Philosophy of Theocracy

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Abstract:

It is a work on the philosophy of theocracy (it is in progress as the Ph.D. thesis of Philosophy). In this work, I (hereafter: the writer) prove theocracy as a political view in political philosophy is inherently and utterly unreasonable and immoral political view.

This work includes these chapters:

- The first chapter is on political authority in a theocracy: "Covid-19 Proves Theocracy Is False",
- The second section is on legal language in a theocracy that the writer has named it: "W, W, W, We Are Theocracy: Legal Stammer",
- The next chapter is on Divine Command Theory in a theocracy which has been called: "Be a Good Person, Not That Theocratic Way",
- The last part of this work is on Freedom of Religion in a theocracy: "The Slap Argument Inclines the Freedom of Religion".

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2 The writer's footnote: It is an early draft, please do not cite without the writer's permission, the writer will be indebted to you if you invite this work to your academic publishing. In addition, the writer has applied the writer’s permanent methodology to this work. I've been working on this work since 2019.
Abstract
It is argued that the standard view of politics and religion is based on well-established moral and political arguments. Faithfully, I (hereafter: the writer) would argue that there is another argument that could prove that not only the standard view is true, but also, theocracy as a political view that refuses the standard view is certainly false. It is called as Covid-19 Sample Argument.

The Standard View and Theocratic Anti-Model
Normatively, the main relation between religion and Political Philosophy has been called standard view (hereafter: SV), it is SV because some strong liberal arguments have produced a consensus or convergent on the relation. Philosophers have called this position toward SV as secularism, also SV produces The Doctrine of Religious

3 The writer’s footnote: The core idea of the Covid-19 Sample Argument (hereafter: the argument) came to the writer’s mind some years ago, the writer figured out the argument could apply covid-19 pandemic in 2019, and so the writer presented it as an open letter to the president of the writer’s country on 10th Feb 2020, it was published eight days before the government of the writer’s country officially announced the Covid-19 disease, the writer thinks that the letter was successful in its own goal, otherwise the pandemic overthrew the society of the writer’s country. The writer has transferred the argument from the letter to this article academically as a Ph.D. semester requirement in fall 2020.

4 The writer’s footnote: "Covid-19 Sample Proves Theocracy Is False" is an early draft and a chapter of the writer’s prospective Ph.D. thesis is "Philosophy of Theocracy", please do not cite without the writer’s permission. Also, the writer will be indebted to you if you invite this paper to your peer-review journal. In addition, the writer has applied the writer’s permanent methodology to this work.

5 For an introduction to the religion and political Philosophy, see: (Eberle & Cuneo, 2017), (Callaway, 2016), (O’Hara, 2010, pp. 212-3), (Quinn, 2005a, p. 253), (Wiethman, 1998).


7 For this political agreement, see: (Callaway, 2016), (Eberle & Cuneo, 2017).

8 For secularism see: (Cliteur, 2010), A. Goals: 1. equal respect (Kant, 1999), 2. freedom of religion and/or conscience (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399], pp. 27-8), (Callaway, 2016), B. Mechanism: 1. neutrality of state (Gaus, 2009, pp. 82-3,88-90), 2. separation of church and state (Rawls, 2000, p. 166), C. More/less criteria (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399], pp. 30-41), D. Public spheres (Habermas, 1997), (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399]).
Restraint (hereafter: DRR) that is an asymmetric secular restraint on religious roles in public spheres, those roles that do not have a rationale for secular coercive laws. Although, theocracy as a political view has a different story, theocracy is not finding a place of religion in politics and it is not a model on the relation between politics and religion, even though, it is an anti-model of the relation, it is on the authority of religion to the government.

**Covid-19 Sample Argument**

Straightforwardly, the writer will present an argument that shows SV is true and so, only public reasons those could epistemologically and ethically enroll their public justification deserve to fill public spheres. The argument will prove legitimate non-theocratic authority and government and it is also in disfavor of theocratic political authority and government. The writer will borrow some symbols and present the argument that is come from the covid-19 pandemic.

**A. The Argument: It is the Covid-19 Sample Argument:**

\[ X = \text{someone is religious and infected by Covid-19 disease,} \]
\[ OM = \text{otherworldly medical method,} \]
\[ TM = \text{thisworldly medical method,} \]

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The writer’s footnote: Very recently, I have found that D. Z. Phillips presented an example "Prayer-Medicine" and Bertrand Russell wrote a chapter "Demonology and Medicine" that would be similar to "Covid-19 Sample Argument". However, first of all, they are in the Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophy of Science, and they are not in the Social and Political Philosophy. Next, the examples are only simple comparisons and without philosophical details, also they are not developed arguments. Besides that, the examples need to be examined empirically as Phillips and Russell mentioned, though, the argument of the writer's work is a normative and philosophical one.

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OTM = otherworldly thisworldly medical method like some medicines that have thisworldly material but it is claimed that they have come from otherworldly prescriptions.

Y = is X who has been cured by OM / TM.
1. ∃X, X OB becomes Y
2. X PE treat with OM
3. ◇, X becomes Y and so, ∃Y
4. X PE treat with TM
5. ◇, X becomes Y and so, ∃Y
6. ◇, ¬∃Y
7. ◇, ¬∃Y

N = is X but only believe to treat with OM.
8. ∃N, X OB becomes N
9. N OB treat with OM (for example, praying, miracle and ...) & N IM treat with TM
10. ◇, N becomes Y and so, ∃Y
11. ¬∃Y
12. If N treats with TM, but, □, N does not treat with TM
13. ⊥
14. ◇, if OTM does not ∈ OM (for example, historically some may ask whether OTM belongs to otherworldly entities?), then what K will do? (14) to (18)
15. ◇, if OTM ∨ TM or OM ∨ TM (Because, 1. there is a new TH that is better than OTM, or there is a new TM that replaces OTM, 2. Or there is a contrast between OTM and TM), then what K will do? (14) to (18)
16. 13 ⊃ ¬15 (that means it is self-defeating like the death of X or X will face inconsistency).

If the argument is plausible, then it is true that every theocracy is false and it does not matter whether one has applied this or that religion. As soon as you fill public institutions with religion, you will face the covid-19 sample. Here are some mainstreams of it:

L1 = is a government that would apply the Y method,
22. ∃L1, X OB becomes L1 institutionally
23. □, L1 could not employ Y institutionally
24. Because, □, there could be ¬∃Y

L2 = is a government that would apply the N method,
25. ∃L2, X OB becomes L2 institutionally
26. □, L2 could not employ N institutionally (13)(25)
27. Because, □, L will face ⊥ (26)

L3= is a government that would apply the K method,

28. ∃L3, X OB becomes L3 institutionally
29. □, L2 could not employ N institutionally (21)(28)
30. Because, □, L will face 13∨15 (29)

The writer is sure that L1, L2, and L3 are the blocking future of every single theocratic government that struggles with a crisis or other debates of governing like the Covid-19 sample.

B. Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Referendum Objection: First possible objection would be that one may argue that it is possible for a state organizes a referendum on the Covid-19 sample to know whether citizens of a country would like to be Y, N, K and expand this decision to the public sphere, legally, governmentally, and socially.

- However, one has to remember that you will face Covid-19 die off the humankind if you hold the referendum.

- Another reply would be that if they want to insist on OM or OTM, it may die off humankind, then they have to remain a staunch advocate of OM or OTM and do not switch to TM. But, we know they ought to do that.

The Irrelevancy of Social Sciences Objection: One may argue that there is a strict distinction between, on the one side, there are applied sciences, for example, Medicine, Engineering, and natural sciences i.e. Physics or Biology, and on the other side, there are social sciences, for example, sociology or political sciences and humanities i.e. philosophy. The writer's reply has four-dimensional:

- First of all, it is a straw man fallacy, since one seems to forget that the writer has chosen the Covid-19 Sample Argument as a sample of the public institutions’ epistemic content. You could replace the argument with another one that may come from Engineering. For instance, imagine one needs to call firefighters with a cellphone to rescue herself from a firestorm, but there is a religion that confines yourself to calling by a cellphone, or imagines you have to do that to rescue an official public organization and its employees from the firestorm. In this case, vis-a-vis, you have to follow the argument.

