. His current interests focus on the economies of China's provinces and regions. He has worked on regional economics and energy issues for the U.S. Department of Energy, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the State of Indiana, the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and the State of Washington.

Michael R. Martin, A.B. (Princeton), A.M., Ph.D (Harvard) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, and for nine years (1993 – 2002) served as Dean of the Faculty of Arts, The University of Hong Kong. His main interests are in Asian art history and comparative philosophy, with an emphasis on moral and social philosophy. His publications have appeared in the *Journal of Philosophy*, the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Books*, *Orientations*, and other venues. He has lived in Hong Kong for over twenty-five years and maintains a second home in Thailand.

Bonnie Melchior is a Professor of English at the University of Central Arkansas in Conway, Arkansas, where she teaches courses in Renaissance literature, drama, world literature, linguistics, and gender studies. She has published articles in *Biography, College Literature, Publications of the Arkansas Philological Association*, and *Studies in the Humanities*.

James F. Peterman is chair of the Philosophy Department at Sewanee: The University of the South. He does research on Wittgenstein, medical ethics, and Chinese Philosophy, and is working on a book-length manuscript on Wittgenstein and Confucius.

Mary Karen Solomon is English and Humanities Instructor at Colorado Northwestern Community College and Chair of the Humanities/Social Sciences Division. She has taught English, humanities, including the humanities survey courses, art history, music history and appreciation, literature, and occasionally mathematics at CNCC since 1990. She earned a B.A. in English from the University of Utah, spent the summer after graduation studying Russian in Moscow and St. Petersburg, then began a graduate program in Comparative Literature, Russian, at Brigham Young University in Provo. After receiving her M. A., she went to Europe and spent four months traveling in Morocco, Spain, Austria, Finland and Norway.

William M. Tsutsui is associate professor of history and director of the Kansas Consortium for Teaching about Asia at the University of Kansas. A specialist in the business, economic and environmental history of modern Japan, he is the author of *Banking Policy in Japan* (1988) and *Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century Japan* (1998), which was awarded the John Whitney Hall Prize of the Association for Asian Studies. His most recent book is *Godzilla on My Mind: Fifty Years of the King of Monsters* (2004), described by the *New York Times* as a "cult classic."

J. David Wemhaner, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Sociology at Tulsa Community College. He earned his B.A., M.Ed., at Central State University and his doctorate at Oklahoma State University.

Xiao Hong is an Associate Professor of Sociology and member of the Asia/Pacific Studies faculty at Central Washington University. Her primary areas of interest are social stratification, cultural values, families, social ecology, and gender. She is the author of *Childrearing Values in the United States and China: A Comparison of Belief Systems and Social Structure* (Praeger Publishers, 2001) and more than a half dozen journal articles. In the past few years, she has been a member of a NSF/REU funded interdisciplinary study of economic development and environmental policy in China. Her current research examines China's economic development orientations, environmental consciousness, and consumption patterns.

Xiufen Liu teaches in the Philosophy Department at Wichita State University in Kansas as an assistant professor, having earned her Ph.D in Philosophy at the University of Kansas, in December, 2000. She also holds the M.A. degree in Philosophy/Women Studies from Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, and a B.A. in English from Beijing Second Institute of Foreign Languages, Beijing, China.

Godzilla and Postwar Japan Lunch Keynote Address 2004 National Meeting Asian Studies Development Program

William Tsutsui, University of Kansas

In 1985, a New York Times/CBS News poll asked 1,500 Americans to name a famous Japanese person. The top three responses were Hirohito, Bruce Lee (who wasn't even Japanese, of course), and Godzilla. This is, needless to say, a stinging indictment of American public knowledge of Japan. But it is also a testament to the impact which a Japanese movie monster has had on popular culture around the globe. Godzilla is the world's oldest and longest film franchise, as well as one of Japan's most enduring and pervasive cultural exports. Godzilla's admirers are a large and varied lot, running from mild-mannered college professors in Kansas to enigmatic, bouffanted dictators in North Korea (Kim Jong-Il is well known to be a film buff and apparently is a world-class fan of Godzilla, to the extent that he commissioned his own giant monster film, entitled *Pulgasari*, in 1985). Godzilla must also be recognized as a pioneer of sorts, as the first creation of postwar Japanese mass culture to gain international exposure and acclaim. Godzilla paved the way in many respects for the other Japanese inventions which have subsequently become ubiquitous in global pop culture, from Ultraman, Speed Racer, and the Mighty Morphin' Power Rangers, to Pokemon, anime, and Iron Chef.

One need only turn on the television or open a magazine to find evidence of Godzilla's place in American popular culture and his iconic association with Japan in the American collective imagination. A big flowery Godzilla once adorned a float at the Rose Parade, the king of the monsters has won an MTV lifetime achievement award, and Mia Farrow famously declared at the Oscars that *Godzilla* was her favorite movie. Japanese monster films have been the subject of tributes and parodies in American art and literature, on TV, and in Hollywood movies. All across the country, oversized cats, dogs, hamsters, and pet iguanas are named Godzilla. And then, of course, there is the ubiquitous -zilla suffix: our society is filled with bridezillas, truckzillas, mozillas, pornzillas, and virtually

every other combination you can imagine. Godzilla even turns up in some really unexpected places: the King of the Monsters recently appeared with his cinematic offspring Minilla (using stock footage from 1967's *Son of Godzilla*) in a disarmingly sweet television ad for the National Fatherhood Institute, blowing radioactive smoke rings to the warm and cuddly theme song from The Courtship of Eddie's Father.

Given Godzilla's status as one of the world's most recognizable, abiding, and unlikely movie stars, it is somewhat surprising how little scholarly attention this giant radiation-breathing reptile has received, either in Japan or in the West. Critics have generally judged the Godzilla films to be artistically lacking, intellectually unchallenging, and ideologically hollow. Donald Richie, the dean of American film critics of Japan, once damned Japanese "cinema" as "a plethora of nudity, teenage heroes, science-fiction monsters, animated cartoons, and pictures about cute animals."[1] Only a handful of scholarly essays on the king of the monsters have appeared in English and few, other than an impressive 1993 article by Susan Napier placing *Godzilla* in a tradition of dystopian science fiction and a somewhat scattershot 1987 piece by Chon Noriega on *Godzilla* and nuclear fear, have even attempted to contextualize the film historically.[2] Japanese writings on Godzilla have also been relatively sparse and generally superficial, though some recent pieces are delightfully tongue in cheek: scientists have attempted to analyze Godzilla from a paleontological point of view, musing on the monster's role in the Jurassic ecosystem, while whimsical economists have attempted to tote up the property damage from the creature's rampages through Tokyo (with one study estimating the losses from a single raid on the Ginza at $175 billion, give or take a few bucks).[3]

In this essay I will argue for the modest notion that the Godzilla films can provide us valuable insights into Japanese culture since World War II. I will not pretend that any of my observations here are particularly earthshattering, or that my conclusions are entirely well-rooted theoretically. High theory, it seems to me, rather ruins the fun of Japanese monster movies, which is, after all, their greatest charm. I do hope, however, that this essay will provide a basic historical and cultural context for understanding the Godzilla phenomenon and will convince even skeptical readers that a man in a latex suit destroying toy cities can teach us significant lessons about postwar Japan, U.S.-Japanese relations, and the phantoms of modernization.[4]

Godzilla was spawned from hardheaded movie-industry economics, fractious Cold War politics, and the fertile imagination of Japanese moviemakers. The early 1950s were a boom time for giant monster films, in Hollywood and around the world. The American classic King Kong was re-released internationally in 1952 and the new Warner Brothers film The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms, based on a

short story by Ray Bradbury and boasting the stop-motion special effects of Ray Harryhausen, came out in 1953. Both proved to be smash hits in Japan. This success implanted the notion of giant monsters into the minds of Japanese film producers and directors, who have never been loathe to steal a good idea from Hollywood.

Godzilla's genesis was also conditioned by Cold War tensions and atomic age anxieties. On March 1, 1954, the United States detonated a 15-megaton hydrogen bomb, a weapon almost one thousand times more powerful than that dropped on Hiroshima. A small Japanese trawler in search of tuna, named the Lucky Dragon No. 5 (Dai-go Fukuryū Maru), had strayed perilously close to the testing zone. The crew reported seeing "the sun rising in the west" and being covered with a powdery white ash as they pulled in their lines and headed for port. The seamen were subsequently found to be suffering from radiation poisoning, tainted tuna entered Japanese markets before the radioactive contamination was discovered, and the news media erupted in a fury of nuclear fear and anti-American hostility. With Hiroshima and Nagasaki painfully fresh memories, the Tokyo tabloids proclaimed the incident yet another U.S. atomic attack on Japan.[5]

Godzilla, as the legendry has it, was the brainchild of Tanaka Tomoyuki, a producer for Japan's Tōhō Studios. Flying home in early 1954 from Indonesia, where the deal for a big-budget feature had just fallen through, Tanaka looked out over the expansive Pacific Ocean and agonized over a replacement for the cancelled blockbuster. His mind racing through the headlines of the day, the trends in the film industry, and, just perhaps, a personal nightmare or two, Tanaka hit upon a notion. "The thesis was very simple," Tanaka later recalled. "What if a dinosaur sleeping in the Southern Hemisphere had been awakened and transformed into a giant by the Bomb? What if it attacked Tokyo?"[6]

Tanaka recruited top talent for the picture, since his monster film was intended to be very serious fare for an adult audience. Among the seasoned professionals on the crew were special effects whiz Tsuburaya Eiji, who had done spectacular work on wartime propaganda films, director Honda Ishirō, a friend and collaborator of legendary filmmaker Kurosawa Akira, and noted composer Ifukube Akira, whose haunting score has been a fan favorite for decades. The name "Gojira" (which was later transliterated into English as Godzilla) was allegedly a nickname given to an overweight press agent at Tōhō, and was a combination of gorira (gorilla) and kujira (whale). Tanaka is said to have loved it and appropriated it for his monster.

Tōhō Studios invested a good deal in *Gojira*: 60 million yen, about three times the budget of the average Japanese film at the time (although far less, one should note, than Hollywood would have spent on a run-of-the-mill B-movie in the 1950s). *Gojira* opened on November 3, 1954 and receipts were good: the film

recorded the best opening-day ticket sales ever in Tokyo and eventually grossed ¥152 million on 9.69 million paid admissions, though it was only the twelfth largest grossing film in Japan that year. Its success (and its export potential) were such, however, that a whole Godzilla franchise was born.

Tōhō began shopping *Gojira* abroad soon after its Japanese release. Hollywood distributors were receptive, but their vision of an American *Gojira* was a mass-market, thrill-a-minute horror flick, not a dark and broody, subtitled art-house release. As a result, the film was cut, edited, shuffled, and augmented to produce something that would meet American audiences' action-heavy expectations of a creature feature and would cater to the filmgoing masses who demanded to hear their movies rather than read them. In order to avoid dubbing the entire movie, new footage incorporating a voyeuristic American reporter who narrates the destruction of Tokyo (portrayed by B-list star Raymond Burr) and his Japanese sidekick (who conveniently translates and summarizes Japanese dialogue) was added. At the same time, virtually all sections of the original film that might have reflected negatively on the United States, highlighted Japanese resentments arising from World War II, or explored the nuclear issue in any depth were excised or otherwise neutralized in the Americanization process. Although *Gojira* was not exactly eviscerated in this transition, with the terrifying charm of the monster thankfully surviving the cinematic surgery, much of the emotional power, intellectual depth, social relevance, and visceral impact of *Gojira* was lost in its translation to *Godzilla, King of the Monsters*, the made-for-America 1956 release.

There have, to date, been twenty-seven Godzilla movies made by Tōhō (and, for the record, most fans—myself included—do not count the appalling 1998 Hollywood production with Matthew Broderick a real Godzilla film). Fifteen of the films appeared between 1954 and 1975, at which point the franchise petered out, before being reborn in 1984 after Tōhō recognized the continued popularity of Godzilla. Seven films were made between 1984 and 1995—known collectively as the "Heisei Gojira" series, Heisei being the reign name of the current emperor of Japan—ending with 1995's *Godzilla vs. Destroyer*, in which Godzilla dies of an internal meltdown, a kind of radioactive heartburn. The latest run of Tōhō-produced films began with *Godzilla 2000: Millennium*, and a new film has been released annually in the busy New Years season. A blockbuster, tentatively entitled *Godzilla: Final Wars*—in which Godzilla is said to (yet again) be killed off by the filmmakers—has been announced for the fall of 2004 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the franchise.

As even the most casual fans of *Godzilla* are aware, after the original film was made, the quality of the series rapidly declined. The serious anti-nuclear message of the first offering was speedily junked for more crowd-pleasing fare and the age of the target audience declined steadily: the first film was specifically intended for adults,

but by the 1970s, eight year olds were the market Tōhō was aiming at. The films became more cynical money spinners, they were dumbed down, production values plummeted, and the somber message of *Gojira* was rapidly abandoned. The films degenerated into big-time wrestling in rubber suits (a technique grandly christened "suitmation" by Tōhō) and the scripts and special effects were remarkably cheesy, although at the same time quite appealingly campy. Who couldn't laugh at the king of the monsters doing a little victory jig, flying on his tail, or playing volleyball (using a huge boulder) with a gargantuan mutant lobster?

The Heisei series films of the 1980s and 1990s were intended to be more serious and take Godzilla back for adults. They generally boasted better special effects (though there were still some real laughers) as well as better overall production values, but most scripts were still weak and the acting was astonishingly poor at some points. The films released since 2000 have generally been quite strong—with significantly improved screenplays and some truly memorable monster fight sequences—but many fans still criticize them for a lack of creativity and a continued pandering to preteen audiences.

Going back to the beginning, however, the original 1954 *Gojira* was without question the finest film of the Godzilla series and it richly deserves the epithet "classic." Until recently, when a new print of the film was distributed to American art houses, this first offering has not been widely available in the United States, except in pirated editions. *Gojira* is different enough from *Godzilla, King of the Monsters*, the version most American viewers are familiar with, that it may be worthwhile running briefly through the plot of the creature's classic, Raymond-Burr-less debut.

Gojira begins with a clear reference to the Lucky Dragon Incident: Japanese fishing boats in the South Pacific are destroyed by some mysterious and lethal force from beneath the seas. The rustic residents of nearby (do Island believe that the boats have been done in by Godzilla, a legendary monster lurking in the ocean's depths. A paleontologist, Dr. Yamane, is dispatched from Tokyo and discovers that a prehistoric creature has been awakened from undersea hibernation by recent hydrogen bomb tests and is now itself radioactive. Yamane reports his findings to the Japanese parliament, the Diet, and argues that Godzilla is a scientific specimen which should be studied, not destroyed.

The monster, however, has set its sights on Tokyo and begins a series of devastating nighttime attacks that the military and civil officials are powerless to stop. The destruction is depicted vividly and in very human terms in the film, in scenes that were certainly intended to bring to mind memories of World War II, the firebombings of Tokyo and, of course, the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Families are shown evacuating the city, Tokyo is engulfed by flames, and the camera lingers on the multitudes of dead, injured, and irradiated civilian

victims.

One of the most surprising aspects of the 1954 *Gojira* for many viewers is how little time the monster actually spends on screen. Indeed, as much attention is given in the film to a melodramatic, sentimental subplot as to the rampages of Godzilla. This subplot focuses on a classic love triangle: Emiko, the daughter of Dr. Yamane the paleontologist, is engaged in an arranged marriage to her father's colleague Dr. Serizawa. Emiko, however, does not love Serizawa, who had suffered greatly in World War II and bears the emotional and physical scars of the experience. Emiko instead is in love with Lieutenant Ogata, a dashing naval officer, and she is torn with guilt as she tries to tell her father and Serizawa that she wishes to renege on her arranged betrothal.

Emiko visits Serizawa in his creepy Gothic laboratory, intending to confess her love for another. Serizawa, however, makes his own confession: he has developed a device called the Oxygen Destroyer that is vastly more powerful than even nuclear bombs. Serizawa is racked with guilt over his creation of such a potent technology and he fears that his discovery will fall into the wrong hands and be used as a weapon. Emiko vows to keep Serizawa's Oxygen Destroyer a secret, yet later, after she witnesses firsthand the devastation wrought by Godzilla, she realizes that the device could be used to kill the monster. Emiko and Ogata convince Serizawa that destroying Godzilla with the doctor's fearsome invention is humanity's only salvation.

Godzilla sleeps by day at the bottom of Tokyo Bay, and Ogata and Serizawa, all rigged up in deep-sea diving gear, carefully place the Oxygen Destroyer by the napping monster. Ogata returns to the surface, but Dr. Serizawa does not; he cuts his oxygen cord in a symbolic act of *harakiri*, and falls to the bottom of the bay to die by Godzilla, taking his awesome secret—the formula for the Oxygen Destroyer—with him to his watery grave. In the end, the people of Japan mourn the sacrifice of Serizawa and continue to fear the unintended consequences of nuclear testing, but rejoice in the demise of Godzilla. And, indeed, some commentators have read the self-congratulatory celebrations at the end of the film as a symbolic and therapeutic rewriting of the end of World War II, with Japan emerging triumphant this time around.

This first Godzilla film clearly had a strong pacifist and anti-nuclear message—a moral—which the director was trying to express. Yet it becomes increasingly hard to conclude that the films have had a consistent message over time, especially since the series has now spanned a full fifty years. Over the decades, several of the Godzilla offerings have tried to tackle timely social issues—pollution, corporate greed, even school bullying—but the majority of the movies have passed on social commentary in favor of good old, crowd-pleasing entertainment value. Thus I would suggest that there is no single moral we can take away from the Godzilla

films—no overriding "deep inner meaning"—but instead, only certain themes and tendencies we can see recurring in the series over time. I might even go one step further and say that the only constant about the Godzilla films is a deep ambivalence, a kind of moral and intellectual ambiguity, that precludes drawing any firm, unitary conclusions. The message of Godzilla, if any, is complex and reflects, I believe, a fundamental ambivalence on the part of the Japanese when they look at issues like modernity, technology, science, nature, politics, and the world outside Japan.

Although many themes could be teased from the twenty-seven Godzilla films, the following five seem particularly relevant in understanding the king of the monsters' place in postwar Japanese culture and society.

First, through the Godzilla series, we see a fairly consistent expression of anti-American sentiments and, at the same time, a strong sense of pride in Japan and Japanese accomplishments. The 1963 fan-favorite *King Kong vs. Godzilla*, which was marketed very overtly by Tōhō as a symbolic showdown between America and Japan, may be the most obvious example of this dynamic. Yet the prominence of this theme runs all the way back to the beginning of the franchise and the 1954 *Gojira*. The original movie seeks to evoke the audience's memories of World War II and makes explicit reference to both the atomic bombings and U.S. nuclear testing. Indeed, throughout *Gojira*, memories of the past war and fears of a coming war are seamlessly intertwined, always with an unspoken sense of antagonism toward America. In one scene, set just before Godzilla's first attack, a group of commuters chat aboard a Tokyo train. "It's terrible, huh?" one remarks. "Radioactive tuna, atomic fallout, and now this Godzilla to top it all off." "I guess I'll have to find a shelter soon," another sighs. "The shelters again?" one of their companions glumly notes, "That stinks!" Later, when the monster is bringing ruin to the city, the camera falls on a woman cowering beside a Ginza building, holding her young children close as flaming debris rains down upon them. "We'll be joining your father soon," she moans, referring (one must assume) to a husband killed in the war. "Just a little longer, a little longer."

The 1954 *Gojira* also has the air of a morality play of sorts, ending with the victory of Japan and Japanese science over the monster. The moral dimension of Japan's triumph pivots, of course, on Dr. Serizawa and his principled act of ultimate self-sacrifice: the apocalyptic fruits of Japanese science, the film bids us to conclude, would only be used for noble ends, for the preservation of humankind. This starkly contrasts, of course, with America's mastery of the atom and its inhumane use of atomic technology in 1945. The moral here is obvious: "good" Japanese science, which would never be used for aggressive or self-serving ends, triumphs over "bad" American science, which bears responsibility, after all, for creating the scourge of Godzilla. Japanese audiences could thus leave *Gojira*

confident in the knowledge that the monster was vanquished, that their nation had prevailed single-handedly, and that Japan was superior—technologically as well as morally—to atomic-age America.

These themes come out particularly nicely in 1991's *Godzilla vs. King Ghidorah*, which posited a new genesis story for Godzilla, depicting the monster as having begun life on an isolated central Pacific atoll as a lone surviving dinosaur, later rendered huge, radioactive, and irate by American atomic testing. During World War II, the dinosaur's coral home was occupied by a company of Japanese marines and when, in 1944, U.S. troops tried to raid the island, the proto-Godzilla emerges from the jungle to fight side-by-side with the Japanese to repel the American assault. Needless to say, this revisionist view of Godzilla's inception—with the king of the monsters rendered as a patriotic Japanese soldier—did not go down well in the United States: veterans groups howled, Hollywood was chilly, and the film was not released in America until 1998.

Second, as most fans of the series will have noticed, Godzilla changes over time from being an enemy of Japan (which the monster clearly is in the first movie) to being a defender and champion of Japan against legions of other monsters, credulity-stretching aliens, and even residents of a reclusive undersea civilization. Godzilla, in fact, seems to become "Japanese" over time, less an outsider than part of *wareware Nihonjin* (we Japanese). As historian Yoshikuni Igarashi has persuasively argued, Godzilla's defanging reflected larger transitions in Japanese society: "In 1960s Japan, a place overflowing with optimism inspired by economic growth, the monsters could not find a place other than as caricatures. The darkness that prevailed in the first two films of the mid-1950s had vanished from the screen and Japanese society." In a reconstructed, growing, increasingly self-confident postwar Japan, audiences—prepubescent as well as adult—had no interest in seeing a creature knock down Tokyo Tower, new highways, or the budding skyline, the very symbols of Japan's economic revival. Instead, Godzilla was "tamed and transformed" as a hometown superhero, "a guardian of postwar Japan's prosperity."[7]

Yet really, and this is where the ambivalence comes in, Godzilla is never entirely friendly and protective: he always remains surprisingly hostile toward Japan and he never, of course, can become truly Japanese. Godzilla must always remain an alien himself, an unpredictable "other." Even if fresh from saving Japan from hostile invaders, some deep genetic programming keeps even the benevolent Godzilla from taking the shortest, least populated route back to the sea; after a busy day of vanquishing outsized enemies, Godzilla always seems to have enough energy, before that long swim home to Monster Island, to drag his big scaly feet through the nearest urban area.

Third, the vulnerability of Japan is a consistent theme in the Godzilla

films, reflecting a similar strand in the Japanese popular imagination. Godzilla is portrayed, from the original 1954 feature on, as an unpredictable and uncontrollable force of nature, much like the earthquakes, volcanoes, typhoons, and tidal waves that batter a helpless Japan. Moreover, the Godzilla series also seems to reflect a sense of vulnerability to international political and economic forces beyond Japan's control: the Cold War, the oil shocks of the 1970s, protectionism, "Japan bashing," and so forth. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s, when Japan appeared headed for global economic dominance, the theme of Japanese vulnerability persisted in the Heisei Godzilla series, although the moral valence of this vulnerability gradually began to change. In the films made during the go-go "Bubble Economy," Japan sometimes seemed less an innocent victim than a victim of its own success. No longer compelling as radiation-made-flesh or a cinematic metaphor of wartime suffering, Godzilla was transformed in the Heisei series into a conscience for Japan, an uncontrollable natural force that popped the bubble of Japan's inflated national pride. Tanaka Tomoyuki was insistent that Godzilla trample the ostentatious landmarks of Japan's 1990s prosperity: the skyscrapers of Shinjuku, the glittering waterfront developments, "the vain symbols of these abundant days," as Tanaka called them. "Japan is rich and people can buy whatever they want," he explained. "But what is behind that wealth? Nothing very spiritual. Everyone's so concerned with the material, and then Godzilla comes and rips it all apart. I suspect that is good for us to see."[8]

Fourth, in common with most works of science fiction, whether Japanese or Western, the attitudes toward science and technology revealed in the Godzilla movies also appear quite ambivalent. There clearly is an anti-science theme in the films: Godzilla is the result of science gone wrong, anti-pollution and pro-environment messages appear in many movies, and there are plenty of mad, evil scientists running around. Godzilla himself often appears to be anti-progress and anti-technology: he trashes cities, destroys industrial areas, and just about always manages to trample Japan's most modern and impressive real estate developments. Godzilla does occasionally trash the repositories of Japanese tradition (like Kyoto, though never, one should note, the Imperial Palace in Tokyo) but he seems especially drawn to the flashy, modern, and industrial.[9]

Although Godzilla may have the air of a Luddite about him, one cannot help but noticing that the Godzilla films often revolve around scientists and scientific discovery, and it is often the heroic efforts of dedicated researchers that save Japan from Godzilla, as in the original 1954 offering. The movies also stress the humanity of scientists, especially Japanese ones: Dr. Yamane shows sympathy for the monster and yearns to study rather than destroy it, while Serizawa is tortured by the guilt of creating a super weapon. And so, as is typical in the genre of science fiction, the overall impression of science and scientists in the Godzilla series ends up being fundamentally ambiguous.

Fifth and finally, and again in common with the larger sci-fi genre, attitudes toward authority are highlighted in the Godzilla films. The movies consistently underline the weakness of traditional authority figures in times of crisis. As in *Gojira*, the military, the government, and intellectuals generally appear impotent in the face of Godzilla's threat: blustering, divided, and often incompetent. Thus the Godzilla films would seem to have a somewhat critical perspective on the establishment. But, at the same time, one could well argue that the films actually have a much more insidious subtext and that their message is in fact rather conservative, even reactionary.

Godzilla, for instance, doesn't really seem to be a great respecter of democratic values. The king of the monsters usually tends to stay above the political fray, but there is a moment in the original 1954 *Gojira* when one wonders if Godzilla is trying to make a more explicit political statement. Near the beginning of the film, Dr. Yamane testifies to a Diet committee, reporting the theory that the monster is the direct result of nuclear testing. This incendiary revelation leads to a spirited debate among the parliamentarians. On one side are a group of self-satisfied middle-age men, the very picture of establishment power with crisply pressed suits and brilliantined hair, who clearly represent conservative, pro-American interests, the dominant line in Japanese politics in the 1950s. "Professor Yamane's report is of such extreme importance," their leader blusters, "it must not be made public." With the back-benchers nodding and grunting in agreement, the speaker reflects on the delicate balance of world affairs and the potential for internal panic if Godzilla's presence—and his H-bomb origins—are publicly revealed. On the other side of the issue stand a knot of women, young but frumpily dressed, brusque, and strident in tone. Clearly intended to represent left-wing opposition politicians—who in 1950s Japan took a firmly anti-nuclear, anti-American stance—the women repeatedly interrupt the conservative spokesman, banging their handbags on the tables and shouting "The truth is the truth. . . . The truth must be made public!" The debate degenerates into a shouting match and eventually into a virtual brawl, with rival gangs of politicians pushing and shoving on the Diet floor. Yamane and his associates, safely away from the scrum, simply shake their heads in disbelief and exasperation, silently bemoaning the folly of politicians in a time of crisis.

Godzilla adds his two cents' worth a few nights later. In the midst of his second nighttime rampage through Tokyo, Godzilla comes upon the Diet Building. The monster looms over the structure, spotlights dancing across his body, and the dramatic tension mounts. With no further ado, Godzilla proceeds to walk through (rather, of course, than around) the building, his massive feet reducing one wing—very likely the exact spot where the unruly hearing had earlier been held—into a pile of monumental rubble. But what is Godzilla's message in this deliberate destruction of the seat of Japan's democracy? Is there a message at all?

Was the Diet, like the Empire State Building in King Kong, just a convenient landmark for the filmmakers to exploit? Or was Godzilla symbolically sticking one to the smarmy conservative politicians who tried unsuccessfully to conceal his very existence? Or, most provocatively of all, might Godzilla have been rendering a judgment on democracy writ large, his actions a damning statement on the divisiveness, infighting, and ultimate impotence of democratic politics and, specifically, of Japan's fractured postwar political system?

How one reads the king of the monster's actions at the Diet is open to interpretation, but one fact is certain. Contemporary reports stated that Japanese audiences in the first theatrical run of *Gojira* were generally somber, watching the film with the gravity that its makers had intended, with a number sobbing or leaving the screenings in tears. Only at one point in the original film did crowds erupt into applause, cheering, and laughter: not when the monster was vanquished at the end, not when he trots down the Ginza, not even during some of the groaner moments of weak special-effects work, but instead when Godzilla sashays through the Diet Building.

The depiction of the military in the Godzilla films is also worth considering. It is inevitable that the Japanese armed forces play a major recurring role in the Godzilla films. Whenever a giant monster appears along Japan's coastline, or comes bubbling out of an inland lake, or crawls forth from hibernation in a mountain cave, the military is johnny on the spot, tanks rolling, howitzers blasting, machine guns rattling, rockets firing, bombers zooming. One might understandably be surprised to find this martial focus—indeed, the glorification of soldiers, weaponry, and the thrill of combat—in postwar Japanese cinema. After the devastating experience of World War II, Japan had sought to redefine itself as a kind of Asian Switzerland, a nation publicly forsaking the scourge of war. To make it official, in 1946 MacArthur and the U.S. occupation wrote for Japan an admirably idealistic constitution that enshrined the theory and practice of pacifism. As the famous Article 9 of the document declared: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes…. Land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." Eventually, under the pressures of the Cold War, Japan did cautiously remilitarize, but only under the banner of "Self Defense Forces," ground, maritime, and air units charged and equipped solely for limited defensive action. Although sentiment in Japan favoring a more substantial military capability has surged from time to time (most notably in recent decades), the majority of the Japanese populace has strongly embraced pacifism and resisted Japan's reemergence as a regional military power.

In this historical and political context, the high-profile depiction of Japan's

armed forces in the Godzilla films, especially the earlier offerings in the series, is undeniably noteworthy. Donald Richie and Joseph Anderson wrote in 1959: "The temper of the Japanese populace in the mid-1950s was such that no film which in any way favored the Self Defense Forces and rearmament could have been successful at the box office; hence none was made. The few pictures which used Self Defense Forces for other than minor characters have shown the new military in an unfavorable manner."[10] Richie and Anderson must have forgotten about Gojira and its 1955 sequel *Godzilla Raids Again*, both of which portray Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen as capable, dedicated, and honorable, even though their tanks, rifles, and depth charges all proved useless against the monster. Through the 1960s and 1970s, even as popular uneasiness about remilitarization began to subside, the upbeat—one might almost say gung-ho—depiction of Japan's military in Godzilla features remained unusual. By the 1990s, many of the taboos against celebrating Japan's martial achievements in popular culture had been broken—in some small part because of the decades of Godzilla films—and the most recent films in particular have offered virtually unrestrained tributes to the professionalism, resolve, and effectiveness of the Self Defense Forces.

Although it would be all too easy to overestimate the importance of the Godzilla opus in the post–World War II Japanese discourse over militarization, we should not ignore the significance of the movies' battle scenes as forbidden pleasures for filmmakers and audiences alike. Producers and directors, who could not, given the political sensitivities of the day, show the nation's troops engaging Americans, Russians, or Asians of any stripe were able to depict combat, showcase flashy new weapons, and gently stir nationalistic sentiments using Godzilla and other giant monsters as a foil. One of the great spectacles of modern cinema—the heroic battlefield—was thus rehabilitated for use in postwar Japan, with a fictional radioactive reptile installed as a legitimate and ideologically sound target for the nation's military might. One can only imagine, of course, what impact all this had on the viewers of the Godzilla films, and especially the impressionable preteens who have, over the decades, been the series' most devoted audience. We will never know for sure if a steady childhood diet of Godzilla pictures and battle scenes conditioned today's Japanese adults to favor a more assertive military policy or a less restrictive notion of pacifism. Might we even regard the Godzilla films as a kind of military pornography, allowing the guilt-ridden, chastened, and disarmed Japanese public to indulge its illicit (and explicit) martial fantasies on the silver screen?

With all this in mind, how, in the end, can we characterize Godzilla? Is Godzilla a subversive or a reactionary? Is Godzilla a rebel without a cause or a harsh social critic? An unpredictable natural disaster or the reptilian conscience of a materially wealthy but spiritually bankrupt Japan? Is Godzilla a harmless man in a rubber suit or a tool of right-wing indoctrination aimed at Japanese youth?

This brings us back, then, to the notions of ambivalence and ambiguity. Godzilla sends a mixed message: as both an enemy and a defender, both a force of nature and the product of high technology, as both an outsider and yet somehow truly Japanese, Godzilla was, in a way, like the larger processes of modernization and industrialization that postwar Japan was undergoing. Godzilla, like the modern world, was both a curse and a blessing, both something alien and something Japanese. Perhaps above all, Godzilla—like modern life—was inevitable and unavoidable, and Japan was forced to take the good with the bad in the decades after World War II.

Notes

[1] Donald Richie, *Japanese Cinema: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 80.

[2] Susan Napier, "Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19:2 (summer 1993); Chon Noriega, "Godzilla and the Japanese Nightmare: When *Them!* is U.S." (1987), in *Hibakusha Cinema: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Nuclear Image in Japanese Film*, ed. Mick Broderick (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996).

[3] See Surfrider 21, *Gojira kenkyū josetsu* (Tokyo: PHP kenkyuo, 1998); Kenneth Carpenter, "A Dinosaur Paleontologist's View of Godzilla," in J. D. Lees and Marc Cerasini, *The Official Godzilla Compendium* (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 102-106.

[4] Many of the themes explored in this essay are developed in more depth in my book *Godzilla on My Mind* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[5] On the Lucky Dragon Incident, see Ralph Lapp, *The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958).

[6] Tanaka Tomoyuki quoted in John Burgess, "Godzilla Rises Again," *Washington Post*, 19 December 1984. Two excellent sources on the origins of the Godzilla series are David Kalat, *A Critical History and Filmography of Tōhō's Godzilla Series* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997), pp. 13ff, and Steve Ryfle, *Japan's Favorite Mon-Star: The Unauthorized Biography of "The Big G"* (Toronto: ECW Press, 1998), pp. 19ff.

[7] Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narrative of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945-1970* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 121.

[8] Tanaka Tomoyuki quoted in Kalat, *Critical History*, p. 162.

[9] Remarkably enough, Japanese cities have come to take being destroyed by Godzilla as a mark of civic pride; in the late 1980s several cities that had been overlooked over the decades by Toho Studios actively lobbied to be the target of Godzilla's wrath in the upcoming movies.

[10] Joseph Anderson and Donald Richie, *The Japanese Film: Art and Industry*, expanded edition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 269.

Dogs, Demons and Dai-Guard: Preserving the Peace of Tokyo in 2030

Paul Dunscomb, University of Alaska Anchorage

This is not the sort of academic paper I foresaw writing when I was finishing my Ph.D. at the University of Kansas. Not so much because as a Japanese historian specializing in the domestic political aspects of Japan's occupation of Siberia, 1918-1922, I considered Japanese anime as to be somehow beneath me, but rather because this is about a particular type of anime for which I've had little use historically. The series "Terrestrial Defense Corporation Dai-Guard" [*Chikyû Bôei Kigyô Dai-Guard*] is from that rather overpopulated genre of piloted robot anime, which includes such shows as *Evangellion, Big O, Pat Labor, Zoids, Brain Powered, Pilot Candidate, Sakura Taisen, Votoms, Escaflowne, Iron Leaguer, Macross* and *Macross Plus*, as well as multiple iterations of the Gundam series. Simply giving an exhaustive listing of other titles in this particular genre could add up to significant column inches.

My first encounter with the series was while living in Japan during its six-month run on TV Tokyo from October 1999 to March 2000. It was immediately apparent that the story of Dai-Guard was much more than the adventures of a large piloted robot, or "vertical model special upright vehicle." There were a number of aspects that seemed not merely thoughtful but potentially useful for gaining an insight into Japanese attitudes on a number of important subjects. The way Dai-Guard both cooperated and competed with the military seemed to throw light on current Japanese debates regarding the Self-Defense Forces. The series also serves as an exceptionally detailed snapshot of the sociology and anthropology of a basic work unit within a large Japanese corporation. Yet my initial impression was that Dai-Guard was a perfect example of maladapted bureaucracy that Alex Kerr describes so thoroughly in his book *Dogs and Demons: tales from the dark side of Japan*.[1] Kerr's central thesis is that Japan's bureaucracies have grown adept at creating grotesque and useless monuments to themselves but utterly incapable of delivering the basic but vital public goods which the nation desperately needs. Taken as a whole the show can be seen as a devastating critique of typical patterns

of cooperation and corruption between corporations, bureaucracy and politicians while suggesting that the only way for Japanese to deal with the critical problems that face them is through private action.

I was very happy when the series finally appeared on DVD (through ADV Films) in 2002 so I could explore these issues in greater depth. Yet watching the series again I found that one particular question kept arising, which I had not considered before. That question, which ultimately lies at the heart of the series, is "what are we fighting for?" or, as bluntly stated in the title for episode 23 "*Mamoritai mono Nandesuka*" [What do you Wish to Protect]? The answers given to this question over the course of the series are both varied and vague. Three phrases most commonly employed to answer it are "kono machi" [this city], meaning the greater Tokyo area and its environs, "seigi" [justice] or "heiwa" [peace]. Exactly how a giant robot beating the crap out of monsters upholds justice or even the peace is rather difficult to explain and indeed throughout the 26 episode series, the characters have a very difficult time articulating what those concepts mean in concrete terms.

As I watched the characters in the series struggle to articulate what it was they were fighting for I recalled that I had encountered this sort of dilemma before. Paul Fussel, author of a number of works discussing the culture of world wars one and two talks about what he refers to as the "ideological vacuum" in his book *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*. Fussel is genuinely angry over the fact that the average German could point to "eine volk, eine Reich, eine fuhrer," or Japanese to "Tennô Heika banzai!" while America's beliefs and objectives resisted such boiling down. [2]

Unlike Fussel, I see this not as a sign of ideological bankruptcy but rather as a sign of hope. "Democracy's quiet virtues"[3] to borrow a phrase from Mark Mazower, are and should be difficult to describe in concrete terms. The characters of Dai-Guard are struggling with exactly this same problem. How does one describe briefly the simple but complex task of preserving a way of life that allows you to enjoy the security of "normal" life, to go about your ordinary affairs, without having to question your ability to do so?

The standard phrase given to suggest this, " to preserve the peace" [*heiwa o mamoru*], is quite vague, yet the creators of the show juxtapose that and other phrases with images that argue strongly that it is precisely these quiet virtues of "normal" life that the characters wish to protect. And not merely do they wish to preserve these things from the other worldly threat of the heterodyne (the series of monsters/natural phenomena that menace the peace) but, as becomes plain during the course of the series, the characters are putting forward such a liberal vision as a specific rejection of other, darker social visions.

In this context it is notable that the phrase "*heiwa o mamoru*" is decidedly uncoupled from any modifying noun. This is in stark contrast to the prewar period when it was commonly found in combination with the phrase "*tō Ajia*." Indeed "*tô Ajia heiwa o mamoru*" [to preserve the peace of East Asia] was a well understood catchphrase denoting Japan as the dominant regional power capable of organizing the area according to its desires without let or hindrance from Western powers or even other Asians.

The Dai-Guard series was directed by Mizushima Seiji. The DVD version offers a choice between sub-titles and dubbing. I strongly suggest going with the sub-titles, not only because it is an excellent translation (often a little too conscientious in fact), but because even by the rather low standards of American voice actors the English vocal cast, especially for the female roles, is particularly insipid.

Unlike anime series like *Dragonball Z* and *Yu-gi-oh*, which are essentially plotless, or *Dot-hack-sign* and *Witch Hunter Robin* which have stories of operatic complexity and plots that evolve at a pace that can only be called glacial, Dai-Guard is episodic, meaning there is a distinct story arc within each episode. The series is equally notable for the fact that while it exists within the very crowded piloted robot genre the overall tone of the show is unlike most other typical anime. In particular, Dai-Guard can not be associated with the "three major expressive modes" described by Susan Napier.[4] While it is a science fiction story set in the future Dai-Guard is distinctly not dystopic or apocalyptic but is rooted in a level of contemporary detail that seems familiar and comforting. Although it does have its moments of pathos the series in no way could be thought of as elegiac. The world in which the story is set is everyday and ordinary, with no hint of nostalgia or a consciousness of something slipping away. And while there is plentiful anarchy and disorder the series has nothing of the festival atmosphere about it. Structures of power and authority may be set up for ridicule but are ultimately upheld.

The main running gag of Dai-Guard is that the most important means of protecting Japan from an inter-dimensional menace has become the property of the ordinary salarymen and office ladies who work in the 21st Century Security Corporation's Public Relations Division Number 2. In the year 2018 an unknown type of monster called a heterodyne appeared off Japan's coast, wandered into the Tokyo area and was ultimately destroyed only by the use of a weapon of mass destruction [*satsuriku heiki*] known as an OE Weapon. In order to meet the anticipated threat of more heterodyne appearances a mammoth infrastructure for predicting, detecting, and tracking heterodyne outbreaks was built by the military as well as the massive piloted robot Dai-Guard to fight and defeat them. The only problem was that there were no further heterodyne appearances.

The military, embarrassed by the continued presence of the "useless super

thing" [*muyô chôbutsu*] chartered the 21st century Defense Security Corporation (*21-seki keibi hôshô*) as a "Terrestrial Defense Corporation," a civilian disaster countermeasures enterprise with the military as the major shareholder and the board staffed primarily by retired military and civilian bureaucrats who have descended from heaven [*amakudari*].

This is a classic description of a Japanese "public corporation," a half private, half public enterprise, usually with the bureaucracy that originally created it as the major shareholder and contractor. There are literally hundreds of such companies in Japan dealing with everything from construction, to operating bridges and highways, to overseeing the operation of pachinko parlors.

Over time the company has branched out to conventional security services in order to make money and the useless super thing Dai-Guard has become the property of PR Division Number 2 which operates it as a sort of company mascot. In 2030, twelve years after the first heterodyne, another suddenly emerges while Dai-Guard is appearing at a company public relations event in the seaside city of Atami. The salarymen crew of Dai-Guard, hot blooded pilot Akagi Shunsuke (the emotional center of the show), reluctant engineer Aoyama Keiichirô, and navigator office lady Momoi Ibuki take their stations and manage to defeat the heterodyne. From that moment and for the rest of the series there is a scramble between competing bureaucracies, other company officers, and politicians to wrest control of the suddenly useful Dai-Guard and to gain credit, make money, or increase one's political clout by defending the nation from the new threat.

Before describing how PR Division Number 2 eventually triumphs it might be useful to say a few words about the nature of the threat they face. The pseudo-science behind the heterodyne is both complex and nonsensical and need not detain us. Basically heterodyne start as energy from the interactions of multiple dimensions caused by tectonic action. This energy manifests itself physically and gathers terrestrial material together to form patterns and shapes which sometimes are simple geometrical designs but sometimes form more classic monsters. Although the various heterodyne display a level of intelligence and purpose they are considered to be merely natural phenomena.

This helps make the heterodyne into the perfect Japanese enemy. Not only is there no human element to worry about but the heterodyne nicely complements the notion of "nature as Japan's special enemy," which has been a commonplace in its postwar culture.[5] Indeed one of the characters remarks that the heterodyne is the "embodiment of nature's retaliation," and that fighting them is fighting against nature itself.[6] When asked if there is hope for a fundamental conclusion of the heterodyne problem Domeki Rika, the 17-year-old girl genius in charge of anti-heterodyne research, replies: why do typhoons appear? Why do earthquakes and tsunami occur? Does knowing why help you do anything about it? Why

heterodynes exist is a question for philosophers. Heterodyne "might be something we have to live with forever."[7]

But let me get back to this question of "what are we fighting for?" This question can actually be read in two ways. The first is as mentioned above, what do you wish to protect; that is, what is the object for which you fight? But it also has another and ultimately more important meaning of what is your motivation for fighting? Although in both senses the answer remains difficult to articulate it is clear that the show's creators feel that fighting for the sake of one's fellow human beings, rather than any unrealizable ideal, and to do all that you can within the limits of your ability, rather than to expend yourself in fruitless albeit sincere effort, are the most noble reasons to fight.

As is made plain in episodes 15 through 18 there are those within the company who lack the pure hearted, people oriented vision of the salarymen and office ladies who comprise Public Relations Division Number 2. Yet the series decisively rejects the notion that peace can be preserved merely for profit or in order to gain political influence. As this story arc begins a coup by the board of directors, old style bureaucratic hacks enjoying lucrative sinecures after retiring from some position in government, has thrown out the old company president sympathetic to Public Relations Division Number 2. The new president wishes to use the company in the much more typical fashion as a moneymaking power-grabbing enterprise. He contracts Dai-Guard to the military (while being careful to retain merchandising and subsidiary rights) and orders Public Relations Division Number 2 disbanded, although to avoid bad publicity over firing them they are dispersed throughout the company to meaningless jobs. Army-trained pilots under contract, supervised by the young, zealous army officer Saeki Toru will now operate Dai-Guard as part of a new Dai-Guard enterprise department.

The new president attempts to increase company profits by more aggressively marketing Dai-Guard's services to get contracts defending clients against heterodyne outbreaks. At the same time he seeks to gain political influence by aligning himself with the head of a minor religious party, a sort of Komeitô substitute, whose leader claims to be spiritually defending Japan against the heterodyne and notes his close contact with Dai-Guard as proof.

However the operations of Dai-Guard under its new crew undermine this scheme. The army pilots are drones who are incapable of doing anything not prescribed by the manual. This is exactly the sort of pilots the new leadership wants. As their supervisor Saeki explains "Lower ranks are simply gears."[8] To provide the crew proper motivation before battle Saeki insists that the crew recite the three department goals: "We should be serious about efficiency," "We should do as the manual says," "We should act according to the circumstances at the time." However, lacking any true motivation the new crew has bad morale, poor

cooperation and no fighting spirit. At one point while waiting for an equipment change they actively wish that the heterodyne confronting them will just move on since if it escapes this time it won't be their fault.

Accumulated failures mean that compensation to contractors because of damage claims outruns premiums. The incompetence of the new crew, along with press investigations into the new president's links to the leader of the religious organization lead to further cancellation of contracts and subsequent fall in the company's stock price. The behavior of Dai-Guard is described in the media as "disgraceful" [*hidoi*]. To stop the bleeding the board of directors agrees to dump the new company president and bring back the old one.

Meanwhile, the members of Public Relations Division Number 2 all decide spontaneously to return to Tokyo after Dai-Guard's repeated failures. Kidnapping and taking the place of the army crew they are able to prove that Dai-Guard's "real" pilots, armed with the proper motivation, spirit of cooperation and initiative are able to triumph.

The issue most commonly raised throughout the series is Dai-Guard's ambivalent relationship with the military. The fact that Dai-Guard's operations require it both to cooperate and compete with the military give rise to a number of tensions. These tensions center around the question of whether or not Dai-Guard is a weapon, of whether civilians or the military should have control over Dai-Guard's operations, what exactly is the role of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in disaster relief, and what is the proper motivation for wishing to fight. All of these issues are dealt with to one extent or another over the series as a whole; but this congeries of issues is most directly addressed in episodes 19 and 20.

As episode 19 begins PR Division Number 2 has just been reconstituted after its temporary disbanding. While moving back into their offices the employees find a proposal to rent Dai-Guard to "third country" or "Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern" armies. The suggestion that Dai-Guard might be used to stop "anti-government activities" in foreign countries or even domestically causes outrage, and the idea of using Dai-Guard as a weapon for military purposes brings disbelief. "Dai-Guard isn't a weapon," pilot Akagi insists and is emphatically supported by the group. Under pressure young officer Saeki, who wrote the proposal, destroys it but says that Dai-Guard was designed by the military and military use will be considered "in case of emergency."

Dai-Guard is scheduled to go to the Sapporo snow festival, where the recent appearance of a heterodyne nearly resulted in a military confrontation with Russia (although it is never named). Moving Dai-Guard into a potential combat zone requires the crew to confront the issue of whether or not Dai-Guard is a weapon, and if it is, why does the crew choose to fight. Upon arriving in Sapporo Dai-Guard engineer Aoyama is forced to justify his role with Dai-Guard to Arisa,

organizer of the festival and an old flame who sees Dai-Guard primarily as a weapon and is deeply distrustful of its presence. She insists that Dai-Guard must be displayed disassembled because she believes it is a "gigantic weapon" that if allowed to move at will would be a threat to the citizens.

Arisa wants to know why Aoyama so desires to fight. Is it just for a paycheck, a simple love of fighting or, even worse, for self-satisfaction [*jiko manzoku*]? Aoyama insists that what he does is not just a job, nor something he does merely for himself. He deeply feels a sense of mission and the desire to serve on Dai-Guard in order to protect people but, as is typical of the show, he has trouble expressing it. Rather Aoyama's sense of commitment is related visually. Scenes of the devastation of Sapporo, Aoyama's hometown, are juxtaposed with Aoyama's anguish to indicate his pure motives to alleviate human suffering. Eventually it is office lady Nakahara Chiaki, who is romantically interested in Aoyama, who explains that Aoyama is "not self-centered, or careless," but "a person who knows what's important."

Meanwhile pilot Akagi has met an Air Self-Defense Force fighter pilot named Ishihara who inadvertently precipitated the crisis with the Russians. In conversation Ishihara says he envies Akagi and longs for the opportunity of "fighting with your life at stake." Ishihara wonders why he endures the hard training and public suspicion which come from being a member of the SDF if all he gets to do is to engage in disaster relief and to bring in snow for the festival. Later, in order to atone for his mistake he steals Dai-Guard (or rather, in a canny act of potential toy marketing, the flying head portion of Dai-Guard) to meet the heterodyne. Sounding like a medieval samurai or wartime army officer Ishihara insists that he intends to take responsibility for his actions through death by ramming the flying heterodyne. "If you're a man there's times when you just have to do it" [*otokonara yaranakya ikenai*]. He's happy because at last he has his chance to fight; at last he can "do my real job and die."

Akagi denies that what he does in Dai-Guard is comparable to any military activity. Piloting Dai-Guard might be difficult and dangerous work but it is not combat. He describes serving in the SDF as "admirable work," and while the public is grateful for the SDF's efforts at disaster relief and the snow festival they understand those things are of secondary importance. The foremost job of the SDF is "something else" [*betsu ni aru*]. But Akagi insists that Dai-Guard is not? all about the secondary stuff of disaster relief and helping people. He suggests that it would be wonderful if there was an army that only had to handle that secondary stuff. More importantly Akagi rejects Ishihara's justification for his actions. Rather than taking responsibility by going off to confront the heterodyne Akagi suggests that he is running away from responsibility. Akagi further asserts that living is far more important than dying. "Even if we defeat the heterodyne,"

he says, "unless you are saved it doesn't mean anything."

The debate over which set of values, military or civilian, are more important and should have priority is most thoroughly explored through the development of the character Shirota Shirô over the course of the series. Shirota is the military officer initially assigned to PR Division Number 2 as their tactical advisor. While in the early episodes it is plain that he is pursuing his own agenda on behalf of the military in the end, as he is socialized into the group by the members of PR Division Number 2, his thinking changes and he comes to accept their more people-oriented vision.

Having joined Dai-Guard as tactical advisor Shirota is initially quite useful, not only making Dai-Guard's operations more effective but managing to convince the crew of Dai-Guard, notably pilot Akagi Shunsuke, that cooperation with the military actually offers benefits. Meanwhile the members of PR Division Number 2 are attempting to socialize Shirota. The Office Ladies bring him tea, snacks and other items and he is invited to join them for lunch in the company cafeteria. Yet Shirota resists these initial attempts at socialization. While he is helping PR Division Number 2 defeat the heterodyne he is also serving as an army mole, passing on technical information to assist the army to construct its own "special model upright vehicle" called Kokubogar. Kokubogar is, like Dai-Guard, a play on words, *kokubô* being the Japanese word for national defense.

Yet there are signs that Shirota has been stricken by conscience and regrets his actions. Before the construction of Kokubogar is announced Shirota earnestly asks Akagi to step down rather than to continue to risk his life. Although he has come to admire Akagi's spirit Shirota insists that "An individual's sense of justice has no place in the wake of a quake disaster." Individuals, no matter how purely motivated, cannot prevail over organizations. When the existence of Kokubogar is revealed there is a general feeling that he has betrayed Public Relations Division Number 2.

Shirota's initial unease over allowing Public Relations Division Number 2 to continue to operate Dai-Guard springs largely from his distrust of the company's motivations. Heterodyne are a worldwide phenomenon and not to be fought for profit, he says. And he justifies his actions in providing information to the military by saying that with Kokubogar there will be no further reason to commission civilian security companies. But he quickly realizes that the military's motives for taking over Dai-Guard are equally or even more petty. The initial pressure to remilitarize Dai-Guard stems solely from the sense that having to rely on civilians impugns the Army's "honor." And when Kokubogar is absorbed by the heterodyne and can only be rescued by Dai-Guard there is reluctance to accept the inevitable because protecting the army's reputation is considered more important than protecting Shinjuku from destruction.

Kokubogar is damaged in action and the field is left to Dai-Guard once again. Initially Shirota is not welcomed back by group but the Dai-Guard crew stands up for him. They make sure he participates in the section's Christmas party, advising him that "socializing is also part of work" and his acceptance is affirmed when he gets stuck with a menial job of labeling envelopes.

Eventually, in the final crisis, forced to make a choice between his duty as a soldier and his loyalty to the group, Shirota chooses PR Division Number 2 over the military. The final heterodyne to appear in the series is massive and the source of great destruction, which is blamed on the military because of a hastily arranged attack. The officer in command insists that in order to restore the army's dignity they must destroy the heterodyne without the use of Dai-Guard. The only means available to do so is the use of OE weapons.

