

On the Immorality of Genealogy

I. Introduction

In *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), Nietzsche stands out as a militant against the long accommodation of Christian values of morality. As for him, morality is “merely an interpretation of certain phenomena, and more precisely, a misinterpretation” (Nietzsche, 1895, The “Improvers” of Mankind, 1). In the context of Christian values that have ingrained people’s mindset for centuries, it “represents a system of errors encompassing our ways of thinking, feeling and living” (Nietzsche, 1994, p.16). Following Nietzsche’s book, Foucault, in 1977, paraphrased the term *Genealogy* in his essay *Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*, widely regarded as the only evident paper that reveals his enunciation of Nietzschean genealogy.

While most of the Anglo-American academia agree that Foucault shared similar concerns with Nietzsche owing to his anti-Platonic stance, Ryan McDermott¹ (2020) argues that Foucault uses this terminology in a notably different way from Nietzsche’s *Moralgeneologen*.² From this point of view, it is significant to look at Foucault’s interpretation of genealogy to analyse his deviation from Nietzsche. What does *genealogy* mean to Foucault, compared to Nietzsche, who conflates morality with a genealogical way of thinking? More importantly, under what circumstances can we talk about the methods of Foucault's methodology, the practice that sheds light upon historical-discursive events?

The analysis of Foucault’s concept of genealogy should not be studied in a single form or figure; instead, we are supposed to view it as an intersection where his genealogy gains relevance for what inculcates us today. Nietzsche (1911, “Why I Am a Fatality”, 4) refers to himself as an *immoralist* because he neither acknowledges the “highest man” nor the “paramount morality” that has been recognised for centuries in the European mode of thinking. In fact, Nietzsche (1994, p.133) claims that “the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality.” The genealogy of morality, therefore, for Nietzsche (pp.126-133), is to set free the “traditional way of behaving and evaluating” that has been “habitual and natural.”

Far from what Nietzsche (p.133) has done to disavow morality as a “traditional way of behaving and evaluating”, which gives way to other opportunities and possibilities for historical narration, Foucault does not pay much attention to the genealogy of morality itself. Instead, he discovers the deeper side of Nietzsche’s genealogy by embedding it into power relations. In this sense, the birth of Foucauldian genealogy, while involving a critique of metaphysics, denotes certain latent forms of *immorality* against the operation of modern ideologies.

¹ Together with his cohorts like Jake Grefenstette, Kirsten Hall Herlin, and Terence Sweeney, a project named *The Genealogies of Modernity* was assembled in collaboration with Beatrice Institute and Collegium Institute, whose aim is to “motivate and organise a critical, cross-disciplinary inquiry into influential narratives of the origins of ‘modernity’ in the humanities, with a special focus theological genealogies”, which provides a modern perspective to discover new relations from the past and present in the account of genealogy, critical reviews, et cetera.

² “Genealogists of morality.” Cf. *Nietzsche Was Not a Genealogist* by Ryan McDermott in *Philosophy & Religion of Genealogists of Modernity*, published on 15 December 2020.

In the first part of this essay, I will work to delineate Foucault's understanding of genealogy, paying attention to his similarities and differences from Nietzsche's correlated ideas by examining his 1977 essay. Considering Nietzsche's use of *Ursprung*, Foucault takes this forward to overturning the concept of origin(s). From his objection to the search for *Ursprung*, Foucault advocates the analysis of *Herkunft* from three postulates. I will focus on the three premises to think about his genealogy through paths to the body, history, and truth, reflecting his concern with the word *origin*.

In the second part, I will use this Foucauldian genealogy to find its effectiveness in contemporary society. A Foucauldian conception of genealogy could be exercised to resolve some ideological issues that have come to dominate certain historical conceptions affecting the notion of modernity. Whereas Nietzsche's genealogy challenges morality by allowing different values, I argue that the idea of Foucault's genealogy characterises *immorality* as a peculiar methodology. In response to the problematised issues of bodies, history, and truth in Foucault's discourses, they pertain to the immoral concepts of incest, prejudice, and lies, amongst other things.

