**Time. Perception. Imagination. Phenomenological Studies on the Question of Time by Augustine, Kant and Husserl.**

**Summary**

The monograph is devoted to the key elements of the philosophy of time which determine the necessity of historicism in the analysis of subjectivity. The main idea which defined the composition and design of this work is to trace how the Kantian definition of time as the “form of inner sense” is revealed in Husserl’s phenomenology. The original intention was to understand all three components of this definition. Firstly, what is the inner form, in terms of phenomenology, what are the principles of its constitution and how one can talk about the property of formation? Secondly, what is the meaning of the term "inner" in philosophy, where the division into internal and external has always been a formality, not affecting the essence of things? And finally, what sort of “sensibility” is assumed in transcendental science, bound to become the basis of understanding the history and culture. Presumably, these three Kantian concepts constituted the original plan to analyze the nature of cognitive capabilities of the subject, claiming the gnoseological stage on which the philosophy of time is unfolded. In other words, this work deals with the historical and philosophical analysis of the phenomenological principles by which the concept of time as developed in the twentieth century emerged in the framework of phenomenology.

The analyze of the structure of the subject assumes that time, perception and imagination combine in a special type of inner synthesis, which may not be relevant to certain aspects of the method but maintain the basis for a kind of anthropology of time, in continuation of the traditional “inner” contemplation. I consider the inner structure of time with the account of philosophy of St. Augustine, who in many respects not only anticipated the conclusions of phenomenology, but also in his reflections encompassed deeper layers of inner experience. The first chapter is devoted to the doctrine of St. Augustine, in which the theory of time is analyzed in conjunction with the doctrine of “inner word”, specifics of memory representations and notion of inner sense. Additionally, I consider St. Augustine’s reflections about numbers that constitute the basis of aesthetic perception of music (De Musica). Thus, the philosophy of St. Augustine already covers the whole spectrum of anthropology of time, including the question of relation between time and eternity, which remains practically unexplored in phenomenology and serves as the proof of that in interactions between philosophy and theology the tradition remains important.

 The second chapter of this study is devoted to analysis of the transcendental aesthetic of Kant, which includes all the methodological possibilities of considering the category of time as a formal condition for any experience, consequentially serving as a foundation for further logical development by Husserl, which includes the critical disengagement of the founder of phenomenology from Kant's transcendentalism. Particular attention is paid to the origin of the concept of inner sense, as well as possible interpretations of the function of imagination, which as a transcendental ability remains the most interesting type of synthesis. Handwritten fragments of Kant’s works are also of interest to the character of the imagery as considered in detail by Husserl.

Chapter three discusses the phenomenology of inner time consciousness, represented in those important aspects, without which it is impossible to speak about the internal structure of temporal experience - the subjectivity of time, retention, "living present", and the character of synthesis. Particular attention is paid to Husserl's polemics with those representatives of psychological branch in the studies of consciousness, whose ideas greatly influenced the very motivation for creating the method. Apart from the well-known criticism of Brentano, the third chapter highlights the rarely analyzed psychological ideas that motivated the choice of Husserl’s terminology - the "Präsenzzeit” by W. Stern, the "psychological analysis" by A. Meinong, and the “fusion” (Verschmelzung) by K. Stumpf. Chapter four deals with the need to analyze the specifics of image as an element of consciousness and imagery as such, which includes a system of objectified acts. Thus is revealed the very nature of synthetic connections in the acts of consciousness, as well as the presumably imaginative character of the constitution of temporal form.