- In addition, the writer is extremely doubtful that one could draw those boundaries among sciences, day to day, more and more, there are multidisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary subjects and aspects among the sciences. Also, on the same page, there are some perspectives in which they have put together social sciences over natural sciences.

- The next is that norms and values that have been found out and/or constructed by philosophy and its branches such as ethics, social and political philosophy,
and the philosophy of law are non-replaceable. These epistemic dimensions of these branches of philosophy are categorized as value theory and they are unique among all majors and subjects, they enforce one to come up with idea that she could not prevent these aspects of human knowledge, and so, philosophy is the most fundamental segment of the knowledge.

- Another reply would be a thought experiment: imagine a world in which a terrific accident by an employee’s nuclear energy company has precipitated a temporary power outage in the whole world. In this case, the human being has to live in this painful situation for more than four decades. It is clear that too many struggles may blow up by this accident. One of them is an opportunist queen of a country who commands her chemists to produce a kind of food that belongs to a religious diet that will addict all indigenous children of some territories. The queen would diminish indigenous cultures, languages, and religions and replace them with the queen’s country by addicting and killing innocent indigenous children. Disgracefully she would transfer all of the human beings' civilization to the queen’s country. Moreover, there is a theocratic government in one of those territories that ludicrously insists on this significant religious diet. There is no electricity for medical doctors to collect information on the addiction and they could not know to treat the children, this ignorance causes the death of children. Fortunately, there are some social scientists who could gather data on the addiction in that society and caution the theocratic government. Social scientists reach a consensus on this consensus has been achieved through positive addiction and death by 9999 cases from 10000 cases, and so, theocracy shall proscribe this diet. Everyone knows that there is no medical treatment and medicine and the only method to know about the diet is the outcome of social scientists’ research. One more, vis-a-vis, you have to follow the argument.

The Form Objection: Another objection would be that one may argue that a theocracy could avoid filling the contents of public institutions epistemologically and ethically, but let its form of it remain theocratically the religious one.

- The writer would caution if the one imposes the secular or epistemic-ethical law and politics instead of religious law and politics into provisions and constitutions in a theocracy, the one will face the theocratic paradox that means theocracy in which set religious authority and track the non-religious authority in its law and politics.

- Another case would be that the one may less rationally call it that it is not a paradox, but it is only that there would arise a meaningless theocracy that recognizes itself as a theocracy but runs non-theocratic laws and politics.

The Scarce Fundamentalists Objection: Here is a common objection, one could present an objection that philosophers caution governments to not apply theocracy as a political view. It is because theocracy attacks the most fundamental values, and so, the writer need not anchor non-moral norms i.e. Covid-19 sample as the argument presents.

- Although, the writer would insist a note that the one has to stand this condition that there could be a theocracy and/or fundamentalists that basically may reject
the fundamental moral norms against it, and this fact leads the writer to
discover what would be another defeater of theocracy and the writer founds out
that it is the covid-19 sample.

The Last Version Objection: Another objection that has been common among religious
scholars is that let is patient with the new scientific and philosophic discoveries. In
other words, our version of religion would be regarding the last findings of sciences
and philosophies. As a result, it seems that there is no inconsistency and/or self-
defeating between them to be an obstacle to a theocracy. So, the theory of everything
or the most developed version of knowledge i.e. sciences and philosophy could lead to
being recognized as a whole or part of a religion and this could transfer to a
government as a theocracy.

- The First reply would be that it is the real hypocrisy of those scholars and
theocracies. This real hypocrisy is seriously immoral and harmful to both public
institutions and the morality of ordinary people.

- Second of all, the question would arise that whether those religions include
nothingness and so, why do we have to keep them as segments of a government
as much as those religions include nothingness and this enforces a government
to be meaningless and nonfunctional.

The Religious Democratic Twin Objection: Some proponents of theocracy and others
would recognize theocracy and religious democracy interchangeably. Therefore, it may
conceal the serious and main weaknesses of theocracy. But, the writer believes that
there could not be sophisticated examples of this interchangeability.

- First and foremost, it is the very common reply that the mainstream of
democracy is that political authority has to place thisworldly, democracy's
political authority is not otherworldly and religious. As a result, it is not only
true that theocracy is not religious democracy, but also, it is not a solution to
label theocracy as theodemocracy, since it remains otherworldly and religious
political authority.

- Another cautionary note is that the first reply of this objection indicates that
this differentiation is on political authority, thus, other related topics of the
differentiation arise after political authority i.e. freedom of religion or religious
rights.

- Some other authors whole-heartedly know theocracy and democracy are
inherently inconsistent,11 and the writer totally agree with this view.

- The last reply is that religious democracy could have only two natures, the first
is that it has to be normatively democratic, the second one is that it has to be
normatively theocratic, there is no the third selection and a religious democracy
could not be both normatively.

11 For this view see: (Onfray, 2007, pp. 177,205).
The Functional Illegitimate Objection: Functionally appropriateness of totalitarian regimes’ special attributes inclines theocracy’s proponents to dwell on the idea that if theocracy could provide some of those attributes, then the opponents have to confirm that theocracy is satisfying.

- The writer enormously disagrees that the theocratic government could provide those functions. It is because of the argument.

- Besides that, not only due to the above-mentioned normative reply but also, there could not be a similarity between other totalitarian regimes and theocratic governments. It is due to the fact that the authority of the former is placed in a thisworldly manner, but the latter recognizes and puts the authority in an otherworldly manner, this reinforces the idea that theocratic governments could not appear as functional appropriateness.

The Humanities Weakness Objection: One common tendency among theocracies is their programs on presenting religious perspectives of humanities that exclude social sciences and philosophy because of the replies to The Irrelevancy of Social Sciences Objection. This tendency leads to satisfying the proponents of theocracies and consequentially there could exist legitimate theocracies.

- The first reply is that the aforementioned replies of The Irrelevancy of Social Sciences Objection could be potential replies to this objection repeatedly since it is very nasty to separate Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Archaeology, Anthropology, Communication, Cultural Studies, Economics, Education, Gender Studies, Geography, History, Political Science, Semiotics, Sociology, Law) from Humanities (Transportation and Business and Marketing, Journalism and Media, Fine and Applied Arts, Religious Studies, Languages, Military Studies) arbitrarily.¹²

- However, if one could successfully and precisely separate the above-mentioned spheres epistemically, a claim would arise that there could not be humanities as public reasons in public spheres due to the fact that the separation enforces those humanities to remain non-epistemic and unknowable so, from the SV point of view, it is not important to call those humanities with any religious prefixes since they are out of governments.

- Indeed, it is feasible that one insists on some indispensability majors and professions of humanities to the government. Although one could not deny their relations to the Social Sciences and Philosophy, and etc., as a result, one could not employ humanities without methodology of sciences and philosophy to a government. For Instance, one could not initiate a government media as a type of media in humanities without principles, data, and knowledge that come from the Communication Science as a Social Science.

- Another reply is that if one could exploit humanities with mysterious and unknown basis and principles, then one needs to face Alice in Wonderland.

¹² The writer’s footnote: The writer has applied and reorganized these lists of Humanities and Social Sciences from pages of the PhilPapers and Wikipedia Websites.
The Theocratic Judgment Day Objection: some proponents of theocracy would cleverly be patient until Judgment Day of sciences on the earth which means it is possible that it could not possible to choose between some theories i.e. scientific or philosophical theories as a true theory. For instance, it is may occur physicians could not select between two candidates of quantum theories, and then it seems similar a Judgment Day on the earth, the proponents jump about one of them.\(^{13}\)

- The first reply of the writer to them is recalling the argument to improve this thought that public reasons to the public spheres are inherently different from religious beliefs since the argument indicate religious beliefs are inherently different from our knowledge and it is due to the fact that the argument also proves if one rejects this argument one will face inconsistency and/or self-defeating.

- Moreover, the writer thinks this strategy of the proponents not only contravenes standards of academic ethics and political ethics, but also it violates the true function and destination of our knowledge i.e. quantum physics.

