

14 The knowledge of other egos

Theodor Lipps[†]

Edited and with an introduction by Timothy A. Burns

Translation by Marco Cavallaro

Introduction

Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) was a German psychologist and philosopher. Both well-known and well-read during his lifetime, he taught first at the University of Breslau (1890–94) and then succeeded Carl Stumpf as the Chair of General and Experimental Psychology at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (1894–1913). Lipps remained in Munich as a professor of psychology and philosophy until his death. Though his scientific output was wide-ranging, Lipps is primarily known for being a key figure in the development of empathy theory in German philosophy and psychology at the turn of the twentieth century. Although Lipps did not coin the term, it is to him that we owe the development of *Einfühlung* from a concept in aesthetics into a more robust theory of “feeling-in” in general and eventually into a theory of *the experience of other selves*.¹

Lipps first developed his account of empathy to explain that we tend to succumb to geometric optical illusions because we project living activity into inanimate objects.² However, he began to recognize that the importance of empathy extended beyond aesthetics, and in the publication here presented, he even declares it the “basic concept” of both psychology and sociology.³

More recently, Lipps has also enjoyed some recognition among historians of phenomenology as holding a position similar to Stumpf and Franz Brentano as a forerunner of phenomenology. In 1895, while Edmund Husserl was penning what we might consider to be his first phenomenological treatises,⁴ Lipps’ students founded the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie* (Academic Society for Psychology) in Munich – the group which, after encountering Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, would become known as the Munich Circle of phenomenologists. Alexander Pfänder completed his

1 The first time that the term *Einfühlung* appears in print is in Robert Vischer’s doctoral dissertation. See Robert Vischer, “On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics,” in *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873–1893*, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou (Santa Monica, CA: The Getty Center Publication Programs, 1994), pp. 89–123. *Einfühlung* is first translated into English as “empathy” in Edward Titchener, *Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), p. 21.

2 See Theodor Lipps, *Raumästhetik und geometrik-optische Täuschungen* (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1897). See also, Montag, Gallinat, and Heinz, “Theodor Lipps and the Concept of Empathy: 1851–1914,” p. 1261.

3 See p. 713 of the original text.

4 Here we have in mind Husserl, “*Anschauung und Repräsentation, Intention und Erfüllung <1893>*,” pp. 269–302; and “*Intentionale Gegenstände <1894>*,” *Husserliana* XXII, pp. 303–48.

dissertation, *Phänomenologie des Wollens*, under Lipps in 1899, and in 1904, Lipps' student Johannes Daubert travelled from Munich to study with Husserl in Göttingen. He was followed shortly thereafter by other members of the Munich Circle, notably Adolf Reinach, Theodor Conrad, Moritz Geiger, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Hedwig Martius.⁵ This migration of students from Munich to Göttingen and back is often thought to mark the beginning of the phenomenological movement. But while Lipps' historical importance is often recognized, his philosophical importance is too often overlooked – in part, due to the fact that almost none of his work has been translated into English.⁶ This is despite the fact that his work on the emotions was particularly influential amongst early phenomenologists.⁷

The text translated here, “*Das Wissen von fremden Ichen*,” bears particular importance for the early phenomenological movement for two reasons. The first is Lipps' refutation of the theory that knowledge of other selves arises by way of an inference from analogy. Husserl and the earliest members of his circle of influence, especially Max Scheler and Edith Stein, were united in their rejection of the theory of analogical inference, despite differences in their positive accounts of what empathy is and how it operates.⁸ In Lipps' work, we find the most sustained and systematic refutation of the theory of analogical inference and the seeds of phenomenology's discontent with the same theory. The second reason for this piece's importance to early members of the phenomenological movement is their univocal rejection of the theory Lipps sets forth in it.⁹ They were roundly critical of theories of empathy cast in terms of “inner imitation” and also of accounts relying on the projection of my experiences into the other.

We begin with Lipps' criticism of the theory of analogical inference. His criticisms are interconnected and sustained, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish where one ends and the other begins. However, we can identify three basic themes in his assault, which we will review. First, it behooves us to understand what the theory of analogical inference claims. It proposes that my understanding of the mental lives of others is the result of an inference from analogy drawn from the experience of other people's bodies and their expressions, which are similar to my own. For instance, I see another's face redden and contort in a particular way. I know that when I am angry I make that same gesture, and so I infer on the basis of analogy with my experience that the other is also angry.

5 Other members of the Munich Circle worth mentioning are Ernst von Aster, Margarete Callinich, Aloys Fischer, August Gallinger, Alfred Schwenninger, and Else Voigtländer. See Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, and Parker and Moran, “Resurrecting the Phenomenological Movement,” 15–16.

6 Two exceptions to this are Lipps, “Empathy, Inner Imitation, and Sense-Feelings,” pp. 371–8, and Lipps, *Psychological Studies*.

7 For instance: Callinich, “*Versuch einer Analyse des Stimmungswertes der Farbenerlebnisse*,” pp. 242–312; Haas, *Über Echtheit und Unechtheit von Gefühlen*; Paul Kananow, *Über das Gefühl der Tätigkeit* (1910); Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, trans. Waltraut Stein (Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1989); and Else Voigtländer, *Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls* (1910). We would also be remiss if we failed to mention the *Festschrift* in honor of Lipps' sixtieth birthday, which contains entries from notable members of the Munich and Göttingen phenomenology circles, including Alexander Pfänder, Ernst von Aster, Alfred Brunswig, Theodor Conrad, Max Ettliger, Aloys Fischer, Moritz Geiger, Adolf Reinach, Otto Selz, and Else Voigtländer.

8 Cf. Husserl, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 82–4; Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 9; and Stein, *Empathy*, p. 26.

9 See for instance, Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*. *Husserliana* XIII, pp. 70–6; Scheler, *Sympathy*, pp. 10–12; and Stein, *Empathy*, pp. 12–18.

The first of Lipps' attacks against this theory is directed against the presupposition that I should have already experienced the connection between my facial gesture and my inner emotional state (e.g., anger) before being able to draw the inference. Yet, the fact is that, in normal situations, I do not directly "perceive" my face when I am angry. Furthermore, even if we grant for the sake of argument that I can become aware of my facial gesture while feeling anger, this is not enough to ground the analogical inference. My perception of the other's contorted and reddening face is nothing like what I live through when I feel the sensation of the contortions of my muscles and skin that make up my angry gesture. This cannot serve to ground the analogical inference for Lipps since, "If I am meant to infer from the fact that I perceive the facial image of the alien gesture the underlying emotion of anger, then I should have obtained a facial image of *my* gesture and have established the connection between it and my anger on the basis of perception."¹⁰ Thus, because I feel my facial expression, and I see the other's expression – and these are two fundamentally different ways of experiencing a facial gesture – a connection between a visual image of *my* gesture and *my* emotional state, one that could secure the analogical inference, has not been established.

On the other hand, one may say that, for me, there is an immediate consciousness of the connection between my emotional state and my gesture; that is to say, there is a connection between my feelings and "my body by means of which certain bodily states and modifications become 'life expressions.'"¹¹ Perhaps this is what is properly transferred to the other via the analogical inference. Lipps notes that we must distinguish between two senses of "gesture" and notice to which one we refer when speaking of such a transfer. There is, first, the visible gesture as what my face looks like when I make an angry gesture. There is, second, the "kinesthetic" gesture as that to which the visible gesture corresponds but I nonetheless feel or live through from the inside.¹² When this distinction is in place, it is clear that the gesture, "for *my immediate consciousness*," is comprised of the second and not the first.¹³ But this is insufficient to ground the analogical inference. "The question at stake here is precisely what binds my perception of *someone else's* optical gestures together with the correspondent kinesthetic gesture, and further the consciousness of the emergence of the latter from my inner experience."¹⁴ It becomes unclear, then, how the defender of the theory of analogical inference can assert the claim that the perception of a certain visible gesture can successfully legitimate the inferential connection with my kinesthetic gesture, much less with the consciousness that such a felt gesture is an expression in me of a particular emotion.

