

What Is Wrong with Secession?

(Please, do not cite without permission) Pouya Lotfi Yazdi¹

Abstract

In this article, I (hereafter: the writer)² have argued that the right to secede as a right to territory is *multilateral*, also, *heterogeneous nationalism* will be suggested to avoidance of secession. Moreover, an argument that the writer has called *Martyr Argument* is presented against unilateral or consensual secession, and the writer will extend this argument to related topics and questions. As a result, this argument will defend a comprehensive anti-model of secession. Well, what is wrong with secession?³

Keywords

Multilateral Territory, Heterogeneous Nationalism, Remedial Right Theories, Martyr Argument

Multilateralism and Heterogeneous Nationalism

Straightforwardly, the right to secede is the right to secede as a right to territory,^{4&5} this thought is the core idea of secession.⁶ Without this idea, secession could be

¹ PhD. Student at Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies (Tehran): lotfiyazdi@gmail.com

² The writer's footnote: The writer has finished this work at 2019 and has uploaded it somewhere, and then, the writer continually has updated references of this work. In addition, the writer would like to thank some activists who have been providing critiques of the writer's thoughts, during these years. Likewise, the writer is indebted to philosophers, social and political scientists and legal scholars who directly sent their works to the writer. Also, the writer has to thank for some notes of other journals' referees. Lastly, this article is dedicated to the people of writer's country.

³ The writer's footnote: There are three methodological notes of this work: Before all else, the normativity of secession represents the realm of philosophers and the writer's theory (hereafter: The theory) which is a pure philosophical theory on secession in itself, and it is not an empirical debate (except these footnotes: 13,14,15). In addition, the theory could be morally defensible iff a theory of secession normatively would be 1. all-things-considered 2. a premise for other philosophical, political, and legal arguments, 3. other various countries and nations require the theory both theoretically and practically. Moreover, this article allows only four types of sentences: 1. the writer's innovative ideas, 2. quotations, 3. interpretations, and 4. footnotes that includes: 4.1. The writer's footnote (footnotes of mine), 4.2. Literature's footnote of secession; and so, the writer has named this methodology "*Microscopic Analyticity*" which means Philosophy is not a game. Besides that, Microscopic Analyticity has two merits, first of all, it avoids repetition of philosophical ideas, also, it proves that the theory is comprehensive and advanced, then, one need to know primary debates of secession to study this work i.e. definitions of secession, distinctions between secession and dissolution etc., special/general right of secession, or claim-right/mere-justification right of secession and many others.

⁴ For secession's possibility see: (Glaser, 2003), (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 332-9), (Lindsay & Wellman, 2003b, pp. 115-20), (Abbott, 1998), (Beran, 1983), (Ker-Lindsay, 2014).

The writer's footnote: The writer is an anti-secessionist, to be precise, the writer very hardly tolerates secession.

⁵ For the right to secede as a right to territory see: (Brilmayer, 1991), (Brilmayer, 2000) (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 11,24), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Wellman, 1995, pp. 144-5), the opposite view (Caney, 1998, p. 151).

⁶ For secession's generalization see: (Corlett, 1998, pp. 123-4), (Nielsen, 1998a, p. 266).

indistinguishable from other political concepts e.g. revolution.^{7&8} Therefore, every unique secessionist act necessarily has to consider a right to secede territorially.⁹ The right to secede as a right to territory is neither unilateral nor bilateral, but, it is *multilateral* relation that secessionists, remainders and a state comprise the segments of the relation. Imagine a territory without a state that straddle the borders between the lands, individuals who inhabit the territory ought to contribute to the territory as a whole.¹⁰ It endures an intuitional idea that every particular citizen of a country possesses the same right as the other citizens of the country where each centimeter does not belong to private ownership. A state does not permit to exchange those public places to the private one as they belong to all citizens of the country, therefore, this fact leads us to know that the right to secede as a right to territory is a public right. For example, a northern citizen of a country who owns her house in a northern city asserts no right regarding a street in her neighborhood more than a southern citizen who possesses her house and other properties in a southern city of that country. Besides that, it has a legal dimension which shows that imagine a citizen is a foreigner, she does not have the same right in regards to the above-mentioned street as she has to obtain official permission to enter other countries. However, there are the exclusion cases such as usurpation by foreigners, annexation, colonization, and occupation,¹¹ and without these exclusionary cases, a multilateral territory is an equity sharing which is morally and fairly the right for those who live in a territory and so, equity sharing is a basis for the right to secede as a right to territory.

⁷ For secession and revolution and their similarity see: (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 326-7) , (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10).

⁸ For secession and other political concepts see: secession and/or intervention (Roth, 2015) , (Fabry, 2013, pp. 94-100) , and/or revolution (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 326-7) , (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10) , (Buchanan, 2017b) , and/or civil disobedience (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 10) , and/or immigration (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 10-2) , (Weltman, 2021) , (Beran, 1977, p. 266) and/or referendum (Pavkovic, 2004, pp. 702-4) , (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. 171,184-94) (Kymlicka, 2000, pp. 221-2) , and/or exclusion or inclusion (Weltman, 2021) , (Buchanan, 1993).

⁹ For secession and territorial debates see: territorial rights (Wellman, 1995, pp. 150-64) , (Brilmayer, 2015) , (Moore, 2020) , (Buchanan, 2003b, p. 232) , indigenous rights over territory (Moore, 2003) , territory as whole (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 234-5) , (Buchanan, 2003a, p. 242) , equity sharing or joint land of territory (Christiano, 2006, pp. 97-9) , (Kant, 1999, pp. 416-9) , (Stilz, 2009, pp. 198-210) , territorial justice (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 114-24) , (Buchanan, 2017a) , (Miller, 1997, pp. 277-81) , (Catala, 2017) , (Dietrich, 2014) , privatizing of territory (Rothbard, 1998, p. 84) , boundaries (Christiano, 2006) , (Horowitz, 2003b, p. 10).

¹⁰ For institutional secession see: (Buchanan, 1997b, pp. 31-4) , (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 345-8) , (Buchanan, 2017a) , (Norman, 1998, pp. 44-54) , (Wellman, 2005, pp. 157-80) , (Seymour, 2007) , (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 54-8) , (Philpott, 2000, pp. 114-5) , (Lefkowitz, 2018) , (Nielsen, 1998a, p. 290) , ideal and non-ideal theory (Lee, 2015) , (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 324-6) , (Buchanan, 1997b, p. 61) , (Buchanan, 1998b, pp. 249-50) , (Buchanan, 2004, p. 346) , (Bauböck, 1997, pp. 12-3) , (Nielsen, 1998b, pp. 130-2) , (Wellman, 2005, pp. 168-172).

¹¹ For secession and violence see: (Buchanan, 2017a) , (Pavković, 2008, pp. 28-31) , (Horowitz, 2003b, pp. 5-6) , (Berkebile, 2017) , (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. x-xii).

