Rethinking Respect

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One of the Enlightenment's defining insights was the idea that each person has an inherent dignity, and so must be treated *with respect*. That idea has stuck with philosophers ever since. Though they disagree vigorously about what such respect amounts to, few dispute the validity of this basic moral insight. Respect, many think, is at morality's bedrock: it is something every person is owed, simply in virtue of the fact that she is a person.

Yet this enduring moral insight may seem to generate a puzzle about the nature of respect. Stephen Darwall identifies this puzzle in his hugely influential "Two Kinds of Respect." He writes:

> An appeal to respect as something to which all persons are entitled marks much recent thought on moral topics… [But] how could respect be something which is due to all persons? Do we not also think that persons can either deserve or fail to deserve our respect? Is the moralist who claims that all persons are entitled to respect advocating that we give up this idea? (1977, p. 37)

This is presumably not what the moralist is advocating. But then it falls to a general account of respect to explain how each person can be owed equal respect, on the one hand, yet be deserving of differential respect, on the other. For these two claims are *prima facie* incompatible.

This is just the puzzle Darwall sets out to resolve in his (1977), and he resolves it by way of his titular claim: for he argues that there are, in fact, two distinct kinds of respect. On Darwall's account, each person is owed equal respect of a certain kind, namely, equal *recognition respect*. But people can also deserve differential respect of another kind, namely, differential *appraisal respect*. Thus there is no incompatibility between these two claims, on Darwall's account, since the attitudes to which "respect" refers in each claim are essentially distinct in kind.[1]

My question is: in virtue of what are these two kinds of respect, both kinds *of respect?* One sort of answer is that there is a still more basic kind of respect in which each of Darwall's two kinds participate. But this sort of answer appears to sacrifice much of the interest of Darwall's central thesis, which is that appraisal respect and recognition respect are *essentially* distinct in kind. Respect, it is natural to think, is a

[1] Darwall's distinction is widely deployed throughout a variety of literatures across philosophy, very often serving to clarify the "kind" of respect that is the author's main subject of discussion. For example, see Appiah (2010, p. 13 and p. 130); Bell (2013, p. 170); Brennan and Pettit (2004, p. 20); Carter (2013, p. 198); Dillon (1992, p. 111); Green (2010, p. 212); Hill (2000, p. 89); Kriegel and Timmons (2021, p. 79); Mason (2003, p. 264); Sensen (2011, pp. 119-20); Sylvan (2020, pp. 15-6); Waldron (2017, pp. 166-7); and Ware (2014, p. 249).

robustly heterogeneous family of attitudes: there is nothing—or, anyways, nothing terribly interesting—that all of its instances necessarily share.

This paper lays the groundwork for a different kind of answer, one based on what Miranda Fricker (2016) has dubbed a *paradigm-based explanation*. I characterize this kind of explanatory strategy in Section 1, where I argue that it is well-suited to illuminating a heterogeneous family of attitudes like respect. I then use the remainder of the paper to sketch the major contours of my own paradigm-based explanation of respect. I begin by advancing a novel paradigm form of respect, what I call *perspectival respect*. I then bring this paradigm to bear on the two kinds of respect with which we began, discussing its relation to appraisal respect in Section 2 and to recognition respect in Section 3.

Given the paper's synoptic ambitions, there are many large questions I head off at the pass, treating complex ethical subjects with perhaps too cursory a hand. This is particularly true of my relatively compressed treatment of the moral notion of respect for persons, which I discuss in Section 3. But I present the discussion in this schematic form to demonstrate the viability and appeal of my paradigm-based explanation of respect.

1.1 Darwall's Account: Two Kinds of Respect

Let's begin with a brief overview of Darwall's account. On Darwall's account, respect is a *basically disunified family of attitudes*: it encompasses two attitudes that are essentially distinct in kind. One kind of respect is what Darwall calls appraisal respect, and he claims it consists in an attitude of positive appraisal of some person or of her excellences of character (p. 38). This is the sense in which one can be said to respect someone as a philosopher, for example, or to respect someone's moral virtues. A second kind of respect is what Darwall calls recognition respect, and he claims it consists in a disposition to give appropriate weight to some object in one's deliberations and to act accordingly (ibid.). This is the sense in which one can be said to respect the law, or to respect things like a person's rights, boundaries, or decisions.

There is much to like about Darwall's account. Chief among its attractions is that it accords with a natural suspicion that respect is a heterogeneous family of attitudes, and that disparate instances of "respect" are in fact substantially different. Darwall's account does not paper over these differences, but rather gives us a pre-theoretically satisfying way of taxonomizing them. For the two kinds of respect Darwall identifies seem to correspond to a recognizable difference between, e.g., respecting someone's character versus respecting her decision. In the former case, we think respect implies *high regard* for its object: one cannot respect a person's character without also thinking highly of it. In the latter case, by contrast, respect comes with no such implication: one need not think highly of a person's decision in order to respect it. Instead, one can normally do this just by *acting* in certain ways: e.g., by not interfering with someone's decision.

This same attraction of Darwall's account appears to be the flipside of one of its central defects, however, which is that it does not illuminate why appraisal respect and recognition respect are, after all, both kinds of respect. Why think that these two things should nevertheless be thought to belong to the same family of attitudes? Darwall's account appeals in the first instance, of course, because it locates a

pre-theoretically satisfying distinction *within* this family. Yet it also looks incomplete as it stands, since it leaves us to wonder whether it is an accident of language that the two kinds of "respect" it identifies just so happen to go by the same name. This is not a particularly tempting dialectical option on the face: it does not seem like a coincidence, e.g., that we can respect a person's character, but also her rights, boundaries, and decisions.

1.2 Fricker's Methods: Analysis versus Paradigm-Based Explanation

As Fricker (2016) has observed, this explanatory defect may in fact be the natural byproduct of attempting to explain an *internally diverse* phenomenon through the philosophically familiar method of *analysis.* Analysis sets out to illuminate a phenomenon by identifying its necessary and sufficient conditions; it is explanatorily fruitful, when it is, because it allows us to better see a phenomenon's common core. But where a target phenomenon is substantially heterogeneous, analysis either gives rise to a dissatisfyingly thin account (to meet the method's built-in demand for full generality), or otherwise gives rise to a multiplicity of apparently disconnected accounts (to placate our own sense that the phenomenon at hand is internally diverse). Darwall's account finds itself with the latter defect: though it carves up "respect" into two kinds that we can recognize pre-theoretically, it also leaves the explanatory connection between the two essentially untheorized—and so threatens to render their relation into nothing more than a pun.

