Kant on Public Reason and the Linguistic Other

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Abstract: On Kant's account, "public use of reason" is the use that a truth-seeking *scholar* makes of his reason when he communicates his thoughts *in writing* to a world of *readers*. Commentators tend to treat this account as expressing an egalitarian ideal, without taking seriously the limiting conditions—especially the scholarship condition—built into it. In this paper, I interrogate Kant's original account of public reason in connection with his construction of the "Oriental" as a linguistically and therefore epistemically and culturally inferior Other. I thereby give reasons to worry that Kant's account is substantively inegalitarian (even if it is nominally egalitarian). I also draw attention to the fact that Kant constructed a linguistic Other against the backdrop of colonialism and from a position of power. This positionality gave what he said about the Other an ideology-forming and world-making effect. In this way, his exclusionary discursive practices—such as depicting the Oriental as an inferior linguistic Other—could have a lasting impact on knowledge production and on the real-world exercise of public reason.

Key words: public use of reason, enlightenment, substantive inequality, Orientalism, linguistic othering, epistemic injustice

1. Introduction

It goes without saying that a philosopher is an embodied, socially situated, and historically contingent human being. As such, she inevitably looks at the world from a standpoint that reflects her social, political, and historical circumstances. The worldview she develops is therefore always a *view from somewhere*. As Edward Said puts it in his groundbreaking study of orientalism, a scholar cannot be detached "from the fact of his involvement (conscious or unconscious) with … a social position," which "bear[s] on what he does professionally." It is important to acknowledge this fact and not to pretend that any of us can achieve "suprapolitical objectivity" or see the world as though from nowhere: such pretension only serves to conceal "the highly if obscurely organized political circumstances obtaining when knowledge is produced" (Said 1994: 10).

It is with this understanding of the political nature of knowledge production that I will study Kant's account of public use of reason ("public reason" for short) in this paper. I will pair it with his Western-centric and Western-supremacist view of the Oriental as a linguistic Other. What concerns me in this study is not just what Kant said in this regard, but when and from what social position he constructed the Oriental as an inferior Other. Kant did this at a *critical historical juncture*, namely the late eighteenth century, when Orientalism began to take shape as "the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient" through such discursive practices as "making

statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it," whereby the West arrogantly asserts its authority over the Orient (Said 1994: 3). Kant performed some of those discursive acts in a public-facing way, with a manifest intent to discredit any favorite view of the Orient. If the Orient is "one of [Western Europe's] deepest and most recurring images of the Other" that helps to define the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1994: 1–2), it is worth noting that there were competing views of the Orient in the eighteenth century. Kant, as we shall see, was bent on disabusing his audience of any suggestion that the Orient is worth emulating. He would do so *from a position of power*, not only as a prominent scholar but also as a lifelong educator.

Interrogating Kant's notion of public reason in this light should make us rethink its value today. Or so I shall argue. I will begin by outlining Kant's arguments for public reason both as a right (section 2.1) and as a calling (2.2). I will then examine the constraints built into Kant's arguments: in the public use of one's reason, one must intend to *seek truth* by communicating one's thoughts *in writing* and addressing them to a *reading public*. Although the resulting account of public reason is nominally egalitarian, it may turn out to be substantively inegalitarian when we begin to query, for instance, who is granted *access* to the requisite means of communication (section 3). This worry about substantive inegalitarianism deepens when we consider the wedge that Kant drives between the symbolic or pictorial language of the Orient and the discursive language of the Occident. He thereby constructs the Oriental as a linguistically—therefore epistemically and culturally—inferior Other from whom the Occidental man must vigilantly distance himself. This preemptively and categorically excludes anyone identified as an "Oriental" from the epistemic community in which public reason is practiced (section 4).

I will conclude the paper (section 5) with reflections on how this kind of identity-based exclusion—a form of "linguistic epistemic injustice" (Catala 2022)—continues to be a problem today. Insofar as the problem is fundamentally a political one having to do with structures of *power*, we can trace it to the Enlightenment era in which Kant simultaneously articulated a theory of public reason and constructed the Oriental as a linguistic-epistemic Other. It was an era, I will remind the reader, in which the West reconfigured the global order to assert its hegemony in every imaginable aspect of human existence, including knowledge production. The world today still largely reflects that logic of hegemony. As a result, neither public reason nor language use can be apolitical: who is included in or excluded from an epistemic community, who are its dominant knowers and get to set the rules and terms of engagement, and which language prevails as the lingua franca for communication—these all reflect and serve to maintain the existing power arrangements. If we find injustice in such arrangements and want *change*, Kant's theory of public reason may not be helpful even as a model for collective reflections on how to engender change. This is because, as I will have shown in section 3, it was specifically intended for "scholars" who did *not* mean to challenge existing power relations.

2. Kant on public use of reason: a basic sketch
2.1. Public reason as a right

In "What is Enlightenment?" (1784), Kant defines "public use of reason" as "that use which someone makes of it *as a scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*." Private use, by contrast, is "that which one may make of it in a certain *civil* post or office with which he is entrusted." A completely free excise of public reason, Kant argues, is the condition of enlightenment: "nothing is required [for enlightenment] but … freedom to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters." Prohibitions of public reason therefore necessarily hinder the progress of enlightenment, whereas restrictions of private use of reason do not. A clergyman, for instance, is certainly bound by the creed of his church when he delivers sermons from his pulpit as an employee of the church; "as a scholar," however, he must be granted "complete freedom … to communicate to the public all his carefully examined and well-intentioned thoughts about what is erroneous" in that creed. In other words, the clergyman *qua scholar* is a person "who by his writings speaks to the public in the strict sense, that is, the world"; as such, he must enjoy "an unrestricted freedom" (WA, 8: 36–8).[1]

Kant also defends public reason in various other contexts. His argument builds on an account of humans as finite beings who depend on each other to overcome the limitations built into their nature. In the Blomberg lectures on logic (1770s), Kant argues not only that "Men have a natural inclination to communicate to others the judgments that their understanding has made," but also that this communication is "the only[,] most certain means to test one's cognitions properly … and to verify them." For this reason, one must enjoy "the right to think without constraint and to bring one's thoughts to light." Whoever takes away this right thereby "takes away from men the one true means they still possess for ever uncovering, becoming aware of, and correcting the frequent deception of their own understanding and its false steps"; to that extent, he is "really theft of the first rights and of the greatest advantages, of the human race, and especially of the human understanding" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 150–1; also 24: 92–3).

