Why Naïve Realism?

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Abstract: Much of the discussion of Naïve Realism about veridical experience has focused on a consequence of adopting it—namely, disjunctivism about perceptual experience. However, the motivations for being a Naïve Realist in the first place have received relatively little attention in the literature. In this paper, I will elaborate and defend the claim that Naïve Realism provides the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience.

The theory of experience known as ‘Naïve Realism’ has generated a lot of discussion in recent years. It’s a theory of veridical experience, that is, an experience in which a subject perceives things, and they appear to the subject to have certain properties because the subject perceives those properties. For example, I’m currently having a veridical visual experience of the banana on my desk: I see it, and it looks to me to be yellow and crescent-shaped because I perceive the banana’s yellowness and crescent-shapedness. Contrast an illusory experience in which I see a banana that looks yellow to me even though it’s really green: in this case, the reason why the banana looks yellow to me isn’t that I see its yellowness (it doesn't have any yellowness for me to see).

Naïve Realism is the view that veridical experience fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving things in her environment and some of their properties. For example, according to the Naïve Realist, my veridical experience of the banana fundamentally consists in my perceiving it, and certain of its properties (its yellowness and its crescent-shapedness). Of course, practically everyone agrees that the subject of a veridical experience perceives things in her environment and some of their properties. But not everyone agrees that veridical experience fundamentally consists in such a state of affairs—in other words, not everyone agrees that this state of affairs constitutes the metaphysical structure of veridical experience.

This talk of fundamentality and metaphysical structure is simply a way of gesturing at the explanatory tasks of a philosophical theory of perceptual experience. The explananda that have loomed the largest are the phenomenal character of experience, the epistemological role of experience, and the role experience plays in facilitating action. For example, my current perceptual experience contributes something to ‘what it’s like’ for me right now; and in virtue of having it, I’m disposed to believe that there’s a banana before me, and to move my arm in a certain direction if I fancy eating a banana. What my experience fundamentally consists in (i.e. its metaphysical structure) is that which provides the ultimate personal-level psychological explanation of these phenomenal, epistemological, and behavioural facts. Of course, there are further subpersonal psychological facts (e.g. the perceptual processing in the brain that takes place between stimulation of the sensory organs and experience), and

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further non-psychological facts (e.g. the biological and chemical facts that underlie such processing) that are explanatorily relevant, but identifying these isn’t within the philosopher’s remit.

According to Naïve Realism, the ultimate personal-level psychological explanation of the phenomenal, epistemological and behavioural features of a veridical experience is the fact that the subject perceives things in her environment (e.g. a banana) and some of their properties (e.g. its yellowness and its crescent-shapedness). Contrast the account given by Naïve Realism’s main rival, Intentionalism. Intentionalism comes in many varieties, but the common thread running through all of them is the claim that all experiences (including veridical ones) fundamentally consist in the subject representing her environment as being a certain way. For example, according to an Intentionalist, the veridical experience I’m having right now fundamentally consists in my visually representing that (say) there’s a yellow, crescent shaped thing before me. It’s not that Intentionalists deny that the subject of a veridical experience perceives things in her environment—all they deny is that her experience fundamentally consists in this fact. That is, they deny that this fact is the ultimate, personal-level psychological explanation of the phenomena under investigation.²

Most of the discussion about Naïve Realism has focused on a consequence of the view: disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism is roughly the view that veridical experiences and at least total hallucinations are fundamentally different.³ Total hallucinations are experiences in which the subject doesn’t perceive anything in her environment at all—for example, an experience had by a brain in a vat. Naïve Realism arguably entails disjunctivism: since total hallucinations don’t involve the subject perceiving anything in her environment, they can’t fundamentally consist in perceiving things in her environment. Hence, they have a radically different metaphysical structure than that of veridical experiences.⁴

There has been a lot of resistance to disjunctivism about perceptual experience.⁵ But strangely, there hasn’t been all that much discussion of why we should adopt the view that entails it. Of course, proponents of Naïve Realism have offered arguments for their view, but they haven’t generated nearly as much discussion as disjunctivism has.

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² Similarly, Naïve Realists need not deny that veridical experience consists in the subject representing her environment as being a certain way (although many do)—the core of the view is the denial that veridical experience fundamentally consists in this fact. (See Logue forthcoming-b and forthcoming-c for elaboration of this idea.)
³ For extensive discussions of disjunctivism about perceptual experience (including how to formulate the view), see (e.g.) the papers collected in part I of Haddock and Macpherson 2008, the papers collected in Byrne and Logue 2008, and Logue forthcoming-a.
⁴ Although for a theory of hallucination that allows a Naïve Realist to eschew disjunctivism, see Johnston 2004.
The motivation for Naïve Realism that presumably gave the view its name is based on the idea that it is the common sense theory of veridical experience. But there are other, more sophisticated arguments: M.G.F. Martin (2002) claims that only Naïve Realism can account for sensory imagination, John McDowell (on some interpretations) claims that a view along the lines of Naïve Realism affords a way out of scepticism about the external world (see McDowell 1982 and 2008) and John Campbell (2002) claims that only Naïve Realism can explain certain representational capacities we have. I don’t find any of these arguments for Naïve Realism persuasive, but I don’t have the space to criticise them here. Rather, the task of this paper is to develop and defend what I take to be a more promising case for Naïve Realism.

Here is a broad outline of the case: Naïve Realism offers an account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience that constitutes a middle path between two undesirable extremes, and it does so in a way that accounts for a certain epistemological role of phenomenal character. In sections I and II, I will outline the extremes and explain why they are undesirable. In section III, I will explain how Naïve Realism can provide a middle path between them. Naïve Realism isn’t the only theory of perceptual experience with this benefit, however, so more needs to be said in order to motivate Naïve Realism over all of its rivals. In section IV, I will outline an epistemological role played by phenomenal character, and explain why only Naïve Realism can account for it.

