Caring for Strangers: Can Partiality Support Cosmopolitanism?

In their strive for designing a moral system where everyone is given equal consideration, cosmopolitan theorists have merely tolerated partiality as a necessary evil (insofar it means that we give priority to our kin opposite the distant needy). As a result, the cosmopolitan ideal has long departed from our moral psychologies and our social realities. Here I put forward partial cosmopolitanism as an alternative to save that obstacle. Instead of demanding impartial universal action, it requires from us that we are equally responsive in all the relationships we stand in. That goes from the local to the cosmopolitan sphere, since I defend that we are related with strangers as co-members of the global community. Thus, partiality not only is accommodated by cosmopolitanism, but actually supports it: only by having meaningful personal relationships we become able to care for distant strangers.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, global justice, ethics of care, partiality, agent-centered ethics.

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**Palavras-chave:** cosmopolitismo, justiça global, ética do cuidado, parcialidade, ética centrada no agente.

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0. Introduction

Partial relationships have long stood as a threat to cosmopolitanism, which requires us to treat everyone equally in our moral considerations regardless of their distance to us (physical or emotional). Cosmopolitan theorists, realizing that censoring partiality as immoral would give rise to a too demanding conception of morality, have conceded that partiality is morally permissible because of its contribution to global justice. However, most of us regard our personal relationships not as merely permissible but as something meaningful for us. We care about our kin, and it is precisely such care which grounds our belief that our partial relationships deserve priority in our moral considerations. Does then embracing the meaningfulness of personal relationships entail a rejection of cosmopolitanism? In this paper I will argue not only that it does not, but that partiality can actually support cosmopolitanism.

I will reconcile partiality with cosmopolitanism by articulating a partialist version of the cosmopolitan ideal. Firstly, I will show that traditional forms of cosmopolitanism are unrealistic, unmotivating and incompatible with meaningful personal relationships. I will suggest a different cosmopolitan approach which targets not abstract duties we have towards strangers, but the relationship we have with them. Such an approach leads to a moral system where cosmopolitanism is a type of bounded partiality. I will discuss the character of our relationship with strangers, and how this new focus changes the cosmopolitan demand from action towards global justice to seeking active emotional engagement with strangers. In that sense, meaningful partial relationships are incorporated into my view as necessary for cosmopolitanism. Finally, I will deal with some objections: whether there is really a relationship with strangers, whether my view could be called cosmopolitan and whether I have erased the limits between partiality and impartiality.
1. The Challenges to Impartialist Cosmopolitanism

The most prominent forms of cosmopolitanism focus on the achievement of global justice and the distinction between right and wrong actions. It is focused on impartial principles so I will refer to it as ‘impartial cosmopolitanism’, exemplified at its best in Singer and Pogge (with, respectively, a consequentialist and a neo-Kantian version of cosmopolitanism). According to impartial cosmopolitanism, being a cosmopolitan is to treat everyone equally; treating everyone equally, for those who adhere to this view (Singer, Pogge, Unger, Caney, Tan, Brock, Murphy among others), amounts to aspire and act to get to a just world.

Their ideal is articulated around a conception of justice, and ultimately of morality, grounded in the application of impartial principles by an autonomous agent. For example, Singer’s grounding principle is the prevention of suffering, Pogge’s is respect for human rights. If the agent is applying the principles correctly (i.e. rationally), being a cosmopolitan is a moral requirement unless she is irrational or immoral. This route to arrive at cosmopolitanism puts the great majority of people under the label of immorality or irrationality. Singer has no problem in doing so: “our traditional moral categories are upset”, he laments (1972: 235).

They also share a practical orientation, since both views make very specific demands to individuals. Singer asks from us to give up anything that is of no comparable moral significance to the suffering of others in order to avoid as much harm as possible. Aiming to make what he considers a realistic demand, he suggests that we donate 10 per cent of our income. Pogge considers that we should engage actively in creating fairer institutions or make up for the benefits we obtain from an unfair political and economic global order (1992: 50).