To avoid secession, we have to evaluate the relationship between secession and nationalism in different political systems, such as unitary or federal states.¹² The first policy to avoid secession is to ask why we recognize challenges of a country or a group of countries that have reciprocal relations with each other and identify those challenges as global struggles.¹³ It seems unfair and irrational. For instance, preserve ancient countries as an antiquity as they represent common heritages of human being, and so, we have to prevent secession in those countries. The second one is that heterogeneous citizens in particular territories have also made their countries *heterogeneous* one. To be open-minded toward nationhood means a collection of races, religions, languages, ethnicities, customs and traditions, therefore, this collection plays a tremendous description of nationhood and people of the nationhood call themselves a nation. It is ironic if critics eliminate this nationhood and interpret ethnic nationalism¹⁴ only as a homogeneous concept. It is not only insufficient, but also, it is hegemonic. Heterogeneous or homogeneous ethnic nationalism and civic-territorial nationalism add up to all of the nations. A burning question raises whether there is a homogeneity we should morally destroy and rebuild with heterogeneous nationhood or it is preferable to have a homogeneous nationhood to tackle those secessionist incentives. The answer would be that there is no such nationhood that could remain a block to avoid all of secessionists' incentives because every single difficulty of the heterogeneous nationhood could emerge for the homogeneous one.¹⁵ But, the heterogeneous meticulously much more parallel with the human values esp. unplanned heterogeneous one. Why the multilateral right to secede as a right to territory among different nations is not acceptable morally and legally¹⁶?

¹² For secession and federalism see: (Norman, 2006, pp. 77-173) , (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. 64-79) , (Kymlicka, 1998, pp. 135-8), (Kymlicka, 2000, pp. 213-6), (Kymlicka, 2007, pp. 45-6), (Bauböck, 1997, pp. 20-32).

¹³ For secession and the similar empirical claim see: (Chandhoke, 2014b, p. 51).

The writer's footnote: The writer's country is an exceptionally suitable example to know that how a country has been devastated by the all of permanent secessionist temptations of some countries.

¹⁴ For secession's requirement of national debates see: Civic-territorial nationalism or ethnic nationalism (Miscovic, 2020), (Liu, 2016, p. 373), (Sorens, 2008, p. 327), (Norman, 2006, pp. 57-66), (Miller, 1995, pp. 188-9), (Gans, 2003, pp. 7-29), (Smith, 1991, pp. 82-3,117-9), (Coppieters , 2003, pp. 9-10), (Gilbert, 1998, pp. 207-8), (Spencer & Wollman, 2002, pp. 101-5), (Kymlicka, 1997, pp. 64-5), another categorization (Miscovic, 2008), empirical heterogeneous nationalism (Van Dyke, 1995, p. 52), (Smith, 1998, p. 40) (Horowitz, 1985, pp. 267-72), (Horowitz, 2003a, pp. 53-5), parochial or tribal nationalism (Glover, 1997, pp. 11-30), (Popper, 1947), (Brilmayer, 2000, pp. 285-6), (Chandhoke, 2008, p. 11) , multinationalism (Buchanan, 1998c, p. 305) , (Buchanan, 2004, p. 392) , empirical multinationalism (Walzer, 1997, p. 247) , national chauvinism (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 390-1) , mononationalism (Mill, 1861 [2001], pp. 181-7), patriotism (Primoratz, 2020).

¹⁵ For secession and the similar empirical claim see: (Sorens, 2014, p. 270).

¹⁶ For legal secession see: A. Constitutional secession (Sunstein, 1991), (Sunstein, 2001), (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 127-49), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Weinstock, 2000), (Weinstock, 2001), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013, pp. 5-7), (Kreptul, 2003, pp. 55-62), (Jovanovic, 2007), (Corlett, 1998, pp. 121-6), (Ewin, 1995, pp. 348-9) , (Aronovitch, 2000, pp. 33-5) ; opponents (Sunstein, 1991) , (Sunstein, 2001) , 1. The

The Martyr Argument

Primary Right theories¹⁷ have played an important role in infringing the remainders' rights.¹⁸ Identity of a person individually or a group of citizens collectively are their instrument to be as a bearer of the right to secede. There are two important different views of the Primary Right Theories:

On the one side, there is/are a/some feature(s) that primarily has/have made a group's willingness as a right to secede that is/are the Ascriptivist Right Theory(ies).¹⁹ Nonetheless, there are some objections against it i.e. *Martyr Argument*.²⁰ &²¹ The most important interpretation of this theory is the Nationalist

Perverse Effects Problem (Sunstein, 1991, p. 648), (Sunstein, 2001, p. 355), (Philpott, 2000, pp. 127-30), 2. Strategic Bargaining Problem (Sunstein, 1991, p. 666), reply (Shorten, 2014, pp. 100-12), 3. The Legal Forms Inconsistency Problem (Sunstein, 2001, p. 354), 4. The Impartial Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpott, 2000, pp. 125-6), 5. The Possibility of Realization Problem (Philpott, 2000, p. 130); proponents (Shorten, 2014), (Norman, 2003), (Norman, 2006, pp. 181-214), (Kreptul, 2003, pp. 87-92), (Jovanovic, 2007, pp. 182-95), (Weinstock, 2001), B. International legal secession (Buchanan, 1997a), (Buchanan, 1997b, pp. 32,41-4), (Buchanan, 1998b), (Buchanan, 2004), (Buchanan, 2014), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Horowitz, 2003b, p. 10), (Philpott, 2000, pp. 115-25), (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 58-67), (Weller, 2008, pp. 23-6), (Vidmar, 2010), (Day, 2012), (Weinstock, 2000, pp. 257-60), (Copp, 1998), (Kohen, 2006), (Lefkowitz, 2018); problems (Copp, 1998, pp. 232-5), 1. Metropolitan Power Problem (Buchanan, 2017a), 2. The Saltwater Decolonization Problem (Buchanan, 2017a), 3. Impartial Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpott, 1998, p. 86), (Philpott, 2000, pp. 116-9), 4. Trial Order Doctrine Problem (Roth, 2015, pp. 411-3), 5. The Preserve Effects Problem (Philpott, 1998, pp. 89-92), (Philpott, 2000, pp. 119-23), 6. The Deliberative Democracy Problem (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 359-60), 6. Realization Problem (Philpott, 1998, pp. 92-3), (Philpott, 2000, pp. 92-3), (Chandhoke, 2010); a proponent (Buchanan, 2006).

¹⁷ For the Primary Right Theories see: (Buchanan, 1997b, p. 35), (Buchanan, 2003b, p. 248), (Buchanan, 2007, p. 758), (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018, pp. 4-8), Hybrid Theories (Pavkovic, 2000, pp. 488-9), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013, p. 5), (Nielsen, 1998a, pp. 265-6).

¹⁸ For objections against the Primary Right Theories see: (Buchanan, 1997a, pp. 44-60), (Midtgaard, 2007, pp. 303-8), 1. The New Set Minority Problem (Horowitz, 1998, p. 199), (Lister, 2016, pp. 154-6), 2. The Global Anarchy Problem (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 102-4), 3. The Soft Paternalism Problem (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 101), (Pavkovic, 2003, p. 75), on The Liberal Paradox (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 34-5), 4. The Non-Seceding Part Problem (Pavkovic, 2004, p. 696), The Supermajority Reply (Antić, 2007, pp. 153-5), 5. The Erga Omnes Problem (Day, 2012, p. 29), 6. The Domino Theory Problem (Beran, 1984, pp. 29-30), reply (Caney, 1998, pp. 169-70), 7. The Strategic Bargaining Problem (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 100), (Buchanan, 1998a, p. 21), reply (Boykin, 1998, pp. 69-70), 8. Compensation Problem (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 104-14), reply (Gauthier, 1994, pp. 365-7), (Nielsen, 1993, p. 36), 9. Problems of Self-Determination (Brilmayer, 1991, pp. 184,192-3), (Vidmar, 2010, pp. 37-8), (Hannum, 1998, pp. 776,779), (Buchanan, 1995, p. 352), (Buchanan, 2004, p. 332), (Chandhoke, 2008, pp. 18-9), (Kymlicka, 2010, p. 384), reply (Copp, 1997, pp. 281-2).

