1 Nature and the Unlovable

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8 > Abstract · Can our relationship with 9 nature be loving and reciprocal? The 10 claim is hard to sustain when nature is 11 taken to encompass polluted and urban 12 places. The notion of reciprocity loses its 13 force, and the lovability of these places 14 is put into question. Also, the demand 15 of love may obscure the ethical demand 16 in our relationship with nature: to be re-17 sponsible in our meaning-making prac-18 tices.

¹⁹ Handling Editor • Alexander Riegler

«1» Contemporary philosophy is mov-22 ing away from simplifying views of love as 23 a mere mental phenomenon, and towards a 24 more complex notion of love as interaction 25 and mutual shaping of perspectives. Laura 26 Candiotto applies her own view within this 27 approach (Candiotto & De Jaegher 2021) 28 to her account of love of nature by loving a 29 place. For Candiotto, love is participatory 30 sense-making: loving a place is a reciprocal 31 encounter, accomplished by listening to the 32 place and being listened to in return. Her 23 contribution is also in line with an innova-34 tive approach within environmental ethics, 35 where several authors have argued that na-36 ture can be an active participant in a recip-208 37 rocal loving relationship.1

«2» Candiotto rejects the notion of 39 love of nature as a love of some universal, 40 uniform, and vague ideal that characterizes 41 many environmentalist views. Instead, it 42 is a love of the particular (§§8-10, 26, 29); 43 love of nature is thus erotic (§§19, 22). In 44 philosophy, the term "erotic" has often re-45 ferred to love that is particular and recipro-46 cal, as opposed to "agapeic" love, which is 47 universal and unilateral. Being particular 48 means that erotic love is grounded on the 49 qualities that make a specific person who 50 she is. While erotic love is grounded on the 51 person's qualities, in agapeic love, the person

1| For example, Bryan Bannon (2017) ar-54 gues that our relationship with nature should be 55 that of reciprocal friendship.

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is merely a vehicle for love of humanity as a whole. This is why, for Candiotto, love of nature is rooted in quality-based (i.e., erotic) love of place.2 Loving a place is loving that place for what it is, and that is loving nature. This is a novel and interesting view, which, in principle, allows for a more comprehensive conception of nature that overcomes the division between nature and culture (§25), and allows love of nature to include love of cities (§43). Too often, environmentalist discourse has called (implicitly or explicitly) for a return to pristine, untouched nature. Esme Murdock (2019: 303) calls this "discriminatory biocentrism," which not only excludes humans from environmental concerns, but specifically vulnerable humans - such as working-class city residents or displaced Native communities. In this sense, Candiotto's view is urgent and important.

«3» For Candiotto, loving consists in knowing what the place is through active listening - instead of just unilaterally making up our minds about what that place is or should be. Although Candiotto's examples are mainly of places in wild nature (§§8, 24, 36), she also discusses the example of a polluted river. When encountering a polluted river, we may become aware that something has gone wrong in our relationship with the place, a "story of violence" that should drive us to amend the harm we - human beings - have inflicted (§36). We can only become aware of this harm by listening to the place; the river has already listened to us by becoming polluted (§41). We have, then, a definition of "listening" that is figurative and – since listening is not the same process for human beings as it is for elements of nature - that can be instantiated by different mechanisms (cf. the concept of "multiple realizability" in mainstream philosophy). This sort of definition is necessary to see love of nature as reciprocal, since it would be hard to defend the idea that nature can listen in the literal sense - as Candiotto herself admits (§41). Her description of listening incorporates an ethical demand, which I understand as a demand to listen to nature's needs. I argue that this element of reciprocity and the subsequent ethical demand is in column C

tension with the incorporation of non-pristine nature into environmental discourse.

«4» The worry here is that we cannot 3 love some places for their qualities. The pol- 4 luted river is a dirty, inhospitable, violent 5 place: if love is to be based on its traits, which 6 is a requirement for this love to be erotic, the 7 polluted river is unlovable. One response to 8 this worry would be that we are unable to see 9 the qualities of the river, since in virtue of be- 10 ing polluted the river is lacking the qualities 11 for which we should love it (pristine, clean, 12 peaceful and full of life, for example). How 13 can we then love the river for its qualities, 14 without projecting our own interpretation 15 and thus making the relationship unilateral? 16 We can only do this by listening to the river 17 - by loving the river. However, the challenge 18 remains if we look at a less clear-cut case. Say, 19 for example, that one has an encounter with 20 a huge car park, built where there used to be 21 a forest. Unlike the river, which is polluted 22 but is still there, the forest simply is no more. 23 There is only the car park. That is what this 24 place is. We can still look at the car park and 25 acknowledge the harm that has been done, or 26 grieve for the lost forest. However, we cannot 27 do this by listening to the place that we have in 28 front of us. We can only acknowledge the his- 29 tory of violence by bringing in our own inter- 30 pretation of what we see. This interpretation is 31 necessarily unidirectional, and not reciprocal. 32

«5» Let us take this problem further 33 by considering the hot, littered, asphalt- 34 covered streets of a non-affluent European 35 neighbourhood. As an example, I choose 36 Vallecas, a suburb in Madrid located in the 37 site of a former valley with multiple mead- 38 ows, creeks, and rivers. Vallecas started as 39 a small human settlement that evolved into 40 a village, then a town, and was ultimately 41 absorbed by the city of Madrid. Now there 42 is little of the valley left, only human-made 43 buildings. After the Spanish civil war in the 44 1930s, the neighbourhood turned into a 45 slum, and although some parts have been 46 regenerated, it is still a neglected area. At the 47 same time, Vallecas has an important anti- 48 fascist history (the artillery damage from the 49 war is still visible in its walls); a strong sense 50 of community; and an indelible identity as 51 a working-class, socially and politically en- 52 gaged neighbourhood. It is certainly a lov- 53 able place. However, at some point in its 54 history, the creeks in the area looked pretty 55

^{2 |} However, see Sam Shpall (2018) for an illuminating view of love for an ideal that does not generalize.

