



Supplementing Ames on Creativity

A Heideggerian Interpretation of *Cheng*

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Of all concepts of classic Chinese philosophy, *cheng* 誠 is one of the most difficult to decipher. The matter is not only of translating the term into English or another language. Even in Chinese, its meaning is so indefinite and elusive that the prominent Chinese philosopher Zhang Dainian has called it “the most unintelligible concept in Chinese philosophy.”¹ Yet, *cheng* is undoubtedly an important concept; no serious student of Chinese philosophy can avoid encountering it.² In this chapter, I examine various efforts that have been made to interpret *cheng* and show how these interpretations have shed light on different dimensions of the concept. I also show that, although Roger Ames has made important contributions in this regard, his interpretation is nevertheless lacking in an important way, and that a crucial aspect of *cheng* has yet to be elucidated. This lack can be filled by a Heideggerian reading.³ In such an interpretation, *cheng* is a mode of being human in the most fundamental sense. As an essential characteristic of humanity, *cheng* signifies authentic human existence. Through *cheng*, humanity, heaven, and the world become, and maintain, what they are and what they ought to be. *Cheng* reflects truth, creativity, and reality, the three key dimensions of the Confucian human ontology. To offer such a reading is not to suggest that ancient Chinese thinkers philosophized as Heidegger. It indicates, however, that different philosophical traditions can share important insights even though they may possess varied ways of thinking and justification. My focus here is on pre-Qin Confucian thought, primarily on *cheng* in the *Great Learning*,



1 the *Zhongyong*, and the *Mencius*, the three classic texts in which *cheng* plays
2 a substantial role.

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5 Interpretation of *Cheng* in English Scholarship

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7 One of the earliest Western scholars who attempted to interpret *cheng* was
8 James Legge. He interpreted *cheng* as “sincerity,” making it primarily an ethico-
9 psychological concept. According to *The Oxford English Dictionary*, “sincere,”
10 the adjective form of “sincerity,” is derivative of the Latin word “*sincerus*,”
11 meaning “clean, pure, sound.” In another interpretation, “sincerity” comes
12 from the Latin word “*sine*,” i.e., “without,” and “*cera*,” i.e., “wax.” The word
13 originally meant that good sculpture artists do not use wax to hide defects
14 in their productions. In either reading, “sincerity” can mean the original state
15 without artificial disguise. Legge used the word mainly as a psychological
16 concept. One of the reasons he stuck to “sincerity” in interpreting *cheng* may
17 be due to his taking on the *Great Learning* before tackling the *Zhongyong*
18 in following the sequence of Zhu Xi’s *Four Books*. In the *Great Learning*,
19 “*cheng*” is used in close connection to *yi* 意, “intention” or “determination.”
20 It is evidently psychological in connotation. To make one’s *yi* “*cheng*” (誠其
21 意) means to set a sincere heart onto something. Legge also extended this
22 translation to the *Zhongyong*. He wrote,

23

24 The second clause of par. 5-誠之不可揜如此, appears altogether
25 synonymous with the 誠於中必形於外, in the 大學傳 [*Great Learn-*
26 *ing*], chap. vi.a, to which chapter we have seen that the whole of
27 chap. i, pars. 2, 3, has a remarkable similarity.⁴

28

29 Interpreting *cheng* as sincerity seems straightforward and unproblematic in
30 the *Great Learning*. It is in the *Zhongyong*, however, that Legge encountered
31 difficulties. Section 20 of the *Zhongyong* states:

32

33 誠者, 天之道也。誠之者, 人之道也。誠者, 不勉而中。不思而得, 從
34 容中道, 聖人也。誠之者, 擇善而固執之者也。

35

36 Legge translated it as follows:

37

38 Sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the
39 way of men. He who possesses sincerity is he who, without an
40 effort, hits what is right, and apprehends, without the exercise of

41

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thought; he is the sage who naturally and easily embodies the
right way. He who attains to sincerity is he who chooses what is
good, and firmly holds it fast.⁵

“The way of Heaven,” however, is obviously not confined to the human person.
Using “sincerity” as a psychological state to describe Heaven hardly makes
sense. Recognizing the difficulty, Legge wrote,

However, we may be driven to find a recondite, mystical, meaning
for 誠, in the 4th part of this work.⁶

Commenting on Section 21, at the beginning of the 4th part of the *Zhongyong*,
Legge wrote,

The ideal of humanity—the perfect character belonging to the
sage, which ranks him on a level with Heaven—is indicated by 誠,
and we have no single term in English, which can be considered
as the complete equivalent of that character.⁷

And he added quickly,

The Chinese themselves had great difficulty in arriving at that
definition of it which is now generally acquiesced in.⁸

Legge’s case shows that, while his interpretation of *cheng* may work in the *Great Learning*, it is far from being appropriate when it comes to the *Zhongyong*.

Wing-tsit Chan’s work on interpreting *cheng* seems to have been influ-
enced by Legge. For instance, Chan translated Section 20 of the *Zhongyong*
in close resemblance to Legge, as follows:

Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is
the way of man. He who is sincere is one who hits upon what
is right without effort and apprehends without thinking. He is
naturally and easily in harmony with the Way. Such a man is a
sage. He who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good
and holds fast to it.⁹

Attributing sincerity to Heaven, Chan encounters the same problem as Legge.
Following Legge, Chan translated “*cheng zhe, wu zhi zhongshi* (誠者, 物之終
始)” as “sincerity is the beginning and end of things.”¹⁰ However, if sincerity

1 is a psychological state, how can it be the beginning and the end of things
 2 in the world? In an attempt to resolve this difficulty, Chan broadened his
 3 renditions of *cheng* and wrote,

4
 5 The quality that brings man and Nature together is *cheng*, sincer-
 6 ity, truth or reality. The extensive discussion of this idea in the
 7 Classic makes it at once psychological, metaphysical, and religious.
 8 Sincerity is not just a state of mind, but an active force that is
 9 always transforming things and completing things, and drawing
 10 man and Heaven (*Tien*, Nature) together in the same current.¹¹

11
 12 Chan's account points out a key meaning of *cheng*, namely, it is an active
 13 force that transforms things and completes things, and brings humanity and
 14 Heaven into unity. However, saying that this force is "sincerity" is clearly
 15 forced; the English word simply does not have such a connotation. Chan's
 16 treatment seems to display Legge's influence. Linking *cheng* to truth and reality
 17 brings it closer to the meanings of the word in the *Zhongyong*. Unfortunately,
 18 Chan did not elaborate on these linkages in explicating *cheng*. Commenting
 19 on *cheng* as a creative force, Chan wrote, "In so far as it is mystical, it tends
 20 to be transcendental."¹² Chan did not explain what he meant by "transcen-
 21 dental." If it means "beyond the human realm," justifying such a reading is
 22 difficult, because in Confucianism the human realm is not separate from
 23 Heaven or earth.