Their emphasis on principles means that their theory is directed at an ideal observer, understood as a person who makes moral judgments without being influenced by any bias, including proximity –including those who are nearest to her and with whom she is involved in personal relationships. However, the practical demands seen above are made to actual, not ideal, agents. My aim here is to show that their cosmopolitan proposal is unrealistic and unmotivating due to two challenges they are unable to meet, making their demands not apt for being imposed on real agents. On one hand, they face a motivational challenge because their route the cosmopolitan ideal ignores the motivational force of emotions for action in partial relationships. On the other, they face a partiality challenge because their view
cannot accommodate meaningful partial relationships. Since they make very practical demands to individuals on how they should live their lives, and meaningful relationships are inseparable from a good life for most people, their proposal is unrealistic. I will develop these challenges next and show how they call for a reinterpretation of cosmopolitanism, which I offer in the second part of the paper.

1.1. Partialist challenges to impartialism

Most criticisms to impartialist cosmopolitanism have focused on the demandingness of the moral system they defend. Indeed, according to the description set out above, most citizens in affluent countries are either immoral or irrational. Since ought implies can and morality should be attainable, it seems impartialism is condemned for making demands no one can comply with. I do not want to pursue the demandingness line of criticism, because my view will also show that many people are somehow at moral fault. My objection to impartialism will focus instead in their route to arrive at the cosmopolitan ideal.

Impartialists see people as followers of rules. The individual in their theories is a mere moral agent, an ideal observer whose only mission is to apply impartial principles at all times and do moral calculations. He is an “archangel” with moral superpowers, in Hare’s words (1974: 182.). I am not against ideal theory, but the problem is that the authors seen above are not trying to do ideal theory. They have practical demands, directly addressed to citizens of affluent nations. ‘Why do people not donate their money to Oxfam despite knowing they are being irrational? Why do they not understand people should have their human rights respected equally?’ they could be pictured wondering.

The answer to these questions lies in their mistake of not accepting that variations in moral concern are a fundamental part of how human psychology works. Let us move from the traditional drowning scenario\(^1\) to personal relationships. If one’s relative is suffering and a distant person is suffering, to put it in Singer’s terms, we do not feel motivated to help them in the same way. We give priority to our relative. This priority in

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\(^1\) In his trademark example, Singer asked whether one would have a moral obligation to save a drowning child at the cost of getting her clothes muddy (1972). From there, he made the utilitarian move to say that one should then donate to famine relief since in both cases we are morally obliged to prevent suffering at little cost to us.
moral consideration is what has usually put cosmopolitanism against partiality: for the cosmopolitan, distance is not morally relevant. Partiality has then been an important matter of debate within cosmopolitanism, with most of the discussions focusing on the so-called associative duties (Scheffler 2002: 51) we acquire when entering partial relationships. Communitarian critics argue that these duties are incompatible with cosmopolitanism (Miller 2004: 67) but that criticism is not the locus of the debate I am focusing on.

I am looking, instead, at the ways impartialists have tried to accommodate personal relationships in their theory. After all, very few people would accept to stop feeding their own children in order to save more lives in another country where currency has more value. Singer accepts that families provide for dependents like children or the elderly (1972: 241). In that sense, partial relationships contribute to a more just world since they prevent potential suffering. Pogge made a similar argument, since he sees partial relationships as actors in the global order, a type of institution that is up for assessment in the pursuing of global justice. Partial relationships, in Pogge’s words, “permissibly compromis[e] cosmopolitan justice” (2007: n.p.). They are allowed by impartial principles.

I have stated before that impartialists misassess partiality. Personal relationships, for a start, do not motivate us to act because they contribute to some bigger goal. They are valuable to us because they are meaningful to us, part of what we are and part of our identity; aside from any normative consideration. Impartialists fail to take this into account. Surely impartialists could argue that the only personal relationships they deem permissible are meaningful ones. But still, if another institution could do the work that families do for global justice (say, a dystopian parentless education system where children learn to apply impartial principles correctly) then families would be of no use.

An impartialist could also argue that such meaningfulness is not morally relevant. Here is where their first challenge lies: they have to either give a purely instrumental account of partiality (which is wrong) or to say that it is irrelevant whether they are meaningful. But that would be, in my opinion, an incongruence in their argument. Let us remember that Singer made us arrive at the cosmopolitan ideal by appealing to our intuitions regarding a distant starving child and a close drowning child. Being motivated to help the second and not the first one would be irrational or immoral because both have the same moral status. We are right to be motivated to help the close child then, but mistaken in not being so to help the distant
one. In other words: we should do with strangers what we already do with our close ones. If the aim is expanding what we do with our kin to the whole of humanity, then a precise and full appreciation of the value of personal relationships is needed. Their meaningfulness for us cannot be overlooked because it is precisely what prompts us to prioritize them in our moral considerations. In other words, it is our affection for them that makes us act.

