Conscious Experience and Phenomenal States

Taicheng Liu *

March 25, 2024

Abstract

Since its proposition, the Knowledge Argument has been the center of debate in the Philosophy of the Mind, and many philosophers have proposed their rejections of it. This paper briefly looked at what Philip Goff characterized as the no-compromise response and the no propositional knowledge response before delving deep into a critique of Brian Loar's response to the Knowledge Argument. This paper accepts Brian Loar's critique of the semantic premise and his analysis of phenomenal concepts. However, after examining the implications of Loar's response through conscious experience, this paper contends those implications conflict with simple intuitions and an analysis of the role of basic experiences in type-demonstrative referencing. It leads to new insights into the location of the dialectic of the Knowledge Argument being external to the brain. For the new dialectic of the Knowledge argument, I argue that a simpler Knowledge Argument provides an account of the referent of phenomenal concepts to be phenomenal properties (qualia), showing that Loar's response did not adequately reject the Knowledge Argument.

1 Introduction

Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. [Sto24] There are two ways to characterize the physical, the a priori way and a posteriori way. The first, a priori way, is to characterize the physical by "[abstracting] from our current physical picture of the world some general characteristics," then stipulating the necessary and sufficient conditions of what counts as physical. [Gof17, pp. 25] The a posteriori way characterizes the physical as "what physicists tell us it is." [Gof17, pp. 25] However, this a posteriori method faces the challenge of Hempel's Dilemma: we are unsure whether to define the physical by our current physics with all its flaws or by future physics with an uncertain direction. Both options have their respective problems. [Gof17, pp. 25] To avoid Hempel's Dilemma, I will use an a priori definition of the physical. Specifically, I will follow Goff in defining physical facts as "facts that can be captured in the mathematico-nomic vocabulary of physics," and I will define physicalism as the

*Advised by: Dr. Alasdair Craig of Oxford University

view that "fundamental reality wholly consists of such facts." [Gof17, pp. 31] In this paper, I will aim to bring more to the debate by defending an established rejection of it, the Knowledge Argument, from an objection to it.

Most rejections of physicalism revolve around the notion of qualia or phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties are claimed by non-physicalist philosophers to be an essential aspect of conscious activities. Consider the visual experience of seeing red. When asked to describe red, one can choose to describe it by either saying "that thing is red" or "red is the color of roses," but one cannot offer a direct description of red to help anyone who did not see the thing that is red or roses to understand what red is. So, there must be a certain qualitative "redness" of red that is ineffable and introspective which is an essential property of the color red; this "redness" of red is the phenomenal property of red. Opposing this phenomenal property of red are the physical properties of red, which can be described through mathematico-nomic vocabulary as entailed by the definition of the physical. One example of such physical properties of seeing red would be the neurons activated due to red stimulation and frequencies of light that result in red.

Many anti-physicalists consider phenomenal properties to offer a strong and intuitive argument against physicalism. Here is an example of such an argument "[nothing one] could tell of a physical sort captures the smell of a rose, for instance; hence, physicalism is false." [Jac82, pp. 127] However, the argument is "weak from a polemical point of view" as physicalists simply won't accept right away that a complete physical description of a rose will leave anything out. [Jac82, pp. 127] Thus, there is a need for an argument that can be approached from a premise that both physicalists and anti-physicalists can agree on.

Frank Jackson made this his mission in the paper "Epiphenomenal Qualia", where he specifically wanted to "present an argument whose premise are as obvious to [both anti-physicalists and physicality]." [Jac82, pp. 128] The result of Jackson's mission is the Knowledge Argument.

As usual, the Knowledge Argument did not go unchallenged. There are three types of responses to the knowledge argument: the no-comprise response, non-propositional knowledge responses, and the new truth/old property response. [Gof17, pp. 66] However, out of the three responses, I shall focus on the new truth/old property response, specifically Brian Loar's response, as I believe it is more advantageous than the other two for its proposition and critique of the semantic premise. I will present the knowledge argument and briefly summarize the other two responses and their shortcomings in Section 1. Then I will present Brian Loar's response in Section 3. Finally, I will develop my argument in Section 4.