1. **Inner experience and formulation of philosophical question of time in the philosophy of Aurelius Augustine.**

**Time and eternity**. Eleventh book of St. Augustine, the “Confessions”, is usually considered as the source of all classic questions in the philosophy of time. Polemicizing with the time doctrines of the philosophers of antiquity, mostly neo-Platonists, Augustine formulated the methodological principles of the philosophy of time, which were later reproduced in their secularized form by phenomenology. In the first place, Augustine reflects on the relationship between time
and eternity, largely relying on the concept of time in Plotinus. The question of the relationship between time and eternity is covered in the seventh treatise of the third “Ennead” (Enn. III, 7), which contains an interpretation of Plato's story on the origin of the world, as expounded in “Timaeus” (Tim.28b). The relation between eternity and time as recognized though the causality in Plotinus correlates with those elements of his philosophy which distinguish it from Plato’s, in particular, with the hypostases of the One, the Mind, and World Soul. St. Augustine accepts the idea by Plotinus that time exists in one’s soul and is part of spiritual mechanisms, however due to inconsistency of the idea of World Soul within the Christian doctrine he has shifted the emphasis into the sphere of individual human soul. In addition, St. Augustine accepts Plotin’s argument about impossibility of attributing eternity with any temporal characteristics.

 Drawing distinction between eternity and time, St. Augustine examines time, based on the everyday experience. Following his method of considering an object of reflection as a part of inner sense, St. Augustine describes the sensations associated with the experience of time, primarily its duration. When he tries to understand what gives us the sensation of duration, the sensation of a time interval being short or long, St. Augustine considers the three attributes that we normally ascribe to time as its essential predicates - the past, the present, and the future. As a result, St. Augustine arrives to an idea that will later form the basis of the phenomenological model of consciousness of time: namely, the knowledge about the past and the future that we obtain through the present. It is in the present where we can extract from the memory images of the past, which do not exist *already*, and anticipate events in the future, which do not exist *yet*. Only the present has ontological status, while knowledge about the past and the future comes from our perception of the present. Bringing all three time predicates to a common denominator, Augustine also points to the subjectivity of time.

**Time and memory. Inner word.** St. Augustine associates the problem of the past and the duration with the question of memory. Memory, or more precisely, the inner memory (memoria interior), is the foundation of thinking in general. Impressions and information about the outside world enter memory and remain there in the form of images or concepts about the objects of external world. Mental states and experiences are stored in memory in the form of recollections, the nature of which corresponds to the nature of memory. Also, memory allows to contemplate the existence of the God. The meditativity of St. Augustine’s reflections which is connected as noted above, with a special type of metaphoricity, continues the tradition of the importance of inner contemplation (intus cernimus). The meaning of image and inner imagery goes back to the notion of man's creation in the image and likeness of God (imago Dei), and that is why imagery as a source of knowledge is the natural foundation of spirituality. St. Augustine aslo links the notion of memory as an inner space to the topic of “inner narrative” (verbum interius, verbum cordis, verbum quod intus lucet). The doctrine of inner narrative is highlighted in greater detail in his treatise “On the Trinity”, however both in “Confessions” and in “The City of God” the interiority is often generally associated with spiritual activity. Inner narrative is both simply a “thought about an object, which finds expression for itself in this or that utterance”, that is, anything pointed to by a particular meaning, and a “thought, contemplated at the moment in its the invariable Wisdom”, “inner conversation of the soul with self” (Popov, 1916). Regardless of its content and value, inner narrative can include anything that we intend to express in words or other signs. It is important that the inner narrative is a concrete image of the thing, although it is less important, whether this thing was perceived through the senses or appeared a figment of imagination. “Inner word” means the thought in its actual state, with the main criterion in this case being the actual moment of speech in its temporal dimension, and not the content of consciousness.

**Distentio animi.** St. Augustine calls time the “distension of soul” (distentio animi). This famous idea allows to take another glance on the issue of duration, and hence on the measurability of inner time. If time is measured as a memory of itself, in other words, as a special kind of image in memory, then the very consciousness of time is nothing but an effort to memorize and to hold in mind. This effort, or as St. Augustine says, “the power invested in my action” (Conf. XI.28.), is the actual present: the effort of consciousness, the attention is focused on the present, through which the future is “dispatched” into the past. Duration is not the property of the past, the present or the future, it is rather the property of attention focusing. Attention (attentio), focused on the present, “diffused” between memory (memoria) and expectation (expectatio), - this is the effort of consciousness, the "motion of the soul," which creates the perception of time. *Attentio, memoria, expectatio* are the three aspects of the act of perception, which correspond to the present, the past and future. This trinity of perception and the associated experience of time exist in the dynamics underlying the historicity.