But if not analysis, then what? Fricker contrasts the method of analysis with an alternative she calls a *paradigm-based explanation*, which she argues is better suited to illuminating internally diverse phenomena. This explanatory strategy does away with analysis's demand for full generality, and instead attempts to illuminate a target phenomenon by identifying a form of the phenomenon (the "paradigm") that is *explanatorily basic*. This paradigm form typically has essential features that are not present across the phenomenon's full range, and so would tend to be passed over by any fully general analysis of it. Yet it is nevertheless claimed to illuminate the phenomenon as a whole insofar as it reveals what can be called the phenomenon's *organizing point*. For example, in her own treatment of blame, Fricker posits that her proposed paradigm, Communicative Blame, has a distinctive point: it aims to inspire remorse on the part of the wrongdoer, and so functions to "increase alignment of moral understanding" between the wrongdoer and the person whom she has wronged (p. 173). Fricker then argues that other forms of blame perform this same function, just in different ways. Thus Fricker claims that Communicative Blame stands to these other forms of blame as a paradigm: although it has essential features that they do not, its status as explanatorily basic is confirmed by the fact that its organizing point illuminates the blame family as a whole.[2]

As I understand the explanatory strategy, paradigm-based explanations have three major tasks. These are:

1. *Sketch of Paradigm.* A paradigm-based explanation must identify and substantially characterize a paradigm form of its target phenomenon. (This paradigm is advanced at the outset as a working hypothesis.)
2. *Organizing Point.* Next, the explanation must posit the *organizing point* of the proposed paradigm. Following Queloz (2020), I will understand a paradigm's point in terms of

[2] For helpful discussion of paradigm-based explanations and related methodologies, see Queloz (2020).

difference-making, or in terms of what would be lost if that form of the phenomenon were absent from our lives.[3] Since many such difference-makers can plausibly be attributed to a single paradigm, I will say that its *organizing* point is that difference-maker in virtue of which the paradigm is claimed to illuminate the phenomenon as a whole.

3. *Derivation.* Finally, the explanation must show how non-paradigmatic forms of the phenomenon can reasonably be understood to derive from this paradigm, by showing how these forms also exhibit the paradigm's same organizing point (though perhaps in attenuated fashion).

Where the derivation succeeds, the paradigm is confirmed as *explanatorily basic*: though it has features that are not present across the phenomenon's full range, it is nevertheless shown to illuminate the phenomenon as a whole because it reveals the phenomenon's organizing point.

Respect's internal diversity is manifest. Thus I submit that we try Fricker's explanatory strategy on for size. And I submit that we start in the obvious place: could either of Darwall's two kinds serve as our paradigm?

1.3 The Paradigm: Appraisal or Recognition?

Let me now show my cards. I believe that what Darwall calls appraisal respect is explanatorily basic, and that what he calls recognition respect is, in fact, derivative. The simplest rationale for this is that recognition respect looks behavioral in a way that appraisal respect does not: for example, we can normally respect others' rights almost as a matter of course, simply by acting in some ways and not in others. This makes it tempting to think that this form of respect can be understood as a kind of *behavioral byproduct* of some more robustly psychological form of respect. Such an explanation would hold that, in the paradigm case, one's respectful behavior *expresses* some underlying attitude of respect. But in the derivative case, these two things come apart: one behaves respectfully in the absence of any such underlying attitude. At a first approximation, then, my proposal is that we can derive a primarily behavioral notion of respect (what Darwall calls recognition respect for persons, and what I will later call *respectful treatment*) from the more avowedly psychological notion Darwall calls appraisal respect.[4]

The idea that appraisal respect could play this kind of explanatory role may seem implausible at first blush. That is perhaps because Darwall's account of appraisal respect (which, recall, he identifies with "an attitude of positive appraisal of some person or her excellences of character") makes it natural to think that the appropriateness of such attitudes is always conditional on the respected person's *merits.* Yet most if not all instances of recognition respect are precisely *not* conditional on anything like a person's merits. For example, we do not think that the appropriateness of respecting a person's rights is conditional on that person being "meritorious" in some undefined respect. This apparent mismatch might therefore be thought to cast a shadow over the order of explanation just sketched, since it might appear to rest many important forms of recognition respect on a fiction: e.g., that whenever one respects the rights of others, one acts *as if* those rights-holders are (equally) "meritorious" in some undefined respect. So long as we

[3] See Queloz (2020), esp. p. 686.

[4] Note that Darwall clearly intends his account of recognition respect to be broader than the special case of recognition respect for persons. Due to space constraints, however, I limit my argument to this central case.

uphold Darwall's account of appraisal respect, then, the prospects for my proposed order of explanation may look dim at best.

We should reject Darwall's account of appraisal respect, however. As I will argue, his account is impoverished: it has four significant problems that give us good reason to think that Darwall has not correctly identified appraisal respect's basic nature. The problems are as follows.

First, Darwall's account defines appraisal respect partly in terms of its objects. Because of this, it finds no substantive difference between the appraisal respect one feels for a person and the positive appraisal one can have of other things. Thus, for example, Darwall's account seems to imply that it is an accident of language that we "admire" a sunset but "respect" a person: for there is nothing that so far distinguishes the latter from the former besides the fact that it takes a person as its object. We call the latter "respect," on Darwall's account, because it happens to take a person as its object. But if it took the sunset for its object, we would call it something else. This is arbitrary.

Second, Darwall's account characterizes appraisal respect as an attitude of positive appraisal. But positive appraisal is presumably common to all forms of approbation. We can respect a person, of course, but also admire, appreciate, or merely approve of her, and all of these attitudes presumably require some attitude of positive appraisal towards that person. Thus Darwall's account implies that whenever we have some other approbative attitude towards a person, we therefore respect that person, too. Yet this implication does not seem sound: it does not seem to follow, e.g., that if you approve of me, you must respect me, too.

Third, Darwall's account of appraisal respect does not intuitively capture the normal affective profile of respecters. That is because mere positive appraisal seems compatible with affective indifference. Yet affective indifference is not intuitively compatible with respect. To see this, consider:

> *Stony Indifference.* Stony admires Saint's many virtues, and he even claims to "respect" her for them. At the same time, however, Stony is *completely indifferent* to what Saint thinks of him. For example, when Stony does something of which Saint approves, Saint does not feel the *warm glow* of Saint's recognition. And when Stony does something of which Saint disapproves, Stony feels no *inner twinge* of shame. Rather, Stony appears to receive Saint's judgments much the way he would receive feedback from a math tutor. He trusts that Saint's judgments of him are generally correct—just nothing to get fussed about.

If Stony indeed admires Saint, he appears to admire her as one admires a snowglobe: at a glassy remove. Yet this form of indifference is not intuitively compatible with the psychology of someone who sincerely respects another's character. For it is a hallmark of such respect that one wants the approbation of those whom one respects.[5] And Stony is indifferent to this: he would be neither gratified to have Saint's approbation, nor distressed to lose it.

Finally, Darwall's account holds that one respects another person in the approbative sense *whenever* one positively appraises that person or her excellences of character. Yet this natural idea,

[5] This is a recurring theme in Williams (1993), for example.

however plausible on the face, appears to overgeneralize on further reflection. In my own case, for example, I cannot sincerely report that I respect Carolina Herrera as a fashion designer. But this is not because I cannot positively appraise her skill as a designer. After all, I can clearly see—as I suspect the reader can, too—that Herrera is an excellent designer.[6] Both of us can see, in other words, that Herrera is *worthy* of certain attitudes of appraisal respect. But much like attitudes of love, attitudes of respect do not only consist in the judgment that a person is worthy of the attitude. There is, evidently, something more to it.