- It also shows how the proponents and theocracies are identical with real and immoral Machiavellianism.

**Conclusion**

This argument has proved that public spheres and institutions such as society or law or government have to fill only with knowledge. Besides that, it is clear that theocracies have been filling their public institutions with OTM or OM that will struggle with self-defeating and/or inconsistency. It was the writer's innovative argument that would persist that SV is true and theocracy is false.

**Bibliography**


\(^{13}\) For indeterminacy of law as justification of religious law see: (Modak-Truran, 2007).
Abstract
In this essay, the writer will attempt to indicate the necessity of a minimalist position on the legal language. Moreover, the writer will transfer this conservative position to legal language in a theocracy and argue that religious legal language in a theocracy is involved the Legal Stammer Argument.

Minimalism in Religious Language
Minimalism in religious language has two advantages for the writer, first of all, minimalist religious language prepares minimalist true ambition of religious language, and so, it seems it could explain religious language. Second of all, this theory could not be misused or extended to other subjects of philosophy of religion i.e. metaphysics of religion or epistemology of religion. Altogether, the writer believes that if one considers the arguments of this theory, then one will agree that religious language is non-descriptive as Minimalism.

Legal Stammer Argument
The writer presents the Legal Stammer Argument (Hereafter: the argument) in favor of non-religious language as legal language, and it is clear that principally theocracy applies to religious language as legal language, the argument will be in disfavor of theocracy. Conversely, if theocracy applies for non-religious language as a legal language, then Legal Stammer Argument will not be on this applying. Moreover, the
writer argues that due to the fact that religious language is non-descriptive and legal language is descriptive, religious language could not be legal language.

A. The Argument: The writer presents the argument in this first face:

Case 1:
X as a religious language= There is a true scripture that produces this utterance: God will forgive the bankrupts’ sin on judgment day.
Y as a legal language= There is a provision that the state will forgive the bankrupts in the last days of every year.
Z= Ana is bankrupt, and she believes in a monotheistic religion that believes in both God and judgment day.

- Z has to pay her debt to a bank,
- Z knows that if she would not pay her debt,
- But she knows that if she does not pay her debt she will face two matters,
- Z knows X,
- Z knows Y,
- Z believes that she is a sinner but X,
  - If X, Z after X, Z will not remain a sinner,
  - If X, then Z will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent religiously,
  - Because the sin of Z depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z,
  - It means that the forgiveness of X is otherworldly that first of all, there is sin as a religious concept and God as a religious entity in religious language and then, they have relations with each other, sin depends on God. Thus, religious language is non-descriptive and unique.
- However, Z knows that she is guilty but Y,
  - If Y, Z after Y is not an offender legally but will remain guilty morally,
  - Therefore, we know that the state will forgive Z and Z will be transformed from an offender to a guilty legally,
  - But we know Z after Y, Z will remain guilty morally, because the guilt of Z does not depend on the willingness of the state to forgive Z morally, bankruptcy is immoral and it is distinguished from forgiveness of the state,
  - It means that the forgiveness of Y is thisworldly that first of all, there is the guilt as a legal concept and the state as a legal entity


in legal language, besides that, the guilt has the legal aspect and the moral aspect, and so, the guiltiness and the state have relations with each other, but the guiltiness is independent of the state.

Case 2:

X as a religious language= There is a true scripture that produces this utterance: God will forgive the bankrupts' sin on judgment day.  
Y as a legal language= There is a provision that the state will forgive the bankrupts' sin in the last days of every year.  
Z'= Ana is bankrupt, but she does not believe in monotheistic religions she does not believe in both God and judgment day, but she does not know Y.

- Z' has to pay her debt to a bank,
- Z' knows that if she would not pay her debt,
- But she does not know that if she does not pay her debt she will face two matters,
- Z' does not know X,
- Z' does not know Y,
- Z' does not believe that she is a sinner but X,
  - If X, Z' after X, will not remain a sinner,
  - If X, then Z' will be transformed from a sinner to an innocent religiously,
  - Because the sin of Z' depends on the willingness of God to forgive Z',
  - It means that the forgiveness of X is otherworldly that first of all, there is sin as a religious concept and God as a religious entity in religious language and then, they have relations with each other, sin depends on God. Thus, religious language is non-descriptive and unique.
- However, Z' knows that she is guilty but Y,
  - If Y, Z' after Y is not an offender legally but will remain guilty morally,
  - Z' does not know Y, and so, reasonably she would not do the bankruptcy, but we know Y,
  - However, imagine Z' do the bankruptcy, if Y, Z' after Y is not an offender legally, but will remain guilty morally,
  - Therefore, we know that the state will forgive Z' and Z' will be transformed from an offender to a guilty legally,
  - But we know Z' after Y, Z' will remain guilty morally, because the guilty of Z' does not depend on the willingness of the state to forgive Z' morally, bankruptcy is immoral and it is distinguished from forgiveness of the state,
  - It means that the forgiveness of Y is thisworldly that first of all, there is the guiltiness as a legal concept and the state as a legal entity in legal language, besides that, the guiltiness has the legal aspect and the moral aspect, and so, the guiltiness and the state have relations with each other, but the guiltiness is independent of the state.
These cases show that First of all, applying different theistic or atheist beliefs in both cases does not lead to different concepts and entities in a religious language such as different beliefs on God’s bankruptcy forgiveness in the scripture, since, it is clear that applying the same religious language is independent of mental or epistemic states, and so, religious language is non-descriptive. Second of all, we discover not only that we could grasp the different aspects of thisworldly concepts and entities such as the moral and legal aspect of guiltiness, but also if we apply different beliefs to non-religious concepts and entities lead to different concepts and entities in a non-religious language such as legal language, and this legal language is descriptive. The first consequence of these cases is that X is an example of religious language, a non-descriptive one. The second consequence of them is that Y is an example of a non-religious language, a descriptive one.

The writer also could present the argument as a second face to insist on the basic requirement of legal language: Radically, imagine another way to prove the Legal Stammer Argument that we have to apply the law of applied physics to civic law because it is necessary to build hydroelectric dams, we know that religious language is not descriptive language and so, legal language could not be religious language, though, it has to be scientific language. One more time, to have theistic or atheistic beliefs on God does not target different concepts and entities in a religious language such as different claims on God’s attitudes on dams in the scripture due to the fact that again it is clear to applying of religious language is independent of mental or epistemic states, and so, religious language is non-descriptive. Moreover, we discover not only that we could grasp the different aspects of thisworldly concepts and entities such as the physical, chemical, and environmental aspects of dams, but also if we apply different beliefs to non-religious concepts and entities lead to different concepts and entities in a non-religious language such as legal language.

Let the writer formalizes the argument of these two faces of Legal Stammer Argument:

\[ \Phi = \text{Descriptive property} \]
\[ \alpha = \text{Religious language} \]
\[ \beta = \text{Legal language} \]
\[ \Theta = \text{empty} \]
\[ N_1 = \text{First descriptive legal code or provision} \]
\[ \text{To } N_n = \text{infinite descriptive one} \]

\begin{itemize}
  \item $\alpha$ is $\Theta$ of $\Phi$,
  \item But, $\beta$ needs to be $\Phi$,
  \item Because, $\beta$ has to be the bearer of $N_1$ to $N_n$,
  \item If $N_1$ is a descriptive discipline like applied physics, then, $\beta$ has to be the bearer of $N_1$,
  \item So, $\beta$ has to include $\Phi$,
  \item A could not be $\Phi$,
  \item Altogether, $\beta$ could not be adopted from $\alpha$.
\end{itemize}

All in all, if the legal language has to be a descriptive language that could be the bearer of descriptive sciences and disciplines such as applied physics, engineering, medicine, and/or normative disciplines such as morality then it has not to be the religious one,
there are, on the one side, the minimalist necessity of legal language that has to be descriptive, and on the other side, lack of descriptive aspect of religious language, and so, there is arising of the Legal Stammer Argument for non-religious legal language.

The above-mentioned thesis is that religious language is not descriptive, but, one could perceive there are normative languages such as non-religious languages, those could bearer of descriptive and/or normative ones, also, we know that we require a legal language that has to fit bankruptcy as illegal. Altogether, if religious language does not indicate that bankruptcy is illegal, then it shall not be a law.

