Acting Together to Address Structural Injustice: A Deliberative Mini-Public Proposal

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I. Introduction

Various contemporary social issues involve two types of moral wrongs: interactional wrongs and structural injustice. Interactional wrongs are moral wrongs that are directly inflicted through interpersonal interactions. For example, consider the issue of sexual violence. There are interactional-wrong elements in this issue, namely those acts of sexual violation that are inflicted by a few individual perpetrators and constitute violations of the victims’ moral rights. At the same time, it should also be noted that people are not impacted similarly by sexual violations. Rather, due to the impacts of social structure, which is formed through interactions between norms, schemas, and material conditions, some groups of people (e.g. women of colour and genderqueer people) are made unfairly prone to the threat of sexual violation. Such unfair structural impacts can be considered a structural-injustice element of sexual violence. Structural injustices exist when social structures expose some groups of people to disproportionate burdens (such as violence, exploitation, and alienation) while granting unearned benefits to others. These two types of moral wrongs can be found in many social issues other than sexual violence, such as colonization, residential segregation, labour injustices in global sweatshops, health inequalities, and the biased impact of artificial intelligence (AI).

Although the ways to address interactional wrongs are relatively well established, ideas for addressing structural injustice are less clear. For example, to address its interaction-wrong element

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1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Political Theory Workshop at Stanford University and the Responding to Injustice conference at the University of Sydney. I am very grateful to all the participants of these events for their constructive feedback. Special thanks to Alex Guerrero for helpful discussions and detailed comments.

2 I discuss more details about the nature of these two types of moral wrongs and the relationships between them in my paper, ‘Sexual Violence and Two Types of Moral Wrong,’ forthcoming in Hypatia.


of sexual violence, we know that individual perpetrators should be held responsible for the harm they impose on the victims. Accordingly, we enforce legal or moral sanctions against them. What about the structural-injustice elements involved in sexual violence? Who should be responsible for an unjust social structure? What does it mean to be responsible for it? How should the responsibility for structural injustice be implemented? The answers to these questions are still unclear.

Over the past few decades, inspired by Iris Marion Young’s work, increased scholarly attention has been paid to the issue of responsibility for structural injustice. According to Young’s influential social connection model, all the agents whose actions contribute to the reproduction of such wrongful social structures together bear a shared responsibility for structural injustice, and such shared responsibility can only be discharged through collective action. Even though the idea of collective action is theoretically attractive, its practical implementation often encounters various forms of practical challenges, which have prevented the realization of mature forms of collective action from adequately and smoothly taking place. To address structural injustice effectively, we need to gain clarity on the practical challenges that are involved and explore possible means of implementing shared responsibility. This chapter thus aims to contribute to the study of addressing structural injustice in the following two ways. First, building on previous studies, I categorize three forms of practical challenges that have been encountered by existing proposals for discharging shared responsibility for structural injustice. Second, I offer an alternative proposal, which I will refer to as the deliberative mini-public proposal, and argue that it has the potential to mobilize structural change and better overcome the identified practical challenges.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In §II, I clarify the notion of shared responsibility for structural injustice and note the multifaceted moral demands to which such responsibility should aim to respond. In §III, I point out three categories of practical challenges to implementing shared responsibility for structural injustice—psychological and epistemic barriers, lack of platforms for coordinating collective action, and a daunting amount of work. I also argue that two types of existing proposals on implementing responsibility for structural injustice fail to overcome these practical challenges. Clarifying the moral demands and common practical challenges facilitates exploration of better alternatives for discharging shared responsibility. In §IV, I outline my proposal for implementing shared responsibility for structural injustice; it is based on a form of political institution known as deliberative mini-publics, which involve a diverse group of people convening to deliberate on issues of public concern. In §V, by evaluating its potential to overcome

10 Young (n 9); Young (n 3).
the practical challenges and satisfy the moral demands of addressing structural injustice, I argue that my proposal based on deliberative mini-publics is a promising alternative for mobilizing the desired form of collective action.

II. Moral Demands for Addressing Structural Injustice

Before exploring the practical methods for addressing structural injustice, we need to obtain a more precise grasp of the moral nature of structural injustice and the moral demands related to addressing it. Who should be responsible for structural injustice? What goals or tasks should the responsibility for structural injustice aim to achieve? This section briefly overviews the theoretical background upon which this chapter builds.

When holding people responsible for interactional wrongs, in both moral and legal contexts, the following two criteria are usually required: (1) cause condition—the agent’s action can be shown to have causally contributed to the wrong and (2) control condition—the action was performed by an agent voluntarily and with sufficient knowledge of the consequences of their actions. This conventional model of ascribing responsibility is often referred to as the liability model. An agent whose action satisfies these two conditions bears responsibility for interactional wrongs in the liability sense, which usually means that legal sanctions (such as imprisonment or fines) or moral sanctions (such as blame) can be imposed upon them.

However, these two conditions of ascribing responsibility in the liability model usually cannot be satisfied when considering structural injustices; in other words, the liability model alone is usually unable to ground the responsibility for structural injustice. Recall that structural injustices exist when the impacts of social structures constitute unfair power relations between different groups of people, exposing some to disproportionate burdens while granting unearned benefits to others. It is important to note that the social structure exists only in dynamic practices and is formed and shaped through the interaction between norms (such as institutionalized laws and social norms), schemas (associated symbols, meanings, and values), and distributions of resources. In other words, structural injustice is a collective result to which various participants of the social structure contribute. This feature makes it difficult to meet the control conditions, as it is almost impossible to single out a few agents as the main contributors or trace the exact causal contribution of each agent’s action on the social structure. Furthermore, agents often contribute to the reproduction of the social structure through their everyday practices without being aware of the consequences of their actions. For example, consumers buying garment products might not know how they contribute to the reproduction of a social structure in which women in the Global South are exposed to poor working conditions. The fact that the practices contributing to structural injustice are often regarded as ‘normal’ or ‘morally permissible’ under the existing norms makes the knowledge condition challenging to meet.