In the Vienna lectures on logic, Kant adds a teleological spin to his argument: if humans are naturally inclined to communicate, it is because this inclination serves an important end of nature. "Providence," he claims, has "placed in us the drive" to "expound our judgments to universal reason." That is, expounding and testing our judgments before "universal human reason" is "nature's wise precept" with a providential "purpose" to it. It follows that the freedom to publicize one's thoughts—in writing—is an inalienable right in a political society. It is "wrong," then, "for the state to forbid men to write books" for example: men are thereby "deprived of the only means that nature has given them, namely, testing their judgment on the reason of others." It is not enough, Kant adds, to grant people the "freedom to think in silence." Even the most despotic rulers can grant this freedom—"only because they cannot prevent anyone from doing it." After all, "I can always think what I will." To think truthfully, however, I must also be granted "a right to

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[1] See the bibliography at the end of this paper for the convention I have adopted in citing Kant's works and the list of abbreviations for the works cited.

expound my thoughts publicly"—precisely because "human nature," due to its finitude, "depends on using this external criterium [of truth]" (V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 874–5)[2]

So, while the freedom to *think* and the freedom to *publicize* one's thoughts can come apart from the perspective of the state (in terms of what is in its power to take away), the former freedom amounts to little without the latter. That is why, in "What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?" (1786), Kant argues that the freedom to think is "opposed first of all to *civil compulsion*." In a sense, the "external power which wrenches away people's freedom publicly to *communicate* their thoughts also takes from them the freedom to *think*." After all, the ability to "think as it were in community with others to whom we *communicate* our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us" is the *only* way by which "we can devise means of overcoming all the evils of our condition" (WDO, 8: 814). To that extent, free exercise of public reason—or what Kant sometimes calls "freedom of the pen" or freedom of "thinking independently and aloud"— is "the sole palladium of the people's rights" (TP, 8: 304; see Anth, 7: 128–29). In other words, as Kant puts it in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/87), "all improvement of which our condition is capable must come from this" freedom to publicize our judgments "without thereupon being decried as a malcontent and a dangerous citizen"; in this sense, freedom of the pen is an "original" as well as "holy" right, wherefore it "must not be curtailed" (A752/B780).

2.2. Public reason as a calling

Kant's defense of public reason as an original, sacred, and therefore inalienable right also clarifies that making use of one's *own* reason, which is the central tenet of enlightenment (WA, 8: 35), is not the same as thinking *alone*. To the contrary, Kant argues, one must use one's reason "socially" (*gemeinschaftlich*) or in community with others; whoever treats the judgments of others as "utterly dispensable in the use of his own reason" is a conceited "logical egoist"; this, as a way of thinking (*Denkungsart*), is not only "ridiculous" but also "blameworthy," because it is "most contrary to real humanity" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 151; also V-Lo/Philippi, 24: 427–28; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 873–4; V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 740; Log, 9: 80; Anth, 7: 128–29). For one, egoistic thinking goes against "human reason's particular and excellent disposition to communicate." For another, "if one judges alone … then one is never really certain whether the judgment does not spring from a certain delusion." The only remedy against such delusional thinking is to make an "experiment" and check "whether what we think is universal, whether others accept it, or whether it is not in agreement with reason." Whoever thinks egoistically has thereby relinquished "the sure touchstone of the understanding" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 178). In short, thinking communally with other human beings is not just natural and beneficial. We are called (*berufen*) to it (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 151; see WA, 8: 38).

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[2] For Kant's distinction between internal (objective) and external (subjective) criteria of truth, see V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 87–8. Also relevant is his distinction between formal and material senses of truth: a cognition may be "correct *materialiter*" but "false *formaliter*" if it is produced without a reflective comparison with the universal laws of reason (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 165–70). Public reason, as it will become clearer later in this paper, is all about such comparison.

Kant presents versions of this view across several texts. In the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), for instance, he presents a trio of "maxims" or "unalterable commands" for all thinkers:

(1) to think for oneself,
(2) to think oneself (in communication with human beings) in the place of everyone else, and
(3) to think consistently or in agreement with oneself.

Kant describes the first maxim as a "negative" principle "of freedom from constraint" (*der zwangsfreien*). The second, by contrast, is a "positive" principle "of the openminded" (*der liberalen*), which is to be congenial with others' understanding (Anth, 7: 228, modified translation; also Log, 9: 57). Similarly, in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), Kant presents the second maxim as that which calls for a way of thinking that is broadminded (*erweitert*) as opposed to narrowminded. This way of thinking is necessary, he submits, for a purposive (*zweckmäßig*) use of our cognitive faculty. It is exemplified by someone who "sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment … and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others)" (KU, 5: 294).

The second maxim follows from the first as a necessary condition for a genuinely free exercise of the latter. As Kant puts it elsewhere, "freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except *those which it gives itself*" (WDO, 8: 145). So, if "thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in oneself," the touchstone does not lie in the merely subjective condition of one's judgment but rather in the use of one's *reason* in accordance with its self-legislated and objective *laws*. This appeal to an autonomous reason entails the need for a universalizability test of one's judgment:

To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. (WDO, 8: 146n.)

And, as we saw, in Kant's view one can run this test only through a free and openminded communication with others.

Thus, logical egoism—insofar as it violates the second maxim of thinking—is contrasted with what Kant calls (logical) "pluralism." The latter is "the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world [*Weltbürger*]" (Anth, 7: 130).[3] As Kant puts it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is only proper that "a reflective and inquiring being should devote certain times solely to testing

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[3] Also see V-Lo/Philippi, 24: 428; V-Anth/Busolt, 25: 1488–89. One who seeks public scrutiny of his judgments is to be distinguished from one who has "prejudice for the multitude," who "distrusts his own reason." (V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 739)

its own reason, withdrawing entirely from all partiality and publicly communicating his remarks to others for their judgment" (A475/B503). Since public use of one's reason is therefore one's calling as a thinker, one should also be granted the freedom to do so. That is,

> no one can be reproached for, still less barred from, coming forward with propositions and counter-propositions just as they are, terrorized by no threats, and defending them before a jury of one's own standing (namely the standing of weak human beings [*Stande schwacher Menschen*]). (A475–76/B503–4, modified translation)[4]

This gives us an abstract ideal: human beings qua finite thinkers are not only called but must also be granted complete freedom to communicate their thoughts to a world made of other equally finite thinkers. Now let us take a close look at what, on Kant's account, the *conditions* for realizing the ideal may be and think critically about *who* can access such conditions.

