

Knowledge, justification, belief, and suspension

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0. Introduction

In this paper, I want to discuss a problem that arises when we try to understand the connections between justification, knowledge, and suspension.¹ It wouldn't be quite right to say that these are Sosa's problems. We'll see that we can find solutions working in his telic virtue-theoretic framework.

In what follows, I shall try to show that some *prima facie* plausible claims about knowledge and the justification for judging and suspending are difficult to reconcile with the possibility of a kind of knowledge or apt belief that a thinker cannot aptly judge to be within her reach. I shall argue that if we try (as we should) to accommodate the possibility of this kind of knowledge, we should reject a widely held view about justification. We can correct this mistaken view about the connection between justification and knowledge by connecting justification to a kind of competence, but not the one we might have expected. In the course of this discussion, I shall flag some questions about the explanatory ambitions of the telic virtue-theoretic approach because, to my discredit, I'm not quite sure how to answer them. I hope they're good questions and hope that someone can answer them.

1. Connections

Let's get down to business. I want to discuss the relationships between knowledge, justified suspension, and justified belief. The discussion of justification mostly occurs late in the book where Sosa outlines his response to the new evil demon problem (2021: 188-205), but it's clear that he accepts at least this much about justification and knowledge:

JK1. It's possible to justifiably believe *p* without knowing that *p* (2021: 189).

JK2. If you know *p*, you justifiably believe *p* (2021: 200).²

These claims are pretty widely accepted. If you accept them, you might agree with Sosa that having a justified belief is only part of what it is to know. Additional factors must be present for a justified belief to constitute knowledge. This will include truth, but not just truth. Some kinds of accidental connections between justified beliefs and the facts will ensure that we don't know what we believe to be the case. Thus, we need more than truth to take us from justified belief to knowledge, but we can subtract truth from knowledge and justification will remain if we hold certain factors fixed.

¹ I would like to thank Adam Carter for his valuable feedback on a previous draft and Ernest Sosa for his generous response to the present paper.

² The cases of 'sub-credal knowledge' (2021: 79) complicate things. They're somewhat peripheral to Sosa's interests, but not peripheral to the sorts of things that worry me.

On Sosa's view of knowledge, knowing is a matter of aptly believing. An apt belief must be accurate, adroit, and accurate because adroit. It is accurate iff it is true. It is adroit if skilfully formed. Our understanding of what success consists of should inform our account of what it takes to perform skilfully. A belief can only be accurate because adroit if its accuracy manifests skill. We can think of this as instancing a more general pattern. When we succeed, we attempt. Attempts can be successful or unsuccessful. They can be skilful or unskilful. Even if skilful and successful, some will be successful because skilful and some will be both without success being due to the skill exercised. As Sosa develops this, true belief is a kind of success. Competently formed belief manifests a kind of skill. Knowledge is what we have when accuracy is attributable to competence.

Where should we locate justification in this framework? One notion of justification is one on which justified beliefs are competently or skilfully formed.³ Justified beliefs can miss their target much in the way that the most skilful shot might be knocked off target by an unexpected gust of wind. This fits well with the way that most epistemologists think about the connection between justification, knowledge, and truth. On this way of thinking about things, part of what it takes to be a knower (and not someone who merely holds a belief that's true) is that you've manifested the right kind of skill in forming the belief or in judging. Notice that if we think about things this way, we seem to be suggesting that the theory of justification should help us understand what it is to know, not using our understanding of what it is to know to help us understand what it is to justifiably believe.

In keeping with this theoretical orientation, Sosa wants to characterise skill and competence in terms of truth or accuracy, the success condition for belief and judgment (according to many).⁴ While taking this starting point has convinced some to embrace some familiar truth-centred views (e.g., a Lockean view of rational belief on which beliefs are rational to hold iff they maximise expected accuracy, a reliabilist view on which beliefs are justified iff (roughly) they are the beliefs produced by faculties or processes that deliver a sufficiently good ratio of true to false beliefs), Sosa's view is that there are interesting and important connections between the prospect of knowing and suspension. Among the things that he wants his framework to help us understand is how it could be that a belief falls short if inapt even if accurate (2021: 145).⁵

³ This can be refined further when we take account of the distinctions between complete competence, inner competence, and innermost competence. If we tie justification to the right notion of competence, we can see how even the systematically deceived might have beliefs that are justified. The key is to recognise that their failures might be due to shape and situation rather than skill (2021: 201).

