

## Non-human animals in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*

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**ABSTRACT:** At first glance, it looks like Aristotle can't make up his mind about the ethical or moral status of non-human animals in his ethical treatises. Somewhat infamously, the *Nicomachean Ethics* claims that "there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things, nor is there towards an ox or a horse" (*EN* 8.11.1161b1–2). Since Aristotle thinks that friendship and justice are co-extensive (*EN* 8.9.1159b25–32), scholars have often read this passage to entail that humans have no ethical obligations to non-human animals. By contrast, although the *Eudemian Ethics* denies that non-human animals can participate in "primary" friendships, *EE* 7.2 claims that "the other kinds of friendship are also found among animals; and it is evident that utility is present to some extent among them both in relation to humankind, in the case of tame animals, and in relation to each other" (*EE* 7.2.1236b3–11). Does the *Nicomachean* account of non-human animals contradict that of the *Eudemian Ethics*? Ultimately, I believe the *Nicomachean* account is consistent with the *Eudemian* account. Nonetheless, I argue that Aristotle's treatment of non-human animals differs significantly in the two texts. My chapter explores this difference in greater detail and considers the ramifications of such a difference for our understanding of Aristotle's place in the philosophical tradition concerning the ethical status of non-human animals.

**Keywords:** Aristotle, animals, friendship, moral status of animals

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## Introduction

At first glance, it looks like Aristotle can't make up his mind about what I will call the ethical or moral status of non-human animals in his ethical treatises. On the one hand, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *EN*) claims that "there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things, nor is there towards an ox or a horse" (*EN* 8.11.1161b1–2), which sounds like the claim that oxen and horses lack ethical or moral status.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, although the *Eudemian Ethics* (hereafter *EE*) denies that non-human animals can participate in "primary" friendships, *EE* 7.2 claims that "the other kinds of friendship are also found among animals; and it is evident that utility is present to some small extent among them both in relation to humankind, in the case of tame animals, and in relation to each other" (*EE* 7.2.1236b3–11). Since Aristotle takes friendship to be a form of community that generates ethical obligations between its members, the *Eudemian* claim about inter-species friendship seems to imply ethical ties between its members.<sup>2</sup>

How ought we characterize the "ethical or moral status of non-human animals" for Aristotle? At least since the 18<sup>th</sup> century, modern European moral philosophers have examined the question whether we have moral and or legal duties to non-human animals categorically.

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<sup>1</sup> Newmyer, *Animals in Greek and Roman Thought* 75, claims that Aristotle thought that "animals are made for man's use, a view which presupposes the absence of any moral ties between the species." Fröding and Peterson, "Animal Ethics," Henry, "Aristotle on Animals," and Cagnoli Fieconi, "Elements of Biology in Aristotle's Political Science," largely concur. By contrast, Hall, *Aristotle's Way*, and Zatta, *Aristotle and the Animals*, provide accounts of human and non-human animal interaction that undermine the claim that Aristotle denied moral ties between human and non-human animals. Torres, "Animal Ethics Based on Friendship," provides a thorough refutation of Fröding and Peterson, "Animal Ethics."

<sup>2</sup> See *EN* 8.9.1159b25–32, 8.11.1161a10–11, 30–b2; *EE* 7.9.1241b12–24, 7.10.1242a19–28; cf. *Pol.* 1.2.1253a7–18. Kim, "Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," argues that friendship and justice are co-extensive in Aristotle's ethical treatises; see also Curzer, *Aristotle & the Virtues*, 275–289, and Lockwood, "Justice in Aristotle's Household and City."

Perhaps most famously, Jeremy Bentham asked on what basis “the rest of animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny”; to which he answered “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they *talk*?, but, *Can they suffer?*”<sup>3</sup> 20<sup>th</sup> century philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, heirs to Bentham, have argued that different species of non-human animals possess a moral status (or what Singer called “equality of consideration”) insofar as they have the capacity for suffering and enjoying things or are “experiencing subjects of a life.”<sup>4</sup> But it is hard to find such a notion of rights or moral personhood in Aristotle—indeed, his account of natural slavery appears to deny any moral obligation to humans as such.<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, I do think that Aristotle recognizes inter-species relationships between individual beings on the grounds of what Lori Gruen has characterized as “entangled empathy.”<sup>6</sup> Indeed, I believe that one way of understanding the morality of friendship for Aristotle is as a form of entangled empathy between different animals, both between human animals and between human and non-human animals.<sup>7</sup> Throughout this

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<sup>3</sup> Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (Ch. XVII.4) 282–83. Kant famously denied that humans have direct moral duties to non-human animals (although he affirmed indirect duties); see his *Lectures on Ethics* 239–41.

<sup>4</sup> Singer, “All Animals are Equal” 107, Regan, “The Case for Animal Rights” 25.

<sup>5</sup> See *Pol.* 1.4.1254a30–33, 124b13–16; cf. *EN* 8.11.1161b5–10 with Lockwood, “Is Natural Slavery Beneficial?”

<sup>6</sup> Gruen, *Entangled Empathy* 65–8. She defines entangled empathy as “a type of caring perception focused on attending to another’s experience of wellbeing. An experiential process involving a blend of emotion and cognition in which we recognize we are in relationships with others and are called upon to be responsive and responsible in these relationships by attending to another’s needs, interests, desires, vulnerabilities, hopes, and sensitivities” (3).

<sup>7</sup> I think it is also an open—and interesting—question whether Aristotle would endorse a notion of biocentrism grounded in the teleological striving of beings like that found in Taylor, *Respect for Nature*, although I think Gruen’s model of entangled relationships is more relevant for evaluating inter-species relationships like friendship.

chapter, when I refer to the “ethical status of non-human animals,” I have in mind the relationships and bonds that exist between individual animals who exist within such entangled relationships, a.k.a., “friendships.”

Although I think it is wrong to claim that the *Nicomachean Ethics* denies friendship and ethical ties between human and non-human animals, nonetheless I argue *both* that Aristotle’s depiction of non-human animals differs significantly in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* treatises *and* that such a difference challenges us to think about the relationship between the two treatises in a fashion that goes beyond developmental or genetic approaches.<sup>8</sup> Rather than ask whether the *Nicomachean Ethics* or the *Eudemian Ethics* is Aristotle’s “more mature” work, I would instead like to ask whether systemic differences between the two treatises can help explain their different depictions of non-human animals.<sup>9</sup> The strategy of my chapter is thus twofold: Part I lays out how the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* treatises depict the quasi-cognitive

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<sup>8</sup> Pakaluk, “*Eudemian versus Nicomachean Friendship*” 3–5, appears to be the first scholarly work to recognize this doctrinal difference between the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* treatises, although he does not explore it at length. Cagnoli Fieconi, “Elements of Biology in Aristotle’s Political Science” 220–221, also detects inconsistencies between *EN* 8.11 and the rest of Aristotle’s writings.

