

Rational Theism, Part One

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Rational Theism

Part One:

An A Priori Proof
In God's Existence,
Omniscient and Omnipotent

(*A Science of Metaphysics* in Answer
to the Challenge of Immanuel Kant)

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“The unexamined life is not worth living.”

--Socrates

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“If the answer is simple, God is speaking.”

--Albert Einstein

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To facilitate an understanding of the conceptual system put forth in the second chapter: *The Impossible Solution to the Impossible Question*, a condensed abstract summary of the Science follows the Appendix.

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Part One:

An *A Priori* Proof in God's Existence,
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Preamble:

The Impossible Question

For inquisitive minds I must issue a forewarning, if not already having been so forewarned, that in the world of academia where there are a few well versed in the Kantian philosophy, that by flipping through these pages you will be trespassing onto forbidden land; for though these scholars have never set eyes on this land, they yet say that it strikes out against all that they hold sacred, all that is within the proper bounds of human reason, and that such a land is not only dangerous, but given what can be called their closed interpretation of Kant, it is unlawful for us to enter; however, we will find in what follows reason enough to dispute this interpretation in favour of a more open interpretation.

* * *

The German philosopher/polymath Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz posed the question: “Why is there something, rather than nothing?” Leibniz offered his answer to the question in the form of what philosophers call his contingency argument, simply put: as everything that exists must have an explanation for its existence, and as the universe exists, the explanation for its existence is God.

Given that the question as to why anything exists has in various ways been asked throughout the centuries prior to and following Leibniz, however, suggests that we have yet to find a sufficient answer to it, meaning one that goes beyond the simple answer given by Leibniz, or any of the other answers to the question that have not managed to silence our need to continue asking it.

The question is thus an open metaphysical question.

Many philosophers though are of the opinion that the problems of philosophy as mentioned by the German eighteenth century philosopher/metaphysician Immanuel Kant, in what they call his ‘Critical philosophy’ as *God, Freedom, and Immortality*, are not only outmoded, but as Kant himself held, they are without meaning; despite Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* (the work in question) being a painstaking critical investigation into the possibility of reason’s ability to arrive at a satisfactory solution to such problems.

Though in absence of a more sufficient answer there is one thing that can be said with respect to this question concerning God’s existence, and this is that either there is or there is not a God whom we can regard as the Creator of all that there is; and though atheism and theism appear to

be at two opposite extremes where this matter is concerned, there is one similarity to be found in the thinking reflected on both sides, for where the one side espouses the existence of this higher Being having existed throughout eternity, at least some of their adversaries hold to the view of a universe with neither a beginning, nor an end, and thus, a universe without the need of a Creator.

The argument to follow, as an answer to both Leibniz, and Kant, decides against both atheism and theism where this similarity is concerned, but it does not thereby fall into an empty, agnostic middle-ground. It demands from the reader a more thorough, critical reflection, for the matter is not as simple as the solution put forth by Leibniz (and so many others) suggests, but while the solution here proposed to the question is not so difficult that it remains beyond the possibility of our grasp, it is still such that it will require much more critical reflection than any argument hitherto put forth, and it may not be so easily fathomed given that the routines of our daily lives press so relentlessly upon us that they leave little room for such critical reflection, yet to mitigate this difficulty this work has been abbreviated, as might be gathered by its length, as much as can be reasonably expected.

The title of this booklet does not mean, as it may seem to suggest, that we intend to engage here in an analysis of religion or whatever arguments can be raised for or against any particular faith, as for say, Christianity, which once this solution to the question is grasped it will be found to hinge upon. What follows is therefore not an apologetic of any sort, at least not in any normal sense, but what follows is a strictly rational solution to the question, and as to the possibility of the answer to it that will be provided and the means of its proof, it will be seen that it rests on pure

reason, but not pure reason alone, but pure reason with its accompanying empirical validation.

As to the apparent philosophical nature of this solution, no familiarity is required with the subject of philosophy, or in this case, the branch of philosophy called metaphysics, for metaphysics insofar as the term can be applied to what follows, in contrast to how it might be defined within the confined circles of academia, is but the exercise of our common faculty of reason, this being a faculty that cannot be conferred or denied to anyone by a higher institute of learning. It is the rightful possession of all who recognize their freedom to utilize their capacity to think and reason howsoever they will, and without the imposition of any kind of prohibition other than whatever prohibition one might choose to impose upon oneself.

The solution made possible by utilizing this common faculty rests on judgments that are not merely arbitrary, but rather, are universally and objectively valid, meaning by this that had the reader lent the same critical attention to the problem the reader would invariably have arrived at this very same solution, for there are not various possible solutions to the problem but there is but this one and only possible solution, and as to this claim, given that it may occasion in the minds of some room for serious doubt, the independent reader may note if only as a point of interest the last quote of Immanuel Kant regarding proofs found in the Appendix, which, along with the other quotes including those of David Hume pertaining to the same matter, reveal that Kant, without any evidence of such a solution and proof, not only foresaw its essential form and nature, but even went so far as to predict its inevitability; while Hume put forth certain rules by which to judge of cause and effect, these being the *indispensable concepts*, as Kant referred to

them, that have been utilized toward the end of this one and only possible solution.

The question of Leibniz: *Why is there something, rather than nothing?* can just as well be rephrased: *Why is there existence, rather than no existence?* And while this may seem to be but the same question expressed in a different manner, the former as put by Leibniz can lend the impression that it has only to do with this material world of things, while it is more evident that the latter takes into account the fact that we live not only in a physical world, but we live in a world in which we are consciously aware of our existence, and this fact of our *very being* cannot be dismissed as being a part of this *something* of which Leibniz speaks. It is this latter, more precise phrasing, that defines the question and the answer to it that follows.

But where then do we begin with respect to this *supposed*—stressing this word ‘supposed’ for the sake of all those who, given the profundity of the question, may have resisted the urge to yield to their skepticism, and have not yet dispensed with the need to continue further—solution to the question?

The most logical answer to this question is that we must begin with the beginning itself.

For those who may be familiar with his *Science of Logic*, though this should pose no impediment to those who are not, we will quote from that compilation of Hegel’s thoughts where he also examines what can be called an ultimate beginning, as they appear analogous to what is expounded here, with the exception however that Hegel offered no complete synthesis of understanding such as will follow here, meaning that is, a series of *a priori* judgments that would connect his premise, necessarily, and by way of a synthesis, to his conclusion.

The understanding here given is abstract only, being derived from pure reason, for it can be derived by no other means; but this does not imply an understanding divorced from reality, that is, from the world of our concrete experience. To the contrary, this understanding will enable us to make sense of this reality in a way that otherwise remains impossible.

But what do we mean by this exactly?

What we mean by this is that this solution must, in fairness, be judged on the grounds of whether or not it manages to provide a rational answer for the existence of what can be called certain universal aspects of our reality. There are but four universal aspects of our reality that will be accounted for in what follows, however, only one of these holds the key to unlocking the explanation for all four of these universal aspects of our reality, and these are:

1. Space.
2. Time.
3. Mass (matter or substance).
4. Consciousness (or mind).

That there are but these four universals that need to be explained to account for our reality—the world of our concrete experience—is simple, for all things that define our reality are particulars in relation to other particulars separated from each other in space, and stretched out apart from each other as regards their duration, that is, in time. Further, all these particulars that make up the world of our experience consist of mass, matter, or substance; and our knowledge of all these particulars separated in space and stretched out over their duration, or in time, is made possible only by our conscious awareness, in part, of this reality as a whole.

It is this latter fact of consciousness that holds the key to unlocking the answer for the existence of all four of these universal aspects of our reality. Without consciousness there would then only be nothing, and of this much we can also be confident, for if there should be such an all-seeing one who could say that this is not so, but that there is no consciousness that cannot be defined as matter, and that matter is all that there is, where is there to be found the incontrovertible proof for such a pronouncement?

Since we have introduced the term: *matter*, it should be clear that we are referring to that essence that makes up this physical world in which we exist and of which we ourselves are constituted, but we do not by this imply that we know what matter is, what electrons, protons, or neutrons are in their fundamental essence, for when plunging into such apparently insoluble depths, scientists realize they can only venture so far, and no further.

Max Planck, the father of quantum theory, put it thus: *Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because, in the last analysis, we ourselves are part of nature and therefore part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.*¹

We will therefore not engage here any further than to simply state that what we mean by matter is this apparent physical reality before us; and as to the question of consciousness, we encounter the same inability to arrive at any precise definition as to what consciousness is in its fundamental essence. We can only delve so far into reality and can only finally admit that we are finite beings and so can never arrive at an understanding of the whole of this reality. Thus, what we mean by consciousness in what follows is simply this undeniable fact of our awareness

¹ *Where is Science Going?* (1932).

towards our existence; and so what is in demand concerning these universal aspects of our reality is a rational proof accounting for their origination by means of a series of logical deductions that follow from the premise (of this argument to be explained), all the way through to a necessary, *a priori* conclusion.

Nothing of the sort is to be found anywhere in all the works of those who would reduce consciousness to mere matter, nor can anything of the sort ever be expected, though it may well be imagined, just as it may well be imagined that matter is itself nothing other than pure consciousness, for again with this twisting around of logic, where is the proof either way?

Here also, with this admission, we are given a clue as to where we must begin if we ever hope to answer the question asked.

Only reason and reason alone is able to address the question with the seriousness that the question demands for the question reaches, as already intimated, beyond the confined scope of all empirically grounded sciences such as theoretical physics or cosmology, and as well, despite its apparent transcendental nature, beyond the scope of theology. Should there be any doubt here consider that the question does not have to do with this material world of things, from which even religion in all its forms finds no release, but it has to do with the Cause having brought about this material world of things. It is the question of not particular causality but the question of universal causality. What is the Cause that has brought about this world of our experience and how are we to confirm that there exists such a Cause?

The conclusion of the following solution to this problem is that this reality of which we are part has been brought about through the limitless power of a higher Will. The

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premise follows through to this conclusion, necessarily, *a priori*, meaning by this that the conclusion cannot be avoided.

Having so declared, or confessed, the question asked can be reworked into the form of the following two sets of contradictory propositions:

First:

Thesis: Existence has a transcendent Cause (outside our material world of things) that can be rationally understood.

Antithesis: Existence has no Cause apart from itself, and a rational understanding of a non-existent transcendent Cause is impossible.

Second:

Thesis: As existence has a transcendent Cause it must have an ultimate purpose that can be rationally understood.

Antithesis: As existence has no transcendent Cause it has no ultimate purpose, and according to all the physical laws known to us, all things are slated for inevitable extinction.

The second of both these sets of contradictory propositions carries with it a certain consequence that cannot help but be reflected in the thinking of those who lean toward them, for those habitual routines to which we are all conditioned and from which we find no escape, and that have only to do with this present reality, provide little or no room for any truly serious answer to such a question as the one asked. They allow for no purpose other than that

which we can work out for ourselves in this temporal existence. Where the search for truth is concerned, they rely on what empirically grounded sciences can provide, but given the limited scope of these sciences, the result in the minds of those who place all their faith in these sciences, and for which they see no alternative path toward the truth, is a hopelessly fatalistic worldview where one's destiny, favourable or not, is determined by chance more than anything else, and where the fate of ultimate oblivion awaits every soul, despite whatever deeds, noble or otherwise, marked their lives.

The first of both these sets of contradictory propositions also carries with it a certain consequence that cannot help but be reflected in the thinking of those who lean toward them, for though held in the grips of the same inescapable routines as everyone else, they share no similar sense of meaninglessness, but they hold to the intuitive belief that all things are destined for an end other than that which can be realized in this temporal existence.

The second of these contradictory propositions having to do with purpose however is not the concern here for it is only a corollary to the first, and the first demands answering the critical objections of atheists against theists, and there is nothing to address the most glaringly obvious of these objections that has been voiced by countless atheists, but never more succinctly or eloquently than by Immanuel Kant, whose words will be quoted shortly.

The truth must rest on one or the other side of these conflicting propositions. Either there is or there is not a Supreme Being, or ultimate Cause, or God—defined here as the Creator of all that is—and the definition here allows only for a God with the three attributes:

Omniscience,

Omnipotence,
Omnibenevolence.

Given the absence of one, or any of these attributes, we are not then speaking, according to the standard of proof that is here called for, of God at all, for if such a proof is indeed not possible we may as well concede that atheism makes more sense than theism.

The first two of these attributes are, according to the following, rationally justifiable for they follow as *a priori*, and necessary attributes, while the third attribute lends itself to what philosophers call the problem of evil, which given its nature, and its relation to the second of the two sets of contradictory propositions, must be left to a separate work.

If there exists such a Supreme Being, as the author of creation, then the obligation rests on those who assert this to be so to prove where this is so, and not simply by appealing either to an intuitive, religiously informed faith, or to the age old argument from design, recast in its present form as the argument from Intelligent Design, this being but a rephrasing of the same argument but now adorned in a more fashionable, modern dress; but what have all these repeated arguments fostered aside from more elevated counterarguments from a host of more hostile, and as they are now called, militant atheists—despite rumors, the veracity of which can always be held in some doubt, that the tendency in this direction has waned? As one of the most noted and outspoken of these atheists maintains, all the arguments thus far presented for the existence of a Supreme Being are not only weak, but they are *spectacularly weak*.²

² *The God Delusion*, Richard Dawkins (First Mariner Books edition, 2008), pg. 24.