B. Objections: There could be some potential objections against the argument:

The Religious Experience Objection: One potential objection may evolve from the connection between religious language and religious experience. It means that a theocracy may argue that its constitutions and provisions and statutes have come from the religious experiences of legislators and many like them i.e. religious feeling, mystical experience, divine revelation. But there would be too many replies to the objection.

- One may rationally claim that it is hypocrisy in law to propose personal religious experience as the content of a statute or provision of law. It is hypocrisy because your personal experience plays impersonal roles as statutes or provisions of law.

- Second of all, this hypocrisy is not only a struggle in the religious language problems but also, it could not enroll functional demand of statutes or provisions of law. It is owing to the fact that a statute or provision of law has to be descriptive, and one more time, the religious experience could not enroll the descriptive aspect of legal language and so, functionally it could not enroll as statutes or provisions of law. For instance, a jurist who grasps a religious experience on the unexpected future earthquake that is in contrast to well-settled outcomes of earth sciences, then how could prove that her experience is a description of the future climate change. Also, it could be a descriptive religious experience on climate change, unless all of the related experts and citizens have this experience universally.

- Last but not least, one may strongly object that religious experience and religious language have a reciprocal relationship and their interpretation that make the impossibility of religious language as legal language. Because legal language could not face biting the bullet, this means religious language in legal language disintegrates legal language and so, it leads to the dissolution of the legal system. Legal language only could be fulfilled by descriptive requirement, and non-descriptive property of religious language and religious experience and their reciprocal relationship will disintegrate law.

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19 The writer’s footnote: There is philosophical literature on at least the three-dimensional relation between religious language and religious experience: Theories of Religious Language (except Face Value Theory) to religious experience, ineffability attribute of religious experience to religious language, and religious language and religious experience via interpretation. However, this note is on the philosophy of religion and so, it is beyond this work.
The Differential Descriptiveness Objection: Another common objection might be that religious language is not non-descriptive, but, it has a differential descriptive property that is not similar to descriptive scientific and/or philosophical language, thus, a theocracy could apply religious language in different ways. For instance, fine-tuning argument is descriptive, and so legal language could employ this religious language that is based on fine-tuning argument.

- First of all, the writer has shown that legal language has to be a non-religious one, because, it is true that not only religious language is non-descriptive and has no (differential) descriptive aspect, but also, legal language has to be descriptive, thereby legal language shall not be religious language.

- Also If one insists on the differential descriptiveness of religious language and rejects the argument theoretically in favor of some descriptiveness of religious language and its advantages practically, then one needs to live under the sovereignty of a theocracy to confess that the Legal Stammer Argument is cogent practically.

- Next, another reply would be that existence of God as a religious and otherworldly concept is one thing and fine-tuning argument as a philosophical and thisworldly concept in the favor of the religious concept is another thing. This distinction is cautionary that if one needs descriptive language in legal language, first of all, this perspective suffers from this serious weakness of this distinction, also, if one insists on the fine-tuning argument and then this argument collapse, the legal language will collapse.

- In addition, other otherworldly concepts that may have thisworldly interpretation and/or explanation like a religious experience that may have natural and/or thisworldly explanation, not only suffer from the last reply, but also, it may be true that religious experience may have natural and/or thisworldly explanation, but this discovery will transform an otherworldly religious concept and/or entity to non-religious thisworldly concept and/or entity. As a result, one more time, legal language will fill with the descriptive property of non-religious language that comes from an experience.

- Besides that, if one belongs to a theistic religion and identifies a religious claim e.g. miracle as a descriptive claim, and another one denies this claim owing to the fact that the second person belongs to a non-theistic religion, the first could not prove that the miracle claim is descriptive unless the first one could indicate that the claim could be provable i.e. as a scientific claim.

- Last but not least, it seems very odd that opponents of the argument are catching sight of the outcome of sciences and philosophy, and then, they persuade legal language to fill with the outcomes and suddenly label them as the religious ones.

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20 For a similar view see: (Vainio, 2020, p. 34).
The Revisionary Objection: One may think that it is true religious language is not descriptive, although it has to include descriptiveness. The one indeed claims in favor of revisionary religious language, and so, if the religious language does not a descriptive requirement of legal language in non-revisionary aspect, we have to prepare this requirement to religious language and then it could satisfy the requirement of legal language.

- The first reply to this objection is that one only disguises the non-revisionary aspect of religious language as the revisionary, it means that one would conceal that the religious language is not descriptive.

- Also, it is possible that one would insist religious language necessarily is revisionary. However, one correspondingly has to admit that one labels the non-descriptiveness of religious language as the descriptive one.

- If one comes up with the last reply, one ought to be doubtful and question whether this perspective of religious language as legal language is appropriate functionally and normatively. The writer is very doubtful that this perspective could be appropriate. Imagine it is appropriate, there is a criticism that if those lawmakers, legislators, and politicians compromise this aspect of legal language, there will arise the criticism to confirm that they only would exploit loopholes and/or manipulate advantages.

The Descriptive Replacing Objection: Some legal naturalists believe that legal language is not normative and we have to replace the normativity of legal language with descriptiveness of it, thus this replacement will defeat the Legal Stammer Argument.

- First of all, the Legal Stammer Argument mainly is on the descriptive requirement of legal language. Also, there are extremely few legal philosophers deny this approach.  

- Also, another common reply that could be applied to the argument is legal language is descriptive because it may include empirical sciences. 

- Besides that, there are only a few philosophers who reject normativity of law and/or legal language, and so, the writer presupposes that if A applies legal language to claim that B shall do or do not to Φ, it means B normatively shall do or do not to Φ.

- The last reply is that the Legal Stammer Argument proves that legal language shall be normative.

21 For a similar view see: (Kramer, 2007, p. 75).

22 For a similar view see: (Kramer, 2007, p. 76), (Finlay & Plunkett, 2018).

23 For similar view see: (Endicott, Law and Language, 2022), (Carston, 2013, p. 19).
The H2O Objection: One may believe that her religious beliefs include descriptive claims that come from knowledge i.e. natural sciences and/or it is similar and/or identical with them, there are some descriptive claims in religious scripture and/or they are placed among other religious claims as religious language, therefore, those religious claims could be as the content of legal language. For instance, image one claims that H2O is the chemical formula of water and it comes from this religious scripture.

- The first strict reply has been come from denying this objection as a proposal fundamentally that means those claims couldn’t be a public reasons of public justification to a political authority of a theocracy although it is beyond the task of this work.  

- Another reply could be doubtfulness on descriptiveness of H2O is water, but one more time it is not the writer’s responsibility to think of the philosophy of chemistry. Besides that, the writer deplores to relegate descriptiveness of scientific language in favor of religious language’s upgrading amply.

- The stimulating reply is that knowledgeable language i.e. formal scientific language or natural scientific language or moral language does not include religious language. It is owing to the fact that first of all, imagine if a religious scripture includes this phrase that H2O is water, although this claim remains scientific claim in the religious scripture, it is not only true that they will remain separated claims on two sorts of claims: religious claims i.e. monotheism, divine attributes, heaven and hell in the scripture and scientific claim: chemical formula of water in the scripture because one could conduct an experiment on the H2O is water claim and share the outcome of this investigation, though, the one could not test a religious claim such as resurrection and share the outcome of it, but also, Legal Stammer Argument corroborates non-descriptiveness of religious language and descriptive requirement of legal language. Second of all, the religious claim is only an otherworldly claim and the scientific claim is simply a thisworldly claim.

- One may cleverly add to the objection that the formula of water in another world is something else and it is mentioned in the scripture, thereafter it proclaims descriptiveness of religious claim. However, one has forgotten that this example is on another earth in the same world, it is not only accessible formula to test within people of another earth and they could share the experiment’s outcome with the people, but also, they could share the outcome with people of our earth if they have a method to pass information.