Having a better grasp of what motivates us to act in partial relationships illuminates why there is an asymmetry in most people’s moral considerations, i.e. why they cannot give equal moral weight to everyone. The key is that we do care for our kin, but we do not care for strangers. Impartialist accounts fail to see that emotion-based motivational gap, or fail to acknowledge its importance. Our lack of care is what prevents us from being cosmopolitans. It is not our lack of care for principles (the ones that demand from us to treat everyone equally), but our lack of care for people (distant strangers) the obstacle that cosmopolitanism has to overcome.

Such obstacle is what I call the motivational challenge: cosmopolitanism cannot be motivating if it fails to engage with strangers the motivation we have towards our kin. The cosmopolitan ideal has to be rooted in emotional motivation and not in application of principles, because it is the former that motivates in partiality. This mistake has been used by communitarians to reject cosmopolitanism, and that approach has been in turn criticized by impartialists. Caney was perhaps the one who deals with the motivational issue the most, criticizing national partiality because it “relies on an impoverished moral psychology, assuming that people are motivated solely by loyalties and attachments to members of their community” (2005: 133). It is doubtful that communitarians say that we are motivated exclusively by affections and not by moral principles. I do not think they do, but they can defend themselves. As far as I am concerned, I do not reject that impartial principles like duty can motivate us to act, both globally and in our personal relationships. But emotions also motivate us. The motivational challenge is indeed the need to include emotional motivation in the cosmopolitan demand, because emotions are the main motivational force towards our kin and cosmopolitanism intends to expand our behaviour in partiality to the global sphere.

Including that emotional motivation into an ethical system would be impossible if partiality is assessed from impartial principles, just a merely permissible feature. Incorporating the emotions that motivate us in our partial relationships is inalienable from recognizing their meaningfulness. Impartialists fail to do that, so they also have to meet a second obstacle, the
partiality challenge. That is to be able to incorporate personal relationships as meaningful features of people’s lives aside from any instrumental value they have for justice.

I have shown then the two challenges partiality sets out for impartialist cosmopolitanism. It is possible to offer a cosmopolitan view that meets both challenges, but doing so requires a shift at the evaluative level.

1.2. Changing the evaluative outlook

The impartialists’ mistake, I believe, stems from the adoption of a top-down approach to cosmopolitanism. From a global perspective where all and every individual ought to be treated equally, they have tried to accommodate partiality in terms of application of principles, which has led them to overlook the true motivational force of partial relationships. I suggest in this paper that the direction of the debate should be the inverse: we should not be looking for cosmopolitanism to allow partiality, but for partiality to allow cosmopolitanism. People are not global in their partial relationships, if that even makes sense. They are local and particular. However, I believe people can be partial to an extent in their global outlook. I will be looking then for partial motivation in cosmopolitanism through a change in the evaluative level.

I suggest that instead of looking at the principles violated by global injustices, we look at the relationship we have with strangers. Although it seems counterintuitive to say that we could stand in a relationship with someone we do not know, I will show how it is not only plausible, but the way to articulating a more realistic and motivating cosmopolitan ideal.

In my move from principles to the specific target of the relationship with strangers, I am rejecting that the “moral point of view” (Singer 1972: 231) can ever lead us to engage actively with global justice, which is the impartialists’ main goal. I am abandoning Singer and Pogge’s ideal agent for the agent suggested by the ethics of care: it is not “abstract, autonomous and impartial” but “embodied, vulnerable and relational” (Robinson 2013: 133). The key is in the latter term, ‘relational’; meaning that agents cannot be understood in isolation from what has formed their identity (living in a society with certain values, within a particular family, being exposed to determinate stimuli). I will direct cosmopolitanism towards agents who are fundamentally social and develop their identities in social practices (Friedman 2000, quoted in Held 2005: 48). Cosmopolitanism will be concerned with a relationship with strangers that is added to the other partial
relationships we have, not confronted with it. That change will result in a cosmopolitan ideal that is much more realistic.