Despite the prospect of widespread damage, uncertainty whether use of a weapon of mass destruction would even be effective and the knowledge that Dai-Guard, in cooperation with the newly repaired Kokubogar would be capable of destroying the heterodyne, the commander insists on using the weapon. Shirota is dismayed by such pettiness, willing to risk the utter destruction of Tokyo merely because "it would embarrass the army if civilians succeeded where they had failed." Knowing that the crew of Dai-Guard is prepared to fight for their lives Shirota feels honor bound to support them even if that means violating the chain of command. Going off on his own, Shirota orders Kokubogar to cooperate with Dai-Guard and, working together, the two machines manage to destroy the heterodyne. In the wake of this success Shirota's disobedience is papered over as a "cooperative operation between private enterprise and the army." This actually disappoints Akagi who was hoping Shirota might be discharged from the military so "we could take him on [here] and work his butt off."

So what ultimately is the motivation which makes Public Relations Division Number 2 successful where all others fail? Part of the answer is spelled out during episodes 21 and 22 when Dai-Guard's navigator, twenty year old high school graduate and office lady Momoi Ibuki suffers a crisis of faith. Ibuki's stepfather, the heart surgeon Dr. Momoi, has been asking her to quit her job with Dai-Guard for a long time and the two have exchanged many bitter words about this. Ibuki's actual father was the scientist Sakurada Eijirô who first posited the existence of the heterodyne 13 years before. Failing to get the rest of the scientific community to believe him he went off aboard a research vessel and was killed during the first heterodyne appearance. Ibuki's primary motivation for becoming one of the pilots of Dai-Guard is to seek a measure of revenge and carry on her father's work to protect people.

However, her image of her father is shattered when Domeki Rika, the teenage girl scientist in charge of heterodyne research, tells her that scientists are less

interested in helping people than they are excited about solving nature's riddles. She shows Ibuki a videotape from the fatal encounter of the research ship with the first heterodyne. While all the other members of the crew are running away, Ibuki's father can be clearly seen running towards the heterodyne, an ecstatic expression on his face, because his theories have finally been proven correct.

Ibuki is devastated by this discovery and filled with self-doubt. The reasons she had wanted to fight Dai-Guard have suddenly proven to be vain and empty. If she was so wrong about her father's true motivations then how could her work with Dai-Guard possibly have any meaning? After a particularly harrowing encounter with a heterodyne Ibuki writes her letter of resignation. Oddly, though, when Ibuki tells Dr. Momoi of her intention to quit, her stepfather is not pleased. Ibuki is upset and angry and the two exchange words again.

In the middle of the night Ibuki is woken by her mother. Yet another heterodyne has appeared and Ibuki's stepfather asks her to accompany him. She discovers that all the time she has been fighting heterodyne, during each appearance Dr. Momoi has been going to evacuation centers and dealing with casualties. "You get overtime," he tells her, "I'm envious. We're all volunteers." As more injured people are brought to him Dr. Momoi explains that it can be like a battlefield without even the time to feel the weight of his responsibilities. But, he explains, "if there are seriously hurt people right before me, if I can save them with my abilities then it's my duty." He acts on this sense of duty not merely because he is a doctor but "to be true to myself."

Watching her stepfather's selfless acts, a new sense of duty is awakened in Ibuki. She cannot take care of the wounded as her stepfather can, but by rejoining the crew of Dai-Guard and helping to defeat the heterodyne Ibuki realizes that she, too can help people with her own abilities. Dr. Momoi hands her the car keys and asks her to go to where Dai-Guard is facing down the heterodyne. There Akagi assures her that he and Aoyama will always be there to help her. "That's why we're comrades" [Nakama].

The only member of Dai-Guard's crew never to suffer a measure of doubt is pilot Akagi Shunsuke. He is the driving spirit animating the PR Division Number 2 and by operating Dai-Guard he manages to realize childhood dreams of becoming a "Hero of Justice" [*seigi no mikata*]. When confronted with the urgent need to act, Akagi is unconcerned over matters of reputation or prestige, or even the company's balance sheet. When Shirota won't allow Dai-Guard to attempt to rescue civilians in the path of an approaching heterodyne Akagi protests, "Don't you have a duty to help them?" When Dai-Guard enters into a prolonged stand off with another heterodyne, even though the civilians have been evacuated, Akagi wants to go in and defeat it in order to relieve the anxiety of those who have been forced out of their homes or lost their electricity and water.

"To lose your home is to lose your memories of your normal life," he insists.

And it is that question of normal life and, if not liberty then certainly the pursuit of happiness [*shiawase*], that is the ultimate answer to the question of "What do you wish to protect." Throughout episode 23 the members of the division are trying to put together a video describing why people work for Dai-Guard. Eventually one of them gives up filming interviews and shoots street scenes instead: children in a pram, old people in a park, a typical shopping street and the people in it, a feral cat, a quiet neighborhood, and a bustling city street. Although she is criticized by the would-be producer for wasting tape Aoyama suggests that this is the answer. Later, taking a boat trip up the Sumida River and seeing the city, "kono machi," at sunset another member of the division says, "we're protecting that."

Again it is visual cues, rather than verbal, that really manage to answer this question of what are we fighting for. Another example can be seen in the montage for the show's end credits. Here we see members of PR Division Number 2 taking advantage of the joys of the ordinary city; shopping in the Ginza, hanging out in Shibuya, buying tofu from a little shop on a busy shopping street [*shōtengai*], or strolling along the carefully sculpted dykes of a river.

Maybe the question of what do you wish to protect is best answered by the company song, the first verse of which says that Dai-Guard stands ready to sally forth "during tempests and even during blizzards for the sake of building a peaceful future," and in the second verse insists that "even calamity and natural disasters can't defeat us in order to protect your happiness."

Notes

[1] Alex Kerr, Dogs and Demons: tales from the dark side of Japan (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001).

[2] Paul Fussel, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 133.

[3] Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 1998) p. xi.

[4] Susan Napier, Anime from Akira to Princess Mononoke (New York: Palgrave, 2000) pp. 12-14.

[5] Kerr, Dogs and Demons, pp. 37-39

[6] Episode 19

[7] Episode 23

[8] Episode 17

Amerika no Omiyage (Souvenirs from America): The Question of Selfhood and Alterity in Late Capitalist Japan

Sawa Kurotani, University of Redlands

Existing literature on contemporary international tourism and souvenir consumption tends to focus on a particular historical formation of international tourism among the middle- to upper-class Western subjects in economically disadvantaged non-Western "periphery" (e.g., Harkin 1995; MacCannell 1976 and 1992; Watson and Kopachevsky 1994). For them, international tourism is a search for a "premodern other" and an escape from the drudgery and alienation of everyday life in industrialized Western societies. Souvenirs, in turn, represent the "authenticity" of non-Western others (Stewart 1993) and masks, if temporarily, the effects of alienated labor and its consequences in modern capitalist society (Apter 1993).

Contemporary Japanese tourism in the United States and other industrialized Western nations defy these implicit assumptions. During one recent trip from Los Angeles to Japan, I ventured into a large duty-free shop in the Los Angeles International Airport, which was packed with Japanese travelers taking advantage of the last opportunity to purchase omiyage, or souvenirs, in the United States. There was something hisshi [desperately serious] about their demeanor, that they had no time to spare for anything but the most pressing demand at the moment. Their eagerness to consume a dizzying selection of commodities –many of them quite pricey – was at once overwhelming and puzzling. Why do contemporary Japanese purchase all these mass-manufactured goods in the United States and haul them back to Japan? What purpose do these *omiyage*, or the souvenirs, from the United States serve in Japanese social contexts and what do they say about their understanding of themselves and their relationship to the world?

In my discussion, I conceptualize *omiyage* as a sign, or the relationship between a signifier and a signified that is arbitrary yet produces specific meanings in a given historical and cultural context. It is, furthermore, the secondary order of

signification or a "myth" in the sense of Roland Barthes (1972), that which "takes hold" of the first level of signification and further condenses, as it distorts, the relationships between the signifier and the signified. This process of signification is for the most part naturalized in the minds of those who practice it, and therefore, the interpretation of its meanings a precarious and complicated process. I propose that the circulation of the *omiyage*-as-a-sign produces difference that are central to contemporary Japanese subjectivity – the difference between the more privileged and less privileged, between the national self of the past and the present, between the self and the other. In this sense, the *omiyage*-as-a-sign generates power and has social and material consequences for those who participate in its circulation.

Social Life of Omiyage

Uchi (an inside, a home, or "the self") is an important cultural idiom that connotes a location of belonging and familiarity (e.g., Nakane 1967; Smith 1983). The opposing domain of *soto* (an outside, a strange place, or "the other"), which is deemed dangerous and undesirable, marks the boundaries around ideal selves and caution against the risk of diversion from the norms of *uchi*. Traveling produces liminality, with its ambivalent implication of boundary-crossing between *uchi*/home and soto/outside. The liminality of travel, if communally shared and carefully marked, can be used to help develop group solidarity. From the medieval pilgrimage to contemporary company recreational trips, members of a social group travel together and share the experience of otherness to affirm their ties. At the same time, traveling and a touch of otherness are considered potentially destructive to stable social relations, as they give travelers the freedom to transcend social conventions and resist imposed identities (Graburn 1983).

Omiyage, from its origin, implies contact with the powerful and dangerous other. Often translated into English as a souvenir, a present, or a gift, it originally meant a container that held food offerings to gods, which was eventually consumed by the members of the community. In the middle ages the word became associated with gift items produced in certain parts of the country. As the means of transportation developed throughout the 17th century, more and more groups of pilgrims traveled to well-known temples and shrines. These pilgrims, who visited sacred sites as representatives of their social groups, were expected to bring home charms or other objects of religious significance and the noted products of the region they visited. The sacred experience and protection granted to the pilgrims were supposed to rub off on those who received these objects (*Heibonsha Daihyakkajiten*, s.v. "*miyage*"). *Omiyage* is, thus, a representation of otherness that one brings home after a journey to another, often distant and/or mythical place. The practice of gift exchange at the commencement and the conclusion of travel (*senbetsu*, or farewell gift given to the departing traveler, and *omiyage*, or souvenirs brought home by the returning traveler) signal the beginning and the end of

travel-as-liminal, and reinscribe the boundaries between *uchi* and *soto* (Kanzaki 1997).

The relational nature of *omiyage* is still evident in *omiyage*-buying practices among Japanese travelers today. They carefully distinguish the categories of *omiyage* in relationship to *ningen kankei*, or the everyday human relations back in Japan. They consider not only their relationship to a specific recipient, but also the balance among the multiple recipients, who may find out what kind of gifts others received, and scrutinize the appropriateness of the gifts relative to the nature and significance of relationships among involved individuals. Two contrasting examples will illuminate these points of differentiation. One of my younger male informants Mr. Kubo was sent to Boulder, Colorado, by his company in Tokyo to take part in a four-week internationalization training program. He was single, in his late twenties, with a small nuclear family from suburban Tokyo. His list of souvenirs was short by Japanese standards: in the "obligatory" category he listed a few workers in his section; for "personal" gifts, he included only his parents, younger sister, and one friend from work who asked him to bring back a baseball cap to add to his collection. He was not sure what he would buy for himself, but thought he might get a pair of jeans and other casual clothes. His entire shopping budget added up to about $200. By contrast, Mrs. Yoshida, who had lived in the United States as an accompanying wife of an expatriate Japanese corporate executive, found gift purchasing a major headache every time she took a return trip to Japan. She listed a couple dozens of people "to whom [she] had to give souvenirs," which included, in addition to the usual list of relatives, in-laws and friends, her neighbors in Japan who are "inconvenienced" by having an empty house in the neighborhood, the wives of her husband's colleagues in Tokyo who helped her when she was preparing to move to the United States, and the neighbors of her in-laws who lived in a rural town, where gift distribution was more frequent and extensive than urban areas. While the difference in their gender, age, social position, marital status, and family composition made Mr. Kubo and Mrs. Yoshida's souvenir lists quite different, these factors also affected their assessment of the importance of such gift-giving and the consequences of failure. When asked what would be the consequence of not bringing home enough gifts, Mrs. Yoshida, although jokingly, said that she would never be able to go home again [*nidoto kaerenakunaru*]. Mr. Kubo by contrast, simply responded, "Nothing in particular" [*betsuni*].

As relational *omiyage* buying requires Japanese travelers – although to different degrees – to dedicate their time, money, and effort in selecting and purchasing appropriate gift items, it has a clear effect on the consciousness of Japanese subjects away from home during foreign travel. They have to think carefully – and continuously – about their social relations back home, and make their purchasing decisions relative to the obligations that such relationships incur. In a way,

Japanese travelers may never leave home in their consciousness, even though they are, physically, thousands of miles away from it. This *uchi*-bound consciousness of Japanese international travelers is also apparent in other travel practices as well. They often travel with their colleagues, friends and relatives, and choose destinations that everyone in Japan would recognize, so that they can say together "we've been there" upon their home-coming. Photographs and objects, taken and purchased at every stop and each occasion during the trip, are necessary tools of relational recounting that prolongs the collective experience of the foreign after they come home. Moreover, these mnemonic devices can even create a collective experience after the fact: even when you were not there at the same time, you can *feel as though* you were, as you swap stories and compare pictures and souvenirs from the same foreign places where they visited at different times. The inability to join in this sharing can affect one's social relationship, as one of my informants found out. Her close friends had all been to Italy, and they were urging her to take a trip there so that, upon her return, they could "talk about it together." She was apparently beginning to feel guilty about this, so, although she and her husband had already taken one vacation in Europe that year, she was considering signing up for an inexpensive tour to Italy.

As much an oxymoron as it may seem, Japanese travel, and travel far, only so they can "come home." The most important moment of the trip, in fact, comes after the trip itself, when they return home and reunite with their in-group. Foreign travel in general serves as a particularly effective spatial practice of cultural-national identity, as the experience of the "foreign" dramatizes "Japan" as the location of cultural identity. A trip to *Amerika*, Japan's most prominent Western other throughout its modern history, provides an especially powerful experience of alterity through which the traveler's social identity is constructed, disclosed, and displayed as the movement between *uchi* and *soto*. This spatialization of difference does not necessarily require an encounter with the alter in any realistic sense, however. Instead, the point is in a gesture or an *alibi* of movement in and out of *uchi*. If the main purpose of travel is to set a stage for a home-coming and strengthening of the *uchi*, it is better to "domesticate" travel destinations, to be able to go away and come back, without ever coming into direct contact with the dangerous *soto* (Nitta 1992; Graburn 1983; also see Boorstein 1972). Photographs and objects from foreign places – particularly the United States – help create this alibi of travel as they represent the alter in their commodified and portable forms that can be conveniently and safely brought back inside the *uchi*/home/Japan.

Compliance vs. Subversion

Impersonal relational gifts are the norm in Japan, whenever gift giving is considered a requirement for cementing and maintaining social relationships. For instance, large retail stores offer a wide selection of prepackaged gifts during customary gift-

giving seasons, standardized in price and content (Creighton 1991). Particularly popular for this type of gift are prepackaged liquor and non-perishable food items. These consumable goods are considered bunan, or "safe," and will not remain [*ato ni nokoranai mono*]. Therefore, neither the giver nor the receiver would have to dwell on them once they are given, received, and used. The sole point is to fulfill the obligation of gift-giving with little concern of offending the receiver's personal taste or revealing the giver's own. Ubiquitous use of store wrapping paper – which immediately signals the origin of the gift item – facilitates the standardization of these gifts; if the wrapping is from a high-end store, it also adds to the commercial and symbolic value of the gift. The depersonalization process erases the specificity of the relationship that the gift represents, in which, it seems, both the giver and the receiver become generalized social entities devoid of personality, taste, and agency.

Following this well-established norm of obligatory gift giving, many cases of *omiyage*-giving are the exchange of conventional and impersonal commodities, such as beef jerky, chocolate with macadamia nuts, cosmetics, liquor and tobacco products, with very little regard to the specific needs and desires of the receiver. The theme of depersonalization came through clearly when I talked with a group of younger women (I think in their late twenties and early thirties) in the duty-free shop in L.A. about what they thought were good souvenirs for middle-aged relatives. First, they advised me that liquor would be a good choice for this particular purpose; then, asked what kind of liquor would be appropriate, they told me, "First, decide how much money you want to spend, and then, in that price range, choose the well-known brand names or pretty packaging." My use of the vague, non-descript kinship term [*shinseki*] itself implied the obligatory nature of distant kinship ties, and my choice to describe them as "middle-aged" [*chuunen*] also suggested that (given that I was also in my early 30s) generational difference separated us even further. Thus, they recommended a possible *omiyage* in a categorical and impersonal fashion: the category of receivers was immediately connected with the product type (liquor), with some flexibility left for my specific requirements (price range), and explicit emphasis on presentation (package, brand name) to make a better impression for the money.

Obligatory gift giving in Japanese social contexts defies the classic requirement of relational gift, that is, the endowment of meanings, of the personality and essence of the giver, onto the objects. Even in the context of late capitalism, anonymous commodities may be appropriated and transformed into gifts and inalienable possessions by the process of "Wise Shopping," in which the consumer/giver invests time and selfless devotion to the selection and purchase of a particular object (Carrier 1995: 120-121; also Miller 1998). Not all gift-giving in contemporary Japan lacks this relational characteristic, and some *omiyage* are considered more "personal," and thus distinct from "obligatory" *omiyage*. Japanese travelers take

much more time and care selecting this category of *omiyage*, and spend much more money per item than for obligatory souvenirs. The lifestyles and tastes of close family members and friends is important, as they try to find something useful and meaningful for the receiver, and the selection of personally meaningful gifts is often a time-consuming, and expensive, endeavor. I rarely heard grumbling about this category of gifts, and instead, such personal engagement in the shopping process makes this category of *omiyage* more personally significant to the giver, much in the manner of Wise Shopping. In other words, the act of shopping in this instance does not transform commodities into inalienable objects, but it also defines shoppers as subjects who are capable of producing meanings out of impersonal commodities and nurturing social relationships that matter to them. Relationality in this context seems to take on a quite different meaning than in the context of obligatory gift exchange, as the giver's desire (to choose, give, and relate) becomes intertwined with that of the receiver (to receive, appreciate and relate), blurring the boundaries between the self and its social others.

If Japanese subjectivity is defined relationally, as many have argued, the sociality of the self is a collective requirement, whether or not the individual subject finds it desirable or not. Relationships may not necessarily be personal to be important, and a socially important relationship does not necessarily require personal attention. To function as a Japanese adult involves an ability to accurately discern this distinction between *honne* [truly personal sentiment] and *tatemae* [socially appropriate facade] (see Doi 1986). An impersonal gift, perhaps, reveals a pragmatic calculation and a dose of cynicism that goes into gift giving and suggests that Japanese subjects deploy multiple strategies to navigate through the maze of relationality. A $40 package of American beef jerky in an airport-store gift wrapping, for example, sends two important messages about their relationship between the giver and the receiver: the maintenance of the particular social relationship is recognized as important, even necessary; yet, both the giver and receiver are reluctant participants in the inevitability of this obligatory relationship. The compliance to the requirement of *omiyage*-giving is publicly displayed as just that, deeming their gifts neither a parting of the giver's self nor an expression of genuine interpersonal connection that the ideology of *uchi* may suggest as appropriate between the members of an in-group.

Obligatory *omiyage* also has its much less relational twin of self-centered consumption, or, as Japanese travelers often call them, *jibun no omiyage*, or "souvenirs for themselves." Fancy designer-brand clothes and accessories are perhaps the most popular souvenirs of this category, including such world renowned names as Tiffany, Ferragamo, Tods, Gucci, Elmes, Coach, Chanel, Versace, DKNY, Armani, etc. In stark contrast to the standardization and depersonalization that characterize obligatory gifts, Japanese traveler-consumers often look for a specific item from a specific brand, in a particular color and

style, and do not spare money or time to find just the thing they are looking for. Novelty consumption is a practice in creating difference, a self that stand apart from the crowd, and thrives outside the circles of complicated social obligations that defined the Japanese self for earlier generations. Younger travelers, and particularly female travelers in their twenties, seemed to be particularly avid self-centered shoppers, who invested a great deal more of their time and care on buying *omiyage* for themselves than likely among middle-aged and/or male informants. The exodus of disgruntled young Japanese to the U.S. cities and young working women's aspiration to work for foreign (and more specifically U.S.) companies are instances in which this utopian fantasy is played out in their life course choices (Kawa 1991; Kelsky 2001). Foreign travel and mass consumption are, perhaps, a much more accessible way for an ordinary Japanese to connect with this utopian aspect of *Amerika* and appropriate its promise of freedom and equality during a brief and highly structured visit to the United States (also Watson 1997).

Many Japanese traveler-shoppers also seemed to find the exercise of their purchasing power enjoyable--even intoxicating--in itself. In the game of consumption, the process of shopping is separated from its original purpose (of acquiring certain goods for their use value), and the pleasure comes from playing, and winning, in the game of consumption, of beating the market and finding the best value. Even the "duty" of buying obligatory souvenirs becomes an opportunity to pursue self-centered pleasures that the consumption-driven world of globalizing capitalism has to offer. In the scene of *omiyage* consumption, such as the one in the LA Airport that I described above, the playful exercise of shopping savvy also has an unexpected outcome of carnivalesque role reversal. Once again, younger Japanese women appeared to be the most knowledgeable and focused consumers, while middle-aged men--who could very well have been their supervisors at work--were at loss, requiring expert help. Shopping in the international marketplace is an exercise that tests one's product knowledge, quick decision-making, focus and determination -- precisely the kind of abilities that Japanese women, often employed as unskilled office workers or part-timers, are not expected to command in the workplace. Thus, the social hierarchy of the everyday is inverted in the liminal space of foreign travel, and the relations of power in the place of production is subverted through consumption, in which the subordinate/younger/female out-maneuvers the dominant/older/male. Whether to find Japanese women's extravagant consumption behavior disturbing and superficial or creative and fun, perhaps, depends on the observer's positioning vis-a-vis the structural differentiation of power in contemporary Japanese society (cf. Kelsky 2001; Nitta 1992).

Unpacking *Amerika*

The last thread of my inquiry into *Amerika no omiyage* is on the notion of *Amerika* as represented in the shifts in *omiyage* practices. During Japan's postwar engagement with the United States, *Amerika* has become not just a common Japanese term for "the United States of America," but also an imaginary place where the benefits of modern society, such as equal opportunity, personal freedom and material comfort, are made accessible and affordable to the masses. If "democracy" and "freedom" were nifty political ideals that filled a void of political ideology in post-imperialist Japan, ordinary Japanese citizens also desperately needed something to fill their empty stomachs and substantiate the image of the hallowed future. To become *Amerika*, and to achieve its particularly materialistic version of modernity, is to consume all the happiness that money can buy. Reflecting this connection between the United States, material affluence and modernity, it was a dream vacation for ordinary Japanese in the 1950s and '60s to take a tour to the United States (including Hawaii as a closer and more accessible destination than the mainland) and bring home bags of high quality commodities as souvenirs. It was as though they were taking a trip to their own future, when Japan becomes a wealthy industrialized nation whose citizens can afford the material comfort and convenience that already seemed to be the norm in the middle-class America.

The role of *Amerika* as Japan's model of modernity did not last forever. Important changes occurred in the political-economic relationship between Japan and the United States through the 1970s and '80s, and it was also in this time period that Japanese views of the United States and the significance of *omiyage* consumption shifted considerably. Beginning in the late 1970s and into the '80s, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan became acute political issues, and international tourism and overseas consumption became one of the ways in which the Japanese government sought to mitigate the trade imbalance. The large amount of purchases by Japanese visitors to the United States could offset, at least to an extent, Japan's huge trade surplus against the United States by increasing Japanese deficit in tourist spending. For the current analysis, however, the actual economic impact is less significant than the ideological ones, as the public discussion of these trade issues and government policies that followed had a ramification in Japanese images of *Amerika* as well. The widening trade imbalance between the two nations meant that Japan, formerly an economic dependent of the United States, had not only developed into an economic giant of its own, but also became a major customer of the United States, whose main concern was to market their agricultural products.

At the same time, Japanese began to see the United States as the dysfunctional nation in the process of deindustrialization, with agriculture as its remaining economic strength. Akio Morita, the founder and former Chairman of SONY,

and Shintaro Ishihara, then a Parliament member and now the governor of Tokyo, portrayed the United States as a morally bankrupt, economically defunct country, and asserted that the fundamental cause of the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan was the desirability of Japanese products over American products: "there are so few things in the United States that Japanese consumers would like to buy, and there are too many things in Japan that American consumers want" (Morita and Ishihara 1989: 68; translation my own). Their rhetoric resonates remarkably with the words of my informants' claim that there was "nothing to buy" in the United States. As *Amerika* no longer stood for the glitter of advanced consumer society that postwar Japanese yearned to become, the strongest motive that moves Japanese travelers to shop in the United States is the lower prices of popular commodities: a mirror image of the postwar era when Americans viewed Japan as the producer of cheap consumer products (Johnson 1988). At this height of Japan's postwar economic growth, it seemed that there was nothing too large or too expensive for Japanese to buy. In turn, this newly dominant position *vis-a-vis* the United States was crucial in the reworking of Japanese national identity, as it began to imagine itself as the new world hegemony that could replace the United States in the late-capitalist world. The otherness of America had become affordable and consumable, and because of that, it is no longer worthy of consuming unless at a discount.

Omiyage in Post-Postwar Japan

The year is 2001, and the place is, once again, Los Angeles. In Little Tokyo, bits of Japan from different eras exist side-by-side. A traditional Japanese sweet shop, which is reputed to have been there since the end of World War II, and a nostalgic *shokudo*, or a working-class restaurant that serves simple and inexpensive meals, are the icons of older times that are increasingly difficult to find in today's "real" Tokyo, perhaps reminiscent of the kind of people who built and frequented Little Tokyo earlier on. There is also a fashionable hair salon, an expensive boutique with designer-brand clothing, a "Japanese" bakery that attracts customers with the aroma of baking French bread, and a posh "Japanese-style" Italian restaurant – a familiar scene for urban middle-class Japanese of my own generation, who grew up amidst Japan's economic miracle and quickly learned to take for granted the increasing presence of American and European material culture in everyday life.

I also notice one boarded store front after another on the street and in newer shopping arcades – probably built in the late 1980s or early 1990s during the heyday of Japan's Bubble Economy – and sense an impact of Japan's prolonged recession on Little Tokyo businesses that have in recent years heavily depended on the revenues generated by Japanese tourism. An expatriate Japanese colleague also picks up the signs of slow business and verbalizes my own feeling: "*Nandaka*

garan to shiteruwane [it somehow seems empty]." Even a mere three years ago, when she first arrived in the Los Angeles area, it was not quite this way, she says. By the early 1990s, Japan's unprecedented economic boom proved fleeting, and the subsequent economic downturn has, by now, lasted an entire decade. During the Bubble Economy, it all seemed possible for the Japanese – both as a nation and as individual consumers – to buy *Amerika* and the rest of the world. Money, then, was no object; now that the "bubble has burst," the neonationalist sentiment of post-postwar Japan appears to lack its material means. When the money ran out and the majority of Japanese can no longer afford the buying frenzy, and when the myth of "Japaneseness" no longer appears to protect Japan from the ravages of late capitalism, Japan's positioning in the globalizing world, as well as the future of its largely middle-class citizens, remain undetermined.

If Japan's postwar modernization project aimed at becoming *Amerika*, its post-postwar national self, without the clearly demarcated alterity, is increasingly ambiguous. Changing travel and consumption practices among contemporary Japanese reflect this ambiguity. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, their desire in domestic tourism is increasingly directed toward the folksy and rustic, as evident in the consumption of *mingei-hin* (folk arts and crafts) and the popularity of *furusato* (old home place) as travel destination (Creighton 1995; Ivy 1995; Kelly 1990; Moeran 1984). During the same time period, more "exotic" locations and activities in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America became new draws for Japanese international tourists who were no longer satisfied with run-of-the-mill group tours to previously popular locations in Europe and North America. In his analysis of the popular musician Ryuichi Sakamoto, Brian Currid (1996) proposes two possible readings of this shifting Japanese interest away from the White-Euroamerican center, toward the non-Western periphery. On one hand, it is clearly a neonationalist move in which the encounter with cultural others becomes "an imperial gesture," displacing the agency of essentialized, primordial others. On the other hand, he points out Sakamoto's queering move, his self-citation and eroticization of "Japaneseness" that create a representational space for "a sensual, queer fantasy" that is not available in the decidedly heterosexual West (Currid 1996: 94-96). Nevertheless, Sakamoto's performance of queer self presupposes the Western gaze, and thus, his attempt at constructing novel Japanese subjectivity does not constitute a radical departure from Japan's postwar national self. I suggest that the uneasiness of post-postwar is in the split – of being "like" the West, but not being it. As symbolized in Sakamoto's self-exoticization in the eyes of the (intended) Western audience, the post-postwar Japan still requires the generalized Western other to consume, and hopefully praise, its simulacrum of Western postmodernity.

Even in this moment of uncertainty, a new practice of consumption emerges. It appears that more and more Japanese travelers in the United States are headed

for outlet malls where the same high-end brand-name products can be purchased at a deep discount – sometimes at a fraction of their retail value. Bus loads of Japanese tourists arrive from L.A. in the monsterosity of an outlet mall in the desert each weekend, and head straight to the signs of famous designer brands, as clerks, who are specialized in catering to Asian customers, greet them at the door. If buying "cheap" consumer goods from America signaled Japan's economic success a decade ago, it is a new economic necessity of the Japanese middle class with diminished financial means to support their acquired taste for novelty and "one rank higher" class identity based on self-centered consumption of luxury commodities.

The lasting power of *omiyage* as a sign is in its multiplicity and mutability to produce and represent the transnational, the national, the social and the personal desires in ever-changing and at times conflicting conformity and individuality. While it has tangible effects on global political economy and the consumption behavior of individual Japanese subjects, it is also framed by the rise and fall of Japan's national economy. While it promotes the hegemonic Japanese subjectivity, it simultaneously creates the space in which to undermine, challenge and mock the very subjectivity that it promotes. *Omiyage* is, then, a fetish in the Freudian sense, which masks an absence while its presence itself becomes a constant reminder of the lack, or, as Homi Bhabha puts it, "a 'play' or vacillation between the archaic affirmation of wholeness/ similarity…and the anxiety associated with lack and difference." And it is this playfulness, in turn, that "allows for the possibility of simultaneously embracing two contradictory beliefs, one official and one secret, one archaic and one progressive, one that allows the myth of origins, the other that articulates difference and division" (Bhabha 1994: 74-80).

Japan still looks to *Amerika* as the ultimate Other in many ways, and its national and transnational identities are still framed within the alterity that dominated Japan's modern history, and postwar history in particular. Commodity fetishism at the core of the myth of *omiyage* also appears to indicate the deep root that the logic of capitalist modernity – now "late" and "global" – has taken in Japanese subjectivity and worldview. This does not mean, however, that any possibility of subversion and resistance within this system of meaning is fruitless and insignificant in the last moment. Travel experience outside one's *uchi* can result in a dramatic change, and the "selfish" act of shopping can add up to something different and transformative. It is anyone's guess, then, what myth *omiyage* may tell tomorrow on the constantly shifting terrain of alterity in the Heisei Japan.

References

Apter, Emily, and William Pietz, eds. 1993. *Fetishism as Cultural Discourse*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Barthes, Roland. 1972. *Mythologies*. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York: Noonday Press.

Bhabha, Homi. 1994. *Location of Culture.* New York: Routledge.

Carrier, James. 1995. *Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700*. Routledge: London.

Clammer, John. 1997. Contemporary *Urban Japan: A Sociology of Consumption.* Oxford, UK: Blackwell

Creighton, Millie. 1991. "Maintaining Cultural Boundaries in Retailing: How Japanese Department Stores Domesticate 'Things Foreign.'" *Modern Asian Studies* 25.4:675-709

———. 1995. "Japanese Craft Tourism: Liberating the Crane Wife." *Annals of Tourism Research* 22.2:463-478.

Crick, Malcolm. 1989. "Representations of International Tourism in the Social Sciences: Sun, Sex, Sights, Savings, and Servility." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 18:307-344.

Currid, Brian. 1996. "Finally, I reach to Africa": Ryuichi Sakamoto and Sounding Japan(ese). In *Contemporary Japan and Popular Culture*. Ed. John Whittier Treat. Richmond, UK: Curzon Press.

Doi, Takeo. 1986. *Anatomy of Self*. Trans. Mark Habison. Tokyo: Kodansha International.

Dower, John. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: Norton.

Graburn, Nelson. 1983. *To Pray, Pay and Play: The Cultural Structure of Japanese Domestic Tourism.* Ser.B, No. 26. Aix-en-Provence: Centre des Hautes Etudes Touristiques.

Harkin, Michael. 1995. "Modernist Anthropology and Tourism of the Authentic." *Annals of Tourism Research* 22.3:650-670.

Harootunian, H.D. 1993. *America's Japan/Japan's Japan. In Japan in the World.* Masao Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian, eds. Durham: Duke University Press.

Ivy, Marilyn. 1995. *Discourses of the Vanishing*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Johnson, Sheila. 1998. *The Japanese Through American Eyes*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kanzaki, Noritake. 1997. *Omiyage: Zoto to Tabi no Nihon Bunka* (Souvenir: Japanese Culture in Gift Giving and Travel). Tokyo: Seikyusha.

Kawa, Emi. 1991. *Kanojo ga Nyu Yoku ni Itta Riyuu (the reason why she went to New York).* Tokyo: PHP.

Kelly, William. 1990. "Japanese No-Noh: The Crosstalk of Public Culture in a Rural Festivity." *Public Culture* 2.2:65-81.

Kelsky, Karen. 2001. *Woman on the Verge* (Durham: Duke University Press.

Leheny, David. 1995. "A Political Economy of Asian Sex Tourism." *Annals of Tourism Research* 222:367-384.

MacCannell, Dean. 1976. *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Shoken Books.

———. 1992. *Empty Meeting Grounds*. New York: Routledge.

Miller, Daniel, ed. 1998. *A Theory of Shopping*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Moeran, Brian. 1984. *Lost Innocense: folk Craft Potters of Onta, Japan.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Morita, Akio, and Shintaro Ishihara. 1989. *"No" to Ieru Nihon (Japan that can say "no").* Tokyo: Koubunsha.

Nitta, Fumiteru. 1992. "Shopping for Souvenirs in Hawaii." In *Re-Made in Japan.* Joseph Tobin, ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Stewart, Susan. 1993. *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Watson, G. Llewellyn, and Joseph Kopachevsky. 1994. "Interpretations of Tourism as Commodity." *Annals of Tourism Research* 21.3:643-660.

Watson, James, ed. 1997. *Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

King Lear and *Ran*: Identity Translated and Transformed

Bonnie Melchior, University of Central Arkansas

In days when film subtitles were very literal, lines such as "Oh honorable Father sir, I beg you to look kindly upon me" gave American moviegoers the idea that the Japanese were painfully formal at all times. The stilted line above results from translating the word *otoosan* into its components (father+ Mr.+ sir) rather than its sociolinguistic equivalent in the given situation—"Dad" (Yamada 47). Subtitles, now, are considerably better, but "translation" in the larger sense is still problematic. The meaning of a film, like the meaning of an individual phrase, is not determined by content alone; it also depends on custom, relationships, expectations, and general cultural values. Kurosawa's *Ran*, a free "translation" of Shakespeare's *King Lear*, has frequently been assessed in terms of Western cultural values, and it has therefore been undervalued.

Although *Ran* (1985) received a number of awards in its first year and was praised by Shakespearean film-makers Peter Brook, Peter Hall, and Grigori Kozentsev (Hapgood 234), it has not been viewed as one of Kurosawa's masterpieces. Much immediate reaction included comments like "mannered," "detached," and "cool." Ron Silberman says that it "shifts the emphasis from word to image, from drama to spectacle … at the expense of characterization"(Thompson 4). British reviewer Peter Ackroyd described the film as Shakespeare "drained of its poetry" and "stripped of its human dimensions" (Thompson 4). The Shakespearean critic Stanley Wells, although not so negative, criticized the very virtuosity of its effects as "deliberately alienating" (276), implying that the film was a brilliant but rather empty spectacle. Later full-length studies of Kurosawa were also relatively negative, seeing Ran as a falling off of the 75-year-old director's powers. Stephen Prince's criticisms in *The Warrior's Camera: The Cinema of Akiro Kurosawa* (1991) typify these:

> Personality [is] an empty form, hollowed out, a role to be performed of great artifice. Human will and free choice are crushed beneath the weight of destiny (274-5).[1]

Japanese papers presented at a 1986 World Shakespeare Congress point out the problems with this Western thinking: Yoshiko Ueno argues that "the search for individual identity, which is usually assumed to be a major focus of *King Lear*, is alien to Japanese thought since the whole concept of self is different for Eastern and Western minds" (Thompson 8). Toshiko Oshio (in an unpublished manuscript) agrees, quoting an interview with Kurosawa in which he said "it was his wish to present a panoramic view of human behavior rather than focus on individual characters" (8). Their views have not had widespread impact on subsequent criticism, although some Western critics have discussed *Ran* in ways sensitive to Japanese cultural traditions, most notably Brian Parker and Ann Thompson.

Kurosawa evidently considered *Ran* his culminating work. Donald Ritchie quotes him as saying that he thought it "would round out my life's work in film, I will put all of my remaining energy into it." Ritchie goes on to say that when asked after the film's release in 1985, what his best film was, "instead of answering 'the next,' as he usually did, Kurosawa simply said '*Ran*'" (*Films* 214). The relatively unfavorable response to this work produced late in life is oddly reminiscent of early critical responses to Shakespeare's late works—his romances—the problem for *Ran* stemming from cultural assumptions. What Peter Donaldson says of *Throne of Blood*—that it is a "meditation on cultural difference" (70)—is even more true of *Ran*. In accounting for early unfavorable comment on *Throne of Blood*—Kurosawa's adaptation of *Macbeth*, now considered a masterpiece—Anthony Davies says that there is a substantial problem interpreting an original work "taken from one culture and articulated through the conventions of another":

> It is deceptively easy for a Western observer with a knowledge of Shakespeare's play (and therefore with certain expectations of his own emotional response) to impose that response upon [an] unfamiliar idiom … to make the unaccustomed semiotics of the film fit the known textual and sub-textual signals of the play. (154)

Ironically, however, Davies then goes on to make that very mistake, finding *Ran* to have more spectacle and less psychological subtlety than *Lear* (153). Perhaps *Throne of Blood* is more accessible because Western influences on this earlier film appear more overtly, making it accord more with Western expectations concerning the nature of individualism and the relation of Nature to human nature. Kurosawa does not present "more spectacle" and "less psychological subtlety." Rather he presents a vision of life which always shows the individual in a context because context is what defines the individual. The film's parallels to *Lear* only underline its differences—each stemming from differences between Western and Eastern views of the individual and of human relation to Nature.

Initially, Kurosawa did not conceive of his film as a version of *Lear*,[2] but as he worked on the screenplay, he noticed the parallels and intensified them. There is no

subplot with Gloucester, Lady Kaede (the wife of the eldest son) incorporates the roles of both Edmund and Regan, and instead of three daughters, Hidetora (the Lear figure) has three sons. Faithfully preserved, however, are Lear's rage when his youngest son Saburo takes issue with his plan to abdicate power, the banishment of that son, the Kent figure, Lear's rejection by both his treacherous elder children, his subsequent madness and wandering on the heath, a tender reunion with the faithful youngest child who has brought the resources of his in-laws to bear in the attempt to rescue his father, the subsequent murder of that child (by Lady Kaede's machinations), and his own immediate death (provoked by the pain of that loss). Even the role of the fool as a privileged and childlike teller of unpalatable truths is retained, played in the movie by a famous transvestite actor named Peter (Grilli H17). In addition to preserving plot lines, Kurosawa's film preserves meaning relationships: *Ran* is at once a domestic tragedy with implications regarding the welfare of the whole state and a metaphysical examination of the human condition. Both *Ran* and *Lear* suggest that betrayal and violence, endemic to the most intimate of human relationships, threaten the stability and meaning of the whole society and of life itself (the word *ran* means chaos[3] [Grilli H1]).

Of course, some differences between Shakespeare's play and Kurosawa's film result from the change in genre. In cinema, as opposed to theater, as Parker notes,

> scenery, props, and costumes are not mere aids or background but provide a semiology of their own that comments independently on the dramatic action. They function, in Kozintzev's words, "like the chorus of a Greek tragedy," … This happens because the very nature of the film medium requires that correspondences between natural, social, domestic, and mental planes that Shakespeare establishes through language must be represented by strong visual images if they are to have a comparable effect upon the screen. ("Mise" 75)

However, references to the film versions of Brook and Kozintzev illustrate that distinctive aspects of Kurosawa's version do not stem from genre alone. They relate to differences between Eastern and Western views of the individual.

The Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro says that whereas "in the modern Western view, self and environment are opposing terms, in Japanese they are seen as interactive" (Berque 93). European culture tends to give the subject a "stable, central, even transcendental position" (95), while in the Japanese view self "melds with the environment by identifying with the patterns of nature" which are at the same time culturally constructed (93). This paradox, exemplified in the carefully constructed Japanese garden, is illustrated in Kurosawa's insistence on transporting 52 horses (flown from Colorado), 1400 hand-made suits of armor, and a large crew to a high elevation on the slopes of Mt. Fuji (Kehr 24), where unpredictable weather conditions made filming expensively chancy, also by his spray painting the reeds gold for an almost black and white shot he never even

used.[4] Although the film was, at the time it was made, the most expensive in Japanese history ($12 million [Grilli H17]), it is not spectacle for the sake of spectacle. It presents a decentered vision of character, one in which character is closely related to background. Kurosawa further decenters or displaces what Berque calls the subject's integrating point of view (96) by his typical use of three cameras, usually stationary. This technique problematizes unitary perspectives and dominant orientations. Telephoto lenses increase the effect by foreshortening and flattening perspective to the two-dimensional surface orientation of traditional Japanese art (Parker, "Nature" 513). Such decentering is quite alien to Western tendencies exemplified by the development of perspective in art and Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* (Berque 96-7).

Kurosawa's ubiquitous far shots ensure that the larger world is always in view, implying— visually— that social relationships and Nature define human identity. The film is formal in the way it delineates social relationships by means of platforms and geometrical arrangements, particularly triangles, with Hidetora at the apex. Hidetora is who he is because he is the head of a powerful clan and the patriarch of his family— "the Great Lord." Thus his plan to disenfranchise himself is visually presented as a major fracture of all order, as it is in *Lear* (although for somewhat different reasons). But the distance shots do more than just underline structure: they de-emphasize his importance at the same time that they emphasize it. The camera rarely focuses on his face alone. He is as much his role as he is a particular person about to make a bad mistake. Brook's and Kozintzev's film versions of Lear were quite different: they agreed on the importance of close-ups, which, according to Kozintzev, enable you to "look into a man's soul through his eyes" (Parker, "History" 413). Kurosawa is on record as opposing close-ups and favoring long shots. Parker interprets his remarks as follows:

> Most important of all, long shots flatten character so that a Noh-like objective aloofness is maintained, in the same way that Noh masks impose a surrender of subjectivism upon the actors wearing them. The characters of Ran are less concerned with intrinsic identity, with 'who is it can tell me what I am?', than with their positions in society. (414)

Schematized names and colors further communicate the idea that identity is intertwined with social role. Hidetora, as mentioned, is the "the Great Lord," and the names of his sons mean eldest, second, and third (Yoshimoto 357). Each sibling is color-coded, represented on-screen by his "colors" (yellow, red, or blue). The shift in dominance from Hidetora's yellow at the beginning to the black of an opportunistic vassal's invading armies at the end parallels the cycle of a day from morning to evening (Parker, "Mise" 88), a cycle endlessly repeated.

Kurosawa's choice to make his film in color, rather than in black and white, contrasts markedly with that of Brook and Kozintsev. In an exchange of letters, the two directors agreed that their cinematic adaptations of *Lear* must be black and

white (for a more "realistic" look) and must make full use of the cinema's capacity for closeups (Thompson 6). Perhaps it is this implied connection between close-up and black and white that influences Kurosawa's choice. His much-praised *Throne of Blood is* in black and white, but not for theoretical or ideological reasons: he "considered the colour process in 1957 not sensitive enough to record the range … he required" (Parker, "History" 405).

The lush color of *Ran* produces a schematic effect reminiscent of Noh. Every frame has the same attention to color, line, and proportion that a still painting would have, not surprising, given Kurosawa's background as a painter and the many full-color paintings he himself made illustrating what he wanted.[5] Like the camera angles, use of color becomes a means to distance spectators, to make them view Hidetora's choices and the consequences of those choices from a social and cosmic rather than personal perspective. They see the suffering, but that suffering becomes much more a part of the cycle of history and the general human condition. Brutalities throughout the film are presented in a stylized form that distances the viewer, as in the first battle scene, which is soundless, except for music, until two-thirds of the way through when a bullet kills a brother by another brother's command. At that point the clatter of fighting and the thud of bodies and horses falling explodes onto the soundtrack. In an interview, Kurosawa said that he eliminated the sounds from the battle scene because "I wanted to indicate that the perspective was that of the heavens: the heavens watch such unthinkable and bloody battles and become literally mute." (Tessier 69)

The influence of Noh in producing such "objective aloofness" is pervasive throughout the film.[6] It can be seen not only in the color but in everything from scene arrangements and pacing to costumes and make up (Hidetora's makeup is modeled on three typical Noh masks [Goodwin 206]). According to Parker, arrangements of scenes reflect a long study of traditional *musha-e* scroll art. The description in Kurosawa's screenplay of Hidetora's descent from the castle might well be modeled on a famous scroll entitled "The Burning of the Sanjo Palace":

> A terrible scroll of Hell is shown depicting the fall of the castle….It is a scene of human evildoing, the way of the demonic Ashura, as seen by a Buddha in tears. ("Mise" 88)

The central scene in Shakespeare's play is the scene on the heath where Lear howls down the elements themselves, a testimony to human will so strong that it defies the forces of the universe. The critic Alan Booth writes that "the tragic force of Shakespeare's play is concentrated in the intense inward turmoil of Lear himself … symbolized dramatically by a storm" (Ritchie, *Films* 216). Directors Brook and Kozintsev agreed that Lear's reaction to the storm is central, so central that the storm itself should not be treated in a spectacular way. They both saw the storm as a means to his education and a reflection of his state of mind as

he struggles to find meaning in what is happening to him (Parker, "History" 413). Lear on the heath is the center of his stage (Coleridge compares him to one of Michelangelo's titans [Bate 393]), and the audience is made to focus on his individual thought processes as he rants on the human condition to the fool, to Edgar, to the blind Gloucester, to the heath itself. This emphasis on individual will is described by Maynard Mack as a "vein of belligerence" embedded "in the linguistic texture," an "imperative mood" prevalent throughout (89). R. A. Foakes, in the introduction to the third Arden edition, says that the play

> exposes the contradiction between, on the one hand, the importance we place on individual freedom of expression and fulfillment and, on the other hand, the diminution of the individual to a nobody. (80)

In Kurosawa's film, which has an equivalent heath scene, the paring away of language eliminates this emphasis on internal thought processes and therefore the emphasis on "individual fulfillment." Although the film still deals with Lear's "education," this education has more to do with relationships than with the definition of the individual as a "poor forked animal" (*KL* 3.4.99[7]).

Therefore the climax in *Ran*, rather than being the heath scene, is a prior scene when Hidetora, having taken refuge in the abandoned castle of his banished son, wakes to find that castle under attack by the armies of his treacherous elder children. The resulting carnage is spectacularly brutal—one loyal soldier shot through the eye, another holding his severed arm, many punctured with so many arrows that they resemble porcupines. Eventually, all his faithful retainers die in his defense, and his wives commit seppuku. With arrows blazing by his head and fire all around him, Hidetora sits absolutely still and erect amid the flames, a portrait of meditation in Hell.

The parallel with Shakespeare is dramatic, since the outer world in both is an expression of the chaos within, implying a relation between human order and larger orders and expressing the fragility of all order and all human value. Nevertheless, the differences signify a different sense of the nature of the individual. First, he is alone, but not alone: dead bodies surround him, dead bodies of his making. Second, the make-up on his face, a Noh mask, makes him less a particularized individual and more a representative of erring, suffering humanity. Third, human will—a magnificent, though doomed defiance of the universe—is not emphasized in this scene. The meditation, instead, suggests submersion of individuality in an eternal beyond the hell of the here and now. Fourth, although the scene suggests the importance of what is going on within his head, the emphasis is not on the self-conscious mind and the self-conscious act of trying to make sense of the world by means of language. The ending of this scene further undercuts the primacy of will and self-consciousness. His meditation ended, Hidetora prepares to commit seppuku, but disastrously finds that he lacks the means to do so. He

looks frantically for a weapon, and finally, not finding any, descends from the burning building to the courtyard below. This descent is as metaphoric as that of Shakespeare's Richard II— down to the base court where men are made base, a fact emphasized by the empty scabbard dragging behind like a dispirited tail that is an emblem of emasculation and degradation.

The distance shot of the burning castle, with the armies formally arrayed before it parting silently like the Red Sea as Hidetora walks sightlessly through and out the huge gate that closes behind him, underlines not magnificent will and defiance but a separation and isolation that threaten his very humanity. It is human society, according to Takami Kuwayama, that provides those "frames of reference for self appraisal and attitude formation" necessary to being human (142). Hidetora, ejected from human society, has lost these. From this point on, he is small and alone, almost mute, saying little in his madness. This condition does not preclude education, since in Eastern thought,

> the self as imposer of dichotomies through thinking, willing, feeling … must be overcome. Self-awareness must be freed from subject-object differentiation. (Lebra 114-15)

On the other hand, Lear, even on the heath, is still an *I*. Although stripped down to the poor forked animal he is, his individuality is affirmed by language, the will to speak his condition. The Japanese language has no exact equivalent of the word *I*, "which would serve as the fixed point of self" (Lebra 111). Hidetora, stripped of his human relationships, becomes—visually—a white dot in the flux of the universe.

The role of language and silence throughout Kurosawa's film differs from what is typical in Western films. There are lengthy silences, during which no one says anything. Particularly striking is a sequence toward the beginning when Hidetora sits among his entourage for quite a while, with only the hum of insects breaking the silence. Such silences enable viewers to notice more subtle signals of human intentions and reactions—a higher seat, the twitch of a sleeve, a pause, a glance. What is not said becomes as important as what is said, providing a different perspective on the frequent "nothings" of Shakespeare's *Lear*. The silences in *Ran* are reminiscent of the Zen Buddhist koan about the sound of one hand clapping. They demand intent listening and watching on the part of the viewer in order to understand the action. In fact, Kurosawa says that one reason he likes Noh drama so much and uses various elements in his films is that "it is … full of subtlety: It is as though the actors and the audience are engaged in a kind of contest and as though this contest involves the entire Japanese cultural heritage" (Ritchie, *Films* 117).

These expectations of interaction are part of Japanese culture and are reflected in conversational style itself. According to Haru Yamada, a sociolinguist, "being able to guess at what others are going to say (called *sasshi*) is central to the Japanese

expectation of unspoken interdependence." Responsibility for communication rests not on the speaker but on the listener, who should be able to anticipate and understand without the speaker having to spell things out:

> Like a person who is only a *bun*, or part of a larger group, a sentence in Japanese is only part of the larger interaction, and consequently often gets completed *across* [italics hers] communicators rather than by a single individual on her own (37).

Plot points are equally subtle and indirect—the fact, for instance, that the eldest brother is shot, not by a stray bullet, but by order of the second brother and the fact that he also orders the killing of his helpless, broken father. The loving, forgiving Lady Sue, who seems to escape death, ultimately does get murdered, but only a distant view of colorful robes on the ground indicates that fact. Throughout most of the work, the audience thinks Lady Kaede's motive is ambition. This misunderstanding is corrected by only one brief statement just before she herself is killed, when she says, "I sought to avenge my family. I wanted this castle to burn. I have achieved what I set out to do." Then, a splat of blood hits the wall, signaling her violent death. This blood, a sign of the act rather than the act itself, is a metonymy throughout the film, a metonymy first presented in the title credits where the word *Ran* appears as splotches of blood—a sign of future and past.

Visual metonymies and metaphors are common throughout the film. The treacherous eldest son, for instance, is shown, at the supposed moment of his triumph, sitting motionless astride his horse, his back toward the audience, gazing at the flames and destruction of his father's castle. His image as a conquering hero fills the screen and lasts two heartbeats— then a shot breaks the surreal silence in which the battle has thus far been presented and a hole suddenly materializes in his back. This is a betrayal he never expected, visually represented by its coming from behind, a shot that shatters an illusion. Such indirectness, however, makes it difficult to understand where the shot has come from and who is responsible.

Throughout, the movie demands considerable viewer participation in the making of its meaning while at the same time preventing the viewer from identifying with the characters. The effect, although similar is some ways to Brecht's famous "alienation effect," does not seem oriented toward the same goal— intellectual analysis. Donald Ritchie's quote by Rimer is apt: Japanese film is analogous to Japanese poetry in that it moves "inward with a narrative line pushing beyond story, often beyond character, to a general realm of feeling." Ritchie goes on to say that both Japanese film and novel create a "kind of atmosphere which becomes a true 'realm of feeling'" (*Cinema* 48). Kurosawa steadfastly refused to bow to the Western passion for abstraction and explain the meaning of his films. Asked to explain the intended meaning of a scene, he responded, "Well, if I could answer that, it wouldn't have been necessary for me to have filmed the scene, would it?" (*Films* 229).