I believe the crux of these problems is that what Darwall identifies as the nature of appraisal respect is, instead, its grounds. For example, someone who respects Darwall as a philosopher does so, in part, *because* she positively appraises his philosophical skill. This helps to explain why Darwall's account initially appeals: it appeals because it correctly identifies something that this form of respect really does require, namely, positive appraisal. But because the account stops here, it leaves us with a curiously impoverished understanding of what appraisal respect essentially is. In particular, this account:

1. Renders the extension of appraisal respect arbitrary, since it affords us no non-arbitrary explanation, e.g., why one cannot "respect" a sunset.
2. Misconstrues the relation between appraisal respect and other approbative attitudes, since it implies that one respects anyone whom one admires, appreciates or merely approves of.
3. Renders appraisal respect compatible with affective indifference, and so fails to illuminate respect's normal affective profile.
4. Appears to overgeneralize, since it implies that there is no daylight between respecting someone and judging that someone is worthy of respect.

These are significant problems—ones that give us good reason to rethink the nature of this familiar form of respect.

In the next section, I will give a considerably more substantive characterization of what is involved in attitudes of respect like these. I will call this *the perspectival account of respect.* The main claims of this account are:

1. Appraisal respect is *perspectival respect*.
2. Perspectival respect is *paradigmatic*: it is from this form of respect that "recognition respect" is derived.

Due to space constraints, I will not be able to fully defend this pair of claims. But I hope for this paper to lay the groundwork for thinking about the nature of respect in this way. To that end, here is the plan for the rest of the paper. Section 2.1 introduces my account of perspectival respect, and Section 2.2 posits its organizing point. With this account in hand, I then argue in Section 3 that we can derive one key form of

[6] For examples of Herrera's work, see "Carolina Herrera, Then and Now" (*The New York Times*). The reader may have to fashion a counterexample for herself, however, in the event she actually does respect Herrera as a designer. Here is an informal recipe for doing that. First, pick a field you don't care all that much about (movies? music? baseball?). Then, pick a person who works in that field, and who is well-respected by others in that field (Meryl Streep? Claude Debussy? Shohei Ohtani?). Now ask yourself: Do you *respect* that person? Or do you simply recognize that she is excellent at what she does?

recognition respect, the important moral notion Darwall refers to as *recognition respect for persons*, via reflection on respect's organizing point.

2.1 Perspectival Respect

Allow me to start with a sketch of our paradigm. Respect in its paradigmatic form is what I will call *perspectival respect*. To respect someone in this sense is to have a value-based inclination to take her perspective on some range of things.[7] For illustration, consider the following:

> *Respecting Anderson as a philosopher.* Evan takes Elizabeth Anderson as a philosopher very seriously. For starters, he considers what she has to say on a wide range of philosophical issues. However—and not to put *too* fine a point on this—Evan is *far* more inclined to do this with her than he is with others (including others whom he judges to be just as good at philosophy as Anderson is). For example, when Evan doesn't understand what Anderson thinks, he tries really quite hard to figure it out. And when he disagrees with Anderson, he nevertheless attempts to understand *why* she thinks what she thinks: he assumes she has her reasons, and those interest him, too. More generally, Evan is interested in or curious about what Anderson has to say on things, and he notices that what Anderson says "sticks" with him. For example, when he's writing papers of his own, he finds himself bringing her insights to bear on them, and often under that description—as *Anderson's* insights.

This case illustrates Evan's perspectival respect for Anderson as a philosopher. On my account, this respect does not consist in Evan's positive appraisal of Anderson's skill as a philosopher. Nor does it consist in Evan's being disposed to deliberate "appropriately" about her, or about the fact that she is an excellent philosopher. Rather, it consists in Evan's trying to see things as Anderson does, for the reason that he values Anderson's perspective on them. The *range of things* Evan is inclined to see from Anderson's perspective is indexed by what Evan values about Anderson's perspective. In this case, since Evan values Anderson's perspective on philosophical questions, he is inclined to take her perspective on those questions. Accordingly, Evan respects Anderson *as* a philosopher.

This is, I hope, a familiar kind of case—one that the reader can recognize at work in her own psychology. With the phenomenon in view, I'll now develop my characterization of perspectival respect in more substantive terms. I submit that perspectival respect is characterized by three central features. To preview, these are:

1. *Valuing.* Perspectival respect requires *valuing* the object of respect.
2. *Engagement.* Perspectival respect requires a tendency towards *engaged* perspective-taking.
3. *Openness to influence.* Perspectival respect requires that one be *open to the influence* of the other's perspective on things.

I will elaborate each of these features in more detail below.

[7] My proposal resuscitates the idea, most explicitly defended by Sarah Buss (1999b) but also advanced by Bernard Williams (2009), that respect is a psychologically complex attitude that involves taking another person's perspective on the world. See Buss (1999b) "Respect for Persons" and Williams (2009) "The Idea of Equality", esp. pp. 102-3.

First, perspectival respect requires *valuing* the object of respect.[8] This feature of perspectival respect distinguishes it from many episodes of perspective-taking that do not amount to respect of any kind. For example, an employee may be inclined to see things from her boss's perspective in order to help herself get a promotion. But as this inclination is grounded in self-interest, it does not amount to an attitude of perspectival respect. Similarly, one may be inclined to take up another person's perspective because one shares that person's interests; for example, one may be inclined to take up Anderson's perspective because Anderson happens to write on subjects that one finds interesting. But this would not yet amount to perspectival respect on my account, because it would not yet be grounded in one's valuing Anderson's perspective on things. Rather, it is grounded in the fact that one is interested in the subject Anderson happens to write on. Insofar as this is so, then, we can expect that one will exhibit a kind of generic inclination to take the perspective of anyone who engages that subject.

Perspectival respect goes beyond this baseline interest in a subject, for the reason that it is grounded in one's valuing the perspective of the person whom one respects. Someone who respects Anderson as a philosopher, for example, will be inclined to take her perspective on philosophical questions not just because Anderson happens to write on subjects that interest one, but rather because one values her perspective on them. Such a person will be interested, then, in what *she* has to say on the subject. As it happens, such interest in a person's perspective is very often differential relative to one's interest in others. But this is not a necessary feature of perspectival respect as I understand it.

Second, perspectival respect requires a tendency towards *engaged* perspective-taking. What I am calling engaged perspective-taking is a tendency for one's own perspective to be directed by the perspective of another. We can latch onto this phenomenon by considering the following contrast:

"I know how things seem to you." *(Objectival)*
"I see things as you do." *(Perspectival)*

When psychologists and philosophers talk about our capacity to develop a "theory of mind" for another person, they often talk about this capacity in purely objectival terms, or in terms of our ability to know how things seem to another person. Perspectival respect requires but goes beyond this general capacity: it involves not only thinking about how the other person sees things, but also a tendency to try to see things that way oneself. In the vast majority of cases, this is not an imaginative exercise: one does not "put oneself in Anderson's shoes" and then attend to various philosophical questions "from that perspective." Rather, one attends to the questions themselves, and tries to see them as Anderson does.[9]

[8] See Scheffler (2011) on valuing. I follow Scheffler in distinguishing between *valuing* and *judging valuable*, and in taking the former to involve "a susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding [the valued object]" (p. 32). Note that Scheffler's account only applies to non-instrumental valuing, however.