<sup>9</sup> Thus I follow scholars like Allan, “Quasi-mathematical Method,” Pakaluk, “The Egalitarianism of the *Eudemian Ethics*,” Schofield, “*L’Éthique à Eudème postérieure à l’Éthique à Nicomaque?*” and Natali, “The Preambles to the Ethics,” who characterize the difference between the two works in terms of intended audience. Bobonich, “Aristotle’s Ethical Treatises,” is a judicious survey of the interrelationship among Aristotle’s ethical writings (although he only focuses on differences between *EE* and *EN* concerning the highest good and their respective epistemologies) and Di Basilio “Introduction: Aristotle’s Two Ethics,” provides a summary of scholarly positions about the relationship between *EE* and *EN* (including the prominent place that Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics*, has occupied in that debate). Frede “On the So-Called Common Books” 112, argues both that the Common Books shared by *EN* and *EE* fit better with *EN* than with *EE* and that “general claims to the effect that the *EE* is better organized and philosophically more interested at closer inspection turn out to be quite dubious.”

and affective abilities of non-human animals, including the apparent tension between the two treatises over the possibility of inter-species friendships. Parts II–III then consider systemic explanations to account for the different emphases we find in the two ethical treatises.<sup>10</sup> Part II shows that whereas the *Nicomachean Ethics* is interested solely in human (and divine) flourishing, the *Eudemian Ethics* announces an explicit interest in how non-human animals share in goods such as friendship and pleasure. Part III shows that whereas the definition of friendship in the *Nicomachean Ethics* severely restricts non-coincidental friendship to virtuous human beings, the “focal meaning” account of friendship in the *Eudemian Ethics* is more capacious and provides room for the attribution of friendship to non-human animals.

### **Part I: Non-human animals in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics***

The *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* treatises exhibit similarities and differences with respect to the depiction of non-human animal quasi-cognitive and affective capacities. In the former case, texts such as *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, which claim that human soul function is radically different from that of non-human animals, suggest that Aristotle believes that there is a difference in kind between the cognitive abilities of human and non-human animals and that

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<sup>10</sup> The *Magna Moralia* (hereafter *MM*) discussion of friendship (*MM* 2.11–17) contains only two discussions of non-human animals, both of which are identical with *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* passages (*MM* 2.11.1208b8–9=*EN* 8.1.3=*EE* 7.1.7; *MM* 2.11.1208b9–14=*EE* 7.1]). Thus, I exclude the *Magna Moralia* from consideration in my chapter.

such a difference establishes a *scala naturae* that places humans above all other (non-divine) living beings.<sup>11</sup> For example, Aristotle asks

**T1:** may we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these? What, then, could this be? For living seems to be shared with plants as well, but what is sought is specific to humans. Hence, we must set aside the living that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order is some sort of perceptual living. But this too seems to be shared with horse and ox and every animal. There remains, then, some sort of practical living of the part that has reason.<sup>12</sup> (EN 1.7.1097b32–1098a4)

[οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον· ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν. ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη· φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. λείπεται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος]

If only humans have the capacity to reason and the cognitive capacity of non-human animals is delimited to “perceptive life” (namely, αἴσθησις) then **T1** appears to make a categorical distinction between human and non-human forms of life that is at odds with the gradualist account of animal cognition found in Aristotle’s zoological writings. Although the function argument in *Eudemian Ethics* 2.1 invokes no such distinction in soul functions, the *Eudemian*

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<sup>11</sup> Scholars debate whether Aristotle embraces a strict demarcation or a gradual continuum between human and non-human animals. For instance, Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals* 13, claims that Aristotle “allows for a sharp intellectual distinction between animal and man”; by contrast, Steiner, *Anthropocentrism and Its Discontents* 76, argues for “Aristotle’s recognition of a continuum between human beings and animals while seeking to distinguish human beings on the basis of their rational capacities.” Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle: Animals,” Newmyer, *Animals in Greek and Roman Thought* 6–9, and Dow, “Human and Animal Emotions in Aristotle” 122–123, are prominent examples of scholars who lean towards Sorabji’s emphasis on discontinuity; Osborne, *Dumb Beasts and Dead Philosophers* 63–64, Lloyd, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability,” and Zatta, *Aristotle and the Animals* 175–214, lean towards Steiner’s emphasis on continuity. Miira Tuominen alerts me that Porphyry ascribes the gradualist reading to Aristotle (*On abstinence* 3.7.1 at 195.5–9, Nauck).

<sup>12</sup> Aristotle also delimits non-human animal soul function to perception in EN 9.9.1170a13–19 and EN 6.2.1139a17–20.

treatise appears to be in agreement with the *Nicomachean* that non-human animals possess only perceptive psychic capacities.<sup>13</sup>

Since both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* treatises appear to delimit non-human animals to the psychic capacity of perception, many of their discussions of non-human animals in the ethical treatises are attempts to explain complex animal behavior without the attribution of *πρᾶξις* or “action,” namely mature ethical agency. For instance, the *Eudemian Ethics* claims that

**T2:** all substances that are in accord with nature are, to be sure, starting-points of a certain sort, which is why each one is capable of generating many other substances of the same sort—for example, a human humans, and, similarly, an animal animals and a plant plants. But in addition to these the human being is, alone among the animals at least, a starting-point of certain actions; for we would not say of any of the others that it acts. (*EE* 2.6.1222b15–20)

[εἰσὶ δὴ πᾶσαι μὲν αἰ οὐσίαι κατὰ φύσιν τινὲς ἀρχαί, διὸ καὶ ἐκάστη πολλὰ δύναται τοιαῦτα γεννᾶν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπους καὶ ζῷον ὅλως ζῷα καὶ φυτὸν φυτά. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁ γ’ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πράξεων τινῶν ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ μόνον τῶν ζώων· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐθὲν εἴπομεν ἂν πράττειν.]

Aristotle attributes *πρᾶξις* only to fully mature humans because *πρᾶξις* presupposes practical rationality, a characteristic the ethical treatises deny to non-human and immature human animals.<sup>14</sup> Since Aristotle claims that deliberative choice (*προαίρεσις*)—the cognitive capacity by

<sup>13</sup> The *Eudemian* iteration of the function argument draws no distinction between human and non-human animal psychic functioning and fails to posit any sort of *scala naturae* (*EE* 2.1.1219a18–28), although the analysis of ethical virtue delimits human virtue to beings that possess reason (2.1.1219b26–1220a4).