II. Foucault and His Genealogy

If we look at the developing process of Foucault's intellectual career, it is not difficult to find out that his idea of genealogy reaches backwards from the present to scour the very beginning of what is thought to make up history and what kind of social and ideological relationships are involved.³ For example, in the second volume of *The History of Sexuality* (1978), Foucault undertakes a genealogy of the modern desiring subject by looking back to ancient Greece. It is from this inquiry that he discovers the use of pleasure for Greeks is more about self-discipline than a drive purportedly derived from nature. Why does Foucault distance himself from the traditional cognition of sexuality and choose as his starting point early Greek society compared to those who exercise "natural" desires subjugated to the repression of laws and morals? The answer rests at the beginning of his paper, where he explicates the task of genealogy:

It must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we need to feel is without history — in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those stances even where they are absent, the moment even when they remain unrealised. (Foucault, 1977, pp.139-140)

³ Despite the fact that Foucault first proposed archaeology in his early 70s as the preparation of his research groundwork, he left it behind when he proceeded with his work at the Collège. Be that as it may, there are arguments that Foucault's genealogical ideas lie to some extent in his early archaeological employment. See "Understanding Foucault: The Shift from Archaeology to Genealogy" by Muzaffar Karim in *Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Science*, Quest Journals, Volume 9, Issue 9 (2021, 72-75) and "Foucault's Historiographical Expansion: Adding Genealogy to Archaeology" by Colin Koopman in *Journal of the Philosophy of History* (2008), both of which justify the concordant position for these two methodologies.

Distinguished from pursuing the subject in an ideal form with unequivocal objectivity, genealogy is more interested in those discursive moments which are fragmented, ruptured and divergent. It is revelatory of Foucault's attempt to reformulate the body, history, and truth that have been considered traditionally in a lineage of societal development. The essential mission genealogy takes on, therefore, is not only to challenge traditional conceptions and to re-estimate their basis but, more importantly, to problematise them in the exposure of the most indecent appearances, posing a resolute posture of denying unity, continuity, and finality — all in the name of Zarathustra.⁴

Foucault (1977, pp.140-145) spends several paragraphs construing the distinction in Nietzsche's usage between *Ursprung* and *Herkunft*, which designate *origin* and *descent*. What makes him take up this distinction here is pivotal to understanding his account of the traits of genealogy. It serves as the checkpoint where Foucault, contending that the words only see slight disparity for Nietzsche, intentionally implants his interpretation of *origin*, which exposes the relations of power hidden in history. He thereupon postulates three reasons to explain why the pursuit of *Ursprung* is challenged by genealogists, which, according to their characterisation from different aspects, deal with the body, history, and truth that are relevant to the context of modern power.

Firstly, Foucault (1971, p.142) purports that *Ursprung* is “an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities.” This assertion can be viewed as the ascertainment of his opposition (as well as Nietzsche's, partially)⁵ to the role Metaphysics plays in history. Plato naturally becomes the target of this attack as he “does not content himself with the lies of mere copies (Lash, 1995, p.158).⁶ For Nietzsche (1994, p.20), origin(s) is something he opposes if there exists “genealogical narcissism”⁷ while more radically, Foucault repudiates the form of origin. Foucault is not interested in searching for the origin of history because he thinks the origin is concerned with essence and loftiness. On the contrary, instead of “assuming the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession”, his genealogy “delineate[s] the forces that participated in a particular occurrence” (1995, p.158) to find “the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (1977, p.142). The rejection of *Ursprung* thus indicates Foucault's attempt to invert Platonism, a metaphysical form of being.

In contradistinction, Foucault (1977, p.145) points out that *Herkunft*, equivalent to *descent*, is “the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class.” Rather than inquiring about the essence of a subject that gives birth to another, Foucault consults the

⁴ Nietzsche masquerades this figure, who teaches the doctrine of “superman”, to utter his thoughts about the will to power in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. For further explanations, see *Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?* by Martin Heidegger in *Review of Metaphysics* (1967).

⁵ Nevertheless, the Introduction's author has some disagreement with this topic in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, p.20.

⁶ For example, in his most famously quoted allegory of the cave, he plays with the metaphor of shadows discerned by the troglodytes and the sun to suggest the real world hidden by ostensible reality.

⁷ Nietzsche reproaches Darwin and his friend Dr Paul Rée in the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morality*, pp.8-9, because he thinks they are the genealogists who examine history in an evolutionary way.

relations where different subjects are linked together. Here, we can see a close relationship with the body when Foucault (1977, p.148) depicts descent as “the body—and everything that touches it: diet, climate, and soul—is the domain of the *Herkunft*.” *Herkunft* does not seek the first ancestry who complied with this inherited pedigree. It gives its attention to unfamiliar relatives and intricate kinship. Instead of tracing the Creator representative of the purest incarnation to pay honour to, its task is to record the stigma the body has suffered, affecting the spread of the bloodline. For Foucault, descent “denotes the repetition of the marking of bodies by history.” (Lash, 1995, p.160)