24 Recognizing the difficulties associated with translating *cheng* as sincerity,
 25 both Donald Munro and A. C. Graham avoided psychologizing *cheng* and
 26 opted for "integrity." Munro wrote,

27
 28 My translation of *cheng* as "integrity" rather than "sincerity" comes
 29 from the term's sense as a completeness that contains all natural
 30 attributes, none of which is fraudulent or missing.¹³

31
 32 This rendering allows Munro to translate "*cheng zhe, zi cheng ye* 誠者，自成也"
 33 in the *Zhongyong* as "integrity is that whereby things complete themselves."¹⁴
 34 In cases like this, "integrity" clearly has an advantage over "sincerity."

35 Graham expanded this rendering to the *Great Learning*, where "sincer-
 36 ity" seems to have stronger grounding than "integrity." He translated "*cheng*
 37 *yi* 誠意" as "integrating the intention." He wrote,

38
 39 *Cheng* "integrity" derives from *cheng* 成 "becoming whole," used (in
 40 contrast with *sheng* 生 "be born") of the maturation of a specific
 41
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thing . . . we use “integrity, integral, and integrate” to combine
the two senses, wholeness and sincerity.¹⁵

Using “integrity” for *cheng*, Graham translated Section 20 of the *Zhongyong*
as follows:

Integrity is the Way of Heaven, integrating is the Way of man.
The man who is integral is on centre without endeavour, suc-
ceeds without thinking, is effortless on the Way; he is the sage.
The man who integrates is one who chooses the good and holds
on to it firmly.¹⁶

Graham’s rendering seems to have been motivated by his effort to offer a con-
sistent interpretation of *cheng* in both the *Great Learning* and the *Zhongyong*.
His translation of “*cheng yi*” as “integrating the intention” suggests that he
read the meaning of *cheng* in the *Zhongyong* back into the *Great Learning*, or
it would be difficult to comprehend how he came to the idea of “integrating
the intention” from “*cheng yi*.”

Munro apparently approached the matter in the opposite direction
from Graham. For Munro, the proper meaning of *cheng* is “sincerity,” which
“referred to the unwavering attempt to realize the specific social virtues.” Such
an attempt is undoubtedly a human effort. On the basis of this, Munro asserted,
“*cheng* was then read into nature.”¹⁷ Such a reading-back into nature can be
found in the *Mencius* as well as in the *Zhongyong*, both of which belong to
the Si-Meng School of Confucianism. Munro’s reading could be supported
in two scenarios. First, the word “*cheng*” originally described a psychological
state. Given the etymological connection of *cheng* 誠 with its homophone 成
(to complete),¹⁸ however, such a conjecture is difficult to sustain. Second, the
Great Learning, in which *cheng* carries a close psychological connotation, was
written before the *Zhongyong* and the *Mencius*, in which *cheng* appears with
broader meanings. However, Munro provided neither as evidence. Therefore,
he has not convincingly established that *cheng* as a personal (psychological)
state was read back into nature to acquire broader meanings such as integrity,
truth, and reality.

In his *Centrality and Commonality*, Tu Weiming followed Wing-tsit
Chan’s interpretation of *cheng*, but emphasized its senses of “truth” and “real-
ity.” Tu wrote,

Cheng as the Way of Heaven is certainly different from “sincer-
ity” as a personal quality. To say that Heaven is *sincere* seems to

1 translate the idea of an honest person into a general description
2 of the Way of Heaven.¹⁹

3
4 For Tu, however, such a reading of *cheng* back into the world is a misinter-
5 pretation. Unlike Munro, Tu maintained that, when the *Zhongyong* describes
6 the way of Heaven as *cheng*, it does not say that Heaven is like a person. On
7 the contrary, it means that *cheng* is unmistakably a quality of Heaven, and
8 that humans should follow this heavenly quality to be *cheng*. Thus, Tu placed
9 “sincerity” in quotation marks and considered *cheng* as “a primary concept
10 in the construction of a moral metaphysics.”²⁰ Toward that end, Tu quoted
11 Lau’s translation of *cheng* in the *Mencius* for support. Lau interpreted *cheng*
12 as “true.” For instance, the *Mencius* states:

13
14 反身不誠，不悅於親矣。誠身有道，不明乎善，不誠其身矣。是故誠者，
15 天之道也。思誠者，人之道也。至誠而不動者，未之有也。不誠未有能
16 動者也。(4A12)

17
18 Lau translated the passage as follows:

19
20 If upon looking within he finds that he has not been true to
21 himself, he will not please his parents. There is a way for him
22 to become true to himself. If he does not understand goodness
23 he cannot be true to himself. Hence being true is the Way of
24 Heaven; to reflect upon this is the Way of man. There has never
25 been a man totally true to himself who fails to move others. On
26 the other hand, one who is not true to himself can never hope
27 to move others.²¹

28
29 “Being true” is key to Lau’s understanding of *cheng*. As Zhang Dainian
30 maintained, there is a close affinity between the concept of *cheng* in Confu-
31 cianism and the concept of “*zhen* 真” (true, truth) in Daoism: “what Dao-
32 ists calls *zhen*, Confucians call *cheng*.”²² In this connection, it makes good
33 sense to interpret *cheng* in terms of “truth,” as Lau did. Being true is a way
34 of being for the person. It is not merely psychological, but also ethical and
35 ontological. In this sense, Lau translated “*bu ming hu shan, bu cheng qi shen*
36 *yi* 不明乎善，不誠其身矣” as, “if he does not understand goodness he can-
37 not be true to himself.” This rendering is much better than either Legge’s
38 (“if a man does not understand what is good, he will not attain sincerity in
39 himself”²³) or Chan’s translation (“If one does not understand what is good,
40 he will not be sincere with oneself”²⁴). Legge’s and Chan’s translations imply
41 that understanding the good is a precondition of being sincere, and hence
42

one could understand what is good without being sincere. This implication 1
is problematic because in Confucianism one has to learn to understand the 2
good (or to become enlightened with the good), and dedication, including 3
being sincere, is required in learning about the good. 4

Aided by Lau's interpretation, Tu went further to link *cheng* directly to 5
the Confucian ideal of the unity of Heaven and humanity. Tu wrote, 6