12 Young (n 3); Hayward (n 5).
13 Young (n 3); Haslanger (n 3).
In response to the limitations of the liability model for ascribing responsibility for structural injustice, Young famously proposed a different conception of responsibility that she called the social connection model.\textsuperscript{15} She suggested that the social connection model supplements the liability model: Whereas the liability model is suitable for responsibility for interactional wrongs, the social connection model is a more appropriate conception of responsibility for structural injustice. In contrast to the two conditions used in the liability model, the social connection model suggests that the moral grounds for ascribing responsibility for structural injustice are based on one’s connections to the related social structure or when one’s actions contribute to the reproduction of that social structure. As the everyday practices of the participants of the social structure usually fuel its reproduction, the social connection model suggests that almost all participants, regardless of their position in the social structure, are responsible for the related structural injustice.

What does being responsible for structural injustice entail? First, the responsibility for structural injustice is a shared responsibility, one that each relevant agent personally bears but does not bear alone. Young drew from Larry May\textsuperscript{16} to contrast shared responsibility with collective responsibility, which is attributed to a collective of persons, such as organizations, corporations, and societies, without being distributed to its constituent individuals. Structural injustice, in contrast, as the wrongful social structure is a collective result produced and maintained by multiple agents through everyday practices, necessitates the assignment of responsibility to each of them, and they bear this responsibility together. Therefore, one implication of this shared responsibility is that it cannot be discharged alone, but only through collective action with other responsible agents.

Second, the content of such shared responsibility is open; in other words, bearing a shared responsibility does not directly specify what one should do. As Young pointed out, responsibility is different from duty.\textsuperscript{17} When one has a duty, morality dictates the specific actions that one needs to perform. In contrast, responsibility points out specific ends that one should bring about without specifying the detailed actions that should be taken. The specifics of assuming responsibility are thus left to the discretion of each agent, who must decide what to do to approach such ends.

What, then, should be those ends of such shared responsibility? Young suggested that the goal is primarily forward-looking and is about transforming structural processes—or reducing unjustified power imbalances—to make them more just in the future.\textsuperscript{18} I will refer to this forward-looking goal as structural transformation. For example, by challenging patriarchal norms, disputing rape myths, conducting legal reforms, or educating people to use interventions in problematic scenarios, the social structures that sustain the prevalence of sexual violence against women of colour could be shaped into a more just form.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{15} Young (n 9); Young (n 3).
\textsuperscript{17} Young (n 3).
\textsuperscript{18} ibid.
In addition to the forward-looking demands, I argue that there are also backward-looking demands, such as structural reparation, involved in addressing structural injustice. After all, while structural transformation might help prevent people from encountering structural injustice in the future, it does not address the wrongful structural impacts that have already been imposed. Reparations, as one form of backward-looking moral demand, pay attention to the victims’ experience and aim to do justice by acknowledging the wrong done, repairing the harm, and holding relevant agents accountable for the reparation. Considering the nature of structural injustice, reparations should be provided to all who inhabit vulnerable positions within the social structure. Measures of structural reparation need to recognize the harmful effects, such as restricted options and compromised well-being, that are imposed on these groups of people and work to rectify the wrongs by compensating for those harmful effects and helping people transition away from vulnerable positions.20

In summary, Young’s social connection model provides a distinct moral ground for responsibility attribution regarding structural injustice. Reflecting on the intertwined relations between individuals’ everyday practices and the influence of social structure reminds us that we, as participants of the social structure, are ‘structurally complicit’21 in many issues of structural injustice. All participants in a wrongful social structure bear a shared responsibility and are required to join in collective action to provide reparations for those who are wronged and to transform the social structure, making it less unjust in the future.

III. Practical Challenges Encountered for Responsibility Implementation

Although Young’s social connection model helps clarify the moral nature of shared responsibility for structural injustice, questions about the implementation of such responsibility naturally follow. How should this shared responsibility for structural injustice be implemented? How might the right sort of collective action for structural transformation proceed? In this section, after identifying two types of proposals for addressing structural injustice in the literature (in §III-1), I identify three categories of common challenges that both of the proposals encounter: psychological and epistemic barriers, lack of platforms for coordinating collective action, and a daunting amount of work (in §III-2).

III-1. Two Types of Proposals for Implementing Responsibility for Structural Injustice

Two types of proposals for implementing the responsibility for structural injustice can be found in the literature: One provides guidelines for moral reasoning (Type 1 proposal), while the other appeals to the power of disruptive politics (Type 2 proposal).

20 I discuss the need to consider the backward-looking reparation for structural injustice in Ting-An Lin, *Addressing Structural Wrongs: From Moral Theory to Implementation* (Rutgers The State University of New Jersey, School of Graduate Studies 2022).

Young is a proponent of the Type 1 proposal, which provides guidelines for moral reasoning for addressing structural injustice. Noting that shared responsibility does not imply that all relevant agents should share the responsibility equally, nor does it suggest that all agents should act similarly, Young proposed what she calls the parameters of reasoning, which each agent can use to decide their actions and the role that their actions may play in the collective action. She pointed out four parameters of reasoning derived from the situated social positions—power, privilege, interest, and collective ability—and sketched some guidelines for contributing to the collective action according to the associated resources. Agents with power are those who have a greater capacity to shape structural processes (such as government officials or, in the case of global sweatshops, large multinational corporations) and should use their influence accordingly. Agents with privilege are those who have benefited from the wrongful social structure (such as consumers in the social structure of the global apparel industry or White men in a White supremacist and patriarchal society), and they should use the ample resources available to them to change their habits and make extra efforts to support collective action. Victims suffering from structural injustice are a group of people with particular interests in transforming the social structure, and they can contribute to the collective action by broadcasting their knowledge and experience of suffering from structural injustice. Lastly, agents with collective ability, such as those in a position to mobilize unions or religious organizations, should exercise their ability.

Young’s parameters of reasoning are not the only form of the Type 1 proposal. For example, Robin Zheng proposed alternative guidance for moral reasoning, the role-ideal model, which suggests that agents should decide what actions to take by reflecting on their social roles, such as that of parent, colleague, employer, and citizen. Considering the relationships that such social roles concern and the expectations associated with them, Zheng suggested that social roles provide us with a more precise guide for identifying the actions one should take.