Some of Kurosawa's published comments on signs and language add further insights. An anecdote from *Something Like an Autobiography* indicates that he became attuned to the meaning of visual signs early in life. His father accused his mother of trying to make him commit suicide because she served him fish with the belly pointing the wrong way (samurai warriors about to commit seppuku were served their fish with the belly away, opposite to the usual presentation) (35). Another anecdote concerns an early experience as an assistant director when he learned to rely on visual images rather than narrative "telling":

> Yama-san read this and said if this were a novel it would be fine, but for a script it was too weak….Instead of having Mizuno do something dull like talk about the edict after having read it on the signboard, Yama-san had him uproot the signboard and arrive carrying it over his shoulder. (103)

According to Parker, Kurosawa habitually wrote his own scripts, in which characters speak "only when they cannot communicate in other ways." Kurosawa himself complained that Shakespeare "is always too wordy," and "hazarded the explanation that the original actors must have egotistically inflated their parts" ("History" 415). Kurowawa's decision to pare language to a minimum is an artistic one, rather than one based on the difficulties of subtitles for foreign audiences.

Western vs. Eastern differences in views of the individual have corollaries in views of Nature. Although cinema, as a genre, tends to replace verbal metaphor with visual metaphor, genre differences alone do not account for the way Nature is presented in Kurosawa's film. One feature common to both Shakespeare's play and *Ran* is use of the pathetic fallacy. In both, disturbances in the macrocosm mirror disturbances in the microcosm. The huge cloud formations so prevalent in *Ran* seem to foreshadow human error and destruction. However, there is no anthropomorphizing of nature in *Ran*—nothing like Lear's adjuration to "blow, winds, and crack your cheeks" (3.2.1) and no analogue to the "germens" Lear regards as the seeds of evil and destruction in nature that made "ingrateful man." Instead, there is a paradoxical sense that Nature is both one with and separate from human beings. The following haiku by Oshi, which has no grammatical subject, illustrates the paradox: "To be under/the little sound/of the wind-bell"(Berque 95). The words *sound* and *under* suggest an appreciative perceiver, but none is explicitly mentioned.

From the very beginning of Kurosawa's film, human order is integrated into Natural order. Hidetora is shown outside rather than inside, with his court arrayed around him and the horizon behind. The kindness and care of his youngest son is signaled by the son's planting a frond over his sleeping father to shelter him from the sun's glare. Even the flimsy walls of a former victim's hut symbolize the relation between inner and outer. When Hidetora, horrified by his guilt, backs into the flimsy wall, he tumbles outside. What Frank Lloyd Wright says about

Japanese architecture might also apply to this film. The distinguishing quality of Japanese architecture, according to Wright, is that it poses the manmade against the natural and the internal against the external (Smith 273).

Another difference in the view of nature is that there is much more sense of the transience of all things—a sense of flux and of change. The human is but one aspect of a total unity beyond what is immediate. The camera endows this transience with evanescent loveliness—sunsets, clouds, blowing reeds, vast panoramas. There is both a kind of reverence and a sense of melancholic tranquility called *mono no aware*, similar to that found in traditional Japanese poetry (Parker, "Nature" 510). Buddhist scholar Daisetz Suzuki says that change means eternal youthfulness, as well as death, and it is associated with the Buddhist virtue of "non-attachment" (380). Kyoshi, a haiku poet says that "Man's life coincides with the movements of nature and heavenly bodies, as flowers bloom and leaves scatter. It is animated along with cosmic phenomena and is annihilated with them" (Minami 57).

In summary, *Ran* is not a film with more spectacle and less psychological subtlety than other film versions of *Lear*. Its far-shots, its stylization, and its silences provide a vision of the self as interactive— it denies to the self a central, transcendental position. More transformation than translation, it is a meditation on cultural difference, one full of paradoxes not congenial to the Western mind: the idea, for instance, that there is no division between subject and object; the idea that there is a boundless self and no-self; the idea that only by acknowledging the existence of self can we achieve no-self. *Ran* is a brilliant exemplification of these paradoxes, a vision not concerned with individuality in the way that Westerners expect. Like a Zen "lesson," the film implies that "the word is not to be detached from the thing or the fact or the experience" (Suzuki 7). The meaning of *Ran*, the meditation, is expressed in this ancient poem by Sojo, a monk-scholar:

> Heaven and earth and I are of the same root,The ten-thousand things and I are of one substance. (Suzuki 353)

The movie *Ran*, itself, has a kind of relational identity. It is a transformation rather than a translation. Nothing of Shakespeare's play

> …that doth fade
> But doth suffer a sea-change
> Into something rich and strange. (*Tempest* 1.2.403-5)

Notes

[1] See also Yoshimoto's comment in *Kurosawa: Film Studies and Japanese Cinema* that "the impressive sets and decor are in the end images without depth … mere visual surface" (358).

[2] Kurosawa first conceived of his film from the story of a Sixteenth Century warlord with three model sons. What if, Kurosawa wondered, the sons had not been so good (Grilli H17)?

[3] In an interview when the film opened, Kurosawa said that he "was not altogether happy with the title 'Ran,' which in Japanese has connotations of historical upheaval and times of battle." He would prefer the English word "chaos," but felt it was too late to change the title (Healy 10).

4. From Chris Marker's A.K., a seventy-five-minute documentary about the making of Ran. This shot was cut from the final version of the film.

[5] He himself painted more than 100 full-color sketches (in the years while he was waiting to get funding) as guides for set designers, costumers, and actors. These went on display in a New York gallery when the film opened (Grilli H17). Many are included in the published version of the screenplay.

[6] The influence of Noh in *Throne of Blood* and other Kurosawa films is extensively discussed by Prince (144-147).

[7] Quotes from Shakespeare's plays come from *The Norton Shakespeare*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, New York (Norton, 1997). Quotes from *King Lear* come from the "Conflated Text."

References

Bate, Jonathan, ed. 1992. *The Romantics on Shakespeare*. New York: Penguin.

Berque, Augustin. 1992. "Identification of the Self in Relation to the Environment." *Japanese Sense of Self*. Ed. Nancy R. Rosenberger. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Davies, Anthony. 1988. *Filming Shakespeare's Plays: the Adaptations of Lawrence Olivier, Orson Welles, Peter Brook and Akira Kurosawa*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Donaldson, Peter. 1990. *Shakespearean Films/Shakespearean Directors*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Foakes, R. A. 1997. "Introduction." *The Arden Shakespeare King Lear*. Surrey, UK: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1-151.

Goodwin, James. 1994. *Akira Kurosawa and Intertextual Cinema*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Grilli, Peter. 1985. "Kurosawa Directs a Cinematic Lear." *New York Times* 15 Dec. sec. H: 1, 17.

Hapgood, Robert. 1994. "Kurosawa's Shakespeare Films: *Throne of Blood*, *The Bad Sleep Well*, and *Ran*." *Shakespeare and the Moving Image: the Plays on Film and Television*. Eds. Anthony Davies and Stanley Wells. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Healy, Michael. 1985. "Kurosawa's Long Answer Said a Lot." *Denver Post* 6 Oct.: 1,10.

Kehr, David. 1985. "Samurai Lear." *American Film* 10: 21-27.

Kurosawa, Akiro. 1986. *Ran*. Trans. Tadashi Shishido. Boston: Shambhala,

Kuwayama, Takame. 1992. "The Reference Other Orientation." *Japanese Sense of Self*. Ed. Nancy R. Rosenberger. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Lebra, Takie Sugiyama. 1992. "Self in Japanese Culture." *Japanese Sense of Self*. Ed. Nancy R. Rosenberger. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Mack, Maynard. 1972. *King Lear in Our Time*. Berkeley: U California Press.

Minami, Hiroshi. 1971. *Psychology of the Japanese People*. Trans. Albert R. Ikoma. Toronto: U of Toronto P.

Parker, Brian. 1997. "Nature and Society in Akira Kurosawa's *Throne of Blood*." *University of Toronto Quarterly* 66 (Summer): 508-25.

Parker, Brian. 1986. "*Ran* and the Tragedy of History." University of Toronto Quarterly 55 (Summer): 412-23.

Parker, R. B. 1991. "The Use of *Mise-en-Scene* in Three Films of *King Lear*." *Shakespeare Quarterly* 42.1: 75-90.

Prince, Stephen. 1991. *The Warrior's Camera: The Cinema of Akira Kurosawa*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Ritchie, Donald. 1996. *The Films of Akira Kurosawa*. 3rd ed. expanded. Berkeley: U of California P.

Ritchie, Donald. 1990. *Japanese Cinema: An Introduction*. New York: Oxford UP.

Smith, Patrick. 1997. *Japan: A Reinterpretation*. Toronto: HarperCollins.

Suzuki, Daisetz T. 1959. *Zen and Japanese Culture*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

Tessier, Max. 1985. "Propos d'Akira Kurosawa." *La Revue du Cinema*. 408 (Sept.): 67-70.

Thompson, Ann. 1989. "Kurosawa's Ran: Reception and Interpretation." *East-West Film Journal* 3.2 (June): 1-13.

Wells, Stanley. 1986. "Reunion and Death." *Times Literary Supplement* 14 Mar. 276.

Yamada, Haru. 1997. *Different Games, Different Rules: Why Americans and Japanese Misunderstand Each Other*. New York: Oxford UP.

Yoshimoto, Mitsuhiro. 2000. *Kurosawa: Film Studies and Japanese Cinema*. Durham: Duke UP.

"[L]ike dusk on the eastern horizon": Reading *Cane* through Chinese Culture

Jun Li

I. Introduction

Since it was first published in 1923, Jean Toomer's *Cane* has been much discussed. Some critics think that it is the most promising book of Afro-American literature in Toomer's time, and its unique form is "one of the distinguished achievements in the writings of Americans" (Turner 208). Many critics have interpreted the work in terms of its aesthetics or have applied a kind of aesthetic criticism to it. Robert Bone says, "No paraphrase can properly convey the aesthetic pleasure derived from a sensitive reading of *Cane*" (quoted in Turner 207).

Montgomery Gregory suggests that we think of *Cane* as a piece of art work and Toomer as its sculptor. *Cane* reveals its aesthetics through its use of language and structure, but most importantly through image and color. If the figure of a circle acts as the external structural frame to unify *Cane*, the creation and depiction of images function as the internal threads that link together its sketches, stories, and poems.

In this paper, I will give attention to the aesthetic quality of *Cane* by considering Toomer's use of the images of dusk and the color purple. I will also offer an interpretation of how these images, understood through Chinese aesthetics, result in a different appreciation for the text than might be had by a Western reader.

II. Dusk as an Image

Dusk as an image in Cane

In *Cane*, dusk symbolizes the dark-skinned Afro-Americans and embodies the moment of mystery and their depth of feeling. Dusk is an integral feature of Karintha's appearance and is used throughout the rural scenes of Georgia to describe the mystery and depth of experience with which Toomer infuses *Cane*. The initial passage and the opening and closing poems associate Karintha with dusk. Toomer says, "Her skin is like dusk on the eastern horizon," Karintha

"carrying beauty, perfect as the dusk when the sun goes down" (Toomer 4). The reference to dusk most obviously describes the color of her skin, but the duskiness also relates to the entire dark beauty that stills the experience of the "dusky cane-lipped throng" (Toomer 15).

Although Karintha is dark, her beauty is irresistible. Though she has been married many times and "men will bring their money" to her, she is not a prostitute. Toomer says, "Karintha is a woman…, carrying beauty, perfect as dusk when the sun goes down" (Toomer 4).

Dusk, as a label for her skin, actually manifests her elusive beauty and soul. This image ties her whole life up like a string. Darwin Turner summarizes Karintha's life as:

> Karintha at twelve—beautiful, matured to sexual knowledge, no longer permitting herself to be dandled on the knees of old men. Karintha at twenty—often mated, perfect as dusk, supported by men, mother of a child who died unwanted on the pine needles beneath the smoke curling from the sawmill. Karintha—"Men do not know that the soul of her was a growing thing ripened too soon. They will bring their money; they will die not having found it out." (Turner 20)

He writes that out of the concealment of darkness darts Karintha, "a bit of vivid color, like a black bird that flashes in light." Karintha's voice is at this moment the corollary to the image of the black bird: "her voice, high pitched, shrill, would put one's ears to itching" (Toomer 3). The contrast between the quiet of the day-night and the sheer force of her liveliness establishes her appeal, for Karintha is part of that dusk only as it reveals her fleeting appearance. Toomer states that she carries her beauty in action. She is active and elusive, inescapably captivating. So, without the stasis of dusk, Karintha could not be known.

Dusk also suggests the hiatus in people's lives between the activities of day and night, the moment of reflective pause "during the hush just after the sawmill had closed down, and before any women had started their supper-getting –ready songs…" (Toomer 3).

In addition, Toomer writes a considerable number of dusk poems in *Cane*, such as "Georgia Dusk", "Song of the Son", "Evening Song" and "Nullo". Toomer's dusk poems often are commentaries on the sadness of a dying culture or the interchangeability of nature with the emotions of humans. In "Song of the Son" dusk is connected most clearly with Toomer's thesis of the "swan-song" of the black folk heritage. It is a song of lamentation, held together by the image of the setting sun. "Georgia Dusk" praises an unknown poet whose folk songs are as elusive as the dusk. "Evening Song" is about an attractive woman whom the narrator observes from a distance but never seems to touch. It is an uneven compromise between boldness and timid tradition, as dusk is a compromise between day and night. "Nullo" is a poem which shows the deep connection between the earth and the sky and the attraction of sunset. So, in each of these

poems, dusk as an important and significant image, helps to create and unveil Toomer's different meanings.

Dusk as a image in Chinese culture

Different cultures cultivate different aesthetic sensibilities. Aesthetic value is always rooted in and highly influenced by its cultural origin. The uses of "dusk" as an image in Chinese tradition and culture may be compared with those depicted in Toomer.

Landscape painting is a widely known form of Chinese aesthetic. It is one of the oldest known art forms in China (De Silva). In the form called *shanshui* (mountain and water), mountains, clouds and mist are the prominent features. Artists learning this form are taught how to use clouds and mist to blur the content objects such as mountains, trees, rivers, and humans. Even contemporary graphic artists are interested in the techniques conforming to this aesthetic.

This "misty" beauty is often set in the context of dusk as well. The sun does not figure prominently in classical Chinese landscapes, because in bright light things are distinct and fixed. The Chinese artists want to express the idea that objects are in constant change and that all things are interconnected, blending into each other. Dusk merges man and nature in a similar way. Human figures in landscape paintings are often foregrounded on mountains or in valleys so as to make them indistinguishable from trees and rocks, merging humanity and nature into one.

In this regard, we can now notice that there is a similarity in the use of the image of dusk between a Chinese artist and Toomer. Both are in quest of misty and elusive beauty in the work of art. Toomer portrays Karintha as a beauty "perfect of dusk," and implies that her soul is merged into the dusk, mysterious, but not black.

Yet, Toomer portrays Karintha's beauty as "like dusk on the eastern horizon." From the point of view of Chinese aesthetic values, this only makes partial sense to a Chinese reader. Under the reading of Chinese aesthetics, if Karintha is regarded and interpreted just as a piece of artistic work, she might be accepted as a dusk beauty, because Chinese landscape artists embrace misty beauty. But if she is treated as a real character, a woman, her beauty as praised by Toomer might cause a perplexity in light of Chinese culture. Instead of being overvalued as Toomer's use of the image taken from Western culture might have it, Karintha would be undervalued in the Chinese reader's view. This is because dusk in Chinese culture also symbolizes spiritual transformation, emphasizing the change to an immortal, or perfected and whole being. While Karintha does experience a transformation of sorts, from a beautiful child to a matured woman, she still has her illegitimate child. This would defame the image of a good woman in a Chinese moral sense. In Chinese culture, a woman such as Karintha is often pitied as a social outcast. So when Toomer insists on praising Karintha as a beautiful woman at the end of the

story, regardless of what she has done, Chinese readers would express puzzlement by questioning: "Is she really beautiful both in skin and in soul?" Perhaps they might like Toomer to change his depiction of Karintha into "like dusk on western horizon" from "like dusk on eastern horizon" (Toomer 4), because Karintha is not typical of the model woman whose quality and essence are valued in Chinese aesthetic..

III. Purple as Image

Another image closely connected with dusk that recurs throughout Toomer's Georgia sketches and stories is the color of purple, which combines the dominant color of the evening half-light with the deepness of the skin pigment and the profundity of the peasant's experience. Toomer thinks the slave heritage is reflected in the "dark purple ripened plums," and the ongoing suffering of that heritage carves in a woman's face an image of "cluster grapes of sorrow/purple in the evening sun/nearly ripe for worm" (Toomer 10).

Purple as an image of *Cane*

In "Blood-Burning Moon," the white Bob and the black Tom are reflections of each other. Their significance to the story is found in their togetherness. They are mirrors of each other even in their actions. While their background and social expectations differ, they are bound together because they love the same woman.

Bob claims racial superiority, yet he is an emotional mixture which reflects the white and the black of the southern society. Toomer says, "The clear white of his skin paled, and the lush of his cheeks turned purple" (Toomer 35). Toomer describes the black farmer's experience as dusk and fruit-purple. Purple not only suggests the skin, but also implies the inner being, the soul of a person. Bob pales and purples simultaneously; the whiter (skin) he gets the darker (soul) he turns. Having arrived at his meeting place but unable to find Louisa, Bob is enraged that Tom "had her." Bob bites his lips so hard that he tastes blood: "Not his own blood; Tom Burwell's blood" (Toomer 34). Bob is too overwhelmed with jealousy to think about the inappropriateness of tasting his enemy's blood in his own veins. Rage has formed a union closer than brotherhood. Bob's darkness of soul can be read from Toomer's use of the color purple. The whiteness of his skin is in inverse proportion to the pureness of his soul.

In the story "Bona and Paul," Paul's activity in the Crimson Garden is regarded as a dream-like transformation. He experiences an awakening and epiphany while being exposed to the garden. Paul's ancestral home is Georgia, but he has never been there. Living in Chicago does not make him happy but gives him a feeling of alienation. Paul is in love with Bona, a white woman. But their experiences and their lives have been kept so rigidly apart for so long by society that they are strangers and do not know how to reach out to each other as man and woman.

The gulf between them is far too wide, from black and white, from man and woman, and from real to real. In the only way they know, they grapple mentally with their estrangement. Both are trying to understand and both are unable to do so. While dancing in the Crimson Gardens filled with both white people and black people, Paul is overwhelmed by a strange feeling. "He sees the Gardens purple, as if he were way off. And a spot is in the purple. The spot comes furiously towards him. Face of the black man" (Toomer 79).

When Paul is about to take Bona out of the garden to make love, the contemptuous and knowing glances of those who watch him bring Paul back to himself, and he embraces at last his own unique being and his blackness. He goes back to tell the black doorman who looks "knowingly" at them.

> … I came back to tell you,…and tell you that you are wrong. That something beautiful is going to happen. That the Gardens are purple like a bed of roses would be at dusk. That I came into the Garden, into life in the Gardens with one whom I did not know…. I came back to tell you, brother, that white faces are petals of roses. That dark faces are petals of dusk. That I am going out to gather petal. That I am going out and know her whom I brought here with me to these Gardens which are purple like a bed of roses would be at dusk. (Toomer 80)

The color purple here functions as a fuse to drive Paul to self-reflection and self-awakening. It makes more sense to read this passage from the perspective of psychoanalytical criticism by taking Paul's psychological conflict and frustration as a dream. Paul's long repressed estrangement is condensed and displaced in a dream-like meditation , and he is awakened in the Gardens by coming up with a vision of purple and wholeness. When trying to explain this sense of wholeness in his excitement, he fails to elaborate it clearly and logically. This explains why Paul's discourse sounds incoherent and subterraneous. Charles Scruggs writes, "…the purple of the Gardens at dusk suggests a fusion of the white and black worlds, especially of Bona and Paul, but it is a fusion whose nature, like that of dusk, is only temporary. The color purple also suggests passion: Paul's passion thins out before he has a chance to experience fullness" (Scruggs 281).

As is seen from the above discussion, purple is an important image employed by Toomer throughout *Cane*. Toomer employs the image with the multiple meanings. In *Cane*, purple stands for the barrenness of Bob's soul and the thinning out of Paul's passion.

Purple as an image in Chinese Culture

In Chinese culture, purple signifies and contains a meaning which is different from Toomer's use in *Cane*. Chinese think that purple is the color which is associated with power, success and spiritual achievement.

The famous landmark in Beijing, the Imperial City, is also called The Purple Forbidden City. Some of the glazed tiles of its architecture are purple in color. It is believed that *Zi Jin Cheng* (Purple Forbidden City), gets its name from astronomy

and folklore. The ancient astronomers divided the constellations into groups and centered them around the *Ziwei Yuan* (North Star). The constellation containing the North Star is called the Constellation of Heavenly God and the star itself is called the Purple Palace. Because the emperor was supposedly the son of the heavenly gods, his central and dominant position was highlighted by the use of the image of purple in his residence. Here we see the use of purple as an image of power.

The use of purple as an image of spiritual achievement may be seen in a famous landscape painting by Nizan (1306-1374) called *The Purple Mushroom Mountain Dwelling*. Like so many landscape paintings, it has a poem on it, celebrating the purple mushroom. If one found this color mushroom and cooked it in soup, the soup would insure longevity. In popular belief, the first Daoist hermits to learn this are simply called The Four Sages of Mount Shang (early Han). They all became immortals by drinking the soup of the purple mushroom. Eventually Daoist masters began to speak of the "growing of the purple mushroom" inside of a person to refer to the use of meditative techniques to focus on the spiritual energy and to overcome illness and aging. So here purple is the sign of spiritual achievement.

It is obvious that purple (just like dusk) has been used in Chinese art. However, the meaning it refers to and its symbolism differs from Toomer's appropriation of his culture's aesthetic of purple in *Cane*. While a Chinese reader would associate purple with power and spiritual accomplishment, a Western reader would link purple with beauty, passion and soul. This analysis brings us to the awareness and realization that different cultures brew divergent interpretations of images found in their aesthetic traditions.

IV. Concluding Remarks on the Cross-Cultural Comparison of Dusk and Purple

While Toomer joins the images "dusk and purple" to suggest the beauty of the women in *Cane*, it is very difficult for a Chinese reader to understand that the dusk and purple skin is meant to convey the beauty of a woman. Chinese culture and Chinese people aspire for and value pure white skin as ideal beauty. The aesthetic criterion of what is beautiful is not identical between these two cultures. Similarly, the United States awards a medal of the Order of the Purple Heart to a soldier wounded in war, but in China, all the heroic medals are made in red. Chinese soldiers would never expect a purple medal as an honor for the recognition of their heroic deeds.

Based on the different connotation of the color purple in the two different cultures this paper describes, Chinese readers might develop a different interpretation of Paul's experience in Crimson Garden. When Paul sees the garden

as purple, Toomer indicates that Paul reflects and meditates on his own condition of being a black. Hence losing confidence in himself and his passion for Bona is hindered. But reading from a Chinese understanding of purple which suggests power, authority and the approach of a spiritual achievement, a Chinese reader might expect that Paul is not supposed to lose confidence and to hesitate on his pursuit of love when he visualizes the color purple. Rather, he should strengthen his passion and follow his courtship for Bona unswervingly, expecting success. So, a Chinese reader may think the ending of the story should have been a happy one, instead of the tragic one Toomer writes with Bona being gone, perhaps leaving Paul forever. So when Chinese readers read *Cane*, they might fail to understand Toomer's intended meaning.

In *Cane*, Toomer utilizes the images of dusk and purple skillfully and successfully within his cultural aesthetic. The two images are woven throughout the narrative sections and interchapters. They help to demonstrate the theme explicitly and to establish the uniqueness of *Cane* as work of art, which allows it to be read aesthetically. However, as I have shown, a reader from another culture might bring very different sensibilities to this text. This is not a reason to question Toomer's use of images. In fact, as *Cane* closes, "dusk becomes dawn, purple becomes gold" (Grant 436). I read this as Toomer's choice to conclude *Cane* with the hopeful image of dawn, and perhaps this is a way of recognizing that readers with other cultural aesthetics will draw out new and unanticipated meanings from the text.

References

"Aesthetics," *Encarta Encyclopedia Online Encyclopedia*. 1997-2003 version. 27 November 2003. <http://encarta.msn.com>.

Bontemps, Arna. 1988. "Commentary on Jean Toomer and *Cane*." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Du Bois, W.E.B.1988. "Sexual Liberation in *Cane*." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

De Silva, Anna. 1964. *The Art of Chinese Landscape Painting in the Caves of Tunhuang*. New York: Crown Publishing.

Eldridge, Richard. "The Unifying Images in Part One of Jean Toomer's *Cane*." In *Jean Toomer: A Critical Evaluation*, ed. Therman B. O'Daniel. Washington D.C.: Howard University Press.

Grant, Sister Mary Kathryn. 1988. "Images of Celebration in Cane." In *Jean Toomer: A Critical Evaluation*, ed. Therman B. O'Daniel. Washington D.C.: Howard University Press.

Gregory, Montgomery. 1988. "Self-Expression in *Cane*." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Littell, Robert. 1988. "Cane." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Little, Stephen. 2000. *Taoism and the Arts of China*. The Art Institute of Chicago. Berkeley: University of California Press.

McKay, Nellie. 1988. "Jean Toomer, the Artist—An Unfulfilled American Life: An Afterward." In *Jean Toomer: A Critical Evaluation*, ed. Therman B. O'Daniel. Washington D.C.: Howard University Press.

———. 1988. "Structure, Theme, and Imagery in *Cane*." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Miall, David S. and Don Kuiken. *Reader-Response: Empirical Research on Literary Reading*. 2 November 2003. University of Alberta. <http://www.ualberta.ca/~dmiall/reading/index.htm>.

Toomer Jean. 1988. *Cane: A Norton Critical Edition*, ed. Darwin T. Toomer. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Turner, Darwin T. 1988. "Contrasts and Limitations in *Cane*." In *Cane*, ed. Darwin T. Turner. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Silk Road Buddhist Cave Art in American Collections: Recovering the Context

Lawrence E. Butler, George Mason University

On a recent visit to Kansas City, I was struck by the Nelson-Atkins Museum's collection of Silk Road Buddhist and Chinese art. Not so much by the usual suspects, though--Tang Dynasty ceramic Bactrian camels, Sogdian riders and the like--but by the disiecta membra, forlorn if beautiful fragments displayed in a back room, pieces grouped as "Silk Road Buddhist," with only the merest provenance or explanation given in the labels. Every American museum with an Asian art collection seems to have a similar room, with similar pieces, including small fragments of Gandharan stucco work from Afghanistan and cave painting fragments from Western China's Buddhist caves. Dunhuang is the best-known of these sites, but American pieces often come from other Central Asian sites, particularly from Kizil, Kucha, and Bezeklik. Why those sites, I wondered? And how did it all get here?

We know part of the answer, as the Buddhist sites of Western China become ever more familiar to scholars and tourists alike. The story of the looting and dispersal of archeological material from the Mogao Buddhist Caves at Dunhuang is well-known from many popular and scholarly accounts, such as Hopkirk's Foreign Devils on the Silk Road (1980). Recently the British Museum has made a concerted effort to make its Dunhuang material more accessible to scholars and the public, and the Dunhuang Research Center at the site itself has become very active in training new scholars. As a result, the field of "Dunhuangology" has been born. It strikes me that it is time for museums to catch up with the new scholarship and dust off the old exhibits.

In this paper I would like to explore some issues these pieces raise in my mind: museological issues involving the collecting, preservation, and display of such material in light of recent advances in Silk Road scholarship, American museum practices, and international cultural property law. I would like to consider some of the ways we can recover some of the lost context for these lonely museum pieces.

Provenance

Provenance is the history of ownership of an object. Ideally, one wants to know precisely where something came from originally, who has owned it and where it has been ever since. This sounds simple, but it usually isn't. To illustrate the complexity of basic provenance issues, I offer the example of a little stucco head in the Nelson-Atkins Gallery (acc. No. 33-1538; my figure 1), labeled "Head of a Donor, Turfan or Khotan, 8th- 9th cent." At first glance this looks reasonable enough: Turfan is on the northern route around the Taklamakan Desert, Khotan on the south route, and both were centers of archeological collecting activity in the early 20th century. Recent research suggests that the Northern silk route sites of kingdom of Kucha, with the nearby sites of Kizil and Shorchuk, were primarily Theravada Buddhist strongholds, while the kingdoms of Khotan and Turfan appear to have been Mahayana in inspiration, reflecting different paths of missionary activity (Härtel and Yaldiz 1982, 22).

A little digging in the major field and museum publications finds many a similar piece labeled "Head of a Brahman," not "Head of a donor," from nearby sites along the Northern Silk Road (Von Le Coq 1922, 23 and Pl. 24). "Head of a Brahman" is also how the piece is listed in the Kansas City archival files, with no other comment on the gallery label's reassignment. Recent German literature continues to call such pieces "heads of Brahmans" and give reasonable explanations for the style, expression, and original provenance of such distinctively bearded and coiffed heads in the background of scenes of the Buddha's life and parinirvana (Härtel and Yaldiz 1982, 139-143). Scenes of the Buddha's preaching, with brahmans scowling incredulously in the margins, are part of the iconography of Theravada Buddhist cave ensembles. I find no particular visual parallels in the heads of donors from any sites in Xinjiang to support the museum label's assertion; the details of the face and hair seem too peculiar, and unlike any of the heads of, say, Uighur donors from the cave art of Khotan or of Turfan. If "head of a Brahman" is indeed what this is, then that would suggest that our little bearded head comes from a sculptural ensemble in a grotto site along the Northern Taklamakan trade routes, more likely from the Theravada region of Kucha than from Khotan or Turfan.

Given the style and probable iconography of the little head, we can reasonably surmise that much about its original context in the absence of scientific analysis. So how did it come into a museum collection in America? This is harder to pin down, for several reasons. The original source of an excavated object can often be guessed if one knows more about the provenance, i.e. which dealer a piece was obtained from, and where that particular dealer was actively acquiring material to sell. Unfortunately, details of sales and prices paid are traditionally kept confidential by museums; only recently have museums begun to make this sort of information public in order to establish provenance.

Another difficulty is the sheer messiness of the collecting activities in Western China in the early twentieth century. It is commonly known that German archeologists explored and harvested material from the northern Taklamakan sites of Kucha, Kizil, and Shorchuk, and the Turfan regional sites of Khocho and Bezeklik, in the early twentieth century, while Aurel Stein concentrated on Dunhuang and the southern Taklamakan sites. The four German "Turfan" campaigns of 1902, 1905, 1905-7, and 1913 were led variously by Albert von le Coq and Albert Grünwedel for the Ethnological Museum of Berlin. Vast amounts of material, most notoriously wall frescoes, were taken from the caves and sent back to Berlin, where they were displayed in glass wall cases in the Museum. During the bombing campaigns of World War II, the majority of this priceless material was said to be damaged or destroyed, leaving only the photographs in Von Le Coq's 1913 Chotcho publication for later generations to study.

This is an oversimplification. In reality, the situation was much more complex (Gies 50; Härtel and Yaldiz 1982, 25-46). The first archeological explorer in the Turfan and Kucha areas was actually the Japanese explorer Count Otani, who was collecting Buddhist pieces to ship back to Japan in 1902 to 1908. His collection was dispersed in the 1930's. The Russians were also in the area in 1907 and 1911, preceding the Germans at several sites, and shipped a number of pieces to St. Petersburg. The French scholar Paul Pelliot came through in 1907, collecting a number of pieces from Kucha, now in the Musée Guimet, Paris. The Germans were the most active in the area from 1906 until World War I, resulting in the Berlin Ethnographic Museum collection's famous holdings. But then from 1913 on, the American Langdon Warner began his rapacious collecting campaigns at Dunhuang and the Xinjiang sites. The pieces he acquired were variously dispersed as well, some going to prominent American museums, but others sold privately. So we know that Otani's collection was widely dispersed through sales, and the German pieces potentially lost through the vicissitudes of war; and while the Pelliot, Warner and Russian collections largely went to museums, small pieces from those expeditions appear to have strayed onto the private market as well.

It is no wonder, then, that American museums and collectors were able to obtain so many small, pretty fragments of Buddhist cave art in the 1920's and again around World War II. One such piece in the Nelson-Atkins Museum is from Count Otani's collection, according to the curatorial files: the stucco wall painting of a Bodhisattva head from Bezeklik (acc. No. 43.17) acquired for the museum in 1943, a few years after his collection was dispersed. Assuming that this provenance is correct, this cautions us not to assume that all Bezeklik pieces were harvested by the Germans.

A number of American collections have fragments of Buddhist frescoes from the Kucha district of Xinjiang, notably from the Kizil Caves, a particularly

well-studied and well-published Buddhist painted cave complex located about seventy kilometers north of Kucha, much visited (and collected) by all the teams noted above, including the third and fourth German "Turfan" expeditions.[1] The grottoes are second only to the Mogao Caves at Dunhuang in their extent and splendor. They consist of some 235 caves stretching over two kilometers along the Muzart River, decorated between the third and ninth centuries CE. A splendid set of wall painting fragments from Kizil was acquired in the 1920's by John Gellatly and donated to the Smithsonian in 1929. Officially owned by the Smithsonian American Art Museum, they are now housed and displayed in the Smithsonian's Sackler Gallery of Asian Art on long-term loan.[2] While the details and circumstances of Gellatly's purchase are not known to me, a search of the Sackler's publicly-accessible curatorial files does show that many of the fragments have been identified with specific caves by Chinese scholars in consultation with the Sackler curators.[3] Many, for instance, are believed to originate in Cave 224, poetically named the Maya III cave in the older German literature (a frieze of three heads, LTS 1985.1.325.6). The latest scholarship favors dating this cave to a period between the late fourth and early sixth centuries CE, based on a combination of stylistic and scientific dating methods suggested by Su Bai.[4] Several very similar fragments in the Nelson-Atkins Gallery look to be from the same workshop; one frieze of four heads (acc. No. 49-23/3) is identified in the curatorial files (though not in the gallery) as likewise coming from Maya Cave III.[5] How it came into the Nelson-Atkins collection in 1949 I do not know; that was not part of the publicly-accessible information.

Decontextualization and Recontextualization

Given the active state of Kizil scholarship, the wealth of Kizil fragments in American collections—and these are but a few examples of many—and given the fragmentary but suggestive evidence of provenance provided by these glimpses into curatorial files, it is hard to understand why these fragments still so often hang isolated, poorly labeled and decontextualized on the walls of American museums. In part this is due to the banal fact that "Silk Road" is a new category for museums, one that doesn't conform neatly to traditional disciplinary boundaries, which tend to separate "East Asian" from "Middle Eastern" material. Until recently, the American museum-going public might be forgiven for having no more than the vaguest awareness of Afghanistan or Xinjiang, let alone of their relationship. The traditional structure of curatorial departments marginalized both, and usually put them in two different galleries to boot.

In part this sort of minimalist display is a holdover from the days when objects collected and displayed as "art" were meant to be admired for their aesthetic formal qualities alone. Museums in the early and mid- twentieth century used plain or understated walls, isolating frames, and great expanses of space to focus

viewers' attention on the objects' aesthetic qualities in a quiet, contemplative setting, devoid of distractions. Even labels were kept minimal, for fear of turning the art museum into a "reading room." Context was given only by the grouping together of like objects, or from subtle cues in the decorative details of the gallery space, such as wall color or molding profile. An excellent example of this display philosophy today is the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C., housed in spacious and exquisitely appointed rooms where the viewer is (theoretically) undistracted by clutter or wordy labels.

Interestingly, this was also the aesthetic philosophy of art display promoted by James Freer at his Freer Gallery of Asian Art, the Smithsonian's very first museum devoted solely to art. It stems in part from the traditions of western connoisseurship, but also from the aesthetics of the tea ceremony. This may in part explain why so many Buddhist cave painting fragments are presented today in American museums as exquisite vignettes, isolated and centered in frames, and given very little further contextualization. They are meant to be viewed not as artifacts of Buddhism, nor as fragments of larger wholes, nor as representative of the archeology of ancient China, but as aesthetic objects in their own right. To use the current jargon of cultural studies, such museum objects are not just decontextualized; they are recontextualized by their display settings, becoming something quite different from what the original patrons and makers intended. It was the intention of Freer (and apparently of Gellatly as well) to promote East Asian aesthetic values to American artists and patrons; and further, to promote American artists like Whistler, Thayer and Twachtman, who appeared to apply these aesthetic principles in their own paintings.

Recovering the Context of the Kizil Grottoes

There is clearly no single "correct" way to contextualize fresco fragments, no single way to be "true to the object," though this notion is something of a holy grail of museology.[6] As my own contribution, I would like to add some notes to the minimalist labels of Kizil fresco fragments displayed at the Nelson-Atkins and elsewhere. To be fair, this is inspired in great part by an exhibition of the Gellatly collection of Kizil cave art at the Sackler Gallery of Asian Art in Washington, D.C. in 2001/2002. Some two dozen fragments were put on display, each labeled with a brief analysis of the probable Buddhist iconography, and to a lesser extent the stylistic painting tradition, that each represented. In my own imaginary exhibition of this material, I might include some of the following topics as well.

Cultural and Historical Context of Kizil Cave Paintings

Xuanzang visited the area in 630 CE, and describes the local Kucha kingdom as a well-known center of Theravada Buddhism, similar to Bamiyan but particularly renowned for its music and dancers. This is reflected in the subject matter that predominates in the cave paintings: the Buddha teaching, Jataka tales,

bodhisattvas, and flying musical devatas (Tucker, 154-5). This knowledge alone has been instrumental in recent redating of the paintings.

The Kizil paintings are notable for a distinctive Indo-Persian style as well as more Chinese painting styles. Older German literature, influenced by traditional art-historical notions of linear stylistic evolution, assumed that the Indo-Persian paintings were older and the Chinese later, reflecting changes in political influence as Buddhism spread east into China (Grunwedel, 5-6; Von Le Coq 1922-3, 7.27-29). More recent studies have combined the results of C-14 testing, studies of liturgical changes reflected in the architecture of Buddhist cave chapels, and developments of the local Buddhist theology to arrive at earlier dates for much of the material, fourth through sixth century as opposed to eighth or ninth century CE. The Kizil caves now appear to have been influential on the style of cave painting in Gansu Province to the east, particularly at Binglingsi and Dunhuang, presumably reflecting the development of Buddhist thought as well (Juliano and Lerner, 128-9). This interplay of scientific, formalistic, theological, liturgical and archeological evidence provides more than just a more accurate date; it gives us a richer understanding of the paintings' significance and original context.[7] With this in mind, one views with horror photos of, say, Kizil Cave 224 stripped bare of frescoes, or fresco sections cut out to the shape of shipping crates with no further concern about their original setting (Gies, 48; Malenka and Price, fig. 4). One also recalls the bitterness of the Chinese guides indicating the glaring losses in the painted Buddhist grottoes at Bezeklik.

Kizil Grottoes: The Physical Context[8]

The Kizil grottoes, like the better-known Mogao caves at Dunhuang, are a series of small chambers and statues carved out of porous sandstone decorated with stucco and paint. Such sites were first developed in the Han period in Western China and the Tarim Basin in response to Buddhist caves in India, but also incorporating local funerary and Daoist traditions. The entire site is threatened by a combination of factors, including seepage and erosion from rain gullies in the hills above the grottoes, windblown sand, and frequent earthquakes. About 60% of the caves have exposed chambers in danger of collapse. The surviving interiors have been badly stripped by all the above-mentioned exploratory teams harvesting Buddhist antiquities, by sawing frescoes off walls and by detaching stucco sculptures. More recently the fragile site is threatened by the deleterious effects of tourism. In order to preserve the site, all of these have had to be dealt with (Jiang and Huang, 170-172).

The preservation of sites such as Kizil or Mogao requires balancing a number of considerations, some conflicting with others. The basic principles of historic preservation, enshrined in the Venice Charter of 1964, include minimal intervention and the avoidance of additions, the maintenance of ruins without their

actual reconstruction, and maintenance of historic authenticity. The principles do allow the use of modern technologies if traditional ones are inadequate to preserve the structures. They allow for modern additions, made distinct from the historic parts of the structure, which may conflict with the desire also stated to make any additions harmonious with the original. In this spirit, the Chinese Cultural Relics Protection Law stipulates "no change in status quo ante," a continuing source of trouble for conservators (Huang, 9-11). The problem with cave sites is that the preservation of the grottoes requires a protective façade. The masonry facade added to the Mogao Grottoes in the 1960's was necessary, but invented de novo and notoriously ugly, awkwardly straddling the need to preserve and the need to maintain historic authenticity by means of a brown drab surface.

At Kizil, major consolidation work was undertaken in 1986, and the Chinese government has continued to pour major resources into its maintenance and management since then. Cantilevered walkways, concrete beams and facades were all added. The disintegrating sandstone has been held together with steel cables, while the surface has been treated to slow water absorption, while overhead watercourses have been diverted. Thorough archeological surveys have been undertaken as part of the documentation, resulting in a much better understanding of the caves and their original contents. Finally, tourist management has become an increasingly important issue, with a need to balance public access with historic preservation (Jiang and Huang).

Conservation of Cave Fresco Fragments in America[9]

The Venice Charter also expressly states, in Article 8: "Items of sculpture, painting or decoration which form an integral part of a monument may only be removed from it if this is the sole means of ensuring their preservation." Clearly it is too late to apply this principle to the art of Western Chinese Buddhist caves, as it is to the sculptures of the Parthenon. It is worth remembering, though, that this is precisely how early archeologists and collectors in Western China justified their work, since they regarded the Buddhist art as threatened with ongoing destruction by the local Muslim population. In any case, now that western museums hold much of this material, it behooves them to preserve it. Several recently-published case studies on the restoration of Silk Road Buddhist fresco fragments in American museums outline the difficulties.

The Philadelphia Museum of Art, for instance, recently restored a Yuan Dynasty fresco derived from a large Yuan Dynasty Buddhist mural (Melenka and Price, 127-131) purchased by the Museum. For once we have a full published provenance for the object. It was purchased for the museum by Langdon Warner, through the agency of George Crofts and Company in Tianjing. It was removed to order from a partially destroyed temple in Henan, cut into eighty sections, backed with paper, and sent to the museum, where it was reassembled in 1930.

The fresco surface was held together with hide glue, paper and muslin, and the plaster backing was then scraped to a thickness of one to two millimeters. This thin layer was backed with linen, glued, then glued again to plywood backing panels. The scars from the saw marks were toned in but not hidden. This is similar to established procedures for rehanging Western fresco fragments and panel paintings. The restorer reported that at the time of the 1990's investigations the fresco appeared to be in good shape, and only minimal interventions were required (Malenka and Price, 131).

Other fresco fragments in American museums have not fared so well.[10] Originally the cave frescoes were painted on surfaces backed by several layers variously made from clay, plaster and vegetal matter. If the fragments were not scraped thin before mounting to linen or panel for museum display, then internal layers will typically degrade, threatening the integrity of the whole object. These fragments were typically packaged in neat wooden frames, the rough edges filled with plaster of paris, in order to approximate the look of a framed panel painting. Because of these frames, degradation of internal layers can be hidden until serious damage has occurred to the surface, such as cracking, separation, or sagging. Such fragments need to be removed from their frames for examination and restoration, have their inner layers refilled, and edges consolidated. The restored fragments may have to be displayed horizontally to prevent a recurrence of crumbling and sagging. Further damage to surfaces may have occurred due to well-intended attempts to infill missing paint, which inadvertently causes ancient paint to be pulled away from the surface. Current museum taste favors minimizing the use of infilling color. Individual museums may or may not favor displaying the repaired fragments as fragments, without the neat square frames. This has the visual effect of recontextualizing the pieces as fragments, rather than as complete and integral paintings equivalent to Western canvases. To some extent, this emphasis on the fragment might be seen as being "truer to the object" and its (destroyed) original context.

Legalities: Chinese and International Cultural Heritage Law[11]

What is the legal status of these fragments, especially the ones clearly removed from specific known locations? Cultural property in international law is governed by UNESCO conventions and by the laws of the individual countries such as China. Chinese laws respecting antiquities were first put in place in the 1930's, meant to halt precisely the sort of dispersal that had been taking place. While the destructive collecting of the early 20th century would be clearly illegal now in all cases, neither UNESCO nor Chinese law governs retrospective cases that occurred before these laws were put into place. China has never, in fact, formally requested the return of cultural property at the governmental level, although in the 1990's the director of the Dunhuang Mogao Caves Research Center issued

his own plea for the return of some 40,000 items in the world's museums to Dunhuang (Greenfield, 138).

The cave fresco fragments are somewhat different from Dunhuang manuscripts, in that they were integral parts of the fabric, ripped out and removed. This is one of the issues raised by Greece's call for the return of the Parthenon sculptures now in the British Museum to Greece. There is, as yet, no international cultural property law requiring repatriation of fragments to existing monuments. The Venice Charter condemns the removal of integral painting and sculpture, but it is a guideline, not a binding international treaty.

The Chinese Buddhist caves do, however, fall under another sort of international protection. Three of the Buddhist cave sites have been listed as UNESCO World Heritage Sites: the Mogao Caves at Dunhuang, the Longmen Grottoes in Henan, and the Yungang Grottoes in Shanxi. Such listing takes place only at the initiative of the host country. Tangible benefits include technical assistance with site management from international bodies; less tangible benefits include protection from damage even in time of war, although the fate of the so-listed Bamiyan Buddhas at the hands of the Taliban government in March 2001 shows the limits of this protection. Many Silk Road sites are similarly threatened because the current inhabitants or authorities have little interest in (or even outright hostility to) the cultural heritage of previous civilizations in their territory. For reasons unclear to me, none of the Xinjiang Buddhist grotto sites has yet been proposed by China for listing as a World Heritage Site. Thus there is no particular status or protection under international law for museum pieces such as the Kizil or Bezeklik Buddhist cave fragments, and hence no legal objection to their current ownership under existing international law. While American museums adhere to professional guidelines regarding provenance, governance, access and conservation, it is up to individual museums to decide how best to give pieces such as these a meaningful context.

Recovering the Context of Silk Road Buddhist Art

In the fall and spring of 2001/2002, while Washington was preoccupied with graver matters, the Smithsonian's Sackler Gallery of Asian Art presented a beautiful show, "The Cave as Canvas: Hidden Images of Worship along the Silk Road." It consisted of some two dozen fragments from the John Gellatry collection mentioned above, primarily from Kizil grottoes. Each piece being isolated and framed in wood, they were presented in a row around the walls of a single, carefully lit room, in the manner of an Old Masters painting gallery. Labels described painting techniques and Buddhist iconography. Nothing much was said about the Kizil Caves themselves, the original location of any particular fragment, nor the circumstances of their removal from the walls of caves to the walls of the Smithsonian. It was as if the museum had gone out of its way to avoid

calling attention to the physicality of the objects, or to the glaring holes left on the walls of the caves where they were made.

It is interesting to compare the text of gallery labels with the curatorial records of individual pieces. One fresco fragment from Kizil (LTS 1985.1.325.3) depicted the head of a devata, presented to the public as "A dark-skinned, red-haired devata" and described in terms of color, painting technique, and possible role in a Buddhist scene. Publically-accessible curatorial notes on the same piece describe correspondence with Chinese scholars at Kizil who confirm that the piece comes from Cave 188. One scholar claimed to find the very spot from which this fragment was taken: "on the upper portion of the right wall." Upon reading this, I found my whole picture of the piece changed. This one piece of information contextualized the fragment for me, changing it from an aesthetic objet d'art with religious iconographic content into a forlorn piece of a larger, more complex whole; a witness to a time when Western scholars ransacked Xinjiang and Gansu for trophies. Or to put in their terms, when Western scholars scrambled to preserve the last remnants of a forgotten Buddhist civilization lost in the midst of the harsh and Islamicized Taklamakan Desert.

More and more American museums attempt to present their objects in a richer, broader context than simple track lighting and brief labels informed by connoisseurship can give. Museums struggle to bring their archeological exhibitions to life using multimedia, reconstructions, performances, walk-through emplacements, and the like. In this paper I have tried to indicate some different ways of recontextualizing those fragmentary Silk Road pieces hiding in the neglected back rooms of America's Asian art collections. As much as I enjoy seeing delicate fresco paintings of bodhisattvas playing musical instruments, or the little stucco heads of frowning Brahmins, I look forward to finding more imaginative displays of Silk Road material in the future. At the very least I would expect to find photographs of grotto sites on the wall, reconstruction drawings of the pieces in their original architectural context, and an honest discussion of provenance. I would like to see the pieces restored and displayed as the fragments they are, in suggestions of original settings and relationships, allowing the viewer to reconstruct the whole mentally without having to think away the artificial wooden frames. Above all, I would like to see American museums catch up with the rapidly evolving scholarship of Silk Road Buddhist art, giving the same scrupulous attention to precise location, function, grouping and context that they give to archeological material from the world's other classic civilizations.

Figure 1: Head of a Brahman. Drawing by the author.

Notes

[1] Basic introduction and excellent color photographs for Kizil can be found in Tucker, 154-5 and figs 193-199; and in Gies, passim. For more detailed studies, see the works of Angela Howard and Ma Shichang, and individual essays in the Wu Hung and Neville Agnew edited volumes.

[2] As described on the Smithsonian American Art Museum's website, http://americanart.si.edu/museum_info/history/history_jg.cfm

[3] Full object reports from the Freer Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, obtained through the kindness of the Freer and Sackler Library staff. Curatorial comments included in these reports name individual scholars and their suggestions regarding provenance and dating.

[4] Summarized and explained in Howard 1991; the redating has been accepted by the Freer and Sackler curators as well, as explained in the museum's full object reports.

[5] I am grateful for assistance from Curator Jason Steuber at the Nelson-Atkins Museum for providing me with these records.

[6] The futility of this search is wonderfully presented in Susan Vogel's classic article, "Always True to the Object, In Our Fashion," which traces the history of displaying African art in Western museums.

[7] This discussion is based on Howard's summary and supportive discussion of Su Bai's redating based on contextual evidence. Howard, passim.

[8] The indispensable reference for this and the following discussion is the Proceedings of the International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Caves at Dunhuang, October 1993, edited by Neville Agnew (1997). A follow-up Second International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, originally scheduled for Summer 2003 will be held again at Dunhuang in the summer of 2004. The published proceedings should prove equally valuable.

[9] See note 8 regarding Agnew (1997). It is indispensable here as well.

[10] This discussion summarizes the article by Luk et alia (1997) on the conservation of two Chinese wall painting fragments. Different decisions were made for each, to some extent reflecting the taste of the two different museums that owned the works.

[11] For detailed discussion, consult Murphy, Plunder and Preservation: Cultural Property Law and Practice in the People's Republic of China (1995). For excellent general discussion of cultural property and specific vexed cases such as the Aurel Stein material from Dunhuang, see Jeanette Greenfield, The Return of Cultural Treasures.

References

Agnew, Neville, editor. 1997. Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings on an International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, 1993. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.

Grünwedel, Albert. 1912. Altbuddistische Kultstatten in Chinesisch Turkestan. Berlin.

Hartel, Herbert, and Marianne Yaldiz. 1982. Along the Ancient Silk Routes: Central Asian Art from the West Berlin State Museums, exhibition catalogue. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art.

Hopkirk, Peter. 1980. Foreign Devils on the Silk Road: The Search for the Lost Cities and Treasures of Chinese Central Asia. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Gies, Jacques. 2003. Painted Buddhas of Xinjiang: Hidden Treasures from the Silk Road. Chicago: Art Media Resources.

Greenfield, Jeanette. 1996. The Return of Cultural Treasures. New York: Cambridge.

Howard, Angela F. 1991. In Support of a New Chronology for the Kizil Mural Paintings. In Archives of Asian Art, 44.

Huang Kezhong. 1997. An Overview of Protection of Grottoes in China. In Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings on an International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, 1993. Neville Agnew, editor. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.

Jiang Huaying and Huang Kezhong. 1997. Stabilization and Consolidation of the Kizil Grottoes. In Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings on an International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, 1993. Neville Agnew, editor. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.

Juliano, Annette L., and Judith A. Lerner. 2001. Monks and Merchants: Silk Road Treasures from Northwest China. New York: Asia Society/ Harry N. Abrams.

Le Coq, Alfred von. 1913. Chotscho: Facsimile-Wiedergaben der wichtigeren Funde der ersten königlich preussischen Expedition nach Turfan in Ost-turkistan. Berlin; reprint Graz, 1979.

Le Coq, Alfred von. 1922-23. Die Buddhiste Spätantike in Mittelasien. 7 vols. Berlin: D. Reimer.

Le Coq, Alfred von. 1926. Buried Treasures of Chinese Turkestan: An Account of the Activities and Adventures of the Second and Third German Turfan Expeditions, trans. Anna Barwell. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1928. (Trans. of Aus Hellas Spuren in Ostturkistan, 1926.)

Luk, Cynthia, Ingrid Neuman, James Martin, Cynthia Kuniej Barry and Judy Greenfield. 1997. The Treatment of Two Chinese Wall Painting Fragments. In Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings on an International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, 1993. Neville Agnew, editor. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.

Ma Shichang, 2001. Essays on the Buddhist Cave Temples of China. Beijing: Chueh Fang Buddhist Art and Culture Foundation (in Chinese).

Malenka, Sally, and Beth A. Price. 1997. A Chinese Wall Painting and a Palace Hall Ceiling. In Conservation of Ancient Sites on the Silk Road: Proceedings on an International Conference on the Conservation of Grotto Sites, Mogao Grottoes, Dunhuang, 1993. Neville Agnew, editor. Los Angeles: The Getty Conservation Institute.

Murphy, David J. 1995. Plunder and Preservation: Cultural Property Law and Practice in the People's Republic of China. New York: Oxford University Press.

Su Bai. 1985. A Structural Analysis and a Historical Chronology in the Kizil Grottoes. In Kijiru Sekkutsu (The Caves of Kizil), vol. 1, 162-178. Tokyo and Beijing: Heibonsha-Wenwu Chubanshe.

Tucker, Jonathan. 2003. The Silk Road: Art and History. Chicago: Art Media Resources.