Cheng, so conceived, is a human reality, or a principle of subjec- 8
tivity, by which a person becomes "true" or "sincere" to himself; 9
in so doing, he can also form a unity with Heaven.²⁵ 10

Thus, in Tu, *cheng* is first of all a metaphysical concept. It refers to the human 12
reality and the ultimate human existence in unity with Heaven. He maintains 13
that such human existence is the unfolding, and hence the realization of the 14
goodness in human nature (*xing* 性).²⁶ From this perspective, *cheng* is not only 15
existence but also activity, not only one of self-realization but also of helping 16
to realize others in the world. In this sense, *cheng* is "creativity." 17

Drawing on Tu Weiming's understanding of *cheng* in terms of creativ- 18
ity, Roger Ames and David Hall translated *cheng* as "creativity." Ames and 19
Hall wrote, 20

Construed by appeal to a world of process, both "sincerity," as the 22
absence of duplicity, and "integrity," the state of being sound or 23
whole, must involve the *process* of "becoming one" or "becoming 24
whole." The dynamic of becoming whole, construed aesthetically, 25
is precisely what is meant by a creative process. It is thus that 26
cheng is to be understood as *creativity*.²⁷ 27

Reading "*wu* 物" in the *Zhongyong* as "process" or "event," Ames and Hall thus 29
interpreted "*bu cheng ze wu wu* 不誠則無物" as "without this creativity, there 30
are no events."²⁸ Whereas Tu Weiming emphasized the religio-ontological sense 31
of *cheng* and closely associated it with the unity of Heaven and humanity (*tian 32*
ren he yi 天人合一), Ames and Hall focused on its sociopolitical meaning. 33
On Ames and Hall's "focus-field" ontology, human existence is to emerge in 34
a social "field." They wrote, 35

We might appeal to the relationship between personal realization 37
and the flourishing community to make this description of creativ- 38
ity more concrete. The basis of community is not a ready made 39
individual, but rather a "functional" or "instrumental" inchoate 40
heart-mind (*xin* 心) emergent from productive relations. It is 41

1 through communication that the knowledge, beliefs, and aspirations
 2 of the individual are formed. Human realization is achieved not
 3 by whole-hearted participation in communal life forms, but by life
 4 in community that forms one whole-heartedly. We do not speak
 5 because we have minds, but become like-minded by speaking to
 6 one another in a communicating community.²⁹

7
 8 It should be noted that Ames and Hall did not deny that *cheng* has a psycho-
 9 logical dimension. Even in that regard, however, they saw that “it describes a
 10 commitment to one’s creative purposes, a solemn affirmation of one’s process
 11 of self-actualization.”³⁰ Nor did they rule out the sense of integrity from *cheng*.
 12 Integrity, to them, meant living in “trustworthy and true” relationships with
 13 fellow human beings. They said,

14
 15 *Cheng* translated as “creativity” underscores the integrative process
 16 itself, while its translation as “integrity” denotes the culmination of
 17 any such integrating process. *Cheng* as “sincerity” underscores the
 18 emotional tone—the subjective form of feeling—that makes this
 19 creative process uniquely perspectival. As we have suggested, the
 20 cluster of translations is present as a seamless range of meaning
 21 in each occurrence of the term *cheng*.³¹

22
 23 Like Tu Weiming, Ames and Hall also regarded humanity as a “co-creating”
 24 force. While Tu called humanity the “co-creator” with Heaven, Ames and
 25 Hall maintained that humans are “co-creative beings that have a central role
 26 in realizing both individual selves and the eventful worlds around them.”³²
 27 Understanding *cheng* in terms of creativity has enabled Ames and Hall to
 28 produce a powerful and apt translation of the important Section 23 of the
 29 *Zhongyong*:

30 誠則形，形則著，著則明，明則動，動則變，變則化，唯天下至誠為能化。

31
 32
 33 When there is creativity there is something determinate; when
 34 there is something determinate, it is manifest; when it is manifest,
 35 there is understanding; when there is understanding, others are
 36 affected; when others are affected, they change; when they change,
 37 they are transformed. And only those of utmost creativity (*zhicheng*
 38 至誠) in the world are able to effect transformation.³³

39
 40 In his more recent work of *Role Ethics*, Ames interprets *cheng* in *Mencius*
 41 7A4 in terms of both “integrative and creative.” He writes,

42

The character *cheng* in this passage is conventionally translated as “sincerity” or “integrity.” In most occurrences in the classical corpus it does carry this meaning, and this *Mencius* passage is no exception. But in a processive and transactional world, sincerity is the bond that unites one in one’s relations with others, and that makes the process of personal co-creativity possible. Under such circumstances, “integrity” is not simply retaining what you “have” or being who you “are”: It is what you “do” and “become” in *integrating* effectively with family and community. *Cheng* is thus the ground of an *integrative and creative process* of becoming consummately human.³⁴

In doing so, Ames connects the dots between “sincerity,” “integrity,” and “creativity.” His interpretation culminates in creativity, with both ontological and ethical significance. As a creative process, *cheng* is in close connection with the notion of “*shengsheng* 生生” (creative creativity) in the *Yijing*.

However, there are two weak links in Ames’s conceptualization of the various meaning of *cheng*. First, while taking “creativity” as its core meaning, Ames nevertheless has accepted “sincerity” as one unquestionable interpretation and has moved too quickly in embracing it into his understanding of *cheng*. Ames takes *cheng* in the sense of sincerity to be “an essential affective ground for deepening one’s relations with others, and in so doing, for achieving real personal growth.”³⁵ He writes, “sincerity is the bond that unites one in one’s relations with others, and that makes the process of personal co-creativity possible.”³⁶ In his view, being sincere to others enables one to strengthen human relationships and to be better prepared in joining the co-creative process in the world. In this understanding, *cheng* as sincerity pretty much stays within the psychological and social dimensions. It is not framed explicitly as a special mode of being true in the ontological context of human *being*. Second, as far as Ames bases his interpretation on ontology, his ontological view is too fluid, too unstructured. The sense of “reality” that Tu Weiming has endeavored to expound is left out or simply consumed in Ames’s extensive processive ontology. In his philosophical framework, Ames gives little room to “being,” to the human reality; everything is in the flux of “becoming.” Reality has been replaced with process. Persons have been dissolved into relations. In this respect, Ames has departed too far from the worldview as developed by the ancient Confucians.