3. Kant's emphasis on "scholarly" communication: a worry of substantive inegalitarianism

It is clear that, for Kant, public use of reason is a matter of *communicating* one's thoughts to others. More specifically, he defends the proposition that one is entitled and even called to

(a) communicate (*mitteilen*)
(b) one's carefully considered and well-meaning thoughts,
(c) as scholar (*als Gelehrter*) and through writing (*durch Schriften*),
(d) to a proper (*eigentlich*) public—to a world of readers (*Leserwelt*) to be exact (WA, 8: 37–8).

Each of these components requires explanation. To begin with (a), how should we understand *mitteilen*? According to Onora O'Neill, we can read this either as an act of mere *expression*, which others may tolerate simply in the form of passive noninterference—that is, by "doing nothing"— or as an act of *communication* that "requires some sort of recognition or uptake by others" in order to be effective (1986: 526–27). I will return to this important distinction below.

Phrase (b) resonates with the epistemic end that Kant invokes in defense of public reason: this use of reason is the surest and indeed the only means that finite humans have to avoid error in their quest for truth.[5] This points to an important restriction built into Kant's defense: one is free

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[4] Weakness of human reason—especially its vulnerability to all sorts of prejudice—was a central concern of the German Enlightenment (Schneiders 1983; Tonelli 1971). This is the baseline for Kant's defense of public reason. His appeal to other, equally finite *human* thinkers is also significant. He views the human race "as a species of rational *beings on earth* in comparison with rational beings on other planets" (Anth, 7: 331). From this perspective, humanity has unique abilities and limitations due to its earthly embodiment.

[5] The need to avoid error is a central theme in Kant's theory of knowledge and indeed in his conception of enlightenment as a whole. His epigraph for the second (1787) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* invokes Francis Bacon's vision of *Instauratio Magna* or Great Renewal to suggest

to publicize one's thoughts only if one's intention is solely to seek truth and avoid error. Kant sometimes explicitly includes this restriction in his argument for public reason as a negative right (against the state). For instance, in the *Anthropology*, he argues as follows: to the extent that public reason is "a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally" and "the greatest and most useful means" of ensuring such correctness, it "offends humanity" for the state to prohibit "books that advance *only theoretical opinions* (especially when they have no influence at all on legal commissions and omissions)" (Anth, 7: 219, italics added).

This reference to the *theoretical* nature of permissible publications echoes Kant's argument in "The Conflict of the Faculties" (1798) that freedom of public reason must be granted to "scholars proper [*eigentlichen Gelehrten*]" (in the faculty of philosophy), but not to the literati (*Litteraten*) who are "instruments of the government" (clergymen, magistrates, and physicians in the faculties of theology, law, and medicine respectively). "As tools of government," Kant argues, these literati "have legal influence on the public"; as such, they "are not free to make public use of their learning as they see fit"; rather, "the government must keep them under strict control" (SF, 7: 18). For, should these people "put before the public their objections and doubts about ecclesiastical and civil laws that have been given, they would be inciting the people to rebel against the government" (7: 29). By contrast, with respect to the faculty of philosophy, its teachings should be left to the scholars' reason (*Vernunft des gelehrten Volks*): philosophers qua scholars must be free to judge things with a scientific (*wissenschaftlich*) interest (in truth), in which case reason must be "authorized to speak out publicly" (7: 19–20). It is on account of this theoretical orientation toward truth that the philosophy faculty must be "free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government": it needs such freedom in order to *test the truth* of its teachings, wherefore it must enjoy the freedom "unimpaired" (7: 27–9).

The upshot of this argument is that one is free to publicize one's thoughts if and only if one is playing the role of a *genuine scholar* in search of truth. This takes us to clause (c) above. Following Colin McQuillan (2018), I call this the "scholarship condition." As McQuillan has highlighted, Kant's emphatic specification of this condition in "What is Enlightenment?"—as well as his references to it in other texts, especially the "Conflict"—indicates that it is constitutive of how he conceptualizes public reason; and the notion of scholarship has a technical meaning in Kant's logic lectures (McQuillan 2018: 52–7, 58–60). In fact, the Blomberg lectures from the 1770s, in which Kant first articulated his arguments for public reason as a right and as a calling (as we saw in sections 2.1 and 2.2), were primarily about scholarly cognition (*gelehrten Erkenntnis*, often translated as "learned cognition")—for example, about its "truth" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 80–106) and "certainty" (24: 142–250), the two headings under which Kant talked about the thinking humans' need and right to communicate so as to test the truth of their thoughts publicly. The

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the following: the renewal of humanity—or, as Kant would put it, the enlightenment for which humanity is destined—consists in the work of laying "the foundation of human utility and empowerment"; this work takes into account the limitations of humans as "mere mortals" and prescribes "a lawful end and termination of endless errors" (Bii, modified translation). For an exposition of Kant's theory of error and the relevant epistemic norms, see Lu-Adler 2017: 222–26.

relevant notion of scholarship, on McQuillan's reading, is also "quite radical" in that it requires an ability to think in accordance with universal rules of reason, which must in turn be cognized *a priori* and *in abstracto*, as opposed to *in concreto* (McQuillan 2018: 61). This is an important point that I will return to below.

So, we can say that Kant has a restrictive view of which exercise of public reason must be free. As we saw in section 2, in defending public reason as a right, Kant limits himself to negative freedom or freedom against prohibitions by the state. Adding the scholarship condition, we get the following statement of such a right.

> For all *x*, if *x* seeks to publicize *x*'s thoughts in writing with the intention to test their truth, *x* should be granted freedom to do so, without any hindrance from the state.

If this statement shows that Kant has a "less liberal" view of public reason "than many commentators have attributed to him" (McQuillan 2018: 61),[6] it nevertheless expresses *nominal equality*. That is, in principle *anyone* can freely publicize their well-meaning and truth-oriented thoughts in writing. It is not the government's duty, Kant might add, to further ensure that societal resources be so distributed that everyone also has genuine opportunities to "work his way up" (MS, 6: 315)—to borrow what he says about active versus passive citizenships in the Doctrine of Right (1797)—to the position where he can effectively exercise public reason. This proviso leaves room for *substantive inequality*.