The Multi-Dimensional Objection: It objects to the writer’s argument, imagine a series of acts that are forbidden by common law e.g. the law is on drunk driving, the law

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24 Writer’s footnote: One could study this argument in favor of non-theocratic authority and government and as an objection in disfavor of theocratic authority and government in another writer’s work: “Covid-19 Proves Theocracy Is False”.

25 For a similar view see: (Weisberg, 2006), differential view (Hendry, 2011, p. 293).

26 For the similar view see: (Putnam, 1973).
prohibits drunk driving. The law proscribes drunk driving as follows: "Every driver while the driver is driving a car or vehicle shall be fully conscience which means drinking alcohol beverage and/or taking the drug is banned since declaring of this law. On condition that the driver involves in an accident and/or other torts and/or crimes, the driver will be fully and legally responsible. Although, if police arrest the driver, the driver will receive punishment by a court due to divine law and/or religious jurisprudence and/or theocratic law." So, the law has both secular and theocratic dimensions.

- The first reply of the writer to this objection is that there is no descriptiveness of religious language or religious language as legal language. Thus, this legal language will struggle with a lack of legal descriptiveness.

- The second reply to another version of the objection in which one may claim the law only has a religious dimension as a symbolic and/or virtual and/or fictional, though, the writer would reply this interpretation of the law will break the law since we need the descriptiveness of the law, it has to be not only on the drunk driving banning but also on the punishment.

- This objection also produces another problem, this non-descriptiveness of the law will violate the descriptive dimension of the law, due to the fact that it wastes the function of the law which means the rightfulness of the prohibition of drunk driving will be infringed by the criminal legal dimension of the law. It will be violated when the driver would claim "I will not obey the law since I am not a religious citizen and/or I disagree with this interpretation of this religious jurisprudence and/or I only follow the secular legal authority since Legal Stemmer Argument inclines the requirement of legal descriptiveness." In this case, the law does not have legal authority.

The Legal Non-Dissolution Objection: One may claim if the Legal Stemmer Argument is true, there could not be a correspondence theocratic system. However, there could be a theocratic system.

- One reply is that if it is true legal system is on social rules or facts to prepare legal authority, then there could be non-legal social rules without legal authority that enroll this correspondence authority and obligation e.g. a rich culture could enroll partially correspondence obligations.

- Second of all, it is also true that those non-legal authorities and obligations could not enroll those norms and so, those systems will face dissolution gradually.

- Also, we need to keep this thought in mind that some theocratic legal system could enroll their norms as long as the correspondence country is a micronation and or they do not need a legal system at all.

The Commensurability Objection: Another objection could run as follow, it is feasible that a theocratic government does not fully make theocratic law, but it introduces theocratic law partially, and it could be a defeater to the argument.
The writer admits that this objection is serious, but it is necessary to remember that the related legal system will face full of non-consistencies and non-functioning.

This law-making will create tremendous conflicts of aims and norms of the law, it is equal to having a legal obligation in favor of a secular statute and/or constitution and in disfavor of a related theocratic statute and/or constitution. There is no doubt that it blocks one sort of the two groups of law.

The Secular Content Objection: One may insist on the normative force of a religious language as legal language, but one argues its content remains fully secular.

- The first reply of the writer is that religious beliefs and actions at first face principally claim neutral and/or non-normative and/or non-valued otherworldly concepts and entities, and so they could run this objection.
- If they have some normative forces they are their second-order and so, they are inherently non-normative.
- Another reply is that the religious normative force of statutory or constitutional provisions could conflict and/or contract with secular content and/or other aspects of it.
- The last reply is that the normative force of secular normative language is principally more enforced. It is because it targets directly authoritative normativity of secular language. Although, authoritative normativity of religious language is authoritative since authority on the correspondence laws depends on the authority of religious language and religions.

The Linguistic Emptiness Objection: One may object to the argument this argument is linguistically empty which means one may insist it includes only linguistic properties, but the writer extends the argument through other concepts and entities.

- The first reply of the writer is a revision of the argument: The first premise is legal language shall be descriptive, and the second premise is religious language is not descriptive, so legal language has not to be religious language. It obviously amends this mistake that the argument extends to other non-linguistic concepts and entities.
- Second of all, this argument proves religious language is not the same as descriptive language. For instance, one could consider these examples: if a hot room is full of people and the only way to escape from the hot is that one has to open the window, the other requires "one! You ought to open the window" and reasonably one would open it. This sentence is descriptive sentence since there is a relation between an empirical claim on the hot room and a justified belief and action on the necessity of openness of the window. Although, if a Zoroastrian believer claim to a Buddhist "Believe Ahura Mazada if you want salvation", the Buddhist could reply to the Zoroastrian "Believe Nirvana if you
want salvation", and it seems that none of them will be an apostate because different religious claim. It means that one more time religious language is non-descriptive due to the fact that there is no relation between religious claims on the different religious beliefs and justification of salvation.

The Legal Tit for Tat Objection: One would argue that weaknesses of the philosophy of law e.g. indeterminacy of law and the disparity among philosophy of law and the practice of law inclines to rethink on the relation of religion and Law.27

- First of all, the writer's argument indicate religious language principally could not enroll as a legal language, and the weaknesses of legal theory and legal philosophy could not be a pretext to resurgence of religious language as legal language. If there is such a language then there is no law, there will remain quasi-law that the writer name it legal stammer.

- Second of all, if the argument only improves this idea that religious language is differentially descriptive, one more time, the argument also proves that this differentiation insists on the impossibility of religious language as legal language. So, the weaknesses could not conceal this differentiation and the infeasibility.

- Also, the writer believe it is deplorable solution of the weaknesses since it is similar with out of the frying pan into the fire. The argument enforces this thought that descriptiveness of legal language is necessary,28 and it seems it is beyond dispute, so one could not choose non-descriptiveness of religious language to conceal other problems of the philosophy of law or legal language i.e. indeterminacy of law. This fault lead to lose the most significant part of legal language: descriptiveness.

- Significantly, there is no causal relation between legal language and ontology or epistemology of law,29 which means it is possible to preserve the descriptive property of legal language, but it is also possible to suspend or do not know on metaphysical theories of law i.e. legal interpretivism or legal positivism.

- It is also irrational to assemble thisworldly and otherworldly worldviews as religions,30 it is not only due to the fact that secularism has to be neutral toward religions and we have to distinguish between different secularisms and its differential interpretation,31 but also it is very common that thisworldly worldviews are irreligious and/or antireligious worldviews. Moreover, there are two other notes it seems very odd that to recognize political or economic theories as religions, also the argument proves otherworldly views and beliefs

27 For this view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007).

28 For dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007, pp. 165-6).

29 For dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007, p. 206).

30 For dissimilar view see: (Modak-Truran, 2007, pp. 182,220).

31 For this view see: (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399]).
do not include a relation to justification and this lead to do not include the descriptiveness or semantic objectivity of law. So, religions and religious language could not be as law and legal language.

**Conclusion**

In this work, first of all, the writer argues Legal Stammer Argument shows that religious language is non-descriptive and so, normative language like legal language could not be the religious one, because of the descriptive necessity of legal language. In addition, the writer presents some other examples to incline how religious language as legal language could not work. The next was that the writer presents some potential objections to the argument and reply to them.

**Bibliography**


**Abstract**

In this article, first of all, the writer will concur humanist counterexample objection against divine command theory (Hereafter: humanist objection). In addition, the writer will argue if one imagines none of the objections –such as the humanist objection– does not work and a theocratic government applies divine command theory, it will struggle with an argument that is in favor of secular ethical theories, the writer calls the argument as the *Inapplicability Problem Argument*. 

**Humanist Objection**

To begin with, the writer concurs humanist objection that is to be a moral person and to have a meaningful and moral life s their individual moral sense is not principally identical to divine command theory (Hereafter: DCT).

This objection has been similar to this: Recall this note that X as a new humanist ought to satisfy ethical life, since, to fulfilling a new humanist life or to be a new

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32 The writer’s footnote: The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement in spring 2021.