Lipps' second criticism is that even if we suppose that I do have a perceptually based image of my face when I am angry and have established the connection between it and my feeling of anger, the analogical inference cannot succeed because it presupposes what it is intended to prove. The theory must claim that I infer from my case to cases of "other individuals" and, moreover, these other individuals are *minded individuals like me*. But that the other is another individual *like me* is exactly what the inference

10 P. 698 of the original text.

11 P. 711 of the original text.

12 P. 711 of the original text. He does not take these to be two separate things but rather two components of the same gesture.

13 P. 711 of the original text.

14 P. 712 of the original text.

from analogy is meant to establish. Before the analogical inference, the others that I perceive can only be “curiously shaped physical things.”¹⁵ Before I can infer that the other’s expression is one of anger, or even an expression at all, she must be constituted *as an other*. Unless this has already been established, the alteration in the physical world that I perceive, the modifications in the hue and shape of the physical thing over there, cannot be the other person’s expression of anger.

The third line of criticism concerns the connection between the alleged premises, or evidence, and the conclusion of the analogical inference. Lipps’ keen considerations of how an analogy-based inference proceeds would be as interesting to logicians as to phenomenologists. Here, though, I restrict my review of his account to concerns over the success or failure of the inference in the case we are considering. Lipps writes that “analogical inferences claim that, since I once found A and B together, also in new cases where I find A again I will think of the past B as existing, and not a fundamentally different B.”¹⁶ The result for a theory that claims that we arrive at the knowledge of other selves via an inference from analogy should be clear. What I found in the first expression (A) was *my* anger (B). Thus, all that I can ever arrive at again, via analogous inference, is *my* anger and never the anger of another. Lipps is adamant that my experience of anger and its expression in my gesture only acquaints me with my anger and not anger as such.¹⁷ When I see an expression of anger (A) at another place in the world (on the physical body I perceive over there), the only justified inference from analogy would be to expect to feel my anger (B) again. To arrive at the anger of another is to infer to a fundamentally different B. In other words, inference from analogy could only ever arrive at self-knowledge, not the knowledge of other selves.

Having identified the three major prongs of Lipps’ attack against the theory of analogical inference, we will now discuss his account of how we come to know of other individuals. It is interesting that, despite asserting early in the text that “no one ever explained anything by calling it an ‘instinct,’”¹⁸ Lipps dubs empathy the “instinct of imitation [*Der Nachahmungstrieb*].”¹⁹ Empathy names the instinct that binds together my perception of the other’s gestures with the experience of my own kinesthetic gesture and the consciousness that my gesture is the lived-through expression of my emotion. In short, empathy makes perceived gestures into life expressions [*Lebensäußerungen*], “expression of specific psychological experiences.”²⁰ The fact that Lipps discounts the explanatory power of calling something an instinct could reveal that he does not expect *Einfühlung* to explain much. In fact, he calls it “the name for an original and irreducible, at the same time highly wonderful, fact.”²¹ I do not, however, take it that he means his account to be the assertion of a brute fact that requires, and can offer, no explanation. Rather, the explanatory force of his account of empathy seems to rest in the two factors that compose empathy: the impulses of expression and imitation.

For Lipps, in every emotional experience, I live through an activity of the emergence, externalization [*Äußerung*], or expression [*Ausdruck*] of the emotion in and

15 P. 699 of the original text.

16 P. 708 of the original text.

17 Ibid.

18 P. 697 of the original text.

19 P. 713 of the original text. The title of the section wherein he begins his positive account of empathy is “*Die Einfühlung. Der Nachahmungstrieb.*”

20 P. 712 of the original text.

21 P. 713 of the original text.

through the gesture. It is “an activity that, as emerging out of the anger, aims at the gesture and accomplishes itself in the production of the gesture.”²² In other words, all of my emotions tend toward expression in or through gestures. And this activity is not only a part of my experience of my own emotions. It is also a part of the perception or grasping of the other’s gesture. “I immediately live through my activity *in* the perception of the other’s gesture.”²³

It is possible for me to find my own activity in the perception of another’s gesture because of the other component of empathy, viz., imitation. Lipps takes the existence of “something like an *instinct of imitation* [*Trieb der Nachahmung*]” to be uncontroversial; the contagious nature of yawning is his initial example.²⁴ This is at work in my perception of others more generally when “by the grasping of another’s gesture I immediately live through the tendency to produce the gesture.”²⁵ Thus, in living through my own tendency to imitate the gestures of others, I find myself directed toward the production of the gesture, and the tendency to imitate the gesture enlivens the concomitant expression in me. In other words, when I perceive another’s angry gesture – to retain our previous example – I experience a tendency to imitate the gesture. As I experience this instinctive imitation, perhaps only inwardly since it is unnecessary that I outwardly imitate the other’s gesture,²⁶ I simultaneously “exercise the corresponding activity, then this activity is, at its core, one and the same thing as the emotion [*Affekt*].”²⁷ Thus, concludes Lipps, the emotion attaches to the gesture by virtue of the instinctive impulse to imitate it, and it makes itself known to me by virtue of the instinctive impulse of expression that always accompanies such emotions. That is how I come to know of other individuals.

I have only attempted here to outline the main points of Lipps’ refutation of the theory that we know of other individuals on the basis of an inference from analogy as well as his theory of *Einfühlung*. Lipps has much else to say in this piece that will be of interest to scholars working in traditions of philosophy outside of phenomenology too. As mentioned earlier, logicians may find much fruit in his analysis of the working of the analogical inference. Those who study the philosophy of emotions will find his discussion of imitation, expression, and the relationship between emotion and gesture – which he calls “lying in” [*Liegen*] and attempts to delineate as closely as possible – to be fruitful. Metaphysicians and epistemologists may find his discussion of an “instinctive knowledge of the existence of an external world” fertile ground for future work.

In sum, Lipps’ groundbreaking article on *The Knowledge of Other Egos* deserves as much interest from the philosophical community today as it had in the past. The figure of Lipps the *philosopher* needs to be taken into consideration anew among other much-celebrated proponents of the phenomenological movement. Therefore, we see this translation as a small but important step towards a reemergence of Lipps studies.

22 P. 715 of the original text.

23 Ibid.

24 P. 716 of the original text.

25 Ibid.

26 P. 717 of the original text.

27 Ibid.

The knowledge of other egos²⁸

[694] The question of this chapter is the following: how is it possible, or how does it come about that, for the particular individual, i.e., for me, others exist? How is it that I come to know of other individuals?

Without any doubts, I know directly only of myself. Here, I intentionally say ‘*myself*’ and ‘*my Ego*’ [*meinem Ich*]. If I speak of ‘my’ Ego, then I am already positing other Egos. Thus, the Ego which I originally know, i.e., before I have any knowledge of other egos, is not ‘my’ Ego. It is also not ‘an’ Ego, or ‘this’ Ego. Indeed, ‘an’ Ego is an Ego among many Egos, and ‘this’ Ego is a particular Ego as opposed to other particular Egos. Rather, the Ego which I originally know is simply ‘ego’ [*ich*];²⁹ the ‘ego’ taken not as a substantive but as a personal pronoun. Only when other Egos enter my consciousness does the ego become *my Ego*, *this Ego*, *an Ego*.

But how do other Egos appear in my consciousness? How do I know of sensations, representations, emotions, wishes, and thoughts which are not mine? How do I know, so I could also say, of human beings? In fact, human beings are not merely bodies, but they are unities of consciousness ‘intertwined’ with bodies.

Instinctive knowledge of the existence of an external world

One could answer the question ‘how do I know about other Egos?’ in the following way: I judge the other lived expressions, the other gestures, words, and behaviours from the standpoint of my own. Thanks to an analogical inference, I conclude that, at their basis, there are similar mental processes [695] as are at the basis of mine. And sometimes it is said, “One acts that way,” as if expressing the most obvious fact.

But one easily notices that this fact is far from being obvious. And under closer examination, one also notices that anyone who admits it is asserting something totally absurd.

Fundamentally, the absurdity is the same one made when admitting that the consciousness of a real, material external world, – i.e., a world existing independently of my consciousness – is a product of a conscious or unconscious *causal inference*. One says, I have at a certain moment an experience that I did not have before. This constitutes a modification of my conscious state. But then there is the law of causality, and it says to me that every modification has a cause. And, either consciously or unconsciously, I apply this law to the appearance of the sensation. I thus ascertain a cause for it, and this cause is part of material reality [*das dinglich Reale*]. I say that the sensation stems from it. Therefore, I establish the causal law with respect to the existence of such a material reality.