It is not this intuitive conviction that theists have that is in question. It is the lack of a strict, rational proof of this higher Being, this Supreme Cause that they believe exists that is in question, and this points to an understanding aside from what can be gathered from religious orthodoxies, as well as anything contained in the scriptures that theists cite as the grounds for their faith. It also points to an understanding aside from all the arguments presented thus far for God's existence, which, whether one agrees or disagrees with this judgment as to their weakness, provide no rational explanation for the existence of the universal features of our reality that have been mentioned.

What will be offered here is thus not to be associated with or compared in any way to such past arguments for there is nothing in the past that reason can look upon and say to itself: *Here at last is where I can find rest.*

So how then exactly do we who call ourselves theists defend our belief in the existence of this higher Being by means of pure reason, that is, without appealing to anything that we can point to in this world of things as our evidence, this being the very same evidentiary appeal made by atheists to cast aside such a belief?

We cannot is the opinion commonly held not only by atheists and a great many philosophers, but theists as well, who with the same dogmatic authority with which atheists attest to the truths of science, attest to the truths of the scriptures for which they also broker no alternatives. Outside of these sacred texts theists are inclined to weld into their innermost beings a dogmatic and steely resistance no different than the dogmatic and steely resistance exhibited by their contrarians, and so with a certain degree of disdain, look down on the idea, just as much so as their adversaries, that there can even be such a thing that we can call pure reason, or a means of proving God's existence

simply by way of exercising, exclusively, this common faculty. Though atheists here have the upper-hand in that with this confession atheists are merely reflecting their honest belief given the absence of anything in the way of a truly rational proof by means of pure reason, whereas theists mock the God for whom they declare nothing is impossible, but a God incapable of instilling in them sufficient mental capacity to prove His existence beyond all reasonable doubt—this being the height of absurdity, to profess to the existence of an infinitely powerful Creator, and then to strip this Creator of this power by confessing to one's inescapable ignorance.

For those brave souls who dare to venture on, we will see what will become of the following exercise of this common faculty, and whether the alternatives offered in the absence of what it will put forth are more agreeable and satisfying.

The question of what underlies reality, or why the world is as it is, was asked by every inquiring philosopher (or, thinkers, or lovers of wisdom—as the Greek from which the term is derived denotes) since Thales. It was asked by the pre-Socratics, by Socrates and his student Plato, and on through Aristotle to all the philosophers throughout history since, including those drowning in the apathy of the present where we now have a vast host of what we can call anti-philosophers, meaning by this, those who go by the name but who are of the opinion that philosophers no longer go about asking questions such as that posed by Leibniz, nor do they as Leibniz, go about inventing systems of understanding—viewed by these more sophisticated and scientifically attuned thinkers, as no more than fanciful and somewhat amusing relics of a bygone past. However, does this opinion of what philosophy is or what it ought to be

find universal agreement among all thinkers, or lovers of wisdom? If it does then we can be confident that all the truly serious, most consequential questions of all have been answered to the fullest extent possible, and we must lower our expectations and relegate ourselves to thinking only in terms of what we can expect from this temporal world before us, and not some imaginary, transcendent, eternal world beyond our possible understanding; but who would be so bold as to state this to be the case aside from those who, resorting to the subterfuge of that higher wisdom exhibited in their confession to our collective ignorance, expose themselves as anti-philosophers?

There is one philosopher (*thinker*, again, for whoever may harbor a prejudice against philosophy) most deserving of the name, and who will be quoted here more than any other, and that philosopher already mentioned, is Immanuel Kant, and here there are sufficient grounds to support the opposite interpretation of the usual one taken of Kant as having not only dispensed with the possibility of any answer to the question asked, but as having imposed limitations on pure reason as the only instrument capable of answering it, for we find:

Now I maintain that transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity among all speculative knowledge, that no question referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for that same human reason, and that no excuse of inevitable ignorance on our side, or of unfathomable depth on the side of the problem, can release us from the obligation to answer it fully, and completely....³

³ *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781—first edition) trans. F. Max Müller (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1966), pg. 338 [A: 477-80; B: 505-08]. Numbers in brackets pertain to the first and second editions. Hereafter, *CPR*.

With this remark Kant provided sufficient grounds to refute what can be called the closed interpretation of his *Critique of Pure Reason* and subsequent *Prolegomena*, wherein he dealt with such problems as the four antinomies (four sets of contradictory propositions), the first of which reads as:

Thesis: The world [universe] has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit).

Antithesis: The world [universe] is, as to time and space, infinite.⁴

As to this problem, which is central to the question and the solution to it that follows, Kant wrote: *I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions and to force it to self-examination....*⁵ But while acknowledging the difficulty Kant did not close the book on the matter, but with this invitation to his critical reader it is clear that he hints at least at the possibility of a positive solution to the problem.

There are now enough reasons to judge that the thesis is true, and the antithesis is false, given not only the findings in the field of big bang cosmology, but on the grounds that

⁴ *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysis...*, ed. & trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, New York; Library of Liberal Arts ed., 1950), pg. 87. The *Prolegomena* in Kant's *Werke*, vol. 4 (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1911), [339-40]. Numbers in brackets refer to the 1911 edition. Hereafter, *Pro*.

⁵ *Pro*, footnote, pg. 88 [340-41].

these findings agree with the direction to which we are led by our own intuitive sense, and our knowledge of the way things are.

The idea that there was no beginning to the universe conflicts with the findings of big bang cosmology and current estimates that point back to a beginning roughly 13.8 billion years ago. There is no reason to doubt this age for the universe at least among the majority of cosmologists, though with future discoveries they may find reason to adjust this age, while there are those who, with little or no understanding or appreciation for the science of cosmology go so far as to discard such estimates altogether; however, this estimate of the age of the universe is not cited as though it were a proof, but it is offered as just one factor among others that lends itself to the empirical validation of what follows.

The idea that there was no beginning also conflicts with what we know from observing the way things are; that within the whole realm of our experience there is no such thing that we can point to and say of this thing that it had no beginning, and it has no end. If this should be disputed, then the question is: where is this thing without beginning and without end? Is it perhaps energy, as some may suggest, given the law of the conservation of energy that states that energy, while it may change in form, can neither be created nor destroyed? We are in the following not speaking of an already existing system to which this physical law applies, though the law may lend itself to the question: *what is energy itself in its fundamental nature?* Here there is no need to venture further, for the question that has been asked is all-encompassing and it presupposes that the laws of physics are themselves part of that something of which Leibniz speaks.

To this end we must admit that this idea that the universe has always existed, or that some part of it has always existed in whatever form one might imagine, not only finds itself at odds with our natural, intuitive insistence on pressing the question of ultimate causality as far as possible—meaning to the end of a final, and satisfactory answer—but it follows through to the indefensible judgment that this natural and intuitive insistence on so pressing the question reflects on our part a psychological deficiency, or a self-deception, or perhaps, a certain childlike naïveté, for if all things have always existed in some form or another, the clear understanding and proof of this fact (which is nowhere to be found) implies that it makes no rational sense for us to question the origin of that which has always existed, and that which we know and not simply believe, can never cease to exist.

For those who see the question at hand, however, as an obviously unavoidable one, it is the antithesis that is false, and it is the thesis that is true.

It is only the thesis that can support the belief in the existence of a higher Being, while the antithesis makes no allowance for such a belief as that which has always existed renders the idea of causality in this universal sense meaningless.

The thesis declares such an argument against causality to be itself the sign of a self-deception in the thinking of those who, while asserting causality in the natural world, dismiss this same notion of causality in the universal sense—as is the case for those who dismiss the idea of a universe with a beginning in favour of the idea of a universe that has, in whatever form, always been. Yet skeptics in this regard are not so much at fault given that no proof, on the grounds of pure reason alone, and without any appeal to this material world of things, has been provided in

answer to the question. An answer, if one is at all possible, must convey the understanding of how a universal, transcendent Cause, can be connected to this phenomenal world by accounting for the possibility of the four universal aspects that define this reality.

If there exists a Supreme Being then it must be apparent to theists that the counsel of the apostle Paul to the Thessalonians: *examine everything carefully and hold fast to that which is good*, was intended to instill in them a trust in their natural capacity to reason, and to inspire them to utilize this faculty to the end of proving that which they held to be true, and here this counsel can be taken even to the point of exercising this faculty to the end of providing a rational, *a priori* proof such as that demanded by Immanuel Kant.

If the reader is not in the least familiar with Kant's critical demands in this regard, not to leave out those who are most learned, I refer the reader to the Appendix wherein can be found all the relevant quotes that will help the reader understand those Kantian demands, all of which can be said to be fully justified.

Here, with regard to the supposed impossible solution to the supposed impossible question, we at least find in the arsenal of those who are of an opposing mindset a somewhat comparative approach to the problem of the why, for the thought is that it is not impossible for a universe like ours to emerge out of nothing, as noted for instance in: *A Universe From Nothing*, with the question of Leibniz turned into an answer in the subtitle: *Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing*, by a noted theoretical physicist.⁶ With this premise the following argument finds agreement, however the subtitle suggests an answer to

⁶ Lawrence M. Krauss.

Leibniz, but what of the question in its rephrased form that points to the universal feature of our reality that reaches beyond the scope of theoretical physics, and science, namely: consciousness?

Not all physicists or scientists are unaware of the limitations inherent in their field, as evident given the previous quote of Max Planck, who also famously stated: *I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative of consciousness. We cannot get behind consciousness. Everything we talk about, everything we regard as existing, postulates consciousness.*⁷

Stating that we cannot get behind consciousness is Max Planck's confession that consciousness defies being explained in materialist terms as just so much matter, or in terms of mathematical theories, as if consciousness could be reduced to a mathematical equation. What we are left with is only the question: can this universal aspect of our reality be explained, at least as regards its source, by means of pure reason, given that pure reason is itself the actualization of this universal feature of our reality?

If it can, then somehow this fact of our reality must be linked to the premise with which we must begin, that is, it must be seen to be inherent within the premise, yet the premise demands beginning not with a something the origin of which itself remains in question, but it must begin with nothing. Herein then lies the problem, and the problem was such that it led Immanuel Kant to confess that he could continue no further, leaving only the presumption on which the proof of his antithesis rested.

⁷ *The Observer*, January 25, 1931. Plank's *I regard matter as derivative of consciousness*, is corroborated in the following chapter, *the impossible answer to the impossible question*. This is not the same as to say however that matter is consciousness or consciousness is matter.

While such a beginning may seem to agree at least with the idea on the part of some theoretical physicists that it is possible for a universe such as ours to arise from nothing, it sets reason at odds with religious orthodoxy and its insistence on beginning with the idea of an eternal Being beyond the conditions of space and time, lurking behind the great expanse of nothingness stretching out to infinity, and then inexplicably springing into action with all the works of creation; but this orthodoxy, illogical as it is, yet adopted as an inarguable truth by religious authorities everywhere, falls victim to the unavoidable critical objection of atheists, best put forth by Kant as:

We cannot put off the thought, nor can we support it, that a Being, which we represent to ourselves as the highest of all possible beings, should say to himself, "I am from eternity to eternity, there is nothing beside me, except that which is something through my will,—*but whence am I?*" Here all sinks away from us....⁸

This objection is highest on the list of all the possible objections that an atheist can level against a theist. It stands not only as a challenge but it stands as the recognition that the obligation rests on theists to put forth an objectively valid rational proof for that which their intuitive convictions holds to be true. It is also an objection that has never been answered. It has never been answered because there is this habitual way of thinking that resists the critical judgment that our intuitive sense is unwaveringly pointing at, and this is that we must dispense with the notion of any complexity of any kind as an ultimate beginning, for any complexity of any kind only places another question before us that is equally in need of an answer.

⁸ *CPR*, pg. 409 [A: 610-14; B: 638-42].

This is where religious dogmas can prove a deterrent to a sound rational proof. Take for instance, the dogma that God, being eternal, cannot change. Such a dogma applied as a universal principle, meaning that it holds true in all respects, conflicts with the idea of a God who can act as the catalyst of change, for we are thereby asked to entertain the thought of a Being who cannot change in any manner, and then somehow relate such a solidified block of immovable marble to a world marked by constant change. We are brought into conflict with the idea that in the very act of initiating change, there must precede in the agency of that change, the perception of such a change. How, for instance, is this principle to be reconciled with Abraham's petition to God to change His mind and spare the righteous in the cities of Sodom and Gomorrah, or with Moses's petition to God to act with restraint in His punishment of the children of Israel for their lawlessness, or even more starkly, with the transformation of God into the form of a corporeal human being subject to birth, a process of maturing to adulthood, and death on a Roman cross?

Given such logical contradictions there arises the need to confront such problems with a view toward resolving them, just as with this notion that once we admit that we must begin with the concept of nothing, we face the problem of explaining how something can follow from nothing.

Does not common sense dictate the conclusion that something cannot follow from nothing?

This is the conclusion Kant arrived at in his proof for the first antinomy's antithesis, that reads in part:

... as beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is an empty time. In an empty time however,

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it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition as to existence rather than non-existence.⁹

Notice however the following continuation of the earlier citation where Kant invites his critical reader to lend to this antinomy his chief attention:

For every proof which I have given of both thesis and antithesis I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption on which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all knowledge by pure reason with me more thoroughly.¹⁰

As Kant requested that his critical reader lend to this antinomy his chief attention, then upon more serious critical reflection, does not the wording in this supposed proof reveal that there is an intentional sleight-of-hand at play? While the *proof of the presumption*, as Kant calls it, lends the impression that a proof has been given, the only proof put forth is a proof that the presumption is only a presumption, and nothing more. It is not what Kant would demand, a proof *a priori*, grounded on necessity; and of this much Kant himself was most certainly aware for otherwise there is no reason why he would have asked his critical reader to lend to this antinomy his chief attention. The sleight-of-hand employed would be, just as Kant knew, enough of a trick to convince those of his readers bound to the limits of their practical, common sensed way of

⁹ *CPR*, pg. 307 [A: 427-29; B: 455-57]. Ref. Appendix, same quote.