Vogel, Susan. 1991. Always True to the Object, In Our Fashion. In Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display. Ivan Karp and Steven D. Levine, editors.Washington, DC: Smithsonian.

Wu Hung, editor. 2000.Between Han and Tang: Religious Art and Archaeology in a Transformative Period. Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 2000.

Yaldiz, Marianne, editor. 2000. Magische Götterwelten: Werke aus dem Museum für Indische Kunst, Berlin. Berlin: SMPK and Museum fur Indische Kunst.

Other resources used or mentioned:

Exhibition at the Sackler Gallery of Asian Art, Washington, DC: "The Cave as Canvas: Hidden Images of Worship along the Silk Road," Sept 9, 2001 to July 7, 2002.

Full object reports in the on-line curatorial archives at the Smithsonian's Freer and Sackler Galleries of Asian Art, Washington, DC

Curatorial archives at the Nelson-Atkins Museum, Kansas City.

International Dunhuang Project, at the British Library, London: http://idp.bl.uk/ . The "links" page is an excellent resource for beginning any Silk Road studies.

UNESCO's World Heritage List: see http://whc.unesco.org/heritage.htm

The Venice Charter (International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites, 1964): http://www.icomos.org/venice_charter.html

The Ethics of Collecting and Preserving Cultural Property in an Age of Terror

Michael Martin, University of Hong Kong

Public art museums as well as private collectors have been regarded traditionally as playing valuable and indeed essential roles in preserving the world's cultural heritage, and enhancing the appreciation of it. In recent years, however, the transfer of cultural property – the art trade in particular – has come under vociferous attack, to the point of being likened to drug running and arms dealing.[1] Collectors and museums have been denigrated as "the real looters" of the world's cultural heritage and they find themselves under increasing pressure from leading archaeologists, such as Colin Renfrew of Cambridge, as well as international organizations such as UNESCO, to adopt ever stricter codes of ethics.[2] In some areas, particularly with regard to antiquities and ethnographic material, collectors and museums have been pressed to give up collecting virtually altogether. Whether based on principles of sound archaeological practice, cultural sophistication, national pride, envy or greed, claims are made in ever widening circles that art and archaeological material is best left in its place of origin.[3]

I believe that such claims need to be seriously re-examined in light of the growing terrorist threats and activities the world has experienced in recent years. With particular reference to the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas by terrorist groups in Afghanistan, in what follows I look at some of the ethical issues at stake, with a view to finding an ethically appropriate balance between the various legitimate interests of museums, collectors, archaeologists, nations, religions, ethnic groups and others concerned with art and the wider issues of protecting cultural heritage.

The Buddhist art located in modern Afghanistan provides a striking case study not only because of the extent and notoriety of the destruction, which was well publicized, but also, and especially, because of the enormous religious and historical importance of the artworks themselves. Much of modern Afghanistan coincides geographically with the ancient region of Gandhara, which extended

beyond present day Afghanistran into what is now Pakistan and parts of India as well. Buddhist sculpture began in Gandhara, influenced in part by the classical Hellenistic tradition. Alexander the Great had conquered the area in 329 BCE and his Greek followers had ruled the territory for a century thereafter. Trade routes became well established. The early human figures in Gandharan art show a unique blending of eastern and western aesthetic features, a synthesis which was lost as the sculptural tradition later moved inward back to India and then on to China and Japan.

In recent years Islamic fighters wrestled control from Soviet forces in 1992, only to become enmeshed in a vicious war amongst themselves over control of Kabul. In 1996 an Afghan Islamic fundamentalist group, the Taliban, took control of Kabul. By 2001 the Taliban had consolidated power and domination in the country. In an effort to rid the Afghan citizens of pre-Islamic influences and destroy all "false idols" the Taliban destroyed the famous Bamiyan Buddhas, the two largest stone Buddhas in the world. These Buddhas were so sacred that the Afghan soldiers themselves refused to carry out the destruction, but the Taliban managed to bring in non-Afghan troops from their allies in Al Qaeda, who carried out the task. In addition, the Kabul Museum, one of the world's greatest storehouses of Gandharan Buddhist art, was ransacked and an untold number of artworks destroyed.[4]

The outside world knew in advance that these actions were likely to take place, but did little to prevent the destruction beyond making diplomatic representations. While world opinion went largely against the Taliban, the Taliban was nevertheless supported by a fundamentalist Islamic core. A summary reconstruction of some of the main arguments, for and against what happened, might go as follows:

Pro-Taliban Claim. The Taliban was the government legally in power at the time.

Counter-claim. The Taliban was not democratically elected and had control only because of brute force.

Claim. Many governments the world-over are not democratically elected and maintain control only by brute force.

Counter-claim. The situation in Afghanistan was particularly unstable, with many factions vying for control. The situation might best be described as one of civil war.

Claim. The Taliban was nevertheless the government in power at the time.

Here the debate would continue along the usual lines of debates in political philosophy about the nature of legitimacy in government control: under what circumstances may a government be said to be legitimate, does might make right,

and so on. Questions of international law could also be considered, and the debate would become ever more complex.

Even if the legal and political issues could be resolved, moral arguments inevitably would remain, perhaps taking the following lines:

Claim. The Buddha images and museum objects were located in sovereign Afghan territory. Therefore, it is up to the Afghan people, or their leaders, to decide what to do with these objects.

Counter-claim. These are sacred Buddhist objects. Although located in Afghan territory, they belong morally to the Buddhist faith and tradition, which is shared by many people throughout the world, including large numbers of people in China, Japan, much of Southeast Asia and indeed much of the rest of Asia, and pockets of the outside world as well. (A variation of this theme would be that the objects belong to world heritage and therefore to all people throughout the world.) Instead of being free to do whatever they want with these objects, therefore, the Afghan people, and their leaders especially, should recognize the claims of other interest groups elsewhere in the world.

Claim. A similar argument could be made against corporate and private wealth domination which removes art from public view and a shared heritage, and restricts them to exclusive, private consumption.

Counter-claim. Although many important works of art have been removed from the public domain and are now owned privately, the objects generally speaking are physically safe and secure. They have not been destroyed. Moreover, interest groups can make their claims, and the issues raised, which are many and complex, can be discussed peacefully and rationally. In recent years museums and private collectors have become increasingly responsive to demands for greater public access to their collections and storage spaces, and to claims for restitution in the case of religious and ethnographically significant art, and stolen or illegally exported material. Sometimes the debates are heated and protracted, as with the Greek request for the return of the Elgin Marbles (Parthenon sculptures) now held in the British Museum, to cite just one celebrated example; but nearly always the objects in question are themselves safe and well cared for. What makes the Taliban and other terrorist positions so special is the threat of pre-emptive destruction, as happened with the Bamiyan Buddhas. Since the objects were located in Afghan sovereign territory, the Afghan leaders should have accepted responsibility for preserving and protecting such material.

Claim. The Taliban was defending its religion as it saw fit. Religious freedom must be respected.

Counter-claim. If we support religious freedom for one group, we must support it for other groups as well. In particular, we must support religious freedom

for Buddhists as well as for Moslems. We must support religious pluralism. Furthermore, just as there can be no absolute freedoms, there can be no absolute religious freedom. The most we can do is support some liberal principle aiming to ensure maximum religious freedom consistent with a similar freedom for all religions.[5]

Claim. Not all religions can accept religious pluralism.

The arguments would go on and on. Even in the unlikely event we could reach an agreement on these issues within our own socio-political framework, there would still be the problem of convincing others who come from traditions which hold different priorities and fundamental beliefs. Whether terrorist groups would agree even to participate in such discussions is perhaps a moot point. In the absence of a binding philosophical, moral, legal and political consensus on how best to protect cultural property, let alone an effective enforcement mechanism, what immediate, practical steps might be justified to preserve works of art under threat?

As the civil war in Afghanistan progressed, but before the Taliban took complete control of the country, there was one particularly important effort made to save and protect some of the smaller works of art in Afghanistan which were capable of being transported out of the country. In 1999 a Swiss organization, the Fondation Bibliotheca Afghanica, led by its director Dr. Paul Bucherer-Dietschi, aimed to set up a sort of museum or repository in Bubendorf, near Basel, Switzerland.[6] The plan was to transport to the repository as many Afghan objects as possible, with a view to returning all of them to Afghanistan once conditions had stabilized and the civil war had concluded. This plan was supported by the then President of Afghanistan, Professor Buhannuddin Rabbanana, and also by the Taliban, who at the time (1999) were adopting a more moderate position than they took once they consolidated power.

One of the virtues of the plan was that it obviated some of the more intractable debates such as whether the works in question were part of world heritage or were solely the property of the Afghan state. For the plan was emphatic that all the works would return to Afghanistan once the situation stabilized. There was thus no question of the works staying permanently in a Swiss museum, let alone entering the art market for open trade. Dr. Bucherer-Dietschi sought assistance on this point from both the government of Switzerland and from UNESCO.

Here is where the trouble began. The Swiss government was already sensitive to pressure it had been under for some years over accusations, mainly from archaeologists, that Zurich had become a center of illicit trade in stolen art and money laundering associated with the art trade. The Swiss government refused to support Dr. Bucherer-Dietschi's plan unless UNESCO supported it. UNESCO refused to support the plan.

UNESCO refused to support the plan for a number of reasons:

First, the authorities concerned in UNESCO apparently believed that the more radical elements in the Afghan civil war would not carry out massive destruction of art. They were quite wrong about this, of course, and arguably they should have known better, for looting had occurred throughout the civil war and many factions had done little if anything to stop it. Indeed, some of the factions participated in looting as a way of funding their militia.

Second, there was no clear source of funding for the plan, though it would not have cost so very much and one would expect wealthy art patrons to respond generously to a good plan. UNESCO made no effort to canvas support and raise funds for the plan.

Third, and this is perhaps the most telling point, UNESCO did not act to support the plan because of UNESCO's own *Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970)*. Despite the plan's emphasis that the "ownership" of the artworks concerned would not be transferred in any way, the UNESCO *Convention* was written in a way which encouraged countries party to the *Convention* to enact legislation preventing the transfer or export of antiquities. Pakistan in particular had enacted very strict laws to this effect (despite there being an active black market in antiquities in Pakistan), and logistic considerations required that the artworks pass through the Kyber pass on to Pakistan. (Essentially, all other routes were closed during the civil war.) In short, UNESCO refused to support Dr. Bucherer-Dietschi's plan in part because of legal scruples arising from the UNESCO *Convention*.

To my knowledge UNESCO has not come forward with any proposals to relax the *Convention*, which was drafted in 1970 and has become an increasingly powerful force in the art world in recent years as more and more countries become party to it. Most archaeologists continue to support the *Convention* unreservedly as providing important safeguards against illegal excavation and illicit trade in illegally excavated pieces. Pieces already above ground or already in museums are of less interest to archaeologists, but are of course much valued by art collectors, museum directors and art lovers generally. The loss of the Kabul treasures may put pressure on UNESCO for some modifications in the *Convention*. Intended to help preserve cultural heritage, the *Convention* appears to have failed to do so in this case.

One arguably happy irony in this context is that throughout the Afghan civil war large amounts of artistic material were smuggled out of Afghanistan through Pakistan (illegally, as explained above) into private collections, especially in Japan. The motivations for such traffic, as with art transfers generally, are various, of course. In addition to its intrinsic value, art can serve as a sign of wealth, power,

taste and social status. It can also serve as a significant investment, and in a time of war or instability opportunism in this connection cannot be ruled out entirely. The preservation of art treasures against terrorist destruction may not have been the primary motivation for the transfer of cultural property which took place out of Afghanistan during the civil war, except perhaps in a few cases. Nevertheless, preservation, significantly, was the end result.

Several other points should be noted concerning the Japanese connection in this regard. First, Japan has a rich art collecting tradition and a very cosmopolitan interest in art ranging from traditional Japanese interests in ceramics, painting and calligraphy to European art, especially impressionism, and even African and ethnographic art. Second, many Japanese collectors have a special interest in Buddhist art, including Gandharan art of the sort I have been discussing. Third, Japan has not signed the UNESCO *Convention*.

The implication of this third point is that under most circumstances Japanese collectors can legally own, in Japan, works of art even if those works of art have been illegally exported from their place of origin. Conditions are rather different in Europe and America, depending on the laws of the country concerned and whether that country has signed the UNESCO *Convention* or another one called the UNIDROIT *Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Property* (1995), which in effect regards any illegally exported cultural property as "stolen" and therefore illegal to own.

In addition to whatever provisions there may be in law, increasing numbers of museums in Europe and North American have signed various "codes of ethics," or are under pressure to do so, which make it impossible to own illegally exported or unprovenanced material, regardless of the circumstances. Indeed one group of archaeologists has set up a website designed to shame dealers, museums and major private collectors who have such material.[7] Significant legal, political, social and "moral" pressure has thus arisen against buying or possessing illegally exported material. The pressure is so strong in Europe that one leading London dealer was quoted recently as saying: "No respectable dealer or collector will touch anything from the Kabul Museum. These objects have no market value."[8]

While such positions may be appropriate in some or most cases of illegally exported art, a counter-view might be expressed in emergencies and cases of imminent destruction. *The Art Newspaper* has editorialized as follows:

> For the last decade or so, the antiquities world has been split between two factions, both of which refuse to look reality in the face. There are the dealers and the collectors, which include a few museums, who say: we love and study these objects, we care for them, therefore we have a right to them no matter how they come to us. Then there are the protectionists, who say it is the integrity of a monument or site that matters; the market and collectors ultimately cause their destruction, so there should be no trade and no collecting. The former group deny that they contribute to the destruction of the art they profess to love; the second group believe that

> the trade can be killed off by legislation and ostracisation. Both are wrong. Test this against the Afghan situation: a drought-stricken, war-torn country with almost nothing to sell apart from its archaeological inheritance. A country beset by zealots, who will happily destroy everything they see as heathen -- unless it can be sold. It will stick in the throat of the protectionists, but it looks as though we will end up being grateful that collectors bought pieces from Afghanistan, as precious little will be left inside. But this cannot necessarily be used as an excuse by collectors in other situations.[9]

The "protectionist" arguments referred to in the above quotation work best on the assumption that were it not for the art market, the integrity of the monument or site in question would remain intact. Terrorism and religious extremism of the sort which led to the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas provide a significant counter-example to this position. One can think also of the enormous pressures coming from developers and government officials for construction projects, whether for hospitals, public or private housing developments, commercial establishments or even hydroelectric dam projects, which so often override archaeological and artistic considerations, not only in developing countries. Thus, although the primary focus of this paper has been the threat to art treasures from religious fundamentalists, threats to art treasures in fact can come from religious or completely secular forces. They are hardly limited to the art trade.

As for objects which have already been removed from their original site and are facing destruction altogether, the protectionist argument seems even weaker. To the objection that the pieces from the Kabul Museum which have ended up in private collections, either in Japan or elsewhere, will never again be seen in public, one obvious reply has already been made in passing: at least the objects are safe rather than destroyed. A further point would be that, should current trends against the movement of art, whether by legislation or ostracism, be reversed, the treasures of the Kabul Museum may, possibly, be once again put up for sale on the open market, donated to a museum (possibly even the Kabul Museum itself) or at least exhibited publicly, thanks to the Japanese collectors and others who managed to obtain them. The current UNESCO position, in contrast, seems to force the Kabul Museum pieces underground or to destruction altogether, as the case may be.

While not wishing to encourage any destructive trade, it seems to me that the terrorist acts of recent years and continued threats are significant enough to force a reconsideration of the more extreme positions restricting trade and movement of art objects. When the choice is between "illicit traffic" on the one hand and total destruction on the other, ways must be found for the art to be moved to safety. Definitions of "illicit" traffic may need to be revised accordingly.

In conclusion I would like to sketch two approaches which if accepted and practiced might bridge some of the larger rifts which have developed in recent years and, conceivably, reunite archaeologists, museum staff, collectors, dealers,

politicians and all others interested in cultural heritage once again in a fruitful nexus.

My first proposal is that each country should develop some system of classification for objects of cultural heritage. These systems would not have to be uniform across the globe but could vary from country to country or region to region. Perhaps countries sharing a common archaeological heritage for certain periods in history (such as Afghanistan and Pakistan shared during the Gandharan period) could adopt similar approaches for art of that period, which would be one way of breaking down overly nationalistic barriers, although nationalism is such a powerful force in so much of the world today that shared approaches would not work in all cases, of course.

A highly sophisticated and effective model of the sort I have in mind already exists in Japan, where it has worked well for over 150 years. In Japan, six categories of objects are currently classified: painting, sculpture, applied arts, calligraphy, archaeological objects, and architecture. Outstanding objects from these categories are classified as National Treasures, Important Cultural Property or Important Art Objects in a hierarchical ranking system.[10] At present Japan has about 9,000 objects registered in this way, including 931 of the first rank, designated National Treasures. Many of these objects are owned by private citizens in Japan. The government provides monetary subsidies for their care and preservation, in return for which the objects must be loaned to government museums upon request. They can be sold freely in Japan, even to foreigners, so long as the ownership records are centrally registered, but the objects cannot leave Japan except for brief periods and of course with special permission. A powerful and respected Commission for the Protection of Cultural Properties oversees the arrangements and administers the procedures. A Commission to Designate meets from time to time to consider proposed additions to the list. Minor works of art are freely exportable from Japan, but major works need an export license provided by the Commission. Strikingly, should an export license not be granted, the Commission undertakes to pay the dealer the full purchase price of the object concerned, a practice which not only reduces smuggling, if not eliminating it altogether, but also gives due respect to art dealers and their profession.

The second approach I wish to sketch concerns excavations more directly. Since illegal excavations have become such a pressing concern, my proposal is to increase the number of *legal* excavations. Archaeology should be given greater support as an academic subject, especially in art rich countries. More archaeologists should be trained and encouraged to enter the workforce professionally as one way of developing the cultural sophistication of the community. A proportionate reduction in accountants, auditors, administrators and assessors might also be encouraged. Licenses could be granted to qualified groups of archaeologists, who

could then undertake digs of their own or, if further control is required, apply for special permission to dig in specific sites. These groups could be connected to universities, governments or, perhaps most desirably, private firms. Once properly excavated and documented, objects could be sold for a profit on the open market or kept in a local or national museum if appropriate. Collectors would be particularly keen to buy well documented pieces of this sort and would be willing therefore to pay higher prices than for unprovenanced material. Special profits taxes could be specified in the export licenses and used to support more extensive excavations, publications, museums and educational programs.

If the two approaches I am suggesting here were combined, I believe there might be some chance of a compromise amongst at least some of the factions I have described.

Notes

[1] For example, see Ricardo Elia, "Conservators and Unprovenanced Objects: Preserving the Cultural Heritage or Servicing the Antiquities Trade?" in Kathryn W. Tubb, ed., *Antiquities Trade and Betrayed: Legal, Ethical and Conservation Issues* (London: Archetype Publications, Ltd., 1995), pp. 244-255.

[2] For a fuller discussion, see, for example, Colin Renfrew, *Loot, Legitimacy and Ownership: the Ethical Crisis in Archaeology* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 2000).

[3] See my "Rethinking Cultural Patrimony", in *Orientations*, vol. 34, no. 3 (March 2003), pp. 117-118.

[4] These events were widely reported in the news media. See, for example, *The International Herald Tribune*, April 20-21, 2002.

[5] I am thinking here, of course, of Rawls' first principle of justice. See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1971. Rawls' later discussion in his *The Law of Peoples* (1999) also bears.

[6] My account of Dr. Bucher-Dietschi's work and UNESCO's response follows largely Elspeth Moncrieff's "Unesco Red Tape Blocks Kabul Museum Salvage" in *The Art Newspaper*, vol. xii, no. 119 (November 2001), p. 1 and pp. 41-42.

[7] Perhaps I have put the point too strongly here. Despite its occasional political overtones, the website of the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research provides a rich and sophisticated source of information on a wide range of issues related to archaeology. See *www.mcdonald.cam.ac.uk*.

[8] Johnny Eskenazi, as quoted in Elspeth Moncrieff, *op. cit.*

[9] Anna Somers Cocks, "Destructive Untruths", in *The Art Newspaper*, vol. xii, no. 119 (November 2001), p. 1.

[10] In describing this system, I have followed for the most part Yoshiaki Shimizu, "Japan in American Museums – But Which Japan?" and Mimi Hall Yiengpruksawan, "Japanese Art History 2001: The State and Stakes, in *The Art Bulletin: A Quarterly Published by the College Art Association*, vol. LXXXIII, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 123 – 134 and pp. 105 – 122 respectively.

Moral Education East and West: A Comparison of Philosophical Underpinnings of Ideas About Childrearing in the West and in Confucianism

Dennis Arjo, Johnson County Community College

Biologists often remark on the helplessness of human infants, and the extensive period of care and socialization they must undergo as they grow and mature. So it is that human parents find themselves charged with the long-term task of caring for and rearing their children, and social groups more broadly with the task of bringing their younger members fully into the fold. These endeavors require some degree of deliberateness, as it is difficult, and rather contrary to human tendencies, to embark on such efforts without some idea as to what is ultimately to issue from them. A natural way to guide child rearing and education is to tie both to more fundamental, widely shared assumptions or ideas about human nature. An understanding, in other words, of what sorts of creatures humans are, and so what sorts of creatures children ought or ought not to be growing into, gives parents and other agents of socialization some idea as to what it is they are trying to accomplish as they struggle to guide their children to maturity. Accordingly, my underlying assumption here is that there will be some connection between prevailing philosophical and religious (and where applicable scientific) assumptions or ideas about human nature, and prevailing ideas about the aims and appropriate methods of childrearing and education.

Implicit assumptions in childrearing: the West

An implicit or explicit understanding of human nature plays into ideas about child rearing and education by way of the inherently teleological nature of the latter. Aristotle's ethics makes the connection in a particularly striking and explicit manner. According to Aristotle, humans are 'rational animals'—each of us is an example of that kind of thing in the sense that each oak tree is an example of a particular kind of tree, distinct in its features and needs from an apple tree. Since Aristotle equates doing well, in the sense of living a good human life, with fulfilling one's natural potential as a human being, there is a clear sense in which human

infants stand to rational animals as acorns do to mature oak trees. Upbringing and education for Aristotle, then, are a matter of guiding and shaping a child so that she becomes such a being in the fullest way possible.

Consequently, Aristotle defines the virtues as dispositions in the manifesting or expressing of our natural capacities, as qualities of character that tend us towards our natural end—the virtuous person, by having the appropriate dispositions, becomes fully human, in the sense that an acorn for which all has gone well grows into a mature oak. The result is an emphasis on the cultivation of the virtues, achieved through the control of behavior as a sort of practice that will ultimately lead to the proper dispositions. By leading a child to practice honesty by doing only honest things, by punishing and so discouraging dishonesty, the child will become habituated to honesty, acquiring a tendency to do honest things.

Change the underlying theory of human nature and you change the details considerably as to exact goals of childrearing and education, but fundamentally you don't change the teleological character of the process. Certain forms of Protestantism, such as that strand of Calvinism dubbed Puritanism, stress the notion of humans as fallen creatures with an innate tendency towards wickedness. This tendency manifests itself in a kind of self-centeredness that leads children in the direction of disobedience, idleness and selfishness. It is the goal of parenting and education to break this willfulness and turn the child towards righteousness and an appreciation of her duty to the larger community and ultimately to God. Hence, the rather notorious (if sometimes unfairly exaggerated) emphasis on punishment as a way of 'breaking the will' so as to compel the child to obedience. In a sense, then, the Puritan conception uses the idea of a child's natural will to explain what it is that parents and others should be leading children away from. At the same time, the *supernatural* end the child is believed meant for, namely salvation, becomes the goal towards which the child is to be turned.

Change the underlying understanding of human nature once again, and you again change the detail and emphasis, but not the underlying teleological character of childrearing. With the arrival of the Enlightenment, in writers such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, the underlying view is that the essential characteristic of humans is reason and autonomy, the ability of the individual human to determine her own course of action. With this comes an emphasis on freedom and autonomy, and later an emphasis on individual self-expression. From this perspective, the goal of parenting and education becomes not shaping a child's character so that she will grow into a specific kind of person, and even less the breaking of her will so that she will become obedient to the laws of man and God, but rather the cultivation of habits of thought that allow for free and critical thinking and autonomous living. The person the child is to become is precisely one who is able to decide for herself what kind of life is good,

and what sort of person she is to be. From this perspective punishment becomes inherently suspect, smacking as it does of coercion and the denial of autonomy, freedom and equality. More deeply, the idea that education is a deliberate process of shaping the child's character or thinking becomes suspect in light of the goal of teaching children to 'think for themselves.' "The child", urges Kant in a passage that anticipates much of what can be found in contemporary child rearing advice, "should learn to act out of 'maxims', the reasonableness of which he can see for himself."[1]

In the 20th century this liberal conception of the goals of childrearing undergoes a modification that sees its moral content submerged in the language of science, and more specifically psychology, so that the explicitly moral concept of the good person as rational and autonomous is hidden to an extent behind the language of a successful person enjoying good mental health. Essentially, being a good Kantian moral agent is equated with being mentally sound or psychologically well developed. This is close to explicit in the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, and implicit in much of the advice given to modern western parents in popular child rearing manuals. This psychologically informed version of the liberal conception shares with its more openly philosophical precedents in beginning from an optimistic view of human nature, and the centrality of reason and autonomy in well ordered human lives. Reflecting the influence of both Locke and Rousseau, the modern approach has emphasized both the inherent reasonableness of children, and the conviction that what they primarily need in order to grow into successful adults is protection and nurturing—care and an appropriate social and cognitive environment—as opposed to control or shaping. Parents are to allow their children to grow into more mature versions of the persons they already are, providing them opportunities and resources to pursue the individual lives they are already embarked upon and entitled to from the very beginning. Discipline is important only as a means of protecting children from their immaturity and lack of experience, as opposed to a means of moral instruction.

Modern Uncertainties

In addition to the fundamentally teleological character of Western thinking about childrearing is a pervasive and growing individualism, in the sense that the individual person is conceived of as the proper focus of childrearing. Since Aristotle in particular is often seen as, indeed appealed to as, a non-individualistic thinker, as opposed to the overtly individualistic thinkers of the Enlightenment, it is worth noting that despite his well known emphasis on the essentially social nature of humans, the ultimate concern of the *Nichomachian Ethics* is how the reader himself ought to live if he is to live well. Throughout, the concern is on what it is to be a virtuous person and on the rewards that brings, with pride in oneself being the 'crown' virtue. Moreover, the overtly teleological assumptions

Aristotle makes, in the biological analogies, and in his conception of virtues as individual habits, belie to some degree his more communitarian moments. While I may need to be a citizen of a well-ordered *polis*, with friends and family, in order to live a good life, it is a well-ordered individual soul that I ultimately strive for as the grounds of my own happiness or flourishing.

In any case, the individualism of the Enlightenment vision, and that vision as it continues to inform modern ideas of childrearing as mediated by psychology, is plain enough and much remarked upon. It is also quite plausibly at the root of much of the confusions, anxieties and uncertainties that mark modern thinking about children, childrearing, and education in the West.[2] It was reasonable enough for modern liberals to want to extend the set of values centered around individual autonomy and freedom—values that include most essentially equality and the respect of individual rights—to domains such as the family that are marked by affective, often arbitrary, and demonstrably uneven relationships. However, the fit between those values and such domains has proved to be considerably more problematic than what their successes in the realms of the political and economic might have predicted.

The idea of individual autonomy—roughly the idea that the individual ought to be, in the words of Supreme Court Justice Stephen Douglas, the "master of his own destiny"—is the locus of much liberal hand wringing about both childrearing and education, and it arises as a problem precisely as it marks the intersection of the traditional teleological character of Western assumptions and its individualism. The problem is easily appreciated. Autonomy is about self determination, and the assumption is that each individual should be as free as possible to make the major decisions about her own life on her own, free of compulsion, coercion or irrational persuasion. These assumptions about childrearing would predict accordingly that liberal parents would want to raise children to be autonomous individuals, as indeed they typically do.

But parenting itself seems perversely opposed to such a goal, involving as it does the willingness of some people, the parents, to do their utmost to shape the life prospects, and indeed the very character, of others, the children, according to *the parents'* beliefs and values. Typically this involves not only the deliberate limiting of the ideas and values a child is exposed to, or at least allowed to consider as reasonable or acceptable, but the overt control of behavior and choices as well. In short, parenting has at least traditionally been a rather illiberal affair—children are not seen as equals, their freedom is deliberately and systematically limited: they are not allowed to be masters of their own destinies so long as they remain children. Education does not fair much better, and the problem is essentially the same: autonomy is about me making up my own mind, while education seems to be a matter of others telling me what to believe on the strength of little more than

their own authority and that of a broader society whose interests are presumably being served. How to reconcile compulsory education with the idea that children must be free to 'think for themselves' or to act only on 'maxims' they freely accept is no small matter.

Recent attempts to rethink liberal interpretations of childrearing and education have focused on ways to argue that the exercise of parental authority and compulsive education can be reconciled with traditional liberal values. Despite this, however, the original tensions remain. The problems inherent in the liberal picture will not be resolved, I would argue, so long as autonomy continues to be understood along traditional liberal lines. Briefly, the deeply individualistic understanding of autonomy that we have inherited from the liberal tradition is problematic, and particularly troublesome in its inability to make sense of our inherent relatedness to others, our necessary reliance on unequal and hierarchical relationships, and our inevitable inclusion in a larger social world that is at least initially chosen for us by others. To resort for the sake of brevity to caricatures, the liberal ideal of the autonomous person as a self sufficient reasoner, free from the bounds of tradition and authority, believing nothing on faith or the word of others, and as practically self determining—as, in short, a Kantian moral agent and a modern man of science—is at best a very partial picture of how most of us are, adequate as explanation to only limited aspects of human life. It is, in particular, a deeply inadequate model to use in trying to think about children and their upbringing.

Assumptions Outside the West: Confucian Moral Education

The idea of autonomy that is the legacy of the liberal tradition—the idea of the autonomous individual as someone defined against social roles, tradition, and authority, so that deference to any of these is understood as antithetical to the exercise of autonomy—would be alien to Aristotle. It would be sheer nonsense to a Confucian. If we understand Confucianism along the lines we've been considering the Western alternatives, it would be fair enough to say that being *ren*, or being an authoritative person, is the end toward which children are to be raised and educated.[3] Someone who is *ren* is certainly portrayed as autonomous: they do what is right or appropriate (*yi*) as a natural expression of their character; they know what the right thing to do is in any circumstances, producing appropriate words and deeds in response to all they meet as a natural expression of their character. A person who is *ren* is a person of wisdom, benevolence, creativity and integrity (*cheng*). Moreover, Confucius repeatedly contrasts this authoritative person with the 'small' or 'petty' person who is unflatteringly depicted as unimaginative and obsequious.[4] What seems paradoxical to the liberal mind, however, is that *ren* is achieved precisely through the most meticulous attention to what is socially proscribed (they are a master of *li*, or ritual propriety) and the deliberate cultivation of respect for traditions that have come before. *Li* is

particularly manifested in strict adherence to the dictates of the Confucian virtue of filial piety (*xiao*). Filiality is said to be at the 'root' of authoritative conduct, producing individuals who are both averse to rebellion and able to rise above small mindedness. The trick here is to see what kind of understanding of what it is to be human would make sense of these strands of Confucian thought. Towards this end, three interrelated things must be stressed. The first is the essential relatedness of human beings on the Confucian understanding. The second is the continuity stemming from this between families, states and the broader world. The third is the essentially dynamic character of heaven and earth and all that transpires within them.

According to Henry Fingarette, in the Confucian world "unless there are at least two human beings there can be no human beings."[5] This captures well what is meant by the idea of the essential relatedness of human beings in the Asian tradition. In Confucianism, to be human is to be related to others, as a son or daughter, a sibling, a cousin, a niece or nephew, aunt or uncle, father or mother, etc. Mindful of our thoroughly biological origins, as the offspring of these two particular humans, at a particular time, in a particular place, the Confucian emphasis is on our concrete relationships. We exist first and foremost as the particular son or daughter of these two particular persons, and everything proceeds from there. We can and do add relationships, but we can never be less than this. Things can go wrong, of course, and we can end up orphaned or homeless or estranged. But something would have to go wrong—membership in a family is where we start, and unless things go wrong, that membership remains constitutive of who we are.

To think about the person within Confucianism is, then, to begin with the family. From here the traditional emphasis on *xiao*, or filial piety comes easily. If the family is in the natural order of things the smallest unit of human life, maintaining the family and attending to its well-being is a natural mandate. This nurturing of the family is for the same reason inseparable from the nurturing of the child who is part of the family, and so the child's learning her place in the family—her roles and duties—is an essential part of her upbringing. Confucianism is also mindful of the natural hierarchies that exist within families. Children are born needy and dependent, lacking experience and the skills needed to navigate an often difficult world. That children should and will (mostly, with a bit of prodding on occasion) defer to their more worldly, and hopefully wiser, elders makes perfect sense from this perspective.

As it goes with the family, so it goes with society; and vice versa. It is a distinctive feature of Confucian thought, and traditional Chinese thought more broadly, to understand social relations on familial lines. As the merits of a father are measured by the well-being of his family, so rulers are judged by their abilities to lead the

people into prosperity. But just as the family does well only when its members live as they should, displaying filial piety, the society does well only when the subjects have cultivated their characters so that they display a certain filial piety to their rulers. But it goes back the other way once again: just as children will be pious only if properly raised, so too will the people be pious only when well ruled. To make the connection complete, we need only note that since a child is a child first and only gradually a full fledged member of the community, the centrality of childrearing and education to governing well will be clear: even a good Emperor will struggle ruling over a nation of ill raised citizens.

The upshot of all this is the deep connection in Confucian thinking between *ren*, as a conception of what it is to be a successful human being; *xiao* as a core requirement for such success to be possible; and *jiao*, or education and upbringing, the process by which it all comes together. This connection is captured nicely in the classical Confucian text *Zhongyong*: "Understanding born of [integrity, (*cheng*)] is a gift of our natural tendencies; [integrity] born of understanding is gift of education. Where there is [integrity], there is understanding; where there is understanding, [integrity]."[6] Because *ren* is the goal, there is no sense in which *jiao* is properly conceived as an imposition on the individual of ideas, practices or values somehow alien or potentially contrary to the interests or needs of the child. While obviously there will be Confucian parents who parent badly by not attending to the genuine needs of their children, the picture that emerges as normative is of parents who are deeply attentive, and the process throughout is depicted as one of nurturing. At its most optimistic, the Confucian tradition sees punishment as rarely needed, and reliance on it a sign of things not being as they should. On the other hand, because the person is understood as fundamentally related, what is being nurtured is not an individual without regard to the needs or concerns of others, but rather a person whose life and welfare is inseparable from those of others. In jiao, the child's needs are met precisely through the cultivation of the child's relations with others, and her instruction in her place and duties and rights within the family. Just what should count as success from the individual's perspective is made clear by Confucius: "Authoritative persons establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seeking to get there themselves. Correrlating one's conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the method of becoming an authoritative person."[7]

The final component in the Confucian picture would be the essentially dynamic nature of the relationships and practices that it informs. Consistent with the dynamic cosmology so distinctive of classical Chinese thought, the Confucian world is one that recognizes change and the particularity of each situation and person. Accordingly, while a child is born into an existing family, and so brought up to be a part of that particular family, it is recognized both that the child will have her own contributions to make, given her particular strengths and

characteristics, and that the family itself will be changed by its new addition. More broadly, sensitivity to the evolving nature of societies and the changing fortunes they experience, produces in Confucian thought a lively awareness that *ren* requires not mindless reproduction of choreographed behaviors, but rather an ability to respond to ever changing circumstances in ways that are both appropriate to what is new, while recognizably consistent with what is already established and accepted. In this way, Confucianism at its best provides reason to believe that deference to established authorities and mores, the sort of virtues exemplified in *xiao* and *li*, will not necessarily translate into a simple, or simple minded, uncritical obedience.[8]

Autonomy Reconsidered

Above I suggested that many of the uncertainties and anxieties that seem to accompany modern childrearing in the West originate in the heightened individualistic sensibilities that have marked much Western thinking since the Enlightenment. In particular, I argued that construing autonomy in such a way that 'thinking for oneself' or being the master of one's destiny is equated with liberation from tradition and external authority makes education seem inherently paradoxical, and the exercise of parental authority innately tyrannical. By way of a conclusion, I'd like to suggest in a brief and sketchy way that Confucius offers a way of understanding autonomy that can act as a bit of corrective to what is really a rather implausible notion. A more thorough development of this idea will have to wait for another occasion.

> Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding."[9]

So wrote Kant in a passage that captures quite well both the modern ideal of the autonomous individual and our suspicion of those who would have us defer to the wisdom of others. However powerful this ideal is (and surely it is quite powerful), Kant's formulation skirts the questions of how we are to become the person who can use his or her own understanding, of how to understand our autonomy as adults in light of the extended period of immaturity and dependence that is typical of human development, of how plausible it is to expect us to live entirely without recourse to wisdom stored in books authored by others, or the consciences of spiritual leaders, or the specialized knowledge of doctors.[10]

In the manner that using language means learning a particular language that transcends us, and deferring to some degree to how others speak that language, so too does using our understanding require our inclusion in a social world that is larger than us. At its most optimistic, the Confucian tradition sees individuals as

connected to those around them in a way that avoids tension between autonomy and deference to others by appreciating how it is in the mastering of traditions that individuals gain the kind of social fluency that enables meaningful self-expression. What is needed in the West is a greater appreciation that, as David Hall and Roger Ames put it, thinking is itself a social achievement, something we do in all but the most unusual of circumstances by working from what others have already thought, rather than through radical innovation.[11] In this regard, J.S. Bach as a model of autonomy, who in mastering thoroughly and working within a tradition of composition was able to create music of staggering originality, may do better than Galileo, whose heroic stand against 1500 years of tradition was surely as anomalous as it was necessary at the time. By focusing on familial and social contexts, including the beneficial role played by the accumulated wisdom that can be bound up in traditions, the Confucian tradition can act as a counterweight to this tendency to see autonomy as an individual achievement.

Notes

[1] Immanuel Kant, *Education*, trans. by Annette Churton, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), 1960, pg 83.

[2] For provocative accounts of the intrusion of anxiety and insecurity into the experience of parenting in the United States in particular, see Frank Furedi, *Paranoid Parenting* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press), 2002 and Peter Stearns, *Anxious Parents* (New York: New York University Press), 2003. For a more general account of the ambivalent relationship between American parents and the psychologists who would advise them on matters of childrearing, see Ann Hulbert, *Raising America: experts, parents and a century of advice about children* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 2003.

[3] I use here the translation of ren as 'authoritative person or conduct' offered by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr, in their T*he Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine), 1998. Other translators have more typically uses 'benevolence.' Ames and Rosemont's expressed purpose in using the phrase 'authoritative' is to capture the Confucian idea that acting out of a genuine benevolence or concern for others is the hallmark of a successful human being.

[4] See, for example, *Analects*, 5.25, or 13.23, among many other passages.

[5] Henry Fingurette, *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred* (New York: Viking Press), 1983, quoted in Ames and Rosemont (1998), pg. 48.

[6] *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, trans. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 2001, paragraph 21. Ames and Hall have 'creativity' instead of 'integrity', which is a more customary translation of cheng. While granting the appropriateness of 'integrity' (as well as 'sincerity'), they opt for the more active "creativity" to emphasize the dynamic cosmology that underlies Confucian thought, while urging the English reader to be mindful of the idea that this creativity remains true to what is given.

[7] Ames and Rosemont, op. cit., 6.30.

[8] It should be noted, however, that later Daoist critiques of Confucianism on just this point show that the danger in placing the emphasis on li would become mechanical and stifling was both real and appreciated. Consider, for example, chapter 19 of the *Dao De Jing*: "Cut off authoritative conduct (*ren*) and get rid of appropriateness (*yi*)/and the common people will return to filiality (*xiao*) and parental affection." (*Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation*, Roger T. Ames and David L. Hall, trans. (New York: Ballantine), 2003.

[9] Immanuel Kant, "An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'", available at http://ethics.acusd.edu/Books/Kant/Enlightenment/what-is-enlightenment.htm.

[10] Kant regards reliance on such things to be 'laziness and cowardice' in the exercise of the understanding.

[11] David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press), 1987. "[T]hinking entails an appropriation of the cultural tradition through the interpersonal activity of learning", pg. 83.

The Hold Parents Have: How Asian American Students Negotiate Cultural Incompatibility

Richard H. Thompson, James Madison University

I begin with a quote from psychotherapist May Paomay Tung writing about her clients who are largely Chinese American professionals.

> When people, including Chinese Americans, say "Americans," they usually mean white Americans. . . . Many of the Chinese Americans I listened to in therapy recalled, as children, that they wanted to be "like everybody else." What they meant was to be like white people. It is ingrained in our society that the white race is the criterion by which everyone else is judged. . . .Having internalized [western] standards of "beauty," many Asian women of all ages blacken areas around theireyes to make them look deeper and rounder. Confusion is inevitable when one lives in the cross section of East and West. Chinese Americans must sort out the contributing factors from both sides in the self-identification process. (2000:24-25)

This paper is an exploration of this "sorting out" of Asian and American factors that constitute Asian American identity formation. As recent research by Tung and others demonstrates, Americans of Asian ancestry often experience an "authenticity dilemma" because others define them as neither real Asians nor real Americans (Tuan 2002:210). In some cases this dilemma (often referred to as "marginality" in older literature) can lead to difficult psychological adjustments that reflect alienation from both Asian and American contexts (Thompson 1989), while in other cases Asian Americans embrace their dual identity and stress the positive aspects of their hybridity. Numerous factors affect these various adjustments including the dominant society's racialized, often contradictory stereotypes of Asians (Kibria 2002), the degree to which immigrant children achieve competence in the parental culture, birth order (first-born siblings report different upbringings than later-born children), and the extent to which friendship networks are largely Asian or non-Asian.

What I want to focus on here is the extent to which the parent-child relationship is a crucial (if not *the* crucial) determinant of Asian American identity formation. The parent-child relationship is crucial to identity formation in all young people, of course, but it seems to be especially so for Asian American youth. I first became

aware of this while conducting fieldwork in Toronto, Ontario's Chinatown in the late 1970s. I met many fully Anglicized Chinese Canadian adults in their 20s and 30s who, despite having college educations and good jobs, remained economically and emotionally dependent on their Chinese immigrant parents (see Thompson 1989, 1994). More recently, increasing numbers of Asian American students are taking my class on Chinese Society and Culture and often remark something to the effect of "Oh, now I understand where my parents are coming from." Where they are "coming from," so to speak, is an Asian culture whose values and "logic" contrast greatly with that of American culture.

These students have renewed my interest in Asian American identity formation and I have begun a research project consisting of long open-ended interviews plus a written questionnaire with, to this point, nearly two dozen Asian students of immigrant parents who attend the Middle Atlantic state university where I teach. This university is situated between two- and four-hour drives from the major metropolitan areas of Baltimore, Washington DC, Richmond, and Tidewater Virginia's Hampton Roads. These cities have been important destinations for many Asian immigrants over the past 20 years and many of their children—some of whom were born overseas but came to the U.S. as young children (the so-called 1.5 generation), others of whom were born in the U.S. (the 2nd generation)—are now attending college.

This paper is a preliminary exploration of the pressures faced and strategies used by Asian students who have to navigate two different cultural worlds—that of their Asian parents and American culture. While most college-age students regardless of ethnicity face pressures from parents to make something of themselves, just what that "something" is can differ substantially for Asian American children of immigrant parents. Middle class Anglo-American parents, for example, stress good grades and a degree in a "practical" major; that is, one that will lead to a stable, well-paying career. American parents are motivated by the desire (even "need") for their children to attain financial and emotional independence. This socialization for independence begins in early infancy when American children are taught that parents cannot be relied upon to satisfy every need on demand; that they must control their emotions, postpone their wants, and make their own decisions concerning relationships, jobs, and so on. Children are expected to deal with the consequences of their decisions—good or bad. American children "please" their parents by achieving their own autonomy and identity *apart* from them.

Immigrant parents of Asian children are motivated by a quite different cultural psychology. As Richard Nisbett reminds us in his recent book, *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently* (2003), Asians stress a social conception of the person in which individuals are expected to perform their

multiple social roles so as to maximize collective well being. An Asian is taught to see herself as first and foremost a member of a collective, especially the "family" collective. A person's individuality is neither lost nor denied in Asian cultures, but there is no "me" that is considered in isolation from others; individuality is *understood* as the totality of one's roles in relation to others. Asians successfully achieve adulthood by fulfilling their obligations to others and paramount among these are lifelong obligations to parents, especially in old age.[1] This relational conception conflicts with an individualist conception and helps explain why Asian parents direct their college-age children's lives in ways that American parents and youth might see as controlling and stifling. Imagine, then, the difficulties faced by Asian university students who have been reared in two cultures, American and Asian, with fundamentally contrasting cultural psychologies.

Liminality and Marginality

All college students regardless of ethnicity are in what anthropologist Victor Turner (1974), following Arnold Van Gennep, calls a "liminal" period of their lives. To be liminal is to be in a transitional phase or state; in this case to be "betwixt and between" childhood and adulthood. College students are no longer children, but are not yet adults despite their proclamations to the contrary. As liminars they are structurally ambiguous between social categories, a condition that produces vulnerability and insecurity. This ambiguity helps explains their quest for *communitas* (a sense of "belongingness" based on equality and comradeship) through social rituals that are important, but often lead to excessive and potentially dangerous activities such as binge drinking and sexual promiscuity. Asian American students are liminars in this sense, too, but in addition they are also what Turner calls "marginals." Marginals are "simultaneously members . . . of two or more groups [in this case, Asian and American] whose social definitions and cultural norms are distinct from, even opposed to, one another" (1974:233). Turner goes on to say that

> What is interesting about such marginals is that they often look to their group of origin, the so-called inferior group [their Asian parents and community—RHT] for communitas, and to the more prestigious group in which they mainly live and in which they aspire to higher status as their structural reference group. . . .Marginals like liminars are also betwixt and between, but unlike ritual liminars they have no cultural assurance of a final stable resolution of their ambiguity. (1974:233)

Applying Turner's insights to Asian American college students yields a complicated set of factors that students from the dominant cultural/racial group do not experience. Asian Americans are simultaneously liminal *and* marginal and their marginality (one might use "hybridity" today) is doubly entwined by both race and culture. As a racialized group Asian Americans face the stereotyping and discrimination that remains a prevalent feature of Euro-American culture. As one of my study participants exclaimed, "I'm tired of being approached by white guys

who say 'You're the most beautiful Asian girl I've ever seen.' Can't they just say I'm beautiful, period?"

But as a racialized minority, Asian Americans are also liminal in that, as recent research by Pawan Dinghra shows, many see themselves not as non-white but "between Black and White" (2003). While Asian American students are vaguely aware of the history of virulent racism and exclusion practiced by whites against "Orientals," they also intuitively know that "Asian-ness" is not stigmatized in the same way as "African-ness."[2] Dinghra's research among Korean and Indian professionals in Dallas, Texas shows that their racial identities are shaped by several factors including class position, geography, political preferences and personal experiences with other racialized groups. By and large, however, few identified with Blacks as fellow minorities and many were critical of affirmative action. They were as likely as whites to see meritocracy as the foundation of the American social structure and to attribute their own success to hard work and determination (Dinghra 2003:139-141).

Similarly, the Asian "model minority myth" works as a cultural device that promotes identification with whites and distances Asians from blacks and Latino/as. As Pensri Ho says, "despite its inaccuracy, the myth persists because it reifies American ideological tenets that valorize self-sufficiency, persistence and pluck to achieve the American Dream. The myth also exacerbates interracial minority relations through claims that non-Asian minorities can emulate Asian American achievements with minimal governmental support and intervention" (Ho 2003:149). The myth both exalts and marginalizes Asian otherness by appealing to exoticized Confucian values such as educational aspirations, filial piety, and meritocratic authority that resonate with American values of hard work, self-sufficiency, and excellence (Ho 2003:151). Both racially and culturally, then, Asian liminality and marginality constitute a contradictory and ambiguous discursive space that promotes self-reflexivity, a heightened sensitivity to the demands of American and Asian cultural contexts, and considerable anxiety.

In what follows I explore how Asian students navigate this space in one especially important domain: intimate relationships. This domain, along with "intended careers," tends to dominate the interviews partly because of the questions I ask, but also because college is a setting in which these primary life choices are at the forefront. I am going to relate the experiences of female participants only because they dominate my sample so far and because there appear to be important gender differences. The few men I have interviewed face heightened pressures, *as* men, from both Asian and American cultural contexts. Patriarchal Asian cultures have different role expectations for men than for women, with the continuation of the family line foremost among them. Patriarchal American culture also promotes a "masculinity" model that includes not only economic success, but also success

with women. The four Asian men I have interviewed to date have experienced difficulties in relationships with Anglo women and attribute these difficulties to their "Asian-ness." "White women do not find most Asian men attractive," one said, "and Asian girls also prefer white guys to Asians." Moreover, parental pressures to marry Asian women, often to the point where the young men are "set up" with Asian girls by their parents, lead some Asian men to prefer non-Asian women.

Although my data are not yet sufficient to sustain this claim, Asian-American men seem more prone to experience the authenticity dilemma than do Asian-American women. In fact, none of the Asian women I have interviewed seem to experience this dilemma. For the most part they see themselves positively as both real Asians and real Americans despite the occasional confusion this duality has produced at various points in their lives. Although nearly all the women have experienced racial discrimination from teachers, other students, and white and black Americans in general (which they attribute primarily to ignorance and insensitivity) they nevertheless score very high on Rosenburg's self-esteem scale. They are generally satisfied with themselves and feel they are people of worth who have good qualities. This is true even for those women who are not particularly strong students and who find college life stressful and alienating. Nevertheless, all the women I interviewed were adamant that their parents controlled their lives in ways that their Anglo student friends could neither understand nor empathize. They explained that their immigrant parents, most of whom worked exceedingly long hours to make a comfortable life in America, placed unusual expectations (by Euro-American standards) on their children from a very early age. As Tammy[3], one of my interviewees said,

> My parents work *all* the time running their [dry-cleaning] businesses and they make me work with them every break at school. And if my mom's away in Korea or somewhere I have to go home and take care of domestic duties and cook for my dad. But I can't complain because they've given me the fruits of their labor. They pay my tuition, rent, car and give me an allowance. Because my parents were always working they couldn'tcome to PTA or concerts or plays I was in. I resented it a little bit. And teachers would say, "Go home and have your parents help you with that." I couldn't do that because my parents worked and didn't know English well enough. I've been a latch-key kid since I was six or seven. I would wait for my little sister after schooland we would walk home together. I had to cook dinner for my parents, set the table, do dishes. And if you complained your parents would say, "We do all this for you so you can't complain."

Tammy's refrain is universal among my study participants and highlights the extent to which Asian parents control their children psychologically through an ethic of self-sacrifice. This sacrificial stance (which also justifies the long hours away from their children), plus the economic generosity that often accompanies it, generates and sustains the culture of filial obligation in which Asian students are raised. Most students are like Tammy and have adjusted to these obligations

without harboring deep resentment towards their parents. A few, however, describe their relationships with one or both parents as "not close at all" due to these same demands. Let's examine these demands somewhat more closely.

Intimate Relationships

No topic engendered more angst among my study participants than the issue of intimate relationships. Here's Tammy again.

> My dad is progressive; speaks English well and has assimilated well. But he can't escape his eastern values. He says I have to marry Korean and he has to be a Christian Korean.
>
> [Q: Why?]
>
> He wants to have Korean grandchildren; have in-laws who are Korean so as not to cause family conflicts. He's like 90%insistent—the other 10% might permit a Chinese or Japanese. All Koreans seek to preserve "purity"—Koreans with Koreans. But it's hard! It's impossible, really, because I have very diversefriends. I don't seek out Korean friends and I'm not just Korean.I respect and even admire my parents wanting to preserve Koreanheritage in future generations but. . .I feel like there is more to me than that.

When I asked her about boyfriends, Tammy responded:

> Up until last year I was dating mostly Koreans. I was in a period when I was getting in touch with my Korean side and hanging out with FOBs ("Fresh off the Boat" immigrants), speaking a lot of Korean. But then last year I met a Vietnamese boy and started dating, but I wouldn't tell my parents about him. That hurt him a lot and doomed the relationship. I met his family—they were warm and welcoming—we had a lot in common. Now I'm single [not dating] and 22. I would like to marry Korean for them [parents], but it's not about them; it's about me.

This last sentence summarizes the inherent conflict between the Asian culture of obligation and the American culture of individualism. It is a theme that is repeated throughout my interviews such as the following with Kimberly, an ethnic Chinese whose parents emigrated from Vietnam. Her parents are physicians—"mom is a pediatrician, dad is an allergist"—in a joint practice that caters to the large Vietnamese and Hispanic communities in northern Virginia. Kimberly's parents have stressed her filial obligations to them in their old age and expect to live with Kimberly and her husband in their retirement years.

> My parents are very strict about grades and dating. Mom especially. I wasn't allowed to have a boyfriend in high school. I did have a date with a boy and brought him home and they rejected him because he was white. I've had boyfriends but could never tell my parents about them. They've made me paranoid about rape and other things. I can't walk on campus by myself at night—I have to call a guy friend to feel safe.

When asked who her parents would accept for a boyfriend, she said: "They've told me I not only have to find a Chinese guy but he has to be a doctor" to which she exclaimed, "Oh God, I'm never going to be able to find a guy!" Her parents have

also told her whom she may not date.

> Don't ever go out with a Vietnamese boy, they say. A Chinese girl cannot lower herself to marry a Vietnamese. I once had a date with a Vietnamese boy and my parents flipped—not only because he was Vietnamese but because his parents own a donut shop.

