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"He Is My Wife", Dissent, Veto Adoption

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Abstract

I argue against the queer adoption right of children and propose this contention via the *Disrespectful Adoption Argument*.

Keywords: Children's Rights, Adoption, The LGBTQI+ Rights, Respect.

Introduction

This work is primarily on the children's adoption rights and after that, it is on the LGBTQI+ adoption rights of children.

The first act: Shelly M. Park has written about the queer adoption right of children through her personal experience.

"You are not my REAL mother!" she screams from behind a locked bathroom door ... all adoptive mothers anticipate this moment. I am not ready for this yet. What is a real mother? Am I one? ... And how do I defend my status as real without implying that her birth mom is somehow unreal ... Clearly my daughter's current metaphysical schema will not readily permit the notion of multiple mothers. One of us must, according to her,

be an imposter ... like Descartes's evil genius" (Park 2005, 171).

The second act: The little girl begs for her rights from Park. *"I don't want to hurt your feelings. Mom, but I really want to live with my real mom"* (Park 2005, 185).

The next act: Park casts lights on the expostulation. *"I know you love me too", "I do love you, but you are not my real mom," she explains ... "Am I fictional?"*" (Park 2005, 186).

The fourth act: She confesses the no-win situation. *"I am tired ... Tired of being unfavorably compared to her "real" mother."* (Park 2005, 181).

The last act: Finally, Park targets standard motherhood. *"I direct my attention to the ways in which a child's affective psychology might be queered to allow "room in her mind" for two (or more) mothers."* (Park 2013a, 120).

Disrespectful Adoption Argument

The aforementioned view and similar views have impelled the writer to present the *Disrespectful Adoption Argument* (Hereafter: DAA), and the writer insists on the wrongfulness of the LGBTQI+/non-heterosexual/queer adoption right of children (for brevity: queer adoption right or QAR). For the synonym views see: Park (2009, 317) and Park (2019, 63).

For some discussions of the adoption rights of children see: **A.** General (Stevens 2005), (Gheaus 2012), (Gheaus 2015), (Mills 2001), (Haslanger 2009, 104-5), (Archard 2018), (Park 2020, 105-6), **B.** QAR (Almond 2006, 106-7), (Brake and Millum 2021), (Park 2006), (Park 2005, 192-4; Park 2013a; Park 2019; Park 2008), **C.** Arguments for QAR: 1. The empirical (Meezan and Rauch 2005, 103-4), reply (Vučković Juroš 2017, 88-90), (Marks 2012, 748-9), 2. The normative and non-normative (Park 2006), (Park 2013a, 20).

A. It is the argument:

1. Parents ought to respect their children primarily and necessarily.
2. Queer individuals ought to respect children in the same way.
3. Respecting children means valuing and satisfying their physical, psychological, educational, loving, and moral aspects of children principally.
4. The queer individuals could not comply with the obligations of the third premise in the case of QAR normatively.

5. If the fourth premise is true that they could not respect children in the case of QAR, then QAR is wrong noticeably.
6. If queer individuals would insist on QAR, it seems they would satisfy their interests and desires arbitrarily.
7. If the sixth premise is true, it seems that DAA is true morally.

B. Interpretation of the argument: In Kantian terms, the writer thinks on the first premise that respect is one of the most fundamental properties of morality, besides that, the second premise is that queer individuals ought to respect children in the same way, also, the third premise describes various valuable aspects of children which are related to the first premise and has to be fulfilled principally, even though, the next premise claims queers could not satisfy the third premise because of these aspects of children:

- i. **Physical Aspect:** Avoiding torture, escaping sex objectification, preventing molestation, providing minimum welfare, preserving breastfeeding, and so forth. For the physical aspect of children see: Park (2010, 62), Park (2013a, 192).

Criticism of QAR from the physical point of view: Could a queer couple e.g. a homosexual male couple breastfeed a child? No. For similar criticism of QAR from the physical point of view see: Almond (2006, 108); Levin (2002, p. 112).