We may briefly turn to a distinction by Charles Mills to appreciate the significance of teasing apart nominal and substantive forms of equality. In *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism*, Mills distinguishes nominal and substantive forms of racial inclusion in response to the claim that "mainstream Kantians already (whether aware of Kant's racist texts or not) use Kantianism in a racially inclusive way." Substantive racial inclusion, Mills submits, "would require that the radically different *history and structural positioning* of blacks in the polity," for instance, "be taken into account and suitably incorporated through the appropriate modifications of the apparatus" (2017: 209, italics added). As the italicized phrase suggests, whether there is substantive inclusion or equality has much to do with the social positionality of individuals as shaped by, for example, their racial and gender identities and the histories of those identities. Such positionality, I shall add, affects not only whether a particular group of individuals have substantively equal access to basic goods but also whether their voices count in social interactions including epistemic exchanges.

This takes me to clause (d) in Kant's account of public reason: one is entitled to its free exercise only if one is addressing a proper public, understood as a world of *readers*. This resonates with the scholarship condition and takes us back to O'Neill's distinction between (one-sided)

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[6] In Kant's view, there is no right without duty in a civil state (MS, 6: 230, 241). He may say that a citizen who claims a right against the state in which he enjoys the protection under its civil laws also has the duty not to impinge on the state's interest to preserve its authority and integrity. So, the way Kant restricts public reason well accords with his general conception of right.

expression and (reciprocal) communication. "There is a narrowness of focus," O'Neill notes, "in Kant's assumption that public uses of reason should address 'the entire reading public'." O'Neill takes this to suggest that "one who reasons publicly must address, i.e., be interpretable by, all others." Such interpretability in turn presupposes mutually intelligible means of communication and "shared standards of rationality" (O'Neill 1986: 531). This condition is not easily realized in any given society. So, one may freely publicize something that is "*in principle* accessible to the world" and yet "may not receive full publicity" *in reality* (1986: 530, italics added). This is where we begin to see how unsatisfying Kant's account of public reason can be if we are interested in *substantive* equality. Successful communication, O'Neill submits, requires certain "social arrangements and technical resources" that one can access. Accordingly, Kant's treatment of public reason feels "quite inadequate" insofar it does not come with "an account of the material and social requirements" for its effective exercise "under various historical conditions"; for Kant "says little about what is needed to secure access to the *means* of public … reasoning for all" (1986: 529).

The problem will turn out to be even worse than O'Neill saw it. To show how, I will examine Kant's view on what type of *language* one needs in order to communicate one's thoughts in a rational and universalizable way. Specifically, I will look at Kant's contention that the Orientals lack the ability to think *in abstracto* and to communicate by means of a *discursive* language, wherefore he deems them incapable of any advanced cultural achievements. This will give us cause to suspect that what is problematic is not Kant's "omission" of an account of the material, social, and historical conditions for effective exercises of public reason (O'Neill 1986: 529). Rather, the problem is that his account of such conditions—as implicit in what he says about the Oriental versus Occidental languages and the concomitant modes of cognition—would be a Western-supremacist and substantively inegalitarian one.

4. Kant's construction of a linguistic Other, from a position of power

Human understanding, Kant claims, is naturally "communicative [*mittheilend*]" and therefore also "sympathetic [*theilnehmend*]" in the sense of being "concerned with what others judge of it" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 179). Now, three basic conditions must be in order if I were to use communication effectively to test and enhance my thoughts. First, I must understand my own thought enough "to communicate and represent it so clearly to another man that he will have insight into it just as perfectly as I"; my inability to do so would be "a certain sign that I do not yet understand it rightly myself" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 96). Indeed, Kant goes so far as to say that "one does not understand a thing until one can communicate it to others" (V-Lo/Dohna, 24: 781). Second, I must choose my epistemic peers well: to compare my judgments "with and against one another" so as to ascertain them as "universally valid," I must seek the agreement of "others who can have science" about them.[7] Third, members of this presumptive community of capable knowers must

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[7] This is an important qualification that echoes what I said about the scholarship condition in section 3. For Kant, to have "science" (*Wissenschaft* or *scientia*) about something is to be able to "prove its conclusion strictly *a priori* from secure principles" (Bxxxv).

be able to "understand the judgment of others and not misinterpret it" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 95).[8]

These conditions in turn point to the need for a shared *language* by means of which one can make one's thoughts universally communicable and interpretable. According to Avi Lifschitz, the recognition that language is essential to the project of enlightenment—more specifically, that language as a system of "artificial signs" plays a "central role … in the unfolding of human culture"—was "almost a commonplace" in the late eighteenth century. There was, in short, a "manifest preoccupation with language in eighteen-century thought" (Lifschitz 2012: 1, 3). We can find this preoccupation in many of Kant's predecessors and contemporaries, from Leibniz and Rousseau to Herder, Kant's student who won the 1771 contest on the origin of language organized by the Berlin Academy (Lifschitz 2012: 165–87).[9] Kant is no exception. He associates a people's linguistic wherewithal with their ability for progress. Superficially, this aligns with the prevailing Enlightenment view that "all cultural phenomena are constructed and maintained by language" (Lifschitz 2012: 194). The crucial question for Kant, however, is *what kind* of language can actually play such an instrumental role. His answer to this question will bring into sharper focus the worry that I raised in section 3: his account of public reason might turn out to be *substantively inegalitarian*. In a nutshell, Kant presents all Orientals—represented by Chinese and Indians among others—and a fortiori all non-white races as lacking the requisite language;[10] this linguistic othering in turn suggests that non-Westerners lack the cognitive wherewithal to exercise public reason or to participate as equals in a community of free epistemic exchanges.

The reasoning that leads to this conclusion begins with Kant's distinction between two kinds of language. One is what he calls "symbolic language" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 536). I call the other "discursive language," insofar as Kant associates it with "thinking," which characterizes the faculty of understanding (as opposed to sensibility) and is essentially discursive (as opposed to intuitive) in his view (A131/B170). On Kant's account, a symbolic language is made of *symbols* qua sensible images (*Bildern*), cognitions through which are therefore intuitive (KU, 5: 351–53; Anth, 7: 191);[11] by contrast, discursive language is made of *words* (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1293–94;

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[8] Kant subsequently cautions against "prejudice of excessive multitude," suggesting that the sought-after agreement must often be gradually secured from careful investigators of truth, not instantly granted by a popular multitude (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 175–76).

[9] See Lu-Adler 2023b for a study of Kant's theory of language in connection with Herder's. See Lu-Adler 2024 on its contrast with Rousseau's and Leibniz's theories of language. The latter contrast shows that, in dismissing the Oriental language as merely symbolic and as therefore inferior, Kant was putting forward a view that he knew was uncommon and controversial.