I then asked Kimberly what might happen if she fell in love with a white guy. She related a story about how her mother had fallen in love with a German man she met while completing medical school in Germany. Her aunt with whom she was living found out about it and demanded she break it off. Her family insisted that she marry a Chinese, which, of course, she later did. But Kimberly says her parents' marriage has never been a good one.

> You would think my mom would understand [about dating men from other cultures] given her own experiences, but she doesn't. Whenever I protest her strictness she gets mad at me and says, "You're so American!" She means I'm willful and independent, not the dutiful daughter I should be.

Both Kimberly and Tammy understand their parents' insistence on marrying within Asian culture, but think their parents' "unreasonable demands" [to quote Kimberly] has affected their relationships with men. If they date someone unacceptable to their parents their strategy is to hide this from them. But this has the effect of stifling potentially healthy and loving relationships as Tammy said this had done in the case of her Vietnamese boyfriend. Both young women recognize the extent to which their continuing economic dependence on parents contributes to emotional dependence. This is why each seeks to establish careers that will enable them to live apart from parents, an American pattern that their Asian parents will also resist.

While the experiences of Tammy and Kimberly are the common refrain, they are not the only one. Listen to Sonia, an Indian American of Punjabi Sikh descent who is soon to graduate with a degree in marketing. Although born in the United States and stressing that she "appreciates the American mentality more than the Indian mentality," Sonia has nevertheless agreed to let her parents match her with a suitable *Jat* Sikh[4] man.

> I was supposed to be a son. My dad still refers to me as "son" in Punjabi, but we are very close because he says I was born in the year that he became financially successful. I'm agreeing to a marriage with a Jat Sikh boy if my parents can find a suitable match.

When I asked her if they were looking to find such a match, Sonia replied:

> Yes, they are looking. I just turned 23 and they have already called me a couple of times and said you are graduating this year and your sister is getting married next year and we want you to marry in two years. They have a blueprint for me and I don't appreciate it because I want to make my own way. On the other hand I trust my parents—I really trust them. I told them specifically—I don't want anyone

> from India because that would lead to divorce. He has to be American or Canadian-born; he has to have grown up like me; he has to be tall like me. I've hurt my parents a lot [by her rebellious "out of control" behavior] but I realize that they have struggled really hard for us –I kind of want to pay them back [by following their wishes]. My sister followed their wishes by becoming a dentist; not the doctor they hoped for, but close enough. But she is marrying a Hindu and my father still will not accept it.

Sonia is not sacrificing her personal wishes for those of her parents. She has reached a stage in her life where she appreciates and understands her parents and, as she said to me, "I've reached the point where it is okay to be Indian now" (after years of rebelling stemming from identity issues). Her close friends are mostly Indian American and she is aware that there are many eligible and successful *Jat* Sikh men seeking *Jat* Sikh wives.[5] She is confident that her own preferences in men will be respected by her parents and she will not be forced to marry someone with whom she is not comfortable. "After all," she said, "my parents were matched by their fathers and they fell in love."

One final example is necessary to round out the picture I have presented so far. Asian Americans have historically had higher rates of exogamy (marriage to persons of non-Asian descent) than have Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. Although this outmarriage declined substantially from 25% to 15% between 1980 and 1990, this reflects the influx of already married Asian immigrants and not the preferences or likely marriage outcomes of their American raised children (Lee and Fernandez 1998). Despite the pressures Asian parents place on their children to marry "Asian," a substantial percentage end up marrying non-Asians. One reason for this is because many Asian children grow up in non-Asian contexts and have few Asian kinship or friendship networks beyond their immediate family. Such is Sue's case, whose ethnic Chinese parents were born and raised in Laos.

> I went to private schools my whole life and I was the only Asian girl. There were a few Asian boys when I got to high school and they thoughtI was so white that they put Twinkies in my locker to tease me.6 But I was the only Asian girl in my graduating class of 101 so naturally I hung out with white kids. And now in college I belong to a white sorority and almost all of my friends are still white. But this has always made me conscious of my Asianness, just like a heavy person is always conscious of her weight.

When I inquired about her dating history Sue continued,

> I've been on dates with Asian guys, but I've only really dated white guys. I'm in a relationship now with a guy who's Jewish. I haven't felt weird in a relationship because I'm Asian—well, sometimes it's an issue with my parents. Mom would probably throw me a party if I was dating a Chinese guy, but she's met the guy I'm dating now and she likes him. She kind of knows she has to accept who we choose. Ideally they would prefer a Chinese guy, but only because they think he would understand Asian [culture] more. It's a cultural thing, not race.

Despite Sue's immersion in the white world, her sometimes conflicted Asian identity, and a likely marriage to an Anglo-American, she is nevertheless proud

of her Asian heritage and very close to her parents, especially her mother. Her experiences, while quite different from the other three Asian women I focused on, have not led her to spurn or bemoan her Asian roots; the "normal" outcome that I observed 25 years ago among Canadian-born Chinese. This raises some theoretical issues that I address briefly by way of conclusion.

What Does "Assimilation" Mean?

Those of us who study the assimilation process tend to emphasize the extent to which assimilation to Euro-American society entails a substantial "loss" of the parental culture in both the first and, of course, succeeding generations of native-born children. By "loss" we mean that assimilators lose both competence in and identification with the ancestral culture as they successfully enter the mainstream.7 This was certainly the pattern discerned in my earlier research with Chinese-Canadians and it is a pattern well documented today among other ethnic minorities (see Rumbaut and Portes 2001). The research I have reported on is leading me to a more nuanced and complex picture, however. In terms of Milton Gordon's "stage-theory" of assimilation, the Asian Americans I have interviewed are culturally and structurally assimilated to American society but do not exhibit "idenfificational assimilation," which Gordon defined as a "sense of peoplehood based exclusively on the host society" (1964:71). Although they see themselves as Americans they are hyphenated Americans who identify rather strongly with their Asian ancestries. And it is reasonable to expect this dual identity to remain strong even as they build lives apart from their parents.

In attempting to answer why this is so, it is certainly plausible that the recent mainstream discourses of diversity and multiculturalism have legitimized hybridity—made it more acceptable to be different than has historically been the case. But another, perhaps more cynical answer suggests itself to me. To repeat an earlier quote from Victor Turner, "What is interesting about such marginals is that they often look to their group of origin . . . for communitas. . . ." (1974:233). Turner does not address why this is interesting or why marginals would seek communitas from the parental culture. Why shouldn't Asian Americans who have successfully assimilated educationally and occupationally seek their sense of belongingness and comradeship from persons in the host society as assimilation theory suggests? A few do, of course, but I discovered in my earlier research that Asians who become estranged from their parents have difficulty finding communitas in the larger society; that is, they fail to make a smooth and successful transition from the Asian parental culture to North American culture. The obvious answer is that the emotional-psychological intensity and complexity of the parent-child bond will "naturally" lead children to seek communitas among parents and their kith and kin. But if this were the sole or even main explanation, then I doubt that Turner would have found this phenomenon "interesting."

My own answer can be summed up in a word: *race*. As I recently argued elsewhere, although Euro-American culture is rooted in an assimilationist (one could say "melting pot") ideal, this ideal has always been refracted through a racialized social order that seeks to make over its nonwhite minorities "in the image, *but not the actuality*, of whiteness" (Thompson 2003:97, original emphasis). The continuing efficacy of racial classifications "tells" Asians that despite their success they can never be white. This *may* prevent a complete embrace of American culture (i.e., "idenfificational assimilation") especially in those deeply personal and emotional contexts where communitas resides. Asian cultural psychology is filtered through a racialized, exclusionary American social order, which work *together* to produce the hold Asian parents have over their children. Ironically, the maintenance of Asian difference in certain domains, at least, is facilitated by America's continuing struggle with identifying (and judging) people by the color of their skin.

Notes

[1] The extent to which Asian cultural psychology is changing toward a more western type is a topic of considerable importance. Recent ethnographic research in China by Yunxiang Yan, for example, suggests that filial obligations of children towards parents are in serious decline owing to the increased emphasis on conjugal intimacy and independence and nuclear household residence patterns (2003, especially Chapter 7).

[2] I would argue that the racism directed against "Celestials" (represented mainly by Chinese immigrants of the middle to late nineteenth century) was what Oliver Cox (1959 [1948]) describes as "social intolerance" rather than the "racial prejudice" directed against African Americans. Social intolerance is a situation in which the dominant group resents a minority group because it is culturally alien and refuses to assimilate (Anti-Semitism is the example used by Cox). Racial prejudice on the other hand is a situation in which the dominant group stigmatizes a minority group as inferior and unworthy of participation in the larger society so as to justify labor exploitation (as in the case of slavery and African Americans).

[3] All of the names used in this paper are pseudonyms chosen by the study participants.

[4] Sikh migrants to the United States are mainly from the northeastern Indian state of Punjab. A subset of these migrants are *Jat* Sikh, referring to landowning "high caste" Sikhs. Even though the Sikh religion claims to have rejected Hindu notions of caste, *Jat* Sikhs are very "caste conscious" especially when seeking marriage partners.

[5] An internet search under "Jat Sikh" produced page upon page of "matrimonial" websites where *Jat* Sikh men are seeking *Jat* Sikh wives.

[6] Almost all of my study participants describe some experiences about their "Twinkie" status—yellow on the outside, white on the inside—but in no case does this appellation seem to have produced traumatic or even serious identity conflicts.

[7] Not all children of immigrants successfully assimilate experiencing downward mobility and troubled lives. Assimilation is thus "segmented" and not uniformly upward.

References

Cox, Oliver C. 1959. *Caste, Class and Race*. New York: Monthly Review.

Dinghra, Pawan H. 2003. "Being American Between Black and White: Second Generation Asian American Professionals' Racial Identities," *Journal of Asian American Studies*, 6.2:117-147.

Ho, Pensri. 2003. "Performing the 'Oriental': Professionals and the Asian Model Minority Myth." *Journal of Asian American Studies*, 6.2:149-175.

Kibria, Nazli. 2002. "College and Notions of 'Asian Americans': Second Generation Chinese Americans and Korean Americans." Pyong Gap Min, Ed. In *Second Generation: Ethnic Identity among Asian Americans.* Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira. 183-207.

Gordon, Milton M. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University.

Lee, S. and M. Fernandez. 1998. "Trends in Asian American Racial/Ethnic Intermarriage: A Comparison of 1980 and 1990 Census Data," *Sociological Perspectives* 41.2:323-342.

Nisbett, Richard. 2003. *The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Rumbaut, Ruben G. and Alejandro Portes, eds. 2001. *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*. Berkeley: University of California/Russell Sage Foundation.

Thompson, Richard H. 1989. *Toronto's Chinatown: The Changing Social Organization of an Ethnic Community.* New York: AMS.

———. 1994. "Chinatowns: Immigrant Communities in Transition." Melvin Ember, Carol R. Ember, David Levinson, Eds. In *Portraits of Culture: Ethnographic Originals*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 241-266.

———. 2003. "Basing Educational Anthropology on the Education of Anthropologists: Can Bilingualism and Biculturalism Promote the Fundamental Goals of Anthropology better than Multiculturalism?" *Anthropology & Education Quarterly* 34.1:96-107.

Tuan, Mia. 2003. "Second Generation Asian American Identity: Clues from the Asian Ethnic Experience." Pyong Gap Min, Ed. In *Second Generation: Ethnic Identity Among Asian Americans.* Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. 209-237.

Tung, May Paomay. 2000. *Chinese Americans and Their Immigrant Parents.* New York: Haworth Clinical Press.

Turner, Victor. 1974. *Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.

Yan, Yunxiang. 2003. *Private Life under Socialism*. Stanford: Stanford University

Ethics and Leadership: A Comparison of Hobbesian Men, Gilliganian Women, and Confucian Asians

Hong Xiao & Chenyang Li, Central Washington University

Academic essays usually fall into two categories. Some essays report certain facts, and some raise questions to make people think; some are a combination of both. The primary goal of this paper is to raise questions. As such, it is meant to be provocative, and, for some people, it may even be outrageous. We want to put forth a hypothesis. If our hypothesis prompts people to ponder the issue we raise, our goal is achieved.

The hypothesis is built on the fact that, while a relatively large number of Asian Americans receive higher education and have a high level of socioeconomic achievement, only a relatively small number of Asian Americans are in the formal authority hierarchy and hold positions of power. We think that one of the possible causes is cultural disadvantage. The Asian American population is not a homogenous group; rather it comprises many groups who differ in language and culture. In this article, we focus on Asian Americans with a Confucian heritage, who can trace their roots to such East Asian and Southeast Asian countries as China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, and Singapore. We hypothesize that these Asian Americans are culturally disadvantaged in moving up within corporate America, and that this disadvantage is similar to the disadvantage American women face in getting ahead.

It is a known fact that American women do not have their fair share of leadership and decision-making power. One of the reasons for this social inequality is that women follow the ethics of care, and this practice puts women in a disadvantaged position in the political/economic system. We suggest that there is a parallel between care ethics and Confucian ethics; in an individualistic competitive society, such ethics put their subscribers at a disadvantage in their pursuit of occupational success. In the space below, we will first present briefly Asian American's leadership representation profile. Then we will compare three ethics: justice ethics, care

ethics, and Confucian ethics. Drawing upon the similarities between care ethics and Confucian ethics, we argue that Asian Americans, especially those with a Confucian heritage, are disadvantaged in their pursuit of leadership positions. Finally we will discuss the implications of the hypothesis.

A Quick Reality Check

Asian Americans do not occupy proportional leadership positions in American society. By leadership, here, we do not mean the occupancy of key academic and research positions, such as leading scientists and medical doctors. Nor do we count as leadership persons like a Mr. Zhao, who owns and runs a small Chinese restaurant in a small Midwest town with the help of his wife and three part-time employees, even though he is technically an owner/manager for U.S. census purposes; or, a Mrs. Kim, a street-corner grocery store owner in California who manages the store with the help of her two teenage children. Instead, by leadership, we mean such roles as elected leaders in government and senior management personnel in public as well as private sectors (senators, governors, mayors, managers, directors, deans, presidents, and corporate CEOs). These positions embody the formal authority hierarchy and carry with them decision-making power in mainstream America.

It is not that Asian Americans are less intelligent or less capable than other Americans. According to the 2000 Census, 28.7 percent of the Asian-Pacific Islander population 25 years and over have bachelor's degrees and 15.3 percent have advanced degrees, whereas the percentages for the total U.S. population are 17 percent and 8.6 percent respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). As is demonstrated in recent U.S. Department of Education NCES statistics, in 1998-99, 8 percent of the Master's degrees and 7.7 percent of Doctoral degrees in the United States were conferred upon Asian-Pacific Islanders, even though Asian-Pacific Islanders comprise only 3.9 percent of the total U.S. population. Despite their higher educational attainment, however, Asian Americans held only 1.7 percent of the federal government's executive positions during 1990-1999 (U.S. General Accounting Office 2001). Among college and university faculty and professional staff, Asian-Pacific Islanders accounted for 5 percent of administrators and non-administrators, while whites made up 16 percent and blacks 21 percent. That is, for every 100 Asian-Pacific Islander faculty/professional staff members in Higher Education, only 5 were administrators, whereas for every 100 black faculty/professional staff members, 21 were administrators.

These numbers present a clear disparity between Asian Americans' educational achievement and their share of leadership roles. How can we explain this disparity? There can be many reasons. Previous research pointed to racism, discrimination, and historical disadvantages in explaining such an unfortunate reality.[1] However, beyond these factors, little attention has been paid to the link between Asian

Americans' ethical beliefs and their leadership representation. Feminist scholarship argues that there are distinctive gender differences in ethical orientations and that these differences account, in part, for gender inequality in power structure. Recent research on comparative ethics has identified important similarities between feminist care ethics and Confucian Jen ethics. We are particularly interested in extending research on ethics and leadership for Asian American population that practice Confucian ethics. Building upon these two theories, we hypothesize that one of the causes of Asian Americans' low representation in leadership roles is cultural disadvantage.

Feminist Ethics of Care and Traditional Ethics of Justice

Feminist studies of ethics suggest that there are gender differences in fundamental value orientations, such as the relative importance attached to justice principles versus care principles and individual well-being versus collective well-being. In her path-breaking work on human ethics, Carol Gilligan argued that women tend to follow a different ethics than men.[2] While men usually follow what has been called the ethics of justice and adopt a "rights perspective," women tend to follow the ethics of care and value a "relationship perspective." A major difference between the two ethics is that while the ethics of justice places more emphasis on individual well-being, the ethics of care attaches more value to collective well-being. Distinguishing between these two ethics, we do not claim that all and only men practice the ethics of justice, nor do we mean that all and only women follow the ethics of care. There are many "Margaret Thatchers" who, being biologically female, follow as much the ethics of justice as men do. There are also men who tend to follow the ethics of care. The standpoint adopted by many feminist scholars, as we understand it, is that women usually tend to follow the ethics of care, whether this is due to biological (e.g., "mothering" experience), or historical (e.g., social oppression), or cultural (e.g., gender roles socialization) reasons.[3] According to these studies, men tend to see themselves as separate individuals while women tend to see themselves as related to others; hence, men are more likely than women to be individualistic, and women are more likely than men to be caring toward others.

Research on gender differences in value orientations demonstrates a gender gap in social relationships. Women are more likely than men to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others. Women are also more supportive than men of education, health programs, social welfare, and reconciliation and peace. Other evidence shows that women are involved more extensively in care-giving than men, both at home and at the workplace. Women are the primary providers of emotional support at home and are more likely to aspire to and be employed in jobs that require interpersonal skills and the provision of social-emotional support. Research on work values also shows that women attach more

importance than men to jobs that are worthwhile to society and involve helping others.[4]

Some feminist scholars have pointed out that the ethics of care has many limitations.[5] In competition with people who follow the ethics of justice, people who follow the ethics of care are disadvantaged. In a society that highly values individuality and masculinity, a care ethicist, who values interpersonal relatedness and is tender-minded, is less likely to gain recognition than one who values individuality and is tough-minded. In a competitive society, a person must be able to utilize one's own rights in order to get ahead. It may be argued that, in our society, the typical men are Hobbesian men: they view themselves as individuals laden with individual rights and individual interests. They are rational and disposed to fighting for their rights, usually following socially established rules and principles. In contrast, we may say that typical women in our society are Gilliganian women: they are more likely to be others-regarding and less concerned with their own individual rights; they are more likely to yield to others and less likely to compete with others. In a competitive world, it is the Hobbesian men, not the Gilliganian women, who are more likely to get ahead.

Take a case in which a man and a woman fall in love and get married. Let us suppose that the man follows justice ethics and the woman follows care ethics. As years pass and they have children, they both have some decisions to make. Following justice ethics, the man considers it his own duty to provide for the family because he has chosen to enter the marriage of his free will, and he also considers it his sacred right to pursue the career that he loves. Following care ethics, the woman also loves her work, but she sees her self as relational, rather than individual; she sees her life as being inseparable from her husband and children. It is in the best interest of her entire family that she stays home to care for her husband and children. Life is good for everyone in the family: the man's career takes off; the children are well cared for, go to good schools, and start their own careers and families. If the marriage continues to be healthy, the woman gets a lot of satisfaction in her choice. In our society, however, it is the man, not the woman, who receives more recognition and credit. Imagine that due to no one's fault, the marriage goes sour and the couple gets divorced. The man still has his job and career, while the woman is left with few marketable skills for paid work. The man does not have to feel guilty because he did not force her to quit her job many years ago; she chose to quit in order to make a comfortable home for her career-oriented husband and to stay home with their small children.

This does not necessarily mean that one ethics is superior to the other. It simply illustrates that the two ethics are different in nature and yield two different social consequences for people who prescribe to them. The values of these two ethics are analogous to the hand gestures in the children's game of "rock-paper-

scissors." In this two-person game, each person is to show his or her hand at the same time the other does. The hand gesture can be a fist ("rock"), a flat hand with five-fingers open ("paper"), or a fist with only two fingers sticking out ("scissors"). The rule is that "rock" is superior to "scissors," "scissors" are superior to "paper," and "paper" is superior to "rock." Each gesture is superior or inferior depending on the gesture with which it is paired. "Rock" is inferior to "paper," but it is superior to "scissors." In a similar way, it is possible that the ethics of care may fare better in winning (getting ahead) when it goes side-by-side with some other ethics, even though it does not get the care ethicist ahead when it goes side-by-side with justice ethicists.

Thus, the ethics of care by its very nature requires self-sacrifice, and it does not guarantee fairness in life. The ethics of justice sometimes also requires self-sacrifice, but it demands fairness in return. In the ethics of care, every one is called upon to help others, but it guarantees no negative sanctions if one does not reciprocate care. In the ethics of justice, on the other hand, it is assumed that one can decide freely to enter or not to enter a contract. If one chooses to enter a contractual arrangement, one is obliged to honor one's obligations. Negative sanctions are enforced if one fails to meet these obligations. Therefore, when people who follow the ethics of care and people following the ethics of justice work together, the latter is more likely to get ahead. In competing for societal recognition and for leadership positions, Hobbesian men are more likely than Gilliganian women to be successful. This may explain *partly* why, in our society, more men than women occupy leadership positions.

The Parallel between Confucian Ethics of Jen and Feminine Ethics of Care

In an article on comparative ethics, Chenyang Li outlined three important parallels between feminist care ethics and Confucian ethics.[6] First, *Jen* and care, as the highest moral ideals of each ethical system, emphasize tenderness toward others. In each system, persons are seen primarily as relational and morality is primarily measured by what one does for others. This is in sharp contrast with human relations in contractarian theories, which view human beings as rational individuals who enter society on a voluntary basis, as if one has signed onto a social contract with the other members of society. In such a contractual society, individuals look out for their own interest and reciprocate favors according to the "contract." Second, compared with Kantian and utilitarian ethics, both *Jen* and care ethics are not as dependent on general rules. Without rigid rules, beneficial effects between individuals cannot be quantified and cannot be calculated on a contractual basis. Third, based on their common notion of the relational self, both *jen* and care ethics believe in care/love with gradations, in contrast with Kantian ethical universality. That is, persons have more moral obligations toward those with which they are in close relationships. Accordingly, a moral person

ought to sacrifice more for one's family and loved ones. Because of these common understandings of morality, Confucians' sense of moral behavior is much like that of the Gilliganian women. They emphasize personal interrelatedness and mutual obligation rather than individual rights. They see society as a big family in which members are bound together and are to care for one another, instead of contractual incorporation in which each individual is to look out for one's own interest.

If Li is correct in his argument, then Asians who follow Confucian ethics may find themselves disadvantaged in similar ways as women are in competing with white males in today's American society. The practice of Confucian ethics, therefore, may explain *partly* why there are a relatively small number of Asian Americans in leadership positions.

This is not to say that Confucians cannot lead. Obviously, there have been many, many leaders in Confucian societies. Our point here is that when people who practice Confucian ethics and people who practice justice ethics live in the same society, the former are disadvantaged in similar ways as care ethicists are.

In a book on gender dynamics in the modern workplace, Gail Evans, a CNN executive, writes about different approaches to opportunities between men and women:

> One scenario:
>
> Situation: A job opens up in the Paris office.
>
> His Move: Asks for it.
>
> Hers, typically: Hints at it.
>
> Game Plan [Evans' solution for women]: If you want something, go for it.
>
> Another scenario:
>
> Situation: The big boss is touring the hallways.
>
> His move: Steps out, introduces himself, and mentions his newest project.
>
> Hers, typically: Stays at her desk, confident that her good work will speak for itself.
>
> Game plan: Take credit for your accomplishments.[7]

Evans argues that boys learn early on to stand out any way they can and suggests that women should learn to blow their own horn. Because women tend to see themselves as part of a large team ("relatedness") and tend to be tender-minded,

however, they are usually less likely to stand out; even if they believe that they deserve something, they tend to be more modest and less aggressive. As a result, women are less likely to be recognized even though they do as good a job as men do.

In this regard, Chinese Americans are like Gilliganian women. They value teamwork, relatedness, and modesty. They believe solid work performance speaks louder than words. Confucius specifically said that morally superior persons do not talk much; they use their actions to show what is right. In today's society, however, such an approach simply does not help them advance in organizational or corporate hierarchies. They are more likely to remain just that: "a good team worker," not a team leader.

Can Asian Americans Lead?

In this paper, we have articulated a hypothesis as to why Asian Americans do not lead in our society. This hypothesis is built on three major assumptions. The first is the validity and applicability of Carol Gilligan's and Nel Noddings' theory of care ethics. The second is the accuracy of parallels drawn between women's care ethics and Confucian Jen ethics. The third is the belief that Asian Americans follow Confucian ethics. The falsification of any of these assumptions can falsify this hypothesis. However, if all three assumptions are as true as they appear to be, then we will have a lot to think about as both scholars and employees. As we have stated at the beginning of this paper, we are fully aware that some people will not feel comfortable with this hypothesis and that some may be outraged by it. Moreover, some Confucian people may even feel it degrading to be compared to women. But, we will leave it to our readers to decide if there is any virtue in this hypothesis.

Where does this hypothesis leave us? That Asian Americans do not lead does not necessarily mean that they cannot lead. But, can Asian Americans lead if they continue to follow Confucian ethics? It seems that Asian Americans face a similar situation as women do in America. Today, women can become leaders by following justice ethics, that is, by becoming "Margaret Thatchers" or "Hobbesian women." That way, they can be competitive and get ahead in competition with men. Or, they can change the American culture to make it friendlier toward non-individualistic practices. In the same way, in order for Asian Americans to take their share of leadership positions in this society, they will have to make changes in many ways. A growing number of Asian Americans have run for elected offices in recent elections.[8] This increase indicates that changes are taking place. However, as far as culture is concerned, it would seem that Asian Americans either have to abandon their traditional Confucian ethics to become more individualistic and hence more competitive, or to change society's way of thinking to make it friendlier toward non-individualistic practices. Our hope is the latter.

Notes:

[1] Stanley Sue, Nolan Zane, and Derald Sue, "Where are the Asian American Leaders and Top Executives?" P/AAMHRC *Research Review*, 4:1/2 (1985), 13-15; and Won Moo Hurh and Kwang Chung Kim, "The 'success' image of Asian Americans: its validity, and its practical and theoretical implications," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 12:4 (1989), 512-538; Sharon M. Lee, "Do Asian American faculty face glass ceiling in higher education?" *American Educational Research Journal* 39 (2002):695-726.

[2] Carol Gilligan, *In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982).

[3] Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1986) and *Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002); Sara Ruddick, *Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989); Ann M. Beutel and Margaret Mooney Marini, "Gender and values" *American Sociological Review* 60 (1995):436-48.

[4] Adrianne W. Kunkel and Brant R Burleson, "Assessing explanations for sex differences in emotional support." *Human Communication Research* 25 (1999):307-340; Eetta Prince-Gibson and Shalom H. Schwartz, "Value priorities and gender," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 61 (1998):49-67.

[5] Alison M. Jaggar, "Caring as a Feminist Practice of Moral Reason," *Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics*, ed. Virginia Held, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Mona Harrington, *Care and Equality* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

[6] Chenyang Li, "The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study," *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, 9 (1994): 70-89.

[7] Gail Evans, *Play like A Man, Win Like A Woman: What Men know About Success that Women Need to Learn*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2001).

[8] Pei-te Lien, *The Making of Asian America through Political Participation*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001); Lisa S. Tsai, "Emerging power: A study on Asian American political candidates." *Asian American Policy Review* 11 (2000):76-98.

Talking Trash: An Examination of Recycling and Solid Waste Management Policies, Economies, and Practices in Beijing.

Devona Ensmenger, State of Oregon
Josh Goldstein, Franklin and Marshall College
Richard Mack, Central Washington University

I. Introduction

Typically, the linear relationship between the generation of municipal solid waste and economic development breaks down after several decades of strong GDP growth. However, China has not been able to reduce refuse generation as GDP has increased. China's municipal solid waste generation was 67,700,000 tons in 1990 and reached 140,000,000 tons in 1998, increasing, along with GDP, at 10% annually (Figure 1)(Dong et al. 2000). With the continuation of rapid economic development, industrialization, and urbanization, there is no question that the country may bear one of the heaviest solid waste management burdens in the world.

This paper will focus upon analyzing the practices and policies that relate to consumption, recycling and waste disposal in urban China. Much of the material in this study was collected during a research trip to Beijing in the summer of 2001. To understand the waste management system and its associated strengths and weaknesses, we conducted interviews with government officials, garbage pickers, recycling stand owners, recycling market workers, scholars of environmental engineering, and employees of various companies. Visits were made to collection sites of recyclables, transfer stations and landfills.

An extensive history of solid waste since Republican period and a discussion of the composition of solid waste comprise the background section of this paper. In the management section, the current practices of reusing, reducing, and recycling wastes are outlined, covering the entire collection chain of recyclables. A brief description of recyclables processing and the practices of solid waste disposal

completes the section. A discussion of implications for the future is presented in the last section.

Figure 1. Relationship between per capita GDP and MSW generation in China



Today's economic imagery of consumption-based growth with few environmental constraints is not the only way that economic development, modernization, or industrialization has been historically experienced in China. In Republican era Beijing, the economy functioned without creating a dominant culture of consumption and disposability. In early Socialist era Beijing, industrialization began to take off, yet the daily habits of consumption and disposal were very dissimilar from those found in contemporary capitalist economies. In both the Republican and Socialist eras, the public could not afford to waste material goods.

In the Republican period collectors roamed the streets, beating rhythms and chanting out calls for residents to bring out their "stuff." Relatively little Republican era "junk" passed through what we today think of as "recycling" processes--shredding, melting, or mashing into raw materials to then be used to manufacture new commodities. Rather, most folks in the Republican era practiced what Susan Strasser (1999) refers to as the "stewardship of objects;" what was broken, if it could not be repaired, would be used bricoluer fashion for some other purpose (cloth scraps for mops, etc.) Recycling in the Republican era was thus an intrinsic aspect of a wide variety of handicrafts and forms of household labor. Our definition of recycling activities in this era must, therefore, encompass a whole range of activities and crafts involving repair and mending. People who depended on recycling for their subsistence--the rag-tag army of junk collectors, the scrap

merchants, second-hand goods sellers, and the thousands of independent crafts-people depending on their refurbished goods--comprised a sizable proportion of Beijing's populace. Indeed, Madeliene Yue Dong has demonstrated that this array of employments was an indispensable part of Republican Beijing's economic and cultural life. Dong has eloquently argued that the experience of modernity in Republican Beijing could be broadly construed as intimately linked to these "recycling" practices (Dong 1999).

The Socialist revolution was supposed to change much of this. As a first step, the city government collectivized this group of laborers who, by the very nature of their work, were dispersed throughout the city; it authorized and organized them into civic groups: shop keepers societies, junk dealer societies, etc. Then, during the 1956 collectivization movement, about 7,000 of these peddlers were organized into the Beijing Municipal Scrap Recycling Company (Beijingshi feipin huishou gongsi). In 1966 it was renamed the Resource Recycling Company (Beijingshi wuzi huishou gongsi: BRRC). The total capital of the company in 1957 came to around 2 million yuan, all of it coming from the "donated" savings of the various junk collectors and shop owners. As the city government contributed no extra funds, Beijing's entire recycling network was built from this nest egg.

With state collectivization, the highly integrated network of daily markets and crafts that characterized the Republican urban economy was digested into a new economic structure. First, the high-end junk merchants, those who dealt in jewelry, watches, and other valuables, quickly became obsolete. For a few years in the late 1950s these specialists were used not only to assess the value of various items that people, sometimes against their will, yielded to the state, but also to do detective work, cracking crime rings and tracing the origins of stolen articles. But soon this strata of the junk world was defunct. And with the disappearance of small markets and individual crafts shops, a primary market for recycled scrap also vanished. Unlike the small shop owners who collected scrap supplies at night markets, the collectivized craft shops got their supplies in bulk from the state. So though domestic habits towards conserving and preserving material objects had changed little since the Republican era, these practices interfaced quite differently with the larger economic system. The nether-world of mended, patched, pawned and traded objects that gathered nightly at the 'dew markets' of the Republican era had been banished. Old things were mended and scraps were saved, but these items were no longer bought and sold at market. Rather, those scraps people chose not to keep were sold to the state, drops in the sea of industry.

The shift in 1966 of the recycling bureau's name, from the *Beijingshi* ***feipin*** (old commodities) *huishou gongsi* to the *Beijingshi* ***wuzi*** (resource) *huishou gongsi* (BRRC), highlighted a change that had already occurred in material practice. Recycling for the BRRC was much more like we conceive of it today: the

gathering of glass, paper and metals in bulk to be reduced and reformed as "new" commodities. Recycling was no longer linked to handicraft, second-hand goods, or mended objects. The BRRC further divided "resources" into two overarching categories, "industrial" and "daily life" (shenghuo). Industrial materials were collected directly from state factories and primarily consisted of metals that were by far the most valued materials the BRRC handled. In addition, daily life materials were delivered from various offices and non-industrial work units, as well as brought in by local residents, and included all sorts of paper, glass and rubber scraps, toothpaste tubes, and other small bits of metal. BRRC "collection points" were dispersed throughout the city; there was one in every neighborhood. They did not have to publicize or encourage people to use their services, as the small change they gave people for their "resources" was a valuable little treat in such a money-scarce economy. The Great Leap Forward, with its drives for backyard steel production, only further highlighted this sense of connection between domestic habits, meticulous accounting for material as resources, and national industrialization. Though the ideological connections had already been made earlier, with the Great Leap Forward citizens began directly connecting their small acts of material conservation and recycling with the enormous picture of a triumphantly industrializing Socialist nation-state. Recycling, though certainly driven by urban residents' personal desire for a bit more pocket money, was also a positive act of citizenship. And, it might also be noted, while both the Republican and Socialist experiences of recycling contained these powerful social implications, they had little connection to the ideology of environmentalism which today dominates the recycling world.

The post-78 reform era witnessed yet other definitive changes in the daily practices of recycling. Many systemic shifts play into this transformation: the enormous expansion of markets for consumer goods and the attendant spread of a culture of disposability; the rapid monetization of the economy; changes in land uses and markets; government policies on internal migration and a recent push for environmental protection and sustainable economic development.

Under the early leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1976 - 1996), the government continued to view industry as the source of most recycling; metals were the primary source of recycling value. Therefore, the emphasis on recycling residential waste disappeared and the market dwindled. Because of the focus on industrial recycling, daily life wastes in Beijing built up, setting the stage for an ad hoc shift in recycling activity. New players were brought to the stage in the 1980s when rapid economic growth and wage stratification widened the gap between the richer coastal areas and the poorer areas of the interior, driving many poor individuals into the cities in search of better wages. At this time, the floating population (illegal immigrants) in Beijing grew rapidly; this group found the untouched accumulation of daily life wastes to have considerable money making potential.

The stuff of daily life was becoming increasingly disposable, and people were becoming more disposed to doing so; urbanites began consuming and discarding with increasing abandon. This shift to a more disposable life-style was abetted by the fact that the two thousand BRRC collection points were themselves being treated as disposable; they were rapidly being gobbled up in Beijing's real-estate boom. Simultaneously, a variety of new retail businesses (restaurants, small stores, hotels, etc.), which had never established relationships with BRRC collection points, began disposing of new quantities of trash. Though there was a lot more trash, it was not at all clear what was to be done with it.

This economic change provided a rich territory in which Beijing's trash-pickers could scavenge. Moreover, the gradual loosening of economic and legal regulations that tied farmers to their villages made it increasingly possible (though far from easy) for them to migrate into the city to meet the steadily increasing demands (both formal and informal) for their labor. Unrelenting urban construction generated dingy heaps of shattered brick and concrete dust, beneath which lay veins and nuggets of recyclable materials--iron, aluminum and copper--to be culled and collected.

The wave of collectors that arrived in the mid 1980s had a much better chance of prospering than those who came later. There was not yet intense competition over turf, and collectors had not yet clearly divided the city into territories for harvesting. By the early 1990s competition was already fierce (at times it could even involve migrant gang violence), and it would require good connections to ply an area like Wang Fujing. After the recyclables administration had fallen apart and gone bankrupt in the 1990s, no other agency wanted to handle solid wastes due to the filth and the associated stigma. Therefore, members of the floating population filled a niche that proved to be quite lucrative. When the government became aware of the profits migrant workers were generating, they began imposing taxes and collecting rent on the land being used to store materials. In 1998, over 10,000 floating population members in Beijing lived off the waste recovery market with an average income of RMB 11,000/year (Dong, Tong, and Wu 2000). Most collectors today have to strike formal or informal contracts with the shops whose recyclable trash they collect. These contracts which give specific collectors exclusive privileges to a business's trash can be quite costly, far beyond the pocket money of a newly arriving migrant: the huge Jinguang Hotel and shopping center charges 8,000 to 10,000 yuan per day for access to their trash, while the more moderate sized Kunlun Hotel sells its access for 2,000 yuan a day (Wang 2001).

The early collecting cohort had the additional advantage that they did not have to lug their scrap very far. In the mid 1980s about 30-40% of the recyclable collection points were also transfer markets, since these small collection depots also served as markets where assorted recyclables were sold by individual collectors

of miscellaneous scrap to larger-scale collectors (aka "little bosses", xiao laoban) who specialize in particular materials. From these collection "points" the materials were then transported to factories to be processed into intermediate materials for reuse. The collection points were still quite centrally located within the 3rd Ring Road. This is quite different today, when all the major collection points are located beyond the 4th Ring Road. Collectors today bike an average of 10 kilometers to their nearest transfer market, and, for those who work the pay dirt of central Beijing, the average distances are even greater (Xie 2001).

There is no doubt that the commercialization of real estate radically changed where trash goes and how it gets there. With the land speculation binge in the 1980s, the little plots of essentially rent-free land that the BRRC used as collection points were quickly scooped up to be used for all sorts of more profitable real estate investments. Accordingly, the state's recycling net dissolved. In 15 years the number of BRRC collection points in central Beijing fell from over 2,000 to just six in 1998 (Wang 2001). But for most of these years the BRRC was unconcerned; they were too busy joining in the speculative fever, shifting their funds into real estate speculation and taxi companies (Feng and Tang 1999). Their strategy was clear: recycling industrial metals was the only really high profit, minimum labor sector under their auspices. "Daily life wastes" were not worth the bother, and the thousands of neighborhood collection points were not worth the trouble and cost to maintain.

As quickly as the BRRC network disappeared, migrants began replacing it with a new, far more dynamic, labor-intensive network that serviced these businesses. Collectors who saved up enough capital then quickly worked out ad hoc deals to open small collection points of their own. But the new collection network that the migrants established faced a locational paradox in the emerging system of land rents. Being productive does not necessarily pay the rent. Many of the more centrally located collection points were quickly driven out by rising rental charges. But even those collection points/ transfer markets that could have met the actual rental costs faced other barriers derived from the logic of the land markets. Few businesses or residential compounds in high-rent areas wanted the negative spillover impacts from what was in essence a specialized trash heap. Moreover, because migrants were legally barred in a wide variety of ways from doing business in Beijing, transfer markets were inevitably of dubious legality and thus the migrants were easily threatened and evicted. So even recycling depots that could meet the rent were far from welcome in such neighborhoods. As a result, centrally located collection points were quickly shut down, and today are still being driven further and further beyond central Beijing's ever-expanding periphery. If rising urban rents do not push recycling out, local governments will. In the late 1980s, from 30%-40% of the new recycling depots were located in central Beijing; now the nearest ones are

located well outside the 4th ring road, and even these areas are pressuring these markets to move.

Composition of Solid Waste

In terms of weight, several studies show that Beijing's refuse has grown at nearly the same rate as the GDP over the last decade, rising at around 8-10% a year. But such numbers are deceptively low, because the composition of that refuse has radically changed. In 1990 over 50% of Beijing's garbage consisted of a single, and quite dense, material: coal ash. Even trash was rare, since it was only after 1958 when the city began putting trash cans in public places like Tiananmen. Until the 1980s, garbage collectors and street sweepers typically called their work "moving dirt" (yun tu) and "dumping dirt" (cao tu) (Wang 1999).

Today, coal heating and cooking inside Beijing's 3rd Ring Road is prohibited and coal ash now comprises less than 5% of the city's refuse. Accordingly, the proportion of waste paper has quadrupled, plastic has nearly tripled, and "hot" organic waste from food has risen from 25% to over 52%. These substances are far less dense than ash, hence garbage in Beijing is about one half as dense as it was in 1990. So, in terms of sheer weight, Beijing is producing about twice as much garbage in the year 2000 as it was in 1990; but in terms of landfill space the quantity of garbage has quadrupled (Wang 2001). And these figures are for garbage after the trash-pickers and recyclers have lessened the tonnage by around 40%.

In urban Beijing, residents generate 60% of the total 5 million tons of refuse, and of this, 79% is non-recyclable while 21% is recyclable (see Figure 2). There are nine main components to MSW: paper, plastic, glass, metal, fabric, food residues, vert (yard clippings), dirt, and tile (Figure 2). Recyclable materials include paper, plastic, glass, metal, and fabric. Non-recyclable materials include food wastes, yard clippings, dirt, and tile. See Appendix II for further explanation about each category in Figure 2.[1]

III. Management: Economic Institutions, People and Practices

The Recycling Chain

Though some commercial packaging wastes are mixed in with residential wastes during collection and transfer, the bulk of wastes reaching the markets have sources in the residential sector. The collection and transfer of recyclables across space and ownership, or the "recycling chain", is comprised of garbage pickers, bicycle/cart peddlers, recycling stands, government units, and markets for recyclables. Figure 3 shows the movement of waste from generation to disposal. The roles of key players are noted below.

Figure 2. Materials generated in residential MSW, 1994 - 1997



Garbage Pickers. Reduce the city's annual garbage burden by 1-2 million tons, one third of the total municipal solid waste generated in 1999 (Wang 2001). Of all the city trash that is recyclable, 20% to 40% is collected by garbage pickers. Working on foot, these members of the floating population scour the city's dumpsters, garbage cans, and streets for recyclables. The pickers work individually; when their sacks are filled, they sell to the owners of three wheeled pedal carts, only after considerable bargaining. Although these individuals play a critical role in the reduction of wastes and collection of recyclables, the government intends to replace all garbage pickers, primarily because of their high visibility and dirty appearance.

Three-Wheeled Pedal Carts. The owners of pedal carts seldom collect their own recyclables; they purchase materials from garbage pickers, shop owners, and/or residents. The pedal cart men directly compete with recycling stands for residents' recyclables by "setting up shop" on the corner of a residential block adjacent to regulated stands and offering residents cash instead of the credit offered by other organizations. The carts then move the recyclables from the city center to markets on the outskirts of the city, often beyond the Fifth Ring Road. The pedal carts, along with the garbage pickers, will also be phased out soon by the government.

Figure 3. Movement of MSW from Generation to Final Disposal



Recycling Stands. There are two types of licensed for-profit recycling stands in Beijing today: intermittent stands run by entrepreneurs and regulated permanent stands. The former target upper middle class gated communities. Today there are eleven stands within the Haidian and Chaoyang districts. The stands are erected once a week on the sidewalks of residential areas to collect recyclables directly from the residents. Items are either counted or weighed for their value and then that value is recorded as credit, which can be used towards various "green" products which the stand offers: 100% recycled paper for writing, various household soaps, toilet paper, collar cleaner, etc. Trucks take the materials to either a recycling market or directly to a recycling plant. Stand owners often trade the recyclables for the finished products of the recycling plants; these are the finished "green" products that are traded to residents for their accrued credits.

The second type of recycling stand is the regulated stand, which also operate on the sidewalks of residential neighborhoods, and operate under contract by the municipal government. These stands are housed in small permanent structures; all of their workers are in uniforms, their transport vehicles bear the company logo, prices are fixed, and land is allocated on which to store recyclables. These stands sell directly to the recycling plants.

Government Units. A small piece of the recycling chain is the recycling performed by official government units, such as Danweis. Danweis associated with universities or work units recycle as they pick up trash.

Recycling Markets. As with the recycling stands, there are two different types of markets in Beijing, are informal and regulated. There are about 36 informal

markets in Beijing, with 40-60 stalls each; there are six state-managed markets in each district inside the city.

The unregulated markets lie beyond the Fourth Ring Road. They are constructed of makeshift materials that were found in the waste stream; every stall has a specialized function. The tenants accumulate recyclables from pedal carts until there is enough to fill a two-ton truck, or until the price is right to sell. In many stalls, such as those who collect metal and other heavy materials, owners are able to hold their recyclables and wait for a trigger price. When ready, the stalls sell to trucks owned by either the government or private contractors, which will transfer the recyclables to either a recycling plant.

While regulated markets function much in the same way, they are managerially stratified and more orderly. At a 34 stall market managed by the Haidian district government there is one head boss, 14 market managers, 34 stall mangers, and over 100 stall workers who sort and stack. The market collects paper, cardboard, iron, steel, aluminum, copper, cloth, wood, styrofoam, and various assortments of plastic.

Recyclables Processing

There are hundreds of plants and companies involved in recycling. Long-standing companies such as Shougang Iron and Steel Works pay 2-4 RMB/lb for scrap steel that comprises 50% of their final product. Core recyclables--paper, plastic, glass, and metal--are sent to recycling companies in outlying geographic areas. Plastics are sent two hours south of central Beijing to Wenan where 663 factories will create new products. Metals go to Baoshan, also a two-hour trip. Paper from all types of stands and markets is sent to Baoding and glass is sent to Handan, Hebei. A plant in Jindo even pays 5,500 RMB/ton for shoe soles.

Solid Waste Disposal

Disposal of the post-recycling solid waste begins at the transfer station where wastes are compacted into 25-ton trucks and carried off to landfills. Of the total refuse that travels through the transfer station, an estimated 20% is still recyclable; however, the sealed environment of the facilities and the trucks do not lend themselves to further picking of the refuse. There are four major transfer stations in Beijing, each feeds into several of the 14 landfills or composting facilities (see Appendix III for map). Landfills vary in capacity from 2,000 tons/day at the Asung site down to the 1,000-ton site at Nangong that specializes in organic wastes. Typically Beijing landfills do not use current best practices in either design technology or management; they do, however, employ plastic or rubber seals to prevent seepage into the earth and use clean soil to cover sections that are completed.

In northern Chaoyang district an experimental incinerator is being built with

American funding. The incinerator will be able to process 1,344 tons of waste per day and contribute towards the generation of 136 million kwh of electricity annually. Though Beijing officials are enthusiastic about incineration, its future may not be so promising, since Beijing's solid waste is high in food and inorganic wastes and has a low heat value. Estimates of the heat value of Chinese municipal solid wastes range from 800-1000 kcal/kg, whereas, wastes of western cities have a heat value of 6278 kcal/kg (Henderson and Chang 1997). As for composting, there are few composting facilities in Beijing because the value of compost is less than the cost of the process. Landfilling is still by far the preferred method.

IV. Economic Considerations

Public Finance of Waste Disposal

Beijing estimates that the cost of waste disposal is 150 RMB/ton. A three RMB/household/month charge now covers approximately one-third of the total cost of the disposal process; this charge began in 1999. The municipal government aims to eventually employ user fees to cover the total disposal process cost; it intends to soon take the next step toward such coverage by charging companies that are producing packing and containers with approximately 50% of the total cost of waste disposal. The municipal government will continue to generate funds for disposal costs by charging rent on lands that are allocated for recyclables storage.

Market Prices

While there is an obvious difference in value added among different types of recyclables, approximately the same 10% markup is applied each time recyclables change hands, up until recycling markets are reached. Across the entire chain of recycling, the total markup is typically 40%. Whether materials are transferred by those of the floating population, or transferred by those sanctioned by the municipalities, this full-chain markup level remains the same.

The Players

In the 1980s and early 1990s most Beijing recyclers were technically illegal migrants due to their rural status in the household registration system. Their marginal status made it literally impossible for them to ply their trade in a wholly legal manner. In the last few years it has become considerably easier to purchase temporary residency, but a series of new permits are now required. The average single migrant now needs four types of identification to legally work in Beijing: a national identity card (no fee); a temporary residence permit (issued by the PBS at about 200 yuan per year); a work permit (issued by districts through neighborhood committees, also around 200 yuan yearly); and a health card issued by an assigned hospital. For those who begin moving upward on the ladder of success, barriers to doing business multiply. Migrants may not purchase or register cars or trucks; they cannot directly rent or build on city land; they must register

their cell phones through a much more expensive service network; if they wish to send their children to public schools they are charged exorbitant fees. Recyclers must also purchase special permits if they wish to buy or sell scrap metal, the most profitable sector of their trade; most are forced to flout the regulation and hope they are not caught.

Inhabiting this quasi-legal terrain, the recycling trade has been plagued by outside and internal corruption. Gangs are a powerful presence. In one cluster of transfer markets in Haidian district, where over 60 separate collection sites are located, gangs charge a 50-yuan fee on every truck that is loaded. Merchants who neglect to pay the fee are harassed or beaten up, and the local PBS can be relied on to not interfere. The gangs prey on the weak and avoid the strong. Wealthy bosses, who due to their money and connections are more powerful than the gangs, can ignore their demands. But most collectors complain more about PBS harassment, complicity, and extortion than about the gangs. Many tell stories of police ripping up their residence or work permits, demanding bribes, detaining, or even beating them. Such institutionalized mistreatment is no doubt exacerbated by the derogatory and discriminatory attitudes that many urbanites hold towards rural migrant laborers.

Until recently the goal behind state imposed barriers on recyclers' mobility and business activities was primarily to curtail and police what as perceived as an uncontrollable inflow of migrants. Since 1998, however, the municipal administration, with the BRRC taking the lead, seems to have a new goal: to get a share of the profits from the recycling industry. In a sense, this is a prerogative which local government has over any business and is usually exerted through a system of taxation. The measures being taken by the BRRC are a bit more coercive and disciplinary in nature, with the objective of rescuing the BRRC from bankruptcy by essentially absorbing the migrant recycling and marketing system into their company. In justifying their plans, the BRRC asserts that the migrants' system is unruly, inefficient, and not publicly or environmentally focused.

The stakes here are quite high for the Beijing government and the BRRC. By 1997 the BRRC employed fewer than 2,000 full time workers (with 2,000 early retirees on payroll) down from over 12,000 in 1990; collection points had fallen from over 2,000 to just 6; tonnage processed fell from over 60,000 to less than 14,000 while types of materials handled fell from 21 to only 5 (Hou 1999). At the same time, the city of Beijing *spent* 750 million yuan in 1998 on waste management, while it is estimated that the migrant recycling network *made* about 1.1 billion that same year (Wang 2001). The BRRC was a shambles, but the recycling economy was thriving.

In the late 1990s the national government seemed to sense a new urgency in environmental issues. Sustainable development became a key term in state

pronouncements, and funds dedicated to environmental protection began rising, reaching 1.5% of GNP this year. In this fresh wind of environmental concern, the BRRC sensed an opportunity to revive itself, with various district branches making proposals for rebuilding the municipal government's recycling network.

Conclusions

The Future of Solid Waste

China's gross domestic product (GDP) continues to grow at an annual rate of 10% per annum, and the country's solid waste burden continues to increase exponentially (Dong et al. 2000). As most countries have developed their GDP increases were accompanied by the use of more advanced technologies to solve MSW problems. Accordingly, the ratio of solid waste/GDP declined with the growing economies. In China's case, the technology is either unavailable or not employed.

With an increasing urbanization rate, and increasing rates of consumption, China will no doubt continue to experience increases in solid waste tonnage. Because 60% of China's municipal solid waste comes from 52 major cities strict management efforts and funding for MSW disposal must be implemented soon, particularly in coastal areas (Fung 1999).

The question of how much more waste Beijing can recycle is a matter of sorting precision, the public's environmental awareness, privatization, funding, and facilities. For the past thirteen years 100,000 floating population garbage pickers have been the core of waste management, collecting 20% to 40% of the city's total recyclables. These individuals depend on the sales of recyclables for their livelihoods, and will spend thirteen hours per day, meticulously sifting through rubbish to find recoverable materials. It is the precision of these garbage pickers that most likely led to the higher rates of recycling today. One wonders what will happen to the recoverability of recyclables when these people and their techniques are managerially phased out. When garbage pickers come to be replaced by waste collection depots, a transition in the making, all of the sorting responsibility will go to the households. This task will most likely prove to be less successful due the tedious nature of sorting. In addition, only the individuals with an environmental consciousness will make sure to carefully sort their refuse. A visit to a rural village stresses the importance of environmental education and its relationship to the aforementioned statement; wastes and recyclables are often piled onto any unused portion of land. The environmental awareness of Beijing residents has definitely grown in the past five years though: there are more environmental student groups than ever before, non-profit organizations are publicizing their campaign to clean up the city, the upcoming Olympics are serving as a major incentive for cleaning and greening the city, and more households are sorting their wastes than before.

A huge step in regulating the solid waste management network was the movement towards privatization that took place in April of 2001. The push toward privatization began when the municipal government became aware of worker inefficiencies at a number of transfer stations. Though transfer stations were designed to only employ 60 individuals, as many as 480 individuals were on the payroll, because those hired were not working. Aware of this problem, the government began reforms in July 2000 and eliminated the Beijing Waste Administration, replacing it with a private company built by the workers. Solid waste removal and processing activities have since been assigned by the district to ten private companies at a specific contract price. Within the next three years contracts will be open to bid, and all companies will compete against each other. In addition to solid waste management, the companies will also assume responsibility by the district for street cleaning, snow removal, and maintenance of Beijing's 5,700 public toilets. The city is also developing ten large recycling markets in the area between the Fourth and Fifth ring roads. Each market will have about 322,920 square feet, subdivided into 60 recycling stalls (China Daily 2001). These markets, which are expected to be running by 2003, will be responsible for sorting and processing reusable waste. According to the Beijing Municipal Commerce Committee:

> A unified citywide reusable waste collection network, being built by the Beijing's municipal government, will soon replace the wandering team of waste collectors that is currently so much a part of life for Beijing residents. [. . .] The local government plans to establish 1,100 collection depots in the eight districts, servicing approximately 60 percent of the communities, by the end of 2002. These collection depots will be distinguishable by uniform logos, prices and measurement instruments. (China Daily 2001)

The availability of recycling and waste disposal facilities, in addition to more advanced technologies, serves to be an essential component in the waste management system. While Beijing will undergo a managerial face-lift in the next three years via private recycling companies, collection depots, and ten new recycling markets, the city still faces a shortage of facilities that can cope with the disposal or processing of wastes. Additionally, landfills, some of which are unlined and uncovered, remain the prevalent method for disposing of wastes. A few specialized recycling plants have recently opened in China, and a few more are in the making. For example, a factory now recycles three types of polystyrene food trays into rulers for students, recycling 200 tons per month (China Daily 2001). In June 2001, the first recycling processing plant for used batteries will open in Hebei, China, a near province to Beijing. The plant will have a capacity of 3,000 tons/year of used dry cells. The only concern is that there may not

be enough materials to support smooth operation, due to the lack of collection efforts. Waste disposal sites remain a problem for Beijing. Currently, incineration is not economically viable due to low calorific values of solid waste, and very few composting facilities exist. Landfills are not all sanitary, and they compete with land that should be used for agriculture, and could be used for urbanization. Still, it seems as though the city's plan is to continue the use of current landfills while expanding the number of new landfills.