[9] My notion of perspective-taking therefore departs from other characterizations of this faculty, which take it to essentially involve a kind of "imaginative projection"; see, e.g., Batson, et al (1997) and Coplan (2011). These richer characterizations typically go hand-in-hand with the idea that "perspective-taking" underlies attitudes of *empathy*. While I do not deny that some episodes of perspective-taking do indeed involve imaginative projection, I am inclined to reject any general account of this faculty that denies its broader applicability.

I will say that one's perspective-taking is engaged when it exhibits this tendency to be directed by another person's perspective on things.[10] Of course, one can try but fail to see things as another person does: after all, we do not leave our own perspectives "behind" when we try to take up someone else's. Thus our ability to see things as another person does will generally be informed (and sometimes limited) by our own perspective on things. We can see this complex dynamic at work in our assessment of other's errors. Consider, for example, a teacher's assessment of a student's mathematical error. Some mathematical errors, oddly enough, make more sense than others, and where this is so, a student's teacher will sometimes be able to take the student's perspective on the math problem in an engaged way. The teacher may even experience this as a kind of interpretive epiphany: the student had been saying all along how he was seeing things, but *now* the teacher "sees" it. Where the student is genuinely mistaken, however, this experience of seeing things as the student does will not last, for the fairly straightforward reason that the student does not see things as they really are.

On the other hand, we sometimes have a very easy time seeing things as someone else does, for the reason that we already see things that way ourselves. In such cases, we do not ordinarily describe ourselves as engaged in any kind of "perspective-taking" at all, since we feel we do not need to see things "through another's eyes" in order to see it as they do. But the general faculty I have called perspective-taking just consists in attending to things with someone else's perspective on them in mind, and the exercise of this faculty is not rendered moot by the fact that one already shares the other's perspective on things. Consider, for instance, the special pleasure of sharing something one loves with a person one loves. The point of doing this is not normally epistemic: we are not trying to develop a still more fine-grained theory of mind for the other person. Rather, we normally share out of a desire for intimacy and connection, in the hopes that we can share one another's perspective on things. Where we do, we can attend to the object in a distinctive way, with the awareness that each of us sees the object as the other does. This general form of awareness, in which one attends to an object with another's perspective of that object in mind, is just what the general faculty of perspective-taking consists in.

Finally, perspectival respect requires that one be *open to the influence* of the other's perspective on things. This feature of perspectival respect is, in fact, already implied by the first two features I have just outlined. But given the diverse range of ways in which other people's perspectives can move and affect us, it is worth pausing to note them here. There are five categories of influence worth noting. First and most minimally, someone's perspective can cause us to pay attention to an object to which we would not have paid attention otherwise. Second, someone's perspective can cause us to see an object in a novel way, at least suppositionally. Third, another's perspective can cause us to change our own perspective on things, as when we adopt the other's way of seeing things for ourselves. Fourth, someone's perspective can cause us to experience a host of context-dependent emotions, including but not limited to emotions like pride and shame.[11] Finally, someone's perspective on things may shape how we conduct ourselves, most obviously by leading us to act in ways which the other prefers, or to refrain from acting in ways which the other disprefers.

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[10] For vivid discussion of the same phenomenon, see Dover's (2022) account of interpersonal inquiry, as well as Cocking and Kennett's (1998) account of friendship.

[11] This is a general feature of Scheffler's account of valuing, which, as I noted above, takes valuing to involve "a susceptibility to experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding [the valued object]" (p. 32).

Of course, perspectival respect does not require that one always be influenced by the other's perspective in all the aforementioned ways. And it does not require, in particular, that one always adopt the other's perspective on things. For example, Evan's respect for Anderson does not require that he come to agree with her on all things philosophical. But it does require that he be open to her perspective, and this openness can be evidenced in many different ways. For example, while Evan may ultimately reject any number of her philosophical conclusions, his openness to her perspective may nevertheless be evidenced by the fact that he registers the force of her arguments—that they raise important points or even serious problems for his own philosophical positions. It is patterns of uptake like these, I think, that lead many of us to believe there is some close affinity between attitudes we call "respect" and certain dialectical virtues, like charity, humility, and keeping an open mind. It is therefore a count in my paradigm's favor that it helps us make good sense of these familiar associations.[12]

To be sure, many of us sometimes say that we "respect" others in the approbative sense even though we have no value-based inclination to take their perspectives on any range of things. And in many cases, we may even feel sincere in saying this. In my view, however, this tendency to misidentify our own attitudes of respect is well-explained by the fact that respect is just one among very many diverse forms of approbation, and that these diverse forms of approbation are frequently found together. For example, because it often happens that we admire someone whom we also respect, it is only natural that we find it hard to say where one attitude ends and the other begins. Thus many of us throw around claims of "respect" when, in fact, other approbative language would better do. Indeed, this is one of the ways in which my account leaves us better off, since it helps us begin to say which of our approbative attitudes are respect *as opposed to*, e.g., admiration, appreciation or approval.

This completes my account of the nature of perspectival respect. For my part, I believe that perspectival respect is a widespread and familiar phenomenon, and one that we can recognize first-personally across a variety of cases. It is the kind of respect that we naturally offer to our friends and loved ones, for example, and that we hope for from them in return. But what exactly is the *point* of this form of respect? That is, what difference does it make to us that we respect one another in the perspectival sense?

2.2 What Is the Point of Perspectival Respect?

My answer takes another page from Fricker's playbook by suggesting that perspectival respect has implicit success conditions, and that these conditions provide the basis for identifying respect's organizing point. That is, just as Fricker claims that Communicative Blame aims at inspiring remorse on the part of the wrongdoer, I claim that perspectival respect aims at *interpersonal understanding* on the part of the respecter. To respect someone in the perspectival sense is to try to really understand her perspective on things, and to want to understand her perspective for its own sake. My claim is that interpersonal understanding is respect's organizing point.

Let me now develop this claim more fully. Perspectival respect aims at understanding another's perspective on things. Of course, we are not always successful in this aim; it often happens that we do not

[12] The perspectival account of respect also makes surprisingly good sense of the etymology of "respect" (from the Latin *respicere*, "to look back at").

fully understand the perspectives of those whom we respect. But it is, at the very least, what we are *trying* to do when we respect others in the perspectival sense. For example, because Evan respects Anderson as a philosopher, he wants to understand her perspective on philosophical questions. To be sure, he may want to understand her perspective on this because he believes this will help him better understand the questions themselves. But it is part of the nature of his attitude of respect for her that he aims to understand her perspective in its *own* right. Thus even where he has quite settled views on something, he may nevertheless persist in trying to understand how she herself thinks about it.