Secondly, for Foucault, history is not written immutably in the human vicissitudes nor learned from the pedagogical materials. If we look at the horizon and say history is a “plateau” accumulated by numerous events, we can see only incredible transformations made of significant events at the top of history. However, if one naughty, mischievous subject ever slides down a bit and looks to the sides of the plateau, he, uncomfortably positioned in a vertical manner, will soon discover the new world of nature, namely, the “effective history” (Foucault, 1977, p.154). It consists of different layers with uneven surfaces, which, according to the bases of unlike ages and their sediments under various conditions, compared to the flatness of the apex, show disparate appearances in the inclination of narration. Hence, “what is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin” but the “dissension of other things” (Foucault, 1977, p.142). It seems pretty clear that when Foucault speaks about history, he does not tend to talk about its primordium but, more progressively, about the formulations and correlations that penetrate the sphere of power. The type of “history” Foucault looks at is more about discontinuity, dispersion, and emergence. In contrast with incorporating everything into a singular body that eradicates different statements before the summation, the execution of history by genealogy suggests “the possibility of revealing series with widely spaced intervals formed by rare or repetitive events” (Foucault, 1972, p.8).

Foucault (1977, p.152) implies that, as a consequence, the real genealogist is the one who holds the so-called “historical sense”. If we look back to Nietzsche, we find his use in *Untimely Meditations* (1997, pp.60-67), where he contrasts it with the “unhistorical animal” as a way for men to become suprahistorical.⁸ Foucault (p.157) follows Nietzsche's example by disclosing the image of a historian: a humble birth, as he says.⁹ Not born for the fashionable genealogy but for the pious veneration of history. What historians do, “without distinction”, is to gain knowledge of everything in “a comprehensive view excluding differences” (*ibid*). Foucault strongly disagrees with the things historians are working on accompanying their particular narratives historically. In this context, the proposition to elucidate history in a progressing way of successive events needs to be revised. Foucault (p.154) insists that history only becomes effective when it “introduces the discontinuity”, “deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature”, and “responds to haphazard conflicts”. The break with history is not history itself but, more precisely, the traditional history that implies “a teleological movement or a natural process” (*ibid*). On the other hand, “effective history” is the history being made; it is the present that opens up the past for the

⁸ Foucault further explains this in 1977, p.152.

⁹ Nevertheless, he keeps his vigilance to Nietzsche, who divides history into three species (1997, p.67). Among them, Foucault criticises “Antiquarian History” for it “seeks the continuities of soil, language and urban life in which our present is rooted” (1977, p.162).

future. Given that the ideological values history has made are merely “an invention of the ruling classes” (p.142), there fails to be a particular trajectory that men should follow to transcribe their history into a specific notion. Relatively, a Foucauldian historian finds himself in the “discontinuity of our very being” (p.154).

Lastly, truth, for Foucault (p.144), is also a doubtful matter due to the fact that “it was hardened into an unalterable form in the long baking process of history.” It brings us back to the idea that Plato values truth as the metaphysical form of being in his book *Republic* (2013). It presumes a supremacy that takes up all other rules in consolidation to “demonstrate a way in which not [other] being can be” (Hestir, 2003a). Although Nietzsche did not believe in Plato’s delusions, he, in his early years, embraced truth as “the thing-in-itself”.¹⁰ At that time, he thought the truth of knowledge we obtain is nothing but “metaphors” that are “worn out and have been drained of sensuous force” (Nietzsche, 1873, p.4). It is not until *The Genealogy* that Nietzsche (1994, p.87) discovers the “ascetic” side of truth where “difference in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge” should be introduced. Foucault adopts this idea in a way that inverts the idea of truth, which previously was “a modification in the rules of formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true” (Foucault, 1980, p.112). With the developments of historical-discursive events, origin loses its primary distance of truth. Truth consequently cannot receive correspondence of truthful discourses but is only formed in "the history of an error" carried forward by historians (Foucault, 1977, pp.143-144).

In general, Foucault (p.143) roughly tears down the mask of Platonists who stand at every origin of the historical events, and what appears behind them is just “a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth”. But what alternates the break of origin when it is no longer valid? Instead, Foucault (p.149) speaks about *emergence (Entstehung)* as “the entry of forces”. It examines different interpretations in the interstice of historical-discursive surfaces with their “youthful strengths” (p.150). Mirroring Nietzsche’s critique of genealogy on morality, Foucault’s genealogy helps us rethink the concepts of bodies, history, and truth. Each bears upon how dominated ideologies in history can be re-estimated or even reshaped through examining Foucauldian genealogy today. Nonetheless, these three aspects are not supposed to be separated; rather, they manifest different issues with accentuations, each from the conception of unity, continuity, and finality:

...to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations — or conversely, the complete versals — the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the foot of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. (Foucault, 1977, p.146)

III. Immorals of Genealogists

¹⁰ Kant referred to this term as noumenon in *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998, p.350), meaning the objects themselves that are independent of the representation or observation of the senses being.