Now, it could also be the case that the appearing of a sensation in my consciousness requires a cause. But how do I arrive at a *material reality*, i.e., a thing existing independently of my consciousness, and avail of it as the cause of the appearing of

28 Theodor Lipps, “Das Wissen von fremden Ichen,” *Psychologie Untersuchungen* 1 (4) (1907): 694–722. The original pagination is indicated in bold and in square brackets throughout the text. For example, [707] marks the beginning of page 707.

29 In the original text, Lipps renders the distinction at issue through the use of the capital letter: “*Ich*” (Ego) versus “*ich*” (ego). The latter is the first-person pronoun in German, whereas the word “*Ich*” (Ego) seems to suggest a hypostatization of the phenomenon referred to by the personal pronoun.

a sensation in myself? How can I, who knows only *sensations* or, more generally, conscious facts – and that it is so is the presupposition of every theorizing – how can I make this gigantic leap from conscious facts to a material, to a real world? How can the causal law push me to think this thought, which has material *reality* as its content, a content that is incomparable to everything else I know, because of this theory?

One certainly has good reasons to criticize Hume's philosophy. But we have at least learned one thing from him. And that is the following: it is only *experience* that can inform us how the cause of a given effect looks like or [696] what can be deemed the cause of a given effect. Thus, we do not know *a priori* which particular cause is at the basis of a particular effect, nor can we achieve such knowledge by means of a sheer thinking performance.

For example, we know that a particular kind of pain is caused by touching a warm object, and that rubbing is a cause of warmth, and so on. Our knowledge is possible because we have already touched warm objects and then experienced pain, or because we have rubbed an object and then seen the object becoming warm. Therefore, *experience* links, everywhere, cause and effect, or brings about causal relations for us. The causal law only requires that every alteration, *in general*, has a cause. But at the same time, it is never said which kind of cause.

That experience, and it only, produces causal relations for us means: we cannot know of any causal relation of any type, thus we also cannot *deduce* the cause from a change or effect even if the cause has been previously *given* to us; thus, we are already aware of what we claim to be the cause.

The supporters of that theory, however, demand that we ought to be able to *pick out* a justification for the existence of objective reality from the fact of our sensations by way of thought alone [*blossen Denkens*]. But in this case, as everywhere, the issue remains. In order to deduce objective reality from our sensations, we must already know that there is something like an objective reality. In short, the resolute attempt to conceive consciousness of objective reality by means of a causal inference is circular reasoning. In fact, there is no need to “explain” our consciousness of objective reality; viz., this consciousness is simply given as a fact which mocks every explanation. It comes unconsciously into view whenever I have a sensation. Simply by the fact that I feel it, the sensuous datum [*das Empfundene*] is, for my consciousness, at the same time something independent of its being felt or something that exists independently thereof. [697] That is, it is something for me that exists, whether or not a sensation of it takes place or ever took place, and it will exist also when the sensation disappears.

If we want to give this fact, irreducible to anything else, a name we could call it an *instinctual* fact. Still, as a point of fact, no one ever explained anything by calling it an ‘instinct’. In doing so, we simply say, “That’s the way it is”, or “It comes from our nature”. In these cases, one says: we cannot change the fact we are made in such a way that we grasp objects of sensation as existing independently of sensation.

Tracing back the knowledge of other egos to an “analogical inference”

Our consciousness of other individuals, i.e., other unities of consciousness, is a completely analogous case. Here too there is nothing like an alleged “inference”, an analogical inference from me to the other. Rather, this fact is also “unexplainable”. It is, like all similar facts, a *Novum*, which one must simply recognize and leave as it is.

Let us reflect on what this alleged analogical inference would presuppose. I am, for example, angry. My face contorts in a certain way, which I do not need to describe here in detail. To actually do so would not be a very simple task. My face shifts, and shapes and lines form in a certain way. This kind of alteration I call an expressive movement [*Ausdrucksbewegung*] or a gesture [*Gebärde*]; in our case, it is called a “gesture of anger.” Now, the theory [of analogical inference] assures me that, when I perceive in an “other” – i.e., in a thing that I additionally conceive of as an alien human body – a similar “gesture” – i.e., a similar alteration of shapes and lines – I infer from an analogy with myself that, where I perceive this alteration, something similar to my experience is occurring; he too experiences an anger like the one I lived through.

We still need to introduce several distinctions here. In the first place, the fact that I “infer” the emotional movement [*Gemütsbewegungen*] of anger [698] from the perceived alteration, and that I infer it based on an analogy with myself, presupposes in any event my knowledge that, in *my* case, this alteration corresponds to the emotional movement of anger. But how in the world am I supposed to know this? How did I obtain consciousness of the connection between my emotional movement and the alteration in my face? Did I then, as I was living through the emotional movement, perceive the alteration in my face? Was I, in the moment that the anger possessed me, in front of a mirror? And if not, how did I get this knowledge? While I was angry, I would have had to have seen the gesture of anger, i.e., the alteration in shapes and lines of my face, at the same time and *without mediation*. But this is simply out of the question.

Perhaps one could reply: when I am angry, I do not actually “see” the gesture of anger, but I *feel* [*empfinde*] it, i.e., I have the corresponding muscle and skin sensations. Now, this may be possible. Yet, I now see the gesture of anger in the other, and from it I allegedly infer the existence of the emotional expression. I do not make this inference because I “see” the same muscle and skin sensations in the other as I once had while feeling anger. I cannot, by any means, “see” muscle and skin sensations. Rather, what I *see* or, generally speaking, what is given in my sensuous perception is merely the image of the *face* [*Gesichtsbild*] or the *optical* image [*optisches Bild*] of the facial alterations; it is the gesture insofar as it is *optically* perceivable. And even if I would be able to perceive a muscle or tactile image while I feel anger, this doesn’t add anything to what is at stake here. If I am meant to infer from the fact that I perceive the facial image of the alien gesture the underlying emotion of anger, then I should have obtained a facial image of *my* gesture and have established the connection between it and my anger on the basis of perception.

Nevertheless, when I am angry I really am conscious of a particular, perceivable alteration in the appearances of my own face. I have a more or less clear [699] *facial representation* [*Gesichtsvorstellung*] of the gesture. But I precisely *cannot* obtain this facial image from the observation of *my* face. Thus, the only option left is that I have gained it from the observation of *alien* faces.

Thus, there is a certain sense in which the principle according to which I would infer, from an analogy with myself, that the alien gesture corresponds to a determinate inner mental process [*Erlebnis*] is modified or even changed into its contrary. It is not by analogy with *my* gestures that I judge the *alien* gestures; rather, it is by analogy with the *alien* gestures that I judge *my own*. This means that I first insert a particular expression into the gestures of the *other*, in our case anger. I first obtain consciousness of the connection between a particular perceivable gesture and a particular inner

mental process by observing the *other*. Then, I subsequently transfer [*übertrage*] this connection to *me*. That is, in my own mind I connect *my* correspondent inner mental process with a gesture as equally perceivable as the one I saw on the alien face. Shortly thereafter, I know that my anger and the particular alteration of my face belong to each other since I know that the other's gesture corresponds to his anger – and not the other way around.

But let us proceed a step further. Suppose that the unthinkable has happened, i.e., that, as I was feeling angry, I saw the movements of the lines on my face occurring. Now, one says, I infer from me to “other individuals”.

Here, the turn “to other individuals” stands out. How do I know of these other individuals? How can I begin to speak of other individuals? This is precisely the *question* here. How can I presuppose the being of other individuals?

The truth of the matter is this: I see bodies and bodily states together with their alterations. These bodies are not human bodies for my consciousness from the outset. Instead, they must become so by virtue of the analogical inference. They are, instead, curiously shaped physical things. I make an inference from a definite [*bestimmt*] kind of [700] physical thing to a similarly constituted [*beschaffenes*] physical thing in this instance. It is by means of this inference that the alien individual first comes into existence for me.