The writer’s footnote: The writer has chosen DCT as a version of the Theological Volunteerism and the writer knows the other types of it as replaceable with DCT for the writer’s purpose.


humanist, X has to follow ethical life,\textsuperscript{36} though, it is possible that one may recognize oneself as freethinker or atheist without ethical life. To begin with, imagine arguments of Y as a religious person to Ψ as meaningful and moral life is that Y requires theistic arguments and beliefs to have Ψ or to defeat death’s meaningless as the enemy of immortality or to defeat the devil as the enemy of morality. But, conversely, X has some arguments and beliefs in favor of Ψ, since, first of all, if one has a life, it includes moral values and meaning of life in the life, and they are not outside of the life, also, you could fulfill your life and has Ψ, even though, you know that you will die forever, and vice versa, these notes indicate that those arguments and beliefs in favor of Ψ could be independent of Y’s arguments and beliefs. One may object that Ψ naturally belongs (and/or identical with) Y and Φ as meaningless and immoral life naturally belongs (and/or identical with) X. Although, a reply would arise that Ψ includes some subjective meaningful phenomena such as hobbies or fine arts or it also could obtain objective meaningful phenomena such as moral values, thus, you ought to make and/or grasp Ψ and avoid to Φ, Y’s life something and Ψ is something else ontologically. Altogether, everyone has to fulfill one’s life in which the one has to follow meaningful hobbies, create the fine arts, make a relationship with others, do nonprofit and voluntary services, protect the environment, go sightseeing, make a love, obey the moral laws and be a good person and so many others, and all of these are inherently and significantly independent from (and prior to) religious arguments and beliefs, and so, we could make and/or grasp the meaningful and moral life here and now. For instance, if you love your child because you ought to do your duties or you have to follow your instinct toward the child and you have passed the special way for him/her, this is naturally different from the point that life is meaningless or death disappears everything.

**Inapplicability Problem Argument**

The proportion of the writer to the debate is this argument -Inapplicability Problem Argument- and so, let reject the concurrent claim -humanist objection- and presuppose that DCT is true. The writer would argue that precisely Divine Command Theory in Theocracy (Hereafter: DCTT)\textsuperscript{37} is not only suffering from the main mistakes of DCTT in the individual moral sense but also, DCTT violates another mainstream that this argument is in favor of secular ethics in the public sphere, as the writer has named it as the Inapplicability Problem Argument of DCTT (Hereafter: IPA).

**A. The Argument:** Let the writer presents the IPA:


\textsuperscript{36} For similar claims see: (Vaughn, 2003, pp. 85-114), (Norman, 2004, p. 18), (Lamont, 1997, pp. 276-322-3)

\[ Z = \text{A theocracy that spins DCTT}, \]
\[ Ys = \text{Citizens of Z}, \]
\[ \Phi = \text{Participating in DCTT}, \]
\[ \Psi = \text{Believing in DCTT}. \]

- **Presupposition A:**

  In this situation, there is Z that would spin DCTT, and there are also Ys who in participate DCT as their individual moral sense, and they also participate in DCT as individual moral sense in the public sphere. What's more, it is clear that Ys do not need to believe in DCT, though, they only need to participate in DCT practically. Another note for this situation is that if Z as a theocratic government spins another moral doctrine such as Kantian Ethics or Consequentialism, it will remain independent of IPA in favor of a secular ethics and/or other theories of normative ethics and it will also remain independent of IPA in disfavor of DCT.

  This presupposition means that imagine this by borrowing some symbols:
  1. \text{DCTT},
  2. \text{Z spins DCTT},
  3. \text{Ys } \Phi\text{-ing in DCTT},
  4. If Ys \Phi\text{-ing in DCTT} \not\equiv \Box \text{Ys } \Psi\text{-ing in DCTT} (assumption).

- **Presupposition B:**

  In this situation, one more time there is a theocratic government such as Z that has had Ys they not only participate in DCT as moral doctrine in their private and public life as individual sense but also believe that DCT is true and/or have trustworthy moral doctrine in the individual sense. Additionally, the writer thinks A is prior to B since one could participate in DCT without believing that DCT is true. And the writer set aside this common debate that one believes in a moral rule but does not act to the rule correspondingly such as an amoral person.

  This presupposition means that Imagine:
  1. \text{DCTT},
  2. \text{Z spins DCTT},
  3. \text{Ys } \Phi\text{-ing in DCTT},
  4. \text{Ys } \Psi\text{-ing in DCTT},
  5. If Ys \Phi\text{-ing in DCTT} \& Ys \Psi\text{-ing in DCTT},
  6. \not\Box \text{Ys } \Phi\text{-ing in DCTT} \& \Box \text{Ys does not } \Psi\text{-ing in DCTT} (assumption).

- **Presupposition C:**

  In the last situation, we suppose presupposition B, although, the writer thinks presupposition C has struggled in IPA in favor of secular ethics and/or other
theories of normative ethics and it will be faced with IPA in disfavor of DCT. Moreover, it is a very common idea that normative ethics is only on moral individuality and if it would include societal and political norms and values it will transform into social and political norms and values such as freedom, quality, justice, and rights that are based on moral norms and values principally. However, the writer has to mention that IPM has to affect and/or relate to Ys’ the public sphere, even though, it also is clear that they have to remain individual.

This presupposition means that Imagine:

1. DCTT,
2. Z spins DCTT,
3. Ys Φ-ing in DCTT,
4. Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT,
5. If Ys Φ-ing in DCTT & Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT,
6. If Ys Φ-ing in DCTT & Ys Ψ-ing in DCTT, even though, Z struggles in IPA,
7. IPA does not ∈ social and political norms and values (assumption).

Let the writer work on the Part 6. of this presupposition that needs to be explained and the writer of this last claim contains a cluster of reciprocal explanations in favor of IPA.

- The first condition is that if a theocracy very strongly and successfully enrolls DCTT, then it appears that Ys will be grateful for Z, and in this case, no one will claim C. However, if Z do not and/or could not enroll A & B strongly and successfully because there could be many explanations for this i.e. bad politicians, then it seems that C will be presented. As a consequence, Ys could be doubtful whether they have to A & B. It is due to the fact that Y believes if Φ and Ψ and IPA arise, then C will be detrimental to DCT. Ys may think it would be better if Ys place and draw DCT individualistically. In other words:
  1. If Z has done DCT in an effective & grateful way functionally,
  2. Ys also thinks of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
  3. However, If Z hasn't done DCT in the effective & grateful way functionally,
  4. Ys also do not think of DCTT as an effective & grateful way functionally,
  5. Therefore, Ys would be doubtful whether they have to do these presuppositions: A & B,
  6. It is owing to the fact that if Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing & C arises: IPA, & then it will be pernicious to DCT & morality,
  7. It ◇ Ys mull DCT over as an individual moral doctrine & Ys may contemplate replacing DCTT.
The second condition would be that Ys think another DCTT has to be applied to avoid IPA. Although what if the new DCTT transfer to IPA as mentioned before, or what would be that if one asks why we need to enforce DCT to DCTT when we know it is possible we face IPA and waste DCT unnecessarily.
1. If Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing & C arises IPA, and then it will be pernicious to DCT and morality,
2. Then, ◇ Ys do Φ-ing & Ψ-ing, but Ys do it with DCTT' ,
3. If ◇ DCTT' leads to another IPA: IPA',
4. Or ◇ one requires that is it necessary to DCT to DCTT in the condition that ◇ IPA & dissipates DCT.

The next condition is that imagine Ys ignorantly choosing misguided DCT and after a while, they come up with idea that they have to select another DCT and run it in DCTT. One more time, they waste DCT, since, they expand the wrongful DCT to DCTT publically.
1. If Ys select inaccurate DCT & then Ys need to select another DCT as DCTT,
2. It dissipates DCT because Ys do inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing in Z.

The last condition is that imagines Y follows the true DCT, but, they have applied the wrongful DCTT. Undeniably, they will be struggling with nonconsistency and wasting of DCT as DCTT.
1. If Ys select accurate DCT,
2. However, Ys choose misleading DCTT,
3. There will be a ⊥ & it dissipates DCT.