In my view, conceptually, the dimension of sincerity in *cheng* should be grounded in the notion of human reality. The human being has its relatively steady structure; it is not always in flux. In an important sense, one can step into the same river more than once. We need to preserve what D. C. Lau

1 and Tu Weiming have accomplished in deciphering the notion of *cheng*. In
 2 their view, the “sincerity” dimension of *cheng* is best understood as being
 3 true to oneself and to others. We should understand sincerity as a mode of
 4 being, as being true. Being true is being, or more precisely, a state of being,
 5 a way of being. Only in this understanding, only by grounding it on being
 6 true can we closely connect sincerity as a psychological concept to *cheng* as
 7 a more fundamentally ontological or metaphysical concept.

8 Following this line of thinking, we can say that the Confucian notion of
 9 *cheng* possesses three main dimensions.³⁷ First, it is trueness or truth. In this
 10 sense, to be *cheng* means being true to oneself, to other people, and to the
 11 world. Being true is a matter of truth. This meaning encompasses sincerity (i.e.,
 12 being sincere) but frames it on an ontological ground. When understood as
 13 a person’s internal state, sincerity is not purely a mental property; it is also a
 14 way of ones being who he is and what he is. It suggests authenticity. A sincere
 15 person is a true or truthful and an authentic person.³⁸ Second, *cheng* implies
 16 creativity. One important characteristic of *cheng* in the *Zhongyong* is that
 17 *cheng* has the capacity to transform the world. It can complete itself (*cheng ji*
 18 成己) and complete things (*cheng wu* 成物). Such a process never ceases (*wu*
 19 *xi* 無息). Together with truth, this meaning of creativity covers the two senses
 20 that Munro uses for “integrity,” namely wholeness and sincerity. Munro uses
 21 “wholeness” to express *cheng*’s role in completing oneself and others. This
 22 sense is better communicated in terms of “creativity” as Ames and Hall have
 23 admirably shown. Third, *cheng* means reality. It does not just refer to whatever
 24 there is. Reality in the sense of *cheng* signifies how the world truly exists. As
 25 Tu Weiming remarked, “*cheng* definitely points to a human reality which is
 26 not only the basis of self-knowledge but also the ground of man’s identification
 27 with Heaven.”³⁹ In Confucianism, this ground is the ultimate reality.

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A Heideggerian Approach

32 How are truth, reality, and creativity related in *cheng*? How can we link these
 33 three dimensions of *cheng* together conceptually to better make sense of the
 34 concept? I believe that Heidegger’s scheme of truth can shed important light
 35 on this question. Like Ames, Heidegger’s world is far from being static, but
 36 it is not as fluid and processive as Ames’s either. By situating Da-sein’s world
 37 within referential contextuality, Heidegger provides a framework of being
 38 with appropriate stability. His framework enables creativity to take place with
 39 reality, enables reality to serve as a fertile ground for creativity and truth, and
 40 enables truth to become realized through creativity.

41

42

Countering the prevailing conception of truth in the West, Heidegger developed a notion of truth through an ontological twist, or a “return” to its Greek roots, as he saw it. In both *Being and Time* and *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger explicitly criticized the Western traditional concept of truth that reduces truth to a matter of “correctness” of the relation of the intellect to the known object. Heidegger objected to the notion that an assertion can “agree” with an object or reality, which is a non-assertion.⁴⁰ He maintained that truth cannot possibly have the structure of an agreement between knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to another (the object). Correspondence between the statement and the thing cannot signify a thing-like approximation between dissimilar kinds of things.⁴¹

Then, what can truth be? Heidegger proposed:

To say that a statement *is true* means that it discovers [uncovers] the beings in themselves. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings “be seen” (*apophansis*) in their discoveredness [uncoveredness]. The *being-true* (*truth*) of the statement must be understood as *discovering* [uncovering].⁴²

For Heidegger, an assertion can “correspond with” or be “in agreement with” an object only in the sense that an assertion points out or reveals what has been hidden. The truth of an assertion, or more appropriately, an assertion’s *being true*, lies in its “being-uncovering.”

If a statement’s being true lies in its “being-uncovering,” and if that is the essence or underlying meaning of truth, then non-linguistic entities can also be true, namely, when they are encountered in Da-sein’s world of referential functionality and get fully uncovered in the way they are what they are. For instance, a hammer is being true when the being of the hammer is unveiled in the world—when it is found in a context in which hammers exist; when a hammer functions in a typical hammering way, not as, say, a paperweight. Thus understood, the “locus” of truth is not in language *per se*, but in the entire realm of being. The ontological status of being true is no longer merely that of knowing, but also that of being. The semantic concept of truth now has turned into an ontological one with a shift in emphasis from “being *true*” to “*being true*.”

Heidegger regarded truth as “true-being” or “being-true (*Wahrsein*),” and defined “being true” as “*aletheia* (ἀλήθεια).” He used three terms for truth: unveil/reveal (*enthüllen*), uncover/discover (*entdecken*), and disclose (*erschliessen*). Heidegger explained the difference between them as follows:

1 We shall call the unveiling of an extant being—for example, nature
 2 in the broadest sense—*uncovering*. The unveiling of the being that
 3 we ourselves are, the Da-sein, and that has existence as its mode
 4 of being, we shall call not uncovering but *disclosure, opening up*.⁴³

5
 6 In uncovering and disclosing entities, Da-sein opens up its world of being
 7 and realizes truth.

8 Da-sein's being-true makes the truth (trueness) of entities possible.
 9 Then, in what way does Da-sein uncover entities in the world? Heidegger
 10 maintains that Da-sein cannot uncover entities unless it is itself disclosed to
 11 the world. He uses “disclose” (*erschliessen*) and “disclosedness” to mean “to
 12 lay open” and “the character of having been laid open.”⁴⁴ To say that Da-sein
 13 is laid open is to say that Da-sein is being-in-the-world in which Da-sein
 14 unveils itself in a referential whole; it is within this referential totality that
 15 Da-sein makes sense of its being. Only within this holistic contexture are
 16 things what they are in the way they are, and thus have meaning. In other
 17 words, the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is *grounded* in the
 18 world's disclosedness; and disclosedness is the basic character of Da-sein “in
 19 accordance with which it *is* its ‘there [Da].’”⁴⁵

20 In this disclosedness Da-sein obtains familiarity with its world, and upon
 21 this familiarity lies the very possibility of Da-sein's explicit ontologico-existential
 22 interpretation of relations and entities in the world.⁴⁶ The disclosedness in the
 23 form of familiarity is, in turn, constitutive of Da-sein. In this disclosedness
 24 lies the very being of Da-sein. In such a way, truth is a fundamental character
 25 or state (*existentiale*) of Da-sein; or in Heidegger's own words, disclosedness
 26 is the primordial truth and the truth of existence.⁴⁷ He stated,

27
 28 In that Da-sein essentially *is* its disclosedness, and, as disclosed,
 29 discloses and discovers [uncovers], it is essentially “true.” Da-sein
 30 is “*in the truth*.”⁴⁸

31
 32 Heidegger maintained that the above assertion has meaning ontologically.
 33 Instead of an “agreement” between two things, truth is that in which Da-
 34 sein uncovers entities in the world. It is a way of Da-sein's being—“a being
 35 toward discovered [uncovered] beings.”⁴⁹ In truth, whereas entities are being
 36 uncovered, Da-sein is being disclosed and is uncovering. The “roots” of
 37 entities being what they are in the world can only be found in Da-sein, and
 38 the foundation of their being true is in Da-sein. Truth is a way of being of
 39 Da-sein itself, of Da-sein's existence.