<sup>14</sup> In the zoological treatises, Aristotle attributes “approximations” of practical rationality to non-human animals (*Historia Animalium* [hereafter *HA*] 8.1.588a28–30, 9.1.608b4–8, 9.1.610b22). See further Lloyd, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability,” on the ample scholarly literature on the subject. The only passage in the ethical treatises that ascribes an approximation of practical rationality to non-human animals is *EN* 6.7.1141a22–28, which claims that some animals “appear to have a capacity for forethought about their life (ὅσα περὶ τὸν αὐτῶν βίον ἔχοντα φαίνεται δύναμιν προνοητικὴν).” Cf. *EN* 7.3.1147a25–b5. *EE* 7.2.1235b30–1236a5, *EE* 2.8.1224a21–30,

means of which humans deliberate about how to obtain their rational wishes or goals—includes rationality, throughout the ethical treatises he repeatedly denies that non-human animals exhibit choice.<sup>15</sup> Rather, Aristotle claims that non-human animals are capable of exercising only a form of voluntary (ἐκούσιον) behavior.<sup>16</sup>

We catch a glimpse of the voluntary but “non-practical” or non-deliberative behavior of non-human animals in Aristotle’s depiction of animals “reacting” to an attack on the basis of the animal’s θυμός or spiritedness. In both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle identifies a simulacrum of complete human courage that he likens to the spiritedness of non-human animals. Here is the *Nicomachean* version:

**T3:** People also count spirit as courage, since those who act because of spirit—like wild beasts that rush at the people who have wounded them—also seem to be courageous, because courageous people are spirited as well, since spirit is most ready to meet dangers....Now courageous people act because of what is noble, and spirit is their co-worker. Wild beasts, however, act because of pain, since they act because they have been struck or because they are frightened. For if they are in a forest, at any rate, they do not attack. Now it is not courage to rush into danger because of suffering pain or because of being driven on and impelled by spirit while foreseeing none of the terrible outcomes, since that way even hungry

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EN 7.6.1149b32–1150a1, EN 7.3.1147a25–b5 group non-human animals and children together as examples of beings who are incapable of action. The zoological treatises ascribe “actions” or perhaps “behavior” to non-human animals to differentiate species. See, for instance, HA 1.1.487a11–14, 7.1.588a17–20, 7.1.588b23–589a10, 7.12.596b20 ff. See further Lloyd, “Aristotle on the Natural Sociability” 280–284, Torres, “Philia” 11–13, and Morel, *La nature et le bien* 69–82.

<sup>15</sup> See EN 10: 3.2.1111b7–12, EE 2.10.1225b25–28, EE 2.10.1226b21–25, EE 7.2.1236b2–7; cf. EE 7.2.1238a32–35, EN 7.6.1149b32–1150a1, EE 7.6.1240b31–38.

<sup>16</sup> See EN 3.1.1111a22–27, 3.2.1111b7–12. See further Carron, “Aristotle on Blaming Animals,” and Elliott, “Aristotle on the Voluntary in Other Animals.” The *Eudemian* account fails to attribute voluntariness to non-human animals.

donkeys would be courageous, since they do not stop grazing when they are beaten.<sup>17</sup> (EN 3.8.1116b23–27, 30–1117a1)

[καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἀναφέρουσιν· ἀνδρεῖοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενα, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θυμοειδεῖς (ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους)... οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι, ἢ διὰ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ ἐάν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἦ, οὐ προσέρχονται. οὐ δὴ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε κἂν οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρεῖοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπτόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς.]

The thumotic behavior of non-human animals is decidedly non-deliberative: animals react or endure pain due to pleasure rather than from a deliberation about outcomes.<sup>18</sup> In such a fashion do the ethical treatises distinguish the “aesthetic” behavior of non-human animals from the deliberate action of mature human animals.

Although the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* treatises exhibit similar accounts of non-human animal quasi-cognitive capacities, they exhibit different accounts of non-human animal affective capacities particularly in the case of love or friendship. Both treatises agree that non-human animals experience intra-species parental and spousal love and that spousal love is characterized as a “community” (κοινωνία) for the sake of reproduction.<sup>19</sup> But on the subject of

<sup>17</sup> See also EN 3.1.1111a22–27, EN 3.2.1111b7–12, EE 2.10.1225b25–28, EE 3.1.1229a26–28, EE 3.1.1230a23–33.

<sup>18</sup> As Lloyd puts it, according to Aristotle’s ethical treatises “animals have certain *natural* capacities and characteristics; humans alone add *moral* ones and ones that depend on φρόνησις, practical reasoning and the capacity to give an account. We have προαίρεσις (choice), other animals just αἴρεσις (a type of choice not based on moral deliberation) (*Politics* 1256a26–7)” (“Aristotle on the Natural Sociability” 290, italics in the original).

<sup>19</sup> See EN 8.1.1155a16–21, 8.12.1162a16–24; EE 7.1.1235a29–35, 7.7.1241a35–b4, 7.10.1242a21–27. See further Hall, *Aristotle’s Way* 145–147, Torres “Philia,” and Lockwood “Aristotle on intra- and inter-species friendship.” Torres “Philia,” characterizes such friendships as “natural,” implying—I think incorrectly—that they are only qualified forms of friendship.

inter-species friendships between humans and non-human animals, the treatises appear to disagree. Whereas *Eudemian Ethics* 7.2 explicitly claims that humans can have friendships with non-human animals, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.11 appears to deny any friendship between humans and non-humans. The *Nicomachean* text claims that

**T4:** in the deviations [of constitutions], however, just as justice is found only to a small extent, so too is friendship, and it is found least in the worst one, since in tyranny there is little or no friendship. For in cases where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there is no friendship, since there is no justice either. Take for example the relation of craftsman to tool, and soul to body. The latter in each pair is benefitted by its user, but there is neither friendship nor justice towards soulless things. Nor is there any towards an ox or a horse, or even a slave, in so far as he is a slave; for master and slave have nothing in common, since a slave is a tool with a soul, while a tool is a slave without one. (*EN* 8.11.1161a30–b5)

[ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρεκβάσεσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπὶ μικρόν ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φιλία, καὶ ἤκιστα ἐν τῇ χειρίσθη· ἐν τυραννίδι γὰρ οὐδὲν ἢ μικρόν φιλίας. ἐν οἷς γὰρ μηδὲν κοινόν ἐστι τῶ ἄρχοντι καὶ ἀρχομένῳ, οὐδὲ φιλία· οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιον· ἀλλ’ οἷον τεχνίτη πρὸς ὄργανον καὶ ψυχῇ πρὸς σῶμα [καὶ δεσπότη πρὸς δοῦλον]· ὠφελεῖται μὲν γὰρ πάντα ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν χρωμένων, φιλία δ’ οὐκ ἐστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δοῦλος ἔμψυχον ὄργανον, τὸ δ’ ὄργανον ἄψυχος δοῦλος.]

Some scholars, such as Newmyer, *The Animal and the Human* 78, take **T4** to indicate that (in Newmyer’s words) Aristotle “comes rather close here to positing a moral divide between human and non-human animals.”<sup>20</sup> He appears to reason that if horses and oxen are akin to inanimate or soulless things, then both friendship and moral ties between humans and horses or oxen seem impossible.

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<sup>20</sup> Henry, “Aristotle on Animals” 23–25, and Cagnoli Fiecconi, “Elements of Biology in Aristotle’s Political Science” 220–221, concur with Newmyer’s reading, although Cagnoli Fiecconi thinks that *EN* 8.11 is inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle’s writings.