With a strong anti-Platonism gesture, Foucault and his genealogy do not care about the values morality traditionally appraises any more. Further, they are more concerned with the perverted, abominable, and flagrant values that used to be forbidden, spurned, and neglected in the development of human history. Now, Foucault asks us to re-pick these ideas connected to insidious immorals through the quest for his genealogy. And what *emerges* in this framework is the immorality that distains the body, history, and truth when it comes to practice.

Along with the overwhelming global crisis, extant issues like racism, wars, and climate change have witnessed the wavering structure of the world socio-economically, politically, and culturally, in which power relations play a crucial role in affecting people's thinking. Against this backdrop, it is necessary to ask what Foucauldian genealogy means to us today; in other words, how should we act as genealogists in this modern society? Before answering this question, we should find more details in Foucault's reflection on *Entstehung* to see how he understands power relations.

Foucault (1977, p.159) links this term with *Herkunft* and finds its history in nineteenth-century Europe. He points out that only by "being seized, dominated, and turned against its birth [of the genealogy of history]" can we be independent of the past to stand in the present and create something new. As a result, "*Entstehung*, like will to power ... is the scene in which forces struggle to dominate" (p.160). This echoes the concept of power/knowledge Foucault constructs throughout his career. Therefore, the liberation of bodies, history, and truth is the manifesto against *savoir* (power), in which different relations emerge as unbalanced flows to usurp the dominance of other forces.

The debate between Foucault and Habermas has shown why it is challenging to become a qualified genealogist today.¹¹ If we affirm, Foucault and his genealogy deal with the traditional concepts ideologically formed by power relations without what Habermas (1987) calls normative justifications (because there shall be no norms to justify due to the denial of *Ursprung*), there exists a necessity to seek the effectiveness of this particular methodology out of legitimacy. In this part, I will elaborate on how immorality relates to the matters Foucauldian genealogy cares about and how they emerge specifically as incest, prejudice, and lies around the discourses of body, history, and truth mentioned above.

1. Incest

The explanation of incest, which "designates intimate relations between relatives or in-laws within a degree that prohibits marriage between them" in Leviticus 18:7-20 shows the immorality of incest that has disgraced God since the dissemination of Catholicism. Incest has long been the taboo of both religion and society because it not only results in genetic illnesses but also "corrupts family relationships".¹² When the search for origin secures bilateral relations between two

¹¹ The political judgement Habermas makes is that he thinks Foucault's genealogy "undercuts all moral bases of the sort on which any non-arbitrary political claim must rest." Cf. *Clarifying the Foucault–Habermas debate* by Matthew King.

¹² Cited from Catechism of the Catholic Church Second, 2388.

strangers through marriage, the analysis of decent makes it obscure or even collides through incest, deeply concerned with the body through a mixture of consanguinity.

In *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1991), Foucault takes the punishment of Robert-François Damiens as an example to delineate how the body was physically disciplined by power so as to show its sovereignty over individuals in the mid-18th century. Even though when it comes to the early 19th century, when punishments became more clandestine and "mild", the body is always the target power aims to control. The remedy Foucault (1977, p.161) prescribes for the modern issue is through "the excessive choice of identities". It is not about where the subjects come from but who they are and within which relationships they are being shaped. As Foucault (pp.145-146) says, "The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis."

According to Foucault, Scott Lash (1995, p.14) makes clear that the effect of such power is "to *invent* (my emphasis) subjects, which are attached to bodies." Incest gives birth to what Foucault calls "the man-of-mixture", whose purpose is copulating with other bodies and destroying a proper relation of morally good customs, be it the well-distant in blood ties. This half-bred, intermingling, and freaky "bastardy" appears as the enemy to the pure, healthy and perfect first son (cherished by patriarchal society) "to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body" (Foucault, 1977, p.148). He should not be ashamed of his identity because he represents nobody but his own *body*.

The tragedy of Oedipus, who is charged with *incest*, is not, thereupon, how he ends up killing his father or marrying his mother, but more fundamentally, that he believes in the prophecy and tries to avoid it as a result of testifying the trick of *Herkunft*. He would rather be the sacrifice of his return to fate than bear the accusation of being immoral. However, if he had committed his "crime" beyond immorality before the avoidance of that prophecy, the ending that is being spread would not have come as tragic as genealogically, and he would not have had to leave Corinth.