40 In this understanding, truth in its primary sense is the disclosing of Da-
 41 sein; when Da-sein uncovers entities, truth is manifested through the being of
 42

entities. Thus, entities are true in the secondary sense, namely when they are 1
 uncovered by Da-sein.⁵⁰ Semantic truth, truth as a characteristic of a statement, 2
 comes only in the tertiary sense, only when entities are uncovered as being true 3
 through Da-sein's being in the truth. For instance, the statement that "this is 4
 a hammer" is true when it uncovers the object in question as a hammer; the 5
 hammer is what it is, i.e., acquires its true being, when it is uncovered in Da- 6
 sein's world of referential nexus, which obtains only because Da-sein discloses. 7
 Accordingly, a statement is true when it works to uncover entities in ways they 8
 are in the world. Entities obtain their being and hence their true existence 9
 when they are uncovered by Da-sein. Da-sein is not only the ultimate source 10
 of truth, but also the ultimate source of reality, in the sense that things exist 11
 as they are only within Da-sein's world of a meaningful referential framework. 12

Now let us see how a Heideggerian reading of the Confucian *cheng* can 13
 help us grasp the linkage of various dimensions of this notion. We begin with 14
 the meaning of truth. As indicated by Zhang Dainian, *cheng* in Confucianism 15
 is the counterpart of "truth" (*zhen* 真) in Daoism.⁵¹ *Zhen* means being true 16
 or truthfulness, as opposed to artificiality (*wei* 偽). This sense is reflected in 17
 the notion of *cheng* in Confucianism. Zhang used as an example the state- 18
 ment of "*xiu ci li qi cheng* 修辭立其誠," namely, the purpose and criterion for 19
 good writing (scholarship) is truth or truthfulness.⁵² In the *Mencius*, *cheng* 20
 is used in a similar sense. For instance, the text records a conversation in which 21
 Mencius's interlocutor said, "Confucius said, at that time the world was in 22
 great danger. Was what he said not true (*cheng*)?"⁵³ In usages like this, *cheng* 23
 has to do with beliefs and statements being true. *Cheng* also refers to a per- 24
 son's psychological state. In discussing the sage King Shun's attitude toward 25
 his brother, Mencius said that Shun "truly believed (*cheng xin* 誠信) him and 26
 was happy for him; where is disingenuousness?"⁵⁴ In this use, *cheng* expresses 27
 the meaning of sincerity. *Cheng* as a quality of knowing and *cheng* as a state 28
 of psychological activity are special modes of being true in the sense of truth. 29
 They are manifestations of being true to oneself and are rooted in being true 30
 to oneself. A person who is true to oneself must be sincere toward oneself 31
 and toward others, and must have a clear sense of reality without delusion. 32
 In the *Zhongyong*, being true to oneself is called *cheng shen* (誠身), or "to 33
 make oneself true." If we are to force this expression in English, we would 34
 say "to *true* oneself," with "true" used as a verb.⁵⁵ To *true* oneself is to open 35
 oneself up, to make oneself authentic. Along this line, Tu Weiming wrote: 36

The person who embodies *cheng* to the utmost is also a most 38
 genuine human being. It is in this sense that he completely real- 39
 izes his own nature. The person who realizes his own nature to 40
 the full becomes a paradigm of authentic humanity.⁵⁶ 41

1 For the Mencian branch of Confucianism, to which the *Zhongyong* is attributed,
 2 human nature is Heaven-endowed and hence is in accord with the Way.⁵⁷ To
 3 be authentic is to be true to one's nature.

4 In Heidegger, Da-sein's being true is in its disclosedness. Heidegger said
 5 in an interview that "man is only man when he stands within the disclosing
 6 of being."⁵⁸ That is, a human is human in the proper sense only when one
 7 stands in truth. When Da-sein discloses, it manifests authenticity and uncov-
 8 ers entities in the world. Heidegger wrote,

9
 10 Da-sein discloses itself to itself in and as its ownmost potentiality-
 11 of-being. This *authentic* disclosedness shows the phenomenon of
 12 the most primordial truth in the mode of authenticity. The most
 13 primordial and authentic disclosedness in which Da-sein can be
 14 as a potentiality-of-being is the *truth of existence*.⁵⁹

15
 16 Being-true is the authentic way of Da-sein's being. It is the ultimate realiza-
 17 tion of Da-sein's innermost potentiality-for-being. Da-sein's disclosedness and
 18 authenticity do not consist in conforming to anything; it is Da-sein's way of
 19 being-in-the-world through choosing its choice in life. Authenticity, however,
 20 does not mean that Da-sein simply chooses a way of being, not even just
 21 a unique way of being. Many people more or less choose their ways of life,
 22 yet they may not all be said to be authentic. Authenticity requires Da-sein
 23 to choose the way that it has to choose. In this sense, there is an apparent
 24 paradox: on the one hand, Da-sein is free and makes its own choice; on the
 25 other, its choice ought not to be just any choice. For Heidegger, authenticity
 26 is linked to the unique singularity of Da-sein's own death. Heidegger wrote,
 27

28 The more authentically Da-sein resolves itself, that is, understands
 29 itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost eminent possibility
 30 in anticipating death, the more unequivocal and inevitable is the
 31 choice in finding the possibility of its existence.⁶⁰

32
 33 Da-sein as being-toward-death brings with it the finitude of existence. This
 34 finitude takes Da-sein back from its endless possibilities "nearby" and to
 35 "the simplicity of fate," namely "a possibility that it inherited and yet has
 36 chosen."⁶¹ This statement points to a constructed common humanity shared
 37 by authentic human beings.