¹⁰ *Pro*, footnote pg. 88 [340-41].

thinking, but regarding this antinomy, Kant ruled out any appeal to as he called it, *the magic wand of so-called common sense*.¹¹ Yet is it not only common sense, or just our everyday practical way of thinking that dictates that something cannot possibly follow from nothing? It is this presumption, carried over by our common-sensed way of thinking into metaphysics and this problem of universal causality, that masquerades as the self-evident proof for the antithesis. However, this does not mean that common sense is entirely out of place with respect to such a problem, for does not common sense inform us that effects do not precede their causes? Does common sense tell us that it makes no sense to question where something came from, whatever that something may be?

In this exercise however this common sense must remain subservient to, and not the master of our critical thinking, for it is the critical exercise of reason that must underlie our judgments, and the conclusions that follow from them.

¹¹ *Pro*, pg. 118 [369-70].

The Impossible Solution
to the Impossible Question,
by Means of Pure Reason

If we are to accept the idea that all things had a beginning (to which in the following we will provide ample qualification), then we can say when all complexity of any kind is dispensed with, the first thing that becomes clear is that such a complete absence leaves us with the concept of a state that resists our imposing on it any arbitrary limitation.

This is the most crucial and fundamentally decisive critical deduction that Kant failed to arrive at in the proof he offered for his first antinomy's antithesis where he speaks of a time before *the thing was not*, that is, as he remarks: *an empty time*.

There is no more proof of this deduction needed aside from the fact that we cannot state with respect to such a void state, as we can with our present state comprised of particulars separated by other particulars in space and in time, that such a state exists only here or there, or only then but not now. Given the absence of any complexity of any kind there is as yet, no here or there, no then or now, for there is as yet, no space, no time, and no matter as we know it. All we can say is that this simplest of all possible states was, if we are to admit to the idea of an ultimate, first beginning, that most original state from which space, time, matter, and all else followed to what now is, and this can only have been according to a causal process of some sort, and hence, it is this causal process that remains to be understood.

But how do we proceed to verify that such a process did indeed occur?

If no such process can be determined there is left the alternative answer to the question of the why, that all that exists simply exists as a brute fact and there is no need to think beyond this fact; but this naturally understandable resistance to the question is no more than the confession to our lack of a sufficient answer to the question; and here again we can reflect back on Kant's more positive remark: *transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity among all speculative knowledge, that no question referring to an object of pure reason, can be insoluble for that same human reason.*

Beginning with the idea of a state wherein we have the absence of any complexity there arises the need to resist any premature judgment such as theists may find themselves incapable of shedding, such as that with this premise we are negating their belief or their faith in the existence of God, but this premise does not negate such belief, but to the contrary it seeks to establish it, for as the question brings us to reflect on the idea of an ultimate beginning it only restricts what we can within the bounds of reason rightfully assume to know concerning such a higher Being in relation to such a beginning; and the first and the only thing that we can assume to know is that as we cannot impose any arbitrary limitation on this simplest and most original of all possible states, it is therefore the idea of a state that is unconditional, for it is not determined by or bound to any other condition, for there is, as yet, no other condition, and as such we can say that we have in this the concept of that which we can define as limitless or infinite, or Absolute.

And the proof of this preliminary judgment is simple enough, for attempt as you may to grasp the concept of this Absolute in your mind, you must admit that it cannot be grasped in its totality; for being without limitation, this

Absolute stretches out infinitely beyond whatever finite notion, whatever imagined or abstract idea, one may form of it.

Now however superficial this observation may seem it is nevertheless a much more concentrated judgment concerning what this ultimate beginning offers for our consideration than any alternative our common-sensed, practical way of thinking might dictate. Here this practical way of thinking cannot inform us because the question reaches beyond the world of our everyday experience. It is a question of how any complexity at all came to be and a question concerning the causal process that must have followed from this ultimate first state to all that now is.

However, given the simplicity of this idea of an ultimate beginning, and despite the apparent profundity and the seeming impossibility of the question, we have the distinct advantage that this beginning not only narrows down what we can logically deduce as having followed from it, but it offers to us a number of judgments that are all necessary, all following one from the other, all the way from this premise on through to a necessary conclusion, *a priori*.

What is first most apparent, given this ultimately most simple of beginnings, is that we need not entertain the idea of a possible beginning preceding this simplest, and most original first state, for it is impossible to conceive of an even simpler state; therefore, it follows that the regress of time cannot be pushed back beyond this simplest of all possible states, and conversely, cannot but move forward from this simplest of all possible beginnings.

This judgment itself fully apparent given this premise dispenses with the problem that philosophers call an infinite regress, for concealed within the fabric of this problem there is something not unlike the philosophers'

stone, a kind of *anima mundi*,¹² this being no less than the infinite itself with which we must begin, and just as stated, though this truth has remained inconspicuously hidden behind the invisible cloak of its manifest presence.

Despite our finite limitations we can understand, abstractly, the causal process that followed from this most original first state, and to begin we can say first that our understanding of this beginning, as may already have been made apparent, presents not just one simple idea for us to consider, but it presents two distinct ideas for us to consider.

First, we have our finite idea of this most original first state, but this only in relation to the second idea of this same state reaching infinitely beyond our finite idea. Hence, we have in these two ideas a relation between that which is finite and that which is infinite, and this relation being entirely divorced from any empirical consideration, is *a priori*, and necessary. It is necessary for it is grounded on the incontrovertible fact that it is entirely impossible for us to conceive the thought of the one idea without the other. If for instance, we designate our finite idea of this simple first state as *B*, and the idea of this same state reaching infinitely beyond our finite idea as *A*, then we can say that if we have *B*, then we must also have *A*, and if we have *A*, then we must also have *B*. We cannot simply have *A* or *B*. They both follow necessarily, *a priori*.

In the following these will be called, for the sake of simplicity, the *A* and *B* representations.

The relation between these *a priori* representations is but a further clarification of the pure understanding reflected in the premise thus far explained, and as it has

¹² Greek: ψυχὴ κόσμου, *psychè kósmou*; or world soul, that intrinsically resides in and binds together all things, persisting in the way the soul persists in the physical body.

been stated that consciousness is the key that unlocks the possibility of explaining the other aspects of our reality: space, time, mass, or matter, or substance; it cannot be denied that in our understanding of the pure relation between these A and B representations that we have this very admission. To repeat this in another way, for the sake of unmistakable clarity, we understand this relation as a pure relation of the finite to the infinite, and this relation can only be understood as an ultimately most simple concept of thought, consciousness, or mind.

It is therefore not with any questionable, or complex empirically definable state, but it is with the concept of Thought, that we begin.

What this beginning suggests then is that if all existence and complexity has been reduced to this simplest of possible states, and we ourselves are removed as a determining factor as with all else, this cancellation cannot nullify the persistence of the Absolute= A , this being the least of all possible states, and as A being that alone that persists, then it follows that A must effect, in the inner awareness of its own persistence, an inevitable finite instantiation of itself= B , and this as an ultimately most simple reflection of thought, consciousness, or mind.

Given the simplicity of this ultimate beginning there is nothing other than this that, on the grounds of its *a priori* necessity, presents itself, nor is there anything else that suggests any possible means of comprehending the causal process that must have, and can only have followed from this most simple beginning; but regardless of however superficial this idea of an ultimate beginning may seem, this further critical judgment that arises from this premise follows through to yet another necessary, critical judgment, for in this relation of the finite with the infinite we have the idea of a Cause= A , and an effect= B ; and given the pure

relation between this Cause and effect we have the grounds to propose the idea of a necessary movement in terms of the finite= B , being compelled or motivated to return to the infinite= A as its source; and given A as an infinite or constant, unchanging condition, it follows that this finite representation= B of the Absolute= A , cannot but inevitably return to and obtain to A .

Thus the question follows: how can this movement of the effect= B back to its source= A , help us to account for the origination of the four universal aspects of our reality, and how can it help to explain the order of complexity now present before us?

To proceed to this end we can take into consideration the science of big bang cosmology, and though it presents an insurmountable obstacle to the field of cosmology as a science restricted to the laws of physics, a beginning with a singular state of zero space-time, with paradoxically, infinite density; otherwise called a singularity. But how are we to make any sense of such a beginning?

Notice the connection here with Kant's proof for the antithesis and the notion of an empty time. For the same reason that Kant could proceed no further and left only the presumption on which his proof of the antithesis rested, we find cosmologists unable to proceed any further given their introduction to this same obstacle, but it is apparent that many theorists in the field of big bang cosmology have, contrary to Kant's stricture, asserted the role of their common sense by declaring that it makes no sense to ask what happened before the big bang because the big bang was the beginning of time. However, here again, the latent truth of the *anima mundi* can be seen inconspicuously hidden within this idea of an infinite density not bound either by space or by time; for here one only needs to consider the possibility of not only this beginning

approximately 13.8 billion years ago, but an even more remote, ultimate beginning to the causal process that preceded, and that led to this beginning that big bang cosmology points back to.

What we will propose in what follows is a complete causal series, with an ultimate beginning as explained, and also, an ultimate end; and this series can be understood as being comprised of two distinct phases, with one phase preceding the big bang that we can call the *formative phase*, and the second phase succeeding the big bang that we can call the *creative phase*.

The formative phase can be understood with the help of an abstract conceptual idea that is not all that difficult to grasp.

Since what is proposed is a movement of B =the effect, back to its source= A , then it follows that this movement can only be thought of in terms of B 's expansion, outwardly toward A .

This entire movement, from its beginning to its end, can be understood with the simple concept of a sphere, with the following three obvious aspects that need to be taken into consideration.

First: there is the idea of that state (even if it be a void state) external to this sphere. This we can associate with the ultimate, infinite, Absolute Cause= A compelling the series.

Second: there is the idea of the circumference of this sphere, or the outermost boundary of this sphere. This we can associate with the finite representation= B , that we can understand in its relation to A as the concept of a *pure relation of mind*, as proposed in the premise.

Third: there is the idea of the volume internal to this sphere, and this we can designate for the sake of further clarity, and the explanation of causality that follows, as X .

All three factors, A , B , and X , are indispensable and instrumental to the understanding of the movement of the effect= B , back to its source= A ; and as the very concept of this movement can only be understood in terms of change, it follows that this change can best, but more properly *only*, be understood in terms of a certain qualitative change in the form of both B and X , given that B and X together, represent the effect.

To help clarify the association here with what is proposed and the world as we know it in terms of the science of cosmology, A represents that state beyond the finite universe, B represents the Cause associated (most closely) with A as that force compelling the expansion of the universe, while X can be associated with the material universe. This provides then, the simple conceptual framework, or schema as it may be called, that must be kept in mind toward the end of understanding this solution to the question of ultimate causality.

Now there is in this an immediate difficulty that arises in that the possibility of this movement demands a constant relation between the effect= B and its Cause= A , whereas the idea of this movement being necessarily a certain qualitative change, seems to suggest the negation of this pure relation allowing for the possibility of the effect.

This however is not so much a difficulty, but rather, this apparent difficulty will only help us to appreciate the qualitative change implied by the operation of this series; and to understand the nature of this qualitative change it is necessary to add to this simple conceptual picture, or schema, the principle of intensity, or as it may otherwise be explained: *momentum*.

This further idea of momentum can be understood in that the causal process whereby B obtains to A , can be accounted for, and indeed can only be accounted for, in

terms of a series consisting of successive stages, with each stage in this series increasing in its momentum over each preceding stage. The first stage in this series would represent that stage with the least possible degree of momentum, while the last stage in this series (to be explained in what follows as the final, *critical stage* of this series) was that stage that obtained to the greatest possible degree of momentum.

The momentum for the first stage in this series, as with all successive stages, is implied in the pure relation explained in the premise between the *A* and *B* representations, between the finite and the infinite. However, since what is suggested is a series of successive stages then it is understood that each stage was only finite in its extent, and this can be understood in that as the effect of each stage must be thought of in terms of an expanding volume of space, then it follows that the momentum that drove each stage of expansion would have diminished in proportion to this increasing expansion, hence, each stage would only have obtained to a certain outward limit. Once each stage obtained to its outward limit each stage would in turn have collapsed back to its originating point.

To understand this principle of expansion followed by collapse we must take into consideration the qualitative change implied by the movement of this series, and as well, this idea of a state of continued relation that would have had to be maintained between Cause and effect throughout this series as a whole, and without which this series would not have been possible.

This constant relation between *A*, as the Cause, and *B*, as the effect, can be explained further in that as *B* marked the outermost limit or boundary to each stage in this series, then *B*, by reason of its closer approximation and relation to *A*, would have had a greater rate of expansion than that

volume= X internal to this sphere of expansion as a whole; and as such B would have maintained a pure, or whole form throughout each stage in this series even while increasing in its momentum, and given its greater rate of expansion and approximation to A , as its Absolute Cause, B would have maintained a constant, pure relation to A throughout each stage in this series; while X , as that volume internal to this sphere of expansion as a whole must be thought of, and can indeed only be thought of, in terms of a rate of expansion that diminished by degrees determined by distance from this outermost limit= B .

