Roger Gibson (ed), *The Cambridge Companion to Quine*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. Pp. xx + 227. $98 (Cloth: ISBN 0-521-63056-8); $35 (Paper: ISBN 0-521-63949-2).

The articles in this collection, all but one new, cover the gamut of Quine's epistemological and semantical themes – naturalism, empiricism, underdetermination, analyticity, indeterminacy of translation, behaviourism and the rest. Some of the papers go over old ground, some are more adventurous; some are mostly expository and supportive, some mainly analytical and critical; some convincing, some less so. Perhaps unsurprisingly (Quine thought it a good thing that philosophy had 'lost contact with people'), the volume does not meet what the blurb says is the aim of the series: 'to dispel the intimidation [students and nonspecialists] often feel when faced with the work of a difficult and challenging thinker'. And some readers, this reviewer for one, will feel that getting Quine right too often takes a backseat to showing him wrong. Still there is plenty in the book and what I take to be misinterpretations are offset by interpretations that hit the nail on the head.

  Those new to Quine will find the first half dozen pages of Gibson's 'Introduction' and section 3 of Isaacson's paper on Quine and logical positivism the place to start (the beginner may also find Isaacson's ten-page survey of empiricism from Hume to Carnap helpful). Both Gibson and Isaacson make use of Quine's autobiographical remarks to introduce his philosophical vision and his all-important relationship to Carnap. (Incidentally Quine's remark: 'Philosophy of science is philosophy enough', which Isaacson was unable to locate, occurs in 'Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory'.)

  Quine is also compared with Carnap in Creath's essay on the intelligibility and relevance of the traditional conception of analyticity. Like Isaacson, Creath aims to pinpoint how Quine differs from Carnap and give Carnap a hearing. He argues that Quine's 'basic demand [concerning analyticity] is for behavioral criteria' (49) and suggests that Carnap could – given his principle of tolerance – have viewed Quine as proposing a linguistic framework for epistemological investigation (58; also compare Isaacson's discussion, 247, 256-7). There is a lot to be said for this line of interpretation but I doubt it is the whole story. For one thing I don't see how, given his philosophical stance, Quine could accept the 'proposal gambit' Creath offers (60).

  Naturally enough, Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction receives considerable attention. In addition to Creath, De Rosa and Lepore discuss it in their paper on Quine's rejection of reductionism, the doctrine that every sentence has its own fund of meaning. In their view Quine's repudiation of analyticity, his 'meaning holism' and his 'thesis' of indeterminacy of translation are 'essentially correlated' (86; also 66, 68, 73). This is a tidy interpretation but not easily endorsed. It is hard to believe the detailed discussion of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' and Chapter 2 of *Word and Object* regarding analyticity, holism and indeterminacy can be boiled down to an argument with a couple of premises (73). And hard as well to accept that Quine 'often refers to meaning holism as "indeterminacy of translation"' (68), has a 'theory of radical translation' (68), is worried about field linguistics (69), equates indeterminacy with the possibility of 'compensatorily juggling the translation of the apparatus of individuation' (70) and is on shaky grounds in arguing for 'moderate holism' (79-82).

 Though deprecated by De Rosa and Lepore (71), there is much to be said for the common practice of discussing Quine on indeterminacy of translation separately from his argument for holism in 'Two Dogmas'. At any rate this is how Kirk discusses him. In a nicely crafted paper, the bulk of which is given over to replaying and augmenting themes of his *Translation Determined*, Kirk labours to formulate Quine's claim so that it is neither trivially true nor obviously false. While this is all to the good, especially in a companion, I couldn't help thinking Kirk finds Quine's remarks troubling because he expects more from them than Quine intended. While acknowledging that Quine's views on radical translation are closely allied with his 'views on the shortcomings of the notion of meaning' (155), he ignores that Quine was of the opinion, as Gibson reminds us, that '[w]hat indeterminacy shows is the notion of propositions as sentence meanings is untenable' (17).