Given that Beijing could implement more efficient collection technologies in the following years, the 20% of recyclables that are reported at transfer stations may be recoverable. This would ease the waste burden by approximately 1 million tons/year, and the end result would be one hundred percent recovery of recyclables. While perfect recovery may not be realistic, it is not unlikely that Beijing will be able to recover ninety-percent or more of its total recyclables. In the next ten years, Chinese innovations and foreign aid may help propel the management of solid wastes into a sustainable system.

Appendix I

Survey of Literature on Current Practices of Solid Waste Management

Several recent Chinese studies on Beijing, and on China in general, have proved to be critical in synthesizing the figures and results of the present study. In an article by Ru et al., *Control Countermeasures of Municipal Refuse in Beijing*, both primary investigation and applied theories/statistics of environmental engineering are used in order to determine the characteristics of MSW generating subjects, generating time, and generating space from 1994 to 1997. They find that municipal residents are important generating subjects, recyclables are increasing in the waste stream, and, though composition varies slightly from district to district, food wastes are always one-half, or more of the total wastes generated.

A study by Henderson and Chang, *Solid Waste Management in China*, compares the waste stream of Qingdao, China to that of Vancouver, Canada, and examines the collection, transportation, and disposal systems of MSW. While food wastes comprise most of Quingdao's MSW, paper dominates the MSW waste stream of Vancouver. The common system characteristics are found in collection, transfer stations, transportation and disposal.

Municipal Solid Waste Management in China: Using Commercial Management to Solve a Growing Problem, by Dong et al., outlines MSW generation trends, present models for MSW management, and analyzes the industry and its lack of high technology. China's MSW production continued to increase (at rates of

10% per annum) as the urban population, urbanization rate, and GDP/capita also increased. Management was found to follow a non-sustainable model and the lack of higher technology hindered the development of the MSW industry.

A 1999 report by Liu et al., Solid Waste Management Technologies, investigates the current situation of industrial solid waste, urban domestic waste, hazardous wastes, recycling, landfill treatment, incineration, and the market access. They conclude, that in spite of the government's attempt to provide locally produced solid waste treatment technologies/equipment, non-local advances are needed to meet the market demand.

For a comprehensive description of the waste management system in Beijing China, refer to the Master's thesis by Shuk-wai Freda Fung, *Handling the Municipal Solid Waste in China: A Case Study of Policies for 'White Pollution' in Beijing*.

Appendix II

Food Wastes

Food residues make up 52% of the total residential wastes, some 2,569,569 tons that must go to landfills because they are unusable. Some residues may be used to feed livestock in the areas surrounding the city, but so far little has been done to ease the burden of this largest category of MSW. As a comparison, in Vancouver, Canada, the percent of food waste by weight is only about 8% and in the United States it is about 7%. Beijing's high percentage may be due to the fact that produce is often not trimmed before entering the city from nearby villages, in attempts by the farmer to add weight and hence profits.

Dirt

As the second largest component of residential refuse, dirt (or dust), accounts for 18% of the total waste. Losing 893, 000 tons of dirt per year into the solid waste stream, Beijing now has the measures needed to quantify the cost of desertification. Much of the dust was likely blown in from other areas, deposited on the streets, and then swept into the rest of the solid waste column. In addition to the lack of vegetation in areas outside the 3rd Ring Road, construction projects all around the city no doubt add to the dust problem.

Paper

The third largest component of residential waste is paper, including cardboard. Some 415,884 tons comprise about 8% of the total refuse. In the districts of Chaoyang, Fengtai, Shijingshan, and Haidian paper is the second largest component. As a comparison, in developed countries paper constitutes the largest component of MSW generated: 33% in Vancouver, Canada and 39% in

the United States. As a country develops, food wastes are replaced by paper as the major component of MSW.

Plastic

Plastics are a growing component of the waste stream, especially with the recent explosion in the sales of bottled water (and with the upcoming Olympics to support this trend even further). Approximately 250,000 tons of plastic fill the waste stream--5% of the total refuse generated by residents. This is 2% less than Vancouver's and 5% less than the United States'. Some districts, of course, have higher or lower percentages. In Shijingshan district plastics comprise only 3.50% of refuse, while Chaoyang district generates the greatest amount at 8.51%.

Yard Clippings

In Beijing, 363,403 tons of yard waste accounts for 7% of the total residential refuse. These yard clippings add to the organic wastes that are destined for landfills. The United States generates twice this amount (percentage by weight) and Vancouver, B.C. generates about 3 times as much vert as Beijing. Though China lacks developable land, greening for the summer Olympics will push the city to increase the sprawl of landscaped areas, and thus, the tonnage of yard clippings.

Glass

Glass comprises 3.67% of the residential refuse in Beijing and is one of the favorites of recycling middlemen, due to its reusability and high value. Of the 181,172 tons of glass generated, much can be reused rather than reprocessed. Vancouver's statistics are quite similar, with a percent by weight of 2.9%. The United States' MSW is comprised of only 2% more glass than Beijing. Though the three locations have similar percentages of glass wastes, the process the glass travels through is quite different. China still reuses/refills glass bottles and a black market emphasizing liquor bottles assures that the glass will travel through the market several times before final disposal. In developed countries the philosophy is one-time-use.

Textiles, Metals, and Tiles

The last three, of the original nine, components to MSW make a very small portion of the waste stream in residential areas. Tonnage and percent composition are as follows: two percent of residential solid waste is composed of fabrics, about 107,437 tons in weight; metals comprise 1.87% of the total refuse and amount to 92,584 tons in weight; tile, the smallest major component of MSW makes up 1.52% of total refuse and amounts to 75,255 tons.

Miscellaneous Materials

Many markets separate MSW into cardboard, ferrous metals, aluminum, copper,

other nonferrous metals, wood, green plastics, mixed plastic, and so on, in addition to the normal collectables. Styrofoam, a form of white pollution, is another important component of solid waste. About 220 million polystyrene food trays are used every year. This product takes 200 years to biodegrade and rarely can be recycled, causing a problem at landfill sites are already becoming full. Items such as batteries, because they do not have a good market, are often overlooked under miscellaneous category, though they have considerable potential for environmental degradation.

Appendix III

Map of Beijing City: Landfill, transfer Station, and Incinerator Localities



Notes

[1] These were calculated from the 1998 MSW figure of 4,951,000 total tons, and are based upon the sources of Ru et al., and Henderson and Chang.

References

China Daily. June 14, 2001. "Unified Citywide Waste Collection."

China Daily. August 12, 2001. "Beijing Centre Recycles Refuse into Rulers."

Dong, Madeline, Yue. 1999. *Remembering the Present: "Old Beijing" and It's Modern Origins*, 1911-1937. University of California Press.

Dong, Suocheng, Tong, Kurt, and Wu, Yuping. 2000. *Municipal Solid Waste Management in China: Using Commercial Management to Solve a Growing Problem*. Available from U.S. Embassy in Beijing.

Feng, Xiaoshuang and Tang, Can. 1999. "Categorizing Peasant migrants in 'Henan Village'" (Henancun liudong renmin de fenhua). Unpublished.

Fung, Shuk-wai Freda. 1999. *Handling the Municipal Solid Waste in China: A Case Study of Policies for "White Pollution" in Beijing*. Master's Thesis, Lund University, 11.

Henderson, Paul and Chang, Terrill. May 1997. "Solid Waste Management in China." *Municipal Solid Waste Solutions*.

Hou, Yushan. November 23, 1999. "Tansuo shoudu Feijiu wuzi huishou hangye fazhan deyouxiao tujing."

Liu, Gary, Harris, Justin, and Adams, Chris. 1999. *Solid Waste Management Technologies*. U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Dept. of State.

Ru, Yihong, Zhang, Keming, and Lu, Xiaochun. 2001. "Control Countermeasures of Municipal Refuse in Beijing." *China Mechanical Engineering*. 12, No. 3.

Strasser, Susan. 1999. *Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash*. New York: Metropolitan Books. 21-67.

Wang, Huiming. 1999. "Jingcheng shenghuo laji de youhuan." *Beijing wan bao.* 1,24: 5.

Wang, Weiping. 1999. *Guanyu Beijing shi shenghuo laji ziyuan huishou liyong he xiangguan chanye wenti de diaoyan baogao #1*.

Wang, Weiping. July 2001. Interview.

Xie, Longyun. July 2001. Interview.

Chinese Women and Feminist Theory: How Not to do Cross-Cultural Studies

Xiufen Lu, Wichita State University

Much of what passes for scholarship in cross-cultural studies is based on bias, ignorance, and unfounded assumptions, and much feminist research has succeeded in uncovering and exposing subjective factors coloring traditional male research. An interesting dilemma is: why are we so poor at realizing when our own research is not conducted with the same careful objectivity we demand in others? Far too often our own biases, prejudices, and unfounded assumptions lead us to accept conclusions which have no objective foundations. This essay is an examination of one instance where Western feminist thinkers have cheerfully embraced an unsound conclusion which nicely fits their own social political agendas and presuppositions. The case in point is the Western feminist understanding and treatment of Chinese women. To a certain extent, the problem can be understood as part of the widely criticized phenomenon of marginalization of "third world" women in Western feminist discourse;[1] yet, the Western representation of cultural "others" in this case has its particular stereotypes and biases.

Recent years have seen numerous books and papers analyzing and criticizing the Western perception of Chinese women;[2] still, many more details of the subject need to be worked out, especially, the factors that gave rise to the image of Chinese women as nothing but victims in pre-modern China. What also seems to have no been emphasized enough is the fact that the problem of distortion and marginalization does not always exist exclusively in Euro-American literature on third world women. People who are writing from the under-privileged state or from the perspective of those within such a state can also bias their understanding by uncritically embracing Western values as universal truth and judging their own tradition as backward and inferior to their Western counterparts. This tendency was clearly revealed in the May Fourth analysis of China's cultural past and women's enslavement in the Confucian family system. Unfortunately, to a large extent, the May Fourth intellectuals' bitter complaint against the Confucian tradition and their unsubstantiated generalization of women's victimization

in pre-modern China are still retained in much of the sinophone literature on Chinese women in contemporary mainland China.3 An awareness of the close relation that the May Fourth tradition bears to the Maoist state ideology and its impact on the academic research conducted within the country can certainly guard scholars outside China against taking the contemporary Chinese materials at face value.

In this essay, I will try to highlight some of the dilemmas embedded in the Chinese May Fourth analysis and Western feminist representation concerning the status of women in pre-twentieth century China. Specifically, I have two main theses: (1) the construction of the image of Chinese women as nothing but victims of Confucian patriarchy in both the Chinese and Western feminist discourse is designed to further other ideological purposes and political agendas respectively; in both cases, the claim that Chinese women had suffered from a more abusive patriarchy is unsubstantiated, and probably, reflects the biases and assumptions of each political tradition more than reality; (2) by way of an example, from a cross-cultural perspective, the interpretation of the custom of footbinding as the sheer victimization of women by male sadism, which is held by both the Chinese reformers and Western feminists, has distorted the meaning and function of that custom in that such a depiction omits the complex details of the traditional Chinese social milieu which gave rise to footbinding.[4]

In the introduction to her book *Teachers of the Inner Chambers*, Dorothy Ko noted, "[T]he invention of an ahistorical 'Chinese tradition' that is feudal, patriarchal, and oppressive was the result of a rare confluence of three divergent ideological and political traditions—the May Fourth-New Culture movement, the Communist revolution, and Western feminist scholarship" (1994, 3). Indeed, despite their distinctively divergent ideologies and political agendas, these three schools unanimously agree that women in pre-modern China were uniformly oppressed by an extremely harsh patriarchy that had dominated Chinese society for more than two thousand years. However, the commonality shared by these three political schools is not merely a coincidence. The formation of the discursive image of women, as uniformly oppressed and victimized in feudal China, which unites these three political schools, has its roots in the history of Western economic expansion in China at the turn of the twentieth century.

In order to understand the factors that influenced the Chinese intellectuals' assessment of women's status during the May Fourth period, one needs to consider the issue in the historical context of Western economic expansionism in China and China's painful transition (beginning in the mid-nineteenth century) from its agricultural economy and traditional life to modernity. A brief discussion of some of the crises that China experienced during the early decades of the twentieth century may shed some light on the subject.

The May Fourth legacy as a distinctive ideological and political tradition received its name from a student demonstration on May 4, 1919. College students in Beijing protested the decision taken by the Allied Powers at the Versailles Peace Conference that year which supported the Japanese occupation of China's Shandong province, previously occupied by Germany. The patriotic demonstration later trigged a nationwide political and cultural movement that involved the critical reevaluation of China's entire cultural heritage.[5]

China during this time had experienced a series of national crises. These crises were manifested in widespread corruption, deterioration of government administration, warlord wars at the provincial level, and the economic poverty that caused nationwide starvation. The domestic crises were intensified by Western economic intervention. Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, after Chinese resistance to foreign trade was repeatedly defeated by the superior military might of Western countries, China was coerced into signing a series of treaties that granted extraterritoriality as an indemnity to Western and Japanese powers. By the early twentieth century, a large portion of the nation's economy was controlled by foreign powers.

Reflection on these crises prompted the May Fourth generation of intellectuals, especially those who had studied in the West or in Japan, to become painfully conscious of China's low international standing and extreme economic poverty in contrast to the dynamism they had found in the West and in Japan. Much literature produced during this time revealed that generation's frustration with China's inability to defend itself, deep concerns with the national salvation, and enthusiasm for Western ideals of liberalism, democracy, and human rights. First published in 1915, *New Youth*, a journal edited by Chen Duxiu, who later became one of the founders of the Communist Party of China (CPC), certainly represents one of the most radical views of the time in advocating a whole sale of rejection of Confucianism. With little scholarly justification, the editors of and contributors to *New Youth* came to believe that Confucian thought and the traditional social organization, which resembled the patriarchal family structure, were the major causes of China's inability to defend itself against foreign invasion. The May Fourth leading figures further argued that in order to save the nation from the colonization of international capitalism and Japanese military invasion, the Chinese people must completely transform Confucian culture.[6] As *New Youth* became widely embraced by the students and even working class population, the iconoclasm became closely attached to the cause of national salvation during the following decade.

Women's issues became the focus of cultural discussions during this time because of their close association with the larger political and ideological concerns of the May Fourth intellectuals in reforming China. Influenced by a Western

ideal of liberalism, the May Fourth radicals had seen the subjugation of women in feudal China as evidence of the most conspicuous aspect of the inhumanity of Confucian traditions. The custom of footbinding, together with others that promoted concubinage, female chastity, and arranged marriage were often cited by the May Fourth intellectuals as evidence of how much harm the Confucian tradition had done to women. The correlation between nationalism and patriotism, and the avocation of women's liberation, according to May Fourth activists, was that since women had been at the bottom of the social hierarchy regulated by Confucian ideals and had suffered the cruelest forms of oppression in the Confucian tradition, the social transformation leading to national regeneration should start with the liberation of women.

Given the historical context, the May Fourth radicals' iconoclasm and their analysis of women's status are understandable reactions to the national crisis; however, one cannot fail to notice that the manner in which the Chinese intellectuals came to regard their cultural traditions in light of their exposure to Western thought. It revealed an unequal treatment of the Chinese and Western ideologies. Christopher Lupke explains this inequality in terms of a perceived difference in the worth of distinct values and traditions (Chow 2000, 130). Modern Chinese intellectuals who have looked to the West as a source of models for reforming China often characterized traditional Chinese values "as 'backward,' 'superstitious,' and even 'cannibalistic'" (130). The discriminative attitude toward the Chinese and modern Western cultures is obvious in the following statement given by Luo Jia Lun, a student leader at The Beijing University during the May Fourth period:

> Chinese culture and society are truly depressing these days. Not only are they depressing at the present, but they may be said to have been this way for two thousand years.… Autocratic thought is rooted in Confucianism, propagated by those who don't dare deviate from the sayings of the Master. (quoted in Schwarcz 1986, 123)

In contrast to the devaluation of the Chinese traditions, the May Fourth generation often assigned a privileged status to Western literature and thinkers. The enthusiasm in receiving Western ideas was best seen in the popularity of *A Doll's House*, the work of the Norwegian play writer, Henrik Ibsen. May Fourth generations embraced the story with great passion and took Nora, the heroine, as the model of individualistic rebellion against family system. Being trapped in the expectation to enter arranged marriages which are not their own choice, many young women in that generation followed Nora's footsteps by breaking up with their families.[7] However, it did not take long for them to realize the limitation of Nora's choice. The crucial question, of course, was what would happen to these young women after they left home? Even Lu Xun, one of the most radical iconoclastic writers during the time, had to write on the theme "What Happens

after Nora Leaves Home" (Lu 1998, 1:150). In this essay, Lu warned young girls, who might have attempted to follow Nora's footsteps, not to forget that success after leaving home can be achieved only among the exceptional. As for those who are not mentally and physically equipped for their own survival in a society where there was no legal protection for women's economic rights and equality; their search for freedom could soon end in despair (150).

The dilemma that confronts Nora's Chinese audience, to a certain extent, reflects the perplexity that had troubled the radical May Fourth reformers at a deeper level. Some of them became increasingly impatient about the gradual changes that such a cultural campaign had brought to Chinese society. During this time the Marxist - Leninist idea of proletarian revolution seemed to have provided a new inspiration, especially after the news of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia had spread to China. Some of the liberal intellectuals came to believe that only through a social revolution involving the masses could the country gain its rebirth. Their commitment to violent revolution as a means of transforming Chinese society soon gave birth to the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Therefore, the connection between the May Fourth Movement and the CPC, which was founded in 1921, is ideological, political, and even personal.[8] In terms of ideology and politics, the CPC continued the iconoclastic and nationalistic tradition developed by the radical intellectuals during the May Fourth period and combined this legacy with the Marxist and Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution. Naturally, the Chinese communists carried on the May Fourth analysis of women's oppression, only adding to it a Marxist dimension. Women's victimization by the Confucian patriarchy was thereafter analyzed by the communists in terms of class domination. The image of victimized women, together with the promise of liberation of women by the communist revolution, was used as a powerful force in mobilizing women to participate in the communist camp during the anti-Japanese war and the civil war.

After the CPC founded the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the May Fourth views on the victimization of women were reinforced and established as the standard reading of Chinese women's history. Such a reading was often used to underscore the contrast between women's low status in feudal society and their achievement in socialist China, where gender equality and women's legal rights are supposedly secured. The contrast was stressed in order to suggest clearly the idea of a glorified communist revolution involving the successful liberation of women from the subjugation of the feudal gender hierarchy. Thus, the generations of Chinese who grew up in mainland China under Mao's regime hardly had access to any competing account of women's history. Only with the demise of Maoist radicalism in 1976 did scholars in China begin to question the success of the socialist revolution in elevating women to an equal economic and political

standing with men. However, even today, the Chinese academic discussion of women's history in feudal China shows no sign of deviation from the theory held by the official Chinese communist government's view.

The readiness of Western feminists to accept such a portrayal of Chinese women is inseparable from their "ethnocentric feminist discourse" that accords Western women a higher social and political status than third world women (Mohanty 1991, 56). As Jinhau Emma Teng has observed, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, influenced by the methodology and political concern prevalent at the time, numerous Western feminist writings on Chinese women tended to focus on the notion of gender subordination (1996, 133). It is commonly asserted by these writers that Chinese women have suffered more than women in the Western world and that Confucianism is the source of women's subordination. Thus, Kay Ann Johnson once stated in an oft-cited remark, "Few societies in history have prescribed for women a more lowly status or treated them in a more routinely brutal way than traditional Confucian China" (1983,1). Such a belief that women in China suffered far more than women in Western societies was also shared by Judith Stacey, who wrote: "All agrarian civilizations rest on patriarchal familial foundations. Few patriarchal systems approach the degree of explication, elaboration, or hegemony Confucianism achieved in imperial China" (1983, 134). Johnson and Stacey's claims about Chinese women's suffering as the result of the dominance of the Confucian system, which very much echo the Chinese May Fourth iconoclastic rhetoric, are, however, not just a reiteration of the Chinese views. They are also conclusions derived from their own rather problematic research.

Two methodological problems can be found in their discussion of Chinese women. First, they have characterized Chinese women as a category that is uniformly victimized in the Confucian patriarchal family. Such a characterization is too superficial and oversimplified to illuminate the complexities in the real status of Chinese women of different ages, different regions, and different social standing. Second, both of their statements are based on the same assumption in which the Confucian tradition was considered to be a static and monolithic system that had dominated Chinese women for more than two thousand years. It is highly implausible to suppose that any belief system can exert such a power in dominating women for such a long time without any fundamental changes, much less Confucianism, since evidence has shown that development of Confucianism and sustaining of the system have involved constant construction and reconstruction by both men and women. Conducted from a Western perspective, Johnson and Stacey's research, which tends to treat Confucianism as a "natural order" which sanctioned a gender hierarchy, has failed to realize "the dynamic and multitudinous nature of the Confucian tradition" (Ko 1994, 19).

In short, the interpretations of Chinese women's oppression and victimization offered by all three of the above mentioned political schools were designed to further other ideological purposes. Some recent post-colonial writers have indeed challenged the assumptions of homogeneity of women across cultures used in some of the Western feminist analyses of the non-Western women, and some have even challenged the idea that has formed the basis for Western feminist constructions of the image of "third world" women, including the image of Chinese women.[9] In what follows in this paper, I will focus on the examination of the accusation of Confucianism as the direct cause of women's victimization advanced both by the Chinese reformers and Western feminists and try to reveal how much this misinterpretation has distorted the nature and function of the Chinese tradition and the history of Chinese women, especially the truth concerning the custom of footbinding. The lesson can obviously be extended to other areas of cross cultural studies.

One of the problems embedded in the Chinese May Fourth criticism of the Confucian tradition, which was repeated by some of the Western feminist scholars in the 1970s and 80s, is that the Confucian tradition was treated as an immutable monolithic system directly responsible for both the crisis that China went through in the early twentieth century and the low status of women in that society. As is apparent in the works of Lu Xun, the foremost writer of the May Fourth Era, the notion of the Confucian tradition was very vague and encompassed everything from the sayings of Confucius and his disciples to the prevailing customs in twentieth century China. In his impassioned short story, "Diary of a Madman," Lu proposed that the essence of the Confucian tradition amounts to a license for cannibalism, a metaphor invoked to reflect the cruelty of a highly exploitative and oppressive social system that had dominated China during its feudal times (Lu 1998 1: 422-433). In the story, Lu depicted a madman, who alone has the ability to read between the lines of the Confucian classics and who discovers an awful truth on every page where the words "virtue and benevolence" occur; between these words is the hidden message: "Eat people!" (425) The political implication of the story was that Confucian morality, which represented nothing but lying and hypocrisy, had been used by the dominant class to cover up their cruelty toward the poor and the powerless.

Lu's story profoundly influenced twentieth century Chinese culture. Large numbers of intellectuals, especially the young iconoclasts who were students during the May Fourth era, enthusiastically embraced Lu's work for its vigorous attack on the Confucian tradition. During the successive decades, iconoclasm and its relevance to the salvation of the nation were the dominant themes of both political and literary discourse. During Mao's regime (1949-1976), when the governmental branch of propaganda mandated for decades that "Diary of the Madman" and Lu's numerous other iconoclastic essays be used in high

school textbooks and literary studies, while rejecting all other competing views, his sweeping criticism of China's past was established as the standard reading of Chinese history. What the "madman" said about the Confucian tradition gradually was taken to be the impeachable truth and the word "Chi Ren de" (cannibalistic) became the most frequently used term when characterizing the nature of Chinese feudal society.

As powerful as it is in influencing the culture of twentieth century China and, to a certain extent, Western feminist theories, Lu's story contained a clear implication that cannot withstand any serious academic analysis. The problem is not that what Lu suggested, through the mouth of the "madman," about the cruelty manifested in human relations in feudal Chinese society was not true. On the contrary, the extreme popularity of the story may, at least partially, have been due to the fact that many people were able to identify with how the "madman" felt about the social reality at that time. The problem was instead with the fundamental claim, which was central to the critiques of Lu Xun and many other May Fourth authors, about the Confucian ideology being the source of all the evils that existed in feudal Chinese society. The indictments leveled against the Confucian tradition could have been legitimately maintained only if its critics had offered an adequate account of how the tradition had been preserved through different social contexts and had been the basis for the perpetuation of a highly exploitative and oppressive social system. However, as is evident in the works of Lu Xun and many other leading May Fourth critics, there was a failure to provide any meaningful account of the implications of Confucian values on, and their relationship to, contemporary issues. Instead, these critics born of frustration reflective of historical crises often blamed Confucianism for many problems that beset early twentieth century China that had no connection with the tradition.

The May Fourth analysis of women's status in feudal China bears a similar shortcoming in that it blames the Confucian tradition for women's oppression and victimization throughout history. That analysis presupposed the continued presence of an extremely cruel Chinese patriarchy regulated by monolithic and static Confucian principles. In failing to realize that the Confucian doctrine, like other classical doctrines, has the capacity to evolve through history through perennial reinterpretation, some advocates of women's liberation during the May Fourth period advanced criticism that rested on inaccurate ahistorical sources.

This mistake can best be seen in the May Fourth critiques of the principles of *Sangang* (the three bonds) which prescribed the duties of the prince, the father, and the husband in guiding their inferiors. Many of those who advanced the cause of women's liberation during the May Fourth period saw the wife's subordination to her husband, as prescribed by the three bonds, as the primary source of the evil that Confucianism had inflicted upon women.[10] However, a more careful study

of the subject shows the historical formation of the principles of the three bonds to be much more complex than what the May Fourth critics considered it to be.

In *Asian Values and Human Rights*, WM. Theodore De Bary argued that part of the so-called "Confucian" doctrine, the principle of "the three bonds," simply has no firm basis in the Confucian corpus,[11] and was a concept later adopted by the tradition (De Bary 1998, 124). De Bary also pointed out that the original articulation of the "the three bonds" can be traced to *Baihutong* (The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall), a first-century text that represents a record of seminars on Confucian classics held by the imperial court (125). De Bary explains that the discussions on the Classics and on Confucian themes held at the imperial court are "typical of the process by which the Confucian doctrine became codified through state patronage" (125). The purpose of this kind of discussion was to delineate the limits and boundaries of public morality based on a certain regime's interpretation of classical scholarship. It is unclear what specific aphorism of Confucius the notion of "the three bonds" was based on; it does not, in principle, contradict the idea of the hierarchical relationships prescribed between the rulers and the subjects and between the sons the fathers. However, in the Confucian classics, which usually emphasize the complementary nature of the relationship between men and women, one cannot find anything comparable or similar to the notion of the wife's total obedience to her husband as it is stated in "the three bonds."

It is also true that, in the long history of Chinese feudal society, the Confucian emphasis on family and social hierarchical order was often abused by the rulers of the family and society and used by them to cover their domination over those under them. In order to legitimize their domination, these rulers often took Confucian doctrine out of context and emphasized the obedience and subservience of the underprivileged parties. It seems that many customs and examples of women's victimization (concubinage, widows' chastity, for example) criticized by the early Chinese reformers belong to the cases of abuse of this nature in which the sacrifice and obedience was forced in the name of Confucianism. What is missing in the May Fourth analysis of these cases was the recognition that the principles of the three bonds is a later dynasty's interpretation of the Confucian text whose consistency with the tenet of Confucianism concerning human relations is subject to argument. A genuine understanding of the doctrine will reveal that the Confucian ideal concerning human relations does not necessarily imply or justify women's domination by Chinese patriarchy; rather, the abuse of women in Chinese society was caused by distortions of the doctrine.

Largely shaped by the concerns and agendas of the iconoclastic movement, the May Fourth radical critics saw the custom of footbinding as an indication of cultural backwardness and an extreme symptom of patriarchal oppression. As portrayed in

Chen Dong Yuan's work, *A History of the lives of Chinese Women*, footbinding is a mutilation of women's body to meet the standard of beauty perceived through the Chinese male's eyes, and a symbol of women's subordination to the sexual tastes of men (Chen 1928, 223-5).

In contemporary Chinese literature in mainland China, the analysis of the custom of footbinding still cannot break away from the iconoclastic framework. Thus, the May Fourth rhetoric was repeated by many contemporary writers on women's studies in post-Mao China. Du Fangqin, one of the most influential writers on women's history, claimed that the practice of footbinding, in essence, was men's conspiracy to keep women home as slaves physically and mentally, and to turn them into sheer objects of men's lust and perversity (Du 1989, 378). Similar to the May Fourth iconoclastic discourse, Du's discussion of the custom of footbinding is designed to enumerate the evils of Confucian patriarchy.

The subject of footbinding held a particular fascination for Western feminist writers. Being largely informed by the Chinese May Fourth iconoclastic analysis of the subject, Western feminists often used the Chinese practice of footbinding as an indication of the pernicious character of the Confucian patriarchy. This point was expressed by Stacey in the following words: "Footbinding is the most infamous of the uniquely Confucian variety of brutal patriarchal practices. … One result was a woman's inability to take any but the tiny, minced steps that produced the lilting gait so admired by Confucian men" (1983, 40-41). Stacey is not alone in claiming that footbinding is a torture for women which originated from males' fantasy. Other Western feminists also made explicit assertions of footbinding as the result of male sadism. In Johnson's writing, for example, footbinding simply "stood as an expression of one of history's most powerful sadomasochistic male fantasies" (1983, 1). A similar view was also expressed by Mary Daly, who portrayed footbinding in terms of men's decision to torture and mutilate women to satisfy their erotic desires (Daly 1978, 134-152).

What often surfaced in the writings of the Chinese nationalists and Western feminists were two main claims: (1) the spread of footbinding is a symbol of male dominance generated from the Confucian gender hierarchy, and (2) the custom of footbinding is a product of male sadism; that is, men were the agents behind the mutilation, demanding it and enforcing it. A more careful study of the subject reveals that in the case of these claims there are serious discrepancies between theory and the fact. The problem with the first claim is that the blame placed on Confucian thought, which often implied that the doctrine was deliberately designed to oppress women in the most brutal of ways, has failed to give any meaningful illumination of the connection between the Confucian doctrine and the emergence of the custom of footbinding. After all, in what sense could the Confucian doctrine, contained in the classical texts complied hundreds of years

before the common era, be responsible for the custom of footbinding, which did not become wide-spread until the twelfth century? The problem with the second claim is that it conflicts historical facts. If the custom of footbinding was merely the result of men's power to use women's body as the object for their erotic desires, then how does one explain the fact that footbinding was always an exclusively female heritage passed down from mothers to daughters? And many male Chinese scholars throughout history seriously questioned the rationality of the custom and many of those men protested against the custom long before the beginning of twentieth century Chinese social reform.[12]

To reject the conventional association of the custom of footbinding with Confucian thought is not to deny any connection between Confucianism and the emergence and persistence of the custom. Indeed, the Confucian biases, as they are expressed in the classical texts, certainly exerted an important influence and helped form and reinforce the gender hierarchy and unequal treatment of women in many areas of traditional Chinese history. Some of the Confucian biases may actually have been responsible in part for the spread of or the rationalization for the practice of footbinding. However, in order to explain the relevance of the Confucian doctrine to the custom of footbinding one has to explain how the doctrine, as the product of constant adaptation and reinterpretation by scholars to realign it with changing social realties, was actually involved (if only indirectly) in encouraging and rationalizing the practice of footbinding.

My disagreement with the May Fourth and some of the Western feminist accounts of footbinding is not that it is untrue that Chinese women had suffered from footbinding. For any one who has basic human compassion, it is always a heartbreaking experience to review the history of footbinding and the pain that this custom inflicted on Chinese women. However, the sympathy and empathy for the victims of footbinding does not automatically guarantee that one can correctly identify the source of the problem. Thus, for anyone serious about the historical truth surrounding the issue of footbinding, it is crucial to recognize the fact that it is not Chinese men, but Chinese women, who played major roles in upholding the custom. To recognize this fact does not mean simply to blame women themselves for the spread of footbinding but to try and achieve a more accurate understanding of the factors that had given rise to and sustained the custom.

The history of footbinding is very complex; numerous factors can be held responsible for the development of the custom. It is beyond the scope of the paper to address them all in detail. However, it is worth mentioning some of the important aspects of the custom that the May Fourth and Western feminist accounts have failed to address.

Footbinding might have started as a fashion among women from a few elite

families, but once it became widespread during the twelfth century, it became part of the training which prepared girls for their roles as married women in the traditional patriarchal family. It took six to ten years to complete the formative treatment. During those years, a girl from the elite family normally was taught the art of poetry, painting, and fine needlework or embroidery; but a girl from the poor family was taught to spin and weave and all the skills needed to produce practically useful goods for the family's survival. While learning these practical skills girls also learned values of diligence, orderliness, the virtue of filial piety, frugality, modesty, and industry. Thus, in traditional Chinese society, the bound feet were taken as one of many indications of girls' home education and training. As the Chinese saying goes: "A pair of well-bound feet not only makes a woman beautiful but also good and virtuous" (Wang 2000, 151).

In traditional Chinese society, a marriage was usually arranged by parents. Men and women were not given many chances to know each other before they were married. Instead, they were chosen for each other by parents and matchmakers. Since a girl's bound feet were commonly regarded as an indication of her proper upbringing, mothers naturally desired to have a daughter-in law with bound feet. It is often the case that the mother in-law's preference and judgment in choosing a particular kind of girl to be her daughter-in-law was more crucial than the son choosing what kind of woman he wished to marry. Therefore, when the marriage market reinforced footbinding, it gave mothers a motive to bind her daughter's feet with the hope that she would grow up like a lady and be married into a good family.

It is also useful for the understanding of footbinding to look at the social and cultural circumstances that had given rise to the aesthetic preference of small feet. In Teachers of the Inner Chambers, Ko offers some insight in this regard. She locates the practice of footbinding in the context of a society regulated by the Confucian vision of the separate spheres. She explains this vision in the following words:

> [A] man was responsible for keeping order in the family, local community, government, and the world at large; his private morality was the root of public good… A woman, too, was to be incessant in her moral cultivation. Her contribution, however, stopped at the "ordered household."(1994, 144)

In other words, a man's virtue was judged according to his economic, social, and political achievement, whereas a woman's virtue was judged by her performance confined to her role in the domestic sphere as a wife, a mother, and a care giver to the family members. Ko also points out that the Neo-Confucian ideology not only prescribes to men and women separate spheres but also reinforces the demarcation between the inner and outer sphere to prevent "disorder" (144). According to Ko, the spread of the custom of footbinding was evidently linked to

the effort of strengthening the gender distinction. She cites Patricia Ebrey's insight to support this point. According to Ebrey, during the Song Dynasty (960-1276), in which footbinding had reached its peak, women's desire in having smaller feet was a response to the refined image of the ideal men in the upper class. When the image of the ideal upper class Chinese male became refined, gentle, and frail-looking, the image of women in the same class was expected to look even more exquisite and delicate (148). Thus, the spread of this custom, in Ebrey and Ko's views, allowed Chinese men to refine themselves without becoming too feminized (148). This theory is plausible in accounting for the connection between the Neo-Confucian's concern with the blurred gender distinction and the derived aesthetic interest which may have in fact encouraged the custom's spread among women of the gentry families.

Ko also characterized in a picturesque way how the 17th century Chinese women from gentry families embraced the custom: "Women exchanged poems eulogizing small feet; mementos such as embroidered shoes were as widely used as poems in cementing female friendships." Ko's discussion is significant in countering the conventional association of footbinding with male eroticism; however, her theory that some Chinese women of the gentry class had enjoyed footbinding should not be overstated, since life in feudal Chinese society was not as pretty for the majority of women as the life of a few elite gentry families. Life for the women of poor families was not so much concerned with artistic embroidery and reading and writing of poetry, but about producing useful goods and managing household chores. Women's labor in poor families normally included cooking, weaving and making clothes and shoes for the whole family in addition to taking care of children. The intensive labor performed by working class women evidently had made their lives with bound feet a lot more painful than their counterparts in the gentry class. However, nothing had stopped footbinding from becoming widely spread even among the poor and working class women. The custom of footbinding reflected, most of all, the desires of all classes in teaching their daughters female virtue and propriety, so that when the young girls grew up their appearance and manners would be admired and appreciated on the marriage market. The Chinese saying "if you love your daughter, you have to be cruel to her feet" reveals the complex feelings that mothers had in passing the custom on to their daughters. Many generations of mothers in feudal China, after going through the tremendous pain of footbinding themselves, insisted on having their little girls' feet bound for this reason.

Given what has been said above about the genuine meaning of footbinding for women in feudal China, one can understand why the May Fourth and Western feminist views about the strange sexual aspect of the custom cannot be taken as correct representations of the custom. Those who have held such a view may draw some support from the folklore literature and legendary stories; these typically

associate the origin of the custom of footbinding with an emperor's attraction to a certain woman dancer's small feet or a male erotic obsession with the "lotus" shape of women's feet produced by tight binding. However, they have never been able to cite any historical evidence for the claim that Chinese men demanded bound feet from their brides or were directly involved in the practice. There is no evidence in the literature that the majority of women who had their feet bound ever knew anything about men's lewd thinking. Such a characterization of footbinding not only, "leaves out the complex motives and feelings of the mothers and daughters involved" (Ko 1994, 148), but also rendered women as nothing but mindless and foolish accomplices to male sadism.

Besides, the contention that footbinding is the result of men's erotic desires is based on a lack of adequate knowledge of Confucianism. Confucianism, with its emphasis on righteousness and duty, would never encourage people to give priority to the satisfaction of desires. It seems that Chinese May Fourth discussions and Western feminist discourse committed a simple logical error when they argued that footbinding was the result of both Confucianism and male eroticism. The logical error resides in the fact that if footbinding had been the direct result of Confucian doctrine, then it was not a result of men's eroticism, and vice versa. The two are ideologically incompatible.

In today's mainland China, the image of Chinese women as victim of the Confucian tradition is still exerting powerful influence, in spite of some important changes that have taken place in other areas of academic research and state ideology. For those who still adhere to the Maoist and post Maoist socialist view, the maintenance of this image is necessitated by their glorification of the communist revolution in liberating women from enslavement. For others, it may be just a matter of time before any radical breakup is to take place. I hope to have shown in this paper that the construction of this image during the May Fourth time is based on bias and unfounded assumptions, and that the usage of the image of victimized women by the May Fourth and Maoist intellectuals served their iconoclastic and nationalist purposes. I also hope to have shown that the May Fourth problematic scholarship, coupled with "ethnocentrism," has led western feminists to perceive third world women as particularly oppressed and victimized. These biases, unjustified assumptions, and ignorance have hindered the May Fourth intellectuals and Western feminists from achieving any meaningful understanding of the custom of footbinding. In consequence, their perceptions of footbinding as sheer victimization of women by male sadism have distorted the truth of that custom. Finally, I hope to have shown that an accurate understanding of the history of Chinese women requires studying them within the context of their own traditions, values, and practices.

Notes

I am grateful to the faculties in the philosophy department at Wichita State University for their colloquial comments on the first draft of this article. I would especially like to think Dr. Debby Soles and Dr. Robert Feleppa for their numerous helpful suggestions and comments on the second draft. My deepest appreciation goes to Dr. David Soles whose polishing and editing on various drafts of this article greatly enhanced its clarity and readability.

[1] The most influential spokesperson in critiquing the problem of marginalization of third world women so far is, perhaps, Chandra Monhanty who provides an insightful analysis of the politics of representation in Western feminist discourse. For more discussion on the subject, see Monhanty, *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) 1-41, 51-74.

[2] Works on this subject include Dorothy Ko, *Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994); and Rey Chow, *Women and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading between West and East* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

[3] Since Du Fang Qin first published her book, *Nuxing guannian de yian bian* (The transformation of views on women) in 1988 in which her main thesis is to argue that throughout history up to the twentieth century Chinese women had been at the bottom of the Confucian social and familiar hierarchy, no competing theory has ever been published in China to challenge her theory.

[4] In criticizing the distortions of the custom of footbinding, I certainly do not have any intention to defend it. In consideration of the tremendous harm that this custom had caused women both physically and psychologically, I firmly believe that footbinding should have been abolished and that it is a great thing that it was abolished. However, the correction of misinterpretations of the custom is still important because meaningful cross-cultural studies require a better understanding of the context, especially the social dynamics that sustained the practice.

[5] As a matter of fact, a critical reevaluation of China's past had actually already begun four years earlier when liberal circles inaugurated the New Culture Movement. Reflecting upon the failure of the Republican Revolution (1911), Chinese intellectuals during that time believed that it was the persistence of the conservative tradition (epitomized in Confucianism) that kept people from embracing any radical social and political reform. The New Culture Movement emerged as a campaign in advocating a radical break away from the Confucian tradition. However, due to the high illiteracy of the general population, the impact of the New Culture Movement did not reach many outside the small intellectual circle until the May Fourth movement took place. During the May Fourth period, the patriotic sentiment added a new dynamic to the earlier elite cultural movement and its agenda of reforming culture and people's minds was carried out, and strengthened much further only after a large number of students and member of the working class joined the cause. Thus, for most scholars of the subject, the May Fourth –New Culture Movement(s) has come to be recognized as a distinctive historical period that includes both the New Culture Movement and the May Fourth Movement. For more information on the history around May Fourth time, see Wang Zheng, *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) 9-10.

[6] For more information about the relation between women's issues and the nationalist concern during the May Fourth time, see Wang Zheng, *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 12.

[7] For more information about the impact made by Ibsen's work, A Doll's House, on Chinese society, see Vera Schwarcz , "Ibsen's Nora: The Promise and the Trap" in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (January-March 1975).

[8] The personal connection between the May Fourth movement and the CPC can be explained by the fact that numerous founders of the CPC, including the three most important figures of the Communist Party of China, Chen Duxiu, Li Da zhao, and Mao Zedong, among others, were all May Fourth activists.

[9] See Mohanty, *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, 1-41, 51-74.

[10] For more May Fourth criticism on Confucianism, see Chen Duxiu, "The Way of Confucius and Modern Life" in De Bary's *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press.1960) 815-818.

[11] The orthodox Confucian texts include the Four Books and the Five Classics. The Four Books are: T*he Great Learning*, *The Doctrine of Mean*, *The Analects of Confucius*, and *Mencius*; and the Five Classics are: The Book of Songs, *The Book of History*, *The Book of Changes*, *The Book of Rites*, and *The Spring and Autumn Annals.*

[12] Lin Yutang provides an insightful discussion of how some well known Chinese male literates during the eighteenth- century had protested against footbinding. See Lin's discussion in "Feminist Thought in Ancient China" in Li Yu-ning's *Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes* (New York: M.E. Sharpe. Inc. 1992) 34-52.

References

Chen, Dongyuan. 1928. *Zhong guo funu shenghuoshi* (A history of the lives of Chinese women). Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi Chubanshe.

Chow, Rey. 1991. *Women and Chinese Modernity: The Politics of Reading between West and East. Theory and History of Literature, vol. 75*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Daly, Mary. 1978. *Gynlecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Boston: Beacon.

De Bary, Wm. 1998. Theodore. *Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective*. London: Harvard University Press.

———. et.al., eds. 1960. *Sources of Chinese Tradition*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Du Fangqin. 1988. *Nuxing guannian de yeanbian* (Transformation in the concept of "woman"). Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe.

Ebrey, Patricia. 1984. "Conceptions of the Family in the Song Dynasty." *Journal of Asian Studie*s 43: 219-45.

Johnson, Kay Ann. 1983. *Women, the Family, and Peasant Revolution in China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ko, Dorothy. 1994. *Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-Century China*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Li, Yu-ning. 1992. *Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes*. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Inc.

Lin, Yutang. 1992. "Feminist Thought in Ancient China" in *Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes*. Ed. Li Yu-ning. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Inc. Li 1992, 34-52.

Lu, Xun. 1998. *Lu Xun Quanji* (The complete works of Lu Xun). Beijing: Renmin Wenxue Chuban she.

Lupke, Christopher. 2000. "Wang Wenxing and the 'Loss' of China" in *Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field*. Ed. Rey Chow. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1991. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" In *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, ed. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, 51-80. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Schwarcz, Vera. 1986. *The Chinese Enlightenment*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

_____. 1975. "Ibsen's Nora: The Promise and the Trap" in *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* Vol 7, No. 1. (January-March).

Stacey, Judith. 1983. *Patriarchy and Socialist Revolution in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Teng, Jinhua Emma. 1996. "The Construction of the 'Traditional Chinese Woman' in the Western Academy: A Critical Review" in *Signs* 22:1 (Autumn, 1996) 114-151.

Tjan, Tjoe Som. 1949. *Po Hu T'ung* (The Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall). Vol 1-2. Netherlands: E.J. Brill, Leiden.

Wang, Ping. 2000. *Aching for Beauty*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wang, Zheng.1999. *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Does China Need a Feminism with Chinese Characteristics?

James Peterman, The University of the South

In this essay, I will examine the crucial question of the limits of the influence western forms of feminism might have on feminism in China. I am specifically interested in the conceptual question of how far we can understand the western concept of gender roles and the their critique in terms of ordinary Chinese motifs (Cummings, Chapter 6), derived from Confucianism, of 1) the relationality of the self, 2) social holism (groups are prior to individuals), and 3) the necessity for hierarchy as a means to promote harmony in groups. I will argue that standard Western concepts of gender and gender liberation are incompatible with these first two motifs. I will, however, propose a form that feminism might take if it is to have Chinese characteristics. Such a form of feminism, already in place in indigenous Chinese women's NGOs, would promote a non-hierarchical view of gender relations, not the overthrow of the system of gender.

I will take as my model for the western feminist theory of gender the essay, "The Traffic in Women," by Gayle Rubin. This essay, translated into Chinese, has been influential in both western and Chinese feminism. It is one of the first western feminist texts translated into Chinese. It also has played an influential role in western feminist critiques of gender roles—for example, in Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble*—but in addition presents what I will call a liberationist approach to gender. Rubin's account of gender identifies the system of gender as a system of a) differentiated and obligatory *sexual roles* that are b) *forced* by society on *individuals*, c) based *solely* on their *sexual anatomy*. These assignments d) cause individuals to repress *innate bisexual impulses* by making *heterosexuality* the only *permissible* option, and so arise out of e) *unavoidable conflict*, which leaves women unsatisfied and resentful. But f) these *assignments can be resisted* with the effect that individuals are g) *permitted* to become more *whole* as a person and achieve h) a more *expansive and free expression* of their sexuality.

This way of thinking of gender will not gain widespread and pervasive cultural

force in China if this analysis is inappropriate for Chinese culture and Chinese women.[1] I will make my argument for this claim first of all by showing how this analysis of gender will not work in a culture committed to the motifs of a) social holism and b) a relational view of the self. For any experience and justified account of the oppression of women in any culture needs to arise out of that culture's conception of what it is to be a human being and what it is for a human being of any sort to be oppressed or liberated. Although I don't defend this general approach here, it rests on Michael Walzer's view that all effective moral critique arises from *within* a culture or tradition. In this essay, the burden of my argument will be to show how indigenous Chinese feminist accounts of the oppression of Chinese women will need to be both developed and limited by the predominant Chinese views[2] of what it is to be a human being. If this argument is successful, it will follow, as I will argue, that a Chinese feminist project of liberation, will have to proceed, not by challenging systems of gender but rather by attacking hierarchy and gender inequality in the family.

In his influential sociological account of Chinese culture, *From the Soil*, (*Xiangtu Zhongguo*) Fei Xiaotong, argues that the mode of association and so social organization in China is differential (*chaxugeju*) as opposed to Western modes of association which are organizational (*tuantigeju*). Organizational associations take place between discreet individuals, who establish relations to others by becoming members of an organization. Relationships between such members are defined in terms of rights and responsibilities members hold by virtue of their membership. Differential modes of association are structured by appeal to what the Confucians refer to as *renlun*, ethical relationships, not in terms of membership. These *renlun* form a web of relationships centered on each particular person. A person is the unique person she is by inhabiting a unique set of relationships that make up her web. The web, however, is not chosen. It is preset, and each person is required to live up to the obligations built into the relationship, which is simultaneously factual and normative (Fei, 22). Moreover, the relationships are differential. To be in relation with another person is to occupy some distinct type of relation to that person: daughter, mother, little sister, and so forth.

This account of differential modes of association goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the morality of human relationships: There are no universal norms or rights governing behavior of individuals toward one another. Rather there are just specific norms attached to each mode of relationship. Fei argues that a clear pattern that emerges in the *Analects* conversations about *ren*, a central ethical concept of that work, is that it is impossible, with this differential account of association, to generate a single universal principle of ethics. Each type of relationship has its own character and requirements. So when Confucius is asked to clarify *ren*, he typically falls back into mentioning specific requirements relative to specific relationships: "the concept of *ren* is in fact only a logical

synthesis, compilation of all the ethical qualities of private, personal relationships" (Fei, 75-6).

In the absence of abstract moral rules that transcend particular contexts, how is this form of morality transmitted? Fei argues that the transmission takes place through what he calls "the rule of ritual." Fei contrasts rule of ritual with rule by law. Whereas the rule of law is enforced by political power, rule of ritual is enforced by tradition through replication (Fei, 97). When learning takes place by replication of past behaviors based on examples handed down from previous generations, action takes on the form of ceremony (*li*). Rituals work through "the feeling of respect and obedience the people themselves have cultivated" (Fei, 99). These rituals are sustained by the cultivation of habits of behavior that makes following the rule the natural result of one's lifetime of cultivation and practice of ritual behavior. In this approach, individuals necessarily occupy gendered relationships, which they learn to fulfill by the rule of ritual. They become fully who they are by following ritual.

This account of the relationality of the self embedded in differential relationships is an instance of what I called earlier social holism. What is primary is the web of relationships extending outward to *tianxia*, everything under heaven. A person is nothing separate from her unique relationship to the whole web.

In contrast, Rubin holds that roles are forced on *individuals* with the result that a person's deeper, original desires are repressed. According to Rubin, the gendered individual is only half a person. The solution she proposes to this problem is to develop the sort of critical consciousness and revolutionary projects that would liberate individuals from gender roles. The underlying ideal is one of polymorphic androgyny that gives individuals the ability to find their own most fulfilling forms of sexual expression *outside of any obligatory system of gender*. Taken to its logical conclusion, Rubin's view entails that human beings can only become *fully human* outside of a system of gender differences.

If Fei is right, there is no intelligible notion of *non-gendered individual* in Chinese culture. A person is the sum total of his or her primary relationships. And these primary relationships are, for the most part, gendered. But unlike gender roles, as understood by Rubin, these gendered relationships are not something one can take off. According to Fei, these relationships are both preset and cannot be given up. To "off" them would be to discard those specific relationships that define who one is, and to attempt to get rid of all gendered relationships would be to give up what makes one the unique human being who one is. It would be, in short, to give up one's humanity. All one can do is either live up to them or fail to follow the norms governing them and become less than the person one should be.

Rubin's view also supposes a feminist version of the Freudian picture of the individual as growing up into a moral stance through conflict with parental figures

over how best to satisfy her sexual desire. This particular view of the self as growing up conflicted and frustrated is, according to Cornell psychologist Qi Wang, a cultural phenomenon, not universal. Through a series of cross-cultural analyses of early childhood memories and autobiographical narratives, Wang has shown how young Chinese adults and children differ fundamentally from American children and young adults. Chinese young adults have later first memories, which tend to focus on situations of moral instruction and harmony in relationship to some key figure in her family. Unlike early memories of Americans, which do involve complex elaboration of emotions or presentation of the self as a hero engaged in a quest to satisfy her desires, the unelaborated memories of the Chinese tend to foster a sense of fitting into social contexts. Wang draws the following conclusion: "Autobiographical memories do not fulfill in all cultures the same psychological functions, namely to anchor the identity of a [discrete] individual in his or her past. No doubt, this form of the autobiographical process has become, for a variety of reasons, a central concept in the 'Freudian cultures' of the West" [my interpolation] (Wang and Brockmeier, 2002 59). China is not, however, a Freudian culture. That is, it is not a culture in which a person's sense of self is formed around the ability to construct stories of her past, which treat her as a central character, seeking satisfaction of her desires, in the face of forms of cultural repression. So Rubin's account of the conflict-ridden psychology of gender does not apply to Chinese culture. What, then, is a Chinese feminist to do?

If "offing" the gender system in the name of individual sexual satisfaction is not an intelligible option under the influence of Confucian motifs of selfhood, then Chinese feminists need to consider how to promote feminist liberation with Chinese characteristics. What would this be like? As I indicated above, I assume, following Walzer, that Chinese feminist criticisms and arguments for change demand an appeal to ideals internal to the Chinese moral tradition. I will focus on the family and gender relations. What moral ideal could bear the weight of such criticism if, as I have argued, some appeal to individual, liberation from gender systems will not work?