¹⁹ For the Ascriptivist Right Theories see: (Margalit & Raz, 1990), (Caney, 1997), (Caney, 1998), (Moore, 1997), (Moore, 1998a, pp. 2,7), (Moore, 1998b), (Moore, 2000), (Moore, 2001), (Moore, 2006), (Nielsen, 1993), (Nielsen, 1998a), (Nielsen, 1998b), (Miller, 1995), (Miller, 1997), (Miller, 2003b).

²⁰ For secession and martyrdom see: (Hirschman, 1970, p. 126), martyrdom's definitions (Luban, 2010, p. 577), (Tamir, 1997, p. 230).

The writer's footnote: First of all, the thought of Martyr Argument came to the writer's mind in a discussion more than ten years ago, and the writer had to present a pure ethical argument without

Right Theories that is based on which the right to secede could be true iff a group of those who objectively and/or subjectively identify themselves as a nation and/or an encompassing group decide to withdraw their rights from a territory unilaterally and have a willingness to construct a state and govern themselves, independently,²² and same objections arise. Furthermore, the writer believes that the other types of the Ascriptivist Right Theories like Communitarian Right Theories²³ have suffered from the same weaknesses; therefore, it does not matter if one insists on other identities or not.

On the other side, Plebiscitarian Right Theories explain that an individual or a group of people have a right to secede iff they represent their willingness through a/some plebiscitary political act(s).²⁴ At first, these theories appear to be more interesting

referring to a culture, history and heritage. In addition, the writer has studied the Hirschman's definition very recently and the writer thinks that Hirschman would claim that there is a similarity between martyrdom and secession and both of them are remorseless. Although, the writer believes that secession is based on Marty Argument morally.

²¹ For objections against the Ascriptivist Right Theories see: 1. Overlapping Problem (Moore, 1997, pp. 910-2), 2. Strife Problem (Vidmar, 2010, p. 37), (Buchanan, 2017a), reply (Catala, 2013, pp. 80-3), 3. Infeasibility Objection (Buchanan, 1998c, pp. 291-3), (Buchanan, 2004, p. 382), (Bauböck, 1997, p. 10), (Norman, 1998, p. 36), (Moore, 1998b, p. 138), 4. The Equal Respect Objection (Wellman, 2003, pp. 268-9), (Brilmayer, 2000, p. 285), (Chandhoke, 2008, p. 11), (Bauböck, 1997, pp. 5-6), (Buchanan, 1998c, pp. 293-9), reply (Nielsen, 1998a, pp. 281-2), 5. The Polyethnic Rights Objection and Vanity Secession (Kymlicka, 2000, pp. 215-6), (Buchanan, 1998c, pp. 300-1), 6. The Nation Concept Problem (Chandhoke, 2014a, pp. 5-6), (Philpott, 1995, p. 365), 7. Problems of National Self-Determination: (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 328-9), (Buchanan, 1998c, pp. 299-307), (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 254-5), Paradoxes (Slattery, 1994, pp. 710-2), Irrelevancy (Chandhoke, 2014a, p. 9), (Copp, 1979, pp. 71-3), e.g. Jihadis (Chandhoke, 2014a, p. 7), e.g. Nazis (Buchanan, 1991b, p. 56), Non Sequitur (Norman, 1998, p. 36), Cycle of Violence (Jenne, 2006, p. 29), Indeterminacy Problem (Moore, 1997, pp. 905-7), (Sorens, 2014, p. 270), The Balkan Objection (De-shalit, 1996, pp. 916-20), (Miller, 2003a, pp. 312-4), 8. Instability Problem (Moore, 1997, pp. 907-10), (Moore, 1998a, p. 4), (Bauböck, 1997, p. 4), 9. Patriotism Problem (Bauböck, 1997, pp. 6-8).

²² For arguments for the Ascriptivist Right Theories and the related replies see: (Moore, 2000, pp. 239-41), 1. The Culture Goods Argument and its weakness (Philpott, 1995, pp. 373-4), (Miller, 2003b, pp. 269-70), (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 249-51), (Buchanan, 2003a, p. 257), 2. Non-Institutional Argument and its weakness (Lee, 2015), 3. Identity Argument and its weakness (Lee, 2012), (Moore, 2000, pp. 240-4), (Weinstock, 2000, pp. 254-6), 4. Instrumental Argument and its weakness (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 251-2), (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 388-92), (Wellman, 2005, pp. 38-9), (Lee, 2019), reply (Caney, 1998, pp. 155-7), 5. The Kantian Argument and its weakness (Caney, 1998, pp. 158-60), 6. Well-Being Argument and its weakness (Caney, 1997, pp. 361-9), (Caney, 1998, pp. 161-7), 7. Rousseauian Argument and its weakness (Caney, 1998, p. 167), 8. The Distributive Justice Argument (Miller, 1997, pp. 277-81), reply (Caney, 1998, pp. 168-9), (Weinstock, 2000, pp. 256-7), 9. The Encompassing Group Argument (Margalit & Raz, 1990), reply (Buchanan, 1997b, pp. 54-5), (Kapitan, 2008), 10. Divorce Analogy Argument (Nielsen, 1993, pp. 35-6), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Ewin, 1994, p. 350), (Aronovitch, 2000, pp. 29-31). 11. The Effectivity Argument and its reply (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 248-50).

²³ For the Communitarian Right Theories as the Ascriptivist Right Theories see: (Pavkovic, 2003, pp. 79-80), (Gilbert, 1998).

²⁴ For the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Beran, 1977, p. 266), (Beran, 1983), (Beran, 1984), (Beran, 1988), (Beran, 1992, p. 253), (Beran, 1993, p. 484), (Beran, 1998), (Philpott, 1995), (Philpott, 1998), (Wellman, 1995), (Wellman, 2005), (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 43-68), (Gauthier, 1994),

than the Ascriptivist Right Theories because they are based on democratic values such as consent or association or religious, social or other reason may incline them to advocate the right to secede, and therefore, perhaps proponents of these theories ponder on the opponents who appear to be eleutherophobic.²⁵ Although those are anarchically chaotic, democratically arbitrary and dramatically inapplicable. One more time, there are some objections against this theory i.e. Martyr Argument.²⁶ In addition, other interpretations like Republican Right Theories²⁷ have focused on the non-domination freedom and have presented the right to secede as a solution of arbitrary domination of political power although they replace the willingness of freedom with the willingness of association or consent. These theories like other Primary Right Theories would not get this point that a country is a multilateral territory and it is owned by the people of that country as a whole, also, they face with the same objections to Plebiscitarian Right Theories. Next, other interpretations such as Libertarian Right Theories were embodied by not only the core weaknesses of other Plebiscitarian Right Theories, but also, the general agreement on the unsolved problems of Libertarian views and reducing the values of multilateral territory to its economic affairs are its weaknesses.²⁸ Additionally, there is a trend to present new Plebiscitarian Right Theories. However, the writer thinks all of the new Plebiscitarian (or Primary) Right Theories suffer from those old and new weaknesses. For instance, one may claim that we could promote a theory that is based on non-normative

(Lefkowitz, 2008), (Copp, 1997), (Copp, 1998), (Reinikainen, 2019, pp. 10-5), (Cavallero, 2017, pp. 128-31,135-9).