⁴ Note that, for Sosa, the success condition for judgment is not mere accuracy.

⁵ On some views, we would have to deny this. Suppose (even though it is not uncontroversial) that we cannot know that a ticket in a large, fair lottery will lose or has lost if we rely only on our knowledge of how unlikely it is for the ticket to win. We would expect Lockeans and many reliabilists to agree that you can justifiably believe the ticket lost even if you're certain that

On some views, the prospect of believing without knowing or without aptly believing shouldn't deter the would-be believer or judge.⁶ Suppose (even though it is not uncontroversial) that we cannot know that a ticket in a large, fair lottery will lose or has lost if we rely only on our knowledge of how unlikely it is for the ticket to win or to have won.⁷ We would expect Lockeans and many reliabilists to say that you can justifiably believe the ticket lost even if you're certain that this belief won't be knowledge, won't be apt, etc. We might also expect that we can justifiably believe conjunctions that combine a belief about the outcome with a negative evaluation of the belief (e.g., that this could be justifiably believed: I don't know whether it won, but it didn't). This, however, just seems completely wrong to me. I think we should instead accept and endeavour to explain this claim about ignorance and suspension:

IS1: If it's certain that you're not in a position to know whether p , you should suspend on whether p .⁸

Think of this as a Moorean constraint. Recall Moore's observation that <dogs bark but I don't know that they do> seems like an awfully strange thing to say and related observations that it would be strange to judge or believe this. Note that IS1 doesn't say, that if you don't know, you ought to suspend. We're not saying that BIVs who couldn't know that they don't know ought to suspend. What we're saying is that if it's clear that your answer to a question would be inapt, you shouldn't (yet) judge or believe. It's here that educated guesses, conjectures, hunches, and the like fill in in the absence of a belief that brings inquiry to its close.

Let's consider the connection between justification and suspension. If we think of judging or believing as alternatives to suspending, it's tempting to think that if belief or judgment is proper, suspension is not required:

JS: If you justifiably believe p , you're not required to suspend on whether p .

If you're taking an exam where the penalty for incorrect answers is greater than the penalty for not answering (e.g., the SATs were like this, but most pop quizzes in high school were not) and it's agreed by all that you shouldn't put an answer down, the question as to whether it's fine to put a question down has been settled.

We have a handful of *prima facie* plausible claims about knowledge, ignorance, justification, and suspension before us. Here is where things get complicated. Aptness seems to preclude kinds of risk. At the very least, we can probably agree that an apt belief is one that, given the thinker's evidence and epistemic position, isn't or wasn't likely to be mistaken.⁹ Still, aptness might be

⁶ See McGlynn (2013).

⁷ See Nelkin (2000) for discussion and defence. In my view, the observation that we don't know in such cases is an important part of the explanation as to why we shouldn't blame or punish others relying only on naked statistical evidence. See Littlejohn (2020).

⁸ This seems to be a consequence of the claim that knowledge is a norm of judgment and of suspension (2021: 53).

⁹ Getting the details right isn't trivial because there are different views about the kinds of risks and dangers of error that threaten knowledge. Sosa (2021: 19) doesn't

compatible with a kind of risk, a risk of inaptness. First-order competences are concerned with the first kind of risk, the risk of error. We manifest second-order competences when we aptly judge that a judgment is apt, affirming that worries about the inaptness of a judgment are misplaced.

I'd expect some broad agreement that the best non-sceptical views allow that when someone knows, the evidential probability that they know needn't be 1. This is obvious on fallibilist views (i.e., views on which $P(p)$ can be less than 1 when p is known), but infallibilists might also want to allow that we can know while being rationally uncertain about whether we know.¹⁰ Questions. If we agree that knowing is compatible with the risk of believing without knowing, how great could this risk be without subverting or destroying knowledge? How does this risk of inaptness bear on justification?

If the risk of not knowing when you know were always negligible, we might be able to ignore the issue, but it might be that the best non-sceptical views should recognise this possibility:

KRI: You can know p even if it's improbable in light of your total evidence that you know p .