Both Young’s parameters of reasoning and Zheng’s role-ideal model implicitly assume a picture in which all or most agents are on board with the idea that they are responsible for structural injustice and are genuinely interested in identifying the specific actions they should take to contribute to the collective action. However, such an assumption is highly problematic. Feminist epistemologies and critical race theorists working under the theme of epistemologies of ignorance have pointed out that ignorance is often actively constructed by privileges and serves the purpose of maintaining the structure of power imbalance. Thus, while the ideal situation, as described in the Type 1 proposal, is that the privileged would use the resources and benefits conferred to them to change their practices and make extra efforts to support collective action, wilful ignorance often prevents this from happening.

Motivated by such concerns, the Type 2 proposal appeals to the power of disruptive politics, such as boycotts, protests, and sit-ins, to ignite collective action. Clarissa Rile Hayward is one of
the proponents of this camp.\textsuperscript{25} According to Hayward, whereas the Type 1 proposal highlights the moral reasoning of the privileged, the alternative emphasizes the political power of the oppressed. By organizing disruptive politics, the oppressed have the power to interrupt (perhaps a subset of) the privileged people’s motivated ignorance and compel them to pay attention to the issues. In his critique of Young’s lack of specification of the content of collective action, David Jenkins also emphasized the value of disruption in mobilizing the collective action required for structural transformation.\textsuperscript{26} Drawing from empirical studies in politics, sociology, and social psychology on social change, both Hayward and Jenkins suggest that a significant part of enacting social change has to do with political disruption, which is usually initiated by the oppressed and then joined by others.

**III-2. Three Categories of Practical Challenges**

In what follows, I identify three categories of practical challenges that concern the implementation of responsibility for structural injustice and argue that both types of proposals mentioned above do not succeed in overcoming them. This examination aims to provide a theoretical ground for identifying the desiderata of a satisfactory proposal and explore alternatives for implementing such shared responsibility.

**Challenge (1): Psychological and Epistemic Barriers**

If the shared responsibility for a structural injustice is to be implemented, the responsible agents must first regard the issue as morally problematic and acknowledge responsibility for it. However, many psychological and epistemic barriers often prevent relevant agents from doing so. It is true that in the cases of interactional wrongs, an agent might also fail to recognize responsibility; still, the nature of structural injustice, namely the difficulty of tracing causal connections and knowing how one’s everyday practices contribute to the wrongful social structure, makes these barriers even more severe. The wilful ignorance mentioned in §III-1 is an example of such a barrier. Moreover, Jade Schiff provides a detailed analysis of three dispositions that problematize individual acknowledgement of implication in structural injustice: thoughtlessness (an incapacity to think, partly produced by one’s socio-political conditions), bad faith (a form of lying to oneself), and misrecognition (a kind of collective bad faith that fails to see how people’s suffering is related to us).\textsuperscript{27} These dispositions support each other, making it more difficult for agents to confront their responsibilities. It is thus impractical to expect that the privileged would naturally conduct moral reasoning and take on their share of responsibility accordingly, as suggested by the Type 1 proposal.

The circumstances of structural injustice exacerbate epistemic barriers not only for the privileged but also for the oppressed. Tamara Jugov and Lea Ypi categorized victims of structural injustice into three different categories based on their levels of awareness of their own oppression:

\textsuperscript{25} Hayward (n 5).
\textsuperscript{26} Jenkins (n 11).
\textsuperscript{27} Schiff (n 11).
(1) the *epistemically aware* (those who understand the existence of injustice as well as its structural nature and how it affects them), the *partially epistemically opaque* (those who rightly observe the existence of injustice and know that they are impacted by it but do not fully understand its structural nature), and the *totally epistemically opaque* (those prevented from adequately understanding the structural nature of their oppression). To enact a Type 2 proposal, which appeals to the power of the oppressed to conduct disruptive politics, there needs to be a sufficient number of oppressed people who are epistemically aware or at least partially epistemically opaque. While this consideration of the epistemic conditions of the oppressed does not entirely rule out the potential to appeal to disruptive politics, it does raise concerns that there are limited circumstances in which this proposal is plausible.

**Challenge (2): Lack of Platforms for Coordinating Collective Action**

If an agent has overcome the psychological and epistemic barriers and thus recognizes the existence of an issue of structural injustice and acknowledges their connections to it, this agent will quickly encounter another challenge. The nature of shared responsibility means that one cannot discharge responsibility solely but needs to do so with others through participation in collective action. But how does such collective action happen?

Anne Schwenkenbecher has helpfully distinguished two types of collective action by unorganized groups: *distributive action* and *cooperative action*. For distributive action to be possible requires only shared plans that inform individuals of the roles they can play to contribute to the collective goal. The actions that individuals need to take in such scenarios are usually relatively straightforward and simple. For example, in public health campaigns to reduce the impact of a pandemic, individuals can contribute to the goal by getting vaccinated. However, given the complicated nature of structural injustice, as Schwenkenbecher pointed out, merely appealing to distributive action is insufficient; rather, cooperative actions are also required. For cooperative actions to be possible, the agents involved need to have more knowledge, which includes: (a) knowledge of a shared plan P, (b) knowledge of one’s role in P, and (c) knowledge that most of the other agents also know about P. In order for agents to acquire the full gamut of knowledge, some form of platform for coordination is also required. However, in our current society, there is a lack of such a platform for facilitating the desired epistemic conditions, and neither the Type 1 nor 2 proposals provide us with any clues on how to approach it.

**Challenge (3): The Daunting Amount of Work**

The idea of joining in collective action with others further raises another practical challenge: the daunting amount of work that such action requires. One unfortunate reality is that there are multiple issues of structural injustice in the contemporary world—racial and sexual violence, global sweatshops, homelessness, and unemployment, to name just a few—and many of us are

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28 Jugov and Ypi (n 11).
29 Schwenkenbecher (n 11).
30 ibid.
implicated in many of them. For an agent to take on responsibility for every issue of structural injustice, they need to invest time and effort in coming up with a shared plan $P$, clarifying their role in $P$, and acting in accordance. Although shared responsibility suggests that the agent does not need to do all of this on their own, given the multiple issues of structural injustice in which each of us is implicated, the demands would add up to a daunting amount of time and effort for each agent.