I believe I have shown that the current mainstream cosmopolitan accounts face a double challenge: they cannot accommodate partiality without reducing it to the purely normative and they are not motivating enough. But if they recognized the motivational strength of partiality, which is its engagement of emotions, they might have a better tool to articulate a motivating cosmopolitan ideal. By explaining cosmopolitanism through partiality, I hope to give an account that overcomes both objections. The outlook shifts then from assessing our obligations in respect to needy strangers to assessing our relationship with them as what can motivate us to act, thanks to the introduction of an affective element into the cosmopolitan ideal. Cosmopolitanism, in my view, becomes partial.

2. Partial Cosmopolitanism

I have anticipated that I will offer a partialist take on cosmopolitanism which is grounded on emotional motivation and embraces the meaningfulness of partial relationships. I have suggested that it will be focused on the relationship that binds us with strangers. In order to achieve my aim, I will describe first the nature of our relationship with strangers and its place in a moral system that admits prioritisation of our kin. I will defend a moral system which is grounded on partiality but is still cosmopolitan, hence the denomination ‘partial cosmopolitanism’.\(^2\) Then, I will explain the emotional component that helps my proposal meet the motivational challenge. Finally, I will explain the role of personal relationships in the cosmopolitan moral system in order to overcome the partiality challenge.

2.1. Nature of our relationship with strangers

Since Diogenes explained cosmopolitanism in such way, many theorists have said the cosmopolitan individual is a citizen of the world (Nussbaum

\(^2\) My proposal of ‘partial cosmopolitanism’ is distinct from Erskine’s ‘embedded cosmopolitanism’ (2002). She also articulated a cosmopolitan ideal which embraces partial relationships and acknowledges their meaningfulness aside any instrumental value. However, Erskine focused on duties to strangers and I define the cosmopolitan ideal in terms of the character of the relationship we have with them. Hence my chosen name ‘partial cosmopolitanism’. My view does have though many points in common with Erskine’s and I am highly indebted to her and other authors who have tried to reconcile partiality and cosmopolitanism, especially Gould and Held.
However, that is not the term I would like to use to refer the relationship with strangers, the one of co-citizens. The concept ‘citizenship’ is problematic due to its political implications –namely, the need of a state as a shared set of institutionalized rules, which does not exist at a global level. So, instead of ‘citizen of the world’ I will refer to members of a global community (mirroring a move made by Dower 1998:74). Members of communities are bound to each other by different ties, affective and non-affective. To cite some examples, families (understood as microcommunities) are bound by filial love and biological ties; national communities are bound by shared institutions and cultural identification.

In the case of the global community, many cosmopolitan thinkers see globalisation as an indisputable reason supporting its existence. Gould, for example, considers that emotional ties built through social media and other Internet forums have created the adequate framework for moral consideration to be expanded outside closed groups towards the global community (2007:148). I think, following Nussbaum, that the emotional tie with strangers is of compassion, understood in the Aristotelian sense as an emotion we feel when a serious bad thing has happened to someone else, such event was not (or not entirely) the person's fault, and we ourselves are vulnerable in similar ways (2002:xii). The non-emotional tie is then our common vulnerability, since all members of the human community are equally vulnerable to ill fate –including global injustices.

These ties are created in parallel to the shaping of the own identity. In some relationships, care for particular individuals is automatic –in general we instantly care for our own new born child – and in others it is built through time –in the case of friendship, both the relationship and the affection develop together from the moment of acquaintance. In other relationships, one comes to care not about individuals but for a group made of individuals, like in the case of co-nationality. In the case of the relationship with other members of the human community, I think care is built in the same way it is in co-nationality, as a way of identity building.