My objective is to analyze Brian Loar's response and present a more plausible account of phenomenal concepts that support the Knowledge Argument. My thesis is that Brian Loar's response to the Knowledge Argument paints an inaccurate picture of phenomenal concepts and the properties they refer to because the dialectic of the Knowledge Argument is located outside the brain, not, as Loar infers, inside the brain. I will further argue that since the dialectic takes place outside the brain, it is more plausible for phenomenal concepts to refer to

phenomenal properties.

2 The Knowledge Argument and Its Responses

2.1 The Knowledge Argument

The Knowledge Argument has its premise made clear through a thought experiment, Mary's Room:

> "Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 'red', 'blue', and so on." [Jac82, pp. 130]

Then, Mary is released from her black-and-white room. When she is released from the room, she sees the color red for the first time. However, she noticed something different from all the physical knowledge she learned in her black-and-white room. Mary has the experience of seeing red and gains new knowledge about the world. In other words, Mary learns what it's like to see red. To Jackson, this means "it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and physicalism is false." [Jac82, pp. 130] Thus, a fully spelled-out Knowledge Argument would look like this:

1. If physicalism is true, then all facts are physical facts.
2. Mary (in her black-and-white room) knows every physical fact.
3. When Mary leaves her black-and-white room and sees something colored (in this case red), she learns something new.
4. From 2 and 3, it follows that Mary learns a non-physical fact.
5. From 1 and 4, physicalism is false.

2.2 The No-compromise Response

Regarding the no-compromise response and the non-propositional knowledge response, I consider Phillip Goff's critique of it in *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality* to be adequate in rebutting them.

The no-compromise response denies that Mary would not be able to work out red visual experiences from pure physical facts. [Gof17, pp. 67] Specifically, the response revolves around the enormity of knowing every physical fact.

> "It is of course true that in any realistic, readily imaginable version of the story, Mary would come to learn something, but in any realistic, readily imaginable version she might know a lot, but she would not know everything physical. Simply imagining that Mary knows a lot, and leaving it at that, is not a good way to figure out the implications of her having "all the physical information"–any more than imagining she is filthy rich would be a good way to figure out the implications of the hypothesis that she owned everything." [Den91, pp. 400]

The response rejects premise 3. We do not know what it is like to know all the physical facts. It is just incomprehensible to us. Therefore, we do not know whether Mary can or cannot work out what it's like to have a red experience from all the physical facts. This means the Knowledge Argument is based on the false intuition that Mary absolutely cannot work out all the facts in the black-and-white room, so the Knowledge Argument is dismissed.

Goff rejects the no-compromise response based on two aspects: Mary did not need to know all physical knowledge regarding visual experiences for the thought experiment to work. Secondly, the no-compromise response entails some extremely implausible claims when it is fully spelled out. [Gof17, pp. 66-67] First, Goff considers even if one can derive color experiences from physical facts, as physicalism implies, Mary should only need to know physical facts at the neurological level, not all the physical facts down to the levels of fundamental particle physics. [Gof17, pp. 66] Consciousness is on the same level as concepts such as cognition; it is a very high-level concept. It is a concept that is frequently dealt with in psychology, and psychology only needs to be explained by the level below it, neuroscience. Hence, lower-level sciences, such as particle physics, should not be needed to explain consciousness; the two are very different levels of science. Thus, the thought experiment does not need all the physical facts to work.

Furthermore, the no-compromise response implies that the knowledge of color experiences would be a causal structural truth, truths that can be stated in the austere mathematico-nomic vocabulary of physics, as it could be derived from other physical facts, which are causal structural truths. [Gof17, pp. 67] The knowledge of color experiences under the no-compromise response should also be simple truths about simple causal behavior since ordinary people (including young children) are familiar with the knowledge of color experiences. [Gof17, pp. 67] In other words, the knowledge of color experiences under the no-compromise response should be knowledge that people can learn by simply watching the reaction of others experiencing red. This means the no-compromise response "must be committed to some form of analytic behaviorism or functionalism," meaning truths of mental states, such as truths of pain, are really truths of the behavior of the person having that mental state, such as pain behavior or "inner states that are disposed to instigate pain behavior as the result of bodily damage." [Gof17, pp. 68] This fact entails the falsity of the no-compromise response. The knowledge of color experience can be derived from simple be-

havior -the functional role of ordinary people. [Gof17, pp. 68] Then Mary could learn about color experiences by just observing people experiencing color, which violates an extremely plausible thesis: it is impossible to teach a contingently blind person the experience of color by describing the causal roles ordinary people associate with color experiences such as using language to describe color experiences. [Gof17, pp. 68] Thus, the no-compromise response is rejected.