Currently, both Type 1 and Type 2 proposals fail to accommodate this challenge. The Type 2 proposal, which appeals to the power of the oppressed to disrupt ordinary people’s ignorance, is essentially silent on this issue. Disruptive politics might function to raise awareness of the issues; however, it does not explain how people should navigate the process of defining the next steps. On the other hand, although Type 1 proposals provide agents with some guidance related to responding to an issue (e.g., reflecting on one’s situated positions or one’s social roles), given the unfortunate reality that many of us are implicated in multiple issues of structural injustice, these proposals bump squarely into the problem of the daunting amount of work. Given the difficulties and amount of work required, individuals might rationally feel overwhelmed and paralysed regarding their share of responsibility.

Overall, although the social connection model provides a helpful theoretical analysis of shared responsibility for structural injustice, the reflections in this section have identified three categories of practical challenges that would prevent the smooth implementation of such shared responsibility. Various psychological and epistemic barriers block individuals’ recognition of structural injustice and their connections to it; the lack of a suitable platform for individuals to organize and coordinate a shared plan makes the more sophisticated type of collective action difficult to enact, and given the unfortunate reality of our involvement in multiple issues of structural injustice, the decision to join collective actions with others imposes a daunting amount of work on each agent, leading to them feeling overwhelmed by the demands. To effectively implement the responsibilities for structural injustice, we need to take these challenges seriously.

IV. The Turn to Institutional Design

The analysis in the last section reveals that it is impractical to expect the desired form of collective action to arise naturally from unorganized groups of people in our current society. How could such circumstances be changed? In this section, I suggest that exploration of institutional design is a promising route.

In presenting her proposal to appeal to the power of disruptive politics to address structural injustice while highlighting the power of those politics to create ‘political openings for structural change’, Hayward also recognized that their influences are partial and impermanent. Reflecting on historical experience, she notes that a more common way to utilize the momentum for structural change is to influence the reluctant actors through extrinsic motivation, which includes but is not limited to moral responses (e.g. praise or blame) and material incentives (e.g. monetary cost or

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31 Hayward (n 5) 408.
opportunities such as jobs or promotions). After all, many individual practices that contribute to the reproduction of social structures are at the level of habit, which is acquired without individuals’ regular conscious thoughts and decisions. Thus, instead of appealing to moral suasion that makes claims about what people ought to do, Hayward suggests that a more effective way to shape and maintain a habit is to change the incentive structure that is favourable to that habit. Making recycling an almost costless option or charging for plastic bags are two examples of this.

I suggest that the idea of shaping incentive structures to change habits is not only relevant when considering changing individuals’ practices in accordance with structural change but is also insightful when considering changing individuals’ practices in approaching issues of structural injustice. Currently, people are usually presented with moral demands to address structural injustice as independent agents and are asked to take the initiative in forming or joining collective actions. Such an experience is often accompanied by a sense of loneliness or of being overwhelmed, which adds another layer of barriers to the three categories of practical challenges mentioned above. Changing the circumstances by reducing the effort required to join collective action might help to incentivize engagement.

While there is potentially more than one way of achieving this goal, in the following sections I sketch a proposal based on a form of political institution known as deliberative mini-publics, in which a diverse group convenes to deliberate issues of public concern and produce some form of result that the greater public can use as guidance when addressing those issues. After briefly introducing the idea of deliberative mini-publics in §IV-1, I discuss the details of my proposal to utilize deliberative mini-publics to address structural injustice in §IV-2. In the following section (§V), I discuss how this proposal provides an incentive structure that complements the two existing types of proposals for implementing shared responsibility for structural injustice and better mobilizes the desired form of collective action.

### IV-1. Deliberative Mini-Publics: A Brief Introduction

Deliberative mini-publics are an institutional mechanism in which an assembly of people who are democratically representative of the larger population is brought together to learn about and deliberate on a topic of public issue in order to form a considered result. They are two core features of deliberative mini-publics. First, it is mini-public, a demographically representative microcosm of the public, which is achieved through random selection or similar methods. Second, it is deliberative; that is, participants engage in a careful discussion about an issue after receiving relevant information. The concepts of random selection and deliberation can be traced to ancient Athenian democracy, but they regained contemporary attention around three decades ago, when

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political scientist Robert Dahl coined the term ‘mini-populous’ and inspired a ‘new wave of deliberative democracy’. In the past few decades, hundreds of deliberative mini-publics have been created worldwide to consider various topics of public concern. Among the varieties of these deliberative mini-publics, five main forms can be observed: citizens’ juries, planning cells, consensus conferences, deliberative polls, and citizens’ assemblies. These sub-types of mini-publics differ in many aspects, from the number of people recruited, the number of meetings, the selection method, and the activities involved to the form of the result and how it is incorporated into the existing political system. Which sub-forms of mini-publics should be adopted and how they should be designed depend on the issue of concern, the nature of the organizer, and the purpose of such an assembly. For example, when the purpose is to obtain a representative survey of the opinions of the public, deliberative polls (which incorporate larger groups of participants and fewer meetings) are often selected. In contrast, when the purpose is for the participants to create more detailed reports or recommendations, citizens’ juries or citizens’ assemblies (which utilize relatively smaller groups but a more extended series of meetings) are usually preferred.

Two relatively recent examples of deliberative mini-publics can provide a brief overview of the design and impact of this mechanism. From 2012–2014, the Irish government established an Irish Constitutional Convention (a form of citizens’ assembly) to discuss and propose amendments to the Irish Constitution. The assembly consisted of 99 randomly selected members: 66 citizen representatives plus 33 representatives from Ireland’s political parties. The members convened for plenary sessions on Saturdays to discuss eight topics within 12 months, and they produced reports sent to Parliament. Later on, Parliament responded to their reports and put three proposals to the referendum—one was about permission for same-sex marriage, and it was subsequently passed, which marked a transformative change in a traditionally Catholic country.