Some authors have identified nationality as an inalienable part of what one is (McIntyre, 1984:14). The tie is forged as one achieves self-knowledge narratively (Held 2005:47). Through the process, one realizes the importance of nationality for one's identity and comes to care for co-nationals as her equals, through a weak emotional tie that takes, in Gould’s terms, the form of national solidarity. I believe the same process takes place for people for whom being a member of the global community is part of what defines their identities; but the grounding emotion, as I said, is compassion.
Another question about the relationship with strangers would be whether we have this relationship with particular individuals or with humanity as a whole. My answer is that the relationship is established with a collective, as co-nationality is. In this case, there is not a ‘collective of strangers’ but a community of fellow human beings. However, although the relationship is established with a group, like in the case of co-nationality the motivation is aroused by particular individuals. This phenomenon can be easily seen in cases of national disasters. One is aware of the tie that links her with her co-nationals in a subconscious way, and without directing her care to any co-national in particular. However, if we take events like the hurricane Katrina, an American feels compassion towards the people she sees suffering on TV as individuals. She feels compassion towards them qua fellow Americans, that is, in function of the relationship that binds her with them. Proof of this is that a similar tragedy in Indonesia fails to move her in an equal way. Similarly, in our relationship with strangers we feel compassion towards them qua fellow members of the global community (which might seem in contradiction with the Indonesia example, but I have already said that we do not currently act as cosmopolitans).

I have provided then with the emotional tie that can ground the motivation for the cosmopolitan ideal, overcoming he motivational challenge I set to impartialists. If we are to respond to the needs of strangers, it will be by the engaging of compassion grounded in common vulnerability. I have yet to explain how this relationship fits in a moral system that is indeed cosmopolitan.

2.2. Bounded partiality as a cosmopolitan system

The moral system I suggest is based on a bounded partiality, with our affective and moral world structured as a series of concentric circles (Nussbaum 2002:9). Also a term coined by the Stoics, the first one encircles the bounds of the self, the last is the bound of humanity as a whole; in the middle there are different allegiances. For them, and for authors like Nussbaum, being a cosmopolitan was to bring the people from the outer circle to the centre. Rorty has offered a different interpretation, an expansion of allegiances from the centre to the outer circle, so strangers become “people like us” (1993:123).[3] My view shares a lot with the Rortyan ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’. But, unlike Rorty, I will insist on the importance of variable degrees of

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3 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this reference.
concern. I will never love the Ugandan woman as much as I love my sister. That is why I will use the same image of concentric circles, but I will accept that the further we go, the fewer affective ties we have, hence the motivation to act also decreases the further we go from the inner circle. However, that does not mean that we do not care for the people in the outer circle. We just care less, so we are less motivated to attend to their needs.

That is a more realistic picture of our moral psychology, which enables me to make demands—which I will detail later—to actual agents and not to ideal ones. Nevertheless, in order to keep the cosmopolitan character of the described system, I have to explain how I articulate the equality requirement of the cosmopolitan ideal. The requirement of cosmopolitanism, if we remember, was that everyone should be treated equally regardless of their distance to us. Despite saying that distance is relevant, I can still offer a cosmopolitan theory.

My view preserves its cosmopolitan character insofar there is still a demand of treating everyone equally. Only that the equality requirement is contextualized. To be explicit, treating everyone equally means being equally responsive to strangers in the context of our relationship with them. Distant people are strangers and thus our relationship with them is different to the one we have with our kin. The demands in each relationship are different but we ought to comply with all the demands we have towards every individual. Explaining the partial cosmopolitan demand in more detail will be my next task.

2.3. Responsiveness in the new cosmopolitan demand

In the first part of the paper, I have argued that impartialist cosmopolitanism does not work because it aims at expanding our moral thought in partial relationships to all individuals, but fails to recognize emotions as our main source of motivation towards our kin. We are morally motivated by our kin because we care for them, I argued. The cosmopolitan should care about strangers. I suggest now that the cosmopolitan demand should be re-defined in order to require from us that we make that relationship more caring so that it is equally caring to our relationship to our kin. Being equally caring in all our relationships can also be defined as being a caring person.

Curzer has defined the caring person as “disposed to make and maintain the right sort of relationships, with the right people, in the right way, at the right times, for the right motives, etc. The caring person must also feel the right level and sort of fondness and responsibility for people standing
in various different relationships to him or her.” (Curzer 2002, quoted in Held, 2005:51). The demand of partial cosmopolitanism stems from the latter premise, namely our fondness and responsibility for strangers.