2.3 Non-propositional Knowledge Response

Just like the no-compromise response, the non-propositional knowledge response also rejects premise 3 but differently. The response accepts that Mary learned "something new," but this "something new" is not propositional knowledge. One example of a response of this kind is the Ability Hypothesis, which claims that "knowing what an experience is like just is the possession of [the] abilities to remember, imagine, and recognize." [Lew99, pp. 288] Thus, Mary learns nothing new when she walks out of the room, but merely gains a new ability to remember, imagine, and recognize having color experiences. Nonetheless, all non-propositional knowledge responses suffer from its implications. The phrase "this is what it is like to see red" also implies that she learned other knowledge such as, "what I am seeing is probably how others see red too," and this cannot be explained by simply gaining a new ability, so, if the implication is correct, Mary must have also gained propositional knowledge about the experience itself. [Gof17, pp. 70] Therefore, the non-propositional knowledge response is rejected.

3 Brian Loar's Response

The New Truth/Old Property View is the view that Mary gains a new phenomenal concept but the phenomenal concept "refers to something she already knew about pre-liberation, namely, brain state X." [Gof17, pp. 72] In other words, when Mary walked out of her room, she gained new knowledge but no new facts and since the Knowledge Argument is only effectual if Mary gains new facts, it is rendered ineffectual. A key strength of this type of response is that it accommodates our intuition that Mary gains new knowledge, rather than denying this intuition. Loar's response in his paper, "Phenomenal States," is a variant of this view. Essentially, he admits Mary gains new knowledge about color experiences but no knowledge of new facts is developed. [NROC23] Specifically, Loar considers that Mary only learned a new concept, a phenomenal concept, about color experiences, but not a new fact about a new property.

Loar saw that the Knowledge Argument, understood in one way, is committed to a very dangerous intuition, which is, that knowledge of a new concept always brings knowledge of a new property. When Mary walked out of her room, she learned the phenomenal concept of red for the first time. The intuition of the Knowledge Argument is that Mary will learn about a new property of red experiences along with the new phenomenal concept, namely the phenomenal properties. Loar disagrees with this intuition and there is perfect sense to do so.

Consider the case of Lois Lane's concepts of Superman and Clark Kent. The two concepts, *Superman* and *Clark Kent*, are independent. We cannot make the connection between Superman and Clark Kent by just thinking in our armchairs. For example, if we know that Superman can fly, we can't work out from just thinking from our armchair that Clark Kent can fly since we may not know that Superman *is* Clark Kent. Therefore, although both concepts refer to the same property, they are distinct and independent concepts.

This example shows that it is incorrect to say that knowledge of a new concept always brings knowledge of a new property or fact. If Lois Lane learns that Clark Kent can fly, when she already knows that Superman can fly, she has not thereby learned a new fact, although she has gained some new knowledge. Therefore, claims Loar, it is very likely the case that Mary learned a new phenomenal concept of red but it refers to a previously learned physical property. Thus, the Knowledge Argument is unsuccessful.

However, the supporters of the Knowledge Argument can say Mary's case is different from Lois's. Lois learned a concept that refers to a contingent property (visual appearance) of the man (that *Superman* and *Clark Kent* refers to), while the phenomenal concept that Mary learned refers to and via an essential property of red. The phenomenal property of red that she learns about is an essential property since, according to the Knowledge Argument, without experiencing it, we would fail to characterize it. With this in mind, we can add a "semantic premise" to the Knowledge Argument:

> (Semantic Premise) "A statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts is true only if at least one concept picks out the property it refers to by connoting a contingent property of that property." [Loa17, pp. 6]

This means if two concepts refer to the same property, they cannot be conceptually independent if they refer to it without identifying it (or "picking it out") in terms of one or more of the other's contingent properties. If two concepts are conceptually independent and refer to the same property, it has to be that one of the concepts or both concepts refer to their property contingently. Therefore, if Mary's physical concepts of the brain and its properties referred to the same properties as phenomenal concepts, which she gained from experiencing red for the first time, then it would mean physical concepts and phenomenal concepts are not independent concepts, or either two of the concepts or both refer via contingent properties. Supporters of the Knowledge Argument claim that neither scenario is correct, and thus Mary's physical and phenomenal concepts (if the semantic premise is true) must refer to different properties.