I. Kantianism. We can situate on a spectrum views about the relationship between the phenomenal character of veridical experience, on the one hand, and the properties one perceives of the mind-independent objects one perceives, on the other. (For brevity’s sake, I’ll often refer to the latter as ‘the properties one perceives’ from here on out; the reader should assume that these properties are properties of mind-independent objects.) I’ll call one extreme Kantianism. Kant is often interpreted as claiming that we can’t have knowledge of things as they are ‘in themselves’—the only knowledge we can have of things is knowledge of how they affect us (see e.g. Langton 1998). There is a view of phenomenal character in a broadly similar spirit, namely: the phenomenal character of a veridical experience can in principle vary independently of the properties one perceives in the course of having it, because the former is entirely determined by features of the subject which aren’t determined by the latter. This view is Kantian in that it presupposes a gulf between the ‘phenomenal world’ and the noumenal realm that gives rise to it—if the phenomenal character of veridical experience can radically vary across possible worlds while we hold the properties perceived fixed, the looseness of the connection between them constitutes a gulf between phenomenal character and the ‘noumenal’ causes of experience.6

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6 The label ‘Kantianism’ is somewhat inappropriate, since the view it refers to allows that you could come to know that something is yellow in itself (‘noumenally speaking’). The fact that the phenomenal character of an experience of yellowness is merely contingently correlated with yellowness doesn’t obviously entail that one can’t know that something is yellow in itself (perhaps the phenomenal character is a contingently reliable indicator of yellowness). However, the view about phenomenal character is broadly similar in spirit to the view about knowledge, in that it posits a gulf between our subjective perspective on things and how they are in themselves.
In order to clarify this rather abstract statement of Kantianism, let us consider an example of the view. One of the more popular examples of Kantianism is the ‘mental paint’ view (see e.g. Block 1996). ‘Mental paint’ is a metaphor for *intrinsically non-representational qualia*: features of experience that determine what it’s like to have the experience, and represent certain properties, but could have represented properties other than the ones they actually do (or none at all). For example, when I have an experience of a yellow thing, my experience instantiates a quale that partially determines the phenomenal character of my experience—it’s what’s responsible for ‘phenomenal yellowness’. This quale in fact represents yellowness, but if things had gone differently (e.g. if the course of evolutionary history had diverged so as to result in a different ‘wiring’ of human brains), this quale could have represented greenness instead. On this view, the phenomenal character of my experience is determined by something that isn’t determined by the properties I perceive—namely, a quale connected to yellowness only by the contingent fact that it happens to represent yellowness.

Full-fledged Kantianism isn’t a popular view. This is because it’s more plausible with respect to the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of some properties than others. For example, it is at least prima facie plausible with respect to colour properties, but not plausible with respect to shape properties. When it comes to the phenomenology of colour experience, it’s hard to resist the conclusion that we’re bringing a lot more to the table than the objects of experiences are. As Adam Pautz notes, ‘the character of color experience is not well-correlated with the character of the reflectances of external objects’ (2011, p. 405). For example, given that the phenomenology associated with veridical experiences of yellow things is normally caused by things with a wide variety of surface spectral reflectance (SSR) properties, it seems plausible that the sameness of phenomenology across such experiences is primarily due to the fact that *our visual systems* happen to respond to the disparate SSR properties in the same way. On the other hand, when it comes to the phenomenology of *shape* experience, it’s hard to resist the conclusion that the shapes *themselves* are doing most of the work in determining phenomenal character. For the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of crescent-shapedness is well-correlated with certain features of external objects (for example, the phenomenal character associated with veridical experiences of crescent-shaped things is well-correlated with a certain arrangement of things’ parts).

The upshot is that, while Kantianism is at least prima facie plausible with respect to the phenomenology of veridical experiences of *some* sorts of

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7 Note that talk of representing properties (e.g. ‘representing crescent-shapedness’) is just a shorthand way of referring to states that have representational contents in which the property of crescent-shapedness is attributed to something. Hence, it would be more accurate to talk of representation of property *instances*: but for the sake of brevity I’ll speak loosely.

8 This view can take the form of a *restricted* version of Kantianism. For example, one might hold that while the phenomenal character of *colour* experience is determined by mental paint, the phenomenal character of *shape* experience is determined by features of experience that *necessarily* represent particular shapes. (Thanks to Adam Pautz for pressing me to mention this qualification.)
properties (e.g. colour properties), it is implausible with respect to others (e.g. shape properties). Hence, Kantianism shouldn’t be assumed by a theory of perceptual experience—it should be argued for on a case-by-case basis. We need to leave room for non-Kantian accounts of what it’s like to perceive at least some properties.

II. Berkeleyian realism. So much for the Kantian end of the spectrum. I’ll call the other extreme Berkeleyian realism. As Bill Brewer notes (2011), Berkeley (along with other early moderns) held that what it’s like to have an experience is entirely determined by the properties one perceives. According to Berkeley, the objects that instantiate these properties are mind-dependent ‘ideas’, and such things exhaust our ontological inventory—there are no mind-independent objects ‘behind’ them. The result is a theory of phenomenal character that has no place on the spectrum under discussion. Since there are no mind-independent objects, the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experiences breaks down. Hence, there is no such thing as the phenomenal character of veridical experience, or the properties perceived of the mind-independent objects one perceives; and a fortiori, there is no relationship between them. However, Brewer suggests that we can construct an analogous version of realism by replacing Berkeleyian mind-dependent objects with good old mind-independent ones. The Berkeleyan realist holds that phenomenal character of veridical experience is entirely determined by the properties one perceives of the mind-independent objects one perceives.