**Treatise “De Musica”. Perception and imagination.** It seems that the idea of ​​the "distension of the soul" and the very purpose of measuring time are directly related to the concept of *number*. Number by St. Augustine is a universal law, a global regularity, based on which all life and the spiritual world are organized. In the sixth book of the treatise “On Music” St. Augustine reflects on the “immutable” numbers, which form the foundation for perception. All four types of numbers are analyzed, because time manifests itself in experience of sensory perception, and so the perception of time is a part of sensuality. Having determined time as the “distension of the soul”, St. Augustine does not thereby provide an opportunity to claim that time is given to us only in our senses.

However, if we consider sensuality or perception in general as abilities of the soul, than sensuality itself is manifested by means of time, or in other words, it is appreciated in a temporal form. In addition, one of the functions of imagination is to shape our sensations. Three different components must arrive to a unity: the type (species) of the body which can be seen, its image (imago), imprinted in senses, or an imaginatory sensation (sensus formatus), and the will of the soul (voluntas animi), which focuses the sense on the percieved object (De Trinitate XI. 2). Thus, delving into the specifics of the function of imagination, we come to the notion of sensation, which brings us back us to the issue of duration - so, the boundary between the past and the present is really hard to measure precisely because of what "is" inside the sensations which are formed by the imagination.

1. **Theory of time in the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant**

**Transcendental Aesthetics. The function of sensibility.** The theory of time in Kant described mainly in the section on the transcendental aesthetic “Critique of Pure Reason”. Preliminary considerations are also contained in the dissertation in 1770, where the main provisions are the same, and often explain in more detail first axiom of criticism. Research interest in this topic are also handwritten notes to Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, the so-called *Reflexionen*, as well as some letters, such as a letter to M. Herz, one of the opponents of the thesis in 1770. The reasoning of the transcendental aesthetic is based on the definition of sensible intuition of itself to its functions for pure knowledge and the form in which the sensuous intuition is given. The definitions of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) are analyzed, the affectivity, object (Gegenstand) of the impressions, soul (Gemüt). The function of time in transcendental philosophy can be divided into three areas, namely:

1.time as a formal condition
2. time as a form of inner sense,
3. temporary definition (Zeitbestimmung) of transcendental schema.

 **Time as a formal condition**.  Time as a formal condition is a subjective form, underlying the inner order of sensual perception. The nature of time, unless it does not seem as continuous mystical reality, determined on the basis of internal representations of the mind, as a principle, before any concept. Each observable (objective) change is preceded by a condition of the internal changes. In connection with this interpretation, there are two properties of time, infinity and continuity. These two properties that define the time as a philosophical as well as in scientific theories, in the transcendental aesthetics are also considered a mathematical angle.

**Time as a form of inner sense.** Kant defines time as a form of inner sense (die Form des inneren Sinnes), i.e. contemplation of ourselves and our inner states (B 49). Inner sense gives an idea of ​​the relation to things (including to a “thing” as I am). The initial idea of ​​themselves, “I”, intuitively, contemplative, soul beholds itself as affective in self-appearance (in 67-68). The problem of inner sense was widespread in Kant studies, including due to the ambiguity of this concept. It is considered that the concept of the internal sense, which is used by Kant, goes back to the philosophy of J. Lock. This term is also found by Leibniz, Baumgarten, Tetens, but Kantian value is closest to the theory of knowledge by Locke, it explains how the term is associated with experience representing of subject of himself. This chapter provides an interpretation of one of Kant interpreter, Norbert Hinske. He points out that the historical and philosophical link requires some clarification, namely, that the notion of internal sense was borrowed by Kant rather by Georg Friedrich Meier (Hinske, 2007). It is very useful to analyze a little-known manuscript of Kant's, so-called “*Leningrad fragment*” in the reconstruction of this aspect of the theory of time. The first part of this piece is called “*On the inner sense”*, and dates from about 1786 (Kant-Forschungen, 1987). In this fragment Kant reflects in a short and capacious form on the relation of time, inner sense and affectivity, in the comparison with the external sense.