On the other side of the spectrum, America in One Room is an example of the recent use of deliberative polls. America in One Room took place over a long weekend in 2019, and it gathered, through stratified random sampling, 526 American registered voters to discuss issues of the 2020 presidential election related to five areas: immigration, the economy, healthcare, the environment, and foreign policy. At the beginning of the process, the participants were surveyed about their views on these issues, and the results were later contrasted with their views (collected via confidential questionnaires) after participating in the deliberation. The general purpose of deliberative polls is to see what the public would think if given sufficient time and opportunity to gather well-balanced information and deliberate with a diverse cohort. One interesting finding of America in One Room is that the deliberative process can significantly reduce polarization. In all

33 Dahl (n 32).
35 For more details on these deliberative mini-publics, visit the Sortition Foundation <https://www.sortitionfoundation.org/> and Participedia <https://participedia.net/>.
36 See Escobar and Elstub (n 32) for a detailed comparison between these five main forms of deliberative mini-publics.
five topic areas, the partisan differences between Republicans and Democrats dramatically decreased after they participated in the deliberation process. Even though the result of America in One Room was not directly used to guide voting in the 2020 presidential election, it received wide media coverage, as it revealed some positive results about how to overcome the differences and polarization in society.

IV-2. A Deliberative Mini-Public Proposal for Addressing Structural Injustice

Deliberative mini-publics, as a form of institutional innovation, are often advocated for their potential to overcome some of the problems of the current democratic system, which relies on elections to select representatives, and to further strengthen the value of democracy. Here, I want to instead argue for the potential of using deliberative mini-publics to address structural injustice; I call this the deliberative mini-public proposal. The proposal, briefly, is to establish deliberative mini-publics as needed and to make it a civic duty to serve on them to address some issue(s) of structural injustice. The participants of each of the deliberative mini-publics would be provided with relevant information and sufficient time, and they would be tasked with producing some forms of results that would be helpful for the greater public to use as guidance in addressing those issues.

Before moving into more details about the deliberative mini-public proposal, two notes should be emphasized. First, there is no one-size-fits-all design of deliberative mini-publics for addressing structural injustices. Instead, depending on the target issue, multiple aspects of the design choices may be needed. While more details about the design and implementation of the deliberative mini-public proposal remain as yet unexplored, my goal is to provide a theoretical ground for approaching some core design choices.

Second, deliberative mini-publics do not have to be used as a sole method; instead, they can be combined with other proposals, including those presented earlier. For example, the occurrence of disruptive politics (Type 2 proposal) can be regarded as indicative of a need to establish deliberative mini-publics on relevant issues. Thus, whereas disruptive politics create political openings, deliberative mini-publics sustain the momentum to proceed with structural change. Furthermore, in the kind of deliberative mini-publics that aim to develop a shared plan or provide actionable guidance for individuals who wish to contribute to the plan, the principles


39 One potential analogy is jury service in the US, which is regarded as part of civic duty. Jury service is mandatory, and the person who is summoned must attend (except for some cases of exemptions and excuses); some reimbursement for the service be provided, and there are some protections (e.g., employers must allow one time off to serve on a jury and cannot fire an employee who is summoned for jury service). For more details about the US jury service, see https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service. I should emphasize that the exact rules of qualifications, exemptions, reimbursement, and protection for attending the deliberative mini-publics need not be like the jury service in the US; I mention jury service just to be used as an example for further exploration.
suggested by the Type 1 proposal might be useful. These, of course, are just a few potential ways to envision the relationships between these different proposals. The takeaway here is that the deliberative mini-public proposal presented below is not and should not be regarded as a silver bullet for addressing structural injustices. Rather, my goal is to argue that this proposal bears several advantages that can complement existing proposals; thus, it should be recognized as a promising alternative in the toolbox for addressing structural injustice.

Typically, deliberative mini-publics proceed in five stages: (1) planning and recruitment, (2) learning phase, (3) deliberative phase, (4) decision-making phase, and (5) follow-up. In the rest of this section, I discuss how the nature of structural injustice informs the design of deliberative mini-publics during these five stages.

In the first stage, planning and recruitment, deliberative mini-publics identify the topic and recruit an assembly of people. To use deliberative mini-publics to address structural injustice, an issue with a specific time and scope, for example sexual violence on college campuses in the US, must first be identified. Participants can then be recruited through random selection or quasi-random selection methods to ensure representativeness. Since all the participants of the wrongful social structure bear a shared responsibility for the issue of structural injustice, the scope of participant recruiting should correspond to the social structure of the target. For example, if the issue is on a domestic level, then people within that national boundary should be the potential pool from which to recruit; when the wrongful social structure goes beyond the state boundary (such as with the issues of global sweatshops and transnational migration), the recruitment pool should expand accordingly.

In the second stage, the selected participants enter the learning phase, where they will be given relevant information about the topic from diverse perspectives. They might, for example, be given information packages in advance and then exposed to a wide range of evidence, views, and testimonies from diverse angles (including experts, officials, activists, etc.). In some cases, there will also be opportunities for the participants to raise questions and consult directly with the selected experts. The point of the learning phase is to inform participants using the best available relevant knowledge. Some questions can be raised about the implementation of this stage: What kind of qualification should be used to consider someone an expert? Among the multiple experts, who should be selected to join the process? Who should be making these decisions? These are all crucial questions that are still under scholarly debate, and the answers to these questions might

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40 Escobar and Elstub (n 30); Dryzek and others (n 30).
41 Questions about how to carve out different issues of structural injustice might need more attention. One consideration has to do with the fact that many issues of structural injustice are intricately interrelated, interwoven, and intersecting with each other. Thus, while drawing distinction to some extent is required for the deliberation to be effective, it needs to be aware of the complicated dynamics in the larger context. Thanks to Nannerl O. Keohane and Valerie Soon for raising this important concern.
42 There are different ways of recruiting for various issues of structural injustice: purely random sampling, stratified random sampling, discursive representation (or opinion representation), target groups, or a mixture of these. For more discussions, see Clodagh Harris, ‘Mini-Publics: Design Choices and Legitimacy’, Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019).
differ depending on the issues of focus. However, I want to emphasize that when using deliberative mini-publics to address structural injustice, it is especially important to count those who are oppressed by the given social structure as a type of expert. As feminist epistemologists have long pointed out, one’s standpoint or situated positions hugely influence how one sees the world, and the situated positions of the oppressed may impart some special epistemic advantage. From this perspective, the oppressed bear expertise that comes from experience and have much to contribute to deliberation on how to address these structural injustices. In addition to epistemic value, inviting the oppressed as experts further satisfies the moral demands of addressing structural injustice; I will discuss this point in the next section (§V-1).

