

to biases or distortions by vividness. So hot coherence needs to be (further) constrained by procedures that will test our intuitive feelings to see whether they are properly informed, factually and normatively, and that will also aim to structure our reasoning so that informed intuitions can be effective rather than be overcome by the uninformed gut feelings they were meant to replace. Crucially, also, the inner workings of HOTCO inferences will often not be transparent to us; we may only have conscious access to their 'sense of rightness/wrongness' outputs.

These are all eminently sensible qualifications, though one imagines that readers unconvinced by the coherence theory of inference in its cold version will not take much more of a shine to the hot version. It would have been interesting, in this connection, to see the defense of HOTCO, *qua* coherence account, related more fully to the discussion, in the chapter 'Critique of Emotional Reason', of Susan Haack's 'foundherentist' epistemology, especially given the kinds of constraints on coherence-only criteria Thagard introduces into HOTCO. The discussion of emotion could also usefully be fleshed out regarding the ways, mentioned but not much explored, in which even 'basic' emotions such as anger and happiness are more complex than just 'valence'. There is also little exploration of *why* hot and cold cognition can diverge, for instance when emotions are recalcitrant in the face of considered judgments. Then again, Thagard's abstention from triumphalist claims to have a definitive account of emotions (a common enough feature of much recent work on emotion, from natural and social sciences to humanities) is a welcome feature, and what is here is a rich and fertile contribution to the emotion literature.

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A Reader's Guide.*

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It is relatively easy to cobble together an interpretation of the *Tractatus* from scattered bits of Wittgenstein's book, much harder to stick to the words on the page and figure out the point of it all. All too often commentators dodge

around, close their eyes to difficulties, and quote passages without explanation. But not Roger White. He looks closely at the text, refrains from putting words into Wittgenstein's mouth and does his level best to clarify what is going on. There is no trimming to fit a preconceived idea or the latest fad, just a sustained effort to deal with Wittgenstein's masterpiece on its own terms and to bring it alive. White has thought long and hard about the *Tractatus*, and one never feels in anything less than excellent hands. Better still I fancy he captures the spirit of Wittgenstein as well as the letter of his text. Much is left to the reader and some of the discussion requires close attention, but anyone who perseveres, novice or expert, will find the effort more than worthwhile.

The book opens with two short chapters, one on Wittgenstein's life up to the completion of the *Tractatus* and the intellectual context in which he was working (1-7), the other on central concepts and themes of the *Tractatus*: the notion of a proposition, the existence and specification of the general form of propositions, logical truth, the 'limits of language', and the say/show distinction (8-15). Next comes White's *pièce de résistance*, a very long chapter on Wittgenstein's remarks from 'The world is everything that is the case' on up to 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent' (16-134). Finally, to round things off, there are short chapters on the fate of Wittgenstein's book (135-143) and what to read next (144-148).

The chapters flanking the long middle chapter are nicely done. Perhaps unsurprisingly — White was a translator of *Philosophical Remarks* — the material on the reception and influence of Wittgenstein's book is unusually helpful, while the guide to further reading, besides sampling the literature, provides useful additional information about how White comes at the *Tractatus*. What impresses most, however, is the core of the book, the detailed commentary on the text itself (30-118, above all). White works systematically through Wittgenstein's remarks (with frequent glances ahead), focusing on passages that have caused readers and commentators most trouble. Though he does not consider everything in the book — in an introductory guide that is out of the question — he covers the key sections and central themes, which on his reading have to do with logic and language. Arguably, 2-2.063 (on objects) are more naturally studied with the 1s, and 3-3.05 (on pictures) more naturally considered with the rest of the 2s. But dividing up the material White's way has its merits, and in any event the important thing is not what goes with what, but how Wittgenstein's discussion develops and what he says at each point along the way.

White's comments on individual passages are uniformly judicious, enlightening and worth pondering. I was particularly taken by his insistence that the remarks about facts at the beginning of the *Tractatus* are 'meant to be read in a way that is as vacuous as possible' (26), his explanation of Wittgenstein's argument that picturing the world presupposes the existence of simple objects (38-44), his discussion of the requirement that sense be determinate (54-60), his examination of the all-important Tractarian idea of propositions as pictures (68-74), his survey of Wittgenstein's remarks about generating all (meaningful) propositions from elementary propositions by means of a single

truth-operator (83-98), and his analysis of how Wittgenstein's view of logical truth does — and does not — fall foul of the undecidability of predicate logic (106-08). But there is much else of interest, and different readers will doubtless applaud White's handling of different topics.

Books on the *Tractatus*, especially ones with their own 'narrative', are bound, as White notes, to 'provoke disagreement at some point or other' (vii). I welcomed the sharp criticism of the so-called New Wittgensteinians' contention that Wittgenstein intends us to come to see that the bulk of the book is out-and-out nonsense (125-30). But I was less persuaded by White's way of accounting for Wittgenstein's claim that his propositions are *unsinnig*, which is to attribute to Wittgenstein the view that nonsensical propositions can show 'a pattern *within* the facts' (133; also 120, 130-34). Is Wittgenstein not more charitably regarded as believing that thoughts are, as he puts it in his preface, expressed in the book, and are his remarks in the body of the book not better understood as communicating truths about representation and logic (as opposed, that is, to truths about the world)? Also I am inclined to think there is more to the idea of Wittgenstein as an 'intuitive thinker' than White allows (viii). Russell and Carnap seem to me to have had it right when they suggested that inspiration played an important point in Wittgenstein's thinking. Nor, I might add, was I able to accept all White's evaluations, for instance his view that colour incompatibility is dealt with at 6.3751 'in a highly unsatisfactory manner' (34).

Mostly, however, I found myself wishing for more. I would have liked the benefit of White's thoughts about the 6.3s on science, the 6.4s on ethics and other passages that he only touches on, to say nothing of the passages he was obliged to skip over. And it would have been good to have had his reflections on the exercises he includes to alert the reader to alternative interpretations. His 'topics for discussion' are tricky and a little help would have been welcome. However unfair it may be to demand more from an author who provides so much, I cannot help hoping there will be a sequel with more discussion, more detail, more stage-setting. On the present showing, nobody is better equipped to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the *Tractatus*.

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