One example of Berkeleyian realism is a common interpretation of Naïve Realism. Naïve Realists sometimes suggest that phenomenal character is ‘out in the world’. For example, John Campbell claims that

...the phenomenal character of your experiences, as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, such as colour and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to one another and to you. (2002, p. 116)\(^9\)

A natural way of interpreting this claim is that phenomenal character is a property of the objects perceived, rather than a property of experiences. If that were right, what it’s like to have an experience would be entirely determined by the properties one perceives—for it would just be the properties one perceives.\(^{10}\)

Another (more widely endorsed) example of Berkeleyian realism can be found in some versions of a view known as Strong Intentionalism. This is the view that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Provided that the representational content of

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9 See also Johnston 2007 for claims in broadly the same spirit.
10 I can’t see how this could be right, though. As I understand it, the very notion of phenomenal character is that of a property of a mental state—what it’s like to have it, or its ‘feel’. So any view on which phenomenal character is the property of something other than a mental state (e.g. a banana) is guilty of a category mistake. This isn’t to say that something other than a mental state can’t constitute phenomenal character—indeed, this is a crucial part of the view I will defend. My point here is simply that the properties one perceives can’t be the whole story.
experience isn’t composed of Fregean modes of presentation (as opposed to being Russellian or coarse-grained possible worlds propositions), any two experiences that consist in representing (say) that there is a yellow, crescent-shaped thing in front of one have exactly the same phenomenal character (assuming that this exhausts the content of the experiences, and that the thing is represented being in exactly the same subject-relative location, etc.). Note that the (non-Fregean) representational content of a veridical experience is entirely determined by the properties one perceives in the course of having it—for example, if I veridically perceive a yellow, crescent-shaped banana, then the content of my experience attributes yellowness and crescent-shapedness to something. Hence, according to a non-Fregean version of Strong Intentionalism, the properties one perceives determines phenomenal character by way of determining representational content. Since this is a view on which the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is ultimately determined by the properties one perceives, it is a version of Berkeleyian Realism.

Berkeleyan realism entails that any two experiences that involve perceiving the same properties have the same phenomenal character—for example, if two experiences involve perceiving a banana’s yellowness and crescent-shapedness from exactly the same location, then they are phenomenally the same. As is well-known from critical discussions of non-Fregean versions of Strong Intentionalism, there are a number of worries about this claim. In particular, there many types of alleged cases of phenomenal differences without representational differences (and, hence, in the case of veridical experience, without differences in the properties perceived)—for example, subjects who are ‘spectrally inverted’ with respect to each other, phenomenal differences solely due to attentional differences, and phenomenal differences solely due to physical differences (perhaps in the subjects’ sense organs, or in the neural activity underlying their experiences). I won’t rehearse all the types of cases here; instead, I’ll discuss two cases of the last sort with the modest aim of showing that Berkeleyan Realism requires some bullet-biting that is best avoided.

On the face of it, it’s plausible that features of the sense organs the subject uses to perceive make a difference to phenomenal character. For example, suppose that there are aliens whose visual systems are sensitive to the same properties that human visual systems are sensitive to (the same colours, shapes, and so forth). Nevertheless, there is a major difference between their visual

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11 On the other hand, if the Strong Intentionalist’s representational contents are composed of Fregean modes of presentation, then the result is a version of Kantianism. For on this view, it is possible for the modes of presentation of a property to vary while holding the property perceived fixed—for example, two veridical experiences of yellowness could have representational contents involving different modes of presentation of yellowness. It is possible for the experiences to differ phenomenally, since the experiences have different Fregean contents. That would be a case in which the property perceived is the same (yellowness), and the phenomenal character is different—and hence a case in which phenomenal character isn’t determined by the properties perceived. (Thanks to Adam Pautz for pressing me to mention this version of Strong Intentionalism.)
systems and ours: they have compound eyes, similar to those of many earthbound insects. It seems plausible that

(1) a human and an alien could have an experience in which they veridically perceive all and only the same properties, and yet
(2) the phenomenal character of their experiences would be different (due to the fact that they are generated by quite different visual organs).

For example, it could be the case that the many lenses that constitute the alien’s eyes receive input from exactly the same region of space that the human’s eyes do, but there are small gaps throughout the alien’s visual field caused by the gaps between his lenses. If such a situation could obtain, then the properties one veridically perceives don’t completely determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience—features of one’s sensory apparatus can play a role too.

The Berkeleyian realist might reply by denying (1)—by insisting that a radical difference in the structure of two kinds of sensory organ must make for a difference in the properties the organs are sensitive to. Then, any phenomenal difference between the human and alien experiences could be attributed to a difference in properties perceived. However, this seems like a shot in the dark that would be difficult to validate. There seems to be no contradiction in the idea of a human eye and a compound eye being sensitive to exactly the same properties. The Berkeleyian realist must explain why this situation is physically impossible; it is not sufficient to merely assert that it must be.\(^ \text{12} \)

The other alternative for the Berkeleyian realist is to deny (2), and insist that any two experiences that involve veridically perceiving all and only the same properties have the same phenomenal character—even if the sensory organs that generate the experiences are radically different. But this seems implausible. Why should we think that looking at the world through such different eyes would leave no trace at all in visual phenomenal character? Perceptual systems give their subjects information about their surroundings, but nothing entitles us to assume that veridically perceiving the exactly same properties will result in experiences with exactly the same phenomenal

\(^{12}\) Some have objected that the situation I’ve described begs the question against Berkeleyian realism, since the view entails that such situations aren’t possible. But this worry is based on a misunderstanding of the dialectic. One cannot respond to a putative counterexample simply by asserting that one’s view entails that the situation described in the counterexample cannot obtain. A counterexample is an intuitively plausible case that conflicts with the view it’s targeted at. So of course the view will entail that the situation described in the case cannot obtain. But the point one is making in giving a counterexample is that the case is intuitively plausible, and so the view must have gone wrong somewhere. Compare: some object to Strong Intentionalism on the grounds that it’s incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion. It wouldn’t do for the Strong Intentionalist to dismiss this objection by saying that it’s question begging—a proper response would explain why spectrum inversion isn’t possible even though it initially seems to be.
character, \textit{regardless} of what goes on in between.\textsuperscript{13} To put the point metaphorically: our experiences are windows on the world, but we're not entitled to assume that they are \textit{entirely} transparent. What the window is made of could easily affect how the things we see through it look.\textsuperscript{14} So again, the Berkeleyian realist’s defensive assertion stands in need of argument.