It wasn't that long ago that I took the *Life in the United Kingdom* test as part of an application to gain permanent resident status. It included questions about history, law, culture, and so on. To study, I had to commit to memory all sorts of facts about jury duty, the inventor of the hydroplane, the right to vote, the War of the Roses, football, Queen Elizabeth, demographics, King Cnut, famous tapestries, etc. Lots of trivia. Lots of independent sources gave me the answers I needed. Much of this knowledge is now thankfully gone, but I had enough to pass the exam.

Let's suppose that you've taken an exam of n questions like this. You're told that you passed with flying colours, getting only one wrong. Assuming that you're not dogmatic (i.e., you accept their testimony) and you recall the questions and your answers, you now either have an inconsistent set of beliefs that is certain to contain one that's inapt or you've suspended judgment on something that you knew initially. I'd think that, provided that you don't suspend, you could have $n+1$ beliefs (the original n beliefs and one additional belief about their correctness) where $n-1$ of the initial beliefs constituted knowledge and continue to do so. If this testimonial belief about your beliefs is also knowledge, you have n pieces of knowledge out of $n+1$ beliefs. This, given reasonable expectations about how well you'd do on the exam, is a reason to celebrate, not to despair. If your confidence in each of the $n+1$ beliefs being knowledge is the equally distributed and your confidence aligns with the evidential probabilities, for each belief the probability that it's knowledge is $n/n+1$.

think the knowledge-threatening risks should be understood in modal terms in the way that, say, Williamson (2000) does.

¹⁰ See Williamson (2000) for a defence of a kind of infallibilist view on which knowing doesn't ensure that we're in a position to know that we know.

If n is large, suspending on each belief shows a pathological aversion to the risk of believing falsehoods or believing without knowing.¹¹ If n is small, we face two questions. Can n be small and still be a case in which some subset of the beliefs constitute knowledge? How does the size of n bear on questions about suspension? My own view is there will be some n such that n can be small enough that a thinker could know even when they know that for any claim the probability they know that claim is less than .5. For example, a thinker might learn that she and four friends seem to recall vividly some event from their respective pasts where three of the five have been slipped a drug that has significantly impacts their recollection of past events so that it's certain that in three cases out of five the subjects wouldn't have knowledge even if their beliefs about past events were correct. I don't believe learning about this setup necessarily would prevent the subjects who weren't drugged from knowing the things about the past that they seem to recall, but I do think that if each of the five ought to say that it's not more likely than not that they know, they should suspend.

In light of this, let's say that knowledge is compatible with a non-negligible risk of not knowing and consider what happens if I'm right that the risk of ignorance can give us decisive reason to suspend:

IS2: If it's improbable in light of your total evidence
that you know p , you should suspend on whether p .

If we accept that improbable knowledge is possible *and* we say that we ought to suspend when the risk of believing without knowing is too great (e.g., when it's more likely than not that we're not in a position to know), the connections sketched above cannot hold. Suppose we have a case of improbable knowledge in which you know p . By hypothesis, you know, so JK2 says that you justifiably believe. By JS, it's not true that you should suspend. By IS2, you should suspend. Something has to give.

2. Resolving the Tension

We have to abandon at least one of the following claims: knowledge requires justification (JK2); we don't have to suspend when we're justified in believing (JS); we have to suspend when it's improbable that we know (IS2); it's possible to know even when it's improbable that we do (KRI).

The least promising way to go would be to deny that improbable knowledge is possible or to say that we sometimes should suspend even when we justifiably believe. The cases above can be convincingly used to show that it's possible to know when it's not more likely than not given our total evidence that we know. I also find Williamson's (2011) defence of improbable knowledge ultimately convincing even if initially quite counterintuitive. This is a guess, but I'd think that Sosa would also not be too keen to respond to the above by simply denying KRI. In various examples involving archers, game show contestants, etc., it seems to us that the success of our attempts can be attributable to ability even if the relevant agents harboured perfectly

¹¹ See Ryan (1991) for defence of the view that it cannot be rational for a thinker to believe each proposition in a set of propositions if one is known to be false.

reasonable doubts about their own abilities and mistakenly took their chances of success to be low. This is part of what makes it tempting to recognise that aptness can be present even when meta-aptness is not. As for JS, this claim seems close to trivial if we think of justification as something that permits and think of judging or believing and suspending as alternatives.