In my view, being adequately fond to people we do not know is defined in a minimal way as openness and imagination to their lives. In a practical sense, what is demanded from me when I see the Ugandan woman on television is that I open myself to her story and to feel emotions of compassion towards her; emotions that will arise from our ties of compassion. This caring relationship is based on what I call active awareness. Being actively aware is being actually engaged in what we see, feeling the emotions that come (or should come) by an appreciation of other members of the human community to whom we are partially linked. People who fail to be cosmopolitans are either unaware or passively aware of strangers and of social injustices. As I have mentioned in an uncontroversial empirical observation, we are exposed to lives of others constantly through media, so most of us fall into the second category. We are often passively aware observers, since we lack any emotional reaction to such exposure. Singer and Pogge think we are irrational, I think we are insufficiently caring in our relationship with strangers.

I admit that calling for active awareness is a very weak cosmopolitan demand. I will defend it as the most urgent task for global justice when I deal with objections later. Now, once the nature of the relationship with strangers and the new cosmopolitan ideal has been explained in a way it engages emotional motivation, it is time to show how my proposal meets the partiality challenge.

2.4. Partial relationships as a cosmopolitan necessity

I have argued that if we understand partiality as bounded and equality as responsiveness in relationships, I can articulate a cosmopolitan ideal by acknowledging the existence of a relationship with strangers and requiring from individuals that they make it a caring one. That is, I have established, a way of making cosmopolitanism partial. However, it seems that such move merely incorporates partiality to the cosmopolitan ideal formally, but it does not justify why it is precisely our relationships with family and friends that are at the centre of concentric circles. I have not, in other words, responded for the meaningfulness of traditionally partial relationships I censored impartialists for not recognizing. I shall finish the exposition of my account responding to that matter.
The cosmopolitan ideal as I have presented it, in the form of a relationship, cannot be understood without an emotional component. We have to care about strangers. However, emotions involved in our relationship with strangers are complex, fine-tuned ones and we learn to master them with our kin. Compassion and care are learnt in small groups. Nussbaum points out that all agents have encountered such emotions from their parents or guardians: family relations are a sort of ‘training field’ to other relationships we build through life, including our relationship with strangers. Hence, meaningful relationships, are necessary for cosmopolitanism since it is in partiality where we learn how demanding care is. Take motherhood. Having a child means to accept that one will plausibly be involved in situations one does not like; having a level of concern that it is usually at par, or sometimes above, one’s own; being emotionally open; and changing the parameters of self-identification to include the new person and the new role. At least, that could be a gloss to what Western societies consider a stereotype of a caring mother. Caring for strangers is quite demanding too, at least in a world with so great global injustices. Watching the news and being open to be emotionally engaged by what one sees – to feel compassion for the other – is neither easy nor pleasant. That is the level of the demandingness of our relationship with strangers, which can only be learnt in meaningful and caring personal relationships.

In partial relationships we also learn the limits of care. Namely, caring for someone is very demanding, but it does not entail that we have to respond for all the needs someone has. This is a crucial element of the cosmopolitanism I am suggesting; being caring in our relationship with strangers means that we are responsible for some of their needs, but it does not mean that we are responsible for covering all their needs. My moral system of concentric circles entails that the scope of demands of each relationship and the motivational power of those demands vary. That already happens in the relationships that have been traditionally considered partial: the demands and motivation in a daughter, sister, cousin or work colleague relationships are quite different. Personal relationships are where we learn it first and where we learn it best.

What I have done though is giving partiality an instrumental value for cosmopolitanism: we learn to show compassion in our partial relationships, and we need such compassion to make our relationship with strangers caring. How is this different to the instrumental value I criticize impartialist cosmopolitanism gave to partial relationships, saying they are a means to global justice? Firstly, I do not deny that partial relationships can have a role
in global justice. Actually, since care is needed for people to be motivated to act as cosmopolitans and I have embraced global justice as a cosmopolitan goal, it follows that care in partial relationships is necessary for global justice. Secondly and more importantly, I admit I have, like the impartialists, given instrumental value to partial relationships. They are valuable because they teach us to be cosmopolitans. But I do, unlike impartialists, embrace the meaningfulness of relationships aside from any instrumental value they might have.