After the learning phase, participants move into the deliberative phase, during which they engage in diverse, small-group face-to-face deliberation about the presented information. Usually, trained facilitators play a crucial role in this phase, as they ensure that the deliberation dynamics are respectful and that participants have equal opportunities to contribute. Given that power imbalance is a key issue underlying structural injustice, how to mitigate problematic impacts and ensure that participants can have equal footing in the deliberative process is crucial. It should be noted that, despite the efforts of trained facilitators, concerns have been raised regarding whether active facilitation in deliberative mini-public settings is sufficient to ensure these values. Some studies suggest that certain groups of people, such as women, less educated participants, and those with a lower economic status, tend to be disadvantaged in contributing to the process, whereas other empirical studies have not found such a gap between different groups. The kind of facilitation that would better ensure the desired dynamic and reduce unjustified power imbalances in deliberative mini-publics remains an active topic under research.

In the fourth stage, the decision-making phase, based on the discussions and information learned in the previous stages, the participants produce outputs together, and such outputs can be used by the greater public as guidance when addressing structural injustices. Depending on the issue of focus, deliberative mini-publics might be designed in different ways and with different kinds of expected outputs. For example, for issues about which there is less consensus or more tension among the public, it might be more appropriate to begin with some survey-oriented mini-publics, such as deliberative polls. In such a setting, the ultimate goal is to examine how people’s

43 Guerrero (n 35); Jennifer J Roberts and others, ‘Experts and Evidence in Deliberation: Scrutinising the Role of Witnesses and Evidence in Mini-Publics, a Case Study’ (2020) 53 Policy Sciences 3.
positions might change after the learning and deliberative phases, and the survey opinions can be used by the greater public to signal the potential for evolution of viewpoint—the degree to which a perspective might realistically change in the short term. In contrast, for cases where there is more general recognition of a moral problem with the issue and a shared vision to address it, models such as citizens’ juries and citizens’ assemblies, where the expected output would be recommendations for actions or analysis of the pros and cons of different proposals, may be most appropriate. It should be noted that the form of deliberative mini-public that is appropriate for a given issue is context-sensitive and might change over time. In societies around the world, for example, some social issues (e.g. the prevalence of sexual violence and its disproportionate impacts on some populations) that once went unrecognized now garner much more awareness and consensus about their moral seriousness. At the same time, these deliberative mini-publics might also play a role in shaping the public’s awareness and perception of certain issues.

Lastly, the results produced by the deliberative mini-publics will be shared through relevant networks and used as helpful guidance for the greater public when approaching issues of structural injustice. Methods through which to follow up on the implementation or communication of the results are needed to better ensure its effectiveness. How exactly the results produced by the deliberative mini-publics should be used is another issue under heated debate. Some scholars suggest that significant power should be conferred to the mini-publics and that the results produced from them can be used to shape public policies directly, while others suggest that deliberative mini-publics should be given rather restrictive power and limited to, for example, indirectly shaping the greater public’s opinion instead of directly deciding public policies. While this issue warrants further consideration in the implementation of mini-publics to address structural injustice, engaging more fully in this issue will go beyond the scope of this piece. For the purposes of this chapter, I will only note the following: Since the social structure is a collective result, addressing any issues of structural injustice comprehensively would require the participation of a sizable portion of the greater public. Therefore, discussion of the role of deliberative mini-publics in this context will need to incorporate the dynamics between the participants of the mini-publics and the rest of the public. No matter how much power the mini-publics are given, some forms of communication of the reasons behind the results will need to be properly presented to achieve an adequate uptake by the rest of the public.

48 Escobar and Elstub (n 30).
V. Evaluating the Deliberative Mini-Public Proposal

I have now sketched a proposal for addressing structural injustices based on deliberative mini-publics, but why should we think this proposal is worth considering? In this section, I evaluate the deliberative mini-public proposal from two perspectives: the potential to satisfy the multifaceted moral demands for addressing structural injustice (§V-1) and the feasibility of overcoming practical challenges and facilitating the proper form of collective action (§V-2).

V-1. Considerations Regarding the Fulfilment of Moral Demands

Let’s first consider the potential of the deliberative mini-public proposal to fulfil the moral demands for addressing structural injustice. Recall that in §II, I pointed out the two-fold moral demands: forward-looking structural transformation and backward-looking structural reparation. The former concerns making changes in social structures to reduce unjustified power imbalances between members of society in the future, while the latter focuses on rectifying the harmful impact that has been imposed on groups of people through recognizing the wrongs, compensating for the harmful impact, and holding relevant agents accountable. How promising is the deliberative mini-public proposal in meeting these moral demands?

First, the deliberative mini-public proposal shows promise regarding holding the relevant people accountable for issues of structural injustice. As mentioned earlier, the facts that structural injustice is a collective result and responsibility is shared among broad groups of people often obscures the issue, allowing people to avoid recognizing their connections to issues of structural injustice. The establishment of various deliberative mini-publics for addressing structural injustice and making participation in these mini-publics part of civic duty has the potential to dispel these myths. The establishment of these mini-publics would make clear that, beyond interactional wrongs, there are structural-injustice elements that require public awareness. Furthermore, making participation in these mini-publics part of civic duty conveys the message that the broader community bears a shared responsibility. Even though each individual only needs to serve on a few deliberative mini-publics, the fact that the selection is made randomly sends the message that the responsibility for these issues of structural injustice is shared (by both the participants of these mini-publics and those who weren’t selected). In this way, the whole process of regularly establishing deliberative mini-publics on some issue of structural injustice urges people to recognize the wrongful impact of these structural injustices, confront their responsibility for them, and gather in collective attention to address them.

Second, the deliberative mini-public proposal is promising for ensuring a fairer distribution of responsibility for addressing structural injustice. Currently, the burden of raising public awareness about some issues of structural injustice, urging changes, or even driving the movement to bring about some large-scale transformation often unfairly falls on the shoulders of the oppressed. This unfortunate reality is in part because those who are oppressed by the existing social structures do have an interest in changing them, while those who are currently conferred benefits
by the social structures tend to be less aware of the problem or lack the motivation to change it.\textsuperscript{51} The design of the deliberative mini-public proposal, specifically making the participation in mini-publics part of civic service, helps to partially solve the paradox. Even though the establishment of deliberative mini-publics would sometimes be prompted by disruptive politics, which often rely on the efforts of the oppressed, once they are established, the mini-publics provide a mechanism to distribute the responsibility for addressing structural injustices more fairly and systematically. The deliberative mini-publics would recruit participants from all positions of the social structure to learn, deliberate, and produce outcomes related to the assigned case of structural injustice. In some cases, the produced outcomes would further guide people with different social roles or positions to contribute to the collective efforts.