This leaves us with a choice. We have to reject JK2, IS2, or both. Let's start with IS2. If we deny IS2, we can say that it's compatible with excellence in the relevant domains that our agent refrains from refraining and forbears from forbearing even when it's quite likely that a performance will be inapt. On this way of thinking, any attempt, provided that it is apt, is one that the agent needn't have refrained from. All is well because all ended well.

I can imagine someone offering the following case for rejecting IS2. We're assuming that it's possible to have aptness even when it's not at all likely that an attempt will be apt. Whilst IS2 tells us that we might need to suspend in spite of aptness, but this overlooks the fact that accuracy, correctness, success and the like are quite likely since a great risk of inaccuracy is, presumably, incompatible with aptness. If accuracy, correctness, success and the like are likely, suspension shouldn't be required. That's a reason to reject IS2.

I think this is an interesting argument. I don't quite know how, in Sosa's telic framework, to respond to it, but we might worry that this rationale for rejecting IS2 also threatens IS1. Here's why. The argument against IS2 might be convincing given a certain evaluative outlook according to which successful attempts are seen as more desirable than omissions (i.e., accurate belief > suspension). If we accept this, we can still say, in keeping with Sosa's take on the swamping problem, that apt attempts are more desirable than inapt successes, but then it seems that if we say that inapt success is more desirable than suspension, we're saying that anyone who prefers suspension in cases where inaptness is likely but success is also likely prefers something less desirable to something more desirable. If we don't think that inaptness is undesirable, it's hard to see why IS1 would hold in full generality. Here's an example to illustrate what I have in mind. If you think that in lottery cases it's nearly certain that we'll have an accurate belief and certain that we'll have an inapt belief, it is hard to see why someone would accept IS1 if they thought *both* that success is better than an omission and that there's nothing undesirable about inaptness *per se*. We can explore this set of issues further in §3. Since I think IS1 is a very plausible claim about the connection between ignorance and warranted suspension, I'd like to explore a different line of response.

Here's a different way to resolve the tension. We can deny JK2 and deny that knowledge implies justification. If we say that beliefs constitute knowledge when their accuracy manifests adroitness (as this notion is normally understood), we can say that some beliefs might be adroit (as we normally understand this notion) without being justified. Specifically, if a belief or judgment is, given the thinker's evidence, too likely to be inapt, this would be a decisive reason to suspend even if, given the thinker's evidence, it's quite likely that the relevant belief or judgment would be accurate. Since the evidence only makes it likely that the belief or judgment is inapt, we'd allow for improbable knowledge and say that the improbability of

knowledge makes it necessary to suspend and thus prevents a belief from being justified in spite of its aptness and adroitness. To put this in terms of the archery analogy, a shot that might be apt but is, given the archer's evidence quite unlikely to be apt, might for that reason be one that the excellent archer wouldn't select.

As we'll see, this revision to the theory of justification and its connection to knowledge can have important implications for how we understand some of the central concepts in telic virtue epistemology.

Here's a pitch for rejecting JK2 that strikes me as plausible. A response like belief or judgment is justified when it manifests the thinker's competence, but we need to take care in specifying which competences matter. The ones that matter are the ones operative in those responses that show the thinker can properly manage the various normative pressures that are incumbent upon her. Some of these pressures can be described in terms of accuracy—the risk of believing falsely is a normative pressure that a rational thinker must be sensitive to. Some pressures, however, cannot be described just in terms of accuracy—the risk of believing inaptly is not just the risk of believing inaccurately and this is another normative pressure that should weigh on rational thinkers when trying to choose between belief and suspension. Why think that? This doesn't go very deep, but this is what we should think if we accept IS1. If we accept IS1, we recognise that the prospect of believing inaptly is one that should worry the would-be believer or judge and should be one that motivates this thinker to suspend. So, it's another normative pressure that matters to the justification of belief and judgment.

Once we see that, we should be open to rejecting JK2, not because we don't see any interesting connection between competence and justification, but because we should recognise that the competences that matter to justification include but don't just include those that have to do with accuracy and reliable means for forming accurate beliefs. It must also include a meta-competence that's operative and helps us discriminate between an unreasonable aversion to the risk of inapt belief that leads us to suspend when suspension is not warranted *and* the risk of believing when the risk of inapt belief is too great.