There are a number of problems with the claim that **T4** is Aristotle's categorical denial of friendship between human and non-human animals. First, **T4** is part of an extended discussion about similarities between political constitutions and household relations, a discussion at best tangentially connected to inter-species relationships. The context of **T4** speaks against reading **T4** as Aristotle's authoritative account of inter-species ethical ties. Secondly, reading **T4** as the categorical denial of inter-species relationships contradicts a claim made several lines earlier within the same discussion, namely Aristotle's assertion that

**T5:** the friendship of a king toward those he rules is in accord with his superiority as a benefactor. For he treats those he rules well, if indeed he is good, and supervises them to ensure that they do well, just as a shepherd does his sheep. (EN 8.11.1161a11–14)

[Καθ' ἐκάστην δὲ τῶν πολιτειῶν φιλία φαίνεται, ἐφ' ὅσον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, βασιλεῖ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς βασιλευμένους ἐν ὑπεροχῇ εὐεργεσίας· εὖ γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευμένους, εἴπερ ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἐπιμελεῖται αὐτῶν ἵν' εὖ πράττωσιν, ὥσπερ νομεὺς προβάτων.]

Although Aristotle rather clearly seeks to elucidate the king-subject relationship by comparing it to the shepherd-sheep relationship, Newmyer's interpretation seems to imply that Aristotle is a covert Thrasymachean who thinks that kings prey upon their subjects like shepherds prey upon their sheep.<sup>21</sup> The context of *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.11 suggests that **T4** cannot bear the exegetical burden of being Aristotle's allegedly categorical denial of inter-species relationships or ethical ties.

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<sup>21</sup> See *Republic* 1.343a7–c1. In the *Politics*, Aristotle identifies a "craft analogy" between correct constitutions and crafts like shepherding, which are directed towards the benefit of the object of the craft or rule (*Pol.* 3.6.1278b39-1279a8); see further Lockwood, *Aristotle's Account of Justice*, XXX–XXX. It is noteworthy that the commentary tradition on *EN* from Aspasius to Gauthier makes no reference to the alleged denial of justice or friendship to non-human animals in his discussion of the passage.

A closer look at Aristotle's Greek in **T4** also shows that the text fails to deny inter-species friendship between humans and animals and that translations that go beyond the Greek make questionable additions to what Aristotle actually says. Aristotle's Greek claims:

φιλία δ' οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν,  
οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ἢ δοῦλος. (8.11.1161b2–3)

The first sentence is simple enough: "There is no friendship towards soulless things, nor is there justice towards them." But what, precisely, is denied towards an ox or horse? "Nor is there any towards an ox or a horse" accurately translates Aristotle's Greek, but reading that "nor" to include both friendship and justice (or either friendship or justice) goes beyond the Greek text.<sup>22</sup> I think the passage is more plausibly read as denying claims of justice between humans and oxen or horses or slaves insofar as the ox, horse, or slave in question is property belonging to an individual, which one cannot "wrong" (as opposed to harm) insofar as one cannot wrong one's self or one's property. For instance, in Aristotle's account of domestic justice in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5, he claims that

**T6:** what is just for a master of slaves or for a father is not the same as [instances of political justice] but similar to them. For there is no unqualified injustice in relation to what is one's own, and our possession or our child, until it reaches a certain age and has been separated, is like a part of us. No one, however, deliberately chooses to harm himself. That is why there is no injustice in relation to oneself and hence nothing politically unjust or politically just either. (*EN* 5.6.1134b8–13)

[τὸ δὲ δεσποτικὸν δίκαιον καὶ τὸ πατρικὸν οὐ ταῦτόν τούτοις ἀλλ' ὅμοιον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀδικία πρὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀπλῶς, τὸ δὲ κτῆμα καὶ τὸ τέκνον, ἕως ἄν ἢ

<sup>22</sup> So too, I would argue, is Reeve, *Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics* 150, rendering of the passage: "Neither is their friendship toward a horse or an ox" (so too Pakaluk, *Nicomachean Ethics VIII–IX* 16). Broadie & Rowe, *Nicomachean Ethics* 220, Irwin, *Nicomachean Ethics* 132, and Rackham, *Nicomachean Ethics* 497, by contrast, translate more accurately, viz.: "but there is no friendship towards inanimate things, nor justice either, and no more is there towards a horse or an ox, or towards a slave insofar as he is a slave."

πηλίκον καὶ χωρισθῆ, ὥσπερ μέρος αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸν δ' οὐθεις προαιρεῖται βλάπτειν· διὸ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδικία πρὸς αὐτά· οὐδ' ἄρα ἄδικον οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ πολιτικόν.]

At least according to Aristotle, it is impossible to commit injustice towards one's own property. Indeed, although **T4** denies that there is justice towards a slave qua slave, the immediate sequel notes that there is both justice and friendship towards a slave qua human (8.11.1161b5–11) and Aristotle may have the same distinction in mind with respect to an ox or horse qua animal (rather than qua property).<sup>23</sup> But whatever Aristotle intended in **T4**, it seems incautious to read it as proof that Aristotle categorically denies either friendship or ethical ties between humans and non-human animals.

But perhaps the biggest problem with interpreting **T4** to deny anything common between human and non-human animals is the explicit *Eudemian* claim that there is friendship between them. The *Eudemian Ethics* quite clearly and explicitly claims that

**T7**: it is evident from these considerations that the primary kind of friendship, that of good people, is reciprocal friendship and reciprocal deliberate choice with regard to each other. For to one who loves, the object of love is a friend, and a friend, to the object of love, is when the love is also reciprocal. This kind of friendship, then, is surely found only among human beings (for they alone perceive deliberate choice). But the other kinds are also found among beasts; and it is evident that utility is present to some small extent among them both in relation to humankind, in the case of tame animals, and in relation to each other.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Oxen (for poorer households) and horses (for wealthier households) is Aristotle's standard way of referring to the animate possessions of the household: see *Pol.* 1.2.1252b9–13, 1.11.1258b11–7; [Arist.] *Oeconomica* (hereafter *Oec.*) 1.2.1343a19–23.

<sup>24</sup> In the *Politics* Aristotle notes that “tame,” or perhaps domesticated, animals (ἡμέροι) are better than wild ones and that their rule by humans secures their safety (*Pol.* 1.5.1254b10–14); cf. *Pol.* 1.8.1256b15–20, *Oec.* 1.3.1343b15–18. The *Historia Animalium* identifies “tameness” as a characteristic that animals exhibit that is similar in degree to humans (*HA* 8.1.588a21). Further, the work claims that tameness is a function of food shortage: based on the evidence of Egypt (where food was apparently abundant), Aristotle predicts that were food plentiful even the most

For example, Herodotus says that the crocodile bird is useful to the crocodile, and as prophets say of the associations and dissociations of birds. (EE 7.2.1236b2–10) [Φανερόν δ' ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἐστὶν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλοῦντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ φιλῶν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ μόνον ὑπάρχει ἡ φιλία, μόνος γὰρ αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις. καὶ γὰρ τὸ χρήσιμον ἐπὶ μικρὸν τι φαίνεται ἐνυπάρχον καὶ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον τοῖς ἡμέροις καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, οἷον τὸν τροχίλον φησὶν Ἡρόδοτος τῷ κροκοδείλῳ, καὶ ὡς οἱ μάντιες τὰς συνεδρίας καὶ διεδρίας λέγουσιν.]