²⁵ For arguments for the Plebiscitarian Right Theories and the related replies see: 1. The Value of Political Self-Determination Argument (Wellman, 2005, pp. 34-64), (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 44-8), (Cavallero, 2017, pp. 133-4), its reply (Buchanan, 1995, p. 352), (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 332-3), 2. Consent Argument (Beran, 1984, pp. 23-7), (Beran, 1988, pp. 317-8), reply (Caney, 1998, pp. 151-4), (Buchanan, 1991a, p. 328), (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 70-3), (Buchanan, 1995, pp. 369-73), (Buchanan, 1997a, pp. 314-5), (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 253-4), (Birch, 1984), (Brilmayer, 1991, pp. 184-5) (Wellman, 1995, pp. 155-6), (Wellman, 2005, pp. 8-9,17), (Dowding, 1998, p. 77), (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 49-50), 3. The Democratic Value Argument: As a majority (Philpott, 1995, pp. 355-62), its reply (Buchanan, 1998a, pp. 19-20), (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 243-6), as an equal respect (Copp, 1997, pp. 277-300), reply (Buchanan, 1998a, pp. 20-1), (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 246-7), (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 256-7), (Cavallero, 2017, pp. 132-3), as the instrumental one and its reply (Buchanan, 2003a, p. 247), 4. The Freedom of Association Argument (Gauthier, 1994), (Lefkowitz, 2008, pp. 496-500), its reply (Wellman, 2005, pp. 16-7), (Cavallero, 2017, pp. 131-2), as The Pro Tanto Defence Argument (Cavallero, 2017, pp. 134-9), reply (Buchanan, 2017a), 5. Samaritanism Argument (Wellman, 2005, pp. 11-25,55-8), , its reply (Lefkowitz, 2008, pp. 494-6), 6. Divorce Analogy Argument (Gauthier, 1994), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Aronovitch, 2000, pp. 29-31), 7. The Effectivity Argument and its reply (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 248-50).

²⁶ For objections against the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Sorens, 2014, pp. 269-74), (Beran, 1998, pp. 46-55), (Moore, 2000, pp. 232-9), 1. The Domino Theory Problem (Patten, 2002, p. 559), (Beran, 1984, pp. 29-30), (Kamanu, 1974, pp. 366-70), reply (Caney, 1998, pp. 169-70), 2. The Equality and Democracy Conflict Problem (Patten, 2002, pp. 573-5), 3. The Global Anarchy Problem (Philpott, 1995, p. 355), 4. The Dissenters Problem (Philpott, 1995, pp. 378-80), reply (Vaca & Artiga, 2021, pp. 24-5), 5. The New Set Minority Problem (McGee, 1994, p. 27), (Sorens, 2014, pp. 274-5), 6. The Open Borders Problem and its reply (Rothbard, 1998, pp. 84-8), 7. The Self-Determination Character Problem (Altman & Wellman, 2009, pp. 48-50), 8. Hirschman's Objection (Buchanan, 1998a, p. 22), 9. The Irrelevancy to Territorial Claims Problem (Catala, 2015, pp. 588-94).

²⁷ For the Republican Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Pérez Lozano, 2021).

²⁸ For the Libertarian Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Kreptul, 2003), (Rothbard, 1998), (McGee, 1994).

and/or amoral terms and concepts, even though, the writer thinks first of all, this type of theory, Realist Right Theories,²⁹ could be categorized as Plebiscitarian Right Theories, since, it is not only true that the one presume that some facts enforce and inform us to permit the right to secede as Plebiscitarian Right Theories, but also, these Theories would only replace some political norms i.e. real politics instead of liberty, justice, or equality. Moreover, it is counterfactually doubtful that their theories and norms could fulfil the functional demand of the right to secede. Last but not least, their theories are full of inconsistencies and inferiority, because they target the heart of the most fundamental norms and values of political philosophy i.e. liberty, justice, equality or rights.

The second group of theories of secession are the Remedial Right Theories³⁰ that completely outweigh the Primary Right Theories.³¹ They are considered the well-settled theories somehow as a standard theory.^{32&33}

²⁹ For the Realist Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories see: (Sanjaume-Calvet, 2020).

³⁰ For the Remedial Right Theories see: (Buchanan, 1991b), (Buchanan, 1997b, pp. 34-5), (Buchanan, 1998a, p. 25), (Buchanan, 1998b, pp. 228-31), (Buchanan, 2003b, pp. 247-8), (Buchanan, 2004, p. 367), (Buchanan, 2007, p. 758), (Buchanan, 2014, pp. 19-20), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Seymour, 2007), (Birch, 1984), (Kamanu, 1974), (Chandhoke, 2014a, pp. 6-7), (Buchanan, 2014, p. 69), (Brilmayer, 1991), (Brilmayer, 2000), (Norman, 1998), (Norman, 2006), (Christiano, 2006, pp. 99-100), (Hannum, 1998, pp. 776-9).

³¹ For arguments for the Remedial Right Theories and the related replies see: (Buchanan, 1991b), (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 369-71), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Norman, 1998, p. 41), 1. Rectifying Past Injustices Argument (Brilmayer, 1991, pp. 189-92), (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 67-70), (Buchanan, 1995, pp. 367-9), (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 355-7), (Buchanan, 2007, pp. 758-9), (Buchanan, 2017a), reply (Bishai, 1998, pp. 96-7), (Philpott, 1995, p. 376), (Miller, 2003b, pp. 77-9), (Catala, 2013, pp. 77-9), *uti possidetis* and its weakness (Buchanan, 2003a, pp. 250-2), 2. The Cultural Preservation Argument (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 52-64), (Buchanan, 1995, pp. 355-64), (Hannum, 1998, pp. 776-7), reply (Corlett, 1998, p. 121), (Buchanan, 2003a, p. 256), 3. Self-Defense Argument (Buchanan, 1995, pp. 364-7), (Buchanan, 1997b, p. 37), (Buchanan, 2007, pp. 759-60), reply (Bishai, 1998, p. 96), 4. The Discriminatory Redistribution Argument (Buchanan, 1991a, pp. 330-1), (Buchanan, 1991b, pp. 38-45), (Buchanan, 1997a, pp. 312-3), (Buchanan, 2007, pp. 760-2), its weakness (Buchanan, 2007, pp. 760-2), (Bishai, 1998, pp. 97-8), 5. The Violations of Intrastate Autonomy Argument (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 357-9), its weakness (Buchanan, 2014, pp. 16-7), 6. Permanent Minority Argument and its weakness (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 360-3), 7. Institutional Democratic Right Argument (Buchanan, 1998a, pp. 16-21, 29-30), (Catala, 2013, pp. 83-9).

The writer's footnote: The writer disagrees with The Cultural Preservation Argument because there is no possible danger for the minority cultures in a heterogeneous ethnic nationalism or civic-territorial nationalism; also, the writer has replied to Institutional Democratic Right Argument in next paragraphs; moreover, the Discriminatory Redistribution Argument, the Violations of Intrastate Autonomy Argument and the Permanent Minority Argument are too problematic to be considered as arguments for the right to secede, and so, the writer has revised the Remedial Right Theories as anti-model of secession; Therefore, we have to care about the arguments associated with this theory.

³² For the Remedial Right Theories and the similar claim see: (Wellman, 2006), (Norman, 2003, p. 198).