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1 much like Candiotto's polluted river - be-2 fore they were permanently covered with 3 asphalt. Indeed, many parts of Vallecas do 4 not look very different from the car park 5 in my example. The story of Vallecas is the 6 story of countless urban places around the 7 world where the notion of reciprocal lis-8 tening seems to lose its meaning. I am not 9 refuting that we can listen to these places, 10 but these places cannot listen to us back in 11 the way suggested by Candiotto. Recall that 12 we are to understand that the polluted river 13 has listened to us by becoming inhospitable. 14 However, how has the car-park site listened 15 to us? How have the hot and littered streets 16 of a culturally rich suburb listened to us? 17 Candiotto's view of the river's reciprocity 18 does not seem available in these cases, not 19 the least because it is not clear what is doing 20 the listening in each case: the place that is now, or the bygone pristine nature that the car park and the streets have substituted? 23 (1) Although we may acquire a great deal 24 of understanding while interacting with a 25 place like Vallecas, this will be done by our 26 own interpretation of the place's history and 27 identity, which is an interpretation by other 28 people of what people have done. The place 29 has not listened to us: we have made it what

« 6 » This takes us to the next challenge. 32 The ethical demand of love, understood as 33 love for a particular place, is not general-34 izable. Interacting with polluted or urban 35 places inevitably reveals that the river, the 36 forest, and the meadows are no more, or 37 have been overtaken by these new places. 38 As noted above, we seemingly have the re-39 sponsibility to amend the harm done. Yet 40 what are we to make of this responsibility 41 when interacting with polluted and/or ur-42 ban places? It cannot be a return to pristine 43 nature: that would conflict with Candiotto's 44 rightful rejection of dualism between nature 45 and culture. In §43, she says that love of cit-46 ies "should not be an excuse for not taking 47 responsibility for structural violence." She 48 seems to address the criticism I am making 49 here about pristine versus polluted/urban 50 places, saying that we should not "reduc[e] 51 action to preserve 'the environment," and 52 we should care about the place's inhabitants as well. However, if we label the creation of urban places as a "story of violence," are we 55 not implying that human intervention is to

30 it is, in its goodness and its badness.

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be conceptualized as violent? Can we then speak of love of cities at all? And are we not falling into discriminatory biocentrism? (12) Candiotto's response to the tension I am noting is that the ethical requirement here is "to put the place at the center, the inhabited space of human and nonhuman beings and their relationships" (§43, emphasis in original). However, this needs more elaboration. Even setting aside the challenge I have presented with respect to reciprocity, there is a dilemma behind the ethical demand for loving engagement. If love of nature is qualitybased, we need to love a place for what it is now. This would allow us to love places like Vallecas, but it would mean that we must either love the polluted river as a polluted river or that the polluted river is unlovable for what it is now. Hence, the demand to amend the harm would disappear. On the other horn of the dilemma, if we want to keep the ethical requirement of making amends for the harm done (which is in turn required for loving engagement), some places like Vallecas are unlovable, since love requires letting a place be (§32) and we would not be able to do that - we would be obligated to "undo the harm."

« 7 » Where does this leave us? I propose that we will be able to make better sense of the ethical demands of our relationship with nature if we recognize that places are what we make them to be. We make a place by our interpretation of the place. As I mentioned above, we can (and we should) acknowledge the harm done to the polluted river and the destroyed forest. We can (and we should) acknowledge the value of humanity in places like Vallecas. Love of urban places should not be diminished by knowing that a place is not the place that it once was. Admittedly, we may still love and interact with some places in the way Candiotto describes, but reciprocal love cannot be the ethical demand. We are the makers of meaning in our relationship with place. That means that meaning-making is not participatory, but that is fine: we still have responsibilities in our interaction with places. The ethical demand is to acknowledge our responsibility to tell the stories of what human beings have done to (and in) these places which cannot be told by the places themselves. We are the ones who need to be responsible in our meaning-making. Candiotto's imporcolumn C

tant contribution on love of place is, I hope, 1 a further step towards an environmental 2 ethic that has the urban as a main element, 3 and not as an afterthought. However, we can 4 only do this by seeing ourselves as the main 5 meaning-makers, and taking responsibility 6 for our interpretation of a place's identity 7 and history, as Murdock beautifully puts it:

66 The voices, narratives, and experiences of those 10 living within and among urban environments are 11 necessary [...] to theorize as well as populate the 12 archives with narratives and histories of the won- 13 derful, diverse, and resilient environments and 14 communities found there. These narratives will, 15 of course, include stories of injustice, but they will 16 also include stories of triumph and natural beauty, as well as stories of community gardens, soup 18 kitchens, backyard chickens, herbal medicines, art, 19 worship, sport, and play. 99 (Murdock 2019: 311) 20

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