I would like to propose the fundamental moral notion of *hemu*, harmony, as the ideal upon which a feminist critique with Chinese characteristics could be mounted. Even though traditional Chinese appeals to harmony as an organizing ideal tended to reinforce the authority of fathers and the hierarchy of family relationships, there is no necessity that harmony be understood in this way. We can draw a distinction between false forms of harmony, which come about when those in a subordinate position are not allowed to voice legitimate concerns and complaints and genuine harmony, which emerges when subordinates play a role in producing agreement on a course of action.[3] Although this approach to harmony is a departure from the actual tradition of Chinese families, this appeal to a distinction between false and genuine forms of harmony has its basis in Confucius' ***Analects***.[4]

An appeal to genuine harmony, understood as requiring free and open discussion and uncoerced agreement by family members would provide Chinese feminists with a powerful moral ideal as the basis for their critiques of gender inequality. This critique would have the hallmarks of other well-known, successful forms of moral critique in the West. For example, the moral basis of the abolition of slavery in the United States was an appeal to freedom and equality, which were already well-established ideals. But these ideals had not been applied to all human beings living within the United States. More and more, people came to recognize that there was no compelling reason to exclude slaves from the class of human beings protected by these ideals. While in one way revolutionary, this "revolution" was really conservative since it sought to defend the best understanding of already entrenched, ideals of freedom and equality. As a result, the appeal to these ideals had a moral force that a novel, "foreign" ideal would not have had. Similarly, the moral ideal of harmony, understood in the way I propose, would have radical consequences, even while at the same time appealing to an entrenched ideal. This appeal to an ideal of genuine harmony could be the basis for a feminism with Chinese characteristics.

I will argue that a distinctively Chinese form of feminist liberation could be pursued by eliminating the traditional role-related hierarchies in the Chinese family; fathers and husbands, for example, would not have special authority just because they are fathers or husbands. This approach would not, however, require eliminating gender relationships. For a person can be the unique person that she is through her gendered relations with members of her family, but her relationship with her husband need not be one of role-related subordination.

A similar view, but perhaps ultimately different, view has been put forth by Hall and Ames, who have argued that Confucianism can overcome its sexism by substituting qualitative hierarchy for the tradition's gendered hierarchy. They argue that harmony in any group requires some form of hierarchy, but that by substituting qualitative hierarchy for the traditional gendered hierarchy, harmony can be sustained and sexism avoided. Although they do not make it clear what a qualitative hierarchy might be, I imagine that they have in mind that the person with the best understanding and ability in some sphere of activity be the person to whom others will defer in that sphere. So if the husband knows best about autos, the wife defers to him. If the wife knows best about relations with the legal system, he defers to her. Even though this hierarchical arrangement might preserve family harmony, it is clearly not necessary for it.

In conversations I conducted in 2002 with Chinese university students at Zhongshan University in Guangzhou about what makes for a good family relationship, some students offered a different, and I take it, emerging model of relationships within some Chinese families. In this model, harmony is fostered

by communication (*jiaoliu*), equality (*pingdeng*) and mutual respect (*zunzhong*). This model, which some students mentioned as an ideal and also as the governing model within their own family, produces harmony though negotiation. Such negotiation does not necessarily exclude deference to a respected figure of authority, but this person has a responsibility to consult and negotiate in making decisions significant to the family. One student reported that because his parents were not educated, they deferred to him to make decisions about his education and professional choices since he would best be able to determine what would be the best course of action. He was not, however, a liberal individual, deciding these matters for himself, for he was responsible for making what were group, family decisions about how best his education and work goals would serve the interests of the family. It is crucial, however, that the authority that this person has rests on it having been given to him by the family.

We can, however, imagine another possibility in which no one is designated the authoritative person. Every member of the family has his or her say and agreements arise as a result of respectful conversation and negotiation. Following such an approach, a father's view could be adopted and become the family's view, but in this case it would not become the family's view because it was the father's. Instead, it would become the family's view because it just so happened that the father's perspective is agreeable to all of the rest of the members of the family. Such families believe that the decisions they make are better than the ones they reject, but they do not base their decision on the authority of any specific person.

For the Chinese family to drop hierarchy altogether, these modes of negotiation would have to rise to the level of ritualized behaviors. Ritualized forms of expression of respect, and ritualized forms of allowing each person to express his or her own point of view, and ritualized forms of finalizing agreements, among others, would have to become key forms of practice within these families. This mode of harmonizing would also have to become part of the gender requirements of family members. Families in which a father refused such modes of negotiation would lose face under the gender rule that fathers must father (*Analects* 12.11). And being a father, or better yet, a parent, would require protecting these practices of negotiation, for parents maintain the good of the family through modes of decision making that strengthen relations within the family and benefit the family as a whole.

In order to become the sort of person capable of participating in this decision making process, participants would have to have learned the practice of articulating their own beliefs and desires when those deviate from the rest of the group. They would also have to be able to treat final group decisions as authoritative, even in those cases where they decided to compromise their own individual views for the benefit of the family as a whole.[5]

If the family were organized around this model of family relationships, how could it come to grips with the homosexuality of a daughter or son? In a situation in which there are rapid social-economic changes, families would need to find ways to adapt to such change. A family-centered culture will have an interest in maintaining the central role of the family as a mode of sustaining social stability. If, as seems to be the case in urban contexts, there is an increasing acceptance of homosexuality and an increasing number of social networks for homosexuals, families would have to find some way to accommodate this change.

But the model for the emerging family, which I have described above, would seem adequate for these purposes. For if the primary task of parents is to ensure that family interests are served through a process of communication and negotiation based on mutual respect and understanding, the primary role-related responsibility of both parents would be to promote these goals and related practices. The rest of their tasks as mother and father would be subject to negotiation. And the tasks of their children would be equally subject to negotiation.

Young children would be raised to respect the authority of the parents and family and would be expected to contribute to the well-being of the family, by preparing to help the family when they become adults and by contributing to the harmony of the family at every juncture. But parents would be required to acknowledge that the well-being of the family would depend on the well-being of its children. If it were clear that the well-being of a son or daughter would be best served by not getting married, by not having children, and so forth, then the family would have to address this issue. The family would have to find ways in which the well-being of the individuals in the family and the well-being of the family could be harmonized.

Sons and daughter might contribute to the well-being of the family in various ways. Beyond the traditional ways of marrying out or in and bearing children and supplying financial support to parents and contributing to the status of the family, they might also support the family financially and in terms of their own professional success, which reflects well on the family and provides it with financial benefits. A reformed approach to the family might even allow for gay couples to adopt and raise children, who would continue the family line. And while this approach to continue the family line might seem to violate the traditional notion that family be defined by blood relationships, more highly traditional marriage arrangements in rural Taiwan in the 1960s allowed for such adoptions (Wolf 24, 28). Men were adopted into families if the families had no sons. The men would take on the family name and responsibility to parents and family as if they had been born into the family. Families too poor to marry out their daughters would tolerate their daughters taking on the job of prostitute in the cities. These daughters were still good daughters if they maintained their familial ties and

contributed to its financial well-being. Such prostitutes could even gain respect accorded to mothers by adopting daughters, who were raised to care for them in their old age. Such flexibility shows how even in an earlier time, families were able to be flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances and challenges.

This orientation would not, however, require the elimination of a system of gender, but requires that a system of gender differences be structured enough to maintain the web of relationships that make up a family, while maintaining enough flexibility so as to allow for variability in how those relationships are achieved. Being a good son would encompass a range of conditions, but the authority to determine which would fit a particular person would be the family in which he was a son. This approach would require the development of respectful communication and negotiation practices and acceptance of non-standard gender relations.

Even though there is no good reason to think that families would make these changes without some form of social pressure, there is historical evidence that such pressure can effect change. It is, however, important to understand that effective pressure will have to be pressure from within China itself, based on its own moral ideals. The late nineteenth and early twentieth century anti-foot binding movement presents a case in point. Christian organizations within China had long pressed for elimination of foot binding. Although they met with some limited success, their views about foot binding did not catch on as long as these views were received as Western cultural impositions. The campaign carried out by the Natural Foot Society (*tianzuhui*), initially through an international leadership, was eventually led exclusively by Chinese (Drucker 189). From 1890 until 1919, the percentage of women with bound feet in a small village south of Beijing fell from 99.2% to 0%. During that time, the natural foot movement had become increasingly sinicized. Alison Drucker describes the process as follows: "Not until [the efforts to turn opinion against foot binding] were perceived as Chinese phenomena in a nationalistic context did a majority of Chinese, at least those residing in urban areas open to educational and media influence, espouse them…. [T]he foreign and Christian roots of the anti-foot binding campaign had to be renounced in order for the victory to be achieved" (Drucker 199).

The moral of this story may be that by a sustained public education program run by Chinese and articulated in the way that appeals essentially to Chinese modes of ethical and political reflection will a reform movement have any chance of success. A feminist critique of gender articulated in terms of a western conception of liberation from gender roles makes little sense in the Chinese context. As a result, efforts to persuade Chinese to support westernized liberation from traditional gender roles is not likely to succeed. An approach to gender flexibility that retains the family as the central web of a person's defining relationships,

however, provides a vehicle for feminist critique and reform that is distinctively Chinese. In fact, something closer to this sentiment has been expressed by Chen Yiyun of Beijing's Jinglun Family Center, who states that even though the Center defends notions of gender equality and liberation from the forms of traditional inequality that have harmed both men and women, it does not support some western perspectives:

> Our perspective is not quite identical to a western feminist perspective in which there are some radical aspects that we might not be able to accept. There are attitudes towards divorce and women who do not want to marry in order to become slaves to men. We do not agree with that. (Milwertz 73)

Chen goes on to argue that the Center's approach to lesbianism departs from what they themselves might say. If someone is biologically lesbian and chooses not to marry or to cohabit with a woman that is her choice, and there is nothing wrong with it. But if one's lesbianism is based on personal choice, such a choice is, Chen claims, pointless: "If you are not biologically homosexual, but you want to demonstrate your very special unique lifestyle, well, I think this is a pointless choice" (Milwertz 73). Even though there is no clear distinction between biological homosexuality and a purely chosen homosexual lifestyle, Chen's comments reflect feminism with Chinese characteristics: the defense of the family as a central institution, the need for individuals to find their place in families if they can, and tolerance of individual difference. But what Chen opposes as pointless is individual choice aimed to "demonstrate your very special unique lifestyle." Following Fei's formulation, Chinese culture is one in which one's primary responsibility as a person is "to achieve" those unchosen relationships that define one's unique identity. Choice against those relationships not "compelled biologically" violates one's primary responsibility, which is to control oneself so as to be able to "achieve" those relationships.

Even though this approach to homosexuality strikes western liberals as a violation of human rights, the notion of human rights that liberates individuals from their primary responsibilities as members of a family is likely to make no sense in a Chinese context—or to be nothing more than a formula for selfish behavior. I have argued that a Chinese feminist approach to gender will need to be couched in terms of the centrality of the web of gender relations that make up who each person is. In this framework, gender equality and tolerance for a variety of forms of gender relations is both possible and desirable as key requirements for genuine harmony within families.

Notes

[1] My claim here is admittedly insufficiently qualified. It is by no means clear that Chinese culture and women represent a single orientation. My argument will work, however, if my characterization of the Chinese relational view of the self holds for the most part. Moreover, there need not be a single version of this relational view, but rather a family of such views. Traditionalists might see primary relationships as blood relationships, but others with a more sociological view, might see relationships as a function of social roles. I ignore these complexities in my argument, which is intended to be quite general and cut across these distinctions.

[2] For purposes of this argument, I assume a single view. I follow Fei Xiaotong's assumption of a single basic view, with variants. I will not in this essay discuss the variants, however. If, however, there are variants on a basic view, A, which is itself completely incompatible with view B, it is unlikely that B will be among that set of variants. My argument on this point is conceptual. A variant on A cannot be completely incompatible in all important respects with it. Variants on A will share some family resemblance with A. For the notion of family resemblance, which I appeal to here, see Wittgenstein, section 66.

[3] For a similar critique of traditional views of harmony, see Omar Swartz' "Hierarchy Is Not Harmony: A View of the Traditional Chinese Family." Swartz does not, however, propose an alternative to a hierarchy-based conception of harmony.

[4] *Analects*, 1.12: "When things are not going well, to know harmony for its own sake, without regulating the situation through ritual propriety will not work." The point here is that harmony needs to be based on forms of ritual propriety. But if ritual propriety in family decision-making requires full and open discussion and arriving when possible at an uncoerced consensus, then we can find a basis for a critique of the Chinese tradition of the family within the writings of Confucius. It is clear that Confucius rejects superficial harmony. In allowing for subordinates to remonstrate with those in authority, he also allows for critical exchange of views. My suggestion goes beyond Confucius' in eliminating hierarchy altogether. But it does retain Confucius' notion that individuals are subordinate to group decisions that express a genuine harmony.

[5] The process of negotiation and the distinction between coerced, illegitimate and uncoerced legitimate forms of consensus needs further discussion than I give here. Needless to say, there is no way to predict the outcome of these negotiations. There is also no way to predict under what circumstances parents might grant their children what their children say they want versus circumstances in which children defer to what parents say they want. Fear of loss of relationship might motivate some members of the family to agree to things they otherwise might reject. Sometimes these fears, and decisions that reflect them, may be the results of manipulation, but in other cases they might reflect genuine weighing and balancing of alternatives.

References

Ames, R. and Hall, D. 1998. *Thinking From the Han : Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture*. Albany, State University of New York Press.

Brockmeier, J. and Wang, Q. 2002. "Autobiographical Remembering as Cultural Practice: Understanding the Interplay between Memory, Self, and Culture." *Culture and Psychology* 8.1: 45-64.

Butler, J. 1999. *Gender Trouble*. New York, Routledge.

Cummings, R. 2000. *Boston Confuciansim*. Albany, SUNY Press.

Drucker, A. R. 1981. "The Influence of Western Women on the Anti-Footbinding Movement." *Women in China: Current Directions in Historical Scholarship*. R. W. Guisso. and S. Johannesen. Youngstown, New York, Philo Press.

Leichtman, M and Wang, Q. W. A. M. 2000. "Same Beginnings, Different Stories: A Comparison of American and Chinese Children's Narratives." *Child Development* 71.5: 1329-1346.

Milwertz, C. 2002. *Beijing Women Organizing for Change*. Copenhagen, NIAS Press.

Rubin, G. 1975. "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex." *Toward an Anthropology of Women*. R. R. Reiter. New York, Monthly Review Press. 157-210.

Swartz, O. 2003. "Hierarchy Is Not Harmony: A View of the Traditional Chinese Family." Chinese Communication Studies: Contexts and Comparisons. Edited by Xing Lu, Wenshan Jia, and D. Ray Heisey. Westport, Connecticut and London: Ablex Publishing.

Walzer, M. 1994. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad*. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press.

Wang, Q. 2001. "Culture Effects on Adults' Earliest Childhood Recollection and Self-Description: Implications for the Relation Between Memory and the Self." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81.2: 220-233.

Wang, Q. 2001. "'Did You Have Fun?' American and Chinese Mother-child Conversations about Shared Emotional Experiences." *Cognitive Development* 16: 693-715.

Wittgenstein, L. 1958. *Philosophical Investigations*. Third Edition. New York: Macmillan.

Wolf, M. 1972. *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Xiaotong, F. 1992. *From the Soil*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Thinking "the Unthinkable" and Teaching "the Impossible": East-West Dialogue through "Chaos" of Aesthetic Formulation, Butterfly Effect of Sagely Action, and Responsive and Responsible Wuwei of De.

Shudong Chen, Johnson County Community College

> It was [Dr.] Gray at [a certain] College. The question was one on a final exam in East-West Philosophy. I think we were supposed to pick one question from the pages of questions Dr. Gray had prepared and then write for the whole exam period on it. (Can't remember if [the college] had one-hour or two-hour final exam periods.) The question went something like this:
>
> You are a Zen monk. It is early autumn. You are walking. You pause on a footbridge over a small stream and watch a single fallen leaf that floats under the bridge and passes on down the stream, eventually going out of sight. What goes on in your mind at this time? [Or it may have been what do you think/feel at this time?]
>
> I wrote "Alone" and turned in my final exam blue book. Gray summoned me to his office as soon as he returned there after the exam period was over. He wanted to know if I really wanted to fail the final exam. I told him that the way the question was presented the only non-failing answer had to be mine or something very like it. If the answer is to come from a Zen monk, it can't have sentence after sentence of explanation. The explanation would indicate that the monk had not become one with nature, was not 'in the experience' -- or something like that; I've forgotten most of what I knew about Zen back then. The answer also couldn't be "lonely" or anything else that carried a negative connotation about the experience. It had to be something that just was, neither positive nor negative.
>
> Anyway, Dr. Gray bought it, gave me an A for the final, and removed the question from the final exam options the next time he offered the course.

So what is the ultimate implication of the story? How or how much does it illustrate the difficulty that we encounter on a daily basis as teachers of different cultures? Should Professor Gray stop using the test question or keep the same test? Yes, indeed, after knowing what had happened, many my friend's schoolmates

did expect for the same luck but never were so lucky. But does Professor Gray thus consider this incident a testimony of his teaching success or failure? Does he realize how absurd the question ultimately is? Or does he himself recognize that he is the one who is enlightened by the student, however hurt he may feel about the way it occurs? Does he really consider that it is absurd to teach and test Zen experience this way? Does he really succeed in this seemingly bizarre situation but simply does not *realize* it? Does my friend give the right response to the question? Does he just explore the "perceived" pitfall of the question and thus take advantage of it or make fun of it? These are the questions that must have been lurking in my mind for a while, as they are analogous to many that I have experienced myself. They instantly surfaced, as if with a vengeance, when I came across David Jones and John Culliney's paper on Daoism and chaos, which also inspired me for a re-visit with Roger Ames's argument for a further mind readjusting rumination regarding how and why we should "Putting the *Te* back into Taoism" in the eponymous article, to tackle problems such as above.

(1) Understanding the indispensable mediation of teacher as "sagely"

Of both articles, I see certain coincidental but quite sagely coordinated alternative view of the *Dao*, *wuwei*, and ethical mediating subjectivity. At the first sight, Jones and Culliney essay does not seem to offer many substantially new ideas, but upon a closer look, it indeed brings me a mind-refreshing chance to re-think various philosophical and pedagogical issues. I am particularly interested in what they suggest as theoretically myriad or infinite ways, opportunities, and responsibilities befitting a sagely role or contribution, which, however, not unlike Ames' "*te*," should not be viewed in any narrowly anthropomorphic or anthropocentric terms. I am also interested in their treatment of these vital but hard-to-grasp notions, such as the self, sage, *Dao*, and *wuwei* as a set of mutually illuminating factors in conjunction with chaos theory. The self, according to Jones and Culliney, for instance, is emphatically *relational* as well as *contextualized*, because, they argue, "[Daoists'] approach has always yielded a contextualized self, a self that realizes its being as a self through its integration with the other myriad creatures and thing." Therefore, "the self in Daoism," as the authors stress, "is relational; it is defined in relation to all other things. The relational self inseparable from the larger structure of society, nature, and the universe" (1999, 644). With its emphasis on the unusual intimacy and interdependence among things, the self of Daoism in Jones and Culliney's article, becomes further *relationalized* and *contextualized*. It is particularly so as the authors bring in chaos theory with its central, tenet-setting metaphorical image of "butterfly effect," which is almost instantly attention catching or tenet-setting as the ***Kuan*** and *Peng* in the *Zhuangzi*.

> A central tenet of chaos theory is sensitive dependence on initial conditions, often called simply the butterfly effect. The classical example involves the local weather. In stimulating weather patterns on supercomputers, meteorologists find that the slightest variation in a factor such as wind speed, temperature, humidity, or barometric pressure cause drastically different virtual weather patterns to emerge …. Amplification of the tiny change in the system caused by the butterfly is possible if the butterfly becomes fractally congruent, or resonant, with the prevailing air currents at the scale of its wingbeats, and then if the system remains seamlessly connected from small scale to large. (648)

While "analyses of chaos and complexity provide us with a new language for interpreting and giving meaning to the worldview of Daoism" (Jones and Culliney, 644), Ames' aesthetic view of the Tao not only brings back the sagely agency of *de* but also further emphasizes interconnection of participatory elements within a given system or composition. In the article, Ames proposes his view of an "aesthetic composition," in which *de* and *wuwei* could have myriad ways of function. Like Jones and Culliney, what Ames searches is also a system or model, which is "immediately distinguishable from transcendent formalism in that there is no preassigned pattern" (Ames 1989, 117). Within this system, "the organization and order of existence emerges out of the spontaneous arrangement of the participants." With this aesthetic model, Ames tries to explain his view of the intricate and intimate *relationships* of the *Dao*, *de*, and *wuwei*, which he considers as "the work of art" and an illuminating "example of the aesthetic composition" that embodies and enlivens "the intrinsic relatedness of particulars" (1989, 117). It is because "given the uniqueness of each aesthetic composition, this conception of order is more complex than that of the logical construction" and "where its 'rightness' lies in large measure with comprehension of just those particular detail constituting the work" (1989,117). Indeed, it is within this system of aesthetic composition that Ames stresses the great agency of *de*, which often means in "the Taoist texts, like their Confucian counterparts the dissolution of discriminating ego-self as a precondition for integrative natural action and the concomitant extension of *te*," while *wuwei* means "the activity which integrates the particular *te* with the *Tao*" (1989, 128). For Ames, "When *te* is cultivated and accumulated such that the particular is fully expressive of the whole, the distinction between *tao* and *te* collapses and *te* becomes both an individuating concept and an integrating concept" (128). Together, these authors propose, as I see it, a refreshing view of Daoism with a more positive, modern tenet, a kind of "can-do" theory, regarding the ancient philosophy, which is indeed often accepted and appropriated as a special form of quietism and out-of-system freedom or independence, *wushi* 無恃, *wudai* 無待, and *wuji* 無己, for very good reasons.

(2) Perceiving Dynamic Wuwei and Participatory Absence

With emphasis now on self-organization, self-recreation of systems as in chaos theory and "aesthetic composition," to flow with the flow is no longer merely

for the purpose to "fit in" but to transform, or to effect changes within, the system that one fits in. Fitting in thus becomes simultaneously the means and ends itself for transformation. In this case, "the self in Daoism is a fractal self, one that potentially can seamlessly interweave its being with affinitive systems, or attractors in the world, whose organization is now recognized to transcend classic dimensionality" (Jones and Culliney, 644). Indeed, more often than not, anyone reading Daoism would inevitably acquire the impression of how little that we humans can do in the world because, whatever we do, we tend to blindly undercut our own endeavor one way or another since things are so intimately intertwined beyond our best knowledge. Thus it is natural for people, including, as Ames points out, "even the most prominent commentators to read Taoism as a passive and quietistic philosophy: 'a Yin thought –system' in which the particular capitulates to the demands of its environment and "flows with the *tao*" (1989, 138). *Wuwei* then becomes literally "doing nothing."

> With such a positive spin on intimate interdependence of participatory elements, however *wufeng* 無分 (no-differentiation), *wushi* 無恃 (no-dependence), *wudai* 無待 (no-expectation), and *wuji* 無己 (no-self) are still the Daoist ideal at least for Zhuangzi,[1] the concept of wuwei now comes to suggest not how little we can ultimately accomplish but how much we can accomplish with whatever slight adjustment we may need to make. As there are myriad enlightened ways that befit a sagely participation or "participatory match," everything we do as teachers or students could have enormous sagely effects, no matter how trivial or frivolous as they might strike us at the first sight. As teachers, we may effect sea changes on a daily basis, however often involuntarily in ways that beyond our consciousness. Such a view of sagely action and responsibility brings us consciousness and confidence regarding who we are and what we do as teachers. It encourages us to pay adequate attention to minute detail because every little thing matters.

With sagely action metaphorized as "butterfly effect" in Jones/Culliney's article and the *de* analogized in the concept of "aesthetic composition" to emphasize its indispensable agency, both articles thus suggest an alternative view of *wushi* 無恃 (no-concern), *wudai* 無待 (no-dependence), *wuji* 無己 (no-self). As can be inferred from Jones/Culliney's reference to Cook Ding, why "amplification of the sage's participation is potentially infinite" (649), it is because there are myriad ways that befit a sagely participation. If the Cook Ding is sagely, it is because he is no longer Cook Ding, but the very knife itself that swims within the maze of carcass. It is the knife that is dancing with the *Tao*, defining *wuwei*, and personifying his sagely action. With Cook Ding's absent participation or participatory absence, the sagely knife maneuvers itself *freely* 無恃 in the labyrinth of carcass, which appears musically responsive to its spirited touch. Cook Ding's participation thus becomes de-personalization "*wuji* 無己" or "*xuji* 虛己." At this moment, his self disappears and his sagely spirit emerges—like Nanguo Ziqi in the *Zhuangzi*, who loses his own self but hears heavenly music, or Yen Hui, who sits and forgets to "let organs and members drop away, dismiss eyesight and hearing, part from the body and expel

knowledge, and go along with the universal thoroughfare," Cook Ding's sagely presence means *absence* of his "self."[2]

So is the sagely absence of Cao Can 曹參, the wise but eccentric second prime minister of Han dynasty, who chooses not to show up neither in court nor in office to fulfill his expected official duties *there* but stay home having drinking parties day and night after he took the office. But his official duties, as the prime minister later explained to his bewildered but soon enlightened colleagues and boss, the Emperor Hui, is to stay dutifully *aside* or *absent* "垂拱," "守職," "遵而勿失" to let his predecessor's good policies that are still working well continue to bring out its utmost benefits—without any unduly willful interruption or wishful improvement. In other words, he *acts* in this way to allow the state and people the indispensable breathing space and time to rest and prosper after the heavy-handed rule of Qin dynasty, according to Sima Qian, who praises the prime minister for his Daoist wisdom and practices.[3] Why "man is also great" for Laozi? It is because man can de-personalize 虛己 to broaden his presence and become sagely transmitter, mediator, conduit, or container. It is also because through *wuwei* that a sage's appearance or sagely presence may not necessarily be anthropomorphic. We could be things as they become so "transformed" (*Wu Hai* 物化) under the influence of sage. Participation thus means depersonalization and "presencing" absence.

Now back to the story about Dr. Gray and his student, I see this incident reminiscent of the dialogue between Zhuangzi and Huizi on the river of Hao, the highly comic but profoundly thought-provocative situation regarding human's ability to know and to express him/her self through pure logical reasoning.[4] But with all the possible suggestions from Daoism and chaos theory thus discussed, we may take a fresh look at this old problem. For me, Dr. Gray is indeed a sage, so is his student. Literally, they each turn the other into a sage through the process of mutual engagement or dialogue with the ambiguous question, which demands the *absence* of a rational "fractal" self—to let go one's imagination without the *presence* of a reflective "fractal" self, to request a rational or reasonable explanation *only* as an elaborated afterthought, thus to make an unique aesthetic composition that absorbs both fractal selves however temporarily. But ironically, neither of them seems to be fully conscious of the *butterfly effect* that they each generate on the other, and then on me, through them.

(3) Appreciating Fluidity of Our Being, Language, and Understanding

But, as suggested in both Jones/Culliney' and Ames's article, the sagely being is more often than not actualized through sagely exploration of language. Fluidity of sagely being is also embodied through the fluidity of sagely language. What characterizes the Daoist discourse is its fluidity of language, which is not only metaphorical but also musical, especially in *Zhuangzi*. The eponymous book

inspires ideas and imaginations not just through the meaning of the word but via the actual being of musical quality inherent in each word through its dynamic yet subtle relationship with other ones in a closely knit aesthetic composition or system that, as both personalized content and context, attracts and absorbs participatory attention. "Ye ma ye, chen ai ye, shen wu zi xi xiang chui ye, tian zhen chang chang, qi zhen se ye? 野馬也, 塵埃也, 生物之息相吹也. 天之蒼蒼, 其正色邪?"[5] The sentences from the *Zhuangzi*, for instance, are not only metaphorical but also musical, which adds the rhythmical, poetic fluidity of the expression. The story of the Cook Ding, indeed, not only instructs but also inspires musically. It embodies the Dao in such metaphorically suggestive and rhythmically fluid way. Although impossible to translate the original flavor, the following pieces of translation by Burton Waston and A. C. Graham, reflect quite analogously the musical fluidity of the original.[6]

> Cook Ting was cutting up an ox for Lord Wen-hui. At every touch of his hand, every heave of his shoulder, every move of his feet, every thrust of his knee—zip! Zoop! He slithered the knife along with the a zing, and all was in perfect rhythm, as though he were performing the dance of the Mulberry Grove or keeping time to the Ching-shou music. (Watson 46)

> Cook Ting was carving an ox for Lord Wen-hui. As his hand slapped, shoulder lunged, foot stamped, knee crooked, with a hiss! With a thud!. The brandished blade as it sliced never missed the rhythm, now in time with Mulberry Forest dance, now with an orchestra playing the Ching-shou. (Graham 63).

For Chad Hansen, who does not believe that Dao, or daos, ever transcend language or the *ways* we use language, which are often of the most intuitive and performative nature, Zhuangzi's lyricism in using language is not only meaning-making but also "way-making" or "world-making," as Ames and David Hall would agree here,[7] especially with regard to his creative use of "onomatopoeia" in account of Nanguo Ziqi's experience with Dao.

> Zhuangzi's lyricism flows into his answering description, filled with creative onomatopoeia. He mentions a clod, recalling Shendao's *clod* that can not miss *dao*. The piples of earth are the physical structure through which the winds blows to produce all manner of natural sounds. He illustrates it richly with invented characters for *whee*, *cooh*, and the like. This he contrasts with the sound of haunting silence when the wind ceases. (Hansen, 1992, 274)

Thus to be sagely with our being through subtle but significant adjustment, which is our action of *wuwei*, we need more than "clear" language. We need also "strong" language, as Edmund Burke would argue, to show the butterfly of our feeling and our state of being through as the immediate indispensable agency of our understanding. In *On the Beautiful and the Sublime*, emphasizing the importance of passion in human cognition particularly under the influences of words, Burke argues how "often [men] act right from their feelings, who afterwards reason but ill on them from principle; but as it is impossible to avoid an attempt at such

reasoning, and equally impossible to prevent its having some influence on our practice, surely it is worth taking some pains to have it just, and founded on the basis of sure experience (Burke 1958, 53). In section titled "How Words influence the Passions," he also emphasizes why understanding often becomes a problem it is "because we do not sufficiently distinguish, in our observation upon language, between a *clear* expression, and a strong *expression*," which are, according to Burke, "frequently confounded with each other, though they are in reality extremely different." For Burke, "the former regards the understanding; the latter belongs to the passions" and while "the one describes a thing as it is; the other describes it as it is felt" (Burke 1958, 177). Also for Burke, "the truth is, all verbal description, merely as naked description, though never so exact, conveys so poor and insufficient an idea of the thing described, that it could scarecely have the smallest effect, if the speaker did not call in to his aid those modes of speech that mark a strong and lively feeling in himself" (Burke 1958, 175). For the fluidity of our thought, we thus also need authentically emotional language, which is metaphorical by nature, but often authenticates not only our meaning but also our being, as suggested by Paul de Man referring to Rousseau's *Origin of Language*. As de Man points out, when one man encounters another fellow human, out of fear, he utters such a false statement, "This is a giant," because the other is literally by no means of being taller and bigger than him. But this false statement of fact reveals the truth implying how scared the person is. Thus factual misstatement become metaphorical truthful.[8]

Indeed, sage's way of affecting our world is often thus metaphorical, suggestive, circular, "to convey a knack, an aptitude, a way of living" (Graham 1989, 199), rather than direct and forcefully straightforward. The way that sage affects us is metaphorically enriching. So is the language that we use to respond to their visions. As we've already discussed, Daoist languages are thus often metaphorical by nature, particularly in the *Zhuangzi* by the eponymous "master of sophisticated argument, aphorism, anecdote, lyrical prose and gnomic verse" (Graham 1989, 199). Sages speak in metaphor that engages and inspires. Sages are themselves metaphors of the Dao, the enlivened embodiment of *de* and active personification of *wuwei*. "The Sage," as Jones and Culliney emphasize, "carves the uncrated block . . . carves *Dao*, the possibility of emergent worlds and their immanent patternigns" (647). It is because the sages also know how to flow with the language and speak to our mind and appeal to our emotion. Sages speak factual as well as emotive language. Their sagely languages are metaphorically fluid and open-ended and, as a result, we become metaphorically responsive in reply. Jones and Culliney, for instance, appear quite simultaneously inspired and inspiring, as they themselves become fluid while responding to the text on Cook Ding, "as the sage achieves fractal integration with the system, the carcass becomes dinner worthy of a king, the game becomes a signature even that may be long remembered, and

even the way may become legendary, having met for a moment the participation of the sage" (647).

This sagely quality of language is perhaps also what C. K. Odgen and I. A. Regards suggest, because they are sensitive not only to what we say but also to what we say *with*. Both Odgen and Richards definitely see the emotive use of language as important as symbolic use of it. For them, who believe that "words or arrangement of words evoke attitudes both directly as sounds," there is clear difference between "the presentation of an object which makes use of the direct emotional disturbances produced by certain arrangements, to reinstate the whole situation of seeing, or hearing, the object, together with the emotions felt towards it" *and* "a presentation which is purely scientific, *i.e.*, symbolic" (236). "The attitude evoked," they emphasize, "need not necessarily be directed towards the objects stated as means of evoking it, but is often a more general adjustment" (236). Like what has been suggested in chaos theory, "the effect of words due directly (i.e. physiologically) to their sound qualities," as Ogden and Richards see it, "are probably slight and only become important through such cumulative and hypnotic effects as are produced through rhythm and rhyme" (236). As a result, they call to our attention, "As sound, again as movements of articulation, and also through many subtle networks of association, the contexts of their occurrences in the past, they play very directly upon the organized impulses of the affective-volitional systems" (236).

(4) Activating Synaesthesia and Authenticating Silence: thinking "the Unthinkable" and Teaching "the Impossible"

With all these rich implications aroused along with the old thoughts, it is clear that we should reassess our approach to the "unteachable" materials through the fluidity of our being and our language for the infinite constructive interaction in ways suggested in the Daoist perception of the world, chaos theory, and "aesthetic composition." As teachers, we should probably find ways to transform ourselves metaphorically, as much as we can, like the musical notes of the emotive/evocative language, a dancing knife, to let our fluid being meld with the system of the text and the collective mind of our students. Like Professor Gray, who encountered the problem of testing and communicating with his students in terms of their experience of Zen, I also ran into difficulty of teaching Japanese *haibu*, because it is as challenging as writing about Zen expedience. Is it possible to teach through verbal description, orally and in writing, about the incommunicable, which seem to encourage *silence* rather verbal communication?

> The ancient pond
> A frog jumps in –
> Sound of water.

Is it possible to describe the feeling that is evoked by this well-known piece by

Matsuo Basho? Does it convey a meaning of love of nature or capture the fleeting and fragile moment of our life? Why is this good poem?

As we may try to explain not only to the students but also to ourselves, this is a good poem because it captures the extraordinary moment of human experience that defies or deters ordinary distinction of things and our feeling about them. It captures the "dramatic" moment when our fractal self slip into the watery universe of the pond following the sagely action of the frog and become part of the system of nature. We are led to lose of grip on our "self" (吾喪我) and become "transformed," "naturalized," or "eternalized" (物化) into the world of profound silence following the momentary "sound of water." It is also the rare moment that we are enlivened to the beautiful *silence* through ripple or echoes of "sound of water" that concurs both audibly and visibly in the form of ripples in the pond and in our mind. With sagely frog, there emerges perfect union between the *audible* silence and *visible* echoes that defines and refines a universe that defies usual human sense experience. It is the moment that our physical and psychological world, our imaginative response and intellectual reasoning, all are emerged or blended into one another to suggest an aesthetic composition that elevates ourselves. It is the rare moment, the seventeen syllabus become lyrically profound or, as Montaigne would imply, "accidentally philosophical."

As if quite accidentally or matter-of-factly, the simple lines touch off a chain of visual and audible ripples/echoes of philosophical reflections in the reader's mind—with a mixed existentialist and Buddhist flavor and touch. The very moment that the frog jumps into the "ancient" pond, it becomes a sage, and so do the poet, the poem, and we as responsive readers. Indeed, following the sagely frog and equally sagely audible ripples and visible echoes, our fractal self enriches itself where we see opposites unite, paradoxes dissolve, sense experiences transgress, and silence communicates. This is where yin and yang complements or the extremes mellow. The different systems we each represents or personifies psychologically or culturally become perfectly merged into a meaningful world, symbolized by the "ancient" pond, the immeasurable depth and beauty of which, like that of Walden, as Thoreau would suggest, depends on where it is. Translated or original, the language here becomes no longer just the tool or barrier but the carrier for the extended self. It *is* now the thought–enriching metaphor of the beauty of systems. Language became the "tongue" of the universal Dao or the harmonious chaos in being.

Such "way-making" or "Dao-carving" quality of language could be particularly explored and appreciated as "synaesthesia," a rhetorical term that, indeed, suggests the unusual (but undoubtedly universal) aesthetic or live human experience where ordinary sense experiences dissolve, as the audible becomes visual while the visual becomes audible.[9] In his poem "London," William Blake, for instance, suggests that he not only hears but also sees ". . . the hapless soldier's sigh/Runs in blood

down palace walls."[10] In *Nostormo*, Joseph Conrad describes how "the solitude appeared like a great void, and the silence of the gulf like a tense, thin, cord to which [Don Martin Decoud] hung suspended by both hand," and how "the cord of silence snap[s] in the solitude of the Placid Gulf" with the self-inflicted gunshot that ends the passionate misanthropic or nihilist's life (498-9). In "Tong Guan," Qian Zhongshu discusses how much a little flower of apricot sticking out the wall of yard suggests *noisy* color of the coming spring "紅杏枝頭春意鬧" and how severely this wonderful choice of word "noisy" is ridiculed by straight thinking critics, such as, Li Yu 李漁, as "illogical" (Qian 21). Qian also refers to mystics like Saint-Martin, who confesses, "I heard flowers that sounded and saw notes that shone" (28). In both "Tong Guan" and *Guanzhui Bian*, Qian mentions about interesting cases in *Liezi* 列子 regarding how one's eye can hear like ear, how one's ear can smell like nose, and how one's nose can taste like mouth, as nothing is not interconnected with one's mind and heart in concentration and with forms of things dissolved "眼如耳, 耳如鼻, 鼻如口, 無不同也, 心凝形釋" (列子/黃帝篇) or how a disciple of Laozi can hear and see the Tao after being enlightened "老聃之第子有亢子者, 得聃之道, 能以耳視而目聽" (列子/仲尼篇). With our understanding of the infinitely interconnected, interacted universe as suggested in the verse of Daoism and chaos theory, the ancient rhetoric seem to suggest a world, an experience, more than it signifies.

As a result, our students should be encouraged to talk about their experience with images created through the enriched image-making, way-making, world-creating, or Dao-carving language that should produce as much meaning-making ripples as it would be with any thought-provoking flapping of the butterfly. We should encourage them to describe in as much detail as possible not just for *correctness* but *relevancy*, not just for *clear* language but *strong* language, not just for *denotation* but *evocativeness* as well. We should let the vibration of their mind go. We should let "butterfly" of their feeling transform with the echoes and ripples of the pond, the evoked rhythm and pulses of their lives. We should actively employ theories that emphasize non-cognitive function of language with the implication of the *Dao*, the chaos theory, and "aesthetic composition" for the dynamic and broad vision of life. Through exploring the evocative and metaphorical nature of language for such live flow of mind, we may quite ironically live up to our subjectivity or any momentary revelation regarding our fragile, fleeting, fluid, and fractal being. So should we, or is it possible for us to, ask students to write a five hundred word paper describe their "feeling" of the haiku? Why not? For me, this is one of the most effective ways for students to enrich or invigorate their "self" through sagely mediation of language, evocative silence, communicative illusion, tangible pulse in words.

As is also vividly implied in James Wright's poem "A Blessing," our life or being will be infinitely enlivened and enriched through such authenticating fluidity

of language that may carry us and our students further for a more enlightened response to our world, which is, however, often segregated by various "barbered wires," inside and outside us, physical and psychological. But once we are tempted by the pair of sagely Indian ponies, enlightened by the simple and innocent beauty of nature that they personify or incarnate, we ourselves will become sagely after the indispensable "trespassing" across the "barbed wires" and then "stepp[ing] out of [our] body […] break Into blossom." With the fluidity of the rhythm and images, what the poet has done for us is also very much sage-like or sagely. So should we as teachers. The sagely ponies that triggers a sea change or butterfly effect that crosses out the boundaries to finally reveal the intimate bond that has long been overlooked and violated between man and man, man and nature, and man and himself. The bond means a perfect "aesthetic composition" that encourages and nourishes spontaneous sagely action for a subtle but significant transformation with every little detail that accounts.

Just off the highway to Rochester, Minnesota,
Twilight bounds softly forth on the grass.
And the eyes of those two Indian ponies
Darken with kindness.
They have come gladly out of the willows
To welcome my friend and me.
We step over the barbed wire into the pasture
Where they have been grazing all day, alone.
They ripple tensely, they can hardly contain their happiness
That we have come.
They bow shyly as wet swans. They love each other.
There is no loneliness like theirs.
At home once more,
They begin munching the young tufts of spring in the darkness.
I would like to hold the slender one in my arms,
For she has walked over to me
And nuzzled my left hand.
She is black and while,
Her mane falls wild on her forehead,
And the light breeze moves me to caress her long ear
That is delicate as the skin over a girl's wrist.
Suddenly I realize
That if I stepped out of my body I would break
Into blossom (Wright 1991, 1029)

Notes

[1] Without depersonalization or losing one's self "*wu shang wo* 吾喪我," there is no genuine transformation "*wuhua* 物化," which may suggest changes and differences but, as Chen Guying emphasizes in his analysis of the first chapter of the *Zhuangzi*, ultimately implies nothing but everything as one. No matter how "idealistic" as it might appear, "*wu shang wo*" through "*wuhua*" indicates in the end "*wu feng* 無分," "*wu dai* 無待," "wu shi, 無恃" as thus analogized with the kind of freedom "*xiao yao* 逍遙" and "transformation" of "Kuan-Peng 鯤鵬," which are after all just ironical images that Zhuangzi creates to show what perfect freedom and "transformation" are not. However free or independent the mythical creature may strike us as it travels and transforms itself, its freedom and independence is nothing but illusion, as its seemingly perfect freedom and independence depends so much on the invisible and indispensable flows or currents of air, because, what Zhuagnzi also argues in the second chapter of the *Zhuagnzi*, according to Zhang Songru, is to show how difference or distinction is just phenomenon and how the real and essential is non-differentiable; and how things in the world are differentiable but not the *Tao*, which is beyond differentiation "有分是現象, 無分是本真, 有分是萬物, 無分是道. 這就叫做齊物論" (Zhang 223).

[2] See *Chuang Tzu* Chapters 2 and 6. A.C. Graham, 48, 92.

[3] This is not a word by word translation but rather a general paraphrase. See Sima Qian, "Cao Can Liezhuan," *Shiji*. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959 (司馬遷, 史記, 曹參列傳, 中華書局, 1959).

[4] See chapter 17 of the *Chuang Tzu*.

[5] Even though none of the translators, Watson and Graham, refers to image of "wild horses (yema 野馬)" that may convey vivid image of flying dusts by suggesting the thousands of wild horses running afield, the two translations do miss the musical quality of the original.

> Wavering heat, bits of dust, living things blown about by the wind—the sky looks very blue. Is that its real color, or is it because it is so far away and has no end? (Watson 23)

> Is the azure of the sky its true colour? Or is it that the distance into which we are looking is infinite? It never stops flying higher till everything below looks the same as above (heat-hazes, dust-storms, the breath which living things blow at each other (Graham 43).

Unlike James Legge, who translates this passage as "Similar to this is the movement of the dust that quivers in sunbeams, and of living things as they are blown against one another by the air," both translators seem to be aware of the serious mistake that Sima Biao 司馬彪 of Jin 晉Dynasty made when he mistakes "ma" as "horse" not knowing that, as Lu Zhongda (陸宗達) points out, in early classic Chinese "Ma 馬" and "chen 塵" (dust) are interchangeable in meaning and pronunciation. For James Legge, see Chuang Tzu: Genius of the Absurd. Arranged from the work of James Legge by Clae Waltham (New York: Ace Books, 1971) 39. For Lu Zongda, see Lu Zongda, Xungujianlun, Beijing: 1983 (訓詁簡論, 陸宗達著, 北京出版社, 1983) 108.

[6] The Chinese program I use does not have large enough vocabulary to transcript the original passage here.

[7] For discussion of dao as "way-making," see Ames and Hall, *Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine, 2003) p. 77. For discussion of "world-making," see Hall and Ames, *Thinking through Confucius* (Albany, SUNY, 1987) p. 229.

[8] Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1979) 149.

[9] Even in everyday situation, we often run into expression, such as "it looks hot" or "it sounds cool." For vivid discussion of cases concerning "synaesthesia" in classical Chinese and western literature, see Qian Zhongshu, "Synaesthesia" *Comparative Literature Studies: A Collection*. Ed. Zhang Longxi and Wen Rumin. Beijing: Peking UP (錢鐘書, "通感," 比較文學論文集, 張隆溪 溫儒敏選編, 北京大學出版社, 1984).

[10] Laurie G. Kirszner, et al. *Literature: Reading, Reacting, Writing*. 3rd ed (New York: Harcourt, 1991) 899.

References

Ames, Roger T.. 1989. "Putting the *Te* back into Taoism." in *Nature in Asia Traditions of Thought: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*. Ed. J. Baird Callicott and Roger T. Ames. State U of New York Press.

——— & David L. Hall. 2003. *Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation*. New York: Ballantine.

Blake, William. 1991. "London." in *Literature: Reading, Reacting, Writing*. 3rd ed. Ed. Kirszner, Laurie G, et al. New York: Harcourt.

Burke, Edmund. 1986. *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame Press.

Conrad, Joseph. 1974. *Nostromo: A Tale of the Seaboard*. Dent, London: Everyman.

De Man, Paul. 1979. *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust*. New Haven: Yale UP.

Graham, A. C. 1989 *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

———. Trans. 1981. *Chuang-Tzu: The Seven Inner Chapters and other writings from the book of Chuang Tzu*. Trans. A. C. Graham. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Hall, David L. & Roger T. Ames. 1987. *Thinking Through Confucius*. Albany: SUNY.

Hansen, Chad. 1992. *A Daoist Theory of Chiense Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation*. New York: Oxford UP.

Jones, David and John Culliney. 1999. "The Fractal Self and the Organization of Nature: The Daoist Sage and Chaos Theory." *Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science*, vol.34, no.4. December. 643-654.

Legge, James. Trans. 1971. *Chuang Tzu: Genius of the Absurd*. Arranged from the work of James Legge by ClaeWaltham. New York: Ace Books.

Ogden, C. K. and I. A. Richards. 1923. *The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Watson, Burton. Trans. 1964. *Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings*. New York: Columbia UP.

Wright, James. 1991. "A Blessing." in *Literature: Reading, Reacting, Writing*. 3rd ed. Ed. Kirszner, Laurie G, et al. New York: Harcourt.

References in Chinese

Cao Chuji. 1982. *Zhuangzi* Gianzhu, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju (莊子淺註, 曹礎基著, 中華書局).

Chen Guying. 1987. "Development of Theoretical Structure of *Qi Wu Pian*." Qilu Press, (陳鼓應, "齊物論的理論結構之開展." 老莊論集. 張松如, 陳鼓應, 趙明, 張軍, 濟南, 齊魯書社)

Lu Zongda. 1983. *Xungujianlun*, Beijing: Beijing Chubanshe (訓詁簡論, 陸宗達著, 北京出版社).

Qian, Zhongshu. 1984. "Synaesthesia." in *Comparative Literature Studies: A Collection*. Ed. Zhang Longxi and Wen Rumin. Beijing: Peking UP (錢鐘書, "通感," 比較文學論文集, 張隆溪 溫儒敏選編, 北京大學出版社)

Sima Qian. 1959. "Cao Can Liezhuan," *Shiji*. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju (司馬遷, 史記 曹參列傳, 中華書局).

Zhang Songru, "On Dream of Butterfly," ibid. (張松如, "說蝴蝶夢," 老莊論集).

Asian Studies and Interpretation: Hermeneutics as a Way for Bridging Cultural Gaps in a Post Cold War World

Keith W. Krasemann, College of DuPage

> We are living in a constant transformative process within the horizon of encounters between different people. If we are open and responsive to other people in dialogue, then mystery can lead humans to learn to trust and find a way of reconciling the differences of culture and existence. —Isamu Nagami

A series of events that included significant changes in the countries of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, Baltic independence and the break-up of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War. The end of the Cold War brought drastic changes to the world situation. The United States emerged as the only remaining superpower and a new multi-polar world order began to take shape. Currently, five power centers structure the international system: the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and Japan. Strategies of peaceful coexistence, coordination, cooperation and competition are replacing the Cold War policies of confrontation, containment and isolation.

The major powers, although retaining their independence, nevertheless have common political and economic interests. Because of these interests, there is increased talk of globalization, interdependence and cultural exchanges. Security interests, most recently threats of global terrorism, also bind the big powers. The mutual pursuit of shared interests is closing the power gaps and will, it is hoped, lead to increased stability amongst the pillars of the new multi-polar system.

However, there will be, Chen Peiyao tells us, "contradiction and friction"[1] among the big powers due to the conflicts that occur in pursuit of national interests. Fortunately, the greater good to be gained via cooperation provides incentive to keep disagreements between world powers in check. But, the end of the Cold War also brought ethnic controversies to the surface and exposed religious strife and hatred. Territorial disputes and conflicts of development and

traditional cultures are not uncommon. Furthermore, local and regional conflicts continue to erupt.

As a result of the emerging world order new possibilities for trans-cultural understanding and opportunities for positive engagement through dialogue have been granted. At the same time, because of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, increased threats of international terrorism and numerous regional and local disputes, the need for cross-cultural understanding has never been more urgent. This paper represents an effort to appropriate new possibilities for understanding ourselves and others and, at the same time, it is a response to the urgent need to counter the many misunderstandings that give rise to conflict in the post Cold War world. Although hermeneutics can be applied universally, the emphasis of this paper is interpreting Asia.

What Is Hermeneutics?

Etymologically the term "hermeneutics" is related to the Greek god Hermes, the messenger of the gods. According to Martin Heidegger,

> The expression "hermeneutic" derives from the Greek verb *hermeneuein*. That verb is related to the noun *hermeneus*, which is referable to the name of the god Hermes by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigor of science. (29)

Hermes carried messages from Zeus and bridged the gap between the gods and mortals. In addition, he crossed the divide between the living and the dead and negotiated boundaries between the visible and the invisible and between the dream world and the waking world. As the god of travelers and merchants, Hermes transversed the borders of empires. "It is Hermes nature," said Walter Otto, "not to belong to any locality and not to possess any permanent abode; always he is on the road between here and there." (117) He is the god of intelligence and the inventor of the alphabet, arithmetic, astronomy, musical scales, weights and measures and gymnastics. As "Mercury" he is the quicksilver god prone to sudden insights, imagination and the creative synthesis of ideas. Richard Palmer tells us, "Hermes truly is the "god of gaps," of the margins, the boundaries, liminus of many things. He is a "*liminal*" phenomenon" (1999, 3).

The term "liminality" was given currency in the twentieth century by anthropologist Victor Turner. The term was used with reference to the state of an individual during a threshold experience. *Limen* in Latin means "threshold" and the liminal stage (the between stage, for example, the period of transition between childhood and adulthood) is that gap between clearly defined life stages where one's status becomes ambiguous. In this transitional state one is "neither here nor there," one is "betwixt and between all fixed points of clarification." (232) Between the margins the rules that govern meaning are temporarily suspended and one exists in a "zone of indeterminacy."[2] Turner and his colleagues were fascinated by this marginal state and argued that this state was the threshold from

which the great artists, writers and thinkers look beyond the established social order and to see, as it were, society from the outside and to bring a message from beyond its borders.

Hermeneutics today takes its character from Hermes and operates at the periphery of cultural horizons in an attempt to bring meaning and understanding across the gaps. From the mythic god Hermes the essential meaning of hermeneutics discloses itself as a mediation between worlds. And, Heidegger tells us, that this mediation brings a "transformation of thinking" (42).

Hermeneutics is both the theory and practice of interpretation. Its long history in Western philosophy can be traced as far back as Plato's *Ion* and Aristotle's, *On Interpretation*. In classical Greek, the term "hermeneutics" means, "to interpret." The term and its cognates were used by the ancients to mean: first, the oral interpretation of Homeric and other classical texts: interpreters of Homer, like Ion, were called "hermeneuts." Second, the term referred to the translation of texts from one language to another. The understanding of translation as a hermeneutical process underscored the fact that all translations are, at once, interpretations. Third, hermeneutics referred to the exegesis of texts. The purpose of exegesis was to bring out the meaning, or hidden meanings, of a text. The various traditions of hermeneutics offered rules for the interpretation of texts.

In the seventeenth century hermeneutics developed as a discipline that established guidelines for interpretation of Biblical texts. Beginning in 1805, Friedrich Schleiermacher attempted to fashion an *allgemeine Hermeneutik*, a "general hermeneutics," that dealt with the "art of understanding" wherever it occurs. He noted, "What every child does in constructing a new word it does not know is hermeneutics."[3]

Although, as a theologian, Schleiermacher was most concerned with the application of hermeneutic principles to Biblical texts, he extended the discipline and looked for "the universal condition" of all understanding in language. In a lecture, published posthumously under the title "Hermeneutics and Criticism, with special reference to the New Testament," Schleiermacher wrote,

> Hermeneutics and criticism, both philological disciplines, both methodologies, belong together, because the practice of each presupposes the other. The first is in general the art of understanding another man's language, particularly his written language; the second, the art of judging rightly the genuineness of written works and passages, and to establish it on the strength of adequate evidence and data. (quoted in Heidegger 1971, 10)

The concept "hermeneutics" thus was extended to mean the theory and methodology for all interpretation.