In other words, if we hypothetically admit that I saw the alterations in “my face” at the same time that I was feeling anger, the situation would be the following: I felt anger at the same time that I saw a modification at a particular place of the physical world that I happen to call “my” body. Now I see the same kind of modification at a similar type of place in the physical world. Or, generally speaking: I saw a process ‘*a*’ going on at a particular place, *A*, in the physical world, namely the place that I call my body. And process ‘*a*’ took place as I had a feeling of anger.

In this respect, we can also add the following: this happened several times or happened repeatedly.

And now I notice process ‘*b*’, which resembles ‘*a*’, in another part of the physical world, *B*, which is similar to *A*.

Now, what is the consequence of all this? First of all, one must say: thanks to the situation that I often or repeatedly had the feeling of anger at the same time as I perceived ‘*a*’, an always stronger association links ‘*a*’ with this feeling.

But what follows from the fact that I now see ‘*b*’, which is similar to ‘*a*’?

The answer is, in the first place, only this: the perception of process ‘*b*’ occasions the representation of my anger. I say the representation of *my* anger; not, for instance, the representation of the anger of the *other*. The other must, I repeat, be constituted [*entstehen*] for my consciousness. Before this occurs, I know nothing of him.

We must pay attention to the matter here at stake. My feeling of anger, or the anger in which I felt myself angry, has been bound together with ‘*a*’, not with the anger of the other. Neither is it bound with “anger in general”. There is nothing like that, in any case not *for my* consciousness. Anger is, for me, necessarily *my* anger or the anger of *another*, in brief, anger of a feeling or self-feeling Ego. In [701] the anger, we find, as inseparable moment, the fact that there is “somebody”, i.e., an Ego, who *feels* the anger as *her* anger. “Anger” means: the feeling of anger that belongs to an Ego. Anger alone, without a self-feeling Ego, is a wholly empty word; it is both unrepresentable and unthinkable.

As already mentioned, I know nothing of the anger of another individual. The representation of the other, of the Ego different from mine, must be constituted in the first place.

In any case, the result is that process 'a' is experientially connected to *my* anger and nothing else. I hope that everyone understands that my anger is something different from the anger of the other. Accordingly, literally all that the perception of process 'b' can reproduce is the representation of *my* anger. I can be *reminded*, in this way, only of *my* anger that I felt on the occasion of perceiving this event.

Something more follows from this. More precisely, one may *suppose* that this connection takes place. What I suppose is this: perhaps, I now *expect* to feel anger again. But suppose that this feeling does *not take place*, that is, that the expectation is disappointed. In this case, I have first of all the feeling of a disappointed expectation.

This disappointed expectation leads me to formulate the judgment and say, probably with astonishment, that, "Here, an alteration takes place that is absolutely identical with the one in which I feel angry; this time, however, there is no such anger. Thus, it seems two things are going on: [first,] that the alteration is accompanied by a certain feeling and [second,] that the same alteration takes place without the accompanying feeling". And possibly I add: "This may not come as a big surprise, since 'b' is not absolutely identical with 'a' for the reason that the former is distinguished from the latter, at least by virtue of the fact that they happen at different places in the physical world."

Analogous cases

Thus, in the above mentioned cases, I say that that is how it will be. I say this because in other cases that are, in a certain sense [702] similar, that is how it is. For instance, I saw in front of me a body with particular, evident properties, e.g., an oven, and at the same time I had the sensation of heat in my hand. This situation was repeated several times. Then, the visual perception of the body so constituted and the sensation of heat are undoubtedly associated with one another. And now, I encounter a similar body in another place. Then, the perception of the body certainly prompts me to recollect the sensation of heat. And, perhaps, I will expect the same, since it holds true that I became acquainted with this aspect through experience. But suppose I do not actually feel the heat again; thus, I will not infer the following: that the sensation of heat is here, only not as *my* sensation of heat. On the contrary, I will simply say: both options are equally granted, that I feel heat when such a thing is located in a particular place, and that I do not feel heat when this thing is located in another place. In other words: I will discern between two possibilities: that a heat sensation belongs to such a thing or that it does not. – I highlight that, here, we are speaking of the *sensation of* heat and not of heat as a physical fact. This bears a similarity to our case in which the *feeling* of anger is at stake, and not anger as a physical fact, which is obviously impossible.

Or [consider] another simple example, which may be even more compelling. Suppose I was once in a determined state of feeling or *mood* [*Stimmung*]; and while I was in it, I perceived some physical event. I saw, for example, a bird flying in a characteristic way and heard an uncommon noise, or had a determinate olfactory sensation. I now see the bird's flight again, or I hear the same noise, or I have the same olfactory sensation; then I am, or can be, prompted to recollect my former mood. But I do not infer that, since the bird's flight, or the noise, or the smell, which were in the world when I was in that mood, is present in the world again, [703] a similar mood must

also appear in the world again. And we could also consider the situation in which I see the bird's flight, I hear the noise, or I smell the smell, but the mood belongs to an *individual different from me*.

And supposing that I had the same experience on several occasions, I repeatedly observed the same bird's flight and so on, when I was in the same mood. This would only have the consequence that I would recollect my previous mood – livelier each time – and finally, by repeated perception of the bird's flight, as lively as possible. Perhaps, I would be surprised, while perceiving the same event in the physical world, to not find myself in the same mood in which I found myself so many times before. Perhaps, I would even *expect* the former mood to take place anew in me by virtue of the repeated perception of the bird's flight. But even then I would be very far from the case in which I assume such a mood outside of myself. In short, I would be very far removed from the kind of analogical inference we have been talking about. Analogical inferences are not as simple as those who invoke them concerning our question believe them to be.

The problem

Suppose now that this analogical inference has taken place, or suppose that this big step of remembering my anger, or also of the expectation of that feeling of anger coming up again, which once I lived through as I was perceiving the modification in the alteration of my own face's appearances, has been, still inexplicably, accomplished by me. Suppose that I would have the consciousness that now, although I do not feel angry – which means I do not know anything about the anger directly – something like anger exists somewhere outside me in the context [*Zusammenhang*] of reality. In this case, I gained something which is *not* in this context.

The question here is not to determine how it happens that I consider anger as present somewhere, since I perceive a certain [704] modification somewhere in the physical world. Rather, the question is this: how is it that I posit an *angry human being* different from me, that I posit anger where I see process 'b', i.e., the modification of a face's appearances?

This "where" is particularly important to observe. When I feel anger, I feel it initially "in" *me*. This does not mean that I feel it in a spatial location [*Stelle*] in the visible world, that I feel it, for instance, where I simultaneously see the "gesture" of anger. That would mean that I feel it in a point on the surface of my face. On the contrary, I feel it in the non-spatial [*unräumliche*] location in the world that I call "myself". And I think of the anger that I believe to be present in another in the same way. I do not think of it as being somewhere in space, for instance located in the perceived gesture. Rather, here also I mean it is in the "place [*Ort*]" where the anger is located for my consciousness, a non-spatial location in the world. I intend the non-spatial location that I can refer to by no other name than an *alien Ego* different from me.

For me, however, this alien Ego is *bound*, in a peculiar and non-spatial manner, to the alien gesture. It is in that manner which I call the alien gesture a "gesture", or more generally, an *expression* [*Ausdrucksbewegung*] – in our specific case – of anger.

Now, this being-bound is absolutely specific. I characterize it insofar as I say that the gesture "expresses" the anger; the anger is "located" in, is "announced" [*kundgeben*] by, the gesture. In no sense other than the one here specified – i.e., *announced* only through the gesture, communicated in it, expressed through it – is the anger "where" I see the gesture.

Yet, suppose that I gain such consciousness by means of an analogical inference, that I infer by analogy with myself that anger is “expressed” in an alien gesture, just as it was perceived in my body. Then, it is firstly presupposed that I know that the anger, that I *myself* feel, is expressed in the gesture I perceive in *myself*. Or, to be more precise, that I know that the bodily process in the visual world, which I perceive when I feel myself [705] angry, not only takes place *at the same time* as this feeling of anger, but is also the *expression* of this anger; accordingly, the anger is “located” in it, is conveyed by it, is communicated in it.