Third, by inviting the oppressed to act as experts in the process, the deliberative mini-public proposal has the potential to further empower those who are disadvantaged by structural injustices. In §IV-2, based on studies of feminist epistemologists and standpoint scholars,\textsuperscript{52} I pointed out the epistemic value of inviting the oppressed to act as experts and share their experiences. In addition to the epistemic value they contribute, sharing their experiences at deliberative mini-publics also empowers them. By incorporating their expert feedback on how they have been and are impacted by the current social structure, the process better recognizes the unfair impacts that society has imposed on them, pays attention to their experience, shows appreciation for their contribution, and ensures that their voices are heard and treated seriously while identifying directions for future growth of the social structure. In this way, this process respects the agency of the oppressed, empowers them, and contributes to the forward-looking goal of reducing the unjustified power imbalances embedded in society.

Lastly, the deliberative mini-public proposal shows promise regarding fulfilling the moral demands of addressing structural injustice by facilitating \textit{relational transformation}.\textsuperscript{53} the needed relational change among members of society. Through bottom-up participation in deliberative mini-publics for addressing structural injustices, people in different social positions can interact and better understand each other’s perspectives. Even though each individual only directly participates in a few mini-publics, the results and information exchanged throughout the process will be communicated to the greater public. This serves an educational function for the general public and encourages more sensitivity towards the related considerations. Thus, through direct participation in deliberative mini-publics and learning about the results from other convenes,

\textsuperscript{51} Such a phenomenon is described as a ‘paradox of the participation of the privileged.’ See more detailed discussions in Sally J Scholz, \textit{Political Solidarity} (Penn State Press 2008).

\textsuperscript{52} Collins (n 39); Harding (n 39); Wylie (n 39).

\textsuperscript{53} I borrowed the term \textit{relational transformation} from Colleen Murphy, \textit{The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice} (Cambridge University Press 2017). In Murphy’s original usage in considering the goal of transitional justice, she uses ‘relational transformation’ to refer to changes in relationships among citizens and between citizens and officials in order to manifest the value of reciprocity and respect for the agency. I believe that the broader sense of ‘relational transformation’, namely the fundamental change of relations between members of society, is not only crucial for societies dealing with transitional justice, but for all societies aiming to address structural injustices, although some specific values and practices might look different in these different contexts.
members of society are provided with opportunities to establish mutual trust and respect, which are ineliminable components for the needed relational transformation.

Overall, the deliberative mini-public proposal has the potential to fulfil the moral demands of addressing structural injustice. The design of deliberative mini-publics directs people’s attention to the structural-injustice elements of some social issues, making it more evident that the responsibility for structural injustices is shared among all participants of the social structure. Instead of putting an unfair burden on the oppressed to drive the needed changes, it distributes the responsibility to broader groups of people; at the same time, by inviting the oppressed to participate as a type of expert, the deliberative mini-public respects the agency of the oppressed and empowers them. Furthermore, through bottom-up participation in a small number of mini-publics and learning about the results from other convenes, the greater public is given opportunities to transform their relations with each other, which is essential for reshaping our unjust social structure.

V-2. Considerations Regarding Practical Feasibility

After examining the promise of deliberative mini-publics, the focus now shifts to examination of their practical feasibility. Recall that in §III-2, I pointed out three categories of practical challenges encountered in the implementation of shared responsibility for addressing structural injustice (psychological and epistemic barriers, a lack of platforms for coordination, and the daunting amount of work) and argued that the existing two types of proposals for implementing responsibilities for structural injustice (one that provides guidelines for moral reasoning and another that appeals to the power of disruptive politics) fail to provide effective ways to overcome these challenges. In this section, I discuss the potential of deliberative mini-publics to overcome the abovementioned three categories of challenges while considering some of their limitations and potential concerns. Given the diverse nature of issues of structural injustice, there might be circumstances in which the proposal of deliberative mini-publics would be more likely to succeed. Through the following reflection on its potential and limitations, my goal is to show that the deliberative mini-public proposal is worth further exploration; at the same time, being aware of its limitations highlights the necessity of caution in design and may guide future studies in identifying conditions that are suitable for its implementation.

First, the deliberative mini-public proposal shows potential to address the epistemic and psychological barriers that prevent individuals from recognizing the moral problems of structural injustice and their responsibility for it. Several empirical studies have revealed the potential of deliberative mini-publics to motivate and facilitate public engagement.\(^{54}\) By exposing the public

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to diverse perspectives and information that might not be accessible to them in their everyday lives, deliberative mini-publics help people to overcome polarization, grow respect and trust towards those holding opposing views, and form a more considered judgment.\textsuperscript{55} Being exposed to the narrative of the oppressed (both in the learning phase, where disadvantaged individuals are invited to share their experience as experts, and in the deliberative phase, where some participants might be situated in the more oppressed positions) encourages acknowledgement of structural injustices and motivates ordinary people to confront their responsibility for them.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, since the output of these deliberative mini-publics will be communicated and shared with the greater public, those who do not attend the deliberations can still have access to the exchange of ideas among the participants, which may motivate them to reflect on their connections to these issues.

The advantages supported by the empirical evidence above mostly occur when people are put into a deliberative mini-public setting; thus, questions might be raised regarding how to motivate people to participate in deliberative mini-publics in the first place. Since the proposal that I advocate here is to make participation in deliberative mini-publics part of one’s civic duty (based on the grounds that the responsibility for addressing structural injustice is shared among all participants of the social structure), it would be generally obligatory to participate in some small number of mini-publics, excepting justified absences. While this might face resistance in the beginning of its implementation, I suggest that once people recognize that participation is part of a civic duty that applies to everyone, they will become more receptive to this new approach to structural injustice.