The worry just described presents a case in which experiences of \textit{two different subjects} that involve veridically perceiving the same properties differ phenomenally. But we can construct a less exotic \textit{intrasubjective} version of worry, based on the fact that some properties can be perceived in more than one sense modality. On the face of it, it’s plausible that which sense modality a subject is perceiving in makes a difference to phenomenal character. For example, introspection suggests that what it’s like to \textit{see} crescent-shapedness is different from what it’s like to \textit{feel} it. If that’s right, then we have a (more realistic) case in which two experiences involve perception of the same property, but the resultant phenomenology is different. If there are such cases, then the properties one perceives don’t entirely determine the phenomenal character of one’s experience—which modality one is perceiving them in plays a role too.\textsuperscript{15}

Of course, the deliverances of introspection shouldn’t be regarded as the final word on this matter. We aren’t able to easily tease apart different aspects of phenomenology when we introspect, and perhaps the judgment that there’s a phenomenal difference is just an artifact of introspection being too blunt an instrument for the job we’re trying to use it to do. For example, we might be misled by the fact that visual shape phenomenology is usually accompanied by colour phenomenology, while tactile shape phenomenology never is (except perhaps in some cases of synesthesia). So it could be that the phenomenal difference between visual and tactile experiences of crescent-shapedness is solely due to the difference in colour phenomenology, rather than a difference in shape phenomenology.

\textsuperscript{13} One might insist that if two experiences of \textit{F}-ness differ phenomenally, at least one must be non-veridical. But this would be the case only if perceiving an instance of \textit{F}-ness \textit{necessitates} a certain sort of phenomenal character, which is precisely what’s up for debate.

\textsuperscript{14} This claim is compatible with the thought that people express by saying that experience is \textit{transparent}—which is roughly the thought that, in having experiences, we are perceptually aware only of the objects of experience (and their features), and never of \textit{experiences themselves} (or their features). The claim that phenomenal character is partially determined by features of the subject doesn’t entail that one is perceptually aware of those features, or indeed of any features of the experience itself.

\textsuperscript{15} It should be noted that this counterexample applies only to a version of Berkeleyian realism that is \textit{unrestricted} with respect to sense modalities—of course, one could hold a version of Berkeleyian realism that is restricted to, say, \textit{vision}. Counterexamples appealing to phenomenal differences across modalities don’t undermine the restricted claim that the phenomenal character of veridical \textit{visual} experience is entirely determined by the properties the subject sees. For such a view could accommodate the phenomenal difference by claiming that something other than the properties one feels contributes to determining the phenomenal character of veridical \textit{tactile} experience.
With that said, it still seems that the claim that there is a difference between visual and tactile phenomenology associated with perception of the same property has default status. For to assume that they are the same would be to assume that the means we use to perceive the world leave no phenomenological trace whatsoever. And, as I suggested above in discussion of the more exotic counterexample, that’s a claim in need of argument.

Moreover, empirical research on Molyneux’s problem provides some support for the claim that the visual and tactile phenomenology associated with perception of the same property differ. Molyneux’s question was basically this: would a person blind from birth recognise a shape if his sight were restored, solely on the basis of his previous tactile experience of it? An affirmative answer to this question suggests that the visual and tactile phenomenology associated with perception of a given shape property is the same—presumably, that’s how the subject would visually recognise a shape without ever having seen it before. A negative answer suggests that the phenomenology differs across the two modalities. And there is some support for a negative answer (Held et. al. 2011).

I’m not suggesting that these counterexamples to Berkeleyian realism constitute knock-down objections to it. All I want to insist upon is that these cases of a difference in phenomenal character without a difference in properties perceived are prima facie plausible, and that denying their possibility is a bullet to bite. Of course, there are things that the Berkeleyian realist can do to make this bullet more palatable, which I don't have the space to discuss in detail. My point is simply that a more palatable bullet is still a bullet, and it would be best to avoid biting it at all.

In summary, we have two extremes on a spectrum of views about the relationship between the phenomenal character of a veridical experience, on the one hand, and the properties one perceives in the course of having it, on the other: Kantianism, which holds the latter plays no role in determining the former, and Berkeleyian Realism, which holds that the latter entirely determines the former. I have argued that both extremes on this spectrum are problematic. Kantianism isn't plausible in full generality, and Berkeleyian realism cannot accommodate the natural idea that the means we use to perceive the world play some role in determining what it’s like to perceive it. An account of the

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16 Actually, Molyneux’s question was slightly more complicated, as it concerned not just the ability to recognise shapes but also the ability to distinguish them from each other.

17 For example, one might reply by denying that there’s any link at all between the conceivability of a scenario and its possibility. However, even if conceivability doesn’t entail possibility, as long as the former provides some evidence of the latter, those who want to deny that a given scenario is possible in spite of its conceivability have the burden of explaining why it is conceivable but not possible. Moreover, Pautz has constructed cases of phenomenal differences without differences in the properties perceived that rely on empirical considerations, rather than on a link between conceivability and possibility (2011, pp. 404-7). So I refer readers who are sceptical of the existence of such a link to Pautz’s cases.
phenomenal character of veridical experience should offer us a *middle path* between these two extremes.

III. A *middle path*. Naïve Realism can be developed in a way that provides such a middle path. Although it is often interpreted as a version of Berkeleyian realism, it need not be. The Naïve Realist holds that veridical experience, including its phenomenal character, fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving things in her environment and some of their properties. The Berkeleyian Naïve Realist holds that the *properties* the subject perceives *entirely* determine the phenomenal character of her experience. But it’s also open to the Naïve Realist to claim that phenomenal character is determined by the *obtaining of the perceptual relation* more broadly. That is, Naïve Realism can appeal to *both* relata in accounting for the phenomenal character of veridical experience, as well as to facts about the relation itself. For example, the Naïve Realist can say that the phenomenal character of my veridical experience of the banana on my desk is determined not just by its yellowness and crescent-shapedness, but *also* by the fact that I *see* these properties (as opposed to perceiving them in some other modality), and by certain facts about my visual system (e.g. that I’m seeing these properties through a simple eye rather than a compound one).

Contrast the accounts of phenomenal character offered by versions of Kantianism and Berkeleyian realism—the mental paint view and non-Fregean Strong Intentionalism, respectively. On an unrestricted version of the mental paint view, the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is entirely determined by the intrinsically non-representational qualia the subject instantiates. So ultimately, only facts about the *subject* determine phenomenal character. And on non-Fregean Strong Intentionalism, the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is entirely determined by how the subject represents things in her environment as being, which is in turn entirely determined by which of their properties she perceives. So ultimately, only properties of the *objects* of experience determine phenomenal character. But for the reasons given in the discussion of the two extremes, our theory of perceptual experience should leave room for the possibility that both features of the subject and features of the objects perceived play a role in determining phenomenal character. There may be properties such that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of them is entirely down to the subject (or, less plausibly, entirely down to the object). But this should be argued for on a property-by-property basis, rather than *entailed* by our theory of perceptual experience.