There could be so many examples of IPA, an example would be that Z proclaims if Ys offer and take bribes, it will be a crime since it is a command -by God and/or this or that religion- to do not break this command and statute; and so we declare this law and Ys shall obey this statute. However, as the first condition what if Z does not and/or could not reach this statute and DCTT functionally? We know that this condition leads to doubt on Φ-ing & Ψ-ing and it could be detrimental to DCT and morality because of the doubtfulness of this DCTT. In addition, as a second condition, if Z enacts another DCTT of the bribe and/or enacts another DCTT, it is feasible that it gets to be another IPA, and this arises this criticism that DCTT and bribe as DCTT is not necessary because of IPA. As a next condition, what if Z proposes a misguided statute of the bribe and this may point that Z needs to declare another statute of the bribe and these legal acts of Z to change the statute, and the law will dissipate DCT owing to inaccurate Φ-ing & inaccurate Ψ-ing. The last condition is that there would be a gap between DCT and DCTT of the bribe, and this gap will prepare a nonconsistency, and a nonconsistency will dissipate DCT.

B. Objections: There are some possible objections to IPA:
The Same Problem of Other Normative Theories: The first objection would be that IPA could arise in disfavor of all or most other normative ethical theories and it is not only on DCT. Said differently, IPA could be in disfavor of perfectionism and favor of neutralism.

- First of all, this work is neither on other normative ethical theories, nor it is on perfectionism and neutralism. This work is only on DCT in a theocracy.

- Second of all, set aside the first reply, it is clear that DCTT will be detrimental to DCT in all four conditions because DCT is identical or has overlapped with DCTT and Ys know that DCTT is enormously same as DCT and they will be incredulous to commends of God and/or a religion and this will dissipate the whole of morality and eradicate it.

The Other Theological Voloutuerism Objections: The other objection toward IPA could be this thought that the writer has chosen wrong version of Theological Voloutuerism, and if the writer chooses true version of Theological Voloutuerism the other versions could apply as DCTT and DCTT remain a defensible version toward IPA.

- The first reply to this objection is that as mentioned before IPA is neither on falsehood of DCT nor it is on the falsehood of religious beliefs.

- Second of all, the writer proposes this idea that DCT is true, and other version of Theological Voloutuerism have the same truthiness value. So, if one set the other versions there is no doubt DCTT and IPA will remain neutral.

The Religious Ethics Objection: One may insist that secular ethical theories, i.e. Virtue Ethics or Kantian Ethics or Consequentialism, could be some candidates for a theocracy and/or toward a God.\(^{38}\)

- The first reply of the writer is that as the writer mentioned before IPA is in disfavor of religious ethics or a version of Theological Voloutuerism e.g. DCT and it is in favor of secular ethics, thus, it is not against those secular ethical theories.

- The another note is that if one selects a secular normative theory in favor of the divine or God, and then one calls it as religious ethics. It seems that one only relates a secular ethical theory to a supernatural, and if content of the theory remains non-religious, one only label a secular ethics as religious ethics.

\(^{38}\) For this view see: (Kant, 1999), (Kant, 2001).
• The third reply is based on pivotal part of IPA. One more time, IPA is on DCTT, and it is not on DCT wholly, hence if a religious ethical theory be as similar with DCT, the theory will play the same properties of DCTT as IPA.

Conclusion

In this work, first of all, the writer has concurred humanist objection to DCT and then, the writer presents IPA against DCTT. It is explained that four conditions of IPA, thereafter, and it is shown that bribes could be an instance of IPA and the last part of this work is devoted to replies to possible objections of IPA.

Bibliography


The Slap Argument Inclines the Freedom of Religion

Abstract
The writer argues that, first of all, the freedom of religion and some standards of the freedom of religion (hereafter: SFR) is absolute. In addition, different concepts of God do not change SFR, and this claim proves that revises of God’s ideas do not lean toward the restructuring of SFR. Last but not least, theocracy suffers from these delighted features of SFR and these claims have been presented by an argument that the writer calls the Slap Argument.

Freedom and Alternatives Concepts of God
Different varieties of the concepts of God or deity or other maximally great beings or the divine have been manifested and opened up new lifestyles and religious worldviews for their followers and other people who are thirsty for new religious beliefs and practices. The first note is that there is some traditional theisms that many of them have been promoting this idea that there is a distinction between God and the universe, even though, there are some others that they refuse or eradicate the distinctness wholly, the writer's concern are whether religious worldview or theologies that reject the distinction affect SFR as absolute freedom or not, the writer will present the Slap Argument (hereafter: SA), to admit that theocracy wastes SFR.

39 The writer has written this work as a Ph.D. semester requirement in spring 2021. I've dedicated this chapter to Prof. Mehdi Aminrazavi who voluntarily recommend supervising this Ph.D. thesis, I greatly thankful to him.

40 For different and alternative concepts of the Divine see: (Buckareff & Nagasawa, 2016), (Diller, 2021).

The writer's footnote: First of all, the writer has applied the term God to include all other similar concepts mentioned before. Next, the writer does not concern with those traditional or modern theologies and religious worldviews, it is not our business to know which one is true


Slap Argument

It seems that this literature focuses only on liberal democracies and if one criticizes the primary values such as freedom or equality in liberal democracies, then, the proponent of it needs to start from very introductory premises. For example, SFR in a theocracy is far away from SFR in liberal democracy. The writer - unlike the other authors - will not apply some normative legal, political, or moral principles and arguments to solve the paradox of SFR, but the writer will undermine the proportion of religion in the whole of our life by drawing on a Kantian term of thisworldly and otherworldly distinction and after that show SFR as absolute freedom.

A. The Argument: The SA has The Slap on the Back and The Slap in the Face:

The Slap on the Back: Let the writer begins with the positive face of SR. It is positive because it seems that SFR is a symbol of absolute freedom. These claims have been motivated by the otherworldly aspect of it. Nobody and nothing could be compliant to your SFR if you avoid the constraint of SFR:

- Religious beliefs and practices have absolute SFR iff it remains deeply and wholly to otherworldly beliefs and practices. That means if you involve in a thisworldly problem you have to apply the thisworldly concepts and entities and avoid otherworldly concepts and entities. Otherwise, there is a conflict between the former and the latter, and then, you defeat this criterion if you choose the latter.

This criterion shows SFR as negative freedom, if SFR would participate in politics, law, public social institutions, and so many others like them, then clearly there is a constraint that principally has to be prior to the SFR. For instance, imagine Niki is driving on a highway to reach the saint temple, there is theurgy in the temple that is once in a lifetime, but there is also a volcanic eruption close to the temple and so, local Police block the crossroads because of the eruption. It is clear that no one could move off the crossroads, and the police do not permit anyone to go there. Niki prefers to be there and she is ready to face the danger. She does not think that it is pulling a stunt and believes if she does not attend the ceremony, then she abjures her religion. We observe a conflict between a case for banning between freedom of participating in an important religious ceremony and willing of the police officers to save lives. The positive side of SA argues that you have absolute freedom of religion when you apply it as otherworldly and if there is a conflict between the otherworldly and thisworldly beliefs and actions, the former is the last priority and so, Nike ought to obey the Police Officers. Altogether, you have an absolute SFR there is a severe constraint on SFR that is SFR has to remains only otherworldly. The writer calls the positive side of SA the Slap on the Back.

Theories of freedom - like SFR - could not refuse SA, because it is based on some sorts of otherworldly beliefs and practices that all of the theories such as positive and negative liberty, republican liberty, and Freedom as a Triadic Relation, libertarian

43 For empirical similar idea see: (Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 195-6).
44 For different view see: (Kymlicka, 2002 [1396], p. 212).
freedom could be free from obstacles. To illustrate, you could have SFR negatively, since SFR has a common feature that is a mere absence of something like interferences, no one could stop you to have SFR unless it does not remain religious. In conditions where SFR follows SA, it seems that politically there would not be conflict. That means if one interprets SFR from the perspective of freedom, then she will come up with the idea that there is no absence of obstacles. Also, if one knows SFR in republican terms then, she will agree with SA because it does not conflict with non-domination or self-mastery of freedom which could be another sphere when she put SFR in front of republican liberty. Besides that, there is no constraint of SFR -to accept religion and express religious beliefs and practices- which is come from SA and so, one could admire that SFR could survive when playing a true role of itself.