I believe it is because respect of this kind aims at interpersonal understanding on these terms that we care so deeply about other people's respect. We care about other people's respect, when we do, because we want them to want to understand our perspective on things.[13] But what exactly is it to understand another person's perspective on things? Like any form of understanding, interpersonal understanding generally involves *grasping connections* between various elements within a person's perspective.[14] For example, if I understand your perspective on something, this often means that I know not only what you think about it, but also why you think this.[15] While I delay a complete account of interpersonal understanding for another discussion, allow me to note three of its central features here. First, interpersonal understanding is *systematic*: it treats the individual elements of a person's perspective as connected in some way, and so apprehends her perspective as a kind of systematic unity. Second, interpersonal understanding is *rationalizing*: it treats these individual elements as presumptively rational, and so tends to identify rational connections between them, at least in the first instance. Finally, interpersonal understanding is *generative*: it enables one to bring another's perspective to bear on novel objects of thought without the other's guidance. For example, if you understand my perspective, you may have an uncanny ability to predict how I would respond to things: that I would love a movie you just saw, despise a joke you just heard, and so on. Obviously, this is the kind of thing we sometimes get wrong about others. Remarkably, though, it is also the kind of thing we can get right—consistently, precisely, sometimes even *painfully* right. When we do, it is a telltale sign that we have really understood another's point of view.

It is also because respect of this kind aims at interpersonal understanding that we rightly regard respect *as an interpersonal ideal*. Most of us, for example, are inclined to affirm the great importance of respect across a variety of relational contexts (e.g., in friendships and other intimate relationships, but also within and between groups, communities and even whole cultures). The account of perspectival respect on hand helps us make good sense of why that is. Respect matters in these contexts because interpersonal relations of all kinds are, as a matter of definition, relations *between* persons, and so are relations between beings with distinct perspectives on the world—beings who may or may not see eye-to-eye on any number of things. One of the distinctive possibilities that attends these relations, then, is the possibility of interpersonal understanding, or of one person's coming to understand how another person sees the world. This is the very possibility that perspectival respect aims to actualize. Accordingly, it makes sense for us to want respect of this kind to govern our relations with others.

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[13] I develop and defend this claim in "Why Respect Matters" (ms), where I provide a more complete account of the nature of interpersonal understanding and its relation to perspectival respect.

[14] For helpful overview, see Grimm (2021).

[15] As Dishaw (2024a) observes, however, interpersonal understanding cannot simply be a matter of "understanding why someone thinks P" in a perfectly general sense. See his "Being Understood" for discussion.

Of course, the exact rationale for why this "makes sense" will plausibly be different in different relational contexts. In friendships and loving relationships, for example, mutual respect may be a precondition for (or partial constituent of) certain forms of intimacy and connection: thus we may want respect to govern our relations with friends and loved ones so that we may foster these special forms of closeness with them.[16] In non-intimate relationships, by contrast, mutual respect will presumably matter for different reasons. For instance, if we think that mutual respect is a precondition for (or partial constituent of) engaging in certain forms of shared reasoning, we may want respect to govern our relations with others so that we can reason together about various aspects of our shared life.[17] For our purposes, however, the precise details of these rationales do not matter. What matters is that the account of respect just sketched makes clear how respect's nature makes many such rationales ready-to-hand, by illuminating why respect is an interpersonal ideal in the first place. Respect is an interpersonal ideal because it aims at understanding another person's perspective on things. This is respect's organizing point.

In the next section, I argue that a morally significant form of derivative respect also exhibits respect's organizing point, albeit in attenuated fashion. This derivation is our next topic.

3.1 The Derivation of Respectful Treatment: An Outline

In Section 1.3, I introduced the perspectival account of respect at a first approximation. There, I said that what Darwall terms "recognition respect for persons" is best understood as a behavioral byproduct of a more robustly psychological form of respect. In paradigmatic cases, this respectful behavior expresses one's attitude of respect. In derivative cases, by contrast, these two things come apart: one behaves "respectfully" in the absence of any such underlying attitude.

Departing from Darwall's preferred terminology, I will call this form of respect *respectful treatment*.[18] As the label suggests, respectful treatment is a purely behavioral notion: one can treat someone with respect without holding any psychological attitude of respect towards him. Similarly, we say that one can treat someone "with love" without thinking that this treatment necessitates one's holding any attitude of love towards her. Expressions like these wear their derivative nature on their sleeve, since they just seem to allow that acting in the relevant ways (respectfully, lovingly) does not require acting *from* the corresponding attitude (respect, love). Instead, they require something less: that one act as one would *if* one had the corresponding attitude.

This is the simplest statement of my account's derivation: to treat someone with respect is to act as one would if one had a particular psychological attitude of respect for that person. This very simple

[16] In this connection, see Dover (2022) on interpersonal inquiry.

[17] In this connection, see Marušić and White (2018, pp. 107-9) on shared reasoning and Dishaw (2024b) on shared moral understanding.

[18] Note that my discussion focuses on deriving the moralized notion of respectful treatment, i.e., that form of treatment we think is owed to each person as such. However, I believe there is good reason to think my derivation can be extended to non-moralized forms of respectful treatment, as well; I touch on this extension in the paper's conclusion. (See also Buss (1999a) for an account of the connection between respect for persons and non-moralized forms of respectful treatment, such as those encoded in social norms of politeness.)

idea, notice, is open to any paradigm-based explanation of respect; competing derivations can be advanced just by advancing competing claims as to the nature of the underlying attitude of respect from which respectful treatment is said to derive. On this front, however, my own paradigm-based explanation advances the following claim: I submit that respectful treatment consists in acting as one would if one had perspectival respect for each person, on what I will call *the question of living together.*

One central task of the section to follow will be to characterize this distinctive moral subject matter in more detail. I begin in Section 3.2, where I offer a perspectival characterization of the attitude of respect for persons as such. I go on in Section 3.3 to argue for the derivation of respectful treatment by appeal to respect's organizing point.

3.2 Respect for Persons and the Question of Living Together

On my account, the attitude of respect for persons as such is a morally significant form of perspectival respect. When one respects another person in this way, one has a value-based inclination to take that person's perspective on the question of living together. For example, if I have this attitude of respect towards you, I have a value-based inclination to consider whether you could reasonably object to how my conduct affects you. This is an attitude I believe many of us in fact have towards others, however imperfectly—to some and not to others, perhaps, or to all others, but to widely varying degrees.

Like other attitudes of perspectival respect, respect for persons as such is indexed to a particular subject matter. For example, just as Evan respects Anderson as a philosopher by valuing her perspective on philosophical questions, we respect persons as such by valuing one another's perspectives on the question of living together. Of course, this latter subject matter may seem nominally unfamiliar. But it is just the name, I think, that is unfamiliar; the subject matter it names is one that any person can reflectively recognize.