**Temporary definition of transcendental schema.** **Time and “imaginative capacity”.** Consideration of the transcendental faculty of imagination and figure synthesis, as well as the introduction of transcendental schematism not only reflect the very essence of the critical method, but also provide the ground for further analysis in phenomenology. The functions of sensibility and reason directly related to the previous aspect, the role of the inner sense, continuing it. In addition to the “dark” chapter on schematism, it is analyzed handwriting and fragments 1778-1780 years, devoted to lectures on metaphysics (Kant, 2000). Kant describes the perceptive ability and classifies sensory cognition. “The imaginative capacity” makes representations in accordance with the three mode of time and consists of:
1) the image [Abbildung], with representations of present; facultas formandi,
2) the ability of the secondary images [Nachbildung], with the ideas of the past; facultas imaginandi,
3) the ability of the previous images [Vorbildung], with views of the future ; facultas praevidendi (Kant, 2000. P. 145).

1. **Phenomenology of the inner time-consciousness by E. Husserl**

**Objective and subjective time.** Husserl talks about the need of eliminating (Ausschaltung) objective time from the phenomenological analysis (Husserl, 1928. S. 369). When placing the time-consciousness in the sphere of phenomenal subjectivity, it is necessary to renounce all assumptions about the objective time. Time must be described on the basis of immediate data in consciousness, refraining from the conventional methods adopted in natural sciences. In Husserl, the concept of subjective time is identical to the concept of phenomenological time. Husserl considers a special kind of the object *appearing-for-consciousness* method, which differs in the first place from the psychological concept of subjective. The difference between the psychological and phenomenological approaches to subjectivity has been the subject of Husserl’s criticism of Brentano.

**Criticism of F. Brentano and influence of L. W. Stern.** Husserl's criticism is focused on the principle of primary association, which is the basis of psychic experiences as such, and through which immediate representations can emerge. Due to the primary association, perceptive representations attach to the representations of memory, forming a continuous series, but Brentano remains unclear about the nature of this kind of imagination and how it is different from memory. One gets an impression that memory is similar to any act of recollection, and thus recollecting yesterday experiences is no different from the immediate experiences of a temporal sequence in the present (Husserl, 1928. S. 380). It should be noted that this difficulty of Brentano's theory is one of the key points in Husserl’s analysis. It is the system of representative and imaginative acts that constitutes the model of phenomenological time-consciousness.

In addition to Brentano, the terminology of Husserl was strongly influenced by L. W. Stern in the matters of primary memory and the specific properties of duration. Stern introduces the concept of “presence-time” (Präsenzzeit): it is the segment in when the mental act is happening. Presence-time is not identical with the time during which the act is happening, but rather it constitutes a holistic and organic unity and as such, presents a qualitative rather than quantitative difference from the physical time duration. The process of constituting a duration is demonstrated in an example of a melody - which is a sequence of tones, containing for instance four sounds - is not seen as consisting of four separate parts, but as a indivisible impression, or an integral image (Gesamtbild). Although four sounds exist sequentially, they all belong to the same act of perception, the same presence-time. All four contribute to a single sequential unity of the apprehension form (Auffassungsform) (Stern, 1897. S. 329-330).

