experientially grounded problems about language.—Dr. Kenneth Knies, Sacred Heart University

Inwood, Brad. *Ethics after Aristotle*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. x + 166 pp. Cloth, $42.00—*Ethics after Aristotle*, the revised and polished version of Inwood’s 2011 Carl Newell Jackson at Harvard University, surveys the ethical teachings of the original “neo-Aristotelians,” namely those self-identified (although not always named) members of the Peripatetic school from the time of Theophrastus (fl. 300 BCE) until that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE). An initial chapter surveys the sorts of problems in Aristotle’s ethical corpus which would generate subsequent debate amongst members of the Peripatetic school. For instance, Aristotle’s account of pleasure is both textually complicated (because of the dual accounts in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII and X) and interscholastically complicated (because of the initial rivalry between Aristotelian and Epicurean schools in the 3rd century BCE). The first chapter also briefly discusses Theophrastus’ own reaction to his teacher’s ethical writings. Chapter Two examines the views of “Magnus,” the name which Inwood gives to the anonymous 3rd century author of the *Magna Moralia* (which Inwood takes to be pseudo-Aristotelian), and those of Strato of Lampsacus, Lycon, and Hieronymus, 3rd century heads of the Peripatetic school, all of whom show the influences of Epicureanism in their re-articulations of Aristotelian positions. Chapter Three, entitled “The Turning Point,” finds in the work of Critolaus—head of the Peripatetic school in the middle of the 2nd century BCE—a move away from the centrality of activity within Aristotelian ethical thought, which Critolaus instead replaces with the notion of possessing specific goods, namely those of the body, the soul, and what is external. The same chapter argues that at approximately the same historical point Cicero, in the character of Piso in *De finibus*, articulated an account of Peripatetic ethics that was far more faithful to 4th century Aristotelianism.

The final two chapters focus on neo-Aristotelian ethical philosophizing within a new and explicitly Roman cultural setting. Chapter Four argues that the developments and debates found in “Doxography C” (a testimony of Peripatetic ethics preserved in Stobaeus’ 5th century CE *Anthology*, the author of which Inwood prefers to name “Harry”) and Seneca’s writings provide indirect evidence for a robust presence of Peripatetic philosophy in 1st century CE Rome even if we lack the texts or the names of their Peripatetic authors from this period. Chapter Five concludes the volume with a brief consideration of Plutarch, and a much longer consideration of Alexander of Aphrodisias, including a full translation with discussion of his “The Views of the Aristotelians about the Primary Objects of Attachment” (an essay taken from the *Mantissa*).

The first chapter begins and the fifth chapter ends with arguments in support of the claim that what is most distinctive (and, I suspect, what Inwood
Inwood is a master of the material and displays deep historical, linguistic, and philosophical comprehension about the texts under discussion. The work clearly builds upon the previous studies of Julia Annas, Gisela Striker, and Bob Sharples, and yet presents a sustained reflection on one strand of Peripatetic philosophy, namely ethical theses, across several centuries which is largely unprecedented in Anglophone scholarship. It is unfair to fault a work for showing signs of its origins, and yet sometimes it seemed that the lecture format of the original presentation was a constraint on the depth of the analysis. Excluding notes, bibliography, index, and a short preface, the five chapters run 125 pages. Nonetheless, the discussion remains exciting and often provocative. I personally found the remarks on “Magnus” and his Magna Moralia especially thought-provoking, and yet they were more like the beginning of a discussion than a scholarly final word (something I am sure the audience in Cambridge, Massachusetts had the opportunity to pursue more than we readers of the book). “Neo-Aristotelians” (both ancient and modern), students of Cicero and Seneca, and scholars of Hellenistic and Roman ethical philosophy will find much to stimulate (if not necessarily satiate) their philosophical curiosity. — Thornton C. Lockwood, Quinnipiac University

Jankélévitch, Vladimir. The Bad Conscience. Translated by Andrew Kelley. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015. xxii + 179 pp. $35.00— Jankélévitch’s The Bad Conscience was initially published in 1933 as La mauvaise conscience, one of two doctoral dissertations submitted by the author, with subsequent revised editions published in 1951 and 1966. Andrew Kelley, associate professor of philosophy at Bradley University, includes in his English translation a detailed annotation of changes within the text, and an account of their historical development within his accessible introduction. Jankélévitch, who held the Chair in Moral Philosophy at the Sorbonne from 1951-1978, died in 1985, leaving behind him more than twenty books, including Le Pardon (also translated by Andrew Kelley as Forgiveness, The University of Chicago Press, 2001).