[10] Although Kant has plenty of denigrating things to say about several racialized peoples (as I detailed in Lu-Adler 2023a), he is preoccupied with the Oriental when it comes to linguistic and epistemic matters. Perhaps, as Anibal Quijano notes, "the only category with the honor of being recognized as the other of Europe and the West was 'Orient'—not the Indians of America and not the blacks of Africa, who were simply 'primitive'" (2000: 542).

[11] Kant's view that what is symbolic is intuitive marks a critical departure from the then-dominant Leibnizian practice of treating symbolic and intuitive cognitions as diametrically opposed. On symbolic cognition in the German tradition following Leibniz, see Lifschitz 2012: 39–64.

V-Anth/Fried, 25: 536; V-Met/Mron, 29: 757–58; V-Met-L1/Pölitz, 28: 238; R1486, 15: 709–10); without words one cannot judge or think at all (Log, 9: 109; V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 588; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 893, 934). Kant claims that discursive language is more advanced or "masculine" and ascribes it to Western civilizations, whereas the language of "sheer pictures [*Bildern*]" is said to be "the child's language of the Oriental peoples" (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1233).

Kant takes this alleged linguistic divide to mark an epistemic chasm. He describes the East as "the land of sensation" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 552). "All the oriental peoples," he asserts, "speak with pictures" (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1232). This means that they are still in "the childhood of the understanding" (R1486, 15: 710), being capable only of "symbolic" or sensible cognitions (V-Met-L1/Pölitz, 28: 238). *Nature*, Kant claims, has thereby "failed them with regard to the faculty of judging from concepts" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 536; V-Met/Mron, 29: 757–58; R451, 15: 788–89). By contrast, the West is the land "of sound and pure reason," where people "judge determinately through concepts" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 552). That is, "the Westerners abandoned sensibility much sooner and have raised themselves up to the concepts of the understanding" (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1233). In particular, ancient Greeks were the first to free themselves "from the jumble of images" and to discourse "by means of concepts" (V-Anth/Fried, 25:536), whereby they were able to cultivate "rational cognition" *in abstracto* (V-Met-L2/Pölitz, 28: 535; see Log, 9: 27).

Kant takes this alleged linguistic-epistemic divergence between East and West to have profound practical implications. That "all the oriental peoples … speak with pictures and do not have spiritual and abstract words such as we have" additionally indicates, Kant asserts, "a weak cultivation of their spirit [*Geist*]" (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1232–33); this in turn suggests that the Orient has "come to the bounds of its destiny" (V-Anth/Pillau, 25: 840). The claim that the Orientals' symbolic qua pictorial language indicates a lack of *spirit*—and, relatedly, a lack of *genius* (R765, 15: 333)—is particularly important within Kant's framework. He takes these concepts to signify none other than the capacity for universalizable communication, which as we saw earlier is the essence of Kantian public reason. On Kant's official account, genius and spirit consist in a certain "union" or "happy relation" of imagination and understanding. Spirit, in particular, comes down to "a faculty for apprehending the rapidly passing play of the imagination and unifying it into a concept," so as "to express what is unnameable in the mental state in the case of a certain representation and to make it universally communicable" (KU, 5: 316–17). That is, bringing sensible representations under unifying concepts is what makes them understandable to oneself and communicable to others.

What makes one's mental content intelligible and universally communicable to others is the use of *words*. The function of words is "to signify a thought exactly" (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 294). This strength lies in their arbitrary connection to the objects of representation, to which they bear no resemblance: words are more stable precisely because they are not bound to sensibility. Kant makes this point through a contrast with the symbolic signification that he attributes to the Orientals.

> The symbol … serves only the immediate cognition of the understanding, but with time it must fall away. The cognitions of all oriental nations are symbolic. … but with discursive cognition the signs are not symbols <*symbola*>, because I do not cognize the object in the sign but rather the sign produces only the representation of the object for me. (V-Met-L₁/Pölitz, 28: 238; see R1486, 15: 709–10)

On this account, symbolic signification is inferior in an important sense: images, the material of which comes from senses, are "not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding." If others cannot understand what is being conveyed through mere images, this is because the speaker "himself does not think about what he says, and therefore others also do not understand him" (Anth, 7: 168–69). Kant says this because proper *thinking* necessarily involves *concepts*; these appear to the mind by means of *words*; therefore, we humans cannot form thoughts or make them "comprehensible other than by clothing them in words" (V-Mo/Collins, 27: 323; also Log, 9: 109; V-Lo/Pölitz, 24: 588; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 934).

Whether one can signify by means of words, then, not only indicates the level of one's understanding but also affects one's relations to others. For Kant, vivid symbolic presentation only suggests "poverty in concepts." If "the best way of signifying thought is through language, the greatest instrument for understanding ourselves and other," only *discursive* language can serve this function. Mutual incomprehension happens when there is a "lack of the faculty of signification, or its faulty use (when signs are taken for things, and vice versa)." In this case, not having a common discursive language means that people cannot form a community where everyone could act on the basis of *universalizable* conceptions of what is right, just, and so on: such a community is possible only if one can articulate and communicate one's thoughts by means of a shared language made of words that signify concepts (Anth, 7: 191–93).

These points about the need for a shared discursive language, coupled with Kant's insistence on the absence of any such language beyond the West, help to explain why he thinks that the East is stuck and cannot progress toward a more advanced culture, civilization, or true morality. By his analysis, with the Orientals everything is reduced to mere sensibility. If they cherish honor, for instance, they "sought their honor … in authority, thus from sensibility and not from concepts," whereas the Westerners do so from a "true concept" of honor (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 552). Kant traces this and other supposed discrepancies to an "essential difference": only the Westerners can think and act in accordance with concepts and principles *in abstracto* (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 655). This alleged difference affects everything from philosophy to moral character. Regarding philosophy Kant contends that it could only have begun with the Greeks. For this people "first attempted to cultivate cognitions of reason, not with images as the guiding thread, but *in abstracto*." Other peoples "like the Chinese and some Indians" admittedly also deal with the objects of reason (such as God), but "only *through images in concreto*" without investigating "the nature of these things in accordance with concepts and rules *in abstracto*" (Log, 9: 27; also V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 800–1).[12] For the same reason, Kant asserts that these peoples are incapable of

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[12] For discussion, see Lu-Adler 2023a (Chapter 6).

moral character properly so called, insofar as such character presupposes the "capacity to act in accordance with [abstract] concepts and principles" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 655). One can thereby infer that the progress in enlightenment envisioned by Kant is ultimately a Western-centric "white progress" (Marwah 2022). His construction of the Oriental as a linguistically inferior Other is a key premise in his reasoning to this conclusion.