X would then have taken on a more and more divergent form, in contrast to the pure and undivided form of B , with each successive stage, and this qualitative change in the form of X can be thought of, and indeed can only be thought of in terms of its concentrated volume, or its concentrated mass, increasing successively throughout this series.

X can therefore further be understood as an opposing force that tended to resist B in its movement to A ; and as the derivative force generated by B 's movement to A ; and as the counteracting force that forced the collapse of each stage back to its originating point once each stage obtained to its outward limit.

Here then we have implicit, the concept of gravity as represented by X . The increasing momentum or degree of intensity of each stage can thus be understood in that as the gravitational pull of X collapsed each stage back to its originating point, then it follows that this cumulative concentration of mass at this originating point would have, given the constant relation maintained throughout this series between B and A , compelled each stage in this series to exceed the limit of expansion obtained by each preceding stage.

This is the most critically important aspect in this schema that demands clarity. Admittedly, it is also the most difficult aspect of all to comprehend in terms of its consequence; however, this idea of momentum and what we can understand as its consequence can more clearly be explained by using increments of time to represent the duration of the stages in this series.

For instance, if it took $T=1$ second (T for time) for the first stage to elapse, and this stage then collapsed back to $T=0$ (0 representing the originating point for the expansion or movement of B to A), the next stage would obtain to the 1 second limit of this first stage instantly, that is in no time; and the expansion compelled by this increase in momentum concentrated at $T=0$ would obtain to $T=2$ seconds; and as this stage obtained to this limit and then collapsed back to its originating point at $T=0$, the momentum of this stage concentrated at $T=0$ would have compelled the next stage to obtain to the 2 second limit of the previous stage instantly, and the expansion continuing on from this previous limit would obtain to $T=4$ seconds; and this same principle would have continued with the next stage obtaining instantly to 4 seconds and continuing on to a new limit of 8 seconds; with the next stage obtaining instantly to 8 seconds and continuing on to a new limit of 16 seconds; and so on throughout this series until this series obtained to a final and critical, absolute limit.

The idea that each stage expanded out in no time to the limit of each preceding stage, that itself may strike one as impossible, given the latent tendency to resort back to our natural, or more practical, common-sensed way of thinking, is explained first of all in that each preceding stage is understood to have elapsed prior to each succeeding stage. The momentum of each stage being concentrated at $T=0$ would have had the consequence of

compelling each successive stage instantly out to the limit obtained by each preceding stage, given that the time it took each stage to elapse was for each successive stage something that had already been established by each preceding stage up to the point of its limit. This can be explained yet again in that the momentum of each stage set back to $T=0$ established itself as a constant condition (not marked by time) in relation to each following stage, thus, each stage advanced to the previous limit set by each preceding stage in no time, and each stage then went on from this previous limit to establish a new limit.

Now with this much understood we can add more explicitly to this schema two other concepts that have been to this point only implicit. These additional concepts are those of heat and velocity.

These concepts are implied in this idea of a compressed and an expanding volume of space and mass combined with this principle of momentum. Where the *B* representation, by reason of its greater rate of expansion and approximation to *A*, would have remained a pure, undifferentiated, or whole force in terms of these additional qualitative factors of heat and velocity, *X* as its derivative, would have increased similarly in terms of these same factors, from an initial stage representing the least possible degree of heat, velocity, and mass, on through to a final critical stage with the greatest possible degree of heat, velocity, and mass.

Where *B*, as that pure force marking the outermost limit of each stage of expansion would have remained indivisible in its qualitative form, *X*, with its rate of expansion diminishing by degrees proportionately to distance from this outermost force, would have undergone an equivalent increase although in increasingly more differentiated and concentrated forms.

Keeping these factors in mind we are led to a further necessary conclusion, for it is inconceivable to think that this qualitative divergence between *B* as that outermost force compelling this series, and *X* as its derivative, could have simply continued without end. Rather, this qualitative divergence between *B* and *X* must have obtained to a critical stage within this series that made it impossible for them to diverge from each other any further; and this can be explained in terms of this series obtaining to an inevitable, absolute velocity.

Prior to this series obtaining to an absolute velocity, *B* and *X* would have remained interlocked within this series, increasing in their qualitative divergence and rate of expansion with each successive stage, but this divergence would inevitably have obtained to such a rate of expansion that *B* would have separated entirely from this counterforce *X* as a completely separate force. The separation of these two opposed forces could only have occurred at a stage in this series in which they were perfectly counterbalanced, one with the other, for otherwise *B* and *X* would have remained interlocked within this series and this series would simply have continued, with space, time, mass, and mind, all continuing to increase further in their extent; however, at this critical stage where no further increase in their rates of expansion, and no further qualitative divergence remained possible, where space, time, mass, and mind had increased to their greatest possible extent, *B* and *X* separated as two distinct, opposed, but perfectly counterbalanced forces, with *B* remaining a qualitatively pure, immaterial, indivisible force, and *X* remaining in contrast to *B* a qualitatively more substantial mass of disproportionate, material forces.

With this final, critical stage, *B*, as that force having maintained throughout this series a pure state of relation

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with *A*, and being no longer interlocked in this series with *X*, obtained to the objective state of its Absolute Cause=*A*, and this series was brought to its end.

Elaboration and Commentary on
Conflicts With Pure Reason,
Science, and Orthodoxy

The question that should naturally follow is: what have we proved with this rather brief but critical exercise of pure speculative reason, and what advantage is it to have gone through such an exercise?

The advantage is that while empirical sciences are limited, as shown with big bang cosmology where the laws of physics are of no assistance with regard to determining what caused the big bang, and theorists bound to the laws of physics have no alternative but to resort to conjectures, this exercise shows that we can arrive at a rational understanding that is not in conflict, but rather, that is in agreement with what the science of cosmology has put forth; and beyond this we have grounds to address in a rational manner, certain issues pertaining to religious orthodoxies; for it is not any questionable, complex state that presents the premise of this *argument*—as it can be called for the sake of whoever may believe themselves capable of providing a better answer to the question of the why—but it is the concept of mind that is inherent in the premise, and this necessarily so, however we cannot gain an adequate understanding of what is implied here by any practical, ordinary concept of mind, or consciousness, and for which there is no widely held or agreed upon definition or explanation, for what is implied is the concept of a pure, dynamic, mobile relation of mind motivated in its outward movement toward the objective state of its Absolute Cause; yet there is nothing in the explanation of the process that describes this movement that suggests anything other than a purely blind, mechanical, or formative process.

The movement that has been proposed is that of a transition from an ultimate original state that most closely approximated a total void, to the state of the infinite mass of the singularity, this being the result of the causal series that preceded this state whereby the universals of space, time, mass, and mind, obtained to their greatest possible extent, and absolute limit.

The singularity itself, that we can equate with the originating point for each stage in this preceding series, and the point to which each stage in this series collapsed, and that we have abstractly represented in our conceptual schema as $T=0$, can therefore be understood as a state wherein these universals that define our reality were unified or synthesized together as one, but in which they had the potential to become what we now observe. In the relation between the two qualitatively opposed forces generated through this series we have the means to account for the infinite complexity of the world of our experience, for the pure, dynamic mobile force of mind having driven this process from its ultimate beginning to what exists now, obtained with the final, critical stage of this series, to its greatest possible state of being as Absolute Mind and Absolute Being, and the conclusion is that this Absolute Mind must possess in its pure and immaterial form an unbounded conscious awareness and relation to this separate mass of more substantial, material forces generated in its movement back to the Absolute, and the unlimited capacity to direct the whole of these separate material forces according to their design.

Here the philosopher Hegel, while providing no similar explanation that could be called a complete synthesis of understanding by means of pure reason, nevertheless draws the same conclusion:

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...we see that absolute spirit, which is found to be the concrete, last; and highest truth of all being, at the end of its evolution freely passes beyond itself and lapses into the shape of an immediate being: it resolves itself to the creation of a world which contains everything included in the evolution preceding that result; all of which, by reason of this inverted position, is changed, together with its beginning, into something dependent on the result, for the result is the principle. What is essential for the science is not so much that a pure immediate is the beginning, but that itself in its totality forms a cycle returning upon itself, wherein the first is also last, and the last first.

And further:

The expression of the absolute, the eternal, or God (and God has the most undisputed right that the beginning should be made with Him), or the contemplation or thought of these, may contain more than pure Being: if that is so, such content has yet to manifest itself to thinking... the first determination which emerges into knowledge is something simple, for it is only the simple which does not contain something more than pure beginning: the immediate alone is simple for there only no transition has taken place from one to an other. If these richer forms of presentation, such as the Absolute, or God, express or contain anything beyond being, then this is, in the beginning, but an empty word and mere being.¹³

Here theologians, steeped in the orthodoxies to which they are bound, may object that we have dismissed their

¹³ *The Philosophy of Hegel*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Random House, Modern Library, 1954), pg.'s 208-11.

cherished dogma insisting on the eternity of God. But have we?

What has been given demands more concentration and reflection than simple faith commands, and it is not faith that we have intended to establish, but rather, a rational understanding and explanation for the existence of the highest of Beings that for many rests on an intuitive faith that is itself sufficient, but it cannot be said to be sufficient for all, and certainly not for those who believe that their faculty of reason is a God-given gift that they have not only the freedom, but the duty to exercise to the fullest.

The premise of this causal explanation begins with the Absolute only it removes from this idea of the Absolute any notion of complexity, but who's mind is so without limit that they can boast of being able to grasp the Absolute in all its eternity, in all its infinite totality? To such a one belongs the only grounds for possible objection.

Though the principles of this argument are grounded on pure reason they provide a strictly rational proof for that which is otherwise left to the uncertain grounds of theologies shrouded in mystery, and apart from which there are only endless conjectures on the part of theorists bound to an empirical method, and while they may explain what conditions might have worked together to bring all things to this present state, these explanations fall short in their inability to account for how or why these conditions themselves came to be. They invariably leave themselves open to the objection raised by Socrates against Anaxagoras's theory of Intelligence, or *nous*, or Cosmic Mind, as the principle that accounts for the order of the world.

While Anaxagoras reached a conclusion similar to what is given here the method he used was empirical, and the

objection of Socrates points out the inherent flaw with all such empiricist approaches to the same problem:

It was a wonderful hope, my friend, but it was quickly dashed. As I read on I discovered a man who made no use of his Intelligence and assigned to it no responsibility for the order of the world, but adduced reasons like air and ether and water and many other oddities. It seemed to me that he was just about as inconsistent as if someone were to say: "The reasons for everything that Socrates does is intelligence," and then, in trying to account for my several actions, said first that the reason why I am sitting here now is that my body is composed of bones and sinews, and that the bones are rigid and separated at the joints, and the sinews are capable of contraction and relaxation, and form an envelope for the bones with the help of the flesh and skin, the latter holding all together, and since the bones move freely in their joints, the sinews by relaxing and contracting enable me somehow to bend my limbs; and that is the reason for my sitting here in a bent position.... Fancy being unable to distinguish between the reason for a thing, and the condition without which the reason couldn't be operative! It is this latter, as it seems to me, that most people, groping in the dark, call a reason—attaching to it a name to which it has no right.¹⁴

The flaw in Anaxagoras's reasoning was that of confounding the explanation of an effect with the

¹⁴ Plato: *The Last Days of Socrates*, trans. Harold Tarrant (London, Penguin Classics, 1993), pg.'s 161-2. Socrates on the problem of causation, the objection being the same as raised by both David Hume and Immanuel Kant, insisting on *a priori* necessity.

explanation of its cause, as if the two were one and the same.

The Cause for all the particular things that make up our reality can only be reasoned to exist outside of all these particulars, and as Socrates understood, Anaxagoras made the mistake of thinking that an explanation of these particular things could suffice, in and of itself, as an explanation and a proof of this universal, transcendent Cause, this *nous*, or this Cosmic Mind.

There is the question of what alternatives there may be to what has been proposed?

The answer to this question is simple. There are none.

If so, where can there be found an explanation for the origination of all four universals: space, time, mass, and most importantly, of mind? And is that solution grounded on the necessity of its *a priori* judgments and principles?

The preceding causal explanation rests on necessity and one of the conclusions that follows is that the universe exists necessarily. This means that if it were done away with then the very same causal process that has been explained would bring all things back into existence. The reality that we experience is something that cannot have failed to be and the answer to the question of Leibniz is that it is impossible for there to be simply nothing. Regardless of however simple that state to which all complexity can be reduced there will always remain grounds for an ultimate beginning from which existence toward greater complexity will follow, even such complexity as that which is evident before us.

There are further, for our consideration, certain obvious problems that are resolved by the foregoing explanation of causality; for instance, the second law of thermodynamics states that any ordered state becomes less ordered over time due to the loss of heat. Heat is needed to produce work, or

we can say, ordered structures or complexity. However, the heat of the big bang, compressed to infinity at the singularity, or $T=0$, has with expansion cooled down over the billions of years that have passed since that expansion began, to 2.725 degrees Kelvin (-270.425 degrees Celsius; or -454.765 degrees Fahrenheit). This temperature known as the cosmic microwave background (CMB), is the leftover radiation from the initial big bang, and while it has cooled down over this vast period of time to this barely detectable temperature, stars and galaxies have formed along with our solar system and our Earth with all the life on it including ourselves, and some of us have been ingenious enough to discover this second law of thermodynamics which is supposedly universally true.