If we think of the adroitness of an attempt in terms of the exercise of some competence and competences in terms of dispositions to reliably succeed in suitable circumstances, a truth-centred conception of epistemic success will encourage us to think of adroitness in a truth-centred way, too. From the truth-centred perspective, it is, as hinted at above, difficult to see why the prospect that an attempt won't likely be apt would be a reason to suspend if the prospect of success is sufficiently high. If, however, we wanted to revise our theory of justification to accommodate the idea that the certainty that some attempt that's likely to be accurate will be inapt, we might say that justification depends upon first-order and meta-competences and includes the first-order competences that it does because of this concern for believing or judging aptly.

This line might be appealing to someone who either doesn't think there is anything desirable *per se* about accuracy or thinks that there's a disvalue that attaches to inapt attempts and that it is overall more desirable to refrain than to succeed by means of an inapt attempt. Given this conception of value, IS1 makes

perfectly good sense in the lottery-like cases where the expectation of accuracy is high and the expectation of aptness is low. Given this conception of value, IS2 would at least be *prima facie* plausible.

Recall what Sosa says about norms:

A desirable level of human knowledge is the apt judgment, the *fully apt alethic affirmation*. Such knowledge constitutes a desirable sort of success in inquiry. It thus provides a (main) norm of judgment ... And it is not only a norm of *judgment*, but also a norm of *suspension* ... The subsidiary aim of proper suspension is that of affirming alethically if and only if one would thus affirm aptly (2021: 53).

I quite like the idea that there is some sense in which we shouldn't believe what we don't know and that fits with what Sosa says in this passage, but insofar as we can rationally be quite certain that we know when we don't, it seems that this understanding of the norm is one according to which it captures a kind of objective suitability. What I'm suggesting is that we think of justified belief as something that ensures that we're not required to suspend and that the requirement to suspend could be grounded in the risk of violating this norm of objective suitability. This seems very much in the spirit of much of what Sosa says even if it means adopting a conception of justification that doesn't fit with his precise characterisation.

Sosa's attitude towards justification is broadly pluralist. By that, I mean he's open to the idea that there are different legitimate ways of understanding talk of 'justification' and he's sceptical that ordinary usage will narrow us down to one right way to understand such talk (2021: 197). Someone might say that the above shows that there's one notion of justification such that (JK2) turns out to be mistaken given this notion of justification and wonder whether there's some other notion of justification that suits (JK2). I doubt it. I suspect that the considerations above rule that out. I don't think the beliefs formed in indifference about whether they'd be apt or whether they'd be knowledge are ones that we can think of as justified. If we reject (JK2) for the reasons offered here, we will have to move away from the project of using a theory of justification to help explain the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge. We seem to have moved pretty close to the approach that says that we use the difference between knowledge and non-knowledge to give a theory of justification by, say, revising truth-centred accounts of what epistemic success consists in or by identifying rational pressures that help determine which responses would be justified that couldn't be described in truth-centred terms.

I'd drop (JK2) and offer this account of propositional justification:

(JK3) You have justification to believe *p* iff it is sufficiently probable that you're in a position to know *p*.¹²

¹² In Dutant and Littlejohn (2021), we defend this view of justification and give a theory of defeat according to which defeaters defeat by indicating that we're not in a position to know. Following Dorst (2019), we suggest that the threshold is determined by taking account of the desirability and undesirability of forming beliefs that have certain features. If we hold fixed the desirability of having an apt

This account allows for two kinds of independence between justification and knowledge. A belief might be subjectively suitable or proper without being objectively suitable (i.e., we can have justification to believe what we don't know) and (JK3) says as much. We might also find that objectively suitable attempts are not always subjectively suitable owing to the risk that the attempt will be objectively unsuitable. This account says as much, too. It predicts (nicely, in my view) that in suitably large preface-type cases where the risk of believing each proposition in a set known to be inconsistent is sufficiently small, you have justification to believe each in the set. When the size of that set contracts or the number of known error increases, we might find a case in which there's a good chance that some propositions in the set can be known when nevertheless it's not rational to believe any in the set since the difference between them might give no clues about which can be known and the risk of believing without knowing in each case is too great.