- ii. **Psychological Aspect:** Providing care, well treating with sexual differentiation, showing kindness, avoiding cruel behavior, intimating and understanding menopausal moods to name but a few. For the psychological aspect of children see Almond (2006, 110), and a differential view, see Park (2006, 206-7).

Criticism of QAR from the psychological point of view: Could a queer couple e.g. a homosexual male couple intimate and understand the menopausal moods of a female child in her future? No. For similar criticism of QAR from the psychological point of view see: (Almond, 2006, pp. 110-11), (Levin, 2002, pp. 112-3).

- iii. **Educational Aspect:** Child-centered education. For the child-centered educational aspect of children see: (Callan

and White 2003, 98), (Smeyers and Wringe 2003, 311-3).

Criticism of QAR from the educational point of view: Could a queer couple or partners e.g. polygamous/polyamorous homosexual females train a child as same as a straight male father/female mother? No. For similar criticism of QAR from the educational point of view see: (Levin, 2002, pp. 112-3). For dissimilar views about the polygamous/polyamorous see: (Park, 2016, p. 77), (Park, 2017, pp. 305,314).

- iv. **Loving Aspect:** Familial love. For the loving aspect of children see: (Park 2013a, 245-51), (Gheaus 2022).

Criticism of QAR from the loving point of view: Could a queer couple e.g. a homosexual female loves an adoptee as the adoptee could love the queer instead of the adoptee's real parents valuably and reciprocally? No. For similar criticism of QAR from the loving point of view see: (Park, 2013a, p. 141).

- v. **Moral:** Humankind is an *""end""* and not a *""means""*. For deontological moral aspects of children see: (Kant, 1999, p. 80), (Matthews & Mullin, 2023), (Wood, 2008, pp. 95-6).

Criticism of QAR from the moral point of view: Could queer partners e.g. a homosexual female couple or bisexual and blended partners tell a lie to a young adoptee about identifying his/her real birth parents or dragging the adoptee into an unreal family with queer parents because of queer's interests and desires? No. We should not, besides that, DAA is not only on consequences of adoption by queers i.e. physical, psychological, loving, or educational but also it obligates only legitimate candidates to the adoption of children -donated gametes or other types of adoptions- is a heterosexual couple since QAR could not respect an adoptee, thus QAR could not treat an adoptee *""as an end, never merely as a means""*. They are *""means""* in the case of QAR because it comes from a significant untrue familial position of QAR via untrue identifying and an essential unreal parental position of QAR via dragging into the unreal that

both emerge through lying and deceiving the adoptee. Altogether, if one confirms this significant untruthiness epistemically, and admits this essential unreality metaphysically, one will recognize QAR is not righteous morally. For instance, in a possible world like X, K is female and L is a male could be biological and birth parents of R, if they have a heterosexual orientation to the opposite sex to reproduce R and be healthy and willing to do it, and so R becomes their biological child as the same as if they intend to adopt R in an actual world, then they could be adoptive parents of R via differential methods, even though, it could not be true vis-à-vis for queers in that possible world. For similar criticism of QAR from the moral point of view see: (Almond, 2006, pp. 110-1).

If the fourth premise is true, then queers could not respect children in the case of QAR, and then the next premise is also true, hence it seems that QAR is wrong, and it seems if queers insist on QAR they would only satisfy their interests and desires arbitrarily. The writer's DAA has to be alike a plea rightfully. For a differential view about QAR see: (Park 2006, 211-2).

C. Some opponents may prepare some objections against DAA:

The ultimate aim of adoption is exclusively well-being. For a similar view see: (Park 2019, 69).

