charge that ‘Foucault’s antihumanism accompanies a severe underestimation of the human goods brought about and maintained by the institutions we owe to the Enlightenment ...’ (277).

This book might have been better, but it is not bad. It achieves some important goals that Farrell sets for it, providing a survey of recent philosophy that renders some relatively difficult work reasonably accessible to the non-specialist and brings together the practices of continental and analytical philosophy with the history of philosophy in a way that displays their mutual relevance for one another.

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Paul Feyerabend
Against Method, 3rd edition.
Pp. xiv + 279.
$18.95 paperback. ISBN 0-86091-481-X.

Had Paul Feyerabend called this book ‘Against some philosophers’ ideas about method’ or ‘What the scientific method is not’ it would have caused less of a stir when it was published in 1975. But its importance would have been better appreciated and its arguments more carefully examined. The critics would not have jumped, at least not so quickly, to the conclusion that he was defending ‘subjectivism’ and ‘irrationalism’, and they would have been much less inclined to pillory his slogan that in science ‘anything goes’. I should like to think — though this is doubtless unrealistic — that with the appearance of another edition of the book, and the passage of time, Feyerabend’s argument will be given a more sympathetic hearing and his critique of professional humbug and pretension at long last be accorded the attention it deserves.

This edition of Against Method contains nowhere near as many changes as the second one. The first fifteen chapters of the book, in which two widely-defended methodological principles are compared with Galileo’s practice and found wanting, are the same apart from the addition of a number of footnotes and various other minor modifications. The famous chapter on incommensurability (chapter 16 in this and the second edition; chapter 17 in the first edition) is — with the exception of some inessential remarks — likewise taken over virtually unchanged, as are the next two chapters on ‘reason and practice’. Finally the revisions to the two remaining chapters are
relatively inconsequential; here Feyerabend mainly confines himself to embellishing his criticism of the idea that there is some one thing that counts as science and to bringing his autobiographical remarks up to date.

The most important revision (actually the only major significant change of doctrine) is that the earlier defence of relativism has been dropped. Whereas in the second edition Feyerabend had nothing but praise for relativism, in this one he candidly admits that he has changed his mind and that some of his earlier recommendations were misplaced. In particular he has withdrawn his observation that he differs from Kuhn 'by being a relativist' and has suppressed the chapter in which he maintained that objects are 'not found [but] shaped by special groups, cultures, civilizations' (pp. 230 and 260 in the second edition). As he explicitly states in a new 'Postscript on Relativism', since writing the second edition, he has come to see that relativism is 'only a first step towards understanding live traditions' and come to appreciate that the position he had been defending is 'as much a chimaera as absolutism, ... its cantankerous twin' (268).

These amendments are to the good. Not only does the relativism of the second edition labour under enormous difficulties, it deflects attention from the important business of the book, which is to expose the bankruptcy of rationalistic theories of science. Disentangled from relativism, Feyerabend's case against rationalism — that it is overly simplistic and counterproductive (see especially chapters 3 and 16) — gains in power as well as clarity. It can no longer be dismissed on the grounds that it leads to an untenable philosophical position (or worse still viewed as revealing the absurdity of anti-rationalism). There can now be no excuse for failing to recognize that Feyerabend is challenging the project of developing a general philosophical theory of science and overlooking that his anarchism is meant to be 'medicine for epistemology, and for the philosophy of science' (9, Feyerabend's italics).

Also it now becomes clear that what primarily motivates Feyerabend's polemic is his belief that 'the chauvinism of science is a much greater problem than the problem of intellectual pollution [and] may even be one of its major causes' (163). While Feyerabend is certainly no apologist for science, neither is he the enemy of it he is usually supposed to be (this should have been obvious all along given his comparison of the importance and depth of Galileo's and Einstein's science with what he takes to be the monotony and triviality of contemporary philosophy of science). The plain fact is that Feyerabend is against scientism (including scientism within the sciences themselves), not science itself, his target being the mindless, albeit common, assumption that scientists know best. As he puts it in a new footnote, 'I am not against science. What I object to is narrow-minded philosophical interference and narrow-minded extension of the latest scientific fashions to all areas of human endeavour' (122).

If I have a criticism of this new edition, it is that Feyerabend seems to have mellowed and is now more willing to allow that the opposition has a point. I was surprised to learn that he approves of recent efforts by historians, sociologists and philosophers to develop a new conception of science (see pp.
x-xi) and that he takes comfort from the 'dramatic political, social and ecological changes' that have occurred since he first published the book (ix). Also I am sure I will not be the only reader to raise an eyebrow when reading his concessions to the rather lame complaints of one of his critics about his tendency to generalize (268); in the old days he would have unceremoniously sent him packing. Still there is still plenty of wit and irreverence in the book (not least in the new preface where Derrida is compared unfavourably with Nestroy, p. xiv). Against Method remains one of the few recent books of philosophy, worth reading for the sheer pleasure of seeing an exceptional mind at work; indeed it is an even better read now that the relativism has been removed.

Note: After drafting this review I learned that Feyerabend had died. While it may seem odd to say in view of his supposed lack of seriousness, it seems to me that we have lost a great champion of truth and square dealing, not just a major critic of intellectual fraud, bombast and quackery. It is, I think, a great tribute to him that a leading logical empiricist could say to me some years ago that he had learned more from reading Feyerabend than from reading almost anyone else.

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John Mark Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds.
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility.
Pp. 347.
US $41.95 (cloth: ISBN 0-8014-2943-9);

This collection of fourteen essays by eleven philosophers covers virtually every question concerning responsibility that has interested analytical philosophers in the last two decades. The essays are without exception of the highest quality with respect to philosophical substance, contemporary significance, and readability. Unlike most collections of essays, this book's structure is integral to its presentation. This collection is not simply a set of contributions to a single theme. It is rather a selection of inter-related perspectives contributing to a single critical discourse about the meaning of moral responsibility and the conditions under which responsibility can be imputed to a person. The various contributors are in real, not incidental, dialogue. The introduction by Martin and Ravizza sets up the issues and