Theorists attempt to avoid the problem of accounting for how this greater complexity has arisen over time alongside this corresponding loss of heat by claiming that it is not impossible for local pockets of order to arise, such as in our own small region of the universe. But this is still no more than an appeal to a possible defiance of the odds, and it fails to account for why any galaxies or stars at all have formed. All purely empiricist attempts to account for the existence of complex structures such as stars and galaxies, let alone life on our own planet, open themselves up to the objection raised by Socrates against Anaxagoras, this objection being Anaxagoras's failure to distinguish the difference between the explanation of an effect and the explanation of a cause; and this becomes most obvious given that all empiricist attempts to explain the existence of our universe fail to account for the origination of the four universal aspects that define our reality. Hence, they do not even begin to approach a rational understanding as to why anything at all exists.

Aside from the endless conjectures of theorists bound by and to the laws of physics, we have theology with its orthodox notion of an eternal Being, with no beginning and no end, but if theists can do no more than appeal to the mere Idea of such a Being, then atheists can, and so they have, using the same reasoning, assert the eternality of matter and thereby dismiss the idea of a Supreme Being altogether. If there has always been matter, in whatever form, there is no need for a Supreme Creator for matter will assemble itself over the eons into all sorts of forms, complicated or otherwise, and we simply happen to be living in one of those more complex, but infinite possibilities. The only difference is that this creation changes while the Being theists speak of does not change, and here atheists have the advantage for, as has already been stated, how can such an oddity as an eternal, changeless Being, find any place whatsoever in a universe subject to constant change?

Though of two opposing mindsets here again we find that atheists and theists can both be likeminded in their refusal to admit to what their intuitive sense is telling them, and that is that with respect to the notion of an ultimate beginning, we have no alternative but to dismiss the notion of any complexity of any kind, material or immaterial.

We are left with only our critical reflection on a state of nothingness and what our intuitive sense can tell us about such a state. The causal process that can be determined as having followed from this beginning provides the understanding of a Supreme Being moving through a process of change, from a least and most simple possible state of Being to a greatest and most complex state of Being, and where are we to find support for such a Hegelian thought, and supposed heresy, without falling victim to hopeless contradictions?

What of the statement contained in the final chapter of the book that theists claim as the source of their faith: *I am the Alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end?*

What are we to make of this?

Is a possible movement, a change from one to the other, implied? The Alpha is not the same as the Omega, the first is not the same as the last, and the beginning is not the same as the end, yet by the statement a relation flows from one extreme to the other. How can this be possible but by some movement from one to the other, just as for instance, Hegel suggests?

If no such movement of change from one to the other is implied, then the statement appears meaningless, though theologians may suggest their answers, but do those answers they offer manage to lift the fog of confusion, or do they add further obscurity to the statement and thereby provide only further grounds for us to confirm that it is indeed meaningless?

And if the statement is not meaningless, then could that movement of change from one to the other be understood in terms of what has been explained? Can the account of a causal process that followed from the simplest of all possible beginnings, explain not only this otherwise enigmatic text, but what natural sciences have discovered concerning the Earth's vast history, where the evidence is that simpler life forms have over time given way to more complex life forms?

Religion is often found to be at odds with what science has uncovered, but this evidence does not conflict with the understanding and the proof of a higher Being as here given. The understanding here given follows through to the idea of a Being who, in the very act of creation, moves from a simpler toward a greater state of conscious awareness that

is itself reflected in the infinite complexity seen in the works of creation and their orchestration over time, and this much is fully apparent given all that we can know from science. Though this does not mean that we are somehow falling back to an appeal to the argument from intelligent design as a proof, but are merely bringing attention to the fact that this empirical evidence does not conflict with, but rather, it agrees with this proof by means of pure reason for the existence of this Supreme Being to which this evidence points, but for which it does not provide a proof, *a priori*.

Further: what are we to make of this idea of not just one, but two Gods—God the Father and God in the person of God's only begotten Son?

No theologian has given anything in the way of a truly rational explanation for this mystery, but can this also be understood by means of pure reason?

What of the *A* and *B* representations, with *A* the Cause of *B*, and the process whereby *B* returns to and obtains to *A*?

Is there something in this that approaches a rational explanation for what theists read in their scriptures and that they can only write off as a mystery knowable only to their God?

Where we are given *A* then *B* is given, and where *B* is given then *A* is given. The logic follows and it is simply necessary, *a priori*.

And what are we to make of Genesis and the six days of creation? How is it possible to avoid conflict with science where the empirical evidence points back not to a creation of six days that took place, as some believe, a mere few thousand years ago, but an Earth that dates back 4.5 billion years and a universe that dates back 13.8 billion years?

The account of Genesis is to a great extent allegorical. There is of course a difference between allegory and fact,

even though facts of a kind can be hidden from plain view within the allegory. Theists who are blind to this cannot but fail to enter into conflict with science, nor can they but fail to enter into conflict with reason, for even with an unquestioning literal interpretation certain perfectly logical questions cannot be avoided.

The first line of Genesis reads: *In the beginning God created the heavens and the Earth*; but if the account does not state when that beginning was do we have grounds to assume how many years ago that beginning was?

The account continues: *And the Earth was formless and void*; but would God, an infinitely powerful creator, design the Earth formless and void, or did something happen to cause the Earth to become formless and void, and further, when did the Earth become formless and void? Where is the information in this extremely sparse account that we could put together to answer this question? Here, it appears, we are left with a complete blank, and this can only lead to the idea that the information needed to fill in this blank must be found elsewhere.

The text goes on to the account of a further beginning with the creation of Adam, and this is followed by the account of another new beginning with Noah, and this is followed by yet another new beginning with the making of a covenant between God and Abraham. Thus, the book of Genesis is not simply the account of one, ultimate beginning, but it is the account of all these particular beginnings; one being a beginning in which we have the creation of the heavens and the Earth at an *indeterminate* time in the past (as scholars versed in the original Hebraic text themselves understand) followed by three particular beginnings that can to some degree be known in terms of years past; but by imposing a precise timeframe into the account of all these beginnings, arbitrarily conflating the

first two versus of the account into a mere six days that took place only a few thousand years ago, theists enter into a conflict with science of their own invention for the minimal information given provides no grounds for an inarguable, true determination, and therefore, no grounds for any discrepancy with anything that science has to offer.

The account also does not provide a rational explanation for the existence of the four universal aspects of our reality that must be accounted for in order to help us make sense of this reality, nor does it provide any rational explanation for the most obvious problem of all, this being how do we account for God's existence—how do we answer the most obvious, and neglected Kantian objection: *from whence am I?*

Here theists, who broker no alternatives to their rationally defunct but dogmatic pronouncements, exhibit a characteristic of thinking that denies the grounds, or legitimacy of such questions for which they, in their sole reliance on the scriptures to the exclusion of all other avenues toward understanding, provide no answers that do not fatally fall into conflict with science.

Nor can they satisfy reason for they dismiss by virtue of their ignorance any reason for questioning from whence God for do not the scriptures simply state: *I am?*

And so we find, but what does this mean? Is the meaning behind this further declaration so self-evident that we can comprehend it in all its fullness?

As seen with their literal interpretation of Genesis, theists are inclined just as much so as so many others, to adopt an all too easy reading of the texts wherein such declarations are manifold, and it is an all too simple interpretation that results in the failure to appreciate such texts, and it is the same inclination to cement oneself in one's common sensed earthbound way of thinking that

drove those who heard the utterance: *Verily, verily I say to you, before Abraham was, I am...* that recalled the words of God to Moses, directing him to go to Egypt and free the Israelites from their bondage, and that they could therefore only regard as an unforgiveable blasphemy, to pick up stones to destroy its source.

If the question remains that of reconciling what has been offered with the idea of a God without beginning or end, with God's eternal nature, with the *I am* of the scriptures, then note that the explanation of causality has time, space, and matter or substance arising as a process and the process is initiated by and compelled by the Absolute as the Cause that marks both its beginning and its end. The eternal God is eternal because this Absolute Being transcends all that has been brought into being, including space and time and all things subject to and bound by these conditions; and so the understanding of God, as an eternal Being, as the Absolute, and as the highest of all possible beings, is transferred from the realm of the supernatural and the inexplicable to the realm of the rational and the understandable; and with this *a priori* proof we answer the greatest of all objections an atheist can put forth, as explained previously, having quoted Kant.

Empirical Validation

There are empirical considerations that do not conflict with, but that only further confirm the line of *a priori* reasoning put forth here, and they are:

This argument necessitates an expanding universe in line with big bang cosmology, and the observations of the red shifts of distant galaxies discovered by the American astronomers Vesto M. Slipher and Edwin Hubble, showing beyond all doubt that we live in an expanding universe, though the explanation of universal causality given here does not dismiss, but it necessitates that this expansion began with a singularity, as explained.

Notice then the arrow of time pointing back. Where does it point back to? It points back toward a synthesizing together of all the particular elements that make up our reality, from this present, more differentiated state, to a less differentiated state.

There is also no doubt that sciences such as biology, anthropology, archaeology, and others, point to a past where less organized and simpler structures and forms of life were followed by more organized and complex structures and forms of life; but we can go much further, for we all, without exception, witness the evidence of this same process of emergence on the level of our own beings, where we were all, prior to our having come into being, but as nothing, but where we now find ourselves subject to a process of change, a process of emergence from a simpler state of conscious being toward a greater state of conscious being; a process of emergence from the nothingness that was through to conception and birth, toward childhood and adulthood; and we are all again without exception, finite beings in a state of relation to an external world that admits

of no limitation. Thus, we find that this principle reflected in our very beings, and that operates also on the cosmic level, is not by mere coincidence, reflected in the explanation of universal causality that has been given.

It is a reflection of the way things actually work.

It is a reflection of reality, and not mere fantasy, as some might argue given that what has been offered is no more than a product of, as they will say, the imagination.

But such a criticism is not what could be called a well constructed, well thought out, counterargument grounded on critical judgments. It is rather no more than an insult that would reduce the critical reflection employed toward the end of this solution to the question of the why to something equivalent to a belief in tooth-fairies, or leprechauns. Yet for anyone who might view such an insult as a justifiable criticism, that the argument is no more than a product of the imagination, and as such groundless, where is their solution to this same question of the why?

The answer is simple enough.

They have no answers for the question of the why, for the question of the why just as with this question concerning God's existence, is meaningless. And indeed there are an over abundance of not only those who do view such questions as meaningless, but who, in the world of academia, interpret Kant in such a manner as to render it even a violation of reason to employ this common faculty, bequeathed to us at birth and without restriction, toward the end of rational solutions to such questions. Their thinking they claim, is now much more sophisticated, much more nuanced, and capable of adapting to a world of infinitely changing complexities; but what are such critically minded thinkers really saying by this?

What they are really saying, despite all their attempts to cling to something tangible for fear of losing all touch with

reality, is that after all things are considered, they live in a world that is ultimately, truly meaningless, for all things are inevitably destined for oblivion. Hence, it is all no more than an inexplicable absurdity. This reasoning, finding root in the absence of any clear, objectively verifiable answers to philosophy's greatest problems, is circular and self-actualizing for nothing that makes any sense can be part of this world that cannot admit to anything sensible or meaningful. In such a world there can never be found, or if it exists, it cannot admit to anything rational, anything grounded on necessity that would threaten to undermine this senseless intoxication with meaninglessness. But we need not revel in the stupors that so many are carried away with in this world of theirs that makes no sense, where critical thinking is but a phantasm that appears only now and then depending on the amount of alcohol flowing through one's veins, and to guard ourselves against such senseless intoxication with meaninglessness, let us put together what we know and what information we can gather that can help us to make sense, as opposed to nonsense, of this world of our experience.

It can hardly be denied that the science of cosmology points back to a state where billions of years ago the universe was confined to a concentrated, superheated, uniform state; and given that even our practical, common sense confirms to us that no effect follows as its own cause but is only brought about by an external cause, it also directs us to the same conclusion toward which all this empirical evidence, and our own intuitive sense points, and that is toward the premise of this argument.

The regress does not end with the big bang but it ends at that simplest of all possible states defined by the premise explained, that allowed for the ultimate beginning of the

formative phase of the series that preceded the big bang, with the final critical stage of this series being evident in this present creative phase.

And there is nothing about this present state that conflicts in any serious matter with the explanation that has been proposed.

Take for instance, the following:

Through their observations cosmologists have learned that the expansion that began billions of years ago is not slowing down, but it is accelerating.

According to this causal explanation the force compelling this expansion would have had an increasing influence over this rate of expansion as it continued and less of an influence in the past. Where the two opposed forces generated by this series that preceded the big bang separated at that critical stage that brought about the end of this series, the counterforce to this expansion—equalling the mass of the universe—would not have been able to either slow down or reverse this expansion, nor would it have been able to prevent this rate of expansion from obtaining to a critical, absolute limit. This result explains why this rate of expansion is observed to be accelerating rather than slowing down, and this then touches on something else that we know for a certainty, but that is commonly overlooked by all those who entertain, as in so many science fiction novels and films, the possibility of one day travelling to distant galaxies and unknown worlds.

When astronomers look through their telescopes they look into the distant past. The radiation in the form of light from stars or galaxies that they observe has been travelling through space for millions of years, and in the case of the most distant objects, billions of years. Hence, we do not and cannot know whether the objects that emitted this radiation that long ago still exist. All we can know is that

they did exist in the far distant past, but considering the wide sweeping changes that have occurred on the Earth during only the last few hundred thousand years, where the emergence of the human race itself spans but a minute fraction of that expanse of time, is it not then plausible to assume that changes as equally vast may have swept throughout the entire universe, and that the universe as it is now may be vastly different from the universe that astronomers observe through their telescopes?