As I mentioned above, Naïve Realism is sometimes espoused in a Berkeleyian Realist form. However, there is a version of the view that is *less* Berkeleyian realist than Campbell’s, but *more* Berkeleyian realist than the one just described. William Fish’s version of Naïve Realism allows that certain features of the subject can contribute to determining phenomenal character—for example, what she’s attending to, and the acuity of her perceptual system (2009, p. 75). As I will argue, though, Fish’s view is too close to Berkeleyian realism for comfort.

Fish argues that adopting Naïve Realism allows us to close an *explanatory gap* between phenomenal consciousness and the underlying physical and functional facts. The gap is this: being in a certain kind of neurological state, or being in a state with a certain functional role, doesn’t explain why the subject of the state enjoys one kind of phenomenal character rather than another. For
example, suppose my veridical experience of the yellow banana on my desk consists in a certain kind of neurological state that plays a certain functional role. This view leaves us with a mystery: why is it like this to be in the physical/functional state, rather than what it is like for me to be in the physical/functional state that grounds veridical experiences of green things? For all that’s been said, ‘phenomenal greenness’ could have been associated with the physical/functional state, rather than ‘phenomenal yellowness’. So we have no explanation of why my state has the particular kind of phenomenal character it does.

Fish thinks that endorsing Naive Realism allows us to dissolve this problem:

The difference in what it is like to see a ripe McIntosh apple and what it is like to see a ripe cucumber is not explained by the differences in the underlying processing—instead, it is explained by the different color properties that the two objects possess. When we see a ripe McIntosh apple, the phenomenal character of our experience is its property of acquainting us with the fact of the object’s being red, when we see a ripe cucumber, it is the experience’s property of acquainting us with the fact of the object’s being green. (2009, pp. 75-6)

The basic idea is that the colour phenomenology associated with a physical/functional state (e.g. the kind that underlies a veridical experience of a yellow banana) is largely determined by the colour properties one perceives (e.g. yellowness). So a veridical experience of a yellow thing couldn’t be associated with ‘phenomenal greenness’, for example, because a veridical experience is associated with phenomenal greenness only if it involves perceiving an instance of greenness. Note that this strategy for closing the explanatory gap results in a view that is rather close to Berkeleyan Realism: all veridical experiences of yellow things (that are the same determinate shade) have basically the same colour phenomenology, because the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is largely determined by the properties one perceives. Although features of the subject can play some role in determining phenomenal character, their influence is limited—Kantianism about the phenomenology of veridical colour experience is ruled out, for example.

Although I find this motivation for Naive Realism tempting (and indeed set out to defend it in an earlier draft of this paper), ultimately I think that a Naive Realist theory of phenomenal character need not and should not be developed in a way that entails that Kantianism is false. For the reasons presented earlier, Kantianism about veridical colour experience is prima facie plausible. So if we can leave room for this possibility in our general theory of the phenomenal character of veridical experience, we should. And the version of Naive Realism I have proposed does just that, in allowing for the possibility that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of some sorts of properties are largely determined by features of the subject. Of course, given an argument against Kantianism about colour experience, we might well end up with
In short, the version of Naive Realism I’m defending is preferable to Fish’s version. We want a middle path between Kantianism and Berkeleyan realism, but not one that builds in a commitment that’s close to either extreme without an argument for doing so. However, my preferred version of Naive Realism isn’t the only theory that can claim this advantage. For example, a weaker version of Intentionalism could do just as well. An Intentionalist could say that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience is determined not just by its content, but also by the attitude the subject bears to that content (e.g. the ‘impure representationalism’ defended in Chalmers 2004). For example, the phenomenal character of my veridical experience of a yellow, crescent-shaped banana could be determined not just by its content (say, that there is a yellow, crescent-shaped banana before me), but also by the fact that I bear the attitude of visually representing to that content. And the difference between the phenomenal character of human and alien visual experiences with the same content can be attributed to species-specific visual attitudes (‘humanly’ visually representing vs. ‘alienly’ visually representing). Furthermore, since the

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18 One might find it strange that two different sorts of properties can be perceived by subjects, when in one case the phenomenal character of veridical experience is primarily determined by features of the subject, while in the other it’s primarily determined by features of the object of experience. Is it really plausible that subjects bear one and the same relation—that of perceiving—to instances of each sort of property? (Thanks to Sam Coleman for raising this question.) I suspect that this reaction ultimately boils down to an assumption about the nature of the perceptual relation—roughly, that one perceives an instance of F-ness only if F-ness plays a substantial role in determining the phenomenal character of one’s experience of it. If this assumption is correct, then phenomenal aspects of experiences caused but not determined by instances of F-ness don’t count as perceptions of instances of F-ness (and so the situation just described can’t obtain). However, I am sceptical about this assumption. The rejection of this assumption is built into Kantianism. One might not accept Kantianism, but insofar as it is intelligible, that counts as some evidence that the assumption about the perceptual relation is false.

19 There is a sense in which a restricted version of the mental paint view and Fregean Strong Intentionalism afford a middle path, too—they allow that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of some sorts of properties are determined by features of the subject (by intrinsically non-representational qualia and varying modes of presentation of properties across subjects, respectively) whereas the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of other sorts of properties are determined by features of the objects of experience (by intrinsically representational qualia and invariant modes of presentation, respectively). However, it seems that both views are committed to the claim that, for any given sort of property, the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of its instances is either entirely determined by features of the subject or entirely determined by features of the objects. Arguably, we shouldn’t make this commitment if we don’t have to—we should allow for the possibility that phenomenal character is partially determined by both.
properties one perceives can play some role in determining the phenomenal character of veridical experience via determining its content, Kantianism isn’t entailed by such a view (although they are compatible, which is all to the good if considerations concerning certain sorts of properties push us in that direction).

In short, there is an Intentionalist alternative to Naïve Realism that affords a middle path between Kantianism and Berkeleyian realism, without building in an unwarranted bias towards either extreme. So although we have ruled out many of Naïve Realism’s rivals (e.g. non-Fregean Strong Intentionalism), we don’t yet have a watertight motivation for the view.