**T4** claims that there is no inter-species justice or friendship because individuals have nothing in common (1161a33, b3), but the *Eudemian* account of friendship explicitly ascribes friendship and κοινωνία between human and non-human animals.<sup>25</sup>

The remainder of my chapter is a reflection on the implications of **T7** for understanding the relationship between the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, but let me establish the basic details of the passage. First, **T7** explains how non-human animals share in the good of friendship within an account of the three kinds of friendship, namely what the *Eudemian Ethics* calls “primary” friendship, pleasure friendship, and utility friendship. Although the *Eudemian Ethics* is at pains to claim that utility and pleasure friendships are indeed forms of friendship, the treatise operates with a more capacious understanding of friendship due to its “focal meaning” analysis of kinds of friendship. Although I deny that **T4** (or any other *Nicomachean* passage) rules out inter-species friendship in the *Nicomachean* account, as Rowe “Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics on Loving People and Things” 29–30, notes there are certainly differences in emphasis between the

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aggressive non-human animals would behave tamely towards humans and other animals (*HA* 8.1.608b26–609a3). See further Hall, *Aristotle’s Way* 174–176.

<sup>25</sup> The *Historia Animalium* claims that hawks and humans share something in partnership (κοινωνία) in their hunt (*HA* 9.36.620a33–b6). Dow, “Human and Animal Emotions” n. 11 p. 115, denies that the non-human animal friendship described in *HA* is like that ascribed to humans.

two ethical treatises. In the case of non-human animals, I will show that whereas the *Eudemian Ethics* explicitly affirms that inter-species relationships are friendships, the *Nicomachean Ethics* generally remains silent on the subject. Thus, the question for the remainder of my chapter is as follows: If the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* accounts of friendship provide different emphases about human and non-human animal friendship, are there systemic differences between the two treatises that can explain that different emphasis? Let me next examine the goals, definitions of friendship, and the political orientations of the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* ethical treatises to see how they relate to the difference in doctrine concerning non-human animals.

## Part II: Non-human animals and the projects of the *Eudemian Ethics*

Although the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics* both deny that non-human animals are capable of activity that constitutes *eudaimonia* or flourishing, they differ fundamentally in the goals of their investigations. For example, the *Nicomachean Ethics* adduces in support of the claim that the contemplative life is superior to the practical life the argument that

**T8:** other animals do not share in happiness, being completely deprived of this sort of activity. Hence the life of the gods is blessed throughout; that of human beings is so to the extent that it has something similar to this sort of activity, whereas of the other animals, none is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. (*EN* 10.8.1178b24–28)

[τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῶων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῆ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας.]

Similarly, the *Eudemian Ethics* describes the life of philosophy as some “divine form of study” (*EE* 1.4.1215b1, 13–14) and claims that for one deprived of the pleasures of knowledge or sight, “one

might just as well be born a beast as a human being” (EE 1.5.1215b31–35). Thus, at first glance the ethical treatises seem to agree about the anthropocentric focus of their investigations.<sup>26</sup>

But when we look at the goods in which non-human animals can share, one detects a subtle but important difference between the two treatises. Aristotle’s initial characterization of happiness in the *Eudemian Ethics* and a programmatic statement of the work’s goals claims that

**T9:** happiness is surely agreed to be the greatest and best of human goods. We say “human” because perhaps there could also be happiness for some other superior being—for example, for a god. For of the other animals, the ones that are inferior in nature to human beings, none shares in meriting this title; for no horse, bird, or fish is happy, nor any other being that does not, as the name suggests, have in its nature a share of something divine. Instead, one lives better and another worse in accord with some other way of sharing in good things. But that this is the way things stand must be investigated later on. (EE 1.7.1217a21–30)

[ὁμολογεῖται δὴ μέγιστον εἶναι καὶ ἄριστον τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων (ἀνθρώπινον δὲ λέγομεν ὅτι τάχ’ ἂν εἴη καὶ βελτιονός τις ἄλλου τῶν ὄντων εὐδαιμονία, οἷον θεοῦ). τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα χείρω τὴν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, οὐθὲν κοινωνεῖ ταύτης τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν εὐδαίμων ἵππος οὐδ’ ὄρνις οὐδ’ ἰχθύς οὐδ’ ἄλλο τῶν ὄντων οὐθὲν ὁ μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει μετέχει θείου τινός, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν μετοχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ζῆ τὸ δὲ χεῖρον αὐτῶν. Ἄλλ’ ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.]

Both *Nicomachean T8* and *Eudemian T9* agree: non-human animals do not share in happiness.

But *Eudemian T9* also expresses interest in the question of how non-human animals share in goods and live better or worse lives, a topic absent from the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Indeed, Aristotle’s promissory note that such a question “must be examined later” (ὕστερον

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<sup>26</sup> EN 1.9.1099b29–1100a3 also denies that non-human animals share in happiness. Although EN ascribes pleasures that are unique to each non-human animal species, such pleasure does not rise to the level of happiness or well-being and appears limited to the sensation of touch (see EN 10.5.1176a3–9, EN 3.10.1118a16–b8, and EE 3.2.1230b36–1231a17; cf. EN 7.11.1152b19–20 and EN 7.12.1153a28–31). See further Lockwood, “The Politics of Non-Human Animal Pleasure in Aristotle’s Ethical writings.”

ἐπισκεπτέον) makes quite clear that how non-human animals share in goods is on the agenda of the *Eudemian Ethics*. Unfortunately, Aristotle’s promissory note does not identify the place (or places) in which the question of how non-human animals share in goods will be investigated. But the *Eudemian Ethics* includes a number of substantive discussions about how non-human animals share in goods, including the discussions of the virtues of temperance and courage, animal foresight, friendship, and how non-human animals share in unconditional goods.<sup>27</sup> I see no reason why the promissory note should be limited to a single discussion; rather, I take the promissory note more generally to indicate that the question of how non-human animals share in goods is integral (even if subordinate) to Aristotle’s project in the *Eudemian Ethics*. Let us next look at how the *Eudemian Ethics* creates the conceptual space to claim that non-human animals share in the good of friendship.