- Children have also fundamental moral aspects, a child is "*as an end, never merely as a means*".
- Next, in the case of the QAR, this well-being is a big lie and deception since a child's parents are not the real child's parents.
- Third of all, it is not possible to know QAR's future consequences for children, unless one would imagine a possible world in which a child has been adopted by queer partners, and then one compares that QAR with the adoption rights of heterosexual partners and their consequences, and it seems QAR produces some consequences that their disadvantages outweigh advantages in that possible world.

QAR is a natural/constructional relationship's rights between two or more partners. For a similar view see: (Park 2013a).

- If it is natural, they have to confirm they could not reproduce a child, and naturally, this ability belongs to the opposite sexual orientation (Park, 2009, p. 318); and it seems they are inconsistent to apply it and would not value this natural perspective. For a dissimilar view of this reply see: (Park 2009, 318). For a dissimilar view see: (Park 2013a).
- Another reply would be gender dysphoria i.e. transsexual or intersex with hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery to become binary male/female with opposite sexual orientation is a differential case and has to be excluded from QAR.
- DAA inclines this note there is a direct relation between gender identity and QAR, thus gender identity provides necessary conditions for QAR.
- The last reply is that if the "*naturalistic fallacy*" is true, then this objection is false. For this view see: (Moore 1993, 40,69).

Imagine a disease has been spreading around the world and only a few people are left, but technological medicine opens the adoption of children without heterosexual intimacy, then queers could have QAR since no one is left as long as you deny QAR, thus we need to confirm QAR in this case. (The idea of this objection has been inspired by a real case.)

- First of all, it is neither natural nor moral as heterosexual adoption rights.
- Second of all, this example could apply to an opposite case that a child who has been adopted by a queer couple may figure out the lying and deceiving of QAR and queer parenthood that rearing up of them, and then the child will wreak revenge on all humankind as soon as the adoptee grows up.

One would recognize QAR is as a choice of a couple. For a similar view see: (Park 2006, 214).

- Children are another part of QAR unless one denies the children rights. For a similar view see: (Almond 2006, 110).

Some Queers fundamentally deny children are naïve and undeveloped and could be guilty. For

similar views see: (Park 2013a, 19), (Park 2009, 325-6).

- It is a retrogressive proposal, a shameful one since it is not only true children are innocent morally, but also it is an arrogant and arbitrary benefit and interests of those queers.

Psychological intimacy between children and parents is by degree, and a divorce could be harmful to children as same as QAR. For a similar view see: (Park 2013a, 121).

- This objection reinforces DAA and does not undermine it since we need to be prioritizing some responsibilities, appreciating some better parents, or acknowledging questions about divorce or the nonexistence of ample emotions toward children, etc.
- Also, children reasonably may complain they have lost their nuclear family which is irreplaceable and bringing them into this world, thus an explanation of divorce needs to be very persuasive and reasonable to identify the importance of children and obligations toward them e.g. losing respectfulness and worthiness of parents if marriage remains and so their obligation to split up is prior to marriage's obligation.

Some prefer bottle-feeding a child to breastfeeding a child, or breast cancer/disease causes pain in the condition of breastfeeding a child, or there is doubt about whether there is a valuable weight in breastfeeding a child. For a similar view see: (Park 2012).

- Women principally could breastfeed a child, but a homosexual male couple principally could not breastfeed a child.
- Also, it is a retrogression since it rejects valuable aspects of a physical and emotional relationship between a mother and her child, it also denies a mother's self-denial. For a dissimilar view to this reply see: (Park, 2013b, pp. 61,73)

Some would generalize their personal experience to eradicate all differentiation between natural parenthood and QAR. For this view see Park (2013a, 58), (Park 2009).

- DAA is normative not an empirical argument, and if we eradicate normativity

and values we'll go back into our uncivilized jungle.

- Besides that, it is very suspect to generalize the experience without reasonable evidence since children are silent.

Conclusion

The writer believes that queers have to ask themselves whether they would violate children's rights since DAA is a multifaceted argument against QAR, and judges when hearing a plea, "*he is my wife*", will veto the adoption that is a secular moral rightful dissent.

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