An individual with no meaningful relationships cannot be a cosmopolitan because fitting personal relationships are supposed to be meaningful. I have mentioned before that we are not global in our relationships: we love our family, our partners, our friends—even our pets—and we do not love them because it can get us to something; let alone because it can get us to bring about a fairer world. Such aimless love is needed for my theory because what I have described before as the demandingness and limits of care cannot be learnt in shallow, merely useful relationships. In such sense my instrumental account of partial relationships is very different from the one impartialists suggest and does not share the flaws of their view. I believe then that my account does not have to face a partiality challenge as the one I set for impartialists.

On that note, I have articulated a cosmopolitan ideal that is fully supported by partiality. It recognizes traditional partial relationships and uses the emotional motivation engaged in them to extend our moral concern towards strangers. The cosmopolitan demand is also partial, since it consists in making our relationship of co-membership with fellow members of the global community more caring. This is a reformulation of cosmopolitanism that might nevertheless meet challenges of its own.

3. Facing objections

The view I have presented here overcomes the obstacles impartialist cosmopolitans face. It is also a partialist moral view that deserves to be called cosmopolitan. However, it relies on the acceptance of my two cornerstones: the existence of a relationship with strangers and the cosmopolitan character of my view. I can advance that sceptics could object to both of them. My final task will be to anticipate my answer to them.
3.1. Scepticism about our relationship with strangers

Firstly, I will deal with scepticism regarding our relationship with strangers. Objections could take two forms: against the existence of the relationship or regarding its motivational power for people who are unaware of it. I will start with the former.

The relationship we have with strangers, I shall remind, is of co-membership of a global community. I think then that the emphasis should be put not in the existence of the relationship itself, but of the community. I have already discarded the term ‘citizen of the world’ because of the lack of a world state. The world community is not bound by legal ties as the national community is. But legal ties are not necessary for national communities either: there have existed plenty of stateless national identities which are bound solely by cultural ties and common history. It is arguable whether the global community has minimal cultural and historical ties, but for the sake of the argument I will assume they do not. Is common vulnerability or common humanity enough to bind a community? I believe it is.

Let us come back to the hurricane Katrina example. The woman sitting in front of her television feels a swarm of compassion for the people she sees because they are fellow Americans. But the basic ground to that compassion is not that they share a renowned Constitution, neither is it the stars and stripes flag or the overcoming of the Great Depression. It is not a legal bound or a cultural bound: it is their common vulnerability that moves her. The legal and cultural ties are what make her feel such compassion more intensely than she would if she was watching a Ugandan woman in the same situation. In other words, common vulnerability grounds the arousing of emotions, legal and cultural ties ground the scope of such emotions. It is then the minimal affective tie that can link two people. As our relationship with strangers is in the outer circle, and I argued that the intensity of affective attachment decreases the further we go from the centre, it seems fair that our emotional tie has to be minimal. The global community can then be bound by common vulnerability.

But these emotions, a critic looking at ‘the real world’ would insist, do not actually arise when people see distant strangers suffering in their television. My theory is directed to actual agents, so I could be accused of demanding emotional superpowers where impartialists required moral superpowers. That is not the case. What happens when people fail to be moved by distant strangers is that they are unaware of the relationship. That is, the relationship is as little caring as it could be (since the equivalent of
a caring relationship was active awareness). That brings me to the second objection, whether we can be motivated by a relationship we are not aware of. I will articulate that point in more detail.

I have defined the cosmopolitan demand as being caring in our relationship with strangers, and being caring as being actively aware of them. The reason most people are not actively aware – the reason they do not act as cosmopolitans – is because they are unaware of the existence of such relationship in the first place. That is due to our education. We are educated to be aware and responsive in our relationships with family, friends and co-nationals. But there is little teaching regarding the common vulnerability that links us with strangers. Here I take from Rorty his call for sentimental education, which is made specifically to institutions by Nussbaum. My demand is, then, two-fold. There is an individual demand of active awareness, and an institutional demand of educating people in such way and promoting a critical culture of open citizens (Nussbaum 2002:6). The ways to promote such culture are many, including promotion of interculturalism and even creation of open spaces that engage emotions in walkers-by (2014:n.p.). As I have said though, mine is fundamentally a claim to individuals to make their relationship with strangers more caring. However, it is primarily in the hands of institutions that individuals are in the position to actually comply with the claim. In that sense, I admit that individuals cannot be motivated by their relationship to strangers if they are not aware of it, but there is a way to bring that awareness about.