 It was clever of Quine to speak of himself as arguing for the indeterminacy of translation rather than as arguing against meanings and propositions. Clever but misleading. One of the important lessons of Dreben's 'garland' of quotations (288) is that Quine's discussion of radical translation is chiefly directed at a philosophical myth. By confronting us with Quine's own words, Dreben gets us to see what Quine is objecting to (and appreciate better other aspects of his thinking). Thus he quotes passages in which Quine says he is advancing a 'conjecture' about radical translation and states that his 'thought experiment ... was meant as a challenge to the reality of propositions as meanings' (289, 291). Reading Dreben, one sees why Gibson refers to him, the dedicatee of the volume, as 'the world's leading expert on Quine's philosophy, ... Quine's favorite sounding board, and at times Quine's bulldog' (287).

  The indeterminacy of translation makes yet another appearance in Gibson's own paper, this time in the context of 'Quine's behaviorism cum empiricism'. With his usual careful consideration of the texts and sympathy for Quine, Gibson shows how 'Quine's behaviourism permeates his philosophy of language' (195) and hence his philosophy of mind (196). While I would have liked to have had more on how Quine's behaviourism 'shapes his general epistemology' (195), I was happy to see so many widespread misunderstandings about it exploded, not least the fiction that Quine 'limits it to conditioned response' (183) and has no time for innate mechanisms for learning language (190).

 Naturalism, which Gibson sees as central to Quine's philosophy (11, 181), is examined at greater length – and much less sympathetically – by Fogelin. After putting Quine right about some minor points of Hume scholarship, Fogelin argues that his 'execution of [the] program [of naturalized epistemology' leaves much to be desired (45). Moreover he claims that 'deep down' Quine favoured the antirealist view that '[o]bjects are posits (reifications, fictions)' over the realist view that '[i]ndependent of us, the world contains all sorts of objects' (38). This seems improbable if only because Quine famously insisted that calling something a posit is not to patronize it (*Word and Object*, 22) and stressed that his 'robust realism' about sticks, stones, atoms and classes is integral to his naturalism ('Things and Their Place in Theories', 21).

  Hylton sheds light on the issue of the sticks and stones (133) and much else besides in an excellent paper on Quine's thinking about reference and ontology. Unlike many commentators, he shows – rather than merely asserts – that Quine is an important philosopher. He brings him to life by comparing him with Russell on how thought can be about the world and with Carnap on the relativity of ontology to theory. And he draws attention to the enormous shift in philosophical opinion Quine is advocating by emphasising how far his rejection of Russell's conception of reference lock, stock and barrel takes him from 'unreconstructed common sense' (145).

  Bergström too brings out the depth of Quine's philosophy in his paper on the underdetermination of physical theories by data. In the course of explaining the role of the doctrine in Quine's thinking, he shows that Quine gives it an interesting twist and underlines that, as Quine understands it, it is not as easy a doctrine as usually assumed. Also *en route* Bergström raises a number of difficulties for Quine, difficulties I imagine Quine would have been pleased to have raised – and would have had something to say about in response. My guess is that Bergström misses a trick in not going on to consider whether the holes he sees in Quine's argument are still holes when viewed from Quine's own standpoint.

 One needs some logic to understand fully Ullian's 'Quine and Logic' and Føllesdal's 'Quine on Modality'. But nobody should be put off. Even those forced to skip the technical details can learn a lot from the rest. Ullian provides a useful account of Quine's contributions to logic and the presentation of logic, what Quine calls his 'project ... of pedagogical engineering' (276), while Føllesdal shows how Quine ended up more or less where he began concerning modality, silently dropping his more ambitious arguments along the way.

  Several authors touch on the systematic character of Quine's philosophy (6, 68, 238, 258) but none discusses it at any length. Though not something Quine trumpeted, there can be no escaping the fact that his naturalism, his behaviourism, his empiricism, his holism, his critique of analyticity, his indeterminacy conjecture and his repudiation of meanings are interconnected parts of a unified system of the world. However Quine may have regarded his contribution to philosophy, he is a historically important figure because his philosophical system ranks with the great systems of the past. Taken as a whole, his philosophy is much harder to dislodge than his critics often suppose – and much less obvious than Quine took it to be.

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