38 By Taylor Carman's account, Heidegger's authenticity consists in two
 39 components: resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) and forerunning (*Vorlaufen*).⁶² It
 40 is a kind of hybrid of Aristotelian *phronēsis* and Kierkegaardian faith.⁶³ With
 41 the former, one needs to exercise practical wisdom because an authentic life
 42

is not prescribable from any rule book. On the latter, there is no absolute assurance in life; ultimately, one has to make up one's mind on how to live. In comparison, Charles Guignon's reading is more concrete and brings it much closer to the Confucian conception of *cheng*. Interpreting authenticity largely from Heidegger's negation of inauthenticity, Guignon emphasizes that, contrary to just drifting along with the latest trends, authentic Da-sein "remembers" its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture, and

[i]t experiences its life as indebted to the larger drama of a shared history. As a result, authenticity involves encountering one's possibilities as drawn from the "wellsprings" of a "heritage" and living one's life as part of the "mission" or "destiny" definitive of one's historical community as a whole. (BT 435–36)⁶⁴

This way of reading differentiates Heidegger from the radical, "naked" freedom of Sartrean existentialism. For Heidegger, authentic existence is rooted profoundly in its destiny, namely "the occurrence of the community, of a people."⁶⁵ Heidegger concluded, "the fateful destiny of Da-sein is and with its 'generation' constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Da-sein."⁶⁶ Being authentic is not only being true to oneself, but also to one's community, or even more broadly, to humanity.

In Heidegger, Da-sein's being true is closely connected to its world of existence. In the sense of "world" relevant to our discussion here, it denotes the human reality. He said,

"Worldliness" is an ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-world . . . "World" is ontologically not a determination of *those* beings which Da-sein is essentially is *not*, but rather a characteristic of Da-sein itself.⁶⁷

Da-sein's world is with "a contexture of functionality."⁶⁸ Without it, entities cannot be what they are in the world. Therefore, "*There is*" [*"gibt es"*] *truth only insofar as Da-sein is and as long as it is*. Beings are discovered only *when Da-sein is*, and only *as long as Da-sein is* are they disclosed."⁶⁹ This does not necessarily mean that Heidegger was an idealist.⁷⁰ However, as far as the world in which we live is already and always a humanized world, our "worldliness" is undeniably a human creation. Moreover, Da-sein for Heidegger will be not mere presence in the sense in which the word "existence" is often used in modern philosophy. Da-sein means "to be there." It is more analogous to an act, a happening, and hence a process, than to a *status* (what stands, what remains). However, such a happening always takes place against

1 a background of Da-sein's contextual framework that is already "there." Da-
 2 sein's being-in-the-world means participatory creation of the humanized world
 3 and participatory enrichment of the world in a fundamental way. In such
 4 an important sense, truth as Da-sein's disclosedness and uncovering in the
 5 world is creation. Heidegger did not use the term "creation," which is usu-
 6 ally associated with God in the West. We can use the word in the sense of
 7 establishment or attainment because, in Heidegger, Da-sein's world is one that
 8 can be established and obtained only with its disclosedness and uncovered-
 9 ness. Da-sein's disclosedness not only bestows on the world its "worldliness,"
 10 thereby making it an undisputable reality, but also maintains it as such. The
 11 foundation of reality in Da-sein's worldliness lies in its truth.

12 This kind of creation or establishment is not the kind that Kant
 13 attributes to the "*Ich denke*" ("I-think"), because Heideggerian creation is
 14 achieved through Da-sein's deep involvement in the world. "To be" in the
 15 world is not merely to think; Da-sein is involved in the world by such ways
 16 as understanding (*Verstehen*), forerunning (*befindlichkeit*), and care (*Sorge*).
 17 Furthermore, Da-sein's creation should be understood as mutual-creation,
 18 in which Da-sein both shapes its world and at the same time is shaped by
 19 it. I will label this mutual transformational relationship "bi-creation." Unlike
 20 the common notion of creation by God, bi-creation is not *creatio ex nihilo*
 21 (creation out of nothing).⁷¹ In bi-creation, Da-sein generates meaning for its
 22 world and enriches its referential framework of functionality and meaning.
 23 In the meantime, Da-sein is also inevitably shaped, or re-created anew in
 24 its world. Da-sein is "thrown" into the world that already exists in the first
 25 place. But, Da-sein is not a passive entity and is fundamentally different in
 26 that Da-sein re-acts to the world and is able to shape and re-shape its world.
 27 Da-sein finds itself in a world with forests, rivers, mountains, and wind.
 28 Through disclosedness Da-sein makes this world filled with timber, water
 29 power, and quarries of rock.⁷² The world in the latter sense, with a "worldli-
 30 ness" in Heidegger's characterization, is an outcome of Da-sein's bi-creation.
 31 It is the reality in which Da-sein finds itself. Thus, in Da-sein's disclosedness
 32 emerges truth, creativity, and reality.

33 Now we return once again to the Confucian notion of *cheng*. In order
 34 to achieve trueness to oneself, a person needs to illuminate goodness (*ming*
 35 *shan* 明善). Goodness, as illustrated in the *Zhongyong*, is not something read-
 36 ily available as a given, but something to be established through the human
 37 co-creation with Heaven. The active human participation in the Heavenly way
 38 is humans "being true." This process can also be characterized as bi-creation.
 39 On the one hand, humanity is not an arbitrary creator in any sense. It is
 40 destined toward the Way of Heaven. Individual persons need to cultivate
 41 themselves in order to come into attunement with the Way. On the other hand,
 42

humanity is definitely a creative force and aims to bring out a humanized world. This is not to say that human beings create mountains and rivers on earth (though they could). But it is through human creation that this world becomes a morally significant human reality. It is in the process of humanizing the world, human beings themselves become (more fully) humanized. It is in the process of co-creating the world, humanity becomes re-created. To be *cheng* is to be true to one's Heavenly endowed nature, and to be true to one's Heavenly endowed nature is to realize it in the world. In this process there is transformational creativity. Section 26 of the *Zhongyong* states,

Cheng is ceaseless. Being ceaseless, it is lasting. Being lasting, it is manifesting. Being manifesting, it is infinite. Being infinite, it is extensive and deep . . . It is because it is infinite and lasting that it can complete all things.⁷³

As such, *cheng* is the force that not only enables us to complete ourselves, but also to complete all other things in the world.

Conceived as creativity, Tu Weiming wrote about *cheng* as follows,

[*Cheng*] is that which brings about the transforming and nourishing process of heaven and earth. As creativity, *cheng* is "ceaseless" (*bu xi* 不息). Because of its ceaselessness it does not create in a single act beyond the spatiotemporal sequence. Rather, it creates in a continuous and unending process in time and space. It is therefore a "lasting" (*jiu* 久) event.