What matters here is not simply the fact that Kant constructed the Oriental as an inferior Other, but *when* and *from what social position* he did this. As I suggested at the beginning of this section, language was a debated topic during the Enlightenment. Overall, the debates assumed an anthropological and historical perspective. This in turn determined their practical upshot: arguing about the origin and development of language and its relation to culture, for instance, was not just a speculative exercise among thinkers with too much time on their hands. Rather, it reflected the Western-European man's anxious attempt to figure out his place in the history of humanity and in relation to other co-existing peoples, especially those in the Orient. Kant's Orientalist anxiety is in full display when he says to his students after a "short survey of the history of human languages":

> one can see that the Oriental peoples still have a child's language of humanity, and that the Westerners abandoned sensibility much sooner and have raised themselves up to the concepts of the understanding. Hence it would be ridiculous for us, who have a more masculine language, to exchange this for the child's language of the Oriental peoples and also to start speaking in sheer pictures, as some writers urgently admonish us to do. (V-Anth/Mron, 25: 1233)

This passage clearly exhibits what Ian Almond describes as Kant's "Occidental concern for the sanctity of the boundary—his desire for it to remain unbreached by the swarms of the Orient" (2009: 38). Given how he associates spirit and genius with discursive language (as I explained above), it is understandable why Kant seems so eager to protect the "Occidental talent" against the influence of Oriental language: he warns his students not to "imitate [the Oriental] manner of writing" for fear that this would cause "the degeneration of Occidental taste" and "wrong the understanding," whereby the precious Occidental spirit would be "ruined" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 536, 552).[13]

Kant made such pronouncements from a *position of power*—both as a lifelong educator and as a systematic, prolific, and influential thinker with potent conceptual tools and theoretical frameworks to offer. Some of those tools and frameworks—such as Kant's theories of cognition and abstraction, rationalist account of morality, and teleological notion of history—were what gave meaning to his claims that the Oriental language is merely symbolic or sensible and that discursive language is the *sine qua non* of humanity's progress toward civilization and moralization (insofar as these require the ability to think *in abstracto*). Whether these claims are true—you may refute them as forcefully as you wish—is beside the point. We should not simply scrutinize them as truth-apt propositions. Rather, we should see them as speech acts with an *ideology-forming* and *world-making* power, on account of Kant's positionality in an extended network of meaning makers and

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[13] Kant's Orientalist anxiety also shows up in other contexts (Lu-Adler 2023c).

social actors at a critical juncture of world history.[14] Kant appeared to be aware of this positionality himself. As he put it in the appendix to his first essay on race (1775), he intended his geography course (taught since 1756/7) and the companion course on anthropology (since 1772/3) to present his students—young Occidental men by default—with the world-knowledge (*Weltkenntniß*) that would prepare them for "the stage of [their] destiny, namely, the *world*" (VvRM 2, 443).[15] Those two courses, offered through the end of Kant's teaching career (1796), together served as the primary locus for him to construct the Oriental as an inferior Other from whom the allegedly superior Occidental man must distance himself.

It should not be difficult to imagine the impact of this Western-centric and Western-supremacist worldview on how public reason may be exercised in reality. As it was already indicated in Kant's basic account of public reason, one does not just communicate one's thoughts to anybody indiscriminately. Rather, one must be *selective* about one's audience: these are people who one *recognizes* as epistemic equals, as agents capable of understanding and meaningfully responding to one's publications in accordance with a shared set of rules and standards of judgment. Now, how does one go about making such selections? Well, as finite human beings with limited cognitive resources, we often rely on *heuristics* (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Kant himself has several examples to offer. As we can already guess, language use is one heuristic: one may take the language that someone else uses to be an external sign of epistemic competence or lack thereof. Kant does this when he claims: "Who speaks by means of symbols indicates that he lacks understanding" (V-Anth/Fried, 25: 536). And language is just one of the many heuristics that Kant uses to judge someone's epistemic character. Referring to a "Negro carpenter" who reportedly criticized whites, for instance, Kant invokes the fact that the "Negro" was "completely black from head to foot" as "a distinct proof that what he said was stupid" (GSE, 2: 254–55). In general, Kant tends to use someone's externally measurable *social standing* to determine what Miranda Fricker (2007: 45) calls two components of epistemic trustworthiness—competence and sincerity. The scholarship condition that I highlighted in section 3 again comes into play here. According to Kant's theory of testimony, only the scholar (*der Gelehrte*), not the common man (*der gemeine Mann*), can be counted on as both able and motivated to tell the truth. That is, someone's standing as a scholar indicates not only that he has the cognitive wherewithal to tell the truth but also that, regardless of his true moral character, he at least has the social stakes—a reputation or "honor" to lose—to want to tell the truth (V-Lo/Blomberg, 24: 245–46; V-Lo/Wiener, 24: 898–99).[16]

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[14] Charles Mills adopts a similar methodology when he argues that the pragmatic (as opposed to semantic) norms of conversational implicature "determine the inclusivity or exclusivity of reference" in the minds of Kant's white audience and such norms may well "track racial membership" (2014: 145). I explain the importance of attending to Kant's social positionality in Chapter 2 of Lu-Adler 2023a, where I focus on his role in the formation of modern racist ideology.

[15] On the origin of Kant's anthropology lectures and their relation to his geography lectures, see Wilson 2006: 7–26. See Lu-Adler 2023a (Chapter 1) for an analysis of their (non-contradictory) relation to Kant's pure moral philosophy and their instrumental role in his construction of a racist (and Orientalist) worldview.

[16] See Lu-Adler 2022 for a detailed treatment of Kant's approach to "testimony."

In this way, we can see how Kant's construction of entire peoples as a linguistically—and therefore epistemically and culturally—alien and inferior Other can lead to their *categorical exclusion* from the sphere of public reason that the Occidental man has carved out for himself. This Other is at best seen as a distant object of the "world-knowledge" that Kant wanted to equip the Occidental man with (so as to conquer the world that would be *his* stage), but never a fellow knower whose perspectives and judgments are worthy of consideration. This is what I meant when I said at the beginning of this section that Kant's construction of a linguistic Other would bring into sharper focus the worry that his account of public reason is *substantively inegalitarian* (even if it is still nominally egalitarian). His very concept of public reason, with its emphasis on scholarly communication, already created room for this worry (as I explained in section 3). His construction of an inferior linguistic Other simply showed one way to materialize it. And, as I shall briefly explain below, I am skeptical that the ideology-forming, world-making, and substantively exclusionary effects of this construction can be easily undone.