This consciousness does not result in, or is in no way identical with, the fact that, as I feel the anger, *at the same time* I perceive the gesture of anger in my body. In other words, this fact does not own anything of the specific kind of unity or inner relation between the anger and the gesture of anger, which makes it a gesture, i.e., an *expression* [*Ausdrucksbewegung*] of the inner passion.

We underline the difference between the specific kind of unity between anger and the gesture of anger, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the unity of any experiential belonging-together. Experience tells me, for instance, that smoke belongs to fire. It tells me that when I see a stone, the visible properties of this stone, its specific hardness or heaviness, belong to it. But still, as much as smoke belongs to fire, this does not mean that the smoke is “located” in the fire in the same sense as anger is “located” in the gesture of anger. The smoke does not “express” the fire; it is not an expression [*Ausdruck*] of it. The fire is not communicated in the smoke, and the smoke not in the fire, not in the sense that the anger is communicated in the gesture. Likewise, just as the specific hardness or heaviness of the stone “closely” belong to its visible qualities, to its form, color, graininess, and so on, the hardness and heaviness are not “located” in the visible qualities and are not “expressed”, “communicated”, or “announced” by them. Hardness and heaviness are necessarily together with the visible properties of the stone, or with that which constitutes the stone for the eye. Yet, this belonging-together is an absolutely different thing than “being-located” in, “expressing themselves”, “externalizing themselves”, or “announcing themselves” [*Liegen*”, *“Sichausdrücken*”, *“Sichäussern*”, *“Sichkundgeben*”].

Or, as if that were not enough, take another example: a specific chemical *reaction*, according to experience, *belongs* to a specific mixture of chemical substances, for instance a reaction that is [706] associated with an explosion. This will never mean that the chemical reaction, or the explosion, is “located” in the mixture of the substances, that the latter is “expressed” in former, not in the sense that anger, or any other sorrow etc., is expressed in a gesture. But here again it is completely clear that the being-located-in, the being-expressed-by, is something completely different from an experiential belonging-together. It is something of a completely unique nature.

If the consciousness of the conscious life that lies in the sensuous manifestation – of which anger was nothing but a random example – is based upon an analogical inference, then this analogical inference must likewise be of a specific nature, a completely different nature than the one discussed above. What is now to be made accessible is not the existence of the feeling, generally speaking, of a conscious life or of a psychic event above and beyond the psychic event through which I personally live and of which, initially, I alone have knowledge. Neither is what is now made accessible the “attachment” of such a psychic event to someone’s else body, that is, to the processes that takes place in the latter, e.g., a gesture. Instead, the sense of the inference must be determined in the following way: as long as the psychic event, for instance the

anger in order to maintain our example, takes place in me, I live through the gesture as an *externalization* [Äußerung] of it at the same time. I live through the gesture as something in which the inner experience *expresses* itself, or in which I *communicate* it. And when I perceive this gesture at any other place of reality, i.e., anywhere else in the physical world, I also infer that there is a similar inner experience, in the very same sense of the word, that *expresses itself* or *announces* an Ego.

Impossibility of the analogical inference

Even the so precisely determined analogical inference is an impossible thing, however. And precisely for the above mentioned reasons. One time, it may be as a result of the perception of someone's appearance that the inner experience that expresses itself in said appearance, or announces an Ego, is [707] reproduced. In other words, I *remember* my experience and my *announcement* [Kundgabe] of it in this gesture. Moreover, I may have the futile expectation that I will find the experience in me again, or that the gesture will announce it. In the first place, though, nothing results from the disappointment of this expectation other than the resigned thought that the gesture occurs despite the fact that I do not express myself or announce an inner experience through it. The gesture occurs as a bare fact in the same way that all kinds of movement occur in the world, which, despite their being similar to my expressive movements [Ausdrucksbewegungen], are not perceived as my expressive movements. For this simple reason, I do not believe, despite the comparability, that an Ego expresses itself in them or that an inner experience announces itself.

On the contrary, it is a long way from the experience to the "association", it is a long way from the "association" between the gesture and the experience to the fact that it expresses itself in my experience by it, e.g., the gesture of my anger and my anger expressed by it, or *my externalization* [Äußerung] of anger: we are talking of the consciousness *that* another expresses *himself*, or *his* internal life, *in* the gesture, one in which I *do not* express *myself*. There is a gap here, and the attempt to fill it by appealing to the word "inferential analogy" represents an illusion.

Let us emphasize once again the general essence of the inferential analogy. Assume that I saw smoke, and together with smoke, or before it, fire. And now I see smoke once again. Accordingly, I think, in correspondence with this second smoke, on the basis of an inferential analogy, of the fire I once perceived at the same time. I think thus for the *second time*, on a new occasion, of what I previously found. Assume now that in our case a similar inferential analogy would be drawn. This would entail that, as long as I perceive a life-externalization [Lebensäußerung], a gesture, I feel *myself* angry, or sad etc. In connection with the gesture, I found *my* anger or my sadness etc., and now I see the life expression, or a similar event, once again in the physical world but at another place. In this respect, the inferential analogy would have only the sense that I think [708] my anger or my sadness *a second time*, i.e., I think of myself again as angry or sad. I think of the past as given, that is of my sadness or my anger, as happening now, once again. In short, I duplicate myself or my conscious experience in my thoughts. In this case, and only in this case, it would be truly possible to speak of an analogical inference.

Generally, analogical inferences claim that, since I once found A and B together, also in new cases where I find A again I will think of the past B as existing, and not a fundamentally different B_i. What I found here was without any doubt my sadness or my

anger, shortly myself, not someone else, or even a sadness, an anger, or an Ego *as such*. In this case, the analogical inference must be drawn between a B and a fundamentally different B_i. That means I have to think not of my sadness or my anger, in short myself, *once again*. Instead, I have to think *something absolutely other*. That is, instead of me and my sadness or my anger, another individual and the anger and the sadness of another. I, the *absolute* subject, should transpose myself, by virtue of this alleged analogical inference, in something that, for me, is an object and can only be an *object*. I have to accomplish a completely *new* thought of an Ego that I am *not* and which is absolutely different from me. One need only to consider this in order to become aware of the absurdity of speaking of an analogical inference in this case, or of analogy at all.

This can finally be added: even supposing that I make the effort, anytime that I perceive the second smoke, to find the corresponding fire, and I do not succeed in it – i.e., despite all my efforts, I do not find the fire – then, my analogical inference would be *disproved* for my consciousness. I would tell myself, this smoke does not mean the presence of fire. In our case, it goes like this: undoubtedly, I normally do *not* find my anger or my sadness as I see the life expression of the other; and *another* anger and another sadness is *not properly* available to me. From this, one would have the impression [709] that no sadness and no anger belong to this life expression. In this way, however, the life expression would no longer be a life expression for me. Instead, it would be for me – simply – an awkward fact.

Plainly, the emphasis is on the fact that, by the occurrence of a life expression, I “find” only *my* anger or *my* sadness, in short *myself*. That means, specifically, that I also do not find, for instance, sadness or anger, in short an Ego *at all*. Consider the matter in this way: one may say that what I once found was “sadness or anger”, in short “an” Ego. Hence, one replaces, in opposition to the facts, “myself” with “an” Ego. If this were the case, then one could speak of an analogical inference. The latter would be an inference from “one” Ego to “another” Ego, as in the previously considered case the inference was from “a” fire to “another” fire. Yet in this way, the analogical inference would be presupposing exactly what it is supposed to bring about. The whole question here may be formulated as follows: How can I derive “an” Ego from “me” or “the” Ego, which I alone find? How can I derive the *genus* Ego from this singularity [*Einziges*], which I call “me”? For I am in fact singular. “An” Ego, on the contrary, is an example of a genus. The answer to this question is this: “An” Ego, or the genus Ego, emerges for my consciousness only insofar as “the other”, that is the other Ego, is faced. And now the question is: how does this happen?

In short, the whole talk of an analogical inference is completely empty. It is not an analogy; rather, it is a transition to a brand new fact. The question is: how does that which I call “the other” emerge for me, who can know initially only of himself? How does this peculiar type of *object*, namely the *subject*, emerge outside *me* for my consciousness? Yet, this question, as the question concerning the possibility that “objects” are given to me *at all*, can be answered basically only in one way. The answer is: that’s how it is [*Es ist nun einmal so*]; that is, I must appeal here to an instinct.