Thus,

It is simultaneously a self-subsistent and self-fulfilling process of creation that produces life unceasingly.⁷⁴

In Ames and Hall's description,

Creativity (*cheng* 誠) as a transactional, processive, and cooperative endeavor, has the element of affirming things as they are and participating in the process of drawing out novel possibilities from the circumstances.⁷⁵

The Confucian world is never a given, static world. It is co-created by humanity with Heaven and is constantly renewed. *Cheng* represents such a perpetual dynamism in such a world.

1 As the true human way of being, *cheng* is to be achieved and realized in
 2 the human co-creation with Heaven. It points to the ultimate yet ever changing
 3 reality, of which humans are a part. This human reality, it should be noted, is
 4 not confined to the human person; it is manifest in the entire realm of human
 5 existence. It implies that in actualizing our Heaven-endowed nature into real-
 6 ity, we make our world a human world. Such a world is a “furnished” one,
 7 one with all kinds of entities in relationship with humanity. In the Confucian
 8 view, without *cheng* such a reality is impossible, since humanity is not only a
 9 creative force but also a constituting party in its realization. The *Zhongyong*
 10 states, “without *cheng* there is nothing 不誠無物.” In Confucianism, creativity
 11 and reality are the two sides of the same coin of *cheng*. The concept of *cheng*
 12 encompasses the idea and the ideal that, in being true, humanity co-creates
 13 the worldly reality with Heaven.

14 Finally, it should be noted that *cheng* in Confucianism should not be
 15 understood as a finalized state in a person. Rather, it is a process that calls
 16 for constant renewal. In Heidegger, truth does not exist apart from untruth.
 17 He wrote,

18
 19 The full existential and ontological meaning of the statement
 20 ‘Da-sein is in the truth’ also says equiprimordially that ‘Da-sein
 21 is in untruth.’⁷⁶
 22

23 Falling is characteristic of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world. Its falling into untruth
 24 is by no means accidental. For Heidegger, the world is a “with-world,” always
 25 the one shared with others.⁷⁷ This characteristic determines that Da-sein is
 26 not free from everyday falling. Heidegger said,

27
 28 The self of everyday Da-sein is the *they-self* which we distinguish
 29 from the *authentic self*, the self which has explicitly grasped itself.
 30 As the they-self, Da-sein is *dispersed* in the they and must first
 31 find itself. This dispersion characterizes the “subject” of the kind of
 32 being which we know as heedful absorption in the world nearest
 33 encountered. If *Da-sein* is familiar with itself as the they-self, this
 34 also means that the they prescribes the nearest interpretations of
 35 the world and of being-in-the-world.⁷⁸
 36

37 In the dispersion of the “they,” Da-sein follows the convenient and usually
 38 popular interpretations of the world. This is so because, in an everyday
 39 manner, the “they” itself articulates the referential context of significance
 40 for Da-sein. Furthermore, because Da-sein is essentially “being-with,” the
 41
 42

“they” is essentially part of Da-sein’s positive constitution.⁷⁹ Paradoxically, 1
 Da-sein’s authentic being is not a state detached entirely from the “they,” 2
 “but is an existentiell modification of the they as an essential existential.”⁸⁰ In 3
 its *existentiell* as well as *existential* being, Da-sein is at both the ontic and 4
 ontological level. Not free from the “they” in its everydayness, Da-sein’s life 5
 is at once both authentic and unauthentic. These two types of existence do 6
 not and cannot exclude one another. They both constitute Da-sein’s being. 7
 Because of this co-occurrence, the very being of Da-sein is in tension, hence 8
 in a struggle, between truth and untruth. Just as there are various degrees 9
 of inauthenticity, there can be various degrees of authenticity with Da-sein. 10
 To live an authentic life is thus to be constantly on guard against falling into 11
 untruth. Thus, living an authentic life is like Sisyphus rolling the stone uphill: 12
 one may never overcome the struggle between truth and untruth, yet it is in 13
 this struggle that truth takes place. 14

Similarly, Confucians see self-realization through *cheng* as a constant 15
 life-long endeavor. The very notions of self-realization and self-cultivation 16
 imply that one is not yet fully *cheng*, that there are both truth and untruth. 17
 A person of full truth is one who is completely one with Heaven. Confucius 18
 is said to have achieved this stage when he was seventy years old. Confucius 19
 supposedly became a “sage.” Presumably, this rarely happens among ordinary 20
 people. In effect, therefore, the Confucian belief is that one’s struggling between 21
cheng and *uncheng*, truth and untruth, never ends. *Cheng* is forever ceaseless. 22

To conclude, a Heideggerian reading sheds new light on our understand- 23
 ing of the Confucian notion of *cheng*. From such a perspective, we can see 24
cheng as being true to oneself, as a creative force, and as a human reality. In 25
 Heidegger, Da-sein’s authentic existence requires it to disclose and uncover, 26
 which can be understood as a creative process that makes beings in the world 27
 meaningful and serves as the foundation of the reality of its “worldliness.” 28
 In the same vein, *cheng* is the mode of human existence in which human- 29
 ity obtains its authentic being by transforming the world into a humanized 30
 world. In being true to oneself, the person of *cheng* co-creates with Heaven 31
 a human reality and achieves one’s authentic existence by promoting the Way 32
 in the world. In this sense, *cheng* is trueness (truth), creativity, and reality. 33
 Perhaps the difference of fluidity of being between Heidegger and Ames is a 34
 matter of degree, since both see the human reality as a generating process. 35
 Nevertheless, by setting human creativity within an already established yet 36
 continually renewing referential framework, Heidegger’s philosophy presents 37
 more stability for being than Ames provides. A Heideggerian reading of *cheng* 38
 furnishes a root metaphor that serves as a foundation for comprehending all 39
 three dimensions of *cheng*.⁸¹ 40