5.   Conclusion: then and now

Onora O'Neill claims that what makes Kant's public reason unique is that it addresses "an *unrestricted plurality*, the world at large" (2011: 147). This is an overly and wishfully generous reading if it attributes to Kant a radically inclusive and pluralistic view that aligns with the avowed commitments of his progressive readers today. For sure, Kant writes in his essay on enlightenment that public reason addresses "the public in the strict sense, that is, the world" (WA, 8: 38). In the very same essay, however, he restricts the scope of his reference to "the world of readers" (8: 37). This restriction, as I explained in section 3, is also implicit in the scholarship condition built into Kant's very definition of "public use of reason" (8: 37). If he advises his truth-seeking scholar to adopt a pluralistic way of thinking or to think like a *Weltbürger* (Anth, 7: 130), he recognizes that this cosmopolitan truth-seeker cannot simply take a universalizing perspective from an armchair. This person needs to identify a community of embodied fellow thinkers, so that he can publicize his thoughts to epistemic peers who *in his view* have the wherewithal to interpret and respond to his publications in a way that is mutually intelligible and intellectually productive. Given Kant's stringent criteria of who can qualify as a "scholar" (as opposed to a mere "common man"), including the ability to think *in abstracto*, the world that his public reason addresses must be substantively limited.

The ability to think *in abstracto* is, as I explained in section 4, the main epistemic quality that Kant denies of the Orientals when he constructs them as a linguistic Other: by describing their language as merely symbolic or sensible, he means to depict them as cognitively immature—as lacking the wherewithal to form abstract concepts or to *think* at all (insofar as thinking is essentially discursive). By presenting this depiction of the Oriental to his (Occidental male) audience, Kant has virtually constructed a "controlling image"—to borrow a concept from Patricia Hill Collins (1986)—of the Orientals as a group. This kind of image, as Kristie Dotson (2011: 242–43) explains, has the power to silence the target group by rendering them as *not*-knowers. This kind of silencing, as Miranda Fricker argues, is an "intrinsic injustice" done to the subject whose "capacity as a

knower" is thereby undermined: if we assume—as Kantians do—that "our rationality is what lends humanity its distinctive value," then being "degraded *qua* knower" is being "wronged in a capacity essential to human value" and thereby "symbolically degraded *qua* human." Meanwhile, preemptively silencing non-dominant knowers "damages the epistemic system": it poses an "obstacle to truth" by, for instance, "creating blockages in the circulation of critical ideas" (Fricker 2007: 43–4). So, in an epistemic environment shaped by ideologies of white supremacy and Western supremacy, both of which are historical legacies of Kant's era,[17] "white ignorance" (Mills 2007) and "Western ignorance" (Said 1994: 62) are only to be expected.

This is where we end up when we read Kant's account of public reason critically and contextually, in connection with his construction of the Oriental as an inferior linguistic-epistemic Other to be kept at an unbridgeable distance. To summarize, Kant's arguments for public reason both as a right and as a calling started with a reasonable premise: being *finite* epistemic agents, we *need* others to ascertain the truth of our judgments and thereby to expand the scope of our knowledge (section 2). Then we asked: by what means should one publicize one's thoughts, to whom, and for what purpose? Kant's answer was captured in the scholarship condition that I foregrounded in section 3: one is free to publicize one's thoughts insofar as one, *in writing*, addresses a *reading public* with none other than the good intention *to seek truth*. These constraints gave rise to the worry that Kant's account of public reason might turn out to be substantively inegalitarian. His construction of the Oriental as an inferior linguistic-epistemic Other sharpened the worry (section 4).

I gave this critical reading not simply to show that Kant's account of public reason may be less virtuous than his progressive readers wish it to be. Rather, to the extent that we agree with the basic premise underlying his account, namely our dependence on one another as finite epistemic agents, I find it instructive to go further with him and think about how epistemic exchanges between embodied humans take place *under concrete social, cultural, and historical conditions*. In thus thinking critically along with Kant, I assume that the social structures, cultural assumptions, and historically inflected power relations that shape our current epistemic environment can be traced to his era. In particular, I am sensitive to the fact that the Enlightenment was also the era of colonialism. Against this backdrop, prominent Enlightenment thinkers including Kant all actively participated in constructing various controlling images of the Other—the "savage" of America, the "Negro" of Africa, the "Oriental," and so on—in order to define the Western European's self-image as civilized, freedom-loving, and singularly rational.[18] In a way, what my critical study of Kant's account of public reason has revealed is what Dotson (2011: 236) calls an "epistemic side of colonialism," which has the effect of dismissing or even erasing certain forms of knowledge and ways of knowing due to structures that privilege the dominant Western epistemic practices. With this in mind, let me conclude with three thoughts for further consideration.

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[17] I talk about Kant's role in the nascent formation of these ideologies in Lu-Adler 2023a.

[18] As I have shown in Lu-Adler 2023a, Kant was actively involved in the construction of each of these categories of the Other.

First, if Kant's public reason can be seen as a practice of knowledge co-production, we should think critically both about the (rationalist) conception of knowledge underpinning such practice and about who has the *power to control the means* of its production. When colonialism reconfigured the global order politically and economically, it also reconfigured the infrastructure of knowledge production. As Anibal Quijano puts it in his important essay on the coloniality of power and Eurocentrism, the effect was a Western-European hegemony encompassing "all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and *especially knowledge and the production of knowledge*." The colonial powers enacted multiple mechanisms to construct "a new universe of intersubjective relations of domination" between the (Western) Europeans and other peoples to whom they attributed "new geocultural identities" (such as the "Oriental"). For instance, they "repressed as much as possible the colonized forms of knowledge production" and "it was precisely such *epistemic suppression* that gave origin to the category 'Orient'." In this way, the long period of colonialism was also a period of "the *colonization of cognitive perspectives*, modes of producing and giving meaning, … the imaginary" and so on and so forth (2000: 540–41, italics added).

This attention to the hegemonic power structure that controls knowledge production leads to my second point, which concerns the politics of language. I studied Kant's account of public reason in connection with his construction of a linguistic Other for the obvious reason that, as I pointed out in section 3, effective communication presupposes a shared language as its *means*. But language is not just a neutral or apolitical means for epistemic exchanges between individuals. Which language came to dominate those exchanges—or to dominate knowledge production more generally—has little to do with its intrinsic quality qua language (as Kant claimed). It is ultimately about who has the *power* to propagate it, impose it on others, and maintain its dominance over time (intentionally or unintentionally).[19] In short, it is political.