³³ For objections against the Remedial Right Theories see: 1. The Blameless Dissenter Problem (Lister, 2016, pp. 161-2), 2. The Violence Paradox (Costa, 2003, pp. 83-4), 3. The Doctrine of Self-Determination Problem (Buchheit, 1978, p. 223), its reply (Buchanan, 2004, p. 372), (Buchanan, 2017a), (Brilmayer, 2000, p. 284), 4. Statist Problem and its reply (Buchanan, 2004, pp. 371-2), 5-

The writer has presented Martyr Argument as a noninstitutional deontological argument, since, it is a mere fact that one cannot compensate for the grievous harms of reminders and the infringement's basic rights of them, then, there could not be utilities and consequences of those immoral acts, but they are about ignoring the transgression of reminder's moral properties. As a result, the right to secede as a right is based on a moral property which is a remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or consensual cases, as Kantian term it is about the mere ends of human beings and their respectful personhood and so, consequentialist argument on the right to secede is not cogent.

Martyr Argument which is the pivotal part of the theory is constructed as follow: One cannot redress for value of a young martyr who was murdered while defending a non-colonizer country. Imagine a person who lived in a village located in the borderline that was assailed by another country. He passed away not only for defending his village and its people in an unjust war, but also for defending the whole of country, his blood has made the boundaries morally valuable and each inch of the country is painted by the blood of this innocent martyr owing to this fact that the innocent martyr died for moral values and a non-colonizer country's defending, he did not die for immoral purposes and attacking in favor of a colonizer country. As a result, unilateral secession is considered a transgressor of other people's rights. The important points of this argument are mentioned below:

A is a non-colonizer country that is forced to enter an unjust war started by B,

B represents an offensive country,

X is an innocent young person who lives in A, and his village is near the borderline where the war takes place.

Z is a secessionist part of A.

- B attacks A,
- X passed away while defending A that includes Z,
- After his death, Z would secede from A,
- But X passed away as a result of defending A,
- Defending A as a whole territory is contrary to withdrawing of a part of that territory,
- Because unilateral withdrawing of Z from A is destroying A as a whole country where defended by X,
- The above-mentioned destroying is come from defending a non-colonizer country by an innocent martyr that is moral contrary to incentives of Z to be an independent territory,
- Then, how Z could compensate and solve this contrary?

The Arbitrary and Internally Inconsistent Problem (Catala, 2017), 6- The Group Problem (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018, p. 3).

The writer's footnote: Look at the rest of this article for replies to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th objections against this theory.

- It is undeniably true that it is morally impossible. Owing to the fact that there is nothing one can do about compensating for the life of an innocent martyr as it is about the moral property of the martyrdom and transgressing of martyr's blood,
- Then, it is not morally possible to redress the life of that martyr,
- As a consequence, unilateral secession is morally unpermitted, except as the theory.

Martyr Argument shows only remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or consensual cases of secession (hereafter: RCRSUCCS) is permissible. Hence, imagine A as the richest and democratic country that democratically joins B as the poorest and undemocratic country, and B welcomes A, although, Martyr Argument is morally sufficient to avert A's secession from B, since, we have to acknowledge B as a present-day country that secession of every part of B is permitted only as these two ways:

- The remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral cases (hereafter: RCRSUC): 1. Self-defense: There are persistent serious and horrendous injustices and/or grave violation of basic human rights such as genocide against huge numbers of people that could not be rectified by other political or legal solutions and escaping ways for those people are unfeasible and unreasonable. 2. Unjust seizure: The unjust seizure of a sovereign territory i.e. usurpation by foreigners, annexation, colonization and occupation.
- The remedial cure for remedial situations of consensual cases (hereafter: RCRSCC) that is a multilateral, negotiated, conservative and democratic procedure with a supermajority vote of all citizens.

The writer thinks legalization of secession remains a futile striving, since, it is not only true that barbaric states do not obey the moral norms and they breach the law as RCRSUC, but also, it requires to codify numerous provisions in constitutional and/or international law as RCRSUCCS and it may lead to arbitrary legal interpretation in favor of some countries. Altogether, we only require a supreme international court to obey the extreme moral codes and has generated those codes through well-entrenched provisions in exceptional cases when we shall hold the court and shall declare and impose them as RCRSUC.

If a group of people secede from a country or join another country as an irredentist without these two permissible political models of secession, those political acts violate the other populace rights atrociously. However, Martyr Argument produces some notes that fundamentally restrict these two models of secession:

1. Institutional Democratic Right Note: The writer has to reply to Institutional Democratic Right Argument of the Remedial Right Theories. Some argue in favor of the right to secede in the case of lack of democracy and human rights in a government, and so, they argue in the other cases of secessionist incentives have to be banned incentives in the movements,³⁴ or have to regain the territory in the case of illegitimate secession.³⁵ The writer's reply has three parts: First of all, there is no doubt that democracy is the most high-quality

³⁴ For secession and similar claims see: (Buchanan, 1998a, pp. 29-30).

³⁵ For secession and similar claims see: (Margalit & Raz, 1990, p. 442).

political system among current political systems, even though, lack of democracy and human rights does not contain inherently a permission to withdraw a territory unilaterally, it means that we have to strive for a democratic state that include human rights. Needless to say, there is a connection between the right to secede as a right to territory and a right to democracy, because a right to secede includes a right to territory and a right to a new independent democratic or nondemocratic state, and conversely there is a -partial- overlapping between a right to secede and a right to democracy. For instance, imagine that A is a territory that includes three parts: J, K, and L, and the political system of A is a dictatorship which infringes human rights. Every act of people of K who are fascinated by the undeniable democratic values to overthrow the dictator state and replace A with a democratic system means their striving that A becomes a democratic state and this does not mean an independent state and does not equal having a right to A's territory and this violates the J and L's moral rights. Moreover, the second part is that imagine A is an ancient country with primary democratic values in the past or now, this situation never means that K is allowed to secede, since, it is unfair to abandon those past or present strivings or become hopeless to endeavor for democratic values or as mentioned in the first part of the reply. Last part is that Institutional Democratic Right Argument could be in favor of democratic countries and be in disfavor of nondemocratic counties arbitrarily, and so, it could not be nominated candidate as an argument to right to secede. Altogether, this reply is against both Remedial Right and Primary Right arguments that desire to create a right to secede upon democratic values.

2. Ancient Countries Note: In disfavor of RCRSCC, the writer would insist that the heterogeneous ancient countries are normatively heritages of humankind and encouraging the citizens of those countries to stay together is a criterion. There are past and future generations that get involved with the timeless ancient countries, and so, next generations who will live in the hypothetical secessionist region will prefer an antiquity to a newly-established country, also, the remainders of the former territory will suffer from the political acts of their descendants. Moreover, those who lived in the past had spent their lives on the country in different ways before we could reach their success, thus we have to retain their accomplishments culturally and morally.
3. Past Borders Note: There are many borders and countries which have been forcibly involved in wars, those have been changed during hundreds or thousands of years, those have not been as same as the past. As a result, it seems the writer has put the Martyr Argument on ice until it could be replaced with other arguments, nevertheless, the writer thinks that this note reinforces Martyr Argument and does not undermine it, because one has to distinguish between legitimacy and illegitimacy of those cases to apply Martyr Argument e.g. the question that whether they are non-colonizer countries or not.
4. Regaining Note: Martyr Argument and the theory of it –RCRSUCCS- bans violence and permit states and remainders to regain their lost territories legally and morally in condition of immoral secession or irredentism, however, first of all, we have to avoid adding more transgression of basic human rights and violence, moreover, we ought to start a morally justifiable negotiation on the regaining of the lost territories with those colonizers or

secessionists, also, we need to present all-things-considered arguments and evidence that could prove our claim, it is also necessary to involve a supreme international court to assess the process.