The question of living together names one of the most basic problems of the human condition. This problem starts from the fact that each of us are separate people with lives of our own, with distinct perspectives on things and ends that cannot always be jointly realized. And it also takes as given that although our own lives are of the utmost importance to us, they are also neither more nor less important than anyone else's. Call this starting point *the separateness of equal persons.* Given the separateness of equal persons, the basic moral problem we face is how we can live together. How does each of us get to pursue our own ends, given that this pursuit generally interacts and sometimes even conflicts with others' pursuits of their own?[19]

The question of living together is obviously a large question, and one that I cannot engage with in very substantive terms here. What I do wish to observe, however, is that there is an important connection between this question and any answer that appeals to attitudes of "mutual respect." That is because it is natural to think that the problem which this question identifies is one that cannot be *adequately* resolved except by thinking about it from perspectives that are not our own. Thus it is natural to think any adequate

[19] This question is otherwise treated under the heading of "what we owe to each other" or "interpersonal morality." For the leading account of this subject, see Scanlon (1998).

resolution to this problem must be one that we could affirm under conditions of *mutual perspectival respect.*

Allow me to illustrate this point by considering a semi-concrete resolution to the question of living together. Consider a resolution that secured the largest possible aggregate benefit for all persons, by imposing very steep costs on just one person and delivering individually minor benefits to all others. Such a "resolution" seems inadequate, to many of us, because it is one that could not be justified to the person who would be made to bear its costs. When we attend to the proposed resolution in this way, however, notice that we seem to attend to it as respecters in the perspectival sense. We attend to it, first, with another's perspective in mind: e.g., with the perspective of the person who would be made to bear its costs. And we attend to it, second, with a value-based inclination to take that perspective: e.g., to see the resolution as unjustifiable, period, *because* it could not be justified *to her*.[20] That we indeed value this perspective, and do not merely "take" it, is what finds expression in this distinctive order of explanation. For what this order expresses is the idea that the former kind of "justification" must be conditioned by the latter, so that any resolution to the question of living together is justifiable *simpliciter* only if it could be justified to each person who was also subject to that resolution.

This characterization of the subject matter of perspectival respect for persons is admittedly impressionistic and incomplete. What matters for our purposes, however, is that it allows us to see how this attitude of respect could be understood to be *relevantly like* Evan's attitude of respect for Anderson. In particular, it allows us to understand both attitudes as value-based inclinations to take some personal perspective on some subject matter. This is not to deny that there are very important differences between the two. Most obviously, they have distinct subject matters. Less obviously, the idea of a personal perspective appears to bear on these distinct subject matters in strikingly different ways. For example, with philosophical questions, we do not think that what is justifiable *simpliciter* is in any way constrained by what could be justified, e.g., *to Anderson*. With the question of living together, by contrast, many of us find it natural to think in these terms. For example, it seems natural to think that each person has reasons of her own, and that these "personal" reasons give her special grounds to "reasonably reject" various ways of arranging our shared life. This is a striking order of explanation indeed, and one that has been dogged over the years by accusations of putting the cart before the horse.[21] But this distinctive order of explanation can be naturally traced to the special nature of the subject matter it explains. For the starting point of this subject is the separateness of equal persons—the fact that each of us is a person with a life of her own, neither more nor less important than anyone else's. This starting point makes it not only possible, but necessary to think in terms of what is justifiable to each.[22]

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[20] On the notion of *justification to each*, see Nagel (1972) and Scanlon (1998). Note that my discussion here does not mean to presuppose Scanlon's substantive account of justification to each. However, it does presuppose Scanlon's claim that each person has *personal reasons* to object to prospective principles for the general regulation of behavior. This is obviously a flagship component of his contractualist account of interpersonal morality, and I believe it is central to any plausible account of justification to each. His account has many other components besides, however, including ones that do not obviously flow from the bare idea of "justification to each"; see Parfit (2003) for discussion. Thus I warn the reader against reading Scanlon's account into my discussion here.

[21] For a representative statement of this objection, see Thomson (1990) p. 20, n.15 and p. 30, n.19.

[22] I take this to be the core moral insight of respect-based moral theories, otherwise known as *Kantian contractualist* moral theories. This family of moral theories aims to deliver a unified account of moral content (justification to each) and moral motivation (anticipatory remorse) as an answer to the question of living together ("what we owe to each other"). I believe that the perspectival account of respect illuminates these theories' foundational appeal to

This characterization of the attitude of respect for persons also makes a derivative form of respect ready-to-hand, along the lines sketched in Section 3.1. In particular, someone who was perfectly governed by this attitude of respect would perfectly comply with principles that are justifiable to each, and this compliance would express her perfect respect for others. By contrast, someone who lacked this attitude altogether, or possessed it but only to some low degree, may or may not comply with principles that are justifiable to each. Insofar as he did, though, this compliance would not generally be a product of his respect. Accordingly, his compliance would not express respect, or would express it only to some low degree. Such a person merely treats persons with respect, then, since he merely acts *as if* he has this attitude of respect.[23]

So the perspectival account of respect holds that respectful treatment consists in acting as one would if one had perspectival respect for each person on the question of living together. Equivalently, it holds that respectful treatment is compliance with principles that are justifiable to each, since these are the kinds of principles we would endorse under conditions of mutual perspectival respect. Our question now is: Is this account right? Why think, in other words, that the perspectival account of respect has defined "respectful treatment" in terms of the *right* paradigm form of respect?

3.3 The Derivation of Respectful Treatment: The Argument

We should think respectful treatment is defined in terms of perspectival respect, I will now argue, because the practice of respectful treatment exhibits respect's organizing point in attenuated fashion. This is what we discover when we examine the connection between non-respectful treatment and the phenomenon of *relational repair*.

Let's start with non-respectful treatment. Consider a case in which some person A fails to treat some person B with respect. Since A's treatment is not respectful, it does not conform to principles that

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attitudes of respect: for what unites their way of thinking about the content of interpersonal morality is that valid moral principles are determined by considering which principles we would adopt if we respected one another, *that is*, if we had a value-based inclination to take one another's perspective on the principles under consideration.

At the same time, many of the questions that beset respect-based moral theories will arise for the perspectival account of respect, as well. For example, just as respect-based moral theories depend for their plausibility on an idealized model of hypothetical co-deliberation, the perspectival account's derivation of respectful treatment will similarly depend for its plausibility on some suitably idealized model of co-deliberation. Accordingly, this account will ultimately need to specify the exact nature of this model, as well as to confront substantive questions regarding the plausibility and appeal of its idealizing assumptions. I delay this large task for another discussion.