In addition, a final, general remark. It is said that all our knowledge is either *grounded* or is [710] immediately evident [*einsichtig*]. The latter refers to, for instance, the knowledge that each color, excluding black of course, has a grade of brightness. Hereby, one wants to say that we cannot think a color without bestowing upon it a grade of brightness.

However, this is a false dichotomy. There is truly a *third* possibility, namely that a piece of knowledge, or a certainty, is *simply given* – i.e., neither grounded nor “evident”. There are even threefold examples of these kinds of knowledge or certainty. Our knowledge of the objective reality of the *sensuously perceived* world is knowledge of this kind. The second is knowledge of my own past conscious experiences, which I *remember*. Finally, a third kind of neither grounded nor evident knowledge is the knowledge at stake here. This is the knowledge, or the certainty [*Gewißheit*], that a conscious life similar to ours is connected to specific sensuous manifestations. As the first and the second are, so also this third knowledge is simply given. We call this simple being “instinctual” [*instinktiv*].

Such knowledge, or such a simply given certainty, underlies all knowledge of reality: the knowledge, or certainty, that we mentioned in the first and the third place, all psychological reality; the certainty we mentioned in the second place, all knowledge of physical reality. There would be no knowledge of the physical without the instinctive belief in the objective reality of the sensuously perceived [*sinnlich Wahrgenommenen*]. Likewise, there would be no psychological insight without the trust we put in remembering and without the belief in conscious life of the other. All knowledge of the real is ultimately grounded on an instinct.

Further arguments against the analogical inference

Incidentally, we must return to our first concern raised against the “analogical inference” and complete it. Undoubtedly, I have a direct consciousness that *I express myself* in my own life expressions, that I display my inner life in a gesture, e.g., my anger. I live through the gesture or the bodily movement in which [711] the gesture consists as *coming* from me or from my inner state. In other words, there is, for my immediate consciousness, a connection between my internal life and my body by means of which certain bodily states and modifications become “life expressions”. Now, one may say that this connection is transferred, through an analogical inference, to the life expression of the other.

Now, it is important to pay attention to what is meant, to pay attention to “which” gesture, or what in the gesture or “life expression”, as an inner expression, immediately appears to me from within, or is immediately lived through by me. Here, we must precisely distinguish two things: namely, [1] the visible gesture and [2] the muscle- and touch-gesture, [1] the optically perceivable and [2] the gesture which corresponds to the optical image but which exists only for the *muscle* and the *sense of touch*. In brief, we must distinguish between the optical gesture and the “kinesthetic” gesture, or, if you prefer, between the optical side and the kinesthetic side, or *component*, of the gesture.

But as long as we draw this distinction, it becomes clear what I really mean when I say that we immediately live through the *emergence* [*Hervorgehen*] of the gesture from inner experience, or our expression in it. This can only refer here to the kinesthetic gesture, or the gesture insofar as it is comprised of muscle and the sense of touch. I immediately live through the movements, i.e., the muscular processes – together with the seeing and the movement of the joints – and the immediately co-given [*mitgegeben*] processes in the skin, as emerging from inner states or processes and externalizing, displaying, or expressing those inner states and processes. The gesture, for my *immediate*

consciousness, is made up of this kinesthetic gesture. The latter corresponds to the expressive movement.

On the other hand, the *visual* gesture or the gesture as an *optical* appearance exists, first of all, for the *other*, that is, for the outside observer. Or, it exists, as long as it can be seen by me, for *my* outside perspective. In any event, it exists for a perspective that is independent from any experience of emerging, externalizing, or displaying, for a perspective in which nothing of the emergence from inner experience, or [712] externalization of such experience, is co-given. Certainly, what I call here the optical and the kinesthetic gesture actually belong together. I already called them the two sides or components of the gesture. Notwithstanding, they are very different in themselves and are seized upon in two completely separate mental acts. Insofar as I feel and seize upon the muscular and tactile gesture, I do not simultaneously seize upon the optical gesture; and vice versa, insofar as I see these, I do not see in them anything of the muscular and tactile gesture. And therefore, the optical gesture as such does not directly tell me that, in its development, an emergence and externalization is lived through.

However, one cannot say that experience associates the two gestures or the two sides of the gesture, which were grasped [*aufgefasst*] separately, i.e., that it ties them together. When an inner experience of mine expresses itself in a muscular and tactile gesture, I do not consider, *at the same time*, this or that corresponding *optical* gesture. We saw that, in some cases, the perception of this gesture is impossible anyway. More often, I see all kinds of optical gestures by *others*. But that does not simultaneously cultivate in me my own feeling of the associated kinaesthetic gesture; instead I will perhaps feel, at the same time, a completely different kinesthetic gesture of my own. Finally, even when I *see it*, I am not able to acquire the same image of my own optical gesture as the one that the *in itself* identical optical gesture of *the other* provides me. The question at stake here is precisely what binds my perception of *someone else's* optical gestures together with the correspondent kinesthetic gesture, and further the consciousness of the emergence of the latter from my inner experience. In short, it is out of question that a tie [*eine Aneinanderbindung*] between a specific optical gesture and a specific kinesthetic gesture comes into being due to experience. Accordingly, it is not so plain to see how experience could make a specific optical gesture, or “life expression”, into expressions of specific psychical experiences for me. [713]

Empathy. the instinct of imitation

But because this is so, one needs a particular moment that binds together these elements, i.e., that makes those gestures or life expressions visible for me. Since the experience is not this moment, it must be the “*instinct*”.

We can call the instinct here in question by a special name. The name is the instinct of empathy [*Einfühlung*]. It bears, as we shall see again, two sides or is a product of two factors. One is the instinct, or instinctive impulse, of the expression of life. The other is the instinct of imitation.

The concept of empathy has now become a basic concept, especially for aesthetics. But it must also be psychology's basic concept; as well as the basic sociological concept.

Empathy does not name an inference, but it is the name for an original and irreducible, at the same time highly wonderful, fact [*Tatsache*]. A fact that is completely

different from any inference and is utterly incomparable to it. In our case, this fact means, in the first place, the following: it is the case that in the perception and apprehension [*Auffassung*] of certain sensory objects – viz., those that we identify in a second moment as the body of another individual or, more generally, as his sensory appearance – that, in particular, in the perception and apprehension of processes and modifications in this sensory appearance, something else is immediately co-grasped [*miterfaßt*], something which, for example, we call anger, or at another time friendliness, or sadness, and the like. We grasp it immediately in and through the grasping of the sensible thing, which does not mean that we see it or that we perceive it in the same sensory manner. We cannot do this. Anger, friendliness, and sadness cannot be sensuously perceived. On the contrary, what these words mean we know only from ourselves. We can only live through something like that in us. We only immediately know something like that as our own experience. But such experiences present themselves to us in a distinct way “in” the grasping of a sensuously perceivable body or “in” its [714] modifications. This means that that sensory perception or grasping, and this becoming-conscious of an internal excitement that is not sensuously perceivable, takes place in an inseparable act. Both experiences are combined into a single experience. The grasping of the sensory appearance is, *at the same time*, the having-present [*Gegenwärtighaben*] of the psychical, in such a way that the sensible seems to immediately include the excitation of the non-sensible within us.

Yet, the sensuously perceivable, on the one hand, and the inner excitation, on the other, not only are two different things in themselves. Moreover, they stem also from two different sources. The object of sensory perception is extracted from the external world; the inner excitation, by contrast, originates from the only source out of which it can originate, myself. According to its origin, it is nothing other than a manner of my own activity. It is, in a word, me [*ich*]. However, precisely this activity of my Ego is, for me, connected to the sensory appearance, or is sensuously perceived from me; it is immediately co-given for me in it. This means that what I take out from me is, or I myself am, objectified [*objektiviert*], and that which is nothing other than a piece of the external world, like any other piece of the external world or occurrence in it, is animated [*beseelt*]. It has been animated in the sense that I have put my soul inside it. It has already been noticed that this wonderful fact cannot be derived from any other fact.