IV. The epistemological role of phenomenal character. The case for Naïve Realism I will present claims that the phenomenal character of veridical experience can play a certain epistemological role. Before I elaborate this claim, I should note a crucial qualification to it: it is restricted to the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of only some kinds of properties. It will be helpful to frame this qualification in terms of a distinction related to the previous discussion, namely, a distinction between Kantian and Berkeleyian properties. Kantian properties are properties such that the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of them are mostly determined by features of the subject. By contrast, a Berkeleyian property is one such that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of it is mostly determined by the fact that the subject perceives an instance of that property (that is, features of the subject play a relatively minimal role in determining phenomenal character). The epistemological role that I’m about to outline is played only by the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of Berkeleyian properties. The reason for this qualification will become clear in due course.

We can work our way towards an understanding of the epistemological role I have in mind by considering the following question: what do we get out of having veridical experiences? One might suggest that veridical experiences (unlike, say, illusions and hallucinations) put us in a position to know certain things our environments. This is an obvious truth—at least, assuming that arguments for scepticism about the external world can be dealt with (which I will be assuming here). But I don’t think that this exhausts the epistemological power of veridical experience.

To see this, suppose that you had a choice between having veridical experiences of your environment, and having a trustworthy, omniscient creature tell you about what’s going on in it. I, for one, would prefer to have the veridical experiences. That’s not because veridical experiences are the only route to knowledge about my environment—on the face of it, trustworthy and reliable testimony could do just as well. And arguably, the preference isn’t just due to the fact that testimony happens to be a slower means of conveying information than veridical experience is—we could revise the case by making the omniscient creature talk really fast and idealising the subject so that she could understand. I would still prefer to have the veridical experience.

So it seems that veridical experience gives us something that trustworthy, reliable, and quickly delivered testimony doesn’t. I propose that the ‘something more’ is something along the lines of the following: the phenomenal character of veridical experience gives its subject insight into what things in one’s environment are like independently of one’s experiences of them. For example, in virtue of having a veridical experience of the yellow, crescent-shaped banana on my desk,
I’m in a position to obtain at least partial knowledge of what the banana is like independently of my experience of it. Moreover, I’m in a position to obtain at least partial knowledge of what other things that have the same properties are like independently of experience—for example, knowledge of what crescent-shaped things are like.

It will be helpful to explicitly distinguish the following two claims:

(1) Veridical experience puts its subject in a position to know that certain properties are instantiated by things in her environment (e.g. that there is a yellow, crescent-shaped banana before her).

(2) The phenomenal character of veridical experience puts its subject in a position to know what the things that instantiate those properties are like independently of experience.

What’s at issue in (1) is knowledge that \( E \)-ness is instantiated by something in one’s environment. What’s at issue in (2) is something different, and difficult to express. It’s not knowledge of the bare fact that something in one’s environment is \( E \). It’s a deeper insight into the (actual and possible) objects of one’s experience—something one couldn’t get by testimony alone.

An idea in the vicinity of (2) is the denial of what Mark Johnston calls ‘the Wallpaper View’, which holds that phenomenal character doesn’t play any essential epistemic role (Johnston 2006, pp. 260-5). One way of cashing out the sense in which sensory awareness is ‘better than mere knowledge’ (as claimed in his paper’s title) is that it not only puts one in a position to know that there is something \( E \) before one, it also puts one in a position to know what \( E \) things are like independently of experience.\(^{20}\)

The sort of knowledge at issue in (2) is related to David Chalmers’ notion of an Edenic property. Chalmers envisions an Eden in which properties are ‘revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory’ (2006, p. 49). In Eden, properties don’t have ‘hidden’ intrinsic natures; everything there is to know about the intrinsic nature of a property is revealed in subjects’ experiences of it. One way of getting at the idea behind (2) is that we haven’t fallen as far from Eden as Chalmers suggests. In particular, the thought is that at least some of the properties we perceive are close approximations of Edenic properties. I’m not suggesting that there actually are any properties such that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of its instances puts the subject in a position to know every non-relational fact about it. What I am suggesting is that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of any Berkeleyian property reveals quite a bit about its intrinsic nature (although not everything).

\(^{20}\) I should note that it isn’t clear that Johnston would accept this way of fleshing out the idea expressed by his paper’s title, as he doesn’t explicitly distinguish between perceptual knowledge that there is something \( E \) before one, and perceptual knowledge of what \( E \) things are like independently of experience. I suspect he thinks that (2) is required for (1) (see Johnston 2006, pp. 284-9), but I will remain neutral on the connection between these claims here.
The epistemological role at issue requires further clarification, but we are now in a position to see why the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of Kantian properties don’t play this role. Recall that the connection between a Kantian property and the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of it is contingent—a veridical experience of a Kantian property could have had a very different phenomenal character than it actually does. If the connection between the phenomenal character and the property is contingent, then the phenomenal character is a mere sign of the instantiation of that property. There is no deep connection between what it is like to perceive instances of that property and what things with that property are like independently of experience. Hence, the phenomenal character actually associated with veridical experiences of a Kantian property cannot put one in a position to know what things with that property are like independently of experience.

Let us return to the task of clarifying the epistemological role under discussion. In particular, we have yet to address the following crucial question: given that knowledge of what $F$ things are like independently of experience is propositional knowledge, what exactly is its propositional content? I’m afraid I’m not entirely sure how to answer this question. But I will briefly speculate nonetheless. If this knowledge about $F$ things is uniquely afforded by the phenomenal character of veridical experience, we might expect that the content of the knowledge involves some sort of close connection between $F$ things, one the one hand, and the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of $F$-ness, on the other. We can capture this close connection if we hold that the content of the knowledge can be expressed only by means of a demonstrative: that instances of $F$-ness are like this (demonstrating the phenomenal character of one’s experience). So, for example, the phenomenal character of my veridical experience of this instance of crescent-shapedness puts me in a position to know that crescent-shaped things are like this (demonstrating the ‘phenomenal crescent-shapedness’ of my experience).