5. Double Remedialism Note: It was claimed that threshold other compatriots and remainders are impeccable and dissatisfied in hard cases due to the fact that multilateral territorial rights of them are contravened by secessionists. However, secessionists may dwell on secession and argue they are entitled to secession, though, it is presumed that humanitarian intervention, nonviolent revolution, civil disobedience, and referendum of constitutional law are superior to secession owing to fact that these solutions do not involve bloodshed of victims or transgression of blameless remainders' rights. This attitude shows RCRSUCCS is a last remedial cure of remedial situations in which other political tools do not work at all. For instance, imagine that a supreme international court condemns states' inhumanity and imposes punishment, there would be de facto condition of recurring felonies, no other political tools are accessible, and so, secession could be on table to escape from recurring ferocities.
6. Animal Husbandry Note: It has been advised that if a state would triumph over secessionist incentives, it has to immediately transplant or deport minorities nationally, ethnically or religiously etc. Let the world become more tribalistic if the state would preserve the state's sovereignty, territory and nationhood, by contrast, it is shocking some countries urge and/or compel other countries to apply this political method, the writer avoids creating this tribalistic animal husbandry.
7. Supervenient Note: There is a relation between victims and tyrants into those savageries, if victims are victimized by a state and are not victimized by other compatriots, then it appears that those remainders are profoundly unhappy with cruelties, are powerlessly rescue targets from oppression and are motivationally restrain persecutors from doing persecution. In those atrocities, moral wrongness supervenes upon tyrants and does not upon the remainders,³⁶ especially in undemocratic states since those states are undemocratic and the citizens are not a part of state's decisions and acts.
8. Temporary-Permanent Note: As RCRSUCCS, it seems true that temporary secession is an antidote. Although, imagine R is a country in which three groups live there as X (has 80% of the territory and population), Y (has 15% of the territory and population), and Z (has 5% of the territory and population), a disagreement strikes, thus Xs attacks Zs unjustifiably, strategically and timely, this turpitude makes Xs commit an infringement of basic human rights of Zs, 88% of Ys approve the strike and only 12% of Ys disagree with the strike. If it is not clear whether the prior political tools e.g. humanitarian intervention is adequate or not, Z ought to secede from R at once permanently. There are no arguments to prohibit this Z's right, respecting and rescuing Zs as human beings are the first-order obligations.

³⁶ For secession and the similar claim, see: (Chandhoke, 2014a, p. 6).

9. U Minority Note: Another hypothetical case is that imagine G is a country includes M, N and L that have supermajority of G, and they would intend to separate from a minority part of G that is identified as U. In this case, M, N and L are not permitted to secede from U, unless they are allowed through RCRSUCCS.
10. Self-defeating Note: Imagine L is a country that includes F as an absolute majority of L, M as a minority of L, M unjustifiably and unilaterally would secede from F, it is not as RCRSUCCS, then F Attacks M, but the attack is outcome of secession and it is not because of RCRSUC, and so, RCRSUC is self-defeating here. Therefore, the writer bans secession and recommends other political tools.

As a result of Martyr Argument, we ought to persuade everyone and every group to follow the theory: RCRSUCCS, and foil acts of those who do not account for this moral defense.

Conclusion

The writer thinks that Multilateralism, Heterogeneous Nationalism and Martyr Argument and its notes are a panacea for questions, troubles and debates of secession philosophically. The writer believes no philosophical theory could escape from RCRSUCCS, and it appears that the theory has discovered "*what is wrong with secession?*" morally.

Bibliography

- Abbott, P. (1998). The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Secession. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of Secession* (pp. 179-204). London: Routledge.
- Altman, A., & Wellman, C. H. (2009). Secession. In *A Liberal Theory of International Justice* (pp. 43-68). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Antić, M. (2007). Procedure for Secession. *Politička misao*, 44, 145–159.
- Aronovitch, H. (2000). Why Secession Is Unlike Divorce. *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 14(1), 27-37.
- Bauböck, R. (1997). Why Stay Together?: A Pluralist Approach to Secession and Federation. In J. Melchior (Ed.), *Political Science Series* (pp. 1-40). Wien: Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS).
- Beran, H. (1977). In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority. *Ethics*, 87, 260-271.
- Beran, H. (1983). Must Secession Be Rebellion? *Politics*, 18(2), 49-56.
- Beran, H. (1984). A Liberal Theory of Secession. *Political Studies*, 32(1), 21-31.
- Beran, H. (1988). More Theory of Secession: A Response to Birch. *Political Studies*, 36(2), 316-323.
- Beran, H. (1992). Secession. The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec By Allen Buchanan. *Philosophical Books*, 33 (4), 251-253.
- Beran, H. (1993). Border Disputes and The Right of National Self-Determination. *Hirrorry of European Idea*, 16(4-6), 479-486,.

- Beran, H. (1998). A Democratic Theory of Political Self-Determination for A New World Order. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of secession* (pp. 33-60). London: Routledge.
- Berkebile, R. (2017). Secession and Jus Ad Bellum. *Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium*. Leavenworth: Arthur D. Simons Center for Interagency Cooperation.
- Birch, A. (1984). Another Liberal Theory of Secession. *Political Studies*, 32(4), 596-602.
- Bishai, L. (1998). Altered States: Secession and the Problems of Liberal Theory. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of secession*. London: Routledge.
- Blahuta, J. (2001). How Useful Is the Analogy of Divorce in Theorizing about Secession? *Dialogue*, 40, 241-254.
- Boykin, S. (1998). The Ethics of Secession. In D. Gordon (Ed.), *Secession, state and liberty* (pp. 65-78). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Brando, N., & Morales-Gálvez, S. (2018). The Right to Secession: Remedial or Primary? *Ethnopolitics*, 1-12.
- Brilmayer, L. (1991). Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial. *Yale Journal of International Law*, 16, 177-202.
- Brilmayer, L. (2000). Commentaries on Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation: One Decade Later. *The Yale Journal of International Law*, 25, 283-6.
- Brilmayer, L. (2015). Secession and the Two Types of Territorial Claims. *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 21(2), 325-331.
- Buchanan, A. (1991a). Toward a Theory of Secession. *Ethics*, 101, 322-342.
- Buchanan, A. (1991b). *Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Buchanan, A. (1993). The Morality of Inclusion. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 10(2), 233-257. doi:10.1017/S0265052500004210
- Buchanan, A. (1995). The Morality of Secession. In W. Kymlicka (Ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 350-374). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, A. (1997a). Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law . In R. McKim, & J. McMahan (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 301-323). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, A. (1997b). Theories of Secession. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26(1), 31-61.
- Buchanan, A. (1998a). Democracy and Secession. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 14-33). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, A. (1998b). The International Institutional Dimension of Secession. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of secession* (pp. 225-254). London: Routledge.
- Buchanan, A. (1998c). What's So Special About Nations? In J. Couture, K. Nielsen, & M. Seymour (Eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism* (pp. 283-309). Calgary: University of Calgary Press.
- Buchanan, A. (2003a). The Quebec Secession Issue: Democracy, Minority Rights, and the Rule of Law. In S. Macedo , & A. Buchanan (Eds.), *Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 238-271). New York: New York University Press.
- Buchanan, A. (2003b). The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism Has to Say. In A. Buchanan, & M. Moore (Eds.), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (pp. 231-261). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Buchanan, A. (2004). *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buchanan, A. (2006). Uncoupling Secession From Nationalism and Intrastate Autonomy From Secession. In H. Hannum, & E. Babbitt (Eds.), *Negotiating Self-Determination* (pp. 81-114). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Buchanan, A. (2007). Secession and Nationalism. In R. E. Goodin, P. Pettit, & T. Pogge (Eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy* (pp. 755-766). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Buchanan, A. (2014). The International Dimension of the Problem of Contested Secessions. *Philosophy and Public Issues*, 4(1), 13-21.
- Buchanan, A. (2017a). Secession. (E. Zalta, Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/secession/>
- Buchanan, A. (2017b). Revolution. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/revolution/>
- Buchheit, L. (1978). *Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Caney, S. (1997). Self-Government and Secession: The Case of Nations. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 5(4), 351-372.
- Caney, S. (1998). National Self-Determination and National Secession: Individualist and Communitarian Approaches. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of secession* (pp. 151-181). London: Routledge.
- Catala, A. (2013). Remedial Theories of Secession and Territorial Justification. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 44(1), 74-94.
- Catala, A. (2015). Secession and Annexation: The Case of Crimea. *German Law Journal*, 16(3), 581-607.
- Catala, A. (2017). Secession and Distributive Justice. *Philosophical Studies*, 174(2), 529-552.
- Cavallero, E. (2017). Value Individualism and the Popular-Choice Theory of Secession. *Social Theory and Practice*, 43(1), 125-153.
- Chandhoke, N. (2008). Exploring The Right to Secession: The South Asian Context. *South Asia Research*, 28(1), 1-22.
- Chandhoke, N. (2010). What Sort of a Right Is the Right of Secession? *Global Jurist*, 10(1).
- Chandhoke, N. (2014a). A Précis to Contested Secessions: Rights, Self-determination, Democracy and Kashmir. *Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series)*, 4(1), 1-12.
- Chandhoke, N. (2014b). Talking Secession. *Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series)*, 4, 51-71.
- Christiano, T. (2006). Democratic Theory of Territory and Some Puzzles about Global Democracy. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 37, 81-107.
- Copp, D. (1979). Do Nations Have the Right of Self-Determination? In S. French (Ed.), *Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation* (pp. 71-95). Montreal: Canadian Philosophical Association.
- Copp, D. (1997). Democracy and Communal Self-Determination. In R. McKim, & J. McMahan (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 277-300). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Copp, D. (1998). International Law and Morality in Theory of Secession. *The Journal of Ethics*, 219-245.