This does not impede us from sorting out different moments in it, which we can in turn put in more general concepts. Thereby, they appear at the same time as examples of more general facts, which are of a well-known nature and disputed by no one.

As long as we sort out these moments, it will become completely clear what is meant by the phrase “a gesture expresses anger” or the like.

First of all, let us be clear about what this expression might possibly mean. It does not mean that the gesture ensues *as a consequence* of the anger. Instead, it means that the anger *calls the gesture into being*, it lets it emerge from itself, or, as I have repeatedly said, the anger externalizes itself in it. Now, [715] this externalization is not a mere *event* [*Geschehen*]. If so, it would amount to the anger in each mere *emergence* of the gesture. On the contrary, an *activity* [*Tätigkeit*] lies in this externalization. I recognize this activity, for instance, when, in the common parlance, I “make” an angry face. Incidentally, the “activity” already lies in the externalization and even more clearly in the manifestation [*Kundgeben*]. Yet, it must be noticed that “activity” is not here meant as an activity in the sense that I first *plan* to do something and then carry out

my intention. That is, it is not a conscious volitional activity; rather, it is an instinctive or blind impulsive activity [*Triebtätigkeit*].

This activity is, like every activity deserving of the name, an immediate conscious experience. Thus, I live through myself immediately as active when I make an angry face.

At the same time, I live through this activity of mine as emerging out of the anger. Also, this is implicit in the phrase "I externalize my anger". Hereby, I identify an activity that, as emerging out of the anger, aims at the gesture and accomplishes itself in the production of the gesture.

Such an activity lies not only in my *externalization* of the anger; rather, it also lies, for my consciousness, in the other's gesture of anger that I perceive, as is made clearly seen when I say of someone else, he "makes" an angry face when he is angry. And this activity appears, for my consciousness, out of the anger.

We must then ask: how can an activity that, for my consciousness, produces the gesture lie in the other's gesture of anger? Clearly, what I previously said about the anger is now also valid for this activity, i.e., I neither see the activity, nor do I perceive it in any way. Rather, I live through it in me, and I can live through it solely in me. I immediately live through my activity *in* the perception of the other's gesture.

But how can I find my own activity in the perception of an object distinct from me, in the perception of an event in the external world? The answer arises from experiences that are well-known to us. [716]

There is something like an *instinct of imitation* [*Trieb der Nachahmung*]. Nobody denies its existence. Let us take a trivial and perhaps not too personal example. I see somebody yawning, that is, I see that a certain process is taking place in his body. And now an inexplicable tendency to yawn grows in me, that is, to produce the corresponding muscle innervations, in short, to exercise the inner activity from which the same modification follows in my body. Perhaps this tendency does not attain in me. Perhaps reasons of decency forbid me to yawn, and because I have enough control over myself, I do not therefore yawn. Perhaps contrary tendencies of physical activity withdraw the tendency at stake here, or in this manner, it holds the balance between them so that I cannot feel it anyway. As such however, that is, disregarding such counter-tendencies, the tendency is still there. Otherwise, it would be incomprehensible that others really are made to yawn through the perception of yawning. This cannot lie in the fact that these others are differently organized than I am, so that the perceived yawning has an influence on them that it does not have on me. Rather, it can only be as follows: there are certain inhibitions against this contagion that work in me that do not work against it in the one for whom the perceived yawning is contagious, or those counter-tendencies are either ineffectively weak in him while these inhibitions or counter-tendencies are strong enough in me to overcome the tendency to imitate this yawning. But apart from these inhibitions and counter-tendencies, or as I already said, as such, there must also be a tendency of imitation in me. I live through this tendency immediately in and with the perception of the other's yawning. By grasping the same, or *in* this grasping, I live through the tendency to the activity of yawning, which means I immediately live through the activity, namely and firstly as an intended activity.

Now, by the grasping of another's gesture I immediately live through the tendency to produce the gesture. While I grasp the gesture and linger on it, I am [717] at the same time, and without knowing how it happens, i.e., instinctively, directed toward the production of this gesture, or I have a tendency toward it. Thus, in the *other's* gesture I also become conscious of *myself* as tending toward my own production of the

same gesture. Here, it is not meant that I actually carry out the movement of imitation; even though that *may* well be the case, especially when the gesture is noticeable and I relinquish to its impression so that the counter-tendencies are more or less put out of action. I may easily catch myself actually imitating the gesture. Here, this means that this tendency is *always* co-given, as such, in perceiving and grasping the gesture; [it also means] that, while grasping the gesture, I am always at the same time the one who tends towards his own production of the gesture.

Sympathy. the instinct of externalization [Äußerung]

Furthermore, a second aspect needs be considered. Besides the impulse of imitation there is, or there precedes it, another impulse undoubtedly present in us. This is the impulse *to make known* [kundgeben] inner processes such as anger. This means: I feel anger, so I feel driven by this anger to call forth the gesture of anger. Thereby, the anger and this impulse are in no way separated for my consciousness, but the anger lies immediately in the emotion, as one piece or one side of the same – that is, the tendency of making-known and the tendency towards the production of this gesture. As I produce this gesture, I also exercise the corresponding activity, then this activity is, at its core, one and the same thing as the emotion [Affekt], i.e., it is nothing other than a moment of the emotion itself.

Now, let us combine these two impulses. We take now as a starting point the impulse we mentioned second, which is the impulse of making-known or the impulse of the expression of the inner. I see the other's gesture and grasp it mentally, or I am grasping in it. And while being in it, there is a tendency in me to produce this gesture, i.e., the tendency to carry out a particular bodily activity. However, this tendency is again, as was just said, one and the same thing as the feeling of anger, it is immediately tied to this emotional state. Hence, the [718] emotional state is inversely linked to the impulse of producing that bodily process. This impulse is in me, insofar as it stirs up, it is not just a mere impulse, but is rooted in one's own emotion of anger. This index to be an expression of the anger, generally speaking to be a moment of this anger, adheres to it insofar as it has developed out of the anger, that is, it makes out one and the same experience together with this anger.

This emotion "lies" now in the perceived gesture, and it lies in it necessarily for me. First of all, that tendency of producing the same gesture lies immediately, for me, in the gesture. However, due to previous experience, the emotion adheres to it, specifically as something that expresses itself in it. So, the emotion has been attached to the perceived gesture by virtue of the impulse to imitate the gesture, and precisely not as an accessory but as something that directly belongs to it. The emotion, I say, lies in the gesture. But it lies therein not in just any sense whatever, but as something that makes itself known or expresses itself in it. In the same breath, we must say conversely that it could not lie in the perceived gesture as something directly co-given in it for my consciousness, and at the same time as something that expresses itself, if the circumstance were not like the one I described, i.e., unless it lies first in the activity of producing the gesture and, second in the emergence of this activity out of the emotion in the perceived gesture. This is, however, precisely what makes gesture a gesture.

Now, let us consider more precisely this "lying in" [Liegen] from another point of view. Manifestly, the sentence "for my consciousness, an emotion lies in the perceived gesture" has a double meaning. On the one hand, the emotion is *thought* into [hineingedacht] the gesture, or is thought of as lying in the gesture; on the other hand,

the emotion is *lived through* in the gesture. Now, certainly the former holds true. Remember what we have said before repeatedly. By seeing the gesture, by virtue of the impulse of imitation, I feel the tendency to call forth the same gesture. And the emotion that I naturally express in this gesture is bound up with it. However, this bond only comes into being once I have lived through and [719] expressed the emotion. Only by doing so do I have the unitary experience of the emotion and, in that at the same time, of its tendency towards expression. Only in that experience has the impulse won the index of being an impulse that stems from the emotion of anger, or has the emotion attached itself to the impulse as that which expresses itself in it. And now I live through the tendency to expression again, but not as arising from my emotion, but rather as founded in the perception of the gesture in another's body. And from this, the tendency that experience *of me* is *reproduced* emerges. Therefore, a reproduced emotion of the anger is, for me, immediately given in the gesture while I perceive it. Such a reproduced emotion is inserted into or lies in it immediately for me. In other words, the emotion is *represented* or *thought*, by me, *as being in* the perceived gesture.