Loar acknowledges that this response is available, and so he tries to give an account of concepts that rebuts the semantic premise and shows how phenomenal concepts can refer to physical properties. If he succeeds in this, then physicalism will be defended against the Knowledge Argument. Specifically, if his account of concepts can show that phenomenal concepts "can pick out a physical property directly or essentially," while maintaining conceptual Independence from all physical-functional concepts, the semantic is rebutted, and

the Knowledge Argument does falsify physicalism. [Loa17, pp. 6] In other words, Loar argues that a statement of property identity that links conceptually independent concepts that do not refer via contingent properties can be true if one of the concepts picks out the property directly.

The rest of Loar's response follows this line of logic. He states phenomenal concepts "belong to a wide class of concepts that [he calls] recognitional concepts;" these recognitional concepts are type-demonstrative and take the form "x is one of that kind." [Loa17, pp. 6] Type-demonstratives are referential expressions that point directly at their reference. An example of demonstratives would be saying "that [thing] over there" while pointing at a peach on a shelf. Demonstratives do not refer via contingent or essential properties of their reference. In other words, demonstratives refer to their reference directly. Recognitional concepts, being demonstrative concepts, also refer to their reference directly.

Loar's account revolves around recognitional concepts. He claims that "[phenomenal] concepts are recognitional concepts that pick out certain internal properties; these are physical-functional properties of the brain." [Loa17, pp. 8] The phenomenal concept of red demonstratively picks out the same brain functions as the physical concept of red picks out. When we think about phenomenal states of red, what we are actually referring to is the brain state of the group of neurons that activates the visual experience. This brain state could be picked out by a different physical concept (neurons fired due to red experiences). When Mary steps out of her room and sees the first red rose, she only learns the new phenomenal concept of a state she already knew when she learned its physical concepts.

Different from the semantic premise, we gain possession of recognitional concepts through experience, just like phenomenal concepts. For example, we learn about yellow not from a description of it then searching for objects that match the description. Instead, we learn and recognize yellow for its unique visual experience. In the same way, we learn about sounds and shapes through the direct experience they cause. On the other hand, physical concepts, being described by mathematico-nomic vocabulary, are concepts that we learn from learning mathematico-nomic vocabulary and their operations. We do not learn physical concepts from experiencing them like phenomenal concepts. One is recognitional and the other is a theoretical concept; the two concepts "have quite different conceptual roles." [Loa17, pp. 9] Thus, the conceptual independence between the two is maintained even though they refer to the same property non-contingently. This shows that the semantic premise is incorrect. So, it allows Loar to depict a picture: when Mary walked out of the room, she only gained a new phenomenal concept but learned no new property or facts as the phenomenal concept refers to an old physical property that she learned from physical concepts in her black and white room. Therefore, concludes Loar, that the Knowledge Argument is ineffectual and physicalism can still be true in the light of the Knowledge Argument.

4 Conscious Experience and Phenomenal States

4.1 Shifting the Dialectic

The difficulty with Loar's argument is its critique of the semantic premise and his account of phenomenal concepts. I accept Loar's critique of the semantic premise to be true, but I argue that the rest of Loar's response is not an adequate rejection of the Knowledge Argument. Although Loar's response seems to provide a reasonable account of the referent of phenomenal concepts, its implication is far less reasonable. When we use the statement "that (thing) over there" and point at a peach on the isle (to refer directly), but to be able to refer to the peach with the finger point, I will have to see it first and distinguish it from other fruits. In other words, to demonstratively refer to a peach, we require a bare minimum of experience with the peach. Therefore, a premise for referring demonstratives can be concluded:

> **(P1)** Concepts that are demonstratives require a basic experience to refer to a property.