Stern points out that the duration of the mental act is its natural property, since the perception of temporal relations cannot be instantaneous, momentary. - The perception of time being itself temporal had become an axiom for Husserl's phenomenological analysis. Stern also turns to the concept of primary memory, which allows to analyze the connectivity of succession within the “presence-time”. The fact that the “presence-time”, or the temporality of the act, exists as a “stretched” sequence, results in the need for analyzing "parts" of the sequence and relationships between them as between the properties of the act.

**Primary impression and primary memory. The time diagram.** The distinction which is necessary when considering the phenomena of immanent objects, the immanent tone, gives rise to ​​some kind of three-dimensional phenomenological description. Husserl distinguishes between the following directions in this description:

1. Immanent object in itself with its inherent duration.
2. The act of consciousness, the way in which the differences in the immanent tone and its duration contents are realized. In other words, the character of reflection, although in the early writing Husserl does not focus on the concept of reflection, using the term "reflective immersion."
3. The phenomenon of temporally-constitutive consciousness itself, the absolute temporal flow, in which temporary objects are constituted with their temporal determinations (Husserl, 1928. S. 387-388). - Third item exists more as a methodological necessity of combining the previous two, a kind of their “product”, because there is no consciousness apart from the immanent object and from its method of appearing. But at the same time the "object in the modus of occurrence" does not define the genetics of the functions of consciousness, although it does define the problems of description.

The main characteristic of duration is its *retentionality*. The flow of time exists in continuity, a continuous modification of the flow functions in the unity of successive retentions. The living “Now-Point” (Jetzt-Punkt) continuously transforms itself into something that is gone, the primal impression (Urimpression) inflows into an always-new rententional consciousness. Rententional modification is the primary constitution of temporal objects, equipping them with their continuity and identity (Husserl, 1928. S. 390-393). Like St. Augustine and psychologists, Husserl illustrates time perception on example of sound. The auditory model remains central in both early lectures, and in later manuscripts.

**Lebendige Gegenwart.** The key mechanism of time-consciousness is constitution of the present. Transcendental Ego as the center of intentional functions is founded on the actuality of perception. In the consciousness of immanent objects one must distinguish not only the properties of objects in themselves, but above all the way in which the differences between the properties are understood. Realization of the differences always occurs as if from the perspective of the Now-Point, originating from the duration of perceiving the actual Now. Perception constitutes the present, it constitutes the temporary objects with their temporal definitions, which is the phenomenon of temporally constitutive consciousness. This structure was brilliantly presented by Klaus Held in his analysis of the concept of “living present” (Held, 1962). The present is understood as *way of being* of the transcendental Ego, i.e. as a constitutive core and the primary function of the *transcendental I* (Held, 1962. S.61).

*The I* itself as a functional center (Funktionszentrum) of various acts and passive affectations is so much conditioned by temporality, that it creates a certain stable (stehend), fixed structure, the presence of the present (Präsenz meines Präsentierens), which Husserl sometimes described as primary-modal (urmodale) and pre-temporal (vor-zeitliche) in his late manuscripts (Husserl, 2006. S. 260). However, this stability is only the result of concretization and radical reduction, which is necessary for an adequate phenomenological analysis. While the stability of the present is accompanied by its fluidity (Strömen), the nature of time as a flow is reflected in the properties of the present. Thus, the structure of the living present, including self-presenting (Selbstgegenwärtigung) and consequentially self-temporalisation (Selbstzeitigung) of *I* can be denoted as stably-fluid (stehend-strömende) from the point of phenomenological reflection datum.

The complexity of this construction is associated with at least two terminological / constitutive features. First of all, the distinction between act and object in Husserl generates a chain of necessary distinctions within a process of reflection. The second feature which organizes the analysis of the phenomenology of time, is the distinction, at least terminological, between the levels of temporality. In the continuous passage of temporal changes the I remains identical, specifically owing to the stability of various temporal transitions from one phase to another. In a sense, the only stable point of the Now is just Ego. According to one of the contemporary scholars D. Zahavi, a key point of the phenomenology of time is that it is the act of reflection structures temporal horizons - the consciousness of time “begins” with an act of reflection, which captures the self-givenness of consciousness (Zahavi, 2003. P. 163-164).