As Amandine Catala argues, we need to adopt such a "politicized view of language" in order duly to register the following fact: language can be "the source of both linguistic privilege and epistemic biases, both of which … can lead to epistemic marginalization by determining who enjoys greater epistemic authority and what qualifies as a worthwhile epistemic contribution" (2022: 330). Many in academic philosophy can attest to that fact, whose native language is not English and who have to spent years trying to become proficient in English in order to be taken seriously by dominant knowers in the Anglophone academic world.[20] At play here are what Catala describes as "linguistic power relations that prioritize English as the primary medium of philosophical communication and marginalize philosophical contributions made in other languages" (2022: 329). The status of English as today's lingua franca is itself a product of historical factors and global power relations—such as British and then American (economic and

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[19] The phenomenon of "English linguistic neo-imperialism" in the age of globalization attests to this point (Zeng et al. 2023). And the ascendence of AI technology led by dominant Western powers, with its reliance on large language models, may further exacerbate the problem (Helm et al. 2024).

[20] On this point, also see the discussion of "linguistic foreigner" (among other types of "foreigner in philosophy") in Erlenbusch 2018.

cultural as well as political) imperialism. In such a world, a non-native scholar who chooses to publicize her thoughts in English is constrained by and, in a sense, forced to capitulate to social structures and power relations that are beyond her control. In this way, her language choice not only reflects but also serves to maintain "background power relations" (2022: 327, 329n.12, 338–39). Meanwhile, insofar as "different languages often offer different insights and hence different ways of apprehending and of knowing the world" (2022: 330), an exercise of public reason using the dominant language—with its attendant concepts—only serves to perpetuate the dominant (Western-centric and Western-supremacist) worldview. This can happen without individual actors being aware of their own complicity.[21]

       This reflection on the politics of language takes me to my third and final point: if language-based epistemic injustice in academia, for instance, is fundamentally a political-structural problem, then it calls for political-structural solutions. I am skeptical that Kant's model of public reason would be helpful in this regard. Suppose we want to deliberate collectively about what structural *changes* we might need in order to make (academic) knowledge production substantively more egalitarian and inclusive. Kant's model might be too conservative for this purpose, since it was strictly intended for truth-seeking "scholars" who did *not* mean to incite actions that could undermine existing power relations. At any rate, what we need is not simply to expand an existing epistemic community (the expansionist approach inevitably raises the question of who gets to set the terms of expansion, which presupposes a center from which the radius of the given community is to be extended). What we need instead is, to borrow from Catala's work once more, to begin by raising metalevel awareness about the "power relations and biases" that caused linguistic epistemic injustice, with a "normative sensibility to linguistic diversity and the existence and effects of linguistic bias in epistemic and academic practices and interactions" (2022: 341). In short, we first need to understand how language-based epistemic exclusions and marginalizations happened in the first place and what ideologies, institutional arrangements, and power relations might have served to perpetuate them. The further we follow this line of critical inquiry, the more we will recognize the colonial roots of everything—and the more hesitant we may become to celebrate *Kant's* model of public reason.

<p style="text-align:center">Sources and Abbreviations of Kant's Works</p>

References to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* take the standard A/B form, corresponding to its first (1781) and second (1787) editions. Unless noted otherwise, references to his other works are to the volume and pagination of *Immanuel Kant: Gesammelte Schriften* (AA), Berlin, 1902–. I use available translations in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Both the abbreviations of the German titles and the English translations used are listed below. Other translations are my own.

A/B   Kritik der reinen Vernunft (AA 3–4)

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[21] See Gani and Marshall 2022 for a relevant and illuminating case study that looks at academic knowledge production in the field of International Relations.

Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Anth   Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 7)
"Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View." In *Anthropology, History and Education*, edited by Günter Zöller and Robert Louden, 231–429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

GSE   Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (AA 2)
"Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime." In *Anthropology*, 18–62.

KU   Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 5)
Critique of the Power of Judgment. In *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, edited by Paul Guyer, 53–346. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Log   Logik (AA 9)
"The Jäsche Logic." In *Lectures on Logic*, translated and edited by Michael Young, 527–640. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

MS   Die Metaphysik der Sitten (AA 6)
The Metaphysics of Morals. In *Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor, 353–603. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

R   Reflexionen (AA 15–19)
Notes and Fragments. Edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

SF   Der Streit der Fakultäten (AA 7)
"The Conflict of Faculties." In *Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni, 233–327. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

V-Anth/Busolt   Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1788/1789, Busolt (AA 25)
"Anthropology Busolt" (excerpts). In *Lectures on Anthropology*, edited by Allen Wood and Robert Louden, 511–24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

V-Anth/Fried   Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1775/1776 Friedländer (AA 25)
"Anthropology Friedländer." In *Lectures on Anthropology*, 37–255.

V-Anth/Mensch   Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1781/1782 Menschenkunde (AA 25)
"Menschenkunde." In *Lectures on Anthropology*, 281–333.

V-Anth/Mron   Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1784/1785 Mrongovius (AA 25)
"Anthropology Mrongovius." In *Lectures on Anthropology*, 335–509.

V-Anth/Pillau   Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1777/1778 Pillau (AA 25)
"Anthropology Pillau" (excerpts). In *Lectures on Anthropology*, 257–79.

V-Lo/Blomberg   Logik Blomberg (AA 24)
"The Blomberg Logic." In *Lectures on Logic*, 1–246.

V-Lo/Dohna   Logik Dohna-Wundlacken (AA 24)
"The Dohna-Wundlacken Logic." In *Lectures on Logic*, 425–516.

V-Lo/Pölitz   Logik Pölitz (AA 24)

V-Lo/Wiener   Wiener Logik (AA 24)

  "The Vienna Logic." In *Lectures on Logic*, 249–377.

V-Met-L$_1$/Pölitz Metaphysik L$_1$ (AA 28)

  "Metaphysik L$_1$." In *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 17–106.

V-Met-L$_2$/Pölitz Metaphysik L$_2$ (AA 28)

  "Metaphysik L$_2$." In *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 297–354.

V-Met/Mron   Metaphysik Mrongovius (AA 29)

V-Mo/Collins   Moralphilosophie Collins (AA 27)

  "Moral Philosophy: Collins's Lecture Notes." In *Lectures on Ethics*, edited Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, 37–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

VvRM   Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen (AA 2)

  "Of the Different Races of Human Beings." In *Anthropology*, 82–97.

WA Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? (AA 8)

  "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" In *Practical Philosophy*, 11–22.

WDO Was heißt sich im Denken orientiren? (AA 8)

  "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking." In *Religion*, 1–17.

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