Phenomenal concepts, being recognitional concepts (type-demonstratives) must also require a sort of basic experience to refer to properties. Contrasted with the type of basic experience needed for other recognitional concepts (such as that of a peach), which requires visual experience, phenomenal concepts require a different type of basic experience–conscious experience. This is rather intuitive: we learn the referents of phenomenal concepts–whether physical or phenomenal properties–through experience, so learning about them requires us to be consciously exposed to them. In both the Knowledge Argument and Loar's response to it, experience is the agreed prerequisite for the acquisition of phenomenal concepts. For example, in both the Knowledge Argument and Loar's response, Mary requires visual experience of the rose to (at least) learn a phenomenal concept of the color.

Perhaps this is better illustrated with a situation where one lacks conscious experience of an object but possesses an experience of the object. Imagine an entomologist is touring a tropical jungle and is looking for a hypothetical species of butterfly. while this entomologist is touring the jungle, a beetle suddenly flies across the bottom border of the entomologist's field of vision. Looking for something entirely different, the entomologist misses the beetle but notices something runs past him. Here, entomologists, though, technically "seeing the beetle", developed a recognitional concept of the beetle in the form of "that thing that just flew by," but a conscious experience of the actual beetle was not developed. Later, when the group, who all consciously experienced the perception of the beetle, talked about the beetle with the group, the entomologist, lacking the conscious experience of the perception of the beetle, found it impossible to relate on a phenomenal level to the group's descriptions of that beetle, indicating a lack of not only the phenomenal concept of the beetle but the properties in which the phenomenal concepts refer to. The others, who consciously experienced the perception of the beetle, can relate on a phenomenal level to

the descriptions. This situation demonstrates the role of conscious experience in learning phenomenal concepts.

With **P1** established, we can transform into **C1**:

> **(C1)** The object that holds the property referred to demonstratively must also be the object that is experienced

This means for my recognitional concept of a peach on a shelf to refer to the properties of the peach, not only will I have to be present on the shelf to see the peach, but the peach must also be present on the shelf. In terms of phenomenal concepts and conscious experience, **C1** means for phenomenal concepts to demonstratively refer to properties, the conscious experience must be the experience of the object with the referred property. For example, if the phenomenal concept of a rose refers to either a property, our conscious experience must be of that particular rose, not anything else. If conscious experience is of anything else, such as an image of the same red rose, it is intuitive that the phenomenal concept refers to properties of the image of the red rose, not the red rose.

In Loar's picture, phenomenal concepts refer to the physical properties of the brain. Then, according to **C1**, the phenomenal concept of a rose relies on the conscious experience of what holds the physical properties of the brain, which are brain states. This account of concepts, however, does not make any sense. It is natural to think that phenomenal concepts refer to properties of the object referred to by conscious experience, not a property of a brain state. To further delineate, Loar's picture violates a simple intuition: if I say I am experiencing the conscious experience of a red rose, it is simply the conscious experience of a red rose, and nothing else. Then according to **C1**, the properties that phenomenal concepts refer to must be properties of the object of conscious experience, the red rose external to the brain, and not physical property of the brain. Therefore, Loar is wrong to think that phenomenal properties refer to the properties of brain states. If he's right that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts, then they refer to external properties of objects out there in the world; these properties could either be physical or phenomenal properties of the external object.

However, one could still object that we are experiencing brain states in the sense that brain states represent or reflect properties parallel to the properties of the external object. Consider the contrast between a red rose and an image of that particular red rose. Assuming that the image completely and accurately represents the red rose, the two objects then possess an identical property–the particular red on the red rose–and thus the identical phenomenal concept of that red. This seems to present a case where brain states, just like the image of the red rose and the actual red rose, represent or reflect the same property of the external object. Then despite the intuition that conscious experience of something means conscious experience of that thing, conscious experience of the external object is really just a conscious experience of brain states, and the dialectic is located inside the brain.

Yet, the red rose and its image are only identical regarding their property the red, and the phenomenal concept of the red. So, for the objection to be successful, every property of the external object that is picked out by phenomenal concepts requires a type-identical relationship between the physical properties of the brain. This premise can be transformed into this premise: every property that a mental state (phenomenal state) refers to (property of an external object) requires a type-identity relationship between the properties of brain states. This new statement seems to resemble the Type-Identity Theory, which claims that mental states are identical to brain states. [Sma22] Therefore, for the objection to be successful, Type-Identity Theory has to be successful, which begs the question. Moreover, there are many reasons to not accept Type-Identity Theory, such as the Multiple Realizability argument[1] and explanatory gap[2].