[23] Of course, this bifurcation between respectful treatment and perspectival respect for persons as such raises a basic question concerning our general moral duty to "respect" persons. In particular, is the duty to respect persons limited to respectful treatment? Or does it extend to a general *psychological* duty of perspectival respect for persons as such? Kant, for his part, saw the development of some such attitude of respect as a *duty of virtue*; in Korsgaard's description, he saw it as "an internal labor with which we are never simply done" (1996, p. 21). My own feeling, by contrast, is that the possibility of any general psychological duty of respect raises significant complications, chief among which is that such a duty would seem to square poorly with the natural idea that "ought implies can." The possibility of psychological duties is an interesting question in its own right, however, and one that I cannot do justice to in this paper. But I note it here because it is an important question that my paradigm-based explanation of respect obviously provokes.

are justifiable to each. Thus there is *someone* to whom A's treatment could not be justified, in virtue of the costs it imposes on her in particular. This person is, presumably, B: because A's treatment negatively affects her in particular, she has special grounds to reasonably object to it.[24] These are the very same grounds B has to *blame* A for his treatment: for in failing to treat her with respect, A wrongs B in particular.

It is generally recognized in the literature that wronging somebody induces certain duties and powers of relational repair. For example, because A wrongs B, A has certain duties of apology, and B has certain powers of blame and forgiveness. Moreover, it is widely thought that there is something special about B's powers of blame and forgiveness as compared to the blame and forgiveness of unrelated third-parties. This is sometimes put in terms of the idea that B has "standing" to blame and forgive A for his non-respectful treatment, whereas unrelated third-parties do not.[25] Of course, unrelated third-parties can "blame" or "forgive" A for his treatment of B in *some* sense of these words. Yet B's blame and forgiveness seem to possess a special significance for A that third-party blame and forgiveness do not. For example, if an unrelated third-party blames A for his non-respectful treatment of B, this third-party blame may strike A as *moot* if B has already forgiven him. Similarly, if an unrelated third-party forgives A for his treatment of B, this third-party forgiveness may strike A as *irrelevant* if B has not yet done the same.

I submit that the perspectival account of respect illuminates this dimension of B's blame and forgiveness. For it allows us to see that the form of moral correction at which relational repair implicitly aims *just is* perspectival respect, and thus it illuminates why this process of repair paradigmatically aims at getting A to see his non-respectful treatment *from B's perspective*. It is because relational repair aims at this that B's blame and forgiveness has special significance for A relative to the blame and forgiveness of unrelated third-parties.

First, this aim illuminates the significance of B's blame relative to third-party blame. Allow me to illustrate this point using Fricker's notion of Communicative Blame as an example. Recall that Fricker claims Communicative Blame aims to inspire a wrongdoer's remorse for his conduct. Notice, however, that this natural idea can be straightforwardly assimilated to the model of relational repair just sketched, since remorse in its proper form is just the pained uptake of another person's attitude of blame.[26] For example, if B's blame successfully inspires A's proper remorse, this remorse will partly consist in A's seeing his non-respectful treatment *from B's perspective*: e.g., that this treatment imposed certain costs on her, in virtue of which she could reasonably object to it.[27] Of course, third-party blame can aim to inspire A's remorse, too. But third-party blame looks derivative of B's in the sense that it derives its proper content from the grounds that *B* has to object to A's treatment. By contrast, B's blame gets its proper content from her *own* reasons for objecting to A's treatment. And since B's reasons for objection are also what *makes* A's treatment non-respectful, B is distinctively positioned to blame A by expressing those

[24] Of course there may be others besides B who could reasonably object to A's conduct. For the purposes of this exercise, however, I artificially exclude this possibility to focus on the relation between A and B, taking for granted that any conclusions I draw about B would extend to any person C who could also reasonably object to A's conduct.

[25] For example, see Murphy and Hampton (1988, p. 21).

[26] See Fricker (2016, p. 173) on remorse as a "partner emotional cognition" to blame in its paradigmatic form.

[27] I take it that similar conclusions can be drawn with a number of other popular accounts of blame (in particular, those which take blame to be at least "incipiently" communicative, and which tie the appropriateness of blame to the fact of someone's having been wronged).

morally significant objections to his treatment *that are also her own.*[28] This is why B's blame has special significance for A as compared to the blame of unrelated third-parties.

Second, the aim of interpersonal understanding illuminates the special significance of B's forgiveness relative to third-party forgiveness. In particular, B's forgiveness has special significance for A because this dimension of her forgiveness helps to elicit an *attuned apology* from A. To see this, consider: in the ideal case, A seeks B's forgiveness through an expression of apology for his non-respectful treatment. In apologizing to B, however, it is not enough for A to express that he regrets his treatment of B for *some* reason or other. ("If I had known you'd cause such a fuss, I wouldn't have done it!") Instead, it is reasonable for B to expect an attuned apology from A, that is, an apology that reflects his uptake of her perspective on things—that he now understands, or has made an effort to understand, the reasons she has to object to his treatment of her.[29] Given this, however, it makes sense that B's forgiveness should have a certain form of practical priority over third-party forgiveness. That is because this dimension of B's forgiveness gives A reason to try to see his non-respectful *from her perspective*, with an eye towards crafting an apology to B that B would actually accept.

The perspectival account of respect therefore illuminates the special significance of B's blame and forgiveness. It does this by illuminating how this dimension of her attitudes originates in a demand for respect. Since the moral correction that relational repair demands from A just is perspectival respect for B, it makes sense that B's blame and forgiveness should have special significance relative to the blame and forgiveness of unrelated third-parties. For this dimension of B's blame and forgiveness are what help to bring about the sought-after correction: a value-based inclination on A's part to see his non-respectful treatment *from B's perspective*.

How exactly does this support the perspectival account's derivation of respectful treatment, though? Here's the argument. Recall that on the perspectival account, "respectful treatment" collects principles defined in terms of perspectival respect: to treat others with respect is to act as one would if one had a special attitude of perspectival respect for each person. What we have just observed, however, is that whenever one fails to treat someone with respect, one inaugurates a process of relational repair—a process that we have found is itself illuminated by respect's organizing point, the aim of interpersonal understanding. Yet this is precisely what we *should* expect if failures of "respectful treatment" are violations of principles defined in terms of perspectival respect. We should expect these violations to be met with a corrective demand for perspectival respect and, thus, for interpersonal understanding. In this way, respectful treatment exhibits respect's organizing point in attenuated fashion, since failures of respectful treatment characteristically elicit a process of repair that paradigmatically aims at getting the disrespectful agent to see his conduct from the perspective of the person he has disrespected.

In view of this, we can provisionally conclude that perspectival respect stands to respectful treatment as a paradigm: although it has essential features that respectful treatment does not, it nevertheless illuminates this family as a whole because it reveals its organizing point. I say that this conclusion is "provisional" because the paradigm-based explanation of respect I offer here is incomplete.

[28] Compare Strawson (1962) on indignation as the "vicarious" analogue of resentment.

[29] See Dishaw (2024b, p. 348) on uptake of the injured party's perspective as a condition on the wrongdoer successfully discharging his duty of apology.

It is incomplete, first, because I have not yet shown that my account of perspectival respect can plausibly supplant Darwall's account of appraisal respect.[30] And it is incomplete, second, because my discussion of the important moral notion of respect for persons leaves many large questions open.[31] But my main aim in this paper has simply been to lay the groundwork for thinking of respect in terms of my proposed paradigm. Thus I have presented the perspectival account of respect in broad outline, in order to illustrate its viability and appeal.