- Coppieters, B. (2003). Introduction. In B. Coppieters, & R. Sakwa (Eds.), *Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 1-21). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Corlett, J. A. (1998). The Morality and Constitutionality of Secession. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 29(3), 120-128.
- Costa, J. (2003). On Theories of Secession: Minorities, Majorities, and the Multinational State. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 6(2), 63-90.
- Day, J. (2012). The Remedial Right of Secession in International Law. *Potentia*, 4(1), 19-33.
- De-shalit, A. (1996). National Self-determination: Political not Cultural. *Political Studies*, XLIV, 906-920.
- Dietrich, F. (2014). Secession of the Rich: A Qualified Defence. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 13(1), 62-81.
- Dowding, K. (1998). Secession and Isolation. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of Secession* (pp. 71-90). London: Routledge.
- Ewin, R. E. (1994). Peoples and Secession. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 11(2), 225-231.
- Ewin, R. E. (1995). Can There Be a Right to Secede? *Philosophy*, 70(273), 341-362.
- Fabry, M. (2013). Theorizing Secession: What Should Be the Relationship between the Ideal and the Empirical? In C. Navari (Ed.), *Ethical Reasoning in International Affairs: Arguments from the Middle Ground* (pp. 81-105). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gans, C. (2003). *The Limits of Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gauthier, D. (1994). Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 24(3), 357-372.
- Gilbert, P. (1998). Communities Real and Imagined: Good and Bad Cases for National Secession. In P. Lehning (Ed.), *Theories of secession* (pp. 205-224). London: Routledge.
- Glaser, D. (2003). The Right to Secession: An Antisecessionist Defence. *Political Studies*, 51, 369-386.
- Glover, J. (1997). Nations, Identity, and Conflict. In J. McMahan, & R. McKim (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 11-30). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hannum, H. (1998). The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century. *Washington and Lee Law Review*, 55(3), 773-780.
- Hirschman, A. O. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1998). Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 181-214). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2003a). A Right to secede? In S. Macedo, & A. Buchanan (Eds.), *Secession and Self-Determination* (Vol. 45, pp. 50-76). New Yorke: NYU Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2003b). The Cracked Foundations of The Right To Secede. *Journal of Democracy*, 14, 5-17.
- Jenne, E. (2006). National Self-Determination: A Deadly Mobilizing Device. In H. Hannum, & E. F. Babbitt (Eds.), *Negotiating Self-Determination* (pp. 7-36). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

- Jovanovic, M. (2007). *Constitutionalizing Secession in Federalized States: A Procedural Approach*. Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing.
- Kamanu, O. (1974). Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: An O.A.U. Dilemma. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12(3), 355-376.
- Kant, I. (1999). *Practical philosophy*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Kapitan, T. (2008). Self-Determination. In R. Halwani, & T. Kapitan, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Philosophical Essays on Self-Determination, Terrorism, and the One-State Solution* (pp. 17-31). New York : Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Ker-Lindsay, J. (2014). Understanding state responses to secession. *Peacebuilding*, 2(1), 28-44.
- Kohen, M. (Ed.). (2006). *Secession: International Law Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kreptul, A. (2003). The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History. *Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 17, 39-100.
- Kymlicka, W. (1997). The Sources of Nationalism: Commentary on Taylor . In J. McMahan, & R. McKim (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 56-65). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Kymlicka, W. (1998). Is Federalism a Viable Alternative to Secession? In P. Lehning. (Ed.), *Theories of secession* (pp. 109-148). London: Routledge.
- Kymlicka, W. (2000). Federalism and Secession: At Home and Abroad. *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, 13, 207-224.
- Kymlicka, W. (2007). Multi-nation Federalism. In B. He, B. Galligan, & T. Inoguchi (Eds.), *Federalism in Asia* (pp. 35-56). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Kymlicka, W. (2010). Minority Rights in Political Philosophy and International Law. In S. Besson, & J. Tasioulas (Eds.), *The Philosophy of International Law* (pp. 377-396). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, H.-w. (2012). The Identity Argument for National Self-Determination. *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 26(2), 123-139.
- Lee, H.-w. (2015). Institutional Morality and The Principle of National Self-Determination. *Philosophical Studies*, 172(1), 207-226.
- Lee, H.-w. (2019). The Instrumental Value Arguments for National Self-Determination. *Dialogue - Canadian Philosophical Review*, 58(1), 65-89.
- Lefkowitz, D. (2008). On the Foundation of Rights to Political Self-Determination: Secession, Nonintervention, and Democratic Governance. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 39(4), 492-511.
- Lefkowitz, D. (2018). International Law, Institutional Moral Reasoning, and Secession. *Law and Philosophy*, 37(3), 385-413.
- Lindsay, P., & Wellman, C. H. (2003b). Lincoln on Secession. *Social Theory and Practise*, 29(1), 113-135.
- Lister, M. (2016). Self-Determination, Dissent, and the Problem of Population Transfers. In F. Tesón (Ed.), *The Theory of Self-Determination* (pp. 145-165). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Liu, H. (2016). Two Faces of Self-determination in Political Divorce. *ICL Journal*, 10, 355-385.
- Luban, D. (2010). Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law. In S. Besson, & J. Tasioulas (Eds.), *The Philosophy of International Law* (pp. 569-588). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.