This realization points out the disconnect that many harbor of a universe that appears to them, established, or fixed, as though what astronomers view through their telescopes reflects the way things are now, rather than what things were like in the past.

Then there is a critical problem that follows from all of this, for the most distant galaxy observed, abbreviated GSZ-13, is at a distance reflecting where this object was only three hundred million years after the big bang, or the beginning of time.

The problem that can be put is: If the universe in its early history was confined to a much smaller volume of space, then how did these most distant galaxies escape the more confined space in which the universe was contained 13+ billion years ago to assume those positions in space that reflect where they were this long ago?

Could they have been both within this more confined space that existed earlier on, when the universe was in its infancy, and many billions of light years outside of this more confined space at the same time?

Consider then the concept of time put forth in the argument that has been given.

Time is explained in terms of the formative phase as a series of successive stages each of which elapsed over a certain duration, and the duration of each stage in relation

to each successive stage is a period of expansion that has already occurred—a period not marked by time.

This problem with respect to the most distant objects observed disappears with this explanation that necessitates that space, along with these objects carried along with it, expanded out instantly (in no time) to the limit of the stage immediately prior to this present final, critical stage of expansion, and it is this limit that marks the approximate distances in space reflecting where these most distant galaxies were so many billions of years ago.

This explanation also falls in line with observations that show an increase in the recessional velocities of galaxies proportional to their distances, where it has been found that the most distant objects observed show velocities approaching the speed of light, and with this coinciding with the diminishment of time in relation to velocities, with time being absent at the speed of light. In the schema as explained, the two representations, *B* in relation to *A*, defines an Absolute constant, unchanging condition that marks the beginning and the end of the series. Time is therefore explained as a condition determined by the expansion of space and it diminishes as a condition in proportion to the velocity of expansion, and it disappears altogether as a condition with respect to the Cause external to and compelling this expansion.

There is in this explanation of causality also an answer as to why the distribution of heat in the early universe was homogenous throughout space, given that the expansion was compelled by an indivisible, absolute force=*B*, that equates with the infinite heat compressed at the singularity, and that becoming separated from the derivative mass generated through the series having predated the big bang,

brought about with the expansion of space the relatively uniform distribution of this derivative mass as well as this uniform distribution of heat throughout the early universe.

There is also found in this explanation of causality an answer for the precise balance between the force of expansion= B and the force of gravity= X , where it is understood that had the force of expansion in the early universe been even slightly greater than the force of gravity, then the rate of expansion would have been too great for any stable structures like stars or galaxies to form, and the universe would have turned out cold and lifeless; and on the other hand, had the gravitational force been even slightly greater than the force of expansion, it would have caused the universe to collapse before any such stable structures as stars or galaxies could form.¹⁵ These further aspects that reflect what cosmologists understand about the

¹⁵ See: Sir Fred Hoyle, *Home is Where the Wind Blows* (Mill Valley, Ca.; University Science Books, 1994). Hoyle mentions there is no accounting for this balance from the big bang supporters, except with the implication of Divine adjustment, pg. 402; and Stephen Hawking in *A Brief History of Time* (New York, Bantam, 1988) mentioning the same, pg. 12. But scientists have sound reasons for objecting to such notions, as Hoyle explains, pg. 257, citing the need to avoid what would amount to the *greatest possible scientific heresy*. While scientists ought to refrain from drawing conclusions divorced from science, metaphysicians are obliged to open the gates to those transcendent realms forbidden to scientists. But this does not mean that scientists cannot avail themselves of the explanation of universal causality given for they need not admit to its conclusion as regards the agency but are free to call this agency by any other name, and so defend themselves against the charge of trespass.

early universe are accounted for and explained by this preceding explanation of universal causality.

Another counterargument that might be raised by skeptics, where such a product of pure reason is concerned, is that any true scientific theory has the characteristic of being able to make predictions that if realized could lend objective validity to the theory, or in the event of their failure could invalidate the theory; and so, even though what has been proposed is but an exercise of speculative reason and does not pretend to be an empirically grounded science, but rather, a science of metaphysics, where are the predictions with regard to what has been offered here?

This is a legitimate criticism, or demand.

So how do we answer it?

This explanation of universal causality is not lacking in this respect for it also follows through to certain logical conclusions, or predictions, for as the formative phase that preceded the big bang came to its end, and with the opposing forces (B and X) generated by this formative phase being equal or balanced in their relation, one with the other, this present stage of expansion will inevitably come to an end, however this will not be followed by a further collapse, or successive stage of expansion. All things, rather, will revert to what Albert Einstein himself preferred over the idea of an expanding universe as dictated by his own General Theory of Relativity, and that is a steady-state universe.

That this will indeed become the case is also a conclusion that cannot be avoided given that the causal process that has been explained links time and space together with expansion, and so it follows that when this expansion inevitably ceases, time itself will come to an end, and consequently, all things will revert from a temporal,

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changing form, to an eternal, unchanging form; and wherein can we find any support for such a scenario, but once again, in no other source but within the book that theists regard as the source and the foundation for their faith.

The Fallacy of Natural Selection

There remains yet the question: what are we given as an alternative to this explanation of causality where the natural sciences are concerned?

While by no means intended to address this larger question of general causality, but only causality in the natural world, the most widely held view, entertained even by many theists who see no real problem with this, is the theory of natural selection as expounded by Charles Darwin as follows:

This preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious ones, I call Natural Selection.... Can we wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far 'truer' in character to man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the mark of far higher workmanship? It may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing, throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the improvement of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life.¹⁶

What Darwin offered in his broader work as a whole, was nothing more than an explanation of what happens in nature—namely: the process, or the effect. Calling this process natural selection is simply to give the explanation of the effect another name; and are atheists who have

¹⁶ *The Origin of Species*, ed. J.W. Burrow (Penguin Books, 1978), pg.'s 131-33.

morphed Darwin's ideas into something akin to an atheistic manifesto in this regard any different from theists, who merely assume to prove the existence of an invisible, transcendent Cause?

Admitting to the fact of what happens in nature, this being the effect, is something hardly deniable, but proof of the effect does not prove the cause. Any claim to the contrary would have us believe that the effect is the same as the cause and the cause is the same as the effect. Proof of the effect does not prove the cause, whether this causal agency be called God or Natural Selection. It can be considered as evidence but evidence of itself is not a proof, not even in the case of civil or criminal law. There is a distinction. The only proof, aside from an appeal to the evidence in design, that in this case, despite their obvious differences, reveals that atheists and theists are entirely likeminded, is by accounting for this evidence by connecting the evidence to a Cause that transcends the evidence according to a necessary, *a priori*, line of reasoning.

Nowhere in Darwin's magnum opus do we find any such necessary line of reasoning.

Nowhere in the scriptures to which theists attest do we find any such necessary line of reasoning.

Both sources, one claimed as the truth by atheists, and the other claimed as the truth by theists, are entirely bereft of any such reasoning. Neither source was intended, by their authors, to explain what therein was never meant to be explained, for the explanation of what was never meant to be explained was left to be uncovered by another source, and that source, despite its multitude of detractors, is itself pure reason.

We see in Darwin's work, among the countless others inspired by it since, this same fallacy of passing the

explanation of the effect off as the explanation of a cause, for while natural processes may no doubt help to explain how certain effects come about, this idea of particular causality when lifted from this natural world and granted transcendent status by suggesting for instance, that *nature's productions*, in comparison to man's productions, *plainly bear the mark of far higher workmanship*, we are thereby merely being invited to take part in the same kind of fallacious reasoning that Socrates saw at work with Anaxagoras 2,300 years earlier, only while Anaxagoras called his transcendent causal agency *nous*, Mind, or Intelligence, Darwin called his transcendent causal agency Natural Selection.

It is this same fallacy that continues to be repeated throughout so much scientific literature directed at not only the scientific community, but the masses, and the result of this mass-induced blindness is not without its negative consequences.

Darwin could not foresee, nor is it likely that he would have condoned the politicization of his idea of the driving principle that goes hand-in-hand with his agency of natural selection: *the survival of the fittest*, and its usurpation by the most extreme movements in history such as Marxism, and far more horrifically, eugenics and Nazism, all claiming Darwin's offspring as their legitimate child; but this usurpation does not begin or end with such abnormalities for those are but malignant outgrowths of this fallacy having imbedded itself like a cancer into the underlying fabric of science, and that in so doing, has undermined science by allowing it to be weaponized by a new brand of hostile, militant atheists who portray religion as the purveyor of the world's greatest evils, being as it must be, given their anti-religious prejudice, steeped in unscientific nonsense and superstition. As the militant

atheist/author mentioned previously regarding proofs for God's existence, has a chapter in the same work: *even a mild and moderate religion helps to provide the climate of faith in which extremism naturally flourishes*, the assumption is that 'religion' and 'faith' are labels to be associated only with those who believe in the existence of God, and irrespective of any grounds that might underlie and support their belief. Given this reasoning, those who profess any religious faith whatsoever, even mildly, such as perhaps in the mere confession that they believe in salvation through Christ, are stoking the flames from which the greatest of atrocities are bound to flare up, for we have this same author quoting someone likeminded: *the cause of all this misery, mayhem, violence, terror and ignorance is of course religion itself* (from an article published in the Glasgow Herald, 24 July, 2005). And, since the author is a scientist, the book in which this unbridled attack against religion appears is not to be found on the mere opinion shelves of bookstores and libraries everywhere, for there are no such shelves, but they are found exactly where one should expect to find them, on the science shelves.

But what is the alternative this militant atheism offers in place of such delusions as God?

What is offered from this same author on his crusade to banish religion from off the face of the earth and usher in what he calls a *new moral zeitgeist*, is the idea that we human beings are not truly human beings at all, nor do we have a consciousness that we can call our own. Rather, we are no more than mere machines whose sole purpose in life is the replication of selfish genes. The idea of the self that we possess is but an illusion foisted on us by genes, and they are our true Masters and Creators, and as this author states in his appendix to Darwin, *The Selfish Gene*, they provide the 'ultimate rationale' for our existence, and of

this we can be sure, for this dogma, along with this author's psychoanalytical diagnosis that those who believe in an invisible Supreme Creator, *working silently and insensibly* behind the scenes, are delusional, rests on the unshakable foundation of science, and science as we all know, has nothing to do with blind faith, or the supernatural, has nothing to do with foolish myths, but it is grounded on the established and verifiable concrete facts that are laid out plainly for everyone to see.

And what are these facts laid out plainly before us?

When you look at another person you are looking at a fact. But the fact you are looking at is not, properly and scientifically speaking, a human being. You are looking at a highly complex mechanism arranged by genes to no end other than their mindless self-replication. If you harbor the impression that what you are looking at is a human being designed for some higher purpose, this is an illusion. What you are really observing is the concrete manifestation of the senseless and meaningless end toward which Natural Selection inexorably moves. This is the new Darwinian inspired Truth that is to pave the way to a religious free world, and what can the proponents behind this crusade hope to achieve but perhaps the diagnosis, following their expertise in the field of human psychology, of a new mental disorder somewhat resembling if not the same as schizophrenia, the symptom of which is denying the reality of senselessness and meaninglessness in favor of the belief in an invisible Supreme Being, and with the banishment of such delusions, perhaps with the help of a new pharmaceutical drug that can restore one back to senselessness and meaninglessness, we are to march with these holy science-minded zealots down the road toward a new moral zeitgeist.

As the same author however—who has merely engaged in the fallacious reasoning pointed out earlier with Socrates’s dismissal of Anaxagoras, of confounding the explanation of an effect with the explanation of a cause and lending the effect a false universal, transcendent status—is wise enough to acknowledge that any higher intelligence, perhaps from somewhere else in the universe, that could help account for our existence, would have to be explained in terms of a rational, understandable process, then perhaps such reasoning that is fully sound can dispense with such pretensions as selfish genes and the need to lower human beings—who as the scriptures state are created in the image of God—to the status of mere machines, and acknowledge the logic of the preceding explanation of a causal process that follows not by chance, not randomly, but necessarily, *a priori*.

Though there is a further problem that must be acknowledged, for what are we to make of all the evil lurking about ready to devour us in this world that is, supposedly, the work of a Supreme Creator, both omniscient and omnipotent?

Certainly this brute fact of evil, in all its various forms, both manmade and natural, explodes every possible legitimate thought that one might have in the existence of a Supreme Being with all the attributes that such a Being must possess, for given this fact one cannot reasonably attribute, as theists are obliged to, the characteristic of moral perfection to such a Creator who bestows life, only to then, like a malevolent thief, steal it away. This is as undeniable as any axiom of geometry, or law of physics, is it not?

There is no denying the obvious.

The fact of evil is a problem that no one has yet come close to answering, at least not very convincingly, and short

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of a clear and rational solution to this problem, it will pose in the minds of many, if not most, a sufficient enough reason to withstand all that has been advanced here in favour of theism as opposed to atheism.