This proposal implies that the phenomenal character of experience can literally resemble properties of the objects of experience—for example, that the property of ‘phenomenal crescent-shapedness’ (instantiated by my veridical experience) is similar to the property of crescent-shapedness (instantiated by the banana). One might think that this claim is either uninterestingly true on one interpretation, or obviously false on another. There is a sense in which this claim is uninterestingly true: there are countless uninteresting respects in which these properties resemble each other (they are both properties, they are both instantiated by things, they are both instantiated in worlds in which $2 + 2 = 4$, etc.). So the claim should be interpreted such that the similarity is substantive (in some sense).

One way for the similarity to be substantive would be for phenomenal $F$-ness to be identical to $F$-ness. But to go this far would be to exchange uninteresting truth for obvious falsity—phenomenal $F$-ness cannot be identical to $F$-ness, as the latter can be instantiated in the absence of perceivers whereas the former cannot. However, we need not go quite so far. We could say that phenomenal $F$-ness involves not only $F$-ness, but something else in addition (e.g. the phenomenal contribution made by the subject’s perspective on her environment, how she distributes her attention over it, and so forth). Of course, even if phenomenal $F$-ness has $F$-ness as a constituent in some sense, it doesn’t
follow that they are 'substantively' similar. Just because a part instantiates a certain property, it doesn't follow that the whole instantiates a property that is substantially similar to it. But the point here is simply that if phenomenal $F$-ness has $F$-ness as a constituent in some sense, then the claim that they are substantively similar is at least intelligible—just as we can make sense of a case in which a whole does in fact have a property that is substantively similar to a property of one of its parts. And that's all we need to make sense of the proposed content of the special sort of knowledge at issue.

So, in summary, the proposal is that knowledge of what $F$ things are like independently of experience is knowledge that $F$-things are like this (demonstrating the phenomenal character of one's veridical experience of $F$-ness)—regardless of who is experiencing them, or indeed whether they are experienced by anyone at all. I realise that the description of the sort of knowledge I have in mind isn't maximally clear, but I don't know how to clarify it further at present. Let us press on in the hope that it's on to something.

Before appealing to this epistemological role of phenomenal character in an argument for Naïve Realism, we should pause to briefly address one further worry. Even if we can fully elucidate what it means to say that the phenomenal character of veridical experience puts one in a position to know something of what things are like independently of experience, one might wonder: what reason do we have for thinking that this claim is true? That is, why should we think that the phenomenal character of veridical experience ever puts us in this position? My response is to turn the tables—why shouldn't we think this? As I noted earlier, there are reasons to be sceptical about whether the phenomenal character actually associated with veridical colour experience reveals much if anything about what coloured things are like independently of our experiences of them. However, in the absence of an argument for the general conclusion that the phenomenal character of veridical experience of any sort of property cannot put one in a position to know anything about what things are like independently of experience, we should be entitled to assume that this general claim is false. That is, absent an argument to the contrary, I see no reason why we can't assume by default that the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of at least some sorts of properties can in principle afford at least partial knowledge of what things are like independently of experience.\footnote{That said, there are arguments out there that could be construed as arguments to the contrary— I have in mind arguments for 'Kantian humility' (see e.g. Langton 1998). I suspect that such arguments presuppose that a view along the lines of Naïve Realism is false, and hence aren't admissible in this dialectical context. Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to discuss such arguments or vindicate my suspicion about them.}

Now that I've outlined the epistemological role played by the phenomenal character of veridical experiences of Berkeleyian properties, let us put it to work in an argument for Naïve Realism. According to any of Naïve Realism's rivals, the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of $F$-ness is distinct from the instance of $F$-ness perceived. All of Naïve Realism's rivals hold the orthodox view that the property instances one perceives cause but do not constitute the veridical experience and its phenomenal character. For example,
Intentionalism holds that a veridical experience of an instance of F-ness is a representational state of the subject (presumably realised by neural goings-on in her head) that is caused by an instance of F-ness affecting her sense organs in the appropriate way. As mentioned above, there is much debate amongst Intentionalists concerning how the phenomenal character of the experience is related to this representational state, but they agree that the former is either identical to or determined by some at least aspects of the latter. For our purposes, all that matters is that on any way of making this claim more precise, the phenomenal character of the experience will turn out to be entirely distinct from the instance of F-ness—since the aspects of the representational state that are either identical to it or determine it are entirely distinct from the instance of F-ness perceived.22

By contrast, Naïve Realism can be elaborated so that it entails that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of F-ness is not entirely distinct from that instance of F-ness. For all I’ve said so far, Naïve Realism claims only that the phenomenal character of veridical experience is determined by the following state of affairs: the subject perceiving objects in her environment and some of their properties. This is compatible with the claim that the phenomenal character of veridical experience is entirely distinct from this state of affairs—it could be something ‘over and above’ the state of affairs (albeit fixed by it). However, there is no barrier to strengthening the Naïve Realist account of phenomenal character as follows: the phenomenal character associated with a veridical experience of F-ness of is identical to the subject perceiving that instance of F-ness (at least when F-ness is a Berkeleyian property—for ease of exposition, I’ll omit this qualification in what follows). On this elaboration of Naïve Realism, if one has a veridical experience of an instance of F-ness, that instance of F-ness is a constituent of the phenomenal character of that experience. In short, it seems that Naïve Realism is the only view that can hold that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of F-ness has that instance of F-ness as a constituent. The next step in the argument for Naïve Realism is intended to show that this claim is crucial for accounting for the epistemological role of phenomenal character outlined above.