Notice that on this view, the manifestation of the meta-competence relevant for justification needn't manifest in an outright belief or judgment that the first-order belief would or would not be apt. The manifestation of this competence would only require that the choice to judge or withhold is properly grounded in the subject's credences about the conditions that matter for aptness. This, I think, is a good thing as there will be situations in which we can neither believe that a belief or judgment would be apt or would not be apt, but we should still be able to manifest the relevant meta-competence in such cases by believing or withholding.

3. Suspension

We're assuming that improbable knowledge is possible. I've argued that if it is possible, we should recognise the possibility of knowledge without justification. We can think of this knowledge as the kind of knowledge that Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) drew to our attention to—knowledge that is within reach that it's not reasonable to reach for. I think recognising this kind of knowledge makes sense of suitably designed preface-type cases and captures what's going on in Williamson's (2011) unmarked clock cases. I would add that it also makes sense of our intuitions about cases where there's some chance that your rational faculties have been compromised by drugs that impair your reasoning but have no druggy side-effects that would alert you to their presence. When it's certain that, say, you've been slipped one of those drugs that messes with your capacity to do logic or mental math, it seems that you ought to suspend and that that's because it's certain that your relevant beliefs won't be apt. When there's only a chance that your reasoning has been influenced by such drugs, it seems the probability of suffering the effects of the drug is crucial for determining whether you ought to suspend or should instead stick by your initial judgment. Suspending when the risk is small might seem like one kind of mistake. Judging when the risk is large seems like another.

This is all pitched at the level of intuition. I think such intuitions are helpful for testing claims about the connections between justified belief, justified

belief (or accurate belief, in Dorst's case) but increase the undesirability of having an inapt belief (or inaccurate belief), the threshold for sufficiency will increase.

suspension, and knowledge, but we haven't seen much theory that supports the claims I've been appealing to. Given the resources of telic virtue epistemology, can we give a theoretical backing for the Moorean constraint and the related claims about the justification of belief and suspension?

Let's start at the beginning. If our judgments and beliefs are successful when accurate, we might say that there is something desirable about accuracy. I suspect lots of epistemologists might say this to capture what seems like a platitude:

- (1) If p is true, it is more desirable to believe p than to believe $\sim p$ and more desirable to suspend than to believe $\sim p$.

Note that this doesn't tell us how to compare true belief and suspension, but someone might want to add this:

- (2) If p is true, it is more desirable to believe p than to suspend.

This much is compatible with the sorts of things that veritists say about epistemic value. If we say only this much, have we left something important out? It seems so. We haven't yet said a thing about knowledge. Let's say that *simple veritism* is the view that combines (1) and (2) and *enriched veritism* adds one more claim:

- (3) It is more desirable to know p than to believe p without knowing it.

The telic virtue-theoretic framework gives us a nice story about why it should be that (3) or something in the vicinity of it is true. The relevant beliefs and judgments are attempts and we should recognise that the attempts that are successful because of skill are more valuable than those that are successful but not because of skill.

Note that by enriching veritism in this way, we make some progress in addressing things like the Meno problem and the swamping problem, but let's set those aside because we're here interested in finding the theoretical backing for the Moorean constraint. There are some questions about epistemic value that enriched veritism doesn't seem to answer and some questions about epistemic value that the enriched and simple veritist views might disagree about. What should we say about the desirability of knowing, believing without knowing, and suspending? Specifically, where should we locate suspension and accurate but inapt belief in the ordering? Which of these should we opt for?

- (4) It is better to suspend than to believe p accurately but inaptly.
- (5) It is better to believe p accurately but inaptly than to suspend.

I can imagine the veritists saying that what makes the enriched veritist view plausible is that accuracy being due to adroitness enhances the value of something that's itself valuable, more valuable than suspension. And they might say that the telic virtue-theoretic story about this holds up well. They might see it as favouring (5). The problem here is that (5) makes it difficult to explain claims like IS1 and IS2. If it's possible for a belief to be certain or nearly certain to be accurate but also certain or nearly certain to be inapt, it seems that IS2 and IS1 should stand or fall depending upon whether we opt for (4) or for (5).

Now, ultimately, I would like to break more decisively away from the veritist views and try to explain the Moorean constraints, IS1 and IS2, by appeal to a very different sort of value theory, a gnostic theory that consists of two claims:

(6) Knowledge is more desirable than suspension.

(7) Inapt belief is less desirable than suspension.