### **Part III: Non-human animals and the kinds of friendship in the ethical treatises**

The *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics* also differ in their explanations of how different kinds of friendship inter-relate: whereas the *Nicomachean* account claims that “coincidental” utility and pleasure friendships only resemble “complete” or virtue friendship, the *Eudemian*

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<sup>27</sup> Simpson, *Eudemian Ethics of Aristotle* 217, suggests that Aristotle most likely has in mind the discussion of human and animal pleasure in common book 6 (namely, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7). But as both Inwood/Woolf, *Aristotle Eudemian Ethics* n. 17 10, and Reeve, *Aristotle Eudemian Ethics* n.55 165, note, the *Eudemian Ethics* includes a number of substantive discussions about how non-human animals share in goods, including pleasure (*EE* 6.8.1148b15–24 and 6.13.1153b25–54a7), ethical virtues (*EE* 3.9.1230b36–1231a17 and 3.1.1230a23–33), animal foresight (*EE* 4.7.1141a22–28), friendship (*EE* 7.1.1235a29–35 and 7.2.1236b6–10), and unconditional goods (*EE* 7.2.1235b30–1236a5).

account claims that utility and pleasure friendships exhibit a “focal meaning” related to the primary sense of friendship, which is virtue friendship.<sup>28</sup> I submit that explaining the inter-relationship of the kinds of friendship by means of their focal meaning (rather than by resemblance) allows for a broader classification of friendship, one which creates the conceptual space for the recognition of inter-species friendships. Ultimately, the *Eudemian* account embraces the more capacious notion of friendship so that it can “save the phenomena” of friendship, namely that it can account for conflicting opinions, such as the belief that humans can have rich inter-species relationships and non-human animals can have intra-species relationships that deserve to be called friendship. Let me first explain the definition and species of friendships in the *Nicomachean* account and then contrast it with the focal meaning account of friendship in the *Eudemian* account.

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<sup>28</sup> Interpretation of the *Eudemian* πρὸς ἕν or “focal meaning” account of friendship is quite contested. Fortenbaugh, “Aristotle’s Analysis of Friendship,” argues (against the ancient commentator Aspasius) that the *Eudemian* account is unrelated to the *Nicomachean* account and that the *Eudemian* account fails to show any relation between primary friendship (the “ἕν” of the account) and pleasure or utility friendships; Price, *Love and Friendship*, expands upon Fortenbaugh’s criticisms, many of which Frede, “The definition of friendship,” also endorses. Pakaluk, “*Eudemian* versus *Nicomachean* Friendship,” recognizes the connection between the “focal meaning” account of friendship and its inclusion of non-human animal friendship. Ward, “Focal Reference in Aristotle’s Account of Φιλία,” and Kenny “Aristotle on Friendship” respond to the critiques of Fortenbaugh and Price. Zingano, “The Conceptual Unity of Friendship,” defends both the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* accounts of the variety of friendships by denying their difference. Although detailed analysis of the argument goes beyond my chapter, regardless of whether one follows the defenders or critics of *pros hen* analysis in *EE* 7.2, at least one intent of the text is quite clear, namely to provide a more capacious notion of friendship that includes friendships involving non-human animals.

Although Aristotle’s definition of friendship and his account of its kinds in the *Nicomachean Ethics* present their own exegetical challenges, I take its core components to be contained in the following dialectical passage:

**T10:** But to a friend, it is said, we must wish good things for his own sake. Those who wish good things to someone in this way, however, if the same wish is not reciprocated, are said to have goodwill toward him, since friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill. Or should we add “that does not go unawares”? For many have goodwill towards people they have never seen but take to be decent or useful, and one of the latter might feel the same way towards one of them. That these people have goodwill toward each other is evident, but how could we call them friends when they are unaware of how they are mutually disposed? Hence friends [1] must have goodwill (that is, wish good things) [2] for each other because of one of the things we mentioned and [3] not be unaware of it. (*EN* 8.2.1155b31–1156a5; numerals inserted)

[τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ εὖνους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ ταύτῳ καὶ παρ’ ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὖνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονημένοι φιλίαν εἶναι. ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; πολλοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν εὖνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· τοῦτο δὲ ταύτῳ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθει πρὸς τοῦτον· εὖνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις, φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; δεῖ ἄρα εὖνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι’ ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων.]

According to this passage, what I will call the paradigmatic *EN* case of friendship involves three conditions: [1] a friend wishes what is good (or has good will [εὖνοια]) to the befriended for the befriended’s own sake; [2] the friend’s good will is reciprocated by the befriended; [3] the friend is aware of the good will reciprocated by the befriended. Since there are three objects of loving—the good, the pleasant, and the useful (8.1.1155b18–19)—it follows that “in the case of each proper object of love there is a corresponding way of reciprocal loving that does not go unawares, and those who love each other wish good things to the other in the way in which they love.”<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> καθ’ ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τὰγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτη ἢ φιλοῦσιν (*EN* 8.3.1156a8–10).

Such paradigmatic forms of friendship, in the *Nicomachean* account, are found *only* in the “complete friendship” between good people and such reciprocal loving presupposes that its members share the same character state and thus the same deliberate choice (*EN* 8.3.1156b6–16, 8.5.1157b29–31). The *Nicomachean* account distinguishes such paradigmatic forms of friendship from “coincidental” friendships in which individuals do not love each other for their own sakes but only for the pleasure or utility that they provide (*EN* 8.3.1156a10–19).<sup>30</sup> Such coincidental friendships concern what is useful and what is pleasant and are called friendship because of their similarity or resemblance to complete friendship—and Aristotle calls them friendships only begrudgingly.<sup>31</sup> About such coincidental friendships, the *Nicomachean* version claims that

**T11:** since people apply the name ‘friends’ even to those who feel affection because of utility, just as they do with cities (since alliances seem to come about between cities for the sake of what is advantageous), and also apply it to those who feel affection for each other because of pleasure (just as in the case of children), so then perhaps we too should call even such people ‘friends’, while saying that there are more forms of friendship than one. (*EN* 8.4.1157a25–30).  
[ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωποι λέγουσι φίλους καὶ τοὺς διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον, ὥσπερ αἱ πόλεις (δοκοῦσι γὰρ αἱ συμμαχίαι ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ συμφέροντος), καὶ τοὺς δι’ ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλους στέργοντας, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες, ἴσως λέγειν μὲν δεῖ καὶ ἡμᾶς φίλους τοὺς τοιούτους, εἶδη δὲ τῆς φιλίας πλείω.]

Although the *Nicomachean* account recognizes three kinds of friendship, namely complete friendship (which exists only between good people) and two forms of “coincidental” friendship (namely, those based in the utility or pleasure a person produces), the coincidental forms of friendship appear to lack essential characteristics of the definition of friendship, such as loving

<sup>30</sup> “Coincidental” translates κατὰ συμβεβηκός (*EN* 8.3.1156a16–17, 8.3.1156b11, 8.4.1157b4–5), which I take Aristotle to be contrasting with καθ’ αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν (*EN* 8.3.1156a11, 1156b9).

<sup>31</sup> See *EN* 8.4.1156b35–1157a2, 1157a30–33, 1157b3–5.

the other because of the other's character traits or wishing good to the other for the other's sake.<sup>32</sup>

Although there are important similarities between the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian* accounts of friendship, the framework and scope of what counts as friendship in the latter is different. At several points in the *Eudemian Ethics*—including in the preamble to the chapter on friendship—Aristotle claims that we must adopt an account (λόγος) that lays out conflicting views or opinions about the matter but nonetheless remains “in close agreement with the appearances” (ὁμολογούμενος ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος τοῖς φαινομένοις [EE 7.1.1235b16–17]).<sup>33</sup> As the sequel will show, to claim that a person is a friend *only* in the primary sense of the term is “to do violence to the appearances” (βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενά [EE 7.2.1236b22]).<sup>34</sup> Aristotle's

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<sup>32</sup> Much of what I say is the subject of extended scholarly disagreement; Rowe “Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* on Loving People and Things” 30–32, succinctly outlines that disagreement over the last half-century.