The next premise of the argument is as follows: if the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of F-ness is entirely distinct from the instance of F-ness perceived, then that phenomenal character cannot put the subject in a position to know what F things are like independently of

22 Note that a Russelian version of Intentionalism which holds that F-ness is a constituent of the representational content of an experience is not a view on which the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of F-ness has an instance of F-ness as a constituent. Even if the proposition has an instance of F-ness as a constituent (as opposed to the universal F-ness), the representational content of an experience is entirely distinct from the experience itself—it is that which is perceptually represented by the subject. For example, the content of my current veridical experience is the proposition that this banana is yellow. In having this experience, I represent this proposition, but it is not part of my experience. My representational state is entirely distinct from what I represent.
experience. This premise is inspired by an idea of Mark Johnston’s (although I’m not sure whether he would endorse the way I will develop it). The idea is this:

If sensory awareness [and thus phenomenal character] were representational, we would inevitably face the sceptical question of how we could know that the human style of representation is not entirely idiosyncratic relative to the intrinsic natures of things. (Johnston 2006, pp. 284-5, footnote omitted)

As I interpret this passage, the idea that phenomenal character is grounded in representational states that are ‘idiosyncratic relative to the intrinsic natures of [F] things’ is basically the idea that the phenomenal character is radically dissimilar to instances of F-ness. (By ‘radically dissimilar’, I mean sharing no non-substantive properties, in the sense discussed above.) Recall that being in a position to know what F things are like independently of experience amounts to being in a position to know that F things are substantively similar to this (demonstrating phenomenal F-ness). Hence, in order for phenomenal F-ness to put a subject in a position to know what F things are like independently of experience, we have to be able to rule out the possibility that they are radically dissimilar. I take it that Johnston’s worry is that accounts of phenomenal character in terms of representation don’t have the resources to rule out this possibility—and hence, they don’t have the resources to account for phenomenal F-ness putting one in a position to know what F things are like independently of experience. But I think the point isn’t specific to representational accounts of phenomenal character. Rather, it applies to any account according to which phenomenal F-ness is entirely distinct from instances of F-ness.

To see why there’s a worry here, let us begin with the following question: how might we rule out the possibility that phenomenal F-ness and instances of F-ness are radically dissimilar? The fact that phenomenally F experiences enable us to track and interact successfully with F things is of no help—as long as phenomenal F-ness is more-or-less isomorphic to instances of F-ness, we’d be able to get along just fine. But since such isomorphism is compatible with phenomenal F-ness being radically dissimilar from instances of F-ness, the mere fact that our experiences enable us to get around just fine doesn’t allow us to rule out this possibility. Moreover, the prospects for ruling out the possibility at issue seem rather dim, given that our only mode of access to the qualitative nature of instances of F-ness is through having veridical experiences that are phenomenally F. Since we cannot ‘get outside’ of the phenomenal character of our experiences to compare it with the properties we perceive, we have no way of checking whether they are substantively similar or radically different from each other.

However, rejecting the claim that phenomenal F-ness is entirely distinct from instances of F-ness can give us some traction. Rejecting this claim leads to the conclusion that there isn’t much to an instance of phenomenal F-ness beyond the instance of F-ness that constitutes it, as long as F-ness is a Berkeleyan property. That is, if the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of F-ness has an instance of F-ness as a constituent, and if the other constituents of the phenomenal character are making a minimal contribution to the phenomenal character as a whole (i.e. F-ness is a Berkeleyan property), then phenomenal F-ness is just ‘F-ness slightly modified’, so to speak. As I argued above, certain
features of the subject will make a contribution to the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of even a Berkeleyian property (e.g. perspectival and attentional facts). But plausibly, these features wouldn't be sufficient to render the instance of phenomenal $F$-ness radically dissimilar from the instance of $F$-ness. Hence, provided that $F$-ness is a Berkeleyian property, if we reject the claim that phenomenal $F$-ness is entirely distinct from instances of $F$-ness, we can rule out the possibility that the former is radically dissimilar from the latter.

To summarise: if the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of $F$-ness (where $F$-ness is a Berkeleyian property) is entirely distinct from that instance of $F$-ness, then we can't rule out the possibility that the former is radically dissimilar from the latter. And if we can't rule out this possibility, we cannot account for the epistemological role of the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of Berkeleyian properties (i.e. putting subjects in a position to know what things with those properties are like independently of experience). All of Naïve Realism’s rivals hold that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of $F$-ness is entirely distinct from that instance of $F$-ness, and so they can't account for the epistemological role at issue. By contrast, Naïve Realism can hold that the phenomenal character of a veridical experience of an instance of $F$-ness has that instance of $F$-ness as a constituent, which allows us to rule out the possibility that the phenomenal character and the property are radically dissimilar. Hence, it is the only view that can account for the epistemological role of ‘Berkeleyian’ phenomenal characters.\footnote{There are two important lingering issues I don’t have the space to discuss. First, how do we determine whether a given property is Berkeleyian or Kantian? Here's a very rough rule of thumb: if the phenomenal character associated with veridical experiences of $F$-ness corresponds to an underlying non-disjunctive physical uniformity amongst $F$ things, then features of the subject play a minimal role in determining that phenomenal character (i.e. the property is Berkeleyian). Second, Naïve Realism is only required to account for the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of Berkeleyian properties. So what should we say about the phenomenal characters of veridical experiences of Kantian properties? We have two options: we could look to one of Naïve Realism’s rivals for an account (resulting in a hybrid account of perceptual experience), or we could give a modified Naïve Realist account (according to which some constituents of a phenomenal character—such as Kantian property instances—make no contribution to the ‘whole’).}

V. Conclusion. I have argued that Naïve Realism affords the best account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience: one that carves a middle path between the extremes of Kantianism and Berkeleyian realism, and does so in a way that accounts for the epistemological role of phenomenal character. Of course, the Naïve Realist isn’t home free. Although I’ve argued that Naïve Realism offers the most promising account of the phenomenal character of veridical experience, it remains to be seen whether it can offer a plausible account of the phenomenal character of non-veridical experiences (i.e. illusions and hallucinations). While I’m optimistic that it can (see Logue forthcoming-c),
elaborating and defending my grounds for optimism will have to be left to another time.24

References


— — —. forthcoming-c. Good news for the disjunctivist about (one of) the bad cases. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

24 In addition to the presentation to the Aristotelian Society, previous versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind at the University of Leeds, the University of St. Andrews, the University of Stirling, a meeting of the Mind Network at the University of Birmingham, and a conference on Perception, Experience, and Reasons at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Related material was presented at the University of Oxford and a conference on Phenomenality and Intentionality at the University of Crete, which led to revision of section IV. Many thanks to those in attendance for their helpful questions and comments. Thanks also to Mahrad Almotahari for illuminating discussions, and to Gerald Lang, Michael Sollberger, and especially Adam Pautz for comments on previous drafts of this paper.