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Notes

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- 3 1. Zhang Dainian 張岱年, *Zhongguo zhe xue shi fang fa lun fa fan* 中國哲學史
- 4 方法論發凡 (*An Introduction to the Methodologies for Studying the History of Chinese*
- 5 *Philosophy*) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2005), 124.
- 6 2. For a comprehensive study of *cheng*, see Yanming An, *The Idea of Cheng*
- 7 (*Sincerity/Reality*) in *the History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: Global Scholarly
- 8 Publications, 2005).
- 9 3. I first made this connection in *The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations*
- 10 *in Comparative Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), ch. 2.
- 11 4. James Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the*
- 12 *Doctrine of the Mean* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1971), 397.
- 13 5. Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the Doctrine*
- 14 *of the Mean*, 413.
- 15 6. Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the Doctrine*
- 16 *of the Mean*, 397.
- 17 7. Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the Doctrine*
- 18 *of the Mean*, 413–14.
- 19 8. Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the Doctrine*
- 20 *of the Mean*, 414.
- 21 9. Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ:
- 22 Princeton University Press, 1963), 107.
- 23 10. Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 108. Legge's translation is that
- 24 "sincerity is the end of the beginning of things." (Legge, 418)
- 25 11. Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 96.
- 26 12. *Ibid.*
- 27 13. Donald Munro, *Images of Human Nature: A Sung Portrait* (Princeton, NJ:
- 28 Princeton University Press, 1988), 120.
- 29 14. Munro, *Images of Human Nature: A Sung Portrait*, 119.
- 30 15. A. C. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*
- 31 (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 133.
- 32 16. Graham, *Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China*, 135.
- 33 17. Munro, *Images of Human Nature: A Sung Portrait*, 33–34.
- 34 18. Chapter 25 of the *Zhongyong* states, 誠者, 自成也, namely that *cheng* means
- 35 "self-completion." (cf. Munro, 119)
- 36 19. Tu Weiming, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religious-*
- 37 *ness* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 71.
- 38 20. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 4.
- 39 21. D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (trans. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 123.
- 40 22. Zhang Dainian 張岱年, *A Concise Discussion of the Key Concepts in Ancient*
- 41 *Chinese Philosophy* 中國古典哲學概念範疇要論 (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chu-
- 42 *banshe*, 1989), 230.
23. Legge, *Confucius: Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, & the Doctrine*
- of the Mean*, 411.

24. Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 107. 1
25. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 73. 2
26. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 77. 3
27. Roger T. Ames and David Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong* (Honolulu: The University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 32. Also see Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011: 307n68. 4
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28. Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, 32. 8
29. Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, 33. 9
10
30. *Ibid.* 11
31. Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, 38. 12
13
32. Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, 34. 14
15
33. Ames and Hall, *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*, 105. 16
17
34. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, 67. 18
35. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, 206. 19
36. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary*, 67. 20
37. For a different reading, see An, *The Idea of Cheng (Sincerity/Reality) in the History of Chinese Philosophy*, 7, who held the two basic meanings of *cheng* to be "sincerity" and "reality." 21
22
38. For an illustration of *cheng* as a Confucian personal virtue, see Chenyang Li, *The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), chapter 2. 23
24
25
39. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 72. 26
40. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 199/216. 27
28
41. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings* (ed. David Farrell Krell, New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 123. 29
30
42. Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 201/218. Joan Stambaugh translated *entdecken* as "discover." "*Entdecken*" consists of "*ent*," to remove, and "*decken*," to cover. In English, "discover" can mean either coming to know something that is unknown before, or removing the cover of something to reveal it. Given this ambiguity, "discover" is less appropriate than "uncover," which is the translation of John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (*Being and Time*, New York: SCM Press Ltd., 1962). 31
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43. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1975), 215. 36
37
44. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson, 105/75. 38
45. *Ibid.* 39
46. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Stambaugh, 81/86. 40
47. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 273/297. 41
42

- 1 48. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 203/221.
 2 49. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 207/225.
 3 50. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 203/220.
 4 51. Zhang, *Zhongguo zhe xue shi fang fa lun fa fan* 中國哲學史方法論发凡, 230.
 5 52. Ibid.
 6 53. *Mencius*, 5A2. Liang Tao reads this as “孔子說: ‘這時候, 天下真是岌岌可危!
 7 不知這話真是這樣嗎?’” See Liang Tao 梁濤, *Interpreting the Mencius* 孟子解讀 (Beijing:
 8 Renmin University of China Press, 2010), 244.
 9 54. *Mencius*, 5A2. Liang Tao reads this as “舜真誠地相信而感到高興, 怎麼能說
 10 是假裝的呢?” See Liang Tao, *Interpreting the Mencius* 孟子解讀, 240.
 11 55. As a verb, “true” in English usually does not have this sense. It means to
 12 make level, balanced, or to bring to a desired state.
 13 56. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 77–78.
 14 57. *Mencius*, 7A1.
 15 58. Interview in *Listening* 6 (1971), 35. Quoted from Barry Allen, *Truth In*
 16 *Philosophy*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993), 82.
 17 59. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204/221. Italics in the original.
 18 60. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 351/384
 19 61. Ibid.
 20 62. Taylor Carman, “Authenticity.” *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. H. L. Dreyfus
 21 and M. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 285–96.
 22 63. Carman, “Authenticity,” 291–92.
 23 64. Charles B. Guignon, “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” in
 24 *Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge
 25 University Press, 1993/2006), 287. “BT” pages in the quote refers to John Macquarrie
 26 and Edward Robinson’s translation of *Being and Time* (1962).
 27 65. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 352/384.
 28 66. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 352/385.
 29 67. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 60/64.
 30 68. Heidegger (1982), 165.
 31 69. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 208/226.
 32 70. For debates regarding this issue, see David R. Cerbone, “Realism and Truth,”
 33 in *A Companion to Heidegger*; ed. Hurbert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Malden,
 34 MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 248–64; William D. Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal*
 35 *Idealism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), see esp. pp. 251–53; Piotr
 36 Hoffman, “Heidegger and the Problem of Idealism,” *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal*
 37 *of Philosophy* 43 (2010): 403–12.
 38 71. For an insightful discussion of the difference between Western *creation ex*
 39 *nihilo* and the Chinese model of co-creativity, see Roger T. Ames and David Hall,
 40 *Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong*.
 41 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 12–13.
 42 72. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 66/70.
 73. Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*, 109, with minor modifications.
 74. Tu, *Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian Religiousness*, 81–82.

75. Ames and Hall, <i>Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong</i> , 39.	1
76. Heidegger, <i>Being and Time</i> , 204/222.	2
77. Heidegger, <i>Being and Time</i> , 112/118.	3
78. Heidegger, <i>Being and Time</i> , 121/129.	4
79. Ibid.	5
80. Heidegger, <i>Being and Time</i> , 130. Hubert Dreyfus explains these terms this way: an “ <i>existential</i> understanding is a worked-out understanding of the ontological structures of existence, that is, of what it is to be Da-sein. <i>Existentiell</i> understanding is an individual’s understanding of his or her own way to be, that is, of what he or she is.” H. Dreyfus, <i>Being-in-the-World: A Commentary of Heidegger’s Being and Time</i> , Division I (Boston: MIT Press, 1991), 20.	6
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