<sup>33</sup> EN 7.1 (a book common to *EE* and *EN*) proclaims that “we must set down what appears to be the case (τιθέντας τὰ φαινόμενα) and, after first puzzling through those appearances, we must display all the reputable beliefs (τὰ ἔνδοξα) about these conditions” (EN 7.1.1145b4–8). The *Eudemian* account of friendship lays out opposing views (e.g. EE 7.1.1235a10–11, 1235a30–31), draws up or identifies puzzles related to those views (e.g. EE 7.1.1235a4–5, 7.2.1235b18–19), and repeatedly insists that an adequate account of friendship must be consistent with “the appearances” (τὰ φαινόμενα) concerning friendship (e.g., EE 7.1.1235a31, 7.2.1235b16–17, 7.2.1236a25–26, 7.2.1236b21–22). The *Eudemian Ethics* also includes a general methodological discussion, which claims that “we seek conviction through argument, using the appearances as witnesses and examples (ζητεῖν τὴν πίστιν διὰ τῶν λόγων μαρτυρίοις καὶ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον τοῖς φαινομένοις [EE 1.6.1216b26–35]). Karbowski “Phainomena as Witnesses and Examples,” argues persuasively that the method described in EE 1.6—which he characterizes as the “global methodology” of the *Eudemian Ethics*—is fundamentally different than that described in EN 7.1, but Karbowski, *Aristotle's Method in Ethics* 131, concedes that the method used in EE 7.2 “expresses a topic-specific norm restricted to the inquiry into friendship.”

<sup>34</sup> Kreft, “Aristotle on Friendship and Being Human,” is one of the few works that recognizes that non-human animals can have pleasure and utility friendships, and yet she argues that “what Aristotle considers to be proper friendship is indeed a uniquely human type of relationship”

zoological writings scientifically describe the loving between non-human animals as “friendship” and the *Eudemian Ethics* repeatedly draws upon such examples. I imagine an opponent to such language saying “the behavior that pigeon spouses exhibit is a simulacrum of human spousal love; but it is not *really* friendship—since birds lack deliberate choice or the intentionality to wish what is good for another’s sake.”<sup>35</sup> The focal meaning account of friendship in the *Eudemian Ethics* seems a direct response to such an opponent: it is intended *both* to apply non-grudgingly the term “friendship” to non-human animal relationships *and* to preserve the claim that there is a primary sense of friendship that captures many of the characteristics of the “complete friendship” described in both the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*.

A “focal meaning” analysis presupposes phenomena that are neither predicated categorically nor ambiguously. The *Eudemian* account of friendship describes it as follows:

**T12:** It is necessary, therefore, for there to be three kinds of friendship, and not all said in the same sense, or as species of a single genus, or altogether ambiguously.<sup>36</sup> For they are said to be friendships with reference to one primary kind, as with “medical”; for we say that a soul, a body, an instrument, and a function are medical, but the primary one is said to be so in the full sense. And primary is that whose account is present in all cases. For example, a medical

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(which she believes requires νοῦς) (182). But such an interpretation seems exactly what *EE* 7.2.1236b22 criticizes. Hall, *Aristotle’s Way*, seems much closer to the *Eudemian* “appearances.”

<sup>35</sup> For discussion of the spousal love of pigeons, see *HA* 9.7.612b33–613a7. I am honored to note that in response to different presentations of this chapter, Christopher Rowe (Durham), Pierre-Marie Morel (Sorbonne), and Raphael Wolff (ICS) have articulated precisely this complaint—a complaint which I take it *EE* already anticipates.

<sup>36</sup> Things said “ambiguously” (or in Aristotle’s technical term “homonymously”) share a name but have entirely different definitions (for example, the word “key” (in Greek κλείς) means the clavicle of an animal and an instrument to open a door [*EN* 5.1.1129a29–31]). See further *Categories* 1.1a1–12, *EE* 7.2.136b23–27. Scholars are divided on whether the *Eudemian* account of focal meaning is consistent with other discussions of focal meaning in Aristotle’s writings; see further Shields, *Order in Multiplicity*, 67–70.

instrument is one the doctor would use, but the account of the instrument is not present in that of the doctor. (*EE* 7.2.1236a16–22)

[Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τρία φιλίας εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μήτε καθ' ἓν ἀπάσας μηδ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνὸς γένους μήτε πάμπαν λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως. πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρώτην, ὡσπερ τὸ ἰατρικόν, καὶ ψυχὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ὄργανον καὶ ἔργον, ἀλλὰ κυρίως τὸ πρῶτον. πρῶτον δ' οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐν πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὄργανον ἰατρικόν ᾧ ἂν ὁ ἰατρὸς χρήσαιτο, ἐν δὲ τῷ τοῦ ἰατροῦ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ ὄργανου.]

Aristotle's analysis in *EE* 7.2 is at times digressive, at times highly compressed, and in several places the Greek text is contested; my treatment cannot provide a full reconstruction of the argument.<sup>37</sup> Nonetheless, I believe that *EE* 7.2 has two non-contested takeaway points relevant to my chapter. The first takeaway point is that in *EE* 7.2, like *EN* 8.3 (or more specifically **T10**), Aristotle stipulates that one becomes a friend “whenever, being loved, he loves in return and when both people are aware of this situation.”<sup>38</sup> As the analysis proceeds, Aristotle adds that the true or complete friend also is one whom one wishes good things for his own sake.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the

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<sup>37</sup> On my reading, Aristotle's focal meaning analysis of friendship in *EE* 7.2 proceeds through seven stages: (1) Preliminary statement of what the account (λόγος) seeks to establish (1235b13–23); (2) statement of the account's “principles” (1235b24–1236a7); (3) definition of a friend (φίλος) that establishes the “one” to which other cases of friendship are related (1236a7–15); (4) identification of the different ways that friendship is predicated (1236a15–22); (5) explanation of the mistake that leads to conflicting appearances (1236a22–32); (6) characterization of the three different kinds of friendship (1236a33–b21); (7) reiteration of conclusion and criticism of those “who do violence to the appearances” (1236b21–32). Within the text of my chapter I summarize and restate highlights from stages (3), (6), and (7) of the analysis.

<sup>38</sup> φίλος δὴ γίνεται ὅταν φιλούμενος ἀντιφιλήῃ, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ λανθάνῃ πως αὐτοῦς (*EE* 7.2.1236a14–15); cf. *EE* 7.2.1236b2–6. Aristotle's definition of the friend also satisfies one of the desiderata identified at *EE* 7.1.1234b18.