This completes the outline of my paradigm-based explanation of respect. In the section to follow, I wish to wrap up our discussion. I will do this by revisiting the puzzle with which we began, and by contrasting my solution to this puzzle with Darwall's.

4. Rethinking Respect

We began our discussion of respect with a puzzle. On the one hand, we think that persons are owed equal respect; on the other, we think it can be fitting to respect some people more than others. Yet these claims look *prima facie* incompatible, since they seem to imply that we owe people equal respect and also that we do not. How exactly can this be so?

My solution, like Darwall's, appeals to the fact that "respect" is essentially ambiguous. On the one hand, we owe each person equal *respectful treatment*: that is, each person is entitled to be treated, in accordance with valid moral rules, just the same as any other person. On the other hand, it can be fitting to have differential attitudes of *perspectival respect*: for example, it can be fitting for Evan to have a stronger value-based inclination to take Anderson's perspective on philosophical questions than someone else's perspective on the same. In this way, my account holds that a particular bifurcation in the nature of respect corresponds to a bifurcation in its normativity.

I take it that this last point is essentially common ground between me and Darwall. We both take for granted that respect is a substantially heterogeneous family of attitudes, and that disparate instances of "respect" are in fact substantially different. My account, like Darwall's, does not try to paper over these differences. But it is a general implication of this pluralistic approach to respect's nature that it suggests a corresponding pluralism downstream. Wherever we have marked a division in the nature of respect, then, we will also need to be on the lookout for a corresponding division in its normativity.

But while my account of respect shares this basic structural feature with Darwall's, I believe it is also illuminating in ways that his account is not. My account is illuminating in at least two ways. First, the

[30] But I defend this claim in "Respect as a Form of Epistemic Partiality" (ms), where I argue that my account of perspectival respect can plausibly be extended to a wide variety of cases of approbative respect (including respecting someone as an expert, as an athlete, and as a morally virtuous person).

[31] In particular, the discussion for the most part leaves open the content of "justification for each." And it also does not address why respectful treatment has what can be called its *normal genetic objects*. For example, most of us believe that "respecting" a person's rights, boundaries and decisions are all *ways* of treating that person with respect. But why these objects and not others? Why *not* think, e.g., that "respecting someone's well-being" could normally be understood as a way of treating that person with respect? While I believe that the perspectival account of respect provides a starting point for answering this set of questions, a complete answer to it requires a more substantive account of the attitude of respect for persons than what I can offer in this paper. Given this, I delay a full treatment of these questions for another discussion.

account has uncovered a first-personally recognizable attitude in the form of perspectival respect which makes good sense of a range of familiar associations about respect, yet nevertheless remains unidentified in the vast literature on the subject. Second, the account stands to illuminate the heterogeneous family of respect as a whole, since it tells us why disparate forms of the attitude should nevertheless be thought to belong to the same family of attitudes. Perspectival respect and respectful treatment belong to the same family of attitudes, I argued, because the former stands to the latter as a paradigm, and so illuminates the family as a whole by revealing its organizing point.

Of course, one central limitation of my discussion is that I have focused on the moral notion of respectful treatment at the expense of other things. I have focused on this notion not only because of its intrinsic interest, but also because of its centrality to broader discussions in moral and political philosophy. Still, the discussion leaves many important cases of respect undiscussed, and thus it naturally leaves one to wonder how the paradigm-based explanation I defend could be plausibly extended to such cases. We think we can respect people as athletes and musicians, for example, as well as very many things besides people: the rules of the road, a community's local customs, a wild animal's habitat or natural proclivities. But how exactly can these attitudes be interpreted along the lines of my paradigm-based explanation of respect? Can they really be seen as cases of perspectival respect, or otherwise as cases that "derive" from this alleged paradigm?

I will not be able to do respect's heterogeneity justice in the span of a single paper. But I can perhaps allay the reader's skepticism somewhat by drawing her attention to the considerable resources that my paradigm-based explanation of respect has at its disposal. To start, some of these cases—with a little creativity, insight and finesse—can be made sense of on the model of perspectival respect. For example, someone who respects soccer player Lionel Messi may tend to regard his performance "as a lesson in the art and science of watching a soccer match": for when she watches Messi play, she is inclined to try to see the match just as Messi does.[32] Or again, someone who respects composer Philip Glass may be inclined to think that the interest of his compositions partly resides in the fact that Glass *listened* to them: for when she listens to his compositions, this is part of what she is listening *for*.[33] These are admittedly unfamiliar ways of thinking about these attitudes of respect. But I believe that once we begin to take a closer look, we will generally find that these patterns of thought really are already there. We just need to look for them.

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[32] See Jody Rosen's "The Genius of Lionel Messi Just Walking Around." She writes:

> "A famous aphorism… sums up the subtly visionary play of the midfielder Sergio Busquets this way: when you watch the game, you don't see Busquets—but when you watch Busquets, you see the whole game. Something related might be said about the great Argentinean: when you watch Messi, *you watch him watching the game*" (emphasis mine).

[33] See this interview with Philip Glass, where Glass criticizes a piece of music generated by artificial intelligence by saying that "the weakness of the piece is that no one is listening to it." He elaborates:

> "You could take this piece, this music, you could turn it into an interesting piece. But that's called *composing*…Now I don't know enough about machine writing, but maybe there's a way for a machine to be taught how to find something interesting… [But] one of the problems we've always had with machine music is that it doesn't have a lot of personality. It's the first five letters of the word 'personality' that you're interested in. That's what we like about art—the human part of it, and it's not here."

Other cases will not be best understood as cases of perspectival respect, however, and should instead be understood as somehow deriving from respect in its paradigmatic form. There are a number of ways such respect might be thought to derive from perspectival respect, and I can only briefly gesture here at how such derivations might be thought to go. In some cases, the discussion might emphasize that the objects of respect are human artifacts (e.g., laws, traditions, crafts, texts or sites). These artifacts are seen by (certain) people in (certain) ways, and thus an invitation to respect these things is very frequently an invitation to act as though one sees them these ways, too. In other cases, where the objects of respect have no intuitive connection to human activity, the discussion might instead emphasize a connection to other creatures with perspectives on the world. For example, when we respect an animal's habitat, this often means that we have taken steps to avoid "invading" its space. Yet seeing things in this way already betrays our willingness to see things as an animal would: to recognize, e.g., that it would see *us* as an invading threat if we entered its space. Finally, in cases where there is no intuitive connection to any creatures with perspectives on the world, we may ask whether someone is perhaps personifying an inanimate object in claiming to respect it. For example, if a sailor claims to "respect" the sea, we should also look to see if he is therefore inclined to describe the sea as *temperamental* or *ruthless*, rather than just unpredictable or dangerous.

This sketch of derivative cases of respect is quick and schematic. Still, I hope it illustrates the prospects for the proposed paradigm-based explanation of respect—that there is much to be gained in rethinking respect, and good reason to think we can understand it in perspectival terms.[34]

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