**Analysis and synthesis: difference and “fusion”.** Thus the structure of inner perception that constitutes foundation of time consciousness consists of continuing combinations of reflected elements of subjectivity and passive synthetic unities which interconnect both object properties and differences in the sequence of apprehensions (Auffassungsakt). The structure of inner perception is founded thereby on certain kind of synthesis which allows to speak about modification not in the sense of changing but additionally about an «interflow» from one phase into another, not in a mechanical way, i.e. solely by the property of continuity, not as categorical synthesis.

This kind of synthesis, referring to the issue of passive syntheses, was often denoted by Husserl as “fusion”, Verschmelzung. It characterizes not only the temporal shape, but also the sensual ability to recognize the sequence as such. I consider this kind of synthesis based on the influence of A. Meinong and C. Stumpf. The term “Verschmelzung” in Stumpf describes the perception of concurrent sounds and analysis of simultaneity in the psychology of tone. Simultaneity, along with succession ordering, creates the structure of auditory perception. Internal “distinctivity” are also inherent to it. By Stumpf, the fusion is a peculiar relationship of simultaneous sensations (Stumpf, 1890. S. 64), unity not as a sum, but as an integrity. Referring to Aristotle, he points to the specifics of simultaneity not only as a combination of sensations, but also their qualities. The fusion can therefore possess an intensity, in the sense that the contents of sensations can add up while being endowed with extensive properties, such as intensity.

1. **Perception and imagination in phenomenology of E. Husserl.**

**Perception and imagination in the phenomenology of image consciousness.** The difference between the perception representations and imagination representations is analyzed on the basis of twenty-third volume of the Husserliana. All the detalization of presentative-representative acts is not only important by itself, but also as a kind of reverse side of the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. Image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) is similar to the consciousness of time (Zeitbewusstsein) in a structural way. “Fusion” and similarity in appearance of objectivities structurally replicates “fusion” of instances in time, demonstrating in description the internal passive mechanism of shaping of temporal form. But in phenomenology of image before introducing the temporal dimension Husserl considers imagination and interprets the imaginative representations (and hence the whole presentative-representative problem) just as part of imagination. In other words, for the purpose of analytic rigor it is important to clarify whether the term “imagination” is synonymous with the “image perception”. The purpose of this chapter is to present a more detailed description of the mechanisms of phenomenology of image, including the representing function (Vergegenwärtigung), the nature of imagination, substantial aspects of image and symbol, and as a result - the system of objectifying acts as such.

**Perception, imagination, image. Image and symbol.** Cognition is realized as a coordination or coincidence (Deckung) between intention and contemplation (this being the subject of the “Logical Investigations“). Contemplation “requires the completion” by an empty horizon. In transcendental perception an object is always given with a certain perspective. On the one hand, a thought is not given in-itself, on the other hand the act of perception or apprehension contains in it the dynamics of self-completion, which is determined by temporality of consciousness and consequentially by a certain space where its content can be placed.When we see a house, it is sufficient to see it from just one side to have an idea that this is a house. While we see just one wall, we can nevertheless perceive the rest three and the house as a whole in three dimensions, rather than in two dimensions. Imagination completes the construction of the image during the act of perception. The act itself must have an empty intention, in the space of which this constitution or completion is realized. *Imagination allows to transform the act of perception into the act of consciousness.* In a sense, consciousness without imagination would be one-dimensional.