<sup>39</sup> βούλεται τις δι' αὐτὸν...τάγαθα (*EE* 7.2.1236b28–30). Rowe, “Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics on Loving People and Things,” claims that the *Eudemian* account includes wishing the good to utility and pleasure friends for their own selves, based on the discussion of εὐνοία in *EE* 7.7. But if εὐνοία becomes integral to utility and pleasure friendships, then I suspect that they will exclude non-human animals.

first takeaway point: on the core notions of primary or complete friendship—reciprocated loving, wishing goods to the beloved for the beloved’s own sake, and mutual awareness of such loving—the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean* accounts seem in agreement.

The second takeaway point is that *EE* 7.2 and *EN* 8.4 strongly disagree about the status of pleasure and utility friendships. The *Eudemian* view is that

**T13:** to say that a person is a friend only in [the primary] sense is to do violence to the appearances and one must make paradoxical statements.<sup>40</sup> But it is impossible for all of them to be friendships in accord with a single account. So, what remains is this: in a sense, only the primary kind is friendship, but in another sense all are, not ambiguously and in a mere chance relationship to each other, and also not in accordance with a single form, but rather with reference to a single form. (*EE* 7.2.1236b21–26)

[τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκείνως μόνον λέγειν τὸν φίλον βιάζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι, καὶ παράδοξα λέγειν ἀναγκαῖον· καθ’ ἓνα δὲ λόγον πάσας ἀδυνατόν. λείπεται τοίνυν οὕτως, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς μόνη ἡ πρώτη φιλία, ἐστὶ δ’ ὡς πᾶσαι, οὔτε ὡς ὁμώνυμοι καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχουσαι πρὸς αὐτάς, οὔτε καθ’ ἓν εἶδος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἓν.]

One could imagine an opponent denying that non-human animals are capable of friendship because they lack deliberate choice. To which the *Eudemian* account explicitly responds: friendship grounded in reciprocated deliberate choice “is a kind of friendship found only among human beings (for they alone are aware of decision [αἰσθάνεται προαιρέσεως]), but the other kinds of friendship are also found among wild animals” (*EE* 7.2.1236b5–7). Regardless of the complexities, compression, and even criticisms of the focal meaning account of friendship in the

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<sup>40</sup> The fifth stage of the analysis identifies the source of the opponent’s mistake: they erroneously reason that since the universal (καθόλου) is primary (πρῶτον), what is primary is also universal (*EE* 7.2.1236a23–30). What Aristotle seems to have in mind is the claim that, for instance, if the primary sense of friendship includes reciprocated love and deliberative choice (ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις [*EE* 7.2.1236b3]), then all forms of friendship include reciprocated love and deliberative choice (and any relationship that lacks those features cannot be called a friendship).

*Eudemian Ethics*, that its intention is to offer a more capacious notion of friendship is clear. It seems hard to imagine that such a widening of the notion of friendship is unrelated to the status of affective relations with and between non-human animals since the account explicitly invokes non-human animal friendship. It is impossible to know whether Aristotle broadens the notion of friendship so as to include animals or whether he broadens the notion to make it consistent with the proper usage of the term and it just so happens to include animals. But in either case, the *Eudemian* account clearly and explicitly makes room for inter-species friendships between human and non-human animals.

## Conclusion

By means of conclusion, consider how the *Nicomachean Ethics* views a non-human animal such as a horse. The *Nicomachean Ethics* offers a relatively straightforward depiction of such a being to illustrate the relationship between “function” and “virtue”:

**T14:** We should say, then, that every virtue, regardless of what thing it is the virtue of, both completes the good state of that thing and makes it perform its function well—as, for example, the virtue of an eye makes both the eye and its function excellent, since it is by dint of the eye’s virtue that we see well. Similarly, the virtue of a horse makes the horse excellent—that is, good at running, carrying its rider, and standing firm against enemies.<sup>41</sup> (*EN* 2.6.1106a15–21)

[Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ἡ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν· οἷον ἢ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ (τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὀρῶμεν)· ὁμοίως δὲ ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους.]

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<sup>41</sup> In *Republic* 1 (352d8–e3) Socrates claims that horses have a function, but he fails to identify it (beyond saying that a function is “that which one can do only with it, or best with it”). *Pol.* 1.2.1252b31–33 identifies the horse as a being with a *telos* or end (like a human or a household).

That a virtue perfects its possessor and allows its possessor to function well is, of course, standard Aristotelian ethics. But that a horse's "excellence" or what makes it σπουδαῖον is what makes it capable to bear a human rider or to carry that human rider into battle as a member of the cavalry looks profoundly anthropocentric and it is hard to imagine how else a political orientation views the natural world.<sup>42</sup> From a political or polis-centric perspective, non-human animals are ultimately the objects of household management (namely, the science of natural resource acquisition [χρηματιστική]). It is telling that the *Politics* claims that household management is the domain not only of the household manager but also the statesman.<sup>43</sup>

Scholars interested in the moral status of non-human animals have generally characterized Aristotle's view of the subject in terms of anthropocentrism. Although I have tried to show it is wrong to claim that Aristotle denies moral status to non-human animals (especially based on misinterpretations of *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.11), I also suspect that the political perspective of the *Nicomachean Ethics* views such non-human animals from the architectonic

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<sup>42</sup> According to Aristotle, the science of horsemanship (ἵππικὴ) is a subordinate military science (πολεμική) which ultimately falls under the science of generalship (στρατηγική [EN 1.1.1094a10–14]). Hall, *Aristotle's Way*, approvingly quotes Louis MacNeice's *Autumn Journal*, canto 12:

"Aristotle was better who watched the insect breed,  
The natural world develop,  
Stressing the function, scrapping the Form in Itself,  
Taking the horse from the shelf and letting it gallop" (9).

I think MacNeice accurately captures Aristotle the zoologist and the *Eudemian* ethical philosopher; I don't think it captures the *Nicomachean* statesman. For a similar position, see Zatta, *Aristotle and the Animals*, 198–201.

<sup>43</sup> See *Pol.* 1.8.1256b28–37, 1.10.1258a19–27, 1.11.1259a32–36. Aristotle describes the teleology of such natural resource management at *Pol.* 1.8.1256b8–26. See further Brill, *Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life*, 207–29.

framework of the human good, a perspective according to which a horse is not a member of an ecological community of plants and other animals, but rather as a being whose purpose is to serve as a domesticated conveyor of human cavalry. Thus, scholars who characterize Aristotle's views of nature as anthropocentric need to amend their allegation: it is Aristotle's political view of animals that is anthropocentric, not necessarily his ethical view. But I hope my chapter successfully shows that Aristotle's political view of non-human animals does not exhaust his thoughts on the matter. If I am correct, then the apolitical status of the *Eudemian Ethics* may afford a different perspective on non-human animals, namely as objects of explanation, as objects of friendship, and as Hall, *Aristotle's Way*, has recently suggested, fellow members of our ecological community (171–73).<sup>44</sup>

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