Wilhelm Dilthey continued Schleiermacher's general hermeneutics as a "general methodology of the humanities and social sciences." According to Dilthey,

> Every single human expression represents something which is common to many and therefore part of the realm of objective mind. Every word or sentence, every gesture or form of politeness, every work of art and every historical deed are only understandable because the person expressing himself and the person who understands him are connected by something they have in common; the individual always experiences, thinks, acts, and also understands in this common sphere. (146 f)

In the 20th century hermeneutical study underwent transformation in both scope and method for what sociologists and phenomenologists call the "human sciences." Heidegger further developed this methodology in his "hermeneutic phenomenology."[4] He stressed the importance of language in the human participation of being. In other words, Heidegger argued that the human world and, hence, human understanding, is linguistically preconstituted.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Ludwig Wittgenstein claimed that the understanding of any meaningful episode requires that the action or utterance be located within its appropriate "form of life." (8-12) In other words, Wittgenstein believed all of our attempts to arrive at the so called "facts" will be relative to the conceptual framework of a particular form of life.

Heidegger's student, Hans-Georg Gadamer maintained that the one model most appropriate to understanding social action and, indeed, culture is that of interpreting a text. In contrast to reductionist models of understanding and explanation, hermeneutics does not seek to determine causes or frame laws but, rather, it employs a circular process of seeking to understand a whole in terms of its parts, and its parts as they contribute to the meaning of the whole.

Like Heidegger, Gadamer emphasized the importance of language to our human understanding and being. "Language," he said, "allows humans to dwell in the house of being." In other words, language is the medium of all human experience. "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all embracing form of the constitution of the world." (3) Language and its structures precede us in the world, and we, in effect, live in our language. Some would even say, "We are lived by our language."[5]

Hermeneutics is an approach to the human world that endeavors to recover and interpret the meanings of human actions from the historical-cultural point of view of the individuals performing them. Tojo Thachankary tells us that,

> …hermeneutical thinkers share a common concern to resist the notion of a wordless and timeless source of insight. Human understanding always takes place within an emerging linguistic framework evolved over time in terms of historically conditioned concerns and practices. In summary, hermeneutics makes the point that language and history are always both *conditions* and *limits* of our understanding. (204)

As human beings, we all exist historically. We are born into a society that is itself historically shaped. We become ourselves, as it were, only within symbol systems. They have us as much as we have them.

Problems with Comparative Studies of Asian Cultures and the Need for Hermeneutics in Asian Studies

Comparative studies of Asian cultures, though both legitimate and useful, are inadequate. Two related reasons account for this inadequacy: First, the uncritical identification with one's own culture, language and the assumptions inherent within one's cultural perspective limit or deny access to the essential features of the other's culture. According to Benjamin Whorf,

> Every normal person in the world, past infancy in years, can and does talk. By virtue of that fact, every person—civilized or uncivilized—carries through life certain naïve but deeply rooted ideas about talking and its relation to thinking. Because of their firm connection with speech habits that have become unconscious and automatic, these notions tend to be rather intolerant of opposition. They are by no means entirely personal and haphazard. Their basis is definitely systematic, so that we are justified in calling them a system of *natural logic*—a term that seems to me preferable to the term *common sense*, often used for the same thing. (85)

Isamu Nagamai refers to this "natural logic" as "taken-for-grantedness." He said,

> We cannot escape the "taken-for-grantedness" of our world. We are fatefully thrown into that world where we must find meanings for our existence. It is impossible to have meaningful dialogue with others if we do not take our language for granted. (318)

However, unless one can transcend this "taken-for grantedness" of which Nagamai speaks, one's thinking will be ideological.

Secondly, understandings of Asian cultures in comparative studies uncritically impose the logical categories of the home culture upon the culture of other. Such attempts reduce the richness of the other culture to the conceptual horizons of the home culture. Sadly, explanatory coherence within the conceptual scheme of the home culture often satisfies the interpreter of Asia in a way that reduces the other culture to a neat, tidy intelligible package with no loose strings attached.

Moreover, this second problem is often compounded in the process of educating others about Asia. Comparative generalizations set the home culture over against the culture of other. In addition, these generalizations typically base cultural understanding on cultural differences, for example, individual orientation versus group orientation, universalist point of view versus particularist viewpoints, and so on. Furthermore, these generalizations are often presented as unchanging universal truths. Many students of Asia indiscriminately apply these categories as a handy way to explain or account for cultural differences.

In contrast, hermeneutics offers an approach to cultural understanding that focuses on transcending the taken-for-grantedness of one's culture. Hermeneutics focuses on essential features of meaning and understanding common to our shared world. Hermeneutics can transport us beyond our cultural horizons to new,

shared significant meanings and transformed ways of thinking. The process of trans-cultural dialogue can bridge cultural gaps and lead to a genuine appreciation of, and mutual sharing/learning with, the other.

Gadamer's Dialogical Hermeneutics and the Fusion of Horizons

Gadamer's dialogical hermeneutics allows the interpreter of another culture to get beyond the "taken for grantedness" of one's home culture and language. This process of going beyond one's cultural horizon occurs when we encounter the other in and through dialogue. By way of practical engagement of the other through dialogue, the interpreter is able to think him/herself into the conceptual categories and frameworks of the other's culture. This dialogical approach is a process of mediation that Gadamer calls "the fusion of horizons."[6]

What makes it possible to fuse our horizon of understanding with another is the pre-understanding we bring to trans-cultural encounters about what it means to express our humanity and a sense of connectedness that one experiences in identification with other persons within the context of a shared world. In the inter-subjective space of engagement a fusion of horizons is possible. Furthermore, because subject-object distinctions collapse in the fusion of horizons the result is not so much a better understanding of another culture (i.e. as an object of understanding) but rather it is the appropriation of the other culture into our lives. Such encounters produce significant learning and development, transformed thinking and personal growth. Moreover, this process is reciprocal. As is the case with all modes of authentic engagement we are influenced and changed by the other as we also influence and change the other. That is to say, we enable each other to grow together. For Gadamer, it is the openness of language itself that grants people the ability to transcend their own interpretive horizons.

One way Gadamer breaks down the tension between the subject and the object or between the I and the other is by invoking the model of a game. In playing a game, Gadamer held a player no longer stands outside the game but rather participates in it. He put it this way,

> For when one plays a game, the game itself is never a mere object; rather, it exists in and for those who play it, even if one is only participating as 'spectator.' In this context, I think, the inappropriateness of the concept of a 'subject' and an 'object' is evident. (quoted in Demeterio 2001, 8)

In a game, the participant loses the status of a subject and the game loses the status of an object. Interpretation creatively emerges in the activity of playful engagement within that space of indeterminacy.

One does not approach another culture in an unbiased, objective manner. Rather, in approaching another culture the interpreter carries a point of view that is structured conceptually, historically, and culturally. This point of view is necessarily limited and brings assumptions, biases, expectations and prejudices

toward the other culture. But, on Gadamer's view these prejudices constitute the fore-structures of our understanding of another culture and, as such, become a condition for understanding.

Because of a transformation in meaning brought by the Enlightenment, the term "prejudice" (originally a term that meant "pre-judgment") acquired pejorative connotations. Nevertheless, Gadamer retained this term and highlighted the fact that prejudices are embodied in the totality of a culture in both judgment and taste. These prejudices contribute to a body of practical knowledge inherited by tradition and structure the practical ideals of the community. Prejudice, Gadamer argued, is necessary for both understanding and interpretation.

Horizon, on Gadamer's view, means that set of prejudices, knowledge that is given, or the "taken-for-grantedness" of a culture that constitutes the starting point of human understanding. Some prejudices are productive and others are not. Judgments about which ones are productive of good interpretation must be worked out within the hermeneutical situation. Horizons are unstable and can change as a result of exposure to other cultural horizons. Gadamer's model for that interaction between two subjective horizons is that of dialogue. Successful dialogue leads to an eventual *Horizontverschmelzung*, or fusion of horizons.

The process of mediation that leads to transformed thinking is circular and ongoing. The so-called "hermeneutical circle" means that interpreters project a meaning into a text (culture), and the text (culture) either confirms or resists that meaning. The projected meaning is structured by the interpreter's background. But, the text (culture) represents a different historical cultural horizon that often resists the fore-understandings of the interpreter. Interpretation is always ongoing and some difficulties are not necessarily or easily resolvable. The text always goes beyond the author and culture always goes beyond interpretation. As such the hermeneutical process is ongoing.

The Hermeneutic Circle

Since the interpretive process is circular and involves understanding the whole in relation to its parts and the parts in relation to the whole, the following key ideas will be helpful for those interpreters of Asia that choose this method. First, context is critical to good interpretation. Participants in the interpretive process, as well as the themes and issues discussed, do not exist in a vacuum. The immediate problem must be located within a larger, deeper historical/cultural context. The broader view, depending upon the issue, will also include social, economic, political, religious or philosophical contexts. Furthermore, the understanding of the participants in the dialogue is embedded in particular cultural contexts.

Secondly, good interpretation considers the effect of the researcher on the researched. Interpretation is a form of qualitative research and outcomes will be influenced by the point of view of the researcher. The interpreter of another

culture brings assumptions to his/her study and good interpretation makes these assumptions explicit. The meaning extracted from cross-cultural research will consider the orientation of the researcher relative to a particular area of interest. One will be aware of the pre-understandings about the themes under investigation gained from literature reviews, films, lectures, etc. One will also note the types of questions asked and the nature of answers sought.

Third, the interpreter of Asian culture is interpreting a world that has already been interpreted by the people actually living in that culture. The major task of hermeneutical reflection is to become aware of the invisibility of one's own cultural presuppositions. If one is hermeneutically open to this task, one's own assumptions are brought to light and can now be critically appraised.

Interpreting Asia in Education

Laurent Daloz asserted that the best education results in significant learning. According to Daloz significant learning is achieved by asking progressively broader and deeper questions and this learning involves development.[7] Hermeneutics is well suited to Asian Studies Development because it deals with authentic encounters that both shatter and extend horizons. Meaningful educational experiences leave the student's understanding transformed and hermeneutics is all about transformed understanding.

The twentieth century philosopher/theologian Martin Buber offered insights that apply to the hermeneutical process of dialogue that leads to a fusion of horizons. He believed that human life, fragile as it is, can be a fulfillment if it is a dialogue. In a response that is open to the point of view of another it is possible to achieve "genuine meetings." Buber put the point this way:

> Human life and humanity come into being in genuine meetings. There man learns not merely that he is limited by man, cast upon his own finitude, partialness, need of completion, but his own relation to truth is heightened by the other's different relation to the same truth – different in accordance with his individuation, and destined to take seed and grow differently. Men need, and it is granted to them to confirm one another in their individual being by means of genuine meetings. (78-9)

Human understanding, through dialogue, does not yield absolute truth but places participants in the hermeneutic process in the proper relationship to truth. The result of genuine meetings, through dialogue, is the transformation of self and others. The genuine work of education according to Nagami "is to provide and teach this dialogical-critical ability to human beings so that we can create and develop meaningful societies in a global sense" (319).

Hermeneutics and Cultural Gaps

As interpreters of Asia we work at the boundaries between cultures and like Hermes we bridge cultural gaps. The fusion of horizons is made possible through

a comportment of openness, an attitude of humility and a willingness to listen to the other. In the process of mediation, it is language itself that discloses the universal dimension in which differences can be overcome and out of which cultural gaps may be bridged.

Philosophy in general, and Western philosophy in particular, is often understood as argument. This conception of philosophy presupposes the dominant metaphor of war or conflict. Thus, philosophy is all about taking and advancing a position, defending a position or attacking and defeating the opponent. In the practical realm this metaphor leads to a confrontational approach towards the other as is evident in global human rights issues. But, philosophy understood as interpretation transcends differences and mediates understanding. The role of mediation is reconciliation. Reconciliation brings peace and restores trust. The human truth of philosophy becomes "real" to the extent that it is translated into life and to the life-world. In our post Cold War world it is clear that a transformation in thinking that can bridge cultural gaps and bring reconciliation through new meanings and understanding is badly needed.

Notes

[1] Chen Peiyao makes extensive use of the phrase "contradiction and friction" in his "China: Post-Cold War Environment & Its External Relations" in *The Post Cold War World*, Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Shanghai, China, 2000. According to Chen direct military threat between the big powers has vanished. But, economic competition, political and security interests will continue to result in contradiction and friction. He claims that the main cause of contradiction and friction is the US desire to dominate nations and attempts by major powers to block US dominance. Contradiction and friction will result from necessary adjustments that must occur between states in a rapidly emerging world order.

[2] Richard Palmer (1980) used the term "zone of indeterminacy" and the term "zone of disclosure" to illuminate Turner's concept of the "liminal" or "threshold" stage; i.e. the gap.

[3] See the posthumous translation of Schleiermacher's *hermeneutics fragments*.

[4] See Quentin Skinner's *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

[5] Theodore Kisiel calls attention to Heidegger's work on Aristotle and Aristotle's sense of how "deeply practical" Greek language was for the ancient life-world. See Kisiel's "Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger's Protopractical Ontology." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 8 (2), 187.

[6] Emergent and ongoing understandings are the results of open dialogue in which there is a coming together of perspectives. As such the basis for judgments and moral decision-making is never fixed a priori, but always emerges from the fusion of horizons.

[7] Daloz views learning as a dialogical process. Development is closely related to a dialogical relationship to oneself and the enrichment of one's inner dialogue. See his *Effective Teaching and Mentoring*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 124.

References

Buber, Martin. 1999. "Response." Quest for Goodness: An Introduction to Ethics, second edition. Ed. Keith W. Krasemann. Boston: Pearson Publishing, 76-82.

Daloz, Laurent A. 1986. *Effective Teaching and Mentoring*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

———. 1999. *Mentor: Guiding the Journey of Adult Learners*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Demeterio, F.P.A. III. 2001. "Dialectical Hermeneutics." *Diwatao*, Vol. 1, No.1, <http://www.geocities.com/philodept/dimatao/dialectal_hermeneutics.htm>.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. 1958. *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichten Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*; *Gesammelte Schrifen*, Vol. 7. Leipzig and Berlin 1927; 2nd ed.

Gadamer, Hans Georg. 1975. *Truth and Method*. Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press.

Heidegger, Martin. 1994. *Einführung ih die phänomenologische Forschung, Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 17. Ed. F.W. von Herrmann. Frankfort: Klostermann.

Heidegger, Martin. 1971. *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers.

Kisiel, Theodore. "Situating Rhetorical Politics in Heidegger's Protopractical Ontology." *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 8 (2), 185-208.

Nagami, Isamu. 2003. "Cultural Gaps: Why Do We Misunderstand." *Questions For the Soul: An Introduction to Philosophy*, Fourth Edition. Ed. Keith W. Krasemann. Acton, MA: Copley Publishing Group, 312-319.

Otto, Walter F. 1954. *The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion*. Trans. Moses Hadas. New York: Pantheon.

Palmer, Richard E. 1980. "The Liminality of Hermes and the Meaning of Hermeneutics" *Proceedings of the Heraclitean Society: A Quarterly Report on Philosophy and Criticism of the Arts and Sciences*, Vol. 5. Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University Department of Philosophy, 411-421.

———. 1999. "The Relevance of Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics to Thirty-Six Topics or Fields of Human Activity." A Lecture Delivered at the Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Peiyao, Chen. "China: Post-Cold War Environment and Its External Relations." *The Post Cold War World*. The Shanghai Institute for International Studies. Shanghai, China: SIIS Publication, 2000. 1-27.

Skinner, Quentin, Ed. 1985. *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thachankary, Tojo. "Organizations As 'Texts': Hermeneutics as a Model for Understanding Organizational Change." *Research in Organizational Change and Development*, Vol. 6. 197 - 233

Turner, Victor. 1974. Dramas, *Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Whorf, Benjamin L. 1998. "Science and Linguistics." *Basic Concepts of Intercultural Communication*. Ed. Milton J. Bennet. Yarmouth, MA: Intercultural Press, Inc., 85-95.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. *Philosophical Investigations*, 2nd ed. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford.

Book Reviews

Enduring the Revolution: Ding Ling and the Politics of Literature in Guomindang China. By Charles J. Alber. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 288 Pages.

Jiang Bingzhi, who reinvented herself as Ding Ling, the foremost female Chinese writer of the 20th Century, fulfilled the old Chinese curse of living through interesting times. She evolved from a dutiful daughter of the Qing dynasty to be Mao Zedong's favorite female writer; the young woman absorbed in love and relationships became a pillar of the Communist regime. Her ambitions and understanding of herself and her talents change. Her relationships with the men in her life are problematical, beginning with her first husband Hu Yepin. They also include relations with the great writer and sometime patron, Lu Xun, as well as Mao himself, and her later husbands and lovers. Late in her life, in the fall of 1948 as the "final victory" was in sight, Ding Ling represented the Chinese Communist Party at the Second International Congress of Democratic Women's Federations in Budapest, the first time she had traveled outside China. It is an interesting interlude in her life, but it is also the final chapter in the book, apart from an epilogue. This disappointed me by leaving out her rather bitter and conflicted later years.

Jiang Yulan, Ding Ling's father, delicate twig on a family tree of generations of scholars, was charming but unsuccessful – as a provider, as a husband, as a father. He dabbled in drugs, developed tuberculosis, and died in 1908, at the age of thirty, leaving his lower-status wife Yu Manzhen practically bankrupt, with a young daughter Bingzhi and a soon-to-be-born son to support. She took on her task with commendable independence. Realizing the only road upward was through education, Yu Manzhen enrolled herself at a teacher's college, where her colleagues helped the busy mother with her children. Jiang Wei (her mother had changed Bingzhi to Wei to reflect her new life and hopes for her children – Wei was a character for "Great"), though not a diligent student, was successful in getting attention and impressing people, an ability that served her well throughout her life. Alber quotes her as remembering: "I was naughty in school and did not like the classroom. I made fun of the teachers and played during lessons, but I

was the child-star at meetings and also at assemblies and made recitations and speeches. . .” (14).

At 17, Jiang Wei planned to move to the big city, Shanghai, inflaming her third maternal uncle who felt his niece should finish school locally and marry his son, to whom she had been betrothed years ago. Her refusal to do so, supported loyally by her mother, caused a breach in the family. There was a dramatic scene, with her uncle shouting operatically that he would beat her if she weren't dutiful, reminding her that they lived in his house, and that he had supported and helped her mother through Changde Women's Normal School. All these claims were true, but they didn't deter Jiang Wei, who yelled back that she would expose him as an oppressor of women. “Just wait. Curse me at home and I'll curse you to the entire city.” This was not an idle threat. Immediately she moved out, but before she left for Shanghai, she wrote an article accusing her uncle as a “local despot,” a hypocrite who ran an orphanage only to exploit the children and employees, who in his private life drove a servant to suicide through an illicit love affair, and who took advantage of his sister-in-law. She managed to get the article published in the local independent newspaper, with some minimal changes to protect the newspaper's liability. Many years later, she admitted to Alber in an interview that she had no proof of these claims and was in fact making reckless claims, for vengeance (25-26). Ding Ling, as she was soon to rename herself, was not a woman to cross.

After considering and rejecting a career as a teacher, after briefly and unsuccessfully attempting to become an actress, Jiang Wei settled on writing. Her early great friend, Wang Jianhong, had died, and she had lost Jianhong, who had moved away. It was a time of great personal difficulty and depression, but a time in which she met two important figures in her life, Hu Yepin, who would become her first husband, and Lu Xun. Out of the depression grew her new identity. (Appropriately enough, then she literally lived on Cultivating Talent Lane.) Shen Congwen, a long-time friend, tells of visiting her: “There were signs that the young woman was still deeply depressed. She slept on a plank bed, her room was not only damp, it was filled with mildew [and odorous]...” But there were also signs that a metamorphosis was taking place as well: “On the desk were several trays of pigments as well as a stack of lined paper. Already she had a jade seal on which was carved the pen name of Ding Ling...” (42-43). Deciding that Ding Ling was to be a writer, she mustered enough courage to reach out to Lu Xun for guidance and support. She wrote to him explaining her circumstances and ambitions. But she received no reply, beginning an interesting and problematical relationship with the older writer, which Albers explores. In general, Lu Xun seems to have avoided and ignored Ding Ling, although at critical times in her life he was supportive. After her first husband Hu Yepin's tragic execution by the Nationalists, Lu Xun was kind and supportive, although she later heard from a

mutual friend that Lu Xun had remarked that she was "still like a little child," a comment which offended her greatly. Somewhat later, when Ding Ling and Feng Da, her lover, were kidnapped by the GMD, Lu Xun began to compose "A Lament for Miss Ding." He never finished the poem, though a draft can be found in his journals (93).

Although Ding Ling's early works focused on love, tragic illness, turbulent times, the traditional concerns of young women, she soon became caught up in the revolutionary movement and adjusted her literary efforts to more political themes and ideals; during the long conflict with the GMD, in 1935-36 she went to the front, walking 20 - 30 miles with Mao's forces. She was recognized as Mao's favorite writer. Mao honored her with a poem:

> On the wall the red flag flutters in the setting sun,
> The West Wind enveloping this solitary city:
> For a moment the people of Bao'an are renewed,
> In a cave, banqueting
> And toasting the escaped.
> For whom will that delicate pen ply?
> Three thousand crack troops, armed with mausers.
> The battle line unfolds east of Gansu Peak.
> Yesterday's Miss Wen
> Has become General Wu (112-133).

The unrhymed poem plays cleverly on the traditional balance between Wen and Wu (civilized vs. martial arts). According to Russ Terrill, there was speculation among many comrades that Ding Ling would be Mao's third wife; in any case, his admiration for her was quite clear (117, see footnote 47). The relationship with Mao was obviously important to Ding Ling herself, although later she became concerned that she had offended Jiang Qing by accidentally missing her marriage to Mao, although it seems more likely to me that Jiang Qing had different reasons for being wary of this writer her husband so greatly admired.

The book has a few infelicities that should have been caught in the editing: On page 35, Borodin is dropped in, with no introduction, no first name, and no further mention, leaving the reader vainly trying to identify him throughout the rest of the book. Hu Yepin, having been in the book several pages and in Ling's life several months, suddenly turns into Pin. Occasionally, a sentence like "Much to their liking, Qu regaled Jianhong and Bingzhi with tales about the Soviet Union" (32) dangles a modifier. There are also a few unlikely conjectures: for example, after Hu Yepin's body is found, Ding Ling is variously told the prisoners were machine-gunned to death, that they were tortured, that they were forced to dig their own graves. Alber observes, "To Ding Ling, that made little difference. Pin had used both his pen and his blood to show the way" (74). How could it not make a difference to a loving wife?

But these are small things. Alber has researched his subject thoroughly and

paints a vivid picture of Ding Ling and the turbulent, fascinating times in which she lived.

Mary Karen Solomon

The Girl Who Played Go. By Shan Sa. Translated from the French by Adriana Hunter. New York: Alfred Knopf, 2003. 312 Pages.

The Japanese occupation of Manchuria during the 1930's is rarely the subject of fiction. Occasional books and films about the tragic life of Pu Yi, the last Qing emperor, touch on his brief tenure as the puppet ruler of "Manchukuo." Shan Sa's novel, winner of the 2003 Kiriyama Pacific Rim Book Prize, is the exception. This short but evocative work, by an author who has lived in France since 1990, depicts the life of the Chinese under Japanese rule during a period of artificial calm just before the Japanese army's full-fledged invasion of China.

The novel is told from the alternating points of view of a sixteen-year-old Chinese girl from an upper class household, and a young Japanese soldier posted to Manchuria. Each in turn narrates the story from a distinctive vantage point. The girl is an anomaly – a female prodigy at the game of Go. Every day she goes to the town square to compete against the town's older men. As the novel opens she has already won 100 matches. However, while she is obsessed with Go, she is also a reckless adolescent, awakening to sexual desire. The soldier is a well-indoctrinated patriot, ready to give his life for his Emperor; but he is also educated and uncomfortable with killing.

The two narratives converge when a Japanese intelligence officer sends the soldier, because of his fluency in Mandarin and his proficiency in Go, to infiltrate the Go players in the square. It is assumed that any place Chinese congregate is a likely source of conspiracy. The soldier, disguised as a Chinese civilian, goes to the square and finds his opponent in the girl. Given the events of the 30's in Manchuria, there is no way the story can have a happy ending. However, the power of the narrative sweeps the reader into a world where the game becomes more important than the political events surrounding the protagonists. The girl takes a lover who is a member of the student resistance. The soldier observes the brutality with which political prisoners are tortured – before their executions. And still the unnamed couple is compelled to return to the square to continue their game.

Before writing fiction, Shan Sa studied art for two years with the eccentric French painter Balthus. Her painterly use of distinctive imagery is evident throughout the novel: whether she describes the emergence of a cicada, the brevity of a Manchurian May, or the sound of the wind - all are glowingly painted

with words. In addition, she makes sure that her readers understand the context in which the novel exists. References to obscure historical and cultural events are explained in a series of footnotes within each chapter. However, her greatest achievement is the creation of two compelling characters whose youth is betrayed by the events of their time and who carry the novel and the game of Go to its ultimately inevitable conclusion.

Andrea Kempf

Soul Mountain. By Xingjian, Gao 2000. 508 pages (ISBN 0-10-093623-1)

The first Chinese winner of a Nobel Prize (Literature, year 2000) is Gao Xingjian, for his book, *Soul Mountain*. Some reviewers, like the writer for *The Economist*, mistakenly concluded, "this is a strongly political novel."[1] Instead, *Soul Mountain*, which Gao started in China (1982) and finished while exiled in France (1989), is a predominantly personal and introspective journey rather than a political statement. After winning the Nobel Prize, Gao announced he wrote the book "because he was lonely." This complex book uses characters framed from aspects of the self to take a journey in search of the self and its relation to the collective.

The Nobel Academy correctly concluded that *Soul Mountain* was a "great novel" and "one of those singular literary creations that seem impossible to compare with anything but themselves."[2] Gao provides clues in chapter 72 that this novel does not fit the standard rules. Instead of characters, Gao uses the pronouns "I," "You," "She," and "He." In actuality, just one character, the narrator, uses these pronouns as alternating states of himself in dialogue. The "I" is the individuated self, the observer who takes care of the material aspects of the journey. The "You" represents the part of the self that is drawn to others by sexual pleasure, intimacy and the need for connection; it is the "You" that searches for family ties and the mythical Lingshan (Soul Mountain). The "She" represents the "other," changing throughout the book into many different women. "She" as "other" can be both the individual's savior and his or her scourge. The least used character, "He," comes forth when infrequent merging with others is so close that "at this point there is a need to step back and create space . . .(T)hat space is 'He.'"

China has traditionally been a society tightly bound by family, ancestors and community ties. While there are benefits flowing from being tightly rooted in family and community, there can also be obligations and costs. The individual cannot exist alone, for (s)he needs others. But the "Other" is like a fire on a cold night; one builds a fire to keep warm, but gets burned if one gets too close to it.[3] And like a raging fire, the Cultural Revolution damaged the threads that bound China's social fabric. But it is not just communism that is overly socially controlling; Gao states that the "Chinese people have traditionally been almost too confined by their own cultural and social ties for centuries."[4] Rather than

the soul-killing of state culture, Gao finds soul-enhancement in micro-cultures like the Daqi and Miao. In *Soul Mountain*, Gao never claims to have found heaven, nirvana, or even The Answer. The key is the journey itself rather than the destination and, like the Buddhist parable he often refers to, full understanding does not come here, it only comes when we arrive at "the other shore."

This book is remarkably complex, brilliant, circular and more demanding than what most western readers will tolerate. But if one can handle the journey, *Soul Mountain* offers much to the discussion of the proper balance between the individual and the collective. Unlike America, which glorifies the individual and vilifies the collective, Gao, even with all the problems in China during the last sixty years, is unwilling to renounce society and the collective. If any culture can find a balance between the Hobbesian extremes of too little and too much social control, it might be the Chinese. The Chinese have a long tradition of connection to family, ancestors, and community in addition to a solid ideological foundation in the importance of (Yin/Yang) balance. As such, Soul Mountain represents a step in the right direction for China, for it emphasizes the movement away from the overly socialized and controlled, and towards a greater balance between the individual and the collective.

J. David Wemhaner

Notes

[1] "Soul man; Chinese fiction; A Chinese laureate's novel." *The Economist*, December 9, 2000, page 2.

[2] Brauchli, Marcus. "Eye on China: The Man Without Politics." *Wall Street Journal*, March 22, 2001.

[3] Lin, Sylvia Li-Chun. "Between the Individual and the Collective." *World Literature Today*, 75, no. 1, Winter, 2001; pp.12-18.

[4] Zhao, Leslie. "Long day's journey." *The Australian, December* 13,2000; Features p. R11.

Asian Studies Development Program
10th National Conference
Kansas City, Missouri
April 15-17, 2004

Conference Speakers

Wendy Doniger, Mircea Eliade Distinguished Service Professor of the History of Religions in the Divinity School, University of Chicago, spoke in the Plenary Session on Friday morning on the topic, "The Mythology of Incarnation in Ancient India and Bollywood." Dr. Doniger earned doctoral degrees at Harvard and at Oxford. She is a specialist in Hinduism and has published numerous translations and studies on mythology, gender, politics and eroticism. Among other service, she is Past President of the Association for Asian Studies (1998) and the American Academy of Religion (1985).

Bill Tsutsui, Associate Professor of History at the University of Kansas, spoke at the luncheon on Saturday on the topic, "Godzilla and Postwar Japan," the topic of his forthcoming book. Dr. Tsutsui holds degrees from Harvard, Oxford, and Princeton. His research focuses on the business, social and environmental history of twentieth-century Japan. Dr. Tsutsui's current projects include studies of the environmental impact of World War II on Japan, marginalized groups in Japanese society, and Godzilla as a Japanese cultural icon.

Charles E. Morrison, President of the East-West Center, spoke on "The U.S. Stake in Asia and the Pacific" at the luncheon on Friday. Dr. Morrison earned his PhD from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His research specialties include Asia-Pacific international relations, economic and security issues and U.S.-Japanese relations. Dr. Morrison has had extensive involvement with the conceptualization, organization and funding of policy-oriented educational research and dialogue projects between Japan and the United States.

Asian Studies Development Program

The Asian Studies Development Program (ASDP) is a joint program of the University of Hawaii and the East-West Center. ASDP was initiated in 1990 to increase American understanding of the Asia-Pacific region through college and university faculty development.

The East-West Center is an internationally recognized education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen understanding and relations between the United States and the countries of the Asia Pacific region. Dr. Charles E. Morrison is President of the East-West Center.

East-West Center
1601 East-West Road
Honolulu, Hawaii 96848
www.eastwestcenter.org

Conference Schedule

Thursday, April 15

1:00-4:00	ARC Directors' Lunch and Semi-Annual Meeting	Vera Cruz 2
2:00-5:00	Conference Check-in	Lapaz 1
5:50	Pre-Conference Dinner and Play (*Windswept Blossoms* by Yang Chiang) at Johnson County Community College. Meet at the main entrance of hotel for transportation.	

Friday, April 16

8:00-5:00 **Conference Check-in and Information** **Lapaz 1**

8:45-10:00 **A. Philosophy & Film: East-West Connections & Applications** **Lapaz 3**

Chair: Brian Mackintosh, University of Alabama in Huntsville

Bonnie Melchior, University of Central Arkansas (English)

"*King Lear* and *Ran*: A Meditation on Cultural Difference"

Mike Awalt, Belmont University (Philosophy)

"Staring Down the Abyss: A Heideggarian Reading of Kurosowa's *Ikiru*"

Erin Cline, Baylor University (Philosophy)

"Holding Up One Corner of a Problem: Using *The Emperor's Club* to Teach Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation"

B. New Asian Initiatives at Johnson County Community College: Targeting New Disciplines **Lapaz 2**

Chair: Andrea Kempf, Johnson County Community College

Jan Cummings, Johnson County Community College (Interior Design)

"Incorporating Required Courses on Asian Furniture and Carpets into Interior Design: Bringing the Far East to Johnson County"

Sheilah Philip-Bradfield, Johnson County Community College (Theater)
"Teaching Kabuki in an Introduction to Theater Class: How Students Relate to this Genre"
Stuart Shafer, Johnson County Community College (Sociology)
"Chinese Society: Past and Present"
Andrea Kempf, Johnson County Community College (Librarian)
"Sex and Violence and Other Timely Issues: Contemporary Asian Literature and its Applicability to Career and Social Science Programs"

C. Asian Art Yesterday & Today: Understanding and Preserving Artistic Culture **Morelia 3**

Chair: Marthe Chandler, DePauw University
Lawrence E. Butler, George Mason University (Art History)
"Silk Road Buddhist Cave Art in American Collections: Recovering the Context"
Susan Clare Scott, McDaniel College (Art History)
"Poetic Painting and the Idea of Reclusion in Japanese Literati Landscapes of the Eighteenth Century"
Lisa B. Safford, Hiram College (Art History)
"Water, Wood, & Women: The Persistence of Ancient Traditions in Modern India"

10:00-10:20 Coffee Break **Lapaz 1**

10:30-11:45 Plenary Session I **Monterrey 1 & 2**

Wendy Doniger, University of Chicago Divinity School
"The Mythology of Incarnation in Ancient India and Bollywood"

12:00-1:00 Lunch **Morelia 1**

Charles Morrison, President, East-West Center
"The U.S. Stake in Asia and the Pacific"

1:15-3:00 **A. Threading Our Way Through Asian Identity: Concepts of Filial Piety and Selflessness in Film** **Lapaz 2**

Chair: Jessica A. Sheetz-Nguyen, Oklahoma City Community College

Jessica A. Sheetz-Nguyen, Oklahoma City Community College (History)
"*The Good Earth*" (United States, 1931, 1937)

Toni Culjak, Central Washington University (English)
"*Red Sorghum*" (China, 1987)

Robert Feleppa, Wichita State University (Philosophy)
"*Traffic Jam*" (Japan, 1991)

Liahna Armstrong, Central Washington University (English)
"*King of Masks*" (China, 1996)

B. Inter-cultural Assimilation and Conflict In Asia: 2003 NEH Workshop I **Morelia 3**

Chair: Michael Hembree, Johnson County Community College

Fay Beauchamp, Community College of Philadelphia (English)
"Inter-Cultural Assimilation and the Creation of *China*"

Brian Seymour, Community College of Philadelphia (Art)
"Qin Warriors"

Gloria Maxwell, Penn Valley Community College (History)
& Vicki Smith, Longview Community College, (Humanities)
"Meiji Japan"

C. Creating the Moral Self: Perspectives East & West **Lapaz 3**

Chair: Ronnie Littlejohn, Belmont University

Richard H. Thompson, James Madison University (Anthropology)
"The Hold Parents Have: How Asian Children of Immigrant Parents Negotiate Cultural Incompatibility"

Dennis Arjo, Johnson County Community College (Philosophy)
"Moral Education East and West: A Comparison of the Philosophical Underpinnings of Ideas about Childrearing in the West and Confucianism"
Cheryl S. Becker, Washington State University (Psychology)
"Expanding the Concept of Self: Implications of Cross-cultural Research for Social Psychological Constructs and Theory"

3:15-4:30 **A. Contemporary Issues in Asia** **Morelia 3**

Chair: Richard H. Thompson, James Madison University
A.R.M. Imtiyaz, Independent Scholar
"West and Islam: Some Fundamental Records on the Roots of Conflict"
Fatma Hassan Al-Sayegh, United Arab Emirates University (History and Archaeology)
"Women of Islam" Diversity and Communality"
Raymond W. Olson, Independent Scholar
"Human Rights in China: The Search for Common Ground" Video Presentation

B. Embodiment and The Sacred **Lapaz 2**

Chair: Lawrence E. Butler, George Mason University
Harriette Grissom, Atlanta College of Art (Humanities)
"Nama-Rupa: The Paradox of Embodiment in Indian Art"
Joe McKeon, Central Connecticut State University (Philosophy)
"Tantric Buddhist Mandala"
David Jones, Kennesaw State University (Philosophy)
"Embodying the Sacred: Animality, Buddha-Nature, and an Ecology of Compassion"

C. Women and Literature **Lapaz 3**

Chair: Roberta E. Adams, Fitchburg State College

Bettye S. Walsh, Piedmont Virginia Community College (English)

"*The Year of the Elephant and Virgin Widows*: Teaching Culture and Women's Issues with Eastern (Moroccan and Chinese) Novellas"

Lakshmi Gudipati, Community College of Philadelphia (Literature)

"Shashi Deshpande's *That Long Silence*: A Post-Colonial Reading"

Evening **Nelson-Atkins Museum of Art**

Guided tours start at the information desk in the museum at 5:00, 6:00 and 7:00.

Please sign up for a specific tour at the conference information table in Lapaz 1.

Vans depart from the hotel's main entrance at 4:45, 5:15, and 6:00 for those wanting transportation.

Dinner is available at the Nelson-Atkins Museum until 8:00 pm. Additional restaurant recommendations within walking distance are available at the conference information table.

Saturday, April 17

8:00-4:00 Conference Information Lapaz 1

8:30-9:45 A. Revisiting Authority in Asian Religion Morelia 3

Chair: Julien Farland, Middlesex Community College

Ronnie Littlejohn, Belmont University (Philosophy)

"Sages Who Are Good at Saving the People: The Authority of Contemporary Daoshi in Southern China"

Jeffrey Dippmann, Central Washington University (Religious Studies)

"Embodied Authority: Vimalak?rti's Thundering Silence and Laozi's Wordless Teaching"

Hue-ping Chin, Drury University (Interdisciplinary Studies)

"Filmmaker as Shaman: Miyazaki's Myth of Deliverance in *Spirited Away*"

B. The Shaping of Modern Japan Lapaz 3

Chair: Joseph Overton, University of Hawai'i Kapiolani

Yoshimitsu Khan, Gettysburg College (Japanese Studies)

"Inoue Kowashi and His Participation in Transforming Japan into a Modern Nation-State"

Mary F. Sheldon, Washburn University (English)

"The Practice of Detachment in Post-World War II Japanese Novels: Ibuse's *Black Rain* and Mishima's *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*"

Paul Dunscomb, University of Alaska Anchorage (History)

"Dogs, Demons and Dai-Guard: Protecting the Peace in Tokyo, 2030"

C. Multi-Media Modules for Enhancing Asian Studies in Grades 7-16: Northeastern State University, Tahlequah, Oklahoma — **Lapaz 2**

Chair: Lallie Fay Scott (Geography)
Participants: David Linebarger (Humanities)
Joseph Suse (English)
John Unger (English)
Andrew Vassar (Humanities)
Paul Westbrook (Communication & Theater)
Louis F. White (Curriculum & Instruction)

9:45-10:10 **Coffee Break** — **Lapaz 1**

10:15-11:45 **Special Roundtable Session I** — **Monterrey 1 & 2**

Inter-Cultural Assimilation and the Creation of China and Japan: NEH Workshop II

Chair & Facilitator: Roger Ames, (Philosophy)
Panelists: Joyce Haines (Humanitie)
David Miller (Psychology)
Rajee Mohan (Art History)
Ed Pederson (History)
Faith Watson (English)

12:00-1:30 **Lunch / Plenary Session II** — **Morelia 1**

Bill Tstsui, University of Kansas (History)
"Godzilla and Postwar Japan"

2:00-3:15 **A. Basic Buddhism: University of St. Thomas Undergraduates** **Lapaz 2**

Chair: Stephen J. Laumakis, University of St. Thomas (Philosophy)

Laurel Stack "Four Noble Truths"

Megan Yelle "Impermanence"

Jacob Tuttle "Insight"

Michael Johnson "Individual Buddhism"

B. Cross-Cultural Dialogue in Philosophy **Lapaz 3**

Chair: Jeffrey Dippmann, Central Washington University

Shudong Chen, Johnson County Community College (Humanities)

"Thinking 'the Unthinkable' and Teaching 'the Impossible': Cross-Cultural Dialogue Through 'Chaos' of Aesthetic Formulation, Butterfly Effect of Sagely Action, and Responsive and Responsible *Wuwei* of the *Te*"

Ewing Chinn, Trinity University (Philosophy)

"John Dewey and the Buddhist Philosophy of the Middle Way"

Brian Mackintosh, University of Alabama in Huntsville (Philosophy)

"Confucius and Hegel: Ethical Obligation *Sub Specie Temporis*"

C. Teaching Asian Literature in Translation **Morelia 3**

Chair: Mary F. Sheldon, Washburn University

Roberta E. Adams, Fitchburg State College (English)

"Monkeying Around: Teaching Wu Cheng'en's *Journey to the West*"

Li Qingjun, Zhengzhou University/Belmont University (English)

"'[L]ike dusk on the eastern horizon': Reading *Cane* Through Chinese Culture"

Marthe Chandler, DePauw University (Philosophy)
"Su Shi's *Red Cliff Odes* and Zhu Xi's Neo-Confucian Synthesis"

3:30-4:45 **A. Legacies & Challenges: South and Southeast Asia in the Twenty-First Century** **Morelia 3**

Chair: Lisa B. Safford, Hiram College

Sandra H. Lopez, Trident Technical College (Sociology/History)
"Legacies of French Colonization in Vietnam"

Muhrisun Afandi, McGill University (Social Work)
"A Lost Generation: Intervention Program for the Elementary School Dropouts in Jogjakarta Indonesia"

Jatinder Bir Singh, SGGS College of Commerce, University of Delhi (Economics)
"Globalization and Agriculture: Challenges for South Asia"

B. Problems Determining the Shape of Feminism in China **Lapaz 3**

Chair: Joanna Crosby, Morgan State University (Philosophy)

Ke Qianting, University of the South (Chinese Language)
"Feminism and Problems within the Modern Chinese Family"

James Peterman, University of the South (Philosophy)
"Chinese Feminism and the Question of Confucianism"

Xiufen Lu, Wichita State University (Philosophy)
"Chinese Women and Feminist Theory: How Not to do Cross-Cultural Studies"

3:30-4:45 **C. Forging New Directions in the Undergraduate Experience** **Lapaz 2Lapaz 2**

Chair: Harriette Grissom, Atlanta College of Art

King-fai Tam, Trinity College (Literature)
"More Than Just Role-Play: Applying the Reacting Game Method to Teaching About Asia"

David Wachtel, Lexington Community College (Education)
"The Sinofication of Lexington Community College"
Chris Deegan, Independent Scholar
"The Real and Imagined Worlds of Culture and Civilization Curricula in Asian Studies: Some Thoughts on Critical Literacies"

6:30 **Dinner & Special Roundtable Session II**
by Advance Reservation

Conference Committee

Jeffrey Dippmann, Central Washington University, Program Chair
Carolyn Kadel, Johnson County Community College, Local Arrangements Chair
Janette Jasperson, Administrative Assistant, Johnson County Community College
Doreen Maronde, Michael Hembree, and Timothy Hoare, Johnson County Community College
Joe Overton, Executive Director, Association of Regional Centers (ARC)
Chris Ralston, Artist, Johnson County Community College

Asian Studies Development Program Association of Regional Centers

University of Alaska Anchorage

Belmont University

Black Hawk College

University of Central Arkansas*

Central Washington University

City College of San Francisco

College of DuPage

Eckerd College

Johnson County Community College

Kapiolani Community College –University of Hawaii

Kennesaw State University

Middlesex Community College

Morgan State University

Paradise Valley Community College

Community College of Philadelphia

University of Redlands*

Slippery Rock University

University of Texas at El Paso

Trident Technical College*

Tulsa Community College

* ASDP welcomes three new Regional Centers.

Contributions From

Johnson County Community College

Asian Studies Development Program

Registered Participants

Name	Institution
Roberta E. Adams	Fitchburg State College
Jeff Allender	Univ. of Central Arkansas
Roger T. Ames	Univ. of Hawaii
Dennis Arjo	Johnson County Comm. College
Liahna Armstrong	Central Washington Univ.
Mike Awalt	Belmont University
Linda Barro	East Central College
Fay Beauchamp	Community College of Philadelphia
Cheryl S. Becker	Washington State Univ.
George P. Brown	Slippery Rock Univ. of Penn.
Walter A. Brumm	California Univ. of Pennsylvania
Lawrence Butler	George Mason University
Betty Buck	East-West Center
Marthe Chandler	DePauw University
Shudong Chen	Johnson County Comm. College
Hue-Ping Chin	Drury University
Ewing Chinn	Trinity University
Erin M. Cline	Baylor University
Rebecca Cramer	Johnson County Comm. College
Joanna Crosby	Morgan State University
Toni A. Culjak	Central Washington Univ.
Jan Cummings	Johnson County Comm. College
Jim Deitrick	Univ. of Central Arkansas
Jeffrey Dippmann	Central Washington Univ.
Paul E. Dunscomb	Univ. of Alaska Anchorage
Mark A.T. Esposito	Black Hawk College
Julien Farland	Middlesex Community College
Robert Feleppa	Wichita State Univ.
Lawry Finsen	University of Redlands
Michael J. Fontenot	Southern Univ. at Baton Rouge
Mary C. Forestieri	Lane Community College
Raymond Frontain	Univ. of Central Arkansas
Harriette Grissom	Atlanta College of Art
Linda Gruber	Moraine Valley Community College
Lakshmi Gudipati	Community College of Philadelphia
Joyce Haines	Kansas City Kansas C.C.
Michael Hembree	Johnson County Comm. College

Name	Institution
Rachel Herman	Longview Community College
Kimmetha Herndon	Shorter College
Peter Hershock	East-West Center
Yusuke Higashi	Northeastern State University
Timothy D. Hoare	Johnson County Comm. College
Nancy Hope	University of Kansas
Nancy Hume	Community Coll. of Baltimore County
Melanie Hunter	Tulsa Community College
Samira Hussein	Johnson County Comm. College
Michael K. Johnson	University of St. Thomas
Stephan F. Johnson	City College of San Francisco
David Jones	Kennesaw State Univ.
Janet S. Jones	Shorter College
Carolyn Kadel	Johnson County Comm. College
Qianting Ke	Sewanee
Andrea Kempf	Johnson County Comm. College
Yoshimitsu Khan	Gettysburg College
Jih-Un Kim	Webster University
Keith W. Krasemann	College of DuPage
Fred Krebs	Johnson County Comm. College
Sawa Kurotani	University of Redlands
Stephen J. Laumakis	University of St. Thomas
Maurice A. Lee	Univ. of Central Arkansas
Li Qingjun	Belmont University
Xilao Li	Harper College
Linda Lindsey	Maryville University
David Linebarger	Northeastern State University
Marcia Little	East Central College
Ronnie Littlejohn	Belmont University
Sandy Lopez	Trident Technical College
Philip Loughlin	Maryville University
Henry Louis	Kansas City Kansas C.C.
Xiufen Lu	Wichita State Univ.
Ann Marie Malloy	Tulsa Community College
Michele Marion	Paradise Valley Comm. College
Doreen Maronde	Johnson County Comm. College
Gloria Maxwell	Penn Valley Comm. College
Joseph McKeon	Central Connecticut State Univ.
Bonnie Melchior	Univ. of Central Arkansas
David L. Miller	Community College of Philadelphia

Name	Institution
Kay Miller	University of Oklahoma
Sachiko Miyaura	Northeastern State University
Rajee Mohan	Johnson County Comm. College
Greg Moore	Eckerd College
Charles E. Morrison	East-West Center
Martha Morton	Univ. of Arkansas at Little Rock
Chihiro Murata	Northeastern State University
Guyeth G. Nash	
Rob Nash	Shorter College
Bonnie Olson	
Raymond W. Olson	College of DuPage
Joseph L. Overton	Kapiolani Community College
Edward Pedersen	Kansas City Kansas C.C.
James Peoples	Ohio Wesleyan University
Bob Perry	Johnson County Comm. College
James Peterman	Sewanee
Sheilah Philip-Bradfield	Johnson County Comm. College
Lester Pittman	Trident Technical College
Katharine C. Purcell	Trident Technical College
Hong Qu	Agnes Scott College
Michael Robertson	Johnson County Comm. College
John P. Ryan	Kansas City Kansas C.C.
Lisa Safford	Hiram College
Lallie Scott	Northeastern State University
Susan Clare Scott	McDaniel College
Brian Seymour	Community College of Philadelphia
Stuart Shafer	Johnson County Comm. College
Jessica Sheetz-Nguyen	Oklahoma City Community College
Mary F. Sheldon	Washburn University
Vickie Smith	Longview Community College
Laurel Q. Stack	University of St. Thomas
Namji Steinemann	East-West Center
William Stockton	Johnson County Comm. College
Eugene Stohs	Kansas City Kansas C.C.
Ruth Stokes	Trident Technical College
Jessica Stowell	University of Oklahoma
King-Fai Tam	Trinity College
Ric Thompson	James Madison University
Megumi Toki	Northeastern State University
Yuko Tsuchida	Northeastern State University

Name	Institution
Barbara Tucker	Trident Technical College
Jacob A. Tuttle	University of St. Thomas
John A. Unger	Northeastern State University
Andrew Paul Vassar	Northeastern State University
David Wachtel	Lexington Community College
Laura Walker	Tulsa Community College
Bettye Walsh	Piedmont Virginia Comm. College
Faith C. Watson	Community College of Philadelphia
Paul Westbrook	Northeastern State University
Sharon V. Willis	Trident Technical College
Mariko Yamugi	Northeastern State University
Megan D. Yelle	University of St. Thomas
Linda Ziegler	Trident Technical College

Patrons

Our appreciation is expressed to those listed below, who have made an annual contribution to East-West Connections. For those wishing to support the journal's efforts, please make checks payable to the ASDP Association of Regional Centers and send them to our Editorial Office.

2002
Shudong Chen
Howard Giskin
Nancy Hume
Ely J. Marquez
Keiko Takioto Miller
Elaine S. Padilla
Bettye Walsh

2003
Shudong Chen
Howard Giskin
Liya Li
Richard Mack
Ely J. Marquez
Keiko Takioto Miller
Elaine S. Padilla

2004
Liahna Armstrong
Fay Beauchamp
Marthe Chandler
Shudong Chen
Lucien Ellington
Danshi Huang
Nancy Hume
Ely J. Marquez
Robert Nash
James Peoples
Jim Peterman
Morita Rupaza
James WonderMey

2005
Liahna Armstrong
Fay Beauchamp
Larry Butler
Marthe Chandler
Shudong Chen
Lakshmi Gudipati
Nancy Hume
David Jones
Keith W. Krasemann
Fred Krebs
Raymond W. Olson
Bettye S. Walsh

Submission and Journal Information

Editorial Office. Correspondence regarding manuscripts and editorial matters should be sent to David Jones, Center for the Development of Asian Studies, #1806 1000 Chastain Road, Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591. The editorial phone number is 770-423-6596.

Book Review Office. Correspondence regarding reviewing books should be sent to:

Ronnie Littlejohn,
Book Review Editor
Fidelity Hall 313
Belmont University
1900 Belmont Blvd
Nashville, TN 37212-3757

The phone number is 615-460-6494. Other contact information is 615-460-6914 (Fax) and <littlejohnr@mail.belmont.edu >. Reviewers are responsible for obtaining their own copies of any books they wish to review.

Abstracts. All submitted abstracts will be published and must be no more than a short paragraph in length (about 15 lines). Abstracts may be edited for grammar, style, length, and clarity. Send only electronic copies to <djones@ksuweb.kennesaw.edu>.

Manuscripts. Published papers should be no more than 20 double spaced pages and follow the Chicago Manual of Style (14th Edition) with in-text citations (Author(s) date, page number) (Hall and Ames 2000, 99) and minimal footnotes. Please note we prefer footnotes to endnotes. Papers should include an abstract following the title, author's name, and institutional affiliation and prefacing the introduction. Papers should also include a Reference section that follows immediately after the conclusion. References should be listed with author's family name first, followed by given name, publication date, book or article title, publication place, and publisher (Ames, Roger T. and Rosemont Jr., Henry. 1998. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books.).

Articles should use inclusive language, and use the author-date system of citation. Submissions with either (or both) a content or theoretical pedagogical focus are welcomed. Authors should retain a copy of their submissions since manuscripts cannot be returned. Upon acceptance of an article for publication, authors may be requested to submit a diskette in either MSWORD or WORD PERFECT format. Most communication between the editor and authors will be done electronically, including sending and receiving attachments. Send two copies of papers to:

David Jones, Editor
East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies
Center for the Development of Asian Studies
Department of History & Philosophy
Kennesaw State University
#1806 1000 Chastain Road
Kennesaw, GA 30144-5591

Statement of Purpose. *East-West Connections: Review of Asian Studies* provides an official record of the annual national conference of the Asian Studies Development Program of the East-West Center in Honolulu as well as making available a forum for the scholarly activity of the conference. The journal also provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and findings of Asian Studies content related materials and theoretical pedagogical techniques and curricular contributions. The journal is the on-going responsibility of the Association of Regional Centers of the Asian Studies Development Program.

Sponsoring Organizations. *East-West Connections* sponsoring organizations include the Asian Studies Development Program and the 20 regional centers of the Association of Regional Centers: Black Hawk College (Moline, Illinois), Belmont University (Nashville), City College of San Francisco, College of DuPage (Illinois), Eckerd College (St. Petersburg, Florida), Kapiʻolani Community College (University of Hawaiʻi), Kennesaw State University (Atlanta), Middlesex Community College (Bedford, Massachusetts), Missouri State University, Morgan State University (Baltimore), Paradise Valley Community College (Phoenix), Community College of Philadelphia, Slippery Rock University (Pennsylvania), Tulsa Community College, University of Alaska-Anchorage, Johnson County Community College (Kansas), University of Central Arkansas, University of Redlands (California), and Central Washington University.