4.2 Phenomenal Concepts and Its Referent

As established, if phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts and refer directly, they should refer to the properties of an external object that is being experienced consciously. There are two possibilities as to what properties phenomenal concepts refer to phenomenal properties of the external object or physical property of the external object. Phenomenal concepts can refer to the physical properties of the external object. So, Loar's response, though entails unreasonable implications, still defends physicalism from the Knowledge Argument. In response, one can set up a simpler Knowledge Argument but with properties of the external object:

1. If physicalism is true, all facts are physical facts, meaning all concepts refer to physical properties.

2. It is impossible to teach a blind person the color of leaves by teaching that person a physical property of the leaf such as the role that chlorophyll plays in coloration.

3. According to 2, phenomenal concepts refer to the phenomenal properties of the leaf, which are irreducible to physical properties.

4. According to, 1 and 3 physicalism is false.

The advantage of this new argument is that it accepts Loar's proposal that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts and accepts his critique of the semantic premise. Yet, this argument is epistemic nonetheless, so it is prone to the dangerous intuition that Loar saw: knowledge of a new concept always brings knowledge of a new property. For this, one could still defend Loar by stating that phenomenal concepts, instead of referring to physical properties of

[1]For more discussion please see Hilary Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States", in David Chalmers (ed), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press.

[2]For more discussion see Levine, Joseph. "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 4, Oct. 1983, pp. 354–361

the brain, demonstratively refers to physical properties of the external object. However, it seems to lead to back Loar's original account of concepts, which in this paper, was established to be unreasonable. One would have to explain how the "certain frequency and intensity of radiation reflected from a certain object" is transformed into a phenomenal experience.

There are two possible explanations: physical properties and phenomenal properties are the same property and we transformed it with our brains. The first explanation is addressed at the end of 4.1; it suffers from begging the question. On the other hand, the second explanation suggests that our brain processes the physical properties of the external object into physical properties of brain states, and then if–physicalism is true–phenomenal concepts refer to these processed physical properties of the brain. This seems no different from Loar's original account of concepts. Now, suppose my previous analysis of the implications of Loar's original response is true. In that case, phenomenal concepts should refer to the phenomenal properties of the external object as it is the only option left. Therefore, the Knowledge Argument still stands with the dialectic taking place outside the brain.

5 Conclusions

Brian Loar's response to the Knowledge Argument fails to properly reject the Knowledge Argument in that its critique of the semantic premise and account of concepts could be true, but its implications suggest an unreasonable account of concepts. When fully inquired, the role of conscious experience in type-demonstratives referencing and natural intuition of conscious experiences suggests Brian Loar's response does not correctly characterize the location of the dialectic, which is external to the brain. The implications of the dialectic being external to the brain suggest that the referent of phenomenal concepts could be either physical or phenomenal properties of the external object. However, the Knowledge Argument could again be applied to the new dialectic. Rejecting the possibility that one could craft a Loar-type response for the new dialectic (as it seems to lead back to Loar's original account), it could be concluded that the Knowledge Argument is still successful despite Loar's response.

References

[Den91] Daniel C. Dennett. *Consciousness Explained*. Penguin Books, 1991.

[Gof17] Philip Goff. *Consciousness and Fundamental Reality*. Oxford University Press, 08 2017.

[Jac82] Frank Jackson. Epiphenomenal qualia. *Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(April):127–136, 1982.

[Lew99] David Lewis. *What experience teaches*, page 262–290. Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1999.

[Loa17] Brian Loar. Phenomenal States. In *Consciousness and Meaning: Selected Essays*. Oxford University Press, 01 2017.

[NROC23] Martine Nida-Rümelin and Donnchadh O Conaill. Qualia: The Knowledge Argument. In Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, editors, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Fall 2023 edition, 2023.

[Sma22] J. J. C. Smart. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory. In Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, editors, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Winter 2022 edition, 2022.

[Sto24] Daniel Stoljar. Physicalism. In Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, editors, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, Spring 2024 edition, 2024.