**Perception and imagination in the system of objectifying acts. The return to phenomenology of inner time consciousness.** Apparently the act of cognition assisted by imagination in the most fundamental way is not the most uniquely acceptable idea for the philosophy, even if we take into account that the imagination is understood in a phenomenological sense. But an empty intention, just like contemplation, can be divided into types. As a participant of the fundamental phenomenological field, it cannot remain out of scope of the main fundamental law of phenomenology. - Namely, Husserl explores the empty intention according to the basic laws of the constitution of time consciousness (Volonte, 1997. S.129-134). Empty intention is divided on the basis of three aspects of time consciousness - the past, the present, and the future.When we think about the process of image constitution, it is most likely that the empty intention will be associated with the future. When imagining a house we think about its facade, and after that our imagination "wanders" around it to "see" the rest of the sides. The empty intention becomes apparent and filled after the consciousness has done some *motion*. Turns out, this motion is associated with the future, the empty intention is there as an empty “protention” because the motion occurs *after* the initial instant of when the house was represented, i.e. the rest of the sides come, so to speak, *after* the first one. Motion is directed towards the future. An example of an empty intention related to the present (which is called “passive intention”) is given by the following case. If we imagine a door, then *simultaneously* with the door we make up some kind of space where it resides. So, there must necessarily exist simultaneously some kind of space which passively “deploys” at the background of my transcendental view, even though I am not focusing on it (while I focus my attention on the door only). It co-exists in the present with the act of consciousness of the “door”.

Finally, the third modus of empty intentions is *retention*, which is important not only in our context of temporal matters. The Contemplated does not disappear after it was apprehended by consciousness. Something that was just seen is more "alive" for consciousness, and in the present there is a reference to the past, so that the consciousness of the past exists as “still-consciousness”. The empty intention demonstrates past as something just-seen in the consciousness of the present.

Therefore, empty horizon consists of protention, empty intention and retention: the three types of intentions which involve either the objectivity of the future, or missing objectivity of the present, or objectivity, fading into the past. It should be noted that retention is considerably different from protention and passive intention, because the latter two have the original focus on the object, while retention does not have this focus at all. As noted in the previous chapter, retention does not have specific focus on the object, it remains solely in the realm of consciousness.

**Conclusions.** This study focused on the structure of inner perception, which in essence is inconceivable without temporalisation. Ignoring the ontology of time, we deliberately leave our discussion without firm ground, instead we step on the stairs of imagination, and only take for granted the nonreality and nonmeasurability of time. Such a position is by no means seeking to prove that time does not exist - on that matter plenty of other good arguments have been found. It is even less possible to derive an existential formula of time, allowing to calculate, following Heidegger, the history and culture as an ecstatic unity of realization. The goal of our research was much more modest, namely to show that natural side of human mind that will always be in the shadow of socio-cultural relevance, but without which not a single intention will complete: the energy of sensibility which is the intuition of freedom, expressed through an image of the past, but realized only in the present.

**5. Afterword. Phenomenology of time and modern cognitive science.** Yet speaking of the possible development of the phenomenological concept of time in Husserl, it is impossible to claim that it finds its applications solely as an example from the history of subject. The well-known reception of Heidegger and the social and philosophical interpretations (A. Schütz, E. Levinas) are complemented by epistemological analysis in the most recent research that takes advantage of the organic Husserlian model of time. One can have different opinions about possibilities of positivist interpretations of phenomenology, or the constructivism inherent in the Husserl’s method, but the really important thing is - it maintains the significance of the original interest of any philosophy in the problem of human.That is why the modern interdisciplinary analysis of subject is unlikely to deprive phenomenology of any of its fundamental principles, but by means of other methods it interprets the results of phenomenology, translating them into the language of modern scientific understanding. In the afterword we shed light on the current state of the phenomenological theory in cognitive research. Perhaps the material in this review does not emphasize clearly the constitutive role of imagination, which is indeed difficult for detection of the empirical means of registration, but it becomes increasingly clear that, paradoxically, the idea of St. Augustine to ​​measure inner time, finds more supporters in the contemporary philosophy of mind.In the epilogue I examine the hypotheses of Zahavi, Gallagher, Varela and Van Gelder.