In summary, I believe I have responded to possible criticisms regarding the relationship we have with strangers. In consequence, my view cannot be dismissed on the basis of scepticism regarding such relationship.

3.2. Is this really a cosmopolitan view?

Now I will turn to the second possible objection. Since the moment I explained my cosmopolitan view, I warned I could be accused of having articulated a moral system that is not cosmopolitan at all. After all, cosmopolitanism necessarily entails equality in moral treatment to all human beings and I admit variations in moral concern. I have already defended that my cosmopolitan ideal contextualizes the equality requirement and reformulates it, so treating everyone equally amounts to being adequately responsive in the different relationships we have with them. The Ugandan woman, I shall insist, does not have the same moral claims my sister has on me because I have different relationships with each of them. Being
responsive means different things in different relationships. So I am not discriminating against her morally if I do not treat her as my sister, as long as my relationship with her is caring in the way and in the scope relationships with strangers should be.

However, that might not satisfy critics. The point of emphasizing the requirement of equality is to challenge common-sense views of morality, because under such views we never have a reason to attend the needs of strangers if our kin has conflicting needs. To illustrate that objection with an example, a Singer-style cosmopolitan could challenge me to apply my view to the following situation. Let us imagine our own child asked for some new, expensive trainers. We are able to buy them but then we will not be able to give that money to charity, and the second action will contribute more to global justice – which I have accepted as a legitimate goal of cosmopolitanism. Since the strangers who would benefit from charity donations are in the outer circle of care and our child is one of the innermost (and apparently he needs the trainers) we will buy our child the trainers. We will repeat that behaviour in all similar situations, because we never care for strangers as much as we care for our own children. In other words, in my system of concentric circles, strangers are always in a position of disadvantage. My view is then not cosmopolitan, it could be argued.

I would recommend to such critics to have another look at my proposal. It is targeted at the relationship with strangers, not at our active contributions to global justice understood as the application of an impartial principle (in this case, avoiding suffering). I would respond again that the critic’s consequentialist approach is void of motivation if he does not incorporate an affective tie. Since the view that arrives at the conclusion that a cosmopolitan view has to give necessarily a mechanism that prevents us from prioritizing our kin always is a view that misunderstands moral psychology, I call as well for a redefinition of that formal requirement for cosmopolitan ideals. It should not aim at giving formulas that we can apply, but at constructing a critical society of cosmopolitan citizens. If we all learn that we are connected with strangers because they are fellow members of the global community, we will be motivated to be actively aware of them. Once we make our relationship with them more caring, juggling priorities will be a matter again not of applying principles, but of critical reflection. Such is the way our moral psychologies function: sometimes a friend calls us to visit her at the hospital, but we also have to attend to a cousin’s wedding, and our mother has asked us to help her move houses. In the system of concentric circles, we do not act like impartialists trying to find some moral formula.
so the closer the person is, the more she deserves from us automatically. We use our critical ability and have to take into account many variables in order to make a decision about different levels of partiality.

In that sense, I believe I have responded to the second objection: my view does not indeed provide us with a mechanism that teaches us when not to prioritize our kin, but we are not currently lacking a mechanism of that nature, we are lacking critical ability. My view has then to be accepted as a cosmopolitan one, if we overcome the hijacking of the term impartialists have carried out for the last forty years.

Conclusion

I hope I have thrown doubt on what has been traditionally seen as a confrontation between partiality and cosmopolitanism, by showing that articulating the cosmopolitan ideal through partiality can solve some of the obstacles the proponents of a global moral community have encountered. Being cosmopolitan in my account means to work on making our relationship with strangers, which is somehow partial, more caring; the emotions in play in such a relationship can only be learned in partial relationships, and that makes partiality necessary for cosmopolitanism. The equality demand in cosmopolitanism takes the form of contextualized equality, since the ideal acquires a new content: to treat everyone equally is to be equally responsive in the relationship we have with them. That admits degrees of attachments and obligations; which is the way most people do live their lives. What I have done is not to derive an ought from an is, but to show how we can articulate the “oughts” in the face of the “is”; thus offering a way cosmopolitanism can be more engaging for people who are more motivated by what engages them emotionally. Partiality can, in that way, support cosmopolitanism.

References


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