On the other hand, when I experienced the emotion, and co-experienced in it its tendency to expression, the tendency of expression of the emotion comprised an immediate unity with the *actual* emotion. In the actually experienced anger, in fact, I co-experienced the tendency of expression of the anger. And now this makes it such that both the tendency to represent the emotion and the tendency to *experience* it again connects itself with the recurrence of the tendency of expression of the emotion. Briefly stated, while I now experience the tendency of expression, there is in me again a part of the former overall experience [*Gesamterlebnis*]. And herein lies the tendency of this part to becoming whole again, or to complete itself in it. And this in accordance with the most general psychological law. However, if I see a gesture, there is in me the tendency to *live through* the emotion from which the same gesture naturally originates. And this tendency gets carried out so long as there is no obstacle. The representing of the emotion in another's gesture, or the imagining into [*Hineindenken*] the same gesture, has become, then, an experience of the same, of co-feeling [*Mitfühlen*], of sympathy [*Sympathie*]. I experience, in me, the inner state that I see expressed in the other. This is how it goes, there are certainly these two impulses, i.e., the one of imitation [720], on the one hand, and the one of the expression of one's own inner state, on the other. This co-experiencing is well known, in many particular cases, to everyone. If this co-experiencing is a pleasant activity, we call it sympathetic joy [*Mitfreude*]. If unpleasant we call it pity [*Mitleid*]. We do not feel such sympathetic joy and pity every time we perceive the expression of joy or pain in the other. However, this at least *can* happen. That means, the conditions for it are given in us every time. And this again means that the givenness of that compassion and that pity, in short that sympathy [*Sympathie*] is a general psychological law. If sympathy does not come forth every time, this does not mean that the psychological law pertains sometimes and does not pertain others; rather, it depends on whether or not hindrances or counter-tendencies can forestall or divert its effect in us. Thus, what needs to be explained is not why this sympathy occurs, but rather, in cases where it does not, why it does not.

By the way, we should not be deceived by the names compassion and pity, as if we were exclusively able to co-experience only the *pleasure* and *displeasure* that somebody announces [*kundgibt*] to our senses. On the contrary, sympathy, or that tendency of co-experiencing applies to every inner activity of the other whose expression we perceive.

With the above said, we reach two objectives. On the one hand, we now know how it happens that other individuals as such are given to me, i.e., that I am acquainted with other unities of consciousness [*fremden Bewußtseinseinheiten*]. Empathy, or the interplay of the impulse of imitation and the impulse of expression, is the ground of such knowledge. At the same time, we know that my knowledge of the inner activity of other individuals is a tendency that depends upon my co-experiencing, or is a tendency that corresponds with my own way of operating [*Betätigung*]. If the latter sentence holds true, so does the former, i.e., that the ground and the origin of my knowledge of the inner activity of another is empathy and that the [721] tendency towards co-experiencing is immediately included in this empathy.

Supplement

In this context, however, what interests us is the first side of empathy, that is, that I *think-in* [*hineindenke*] conscious experiences in certain alien sensory appearances [*fremde sinnliche Erscheinungen*], or that I see it with the mind's eye.

Nonetheless, we still did not completely answer the question: how there are alien Egos for me? We do not only think conscious life in our own sensory appearances, rather the same appears to us immediately, not as something merely thought about, but as *real*. We *believe* that which we think. This fact is worthy of mention. At the same time, it is nothing other than that, i.e., a brute *fact* that admits of no further explanation.

Finally, the following fact also deserves attention: we not only think-in a conscious life, in general, into the lively human body [that we perceive], but also a *unitary* conscious life, a *unity* of consciousness [*Bewusstseinseinheit*], i.e., a conscious life appears to us as the conscious life of a *single* individual Ego, which unites itself in it.

In the singular human body, we see, despite the multiplicity included in it, a closed totality, a complex of parts that belongs together, a singular thing. And thus it goes hand in hand, albeit we do not know how or why, that the conscious life thought in it is also, for us, the conscious life of a singular Ego. This also implies that this fact is an irreducible ultimate fact.

Ultimately, I underline once again that this “thinking-in” [*Hineindenken*] has nothing to do with spatiality. It means only that we think the alien conscious life with instinctive necessity *while* we grasp the bodily appearance in thought; we do both in a single act. The meaning of this “in” [*Hinein*] will probably become more understandable if we turn the issue upside down while introducing a new concept, saying that we see with the mental [722] eye – in the bodily appearance – a “*representative*” or “*symbol*” for an Ego. Hereby, the relationship in which the “thought-in” [*hineingedachte*] Ego stays with the bodily appearance, for us, is characterized as the peculiar relationship between the representative and the represented, or also between the symbolized and the symbol, i.e., as a peculiar “symbolic relation”.

From this point of view, the thinking-in of the Ego in the bodily appearance is comparable to the thinking-in of the “thing” in each spatial complex of the sensuously given. Also, here we may say: the complex of the sensuously given, or of the physical appearances, “represents” a thing to us. And also here it holds that the unitary complex represents to us “*one*”, i.e., a singular, thing.

Besides, the irreducible fact that we consider the Ego thought-in the bodily appearance as real has its counterpart in the double fact that, on the one hand, the sensuously given, i.e., the thing thought-in, appears with original necessity to us as objectively

real, and in the fact that, on the other hand, the objects of inner perception, or of remembering, appear to us in this manner as well.

With that, I have identified the three sources of our knowledge of reality, and they are all ultimate sources.

Works cited

- Calinich, Margarete. (1910). Versuch einer Analyse des Stimmungswertes der Farbenerlebnisse. *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 19.
- Haas, Willy. (1910). *Über Echtheit und Unechtheit von Gefühlen*. KB Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
- Husserl, Edmund. (1979a). Anschauung und Repräsentation, Intention und Erfüllung <1893>. In *Husserliana XXII: Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, ed. Bernhard Rang, 269–302. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- . (1979b). Intentionale Gegenstände <1894>. In *Husserliana XXII: Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910)*, ed. Bernhard Rang, 303–48. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- . (2006). *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology: From the Lectures, Winter Semester (1910–1911)*, trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Dordrecht: Springer.
- . (1973). *Husserliana XIII: Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass. Erster Teil (1905–1920)*, ed. Iso Kern. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Kananow, Paul. (1910). *Über das Gefühl der Tätigkeit*. Inaugural Dissertation presented at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Munich.
- Lipps, Theodor. (1979). Empathy, inner imitation, and sense-feelings. In *A Modern Book of Esthetics: An Anthology*, trans. Max Schertel and Melvin Rader, ed. with an intro. and Notes Melvin Rader, 5th ed, 371–8. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
- . ([1926] 1973). *Psychological Studies*, trans. Herbert Sanborn. *Classics in Psychology*, Vol. 2. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Company. Reprint, New York: Arno Press.
- . (1897). *Raumästhetik und geometrik-optische Täuschungen*. Leipzig: J.A. Barth.
- Montag, Christiane, Jürgen Gallinat, and Andrea Heinz. (2008). Theodor Lipps and the concept of empathy: 1851–1914. *American Journal of Psychiatry* 165(10): 1261.
- Parker, Rodney K.B. and Dermot Moran. (2015). Resurrecting the phenomenological movement. *Studia Phaenomenologica* 15: 11–24.
- Scheler, Max. (1954) *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. Peter Heath. London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. [Reprint, London & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979].
- Spiegelberg, Herbert. (1969). *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*, Vol. 1. The Hague: Nijhoff.
- Stein, Edith. (1989). *On the Problem of Empathy*, trans. Waltraut Stein. Washington, DC: ICS Publications.
- Titchener, Edward. (1909). *Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the Thought-Processes*. New York: Macmillan.
- Vischer, Robert. (1994). On the optical sense of form: A contribution to aesthetics. In *Empathy, Form, and Space: Problems in German Aesthetics 1873–1893*, trans. with introduction by Harry Francis Mallgrave and Eleftherios Ikonomou, 89–123. Santa Monica, CA: The Getty Center Publication Programs.
- Voigtländer, Else. (1910). *Über die Typen des Selbstgefühls*. Leipzig: Voigtländers.