Appendix

Like a trail of clear markings left in a foreboding forest that threatens to swallow up those who wander into it, and purposely meant to guide the lost back to civilization, there is something of the kind left by Kant in the forest of his *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In his appendix to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, written by Kant in the attempt to mitigate the confusion and misunderstandings that followed with the publication of his *Critique*, Kant issued a challenge to a reviewer lost in this forest, and this challenge, along with the several other passages quoted, stand out as markings that can guide the lost and the confused toward clarity and understanding. These passages have the advantage over so many endless secondary commentaries on Kant of allowing Kant the courtesy of clarifying himself, with only the assistance of the preceding causal argument to help explain what Kant meant by, for instance: ‘synthetic cognition *a priori*’, and that for Kant would constitute the necessary form, if one could be said to exist, of a *science of metaphysics*:

He [Kant’s reviewer] seems not to see at all the matter of the investigation with which (successfully or unsuccessfully) I have been occupied. It is either impatience in thinking out a lengthy work, or vexation at a threatened reform of a science in which he believed he had brought everything to perfection long ago; or, what I am reluctant to suspect, real narrow-mindedness that prevents him from ever carrying his thoughts beyond his school metaphysics.¹⁷

¹⁷ *Pro*, pg. 117-18 [369-70].

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That my suspicion is not without foundation is proved by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge *a priori*, the special problem upon which the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests and upon which my *Critique* (as well as the present *Prolegomena*) entirely hinges.... The reviewer, then, understands nothing of my work and possibly also nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics itself.¹⁸

I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is only just, on *a priori* grounds, in his own way, any single really metaphysical proposition asserted by him....¹⁹

He finds in these *Prolegomena* and in my *Critique* eight propositions of which one in each pair contradicts the other, but each of which belongs to metaphysics... he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure and accepting it without any proof, of which I will make him a present, but only one... and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one and at the same time show that, according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can just as clearly be proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing not to be explained, much less set aside, until we ascend to its birthplace, pure reason itself.²⁰

There is also a condition that Kant imposes on any proposed answer to this challenge:

¹⁸ *Pro*, pg. 's 126-7 [376-77].

¹⁹ *Pro*, pg. 127 [377-79].

²⁰ *Pro*, pg. 128 [378-79].

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But there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, which are suited as little to metaphysics as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of so-called common sense, which does not convince everyone but accommodates itself to personal peculiarities. For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd than in metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason, to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be known *a priori* is thereby announced as apodictically certain, and must therefore be proved in this way. We might as well think of grounding geometry or arithmetic on conjectures.²¹

The premise of the causal explanation given overturns the proof given by Kant to the antithesis of the first antinomy, and follows through to the understanding of a process that leads to the conclusion that there exists a Supreme Being to whom we may attribute the complexity of order exhibited in reality, and it should be of some interest to cite what David Hume and Immanuel Kant had to say concerning metaphysics, and this concept of cause and effect utilized to the end of such a proof.

As to this Hume wrote:

We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connection between the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be followed or preceded by the other.... Now nothing is more evident than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects [here Hume refers to the

²¹ *Pro*, pg.'s 117-18 [369-70].

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world of our experience, and therein the problem lies] as to conceive any connection between them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy by which they are united. Such a connection would amount to a demonstration, and would imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other.²²

Notice carefully here Hume's phrasing: ...*the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other*. Where is such an absolute connection between cause and effect to be found?

Think here not then of a material object, but think rather the *A* and *B* representations, where the connection is necessary, as Hume would demand.

There were in Hume's time, as there are even now, those who for most likely the same shortcomings that Kant noticed in his reviewer, believed Hume denied causality in nature, but Hume sought for the demonstration of an absolute connection between cause and effect which is exactly what is called for in metaphysics, where the problem of causality is, just as Hume well enough understood, not that of particular causality, but rather, universal causality.

Kant adds clarification in this regard with his defense of Hume against his opponents who mistakenly assumed that Hume was speaking of causality as it pertains to nature:

The question was not whether the concept of cause and effect was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume had never

²² *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (London, Oxford University Press, 1967) Sec. XIV, under: Of the idea of a necessary connection, pg.'s 161-62 (old English edited to modern). Hereafter: *Treatise*.

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doubted, but whether that concept could be thought by reason *a priori*, and consequently, whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying perhaps a more extended use not restricted merely to objects of experience.... the opponents of the great thinker should have penetrated very deeply into the nature of reason, so far as it is concerned with pure thinking—a task which did not suit them. They found a more convenient method of being defiant without any thought, namely, the appeal to common sense. It is indeed a gift of God to possess right or (as they now call it) plain common sense. But this common sense must be shown in action by well-considered and reasonable thoughts and words; not by appealing to it as an oracle when no rational justification for one's position can be advanced. To appeal to common sense when insight and science fail, and no sooner—this is one of the subtle discoveries of modern times by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. Seen clearly, it is but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and boasts in it.²³

Kant reinforces this defense of Hume by making the same observation that Hume's opponents mistook for a denial of causality in nature. Notice first however Kant's phrasing: *so far as it is concerned with pure thinking*. This is the problem that shows well enough where philosophers opposed to metaphysics find room for criticism where there is none, and this misunderstanding referred to by Kant in his defense of Hume, is as common, if not more common

²³ *Pro*, pg.'s 6-7 [158-59].

now. There is a distinction between those who cannot divorce themselves from the world of their immediate experience, and those more suited to abstract concepts and pure thinking as in metaphysics, that alone can deal with the problem of causality in its universal sense, having as its goal the explanation of a transcendent Cause outside our material world of things, and here the connection between cause and effect must be shown not as in nature, with a degree of probability, or on the grounds of its possibility, but on the grounds of its *a priori*, necessity.

As Kant explains, just as we find with Hume:

But I cannot by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else whose existence is necessarily connected with the former, for this I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me *a priori* (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (that is causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by intuiting it *a priori*.²⁴

Kant admits his inability to comprehend a causal connection *a priori*, but notice his thinking, like Hume's, is bound to objects—the material world, which contradicts the method of metaphysics that demands divorcing one's thinking from this world of objects, as exemplified in the explanation of universal causality given wherein alone, the kind of *a priori* connection called for can be found.

Here again Kant clarifies the same problem while distinguishing those better suited to understanding and tackling the problem, and those better suited to less demanding, more easily obtainable ends:

²⁴ *Pro*, pg. 119 [370-71].

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All metaphysicians are therefore solemnly and legally suspended from their conjectures till they shall have adequately answered the question: "How are synthetic cognitions *a priori* possible?"²⁵ For the answer contains the only credentials which they must show when they have anything to offer us in the name of pure reason. But if they do not possess these credentials, they can expect nothing else of reasonable people, who have been deceived so often, than to be dismissed without further inquiry.

If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief, they will grant that they are not even allowed to conjecture far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians. For the latter profess to be speculative philosophers, and since, when judgments *a priori* are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known *a priori* is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be

²⁵ Refer: *Beyond Kant and Hegel*, adhering to Kant's stricture; in answer to the question: "How are synthetic cognitions *a priori* possible". *The Review of Metaphysics*, Mar. 2013, issue 263; Vol. LXVI, No. 3.

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permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertion must be either science or nothing at all.²⁶

Thus, it can be seen that what Kant demanded from metaphysics was not anything in the usual, ordinary sense, but something that went beyond mere conjecture, and if not already clear enough concerning the object in need of such a proof:

Were a metaphysics which could maintain its place as a science really in existence, could we say: “Here is metaphysics; learn it and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth”? this question would then be useless, and there would only remain that other question (which would rather be a test of our acuteness than a proof of the existence of the thing itself): “How is the science possible, and how does reason come to attain it?” But human reason has not been so fortunate in this case. There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: “This is metaphysics, here you may find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a higher Being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason.”²⁷

And these problems central to metaphysics we find mentioned in the introduction to Kant’s earlier *Critique*, not as a passing thought, but to instill in his readers the understanding that these are the central problems that must be kept in mind to the end of weaving together all the various elements that help to make sense of his *Critique*:

²⁶ *Pro*, pg.’s 25-6 [277-79].

²⁷ *Pro*, pg. 20 [270-71].

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And it is in this very kind of knowledge which transcends the world of the senses, and where experience can neither guide nor correct us, that reason prosecutes its investigations, which by their importance we consider far more excellent... far more elevated than anything the understanding can find in the sphere of phenomena. Nay, we risk rather anything, even at the peril of error, than that we should surrender such investigations, either on the ground of their uncertainty, or from any feeling of indifference or contempt. These inevitable problems of pure reason itself are, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which with all its apparatus is really intended for the solution of these problems, is called Metaphysics.²⁸

The difficulty is that the empirical method, commonly assumed to be the only way of grounding and verifying our judgments, cannot address such problems, which as Hume and Kant understood, demand certainty.

The previous quote where Kant distinguishes between two different types of thinkers reflects his awareness toward the biases of those predisposed against speculative reason. Where one way of thinking may be fully aware of the problem as it relates to such concepts as cause and effect, the other way of thinking, bound to thinking strictly in terms of this material world of things, will tend to view these same concepts, when employed to the end of the problem of universal causality, as a reflection of the old school metaphysics supposedly repudiated by Kant, and carrying this bias with them they will naturally look down on speculative reason with a great deal of suspicion, if not contempt.

While having a deep insight into the nature of such problems in metaphysics as this idea of a necessary

²⁸ *CPR*, pg. 5 [A: 3-4; B: 4-8].

connection between cause and effect, and the use of these concepts not with respect to, but beyond the world of our experience, Kant nevertheless saw no escape from thinking purely in terms of experience, as seen in the reasoning exhibited in his proof for the first antinomy's antithesis:

For let us assume that it [the universe] had a beginning. Then, as beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is an empty time. In an empty time however, it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition as to existence rather than non-existence, which condition could distinguish that part from any other (whether produced by itself or through another cause). Hence, though many a series of things may take its beginning in the world, the world itself can have no beginning, and in reference to time past is infinite.²⁹

There is no doubt that Kant was fully aware that it was only the thesis that provided grounds for a possible argument for God's existence given that the antithesis grounded on the idea of an eternal universe renders the idea of such a Cause meaningless.

Is it the presumption on the part of those Kantians who truly regard the antinomy as insoluble to argue therefore, that Kant viewed the question of God's existence as equally insoluble, and as such, meaningless?

While presenting this proof however, Kant issued the previously quoted challenge to his reviewer, and this challenge, along with Kant's request that his critical reader devote to the first antinomy his chief attention, can be taken as a clear reflection that this proof was not as convincing to

²⁹ *CPR*, pg. 307 [A: 427-29; B: 455-57].

Kant as many, if not most readers of Kant are likely to assume, and that this is so becomes most apparent for not only does this proof qualify as nothing more than a mere presumption grounded on common sense, but elsewhere Kant offers, with an exercise of pure speculative reasoning of his own, the very means of undermining this supposed proof:

There is between reality (sense representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity. For between every degree of light and of darkness, between every degree of heat and of cold, between every degree of weight and of absolute lightness, between every degree of occupancy space and of totally void space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness (psychological darkness) ever-diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as consciousness which is only outbalanced by a stronger consciousness.³⁰

For whoever may mock the idea of Kant's relevance, and especially as regards his *Critique*, as indeed some have,³¹ given that he was an eighteenth century philosopher without the benefit of all that we have come to know since, one might see here, if one only considers the matter closely, that Kant's thinking is not far from anticipating all that has come to be known with advances in quantum theory; but

³⁰ *Pro*, pg. 54 [306-07].

³¹ Here I speak of several philosophers or students of philosophy with some familiarity with Kant, however I have more in mind such recent philosophers as the late Mortimer J. Adler.

what really is revealed in any such dismissal is that they originate from those types of thinkers of whom Kant writes, who are not suited to thinking on abstract terms with pure concepts, and who are also prone to dismissing by reason of this inability, those problems with which Kant dealt with in his *Critique* and that have been clearly mentioned previously; but beyond this, what is further revealed is this underlying assumption, that since knowledge increases with science as it marches ever forward, then the further back in time one lived the more inferior in intelligence one had to be, however, for those who are able to see through the brazenly egotistical psychology of such pretenders to wisdom, we find that this same line of speculative thinking on Kant's part reads in the *Critique* as:

Now there is a gradual transition possible from empirical to pure consciousness, till the real of it vanishes completely and there remains a merely formal consciousness (*a priori*) of the manifold in space and time; and, therefore, a synthesis also is possible in the production of the quantity of a sensation, from its beginning, that is, from the pure intuition=0, onwards to any quantity of it.... That quantity which can be apprehended as unity only, and in which plurality can be represented by approximation only to negation=0, I call intensive quantity. Every reality therefore in a phenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If this reality is considered as a cause (whether of sensation, or of any other reality in the phenomenon, for instance, of change) the degree of that reality as a cause we call a momentum, for instance, the momentum of gravity.³²

³² *CPR*, pg. 139-40 [A: 164-70; B: 205-12].

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The same reasoning Kant displays here, with: *there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as consciousness which is only outbalanced by a stronger consciousness....* along with: *a synthesis also is possible in the production of the quantity of a sensation, from its beginning, that is, from the pure intuition=0, onwards to any quantity of it,* including here the concept of *momentum* along with *gravity*, is well reflected in the preceding explanation of universal causality.