How could the writer argue that SFR has nothing in common with different concepts of God that the writer acknowledges the proportions of religion to the whole of our life have a serious constraint. That means that religion is the only otherworldly concept in which other types of concepts of God that would push God to this world need to add something otherworldly like God to this worldly concepts and entities.

The Slap in the Face: Let the writer mention another aspect of the argument that is opted to the one how to identify and/or interpret one’s religious belief and practice. That shows if the one would like to unseen the distinctness then the one will face answering what would be his option that a Slap in the Face:

- In a dissimilar way, we could perceive the former writer’s criterion in this way that religion includes religious beliefs and practices that the adjective of -religious- could only be identified iff it precludes the religious from non-religious one and it does not occur unless we grasp the religious as otherworldly concepts and entity and know the non-religious one as this worldly. This new criterion shows that different concepts of God do not affect the SFR. Due to the fact that different concepts of God lead to the traditional theism and God by knowing them to be added to this world or would be this worldly.

Let one more time, know that whether the Niki as a panentheist or pantheist or theistic idealist, theistic fictionalist, theistic ultimist, and so many others would decline SFR or not. The first example is that Niki believes God is identical to the world and due to the reason that SFR is absolute, she is free to believe in pantheism on the condition that it follows the first criterion in which pantheism has to remain otherworldly and we know that pantheism is otherworldly, because it only adds God to this world identically. As a result, Niki may wrongfully claim that she ought to participate in the ceremony, also, she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer’s order and it is because the eruption is identical to God and so, there is no conflict between the theurgy for God and the eruption, then, the police have not to issue an order on the moving off and Niki could also disobey the order. Although undeniably, this case is a Slap in the ace to Niki, since, she may die as soon as an active volcano erupts, she will die and rescuers and firefighters may die because of her. Altogether it

45 For these parts of SFR see: (Maclure & Taylor, 2011 [1399], p. 69).
does not matter how you place your faith in God as a pantheist or theist, there will be a death toll rose.

Another example will be the same as the abovementioned example, Niki believes the world is a part of God and due to the reason that SFR is absolute, she is free to believe in Panentheism on the condition that it follows the first criterion in which Panentheism has to remain otherworldly and we know that Panentheism is otherworldly because it only adds God to this world as containing way of it. As a result, Niki may wrongfully claim that she ought to participate in the ceremony, also, she may argue that she is not obligated to obey the police officer's order and it is because the eruption is a part of God and the same story: there is no conflict between the theurgy for God and the eruption, then, the police have not to issue an order on the moving off and Niki could also disobey the order. Although undeniably, this case is a Slap in the Face to Niki, since, she may die as soon as active volcanic erupt, she will die and rescuers and firefighters may die because of her. Altogether, it does not matter how you place your faith in God as a pantheist or theist, there will be a death toll rose.

You could replace Pantheism or Panentheism with different kinds of modern theologies or religious worldviews. However, the writer's two criteria will remain the same.

The writer's point in this section is that theocracy lacks both faces of SFR in which it has neither SFR as mentioned in the SA on the back and nor SA in the face arguments. The writer's argument on the SFR in theocracy (Hereafter: SFRT) is this:

1. SFRT suffers from the Slap on the Back argument (with an official religion):
   - SFRT in this argument has some serious difficulties,
   - Imagine, a theocracy announces an or some religion(s) as an official religion(s) of a government, then,
   - First of all, it will face nonbelievers of the official religion who do not believe in the official religion,
   - What would be the response of the theocracy to them?
   - A question will arise whether the theocracy will know them as the second citizen?
   - Because they could not be like other citizens whose religion is the same as the official religion iff the theocracy only behaved toward them neutrally,
   - That means, they lack something unjustifiably that other citizens who live in the theocracy have,
   - It will be discriminatory.
   - Another response of the theocracy would be that the theocracy will threaten nonbelievers with cruelties such as prison, torture, massacre, the death penalty, and many others?
   - In this case, the theocracy will do something that is not neutral, those identified as cruelties. Undeniably, it will be brutal.
   - As a consequence, the theocracy could not enjoy the freedom and more importantly, it could not use the delighted aspect of SFR as absolute freedom.
2. SFRT suffers from the Slap on the Back argument (without an official religion):
   o Imagine that a theocracy that is based on an or some religion(s) does not announce an or some religion(s) as an official religion(s),
   o That means, they only run an or some religion(s) as a basis for political authority and governing a country functionally,
   o Then it seems that they one more time will struggle with some strict problems,
   o Because, inherently, it has changed the otherworldly identity of that religion(s) and SFR which is the basis for political authority and governing the country to a thisworldly one, functionally
   o It is not only to the believers but also, it is to the nonbelievers,
   o As a result, they face not only the Niki example but also will suffer that it could not use the delighted aspect of SFR as absolute freedom.
   o Although, in this case, both discrimination and cruelties would arise again.

3. SFRT suffers from the Slap in the Face argument:
   o If the second constraint is true then it seems that it does not change the first and second cases of SFRT,
   o It is due to the fact that if the alternative concepts of God remain SFR all of the discrimination, cruelties, the functional problem of Niki example and delighted aspect of SFR would come again.

4. SFRT in both arguments suffers from this claim that which God or religion is true to be as a basis for this or that political authority and so, admitting or refusing SFR could solve the plurality concepts of God and religion.

If SP is true as SFR and SFRT, it is clear that theocracy suffers from a political value that is called freedom.

B. Objections: There would be sorts of objections to SP as follow:

The Imperialist SFR Objection: First of all, one may object that SP could enroll as a negative actor in international debates, delighted features of the argument could be a disadvantage to the third world, developing, and powerless countries. It means that superpower countries could persuade and/or target citizens of those powerless countries to proselytize their religion. Therefore, it could transform all or most religions to only a few ones in favor of superpower countries.

- The first reply of the writer is that we need to recall the core idea of the argument that SFR only includes otherworldly entities and concepts, and so, it could not include thisworldly entities and concepts such as festivals, ceremonies, law, politics, and many others. There is a serious constraint on SFR as mentioned before. The former countries could apply those constraints to their citizens.

- Second of all, it seems some traditional or modern theologies and religious worldviews are more rational compared with the other ones. For instance, there
is a consensus that monotheism is much more coherent compared to polytheism. As a result, this concern could not be a restraint to the irrational traditional or modern theologies and religious worldviews. Those countries that insist on those irrational traditional or modern theologies or religious worldviews seem that they could not isolate their citizens to believe or practice the rational one.

The Cultural Eradication Objection: Another objection would be that SFR and SP could be harmful to diversity in pluralistic countries and/or moral indigenous cultures owing to the fact that they could transfer all of those diversities and cultures to homogenous and/or immoral ones or eradicate all of them.

- It seems that first of all, we have to recall the former objection's replies to this objection.

- Also, we have to remember that both SP and SFR belong to the private sphere because of the constraints. As a result, a legitimate government could recognize the diversities and the cultures officially, it shall impose provisions to present the indigenous diversity and the indigenous cultures as the official ones. For instance, the government could declare that a language is the only official language and the others could be practiced as non-official ones or it could impose some festivals and ceremonies as official ones and the others as private one. This trend toward diversities and the moral indigenous cultures will make the others as private one and it could preserve them practically.

The General Freedom Objection: Another objection would come from freedom in a general sense in which there is a question of how we could determine constraint in SFR, and it seems to the writer's mind SFR is interestingly different from other types of freedom.

- It is owing to this fact that all other types of freedom and freedom in general except SFR do not involve the before-mentioned constraint which means they have to be evaluated from different perspectives and this SFR's constraint is based on the thisworldly and otherworldly distinction those others are not. For instance, one may argue against freedom of speech, since, there is a serious constraint on it which is hate speech. But, look both of them are involved with thisworldly issues. It is the delighted aspect of SFR.

**Conclusion**

All in all, SA will prove that SFR is not only absolute iff the former criterion is satisfied, but also, different concepts of God do not revise absolute SFR iff the latter criterion is fulfilled. Even though, Theocracy suffers from these delighted features of SFR.
Bibliography