- Margalit, A., & Raz, J. (1990). National Self-determination. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 87(9), 439-461.
- McGee, R. (1994). Secession Reconsidered. *The Journal of Libertarian Studies*, 11, 11-33.
- Midtgaard, S. (2007). 'But Suppose Everyone Did the Same' — The Case of the Danish Utopian Micro-Society of Christiania. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 24(3), 299-315.
- Mill, J. S. (1861 [2001]). *Government Representative*. Kitchener: Batoche Books.
- Miller, D. (1995). *On Nationality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Miller, D. (1997). Secession and the Principle of Nationality. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 26(1), 261-282.
- Miller, D. (2003a). In Defence of Nationality. In D. Matravers, & J. Pike (Eds.), *Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy : An Anthology* (pp. 301-318). New Yorke: Routledge and Open University.
- Miller, D. (2003b). Liberalism and Boundaries: A Response to Allen Buchanan. In A. Buchanan, & M. Moore (Eds.), *States, Nations, and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (pp. 262-274). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Miscevic, N. (2008). Philosophy and Nationalism. In G. H. Herb, & D. H. Kaplan (Eds.), *Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview 1770 to 1880* (Vol. 1, pp. 85-98). Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc.
- Miscevic, N. (2020). Nationalism. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/nationalism/>
- Moore, M. (1997). On National Self-Determination. *Political Studies*, 45(5), 900-913.
- Moore, M. (1998a). Introduction: The Self-Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 1-13). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, M. (1998b). The Territorial Dimension of Self-Determination. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 134-157). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, M. (2000). The Ethics of Secession and a Normative Theory of Nationalism. *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, 13(2), 225-250.
- Moore, M. (2001). *The Ethics of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Moore, M. (2003). An Historical Argument for Indigenous Self-determination. *Nomos*, 45, 89-118.
- Moore, M. (2006). The Ethics of Secession and Postinvasion Iraq. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 20(1), 55-78.
- Moore, M. (2020). Territorial Rights and Territorial Justice. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/territorial-rights/>
- Nielsen, K. (1993). Secession: The Case of Quebec. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 10(1), 29-43.
- Nielsen, K. (1998a). Liberal Nationalism, Liberal Democracies, and Secession. *The University of Toronto Law Journal*, 48(2), 253-295.
- Nielsen, K. (1998b). Liberal Nationalism and Secession. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 103-133). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.
- Norman, W. (1998). The Ethics of Secession as the Regulation of Secessionist Politics. In *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 34-61). New Yorke: Oxford University Press.

- Norman, W. (2003). Domesticating Secession. In S. Macedo, & A. Buchanan (Eds.), *Secession and Self-Determination: NOMOS XLV* (pp. 193–237). New York: New York University Press.
- Norman, W. (2006). *Negotiating Nationalism: Nation-building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Patten, A. (2002). Democratic Secession from a Multinational State. *Ethics*, 112, 558–586.
- Pavkovic, A. (2000). Recursive Secessions in Former Yugoslavia: Too Hard a Case for Theories of Secession? *Political Studies*, 48, 485-502.
- Pavkovic, A. (2003). Secession, Majority Rule and Equal Rights: A Few Questions. *Macquarie Law Journal*, 3, 73-94.
- Pavkovic, A. (2004). Secession as Defence of a Political Liberty: A Liberal Answer to a Nationalist Demand. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 37(3), 695–713.
- Pavković, A. (2008). Liberalism, Secession and Violence. In M. Jovavonić, & K. Henrard (Eds.), *Sovereignty and Diversity* (pp. 15-31). The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing.
- Pérez Lozano, L. (2021). Theories of the Right of Secession: A Republican Analysis. *Las Torres de Lucca. International Journal of Political Philosophy*, 10(18), 27-35.
- Pérez, L., & Sanjaume, M. (2013). Legalizing Secession: The Catalan Case. *Journal of Conflictology*, 4(2), 3-12.
- Philpott, D. (1995). In Defense of Self-Determination. *Ethics*, 105(2), 352-385.
- Philpott, D. (1998). Self-Determination in Practice. In M. Moore (Ed.), *National Self-Determination and Secession* (pp. 79-102). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Philpott, D. (2000). Should Self-determination be Legalized? *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 12(3-4), 106-134.
- Popper, K. (1947). *The Open Society And Its Enemies*. London: Routledge.
- Primoratz, I. (2020). Patriotism. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/patriotism/>
- Reinikainen, J. (2019). What is the Democratic Approach to Plebiscitary Secessionism? *Ethnopolitics*, 1-17.
- Roth, B. (2015). The Virtues of Bright Lines: Self-Determination, Secession, and External Intervention. *German Law Journal*, 16(3), 384-415.
- Rothbard, M. (1998). Nations By Consent: Decomposing the Nation-State. In D. Gordon (Ed.), *Secession, State and Liberty* (pp. 79-88). New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers.
- Sanjaume-Calvet, M. (2020). Moralism in Theories of Secession: A Realist Perspective. *Nations and Nationalism*, 26(2), 323–343.
- Seymour, M. (2007). Secession as a Remedial Right. *Inquiry*, 50(4), 395–423.
- Shorten, A. (2014). Constitutional Secession Rights, Exit Threats and Multinational Democracy. *Political Studies*, 62(1), 99-115.
- Slattery, B. (1994). The Paradoxes of National Self-Determination. *Osgoode Hall Law Journal*, 32(4), 703-733.
- Smith, A. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Smith, A. (1998). *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.

- Sorens, J. (2008). Regionalists Against Secession: The Political Economy of Territory in Advanced Democracies. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 14, 325–360.
- Sorens, J. (2014). Legal Regims for Secession: Applying Moral Theory and Empirical Findings. *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 28(3), 259-288.
- Spencer, P., & Wollman, H. (2002). *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Stilz, A. (2009). Why Do States Have Territorial Rights? *International Theory*, 1, 185-213.
- Sunstein, C. (1991). Constitutionalism and Secession. *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 58(2), 633-670.
- Sunstein, C. (2001). Should Constitutions Protect the Right to Secede? A Reply to Weinstock. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 9(3), 350-355.
- Tamir, Y. (1997). Pro Patria Mori!: Death and the State. In R. McKim , & J. McMahan (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 227-241). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vaca, M., & Artiga, M. (2021). defense of the moral and legal right to secede. *Ethics & Global Politics*, 14(1), 18-35. doi:10.1080/16544951.2021.1913902
- Van Dyke, V. (1995). The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory. In W. Kymlicka (Ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 31-56). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Vidmar, J. (2010). Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice. *St Antony's International Review*, 6(1), 37-56.
- Walzer, M. (1997). The Politics of Difference: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World. In R. McKim , & J. McMahan (Eds.), *The Morality of Nationalism* (pp. 245-257). Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- Weinstock, D. (2000). Toward a Proceduralist Theory of Secession. *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, 13(2), 251-265.
- Weinstock, D. (2001). Constitutionalizing the Right to Secede. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 9(2), 182–203.
- Weller, M. (2008). *Escaping the Self-Determination Trap*. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press.
- Wellman, C. H. (1995). A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 24, 142-171.
- Wellman, C. H. (2003). Nationalism and Secession. In R. Frey, & C. Wellman (Eds.), *Companion to Applied Ethics* (pp. 267–278). Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Wellman, C. H. (2005). *A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wellman, C. H. (2006). Secession. (Taylor, & Francis, Eds.) *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved from The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: <https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/secession/v-1>
- Weltman, D. (2021). Territorial Exclusion: An Argument against Closed Borders. *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, 19(3), 257-290.