In contrast to this, the proof of the antithesis reflects the kind of conflict in thinking pointed out by the French philosopher, Henri Bergson:

The inherent difficulties of metaphysics, the antinomies which it gives rise to, and the contradictions into which it falls.... are largely the result of our applying to the disinterested knowledge of the real, processes which we generally employ for practical ends.... But the truth is our intelligence can follow the opposite method. It can place itself within the mobile reality and adopt its ceaselessly changing direction, in short, it can grasp it by means of that intellectual sympathy that we call intuition. This is extremely difficult. The mind has to do violence to itself, has to reverse the direction of the operation by which it habitually thinks, has perpetually to revise, or rather recast, all its categories.³³

But how, given this departure from our ordinary, practical way of thinking, is it possible to lend objective validity to what we think we can know?

³³ *Introduction to Metaphysics* (Library of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, N.Y., Bobbs-Merrill, 2nd revised ed. 1955), pg.'s 50-2.

Kant explains:

If knowledge is to have any objective reality, that is to say, if it is to refer to an object and receive by means of it any sense and meaning, the object must necessarily be given in some way or other. Without that all concepts are empty. We have thought in them, but we have not by thus thinking, arrived at any knowledge. We have only played with representations. To give an object, if this is not meant again as mediate only, but if it means to represent something immediately to intuition, is nothing else but to refer the representation of the object to experience (real or possible). Even space and time, however pure these concepts may be of all that is empirical, and however certain it is that they are represented in the mind entirely *a priori*, would lack nevertheless all objective validity, all sense and meaning, if we could not show the necessity of their use with reference to all objects of experience.³⁴

This is merely to state what should be obvious, that with any proposed understanding from pure reason, objective validity is determined on the grounds of whether or not the understanding it puts forth can be referred to the world of our experience, and whether or not that understanding can thereby help us make sense of reality; otherwise, we are merely playing with representations. As an example: take all past arguments claiming to provide a proof of God's existence but that fail to account for the four universal aspects of our reality that must be accounted for, such as space and time, as Kant mentions here. For Kant, these arguments would amount to a mere playing with representations (it could just as well be said, a mere playing

³⁴ CPR, pg. 131 [A: 153-56; B: 191-95].

with words), and so it was that he took exception to such arguments as those advanced by the two philosophers he mentions by name in the Appendix to his *Prolegomena*.

In the following Kant clarifies this critical demand even further, and as the rhetoric is difficult, and some may even declare obscure to the point of being indecipherable, I've added what I will myself argue stands as the only possible, truly rational clarification and explanation, inside brackets:

As therefore experience, being an empirical synthesis, is in its possibility the only kind of knowledge that imparts reality to every other synthesis, this other synthesis [the causal explanation given] as knowledge *a priori*, possesses truth (agreement with its object) [the object being the world of our experience] on this condition only, that it contains nothing beyond what is necessary for the synthetical unity of experience in general [this synthetical unity of experience in general being made possible by our utilizing the four universal, *a priori* concepts of space, time, mass, and mind, toward the end of explaining the causal process accounting for their origination]. The highest principle of all synthetical judgments is therefore this, that every object is subject to the necessary conditions of a synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience [stressing the same point, as a critical principle]. Thus synthetical judgments *a priori* are possible, if we refer the formal conditions of intuition *a priori* [space, time, etc.], the synthesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of it in a transcendental apperception [example: the causal explanation given], to a possible knowledge in general, given in experience [the world of our experience].³⁵

³⁵ CPR, pg. 132 [A: 153-56; B: 192-95].

This other synthesis of pure understanding of which Kant speaks, that is divorced from experience yet abstractly linked to and thereby able to account for our phenomenal world, is initially made possible by the concept of, as Kant has it, an empty time, or what we might otherwise define simply as nothing, but that lends itself to the idea of a relation of the finite to the infinite, and the *A* and *B* representations as an abstract means of explaining this relation—reflecting the kind of pure thinking demanded in metaphysics—and this in contrast to Kant’s antithetical proof grounded on a presumption dictated by common sense, and to which, though we may have already belabored this stricture even to the point of monotony, but that nevertheless demands repeating given that this will no doubt prove to be the impregnable fortress to which the opponents of speculative reason will flee to withstand its assault, Kant remarks:

Common sense can hardly understand the rule that every event is determined by means of its cause and can never comprehend it in its generality. It therefore demands an example from experience, and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what is always thought when a pane was broken, or a kitchen utensil went missing, it then understands the principle and grants it. Common sense, therefore, is only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are *a priori*) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them *a priori*, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative understanding and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense.³⁶

Beyond these critical insights we have the following from Kant with respect to the idea of a necessary

³⁶ *Pro*, pg.’s 118-19 [369-71].

connection between cause and effect, and here, for clarification, I have—as with the clarification of Kant’s criteria for objective validity by using the causal argument as an example of the kind of *synthesis of imagination* and *transcendental apperception* of which he speaks—added the *A* and *B* representations inside brackets:

But the question is not what we must join in thought to the given concept, but what we actually think together with and in it, though obscurely, and so it appears that the predicate [*B*] belongs to the concept [*A*] necessarily indeed, yet not directly but indirectly by means of an intuition which must be present.³⁷

And with Hume, we find the same, but again, for clarification, I have included the *A* and *B* representations inside brackets:

A cause [*A*] is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one [*A*] determines the mind to form the idea of the other [*B*], and the impression of the one [*A* or *B*] to form a more lively idea of the other [*B* or *A*].³⁸

Having explained what is in demand, Hume further put forth four rules by which to judge of cause and effect as follows:

1. The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time.
2. The cause must be prior to the effect.

³⁷ *Pro, Preamble*, pg. 17 [269, 272].

³⁸ *Treatise*, pg. 170.

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3. There must be a constant union between the cause and effect. It is chiefly this quality that constitutes the relation.

4. The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause.³⁹

The causal process explained adheres to Kant's stipulations for *a priori* necessity, and thereby for what he would call a science of metaphysics, and not by coincidence, it also falls in line with these four rules stipulated by Hume.

Kant was quite clear concerning his expectations for, as he called it, a science of metaphysics; stating of his own work that: *these dissections of concepts are nothing but the materials from which the intention is to carpenter our science*;⁴⁰ thus we find in the same section of his *Prolegomena*, under the heading: *How Is Metaphysics Possible As A Science?*:

When I say that I hope these *Prolegomena* will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand that everyone whom the thorny paths of my *Critique* have tired and put out of humor will ask me upon what I found this hope. My answer is: upon the irresistible law of necessity.

That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be

³⁹ *Treatise*, pg. 173.

⁴⁰ *Pro*, pg. 117 [368-69].

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metaphysics in the world; nay, everyone, especially every reflective man, will have it and, for want of a recognized standard, will shape it for himself after his own pattern. What has hitherto been called metaphysics cannot satisfy any critical mind, but to forego it entirely is impossible; therefore a *Critique of Pure Reason* itself must now be attempted or, if one exists, investigated and brought to the full test, because there is no other means of supplying this pressing want which is something more than mere thirst for knowledge.⁴¹

Finally, there is one other thing that should be mentioned, and that is Kant's remark concerning proofs, found near the conclusion of his *Critique*:

By this caution the assertions of reason is much simplified. Whenever reason operates with concepts only, only one proof is possible, if any. If therefore we see the dogmatist advance with his ten proofs, we may be sure that he has none. For if he had one which (as it ought to be in all matters of pure reason) had apodictic power [necessity] what need would he have of others?⁴²

The explanation of universal causality given falls in line with this further Kantian demand, as it does with all of Kant's other critical demands. This explanation of causality requires no subsidiary proof for it is a coherent, self-explanatory, pure synthesis of understanding from beginning to end. It is in its form what Kant would call a synthetic cognition *a priori*, from its premise through to its conclusion, and its purpose is intended to help us make sense of the world of our experience that is otherwise

⁴¹ *Pro*, pg. 116 [367-78].

⁴² *CPR*, pg. 506 [A: 784-88; B: 812-16].

impossible. It is the one and only seemingly impossible answer to the seemingly impossible question.

But when reflecting on it, for all the simplicity that it exhibits in its form, and that is really no more than a pure conceptual system that can lend sense to an otherwise senseless reality, is it really all that impossible?

Its realization stems not from any simple, momentary reflection, but a form of critical reflection that anyone is capable of, if only one were to adopt a similar, stubborn resistance to the false thought of its impossibility.

In the absence of this solution to the problem of universal causality it is more than just doubtful that readers of Kant will come to appreciate the full depth of his critical insights, or truly understand the project he was occupied with, this being the criticism leveled by Kant at his reviewer; and how exactly did Kant respond to this critic of his philosophy? He challenged his critic to analyze any one of his four sets of contradictory propositions and to offer in return a necessary, *a priori* proposition of his own that would resolve the obvious problem; this being itself the challenge for anyone who dares to venture into and chart the forest of Kant's *Critique*.

Where this challenge, offered in all seriousness and not just as a passing amusement, is downplayed by readers of Kant, including scholars who, assuming Kant's critical works merely paved the way for his subsequent works, wrench Kant's *Critique* from its transcendent realm down to their own earthly level where alone they believe they can find legitimacy, they reveal that they, just as Kant's reviewer, understand nothing of the spirit and essential nature of metaphysics, and so underestimate the faculty of pure reason and our inherent capacity to settle, fully and conclusively, and in a logical and rational manner, such matters as whether or not there exists a higher Will, and a

purpose that reaches beyond this mere temporal existence. This timeless and truly most practical of all concerns that has spanned the ages is not something that should occupy only philosophers, so-called intellectuals, or experts in human psychology, and it is not something that should be relinquished, as indeed it has been as seen in the thinking of so many, to either evolutionary biologists or theoretical physicists; nor should it be relinquished to any religious authority of any kind. It is a matter for which, in virtue of the absence of any such solution and proof as that given, the doors have been left open for a flood of mere biased opinions from empiricists and atheists having taken up science as their sole possession, and as the weapon wherewith they aim to save humanity from the scourge of religion and in its place establish their own scientifically anointed truth. This truth being that we are just so much dead matter, just so much common cosmic stardust that has miraculously and inexplicably self-assembled itself into this reality before us, and in this freakish defiance of the odds, we are simply living out our absurd, petty, and meaningless lives in a completely cold and indifferent universe.

It is left for the independent reader to lift this matter from the hands of those who would impose this aberrant atheistic ideology steeped in ignorance and prejudice and nihilism on them, for it is the individual alone, and not any power outside of the individual, who holds the means to exercise mind and will and action to the end of either casting aside or embracing meaning, but armed with what has been given it is hoped that the reader will find herein much more than what poor presents these atheistic, self-styled benefactors to the storehouse of human wisdom and understanding, have laid before us.

Science of Metaphysics Abstract

The Formative Phase:

The beginning in the ultimate sense.

Prior to the big bang, 13.8 billion years ago.

The premise: The Absolute/Infinite/Eternal/Unconditioned.

T=0 (Time equals 0).

Prime Mover/First Cause to B as a finite representation of itself. A pure relation of the finite to the infinite.

B's movement to return to A as its source and constant motivating factor.

This movement can be explained in terms of: Space (S), Time (T), Mass (X), and Mind (B), where in the beginning (T=0) these universals were unified or synthesized together as one; but where with B's movement toward A, we have the beginning of a process of progressive differentiation, with S, T, X, B, separating out (diverging) by means of successive stages.

Here, space and time must be linked together with the concept of expansion, explained in terms of B's movement to A. Thus, where T (time) is used below, we also have S (space), X (mass), and B (mind=the outermost limit to each stage of expansion, maintaining a constant relation to A). Then factor in also degrees of intensity with respect to velocity, heat, and momentum.

1st stage ----> outward expansion.

T=0 -----> T=1 sec. limit, with limit obtained we have:

T=0 < ----- Collapse of B and X.

2nd stage: ----->

T=0 -----> T=0 -----> T=2 sec./new limit.

(previous limit)

T=0 < ----- Collapse of B and X.

3rd stage: -----> T=0 -----> T= 4 sec./new limit.

(previous limit)

T=0 < ----- Collapse of B and X.

Rational Theism, Part One

All intermediate stages up to a final critical stage follow the same principle.

The duration of expansion of each preceding stage is not factored into the duration of each succeeding stage as its duration has past and remains a constant in relation to A as well as each succeeding stage.

The number of stages may be approximated by dividing the speed of light (186,000 miles/sec.) by half down to the shortest distance measurable—the Planck time. The series would end with the infinite moving back, as it would moving forward.

The Creative Phase

The series obtains to a critical stage of velocity, or absolute intensity, where S, T, X, and B cannot undergo further intensification, or qualitative differentiation, but have obtained to their greatest possible extent.

Critical, final stage: ----- > T=0 ----- > Absolute.
(previous limit)

B and X fully
differentiated.

Forces of expansion (B) and gravity (X) perfectly balanced.

As B and X are fully separated out there is no possibility of further collapse.

Space, time, mass, and Mind, have increased to their furthest possible extent; along with the related factor of heat. Given that heat would have expanded out instantly to the limit of the preceding stage (prior to the big bang) there is room for an explanation for the uniform distribution of heat in the early universe, and possibly other anomalies related to big bang cosmology.

The singularity at T=0 with infinite density, 13.8 billion years ago, is accounted for, as is the design apparent in the universe on the smallest and highest level for with this creative phase, where with B having separated out from X (its derivative), obtained to its greatest possible state as Absolute Being and Absolute Mind, transcending S, T, and X as the Supreme force controlling and upholding all that there is.

Rational Theism, Part One

With respect to this schema, or as it can be called, conceptual system of pure, philosophical understanding, it can be said that all that is finite is moving toward (or returning to) the Eternal or the Infinite or the Absolute as its source, and once this end is obtained, time will end, and the future will transition to an ever-abiding present.