Some might still worry that merely making attendance at mini-publics obligatory cannot ensure that participants will display the appropriate amount of motivation needed to participate in the whole process. What if people are there but are unwilling to engage? Indeed, depending on the issues of focus, different levels of resistance might be encountered. However, reflecting on the hundreds of deliberative mini-publics that have been implemented all over the world in the past few decades\textsuperscript{57} should give us confidence that people are generally interested in joining in deliberation on difficult social issues with others. At the same time, to ensure an effective implementation of the deliberative mini-public proposal, future research can examine and identify factors that might influence motivations for such participation.

Second, in response to the challenge of the lack of platforms for coordinating the collective action required for addressing structural injustice, the deliberative mini-public proposal provides a way to make more sophisticated forms of collective action possible. In fact, the deliberative mini-publics themselves serve as a platform for idea exchange and collaboration among participants. With the help of proper facilitation, participants engage in the process of informed deliberation with others and may produce certain detailed plans about how to address the issue of structural injustice.

\textsuperscript{55} Luskin and others (n 49).
\textsuperscript{56} Schiff (n 9).
\textsuperscript{57} For more details, visit the Sortition Foundation <https://www.sortitionfoundation.org/> and Participedia <https://participedia.net/>.
injustice, which will be further communicated to the greater public. The shared plan and guidance for people occupying a variety of societal roles provide an epistemic foundation conducive to more sophisticated forms of collective action.

Although actionable changes would still depend on the general public’s uptake of the overall plan, a few features of this shared plan might increase general motivation to engage. Knowing that this plan is made by participants of the deliberative mini-publics instead of a group of elite politicians might help the public to believe that their perspectives were represented and taken into account during production of the plan. Furthermore, considering that successful structural change is only possible when sufficient numbers contribute to joint efforts, the public nature of the shared plan can bolster belief that individual efforts made in accordance will not be in vain, and thus should motivate the populace to act according to that plan. How effectively these factors contribute to collective agency is a topic worth further exploration in future studies.

Lastly, responding to the challenge of the daunting amount of work caused by the unfortunate reality that we are all inevitably implicated in various issues of structural injustice, the deliberative mini-public proposal provides a form of division of labour to lessen the overall burden. Instead of asking all agents to understand every single issue in which they are structurally complicit and to laboriously reason with others to figure out a shared plan to address it, each individual agent can focus on just a few issues when they are randomly selected to serve as participants in the deliberative mini-publics. Regarding additional issues, they can defer to others for clarification, an overall plan to address them, and guidance for ways in which the greater public can contribute to that plan. In this way, although the deliberative mini-public proposal cannot reduce the moral responsibility for structural injustice that each individual bears, it provides a helpful mechanism of division of labour that reduces the overall work for all individuals. Furthermore, with the publicity of the shared plan, everyone gains grounds to hold each other accountable and reasons to believe that their efforts are in accordance with the plan that is most likely to bring about the desired change.

Overall, despite some limitations, I argue that the deliberative mini-public proposal exhibits promise regarding shaping people’s habits when approaching issues of structural injustice and overcoming the three practical challenges to implementing shared responsibility for structural injustices. By exposing people to an environment in which they can hear narratives of the oppressed and deliberate with people of diverse perspectives, the deliberative mini-public proposal motivates people to overcome psychological and epistemic barriers and better recognize structural injustices and their connections with them. To make possible the sophisticated form of collective

58 While some suspicions might be raised about the quality of the plan produced by the deliberative mini-publics, there are actually reasons to think that the outcome can be fairly good. According to the diversity trumps ability principle, groups of agents with high cognitive diversity usually outperform groups of individually high-performing agents (namely, experts). As the assembly of people recruited through random selection in deliberative mini-publics would have high cognitive diversity, there are good reasons to believe that the proposed results would be even better than the results proposed by a few experts or came up by individuals reasoning independently. For more discussions on the diversity trumps ability principle, see Lu Hong and Scott E Page, ‘Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers’ (2004) 101 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 16385.
action necessary to address structural injustice, deliberative mini-publics serve as a platform for coordination, and the shared plans produced by the mini-publics provide guidance in how the greater public can contribute to the joint efforts. Lastly, even though the proposal cannot reduce each individual’s responsibility for various issues of structural injustice, it provides some mechanism of division of labour to reduce the amount of work that each person needs to take on in order to discharge the shared responsibility.

VI. Conclusion

Situated in a world with multiple issues of structural injustice, we, together with others, bear a shared responsibility to join collective actions to address the unfair restrictions imposed by social structures. Various challenges make it impractical to expect the desired form of collective action to happen naturally among unorganized groups of people. To change the way people respond to structural injustice, we need to change the incentive structure. In this chapter, I have proposed a deliberative mini-public proposal, according to which multiple deliberative mini-publics should be established in order to address various issues of structural injustice; responsible agents should be randomly selected to serve on these deliberative mini-publics, where they will convene with diverse participants and produce outcomes that can be used as guidance for the greater public. By examining its potential to fulfil the moral demands of addressing structural injustice and its practical feasibility in implementing shared responsibility, I have argued that the deliberative mini-public proposal provides a promising incentive structure that is conducive to the desired form of collective action. Like all measures, this proposal has limitations and might be more attuned to success under certain circumstances; future research is thus required to better identify those circumstances and tailor the design of deliberative mini-publics to different contexts. Furthermore, since the issue of unjustified power imbalances is at the core of structural injustice, while designing and implementing deliberative mini-publics for addressing structural injustices, caution should be constantly paid to avoid creating new forms of unwarranted hierarchies.\(^{59}\)

One might still ask: How, then, can we get from here to there? In other words, how do we move from our current society into the world depicted by the deliberative mini-public proposal, where deliberative mini-publics are established on an ongoing basis for the purpose of addressing structural injustice? Although we are definitely not there yet, observing that hundreds of deliberative mini-publics have been established over the past few decades, I suggest that we are progressing steadily towards that reality. My hope is that this chapter provides evidence that the deliberative mini-public proposal is worth further exploration—and the more people who share that thought, the closer we will get to that world.

\(^{59}\) Relevant cautions are recently raised through the urge of ‘decolonizing deliberative mini-publics’. For more detailed discussions, watch the lecture, ‘Decolonizing Deliberative Mini-Publics’ by Azucena Morán and Nicole Curato https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r6aGb57d8Z0&ab_channel=DelibDem.