This gnostic theory makes it really easy to explain IS1 and IS2, but the problem with this theory is that it's hard to justify in a setting where everyone takes it for granted that accurate belief is a kind of success that makes it desirable to some extent. I would need a good theoretical rationale for rejecting (5), but I'm not quite sure I see how to get there without appealing to some assumptions about how we ought to score full success, partial success, and complete failure.

To make this a bit more concrete, let me illustrate using an example that concerns the evaluation of complete success and complete failure.¹³ I'm using a different example to suit my purposes, but I suspect my worries about my ability to effectively undercut views that threaten the Moorean constraint are connected to that example. I'm imagining an objector who claims that it's not true of performances generally that we aim for the avoidance of inaptness and that's either because or at least related to the observation that some failures aren't seen as disvaluable or undesirable even if they are seen as less desirable than success. Consider the scoring of exams. There are some exams that score things like this:

Scoring Scheme 1: For each correct answer, you'll get x points.

There are some exams that score things like this:

Scoring Scheme 2: For each correct answer, you'll get x points. For each incorrect answer, you'll lose y points. If you don't answer, you neither gain nor lose points.

Let's suppose every test taker wants to maximise her score. In either set up, we can say that an accurate answer is desirable, but the rational strategies to get through the exams differ significantly. It's always irrational to 'suspend' or fail to answer given the first scoring scheme, but not the second. Moreover, the values we assign to x and y will, given our epistemic state, determine when it's rational to omit or to answer. If the absolute value of y is much greater than that of x , we should only answer when we're very certain, but if the absolute value of x is much greater than y , we should be willing to guess when we're not at all likely to be right.

This example doesn't raise questions about the additional complexities of scoring partial success (e.g., true but inapt belief) along with full success (i.e., apt belief) and complete failure (e.g., false belief), but it should be clear that without clear guidance on these evaluative issues, it's hard to see whether theory will support our preferred views about when we ought to suspend and when it's proper to judge. The methodological question I want to raise is this. I feel somewhat confident in my judgments about what a skilful attempt would be, what success would be, etc. when given more details about the full scoring scheme. I feel less confident, however, in trying to choose between different scoring schemes given

¹³ This might be connected an issue that Sosa (2021: 94, fn. 9) discusses.

only a specification of what success consists in, what would constitute a failure, and what the agent's aims are because I see only how to use the telic virtue-theoretic framework to explain why some types of success are more desirable than others, but not to understand whether and why omission or suspension is preferable to partial success or success that's due to a significant degree of luck. This might not be a major problem with the approach. It might be that the ambition isn't to show that some unique system of scoring is the right one without importing additional assumptions beyond the bare structure of a telic normative framework.¹⁴

These worries might be completely misplaced. The cases that get me worried about a crucial detail are cases in which I think a judgment is nearly certain to be accurate and certain to be inapt. These are the lottery cases. If someone says that such cases are cases of apt belief, it's difficult to get the problem I have in mind off the ground. And if we start from the gnostic starting point and say that true but inapt beliefs aren't really cases of inapt success on the grounds that success consists in having hold of the truth and not just having hold of a belief that happens to be true, these problems won't arise and we get IS1 and IS2 on the cheap. If, however, we take on board some veritist assumptions, I find myself stuck unable to say anything helpful about why we should say that all failure must be worse than refraining from attempting (as opposed to just lacking value) or why it is more desirable to refrain than to try and succeed inaptly.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that if aptness or knowledge is necessary for objectively suitable belief or judgment and that the certain absence of aptness or knowledge requires us to suspend, we should revise a standard picture of justification according to which justification is necessary but insufficient for knowledge. This might require us to deny that justification is connected to a kind of competence (i.e., the one associated with adroitness), but it allows us to retain a connection between justification and meta-competence. On this view, we have justification to believe iff the risk of believing inaptly is sufficiently small. This view, I think, fits nicely with Sosa's telic virtue-theoretic approach, but we've also seen that it might be difficult to explain why the evident inaptness of a belief or judgment is a decisive reason to suspend without appeal to something like an epistemic value theory or set of scoring rules that might not be easily derivable from an account of the difference between excellent and inferior attempts.

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¹⁴ One further challenge, which we don't have the space to explore here, is to explain how suspension might be irrational and we might want our scoring rule to help with this. See Miracchi (2019) for a helpful discussion of the irrationality of some suspension in a virtue-theoretic framework.

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