As the analysis of descent, incest substitutes the body with the inventive subject to "recognise opportunities for new formations" (McDermott, 2021). It is averse to the fundamental stake of origin but solicits cutting and grafting from family trees. By disturbing the proximity and distance that the origin keeps, the body blends the kindred into its own flesh to "be perpetually reduced to filiation in the act of re-engendering oneself" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2009b, p.183).

2. Prejudice

History acts as a shared image where everybody can have a common sense of non-discursive events. However, their historical contents are seamless and successive, excluding pettiness or accidents. They only "allow us to see the dividing lines in the confrontations and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organisations are designed to mask (Foucault, 2003b, p.7)." That is to say, history is a structural process implanted by certain ideologies in particular historical periods. What is to do with this kind of history that pretends to be non-biased? Only through the

Introduction of prejudice can history amount to “a compendium of factual immorality” (Nietzsche, 1997, p.105).

If we remember Foucault’s “effective history”, we would be able to unmask traditional history in a prejudiced stance — it is lofty, grand, and explicit; it defines every event formally and names every participant involved. Nietzsche’s *monumental history*, for instance, is one presentation of the history type. In *Untimely Meditations* (1997, p.68), he describes it as “the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain”, and this chain signifies an arbitrary continuity in which subjects succumb to the towering “mountain peaks”. As for genealogists, they look down upon traditional history with its self-content and righteousness. They start to learn about history at the foot of every mountain, collecting falling gravel and researching the most unknown species of plants. Compared with the curious historians who seek total knowledge about historical events in order to disclose the secrets of the past, Foucauldian genealogists would undoubtedly appear in those interstices of rocks and breaches of landslides. The genealogy guides us to commit ourselves to dissipation through history rather than discover the roots of our identity (Foucault, 1977, p.162).

Different from preference, with regard to personal taste, the exercise of prejudice is more about a method to disparage and demean something, rending the ideological power. Becoming prejudiced means incorporating oneself in the power/knowledge relations, and only through these relations can the biased person gain his knowledge that is covered and subjugated by the dominant power. The diversity of knowledge, therefore, is opened up by the gaps in traditional history. Prejudice bears the erudition of knowledge because of the flood of emerging trivia. Prejudice also welcomes different timescales because of its vertical focus on a specific locus. In this sense, genealogy “create[s] its own genealogy in the act of cognition” (Foucault, 1977, p.157) by “substituting historical unity and necessity for temporal complexity and contingency” (Koopman, 2008, p.358).

3. Lie

Truths, for Nietzsche (1873, p.4), are illusions and metaphors that have been intensified, transferred, and embellished in human relations. In retrospect of his ideas about truth, Foucault (1977, p.156) extends his account of “effective history”: it affirms the knowledge as perspective. From the so-called *perspectivism*¹³ A good deal of commentaries are inclined to regard it as Nietzsche’s denial of truth as he reveals the idea that “all human knowledge is perspectival” (Clark, 2009a). Foucault (2013, pp.216-217) proposes several questions in his lecture on Nietzsche, in which he concludes that “truth” is not *true* because “all truth is deployed in the non-true”. In other words, there is no ontological being for truth believed to be the basis of what *is* true.

How do we understand such a statement, which seems to be dialectic? Foucault (2013, p.217) continues to say that “illusion, error, and lie are the differences introduced by truth, but these differences are not only the effects of truth.” Lies, like other mentioned elements, oppose the

¹³ There is no certain definition of this term. However, *perspective* is often used in some of Nietzsche’s works. One famous elucidation is from Nietzsche’s statement: there are no facts but only interpretations, as seen in *The Portable Nietzsche* (1954) by Walter Kaufmann, p.458.

concept of truth. They act as the differences to intersect with other truths. But “they are truth itself” (*ibid*) because they are truthfully *non-true* in reflection on the “truth”. So there are *two* truths, Foucault (p.219) clarifies — “the first truth that is lie: the truth that is not true. The second is the truth freed from this truth-lie: the truthful truth, the truth that is not reciprocal with being.” The former is the metaphysical one that makes room for historical fetishism: where there is power, where they appear as the infinitude of struggles. The latter is the anti-metaphysical one, which only regains through a series of elements (i.e. lies) that are truthfully not true to emancipate from the immobile form of “truth”.

Through lie, we can call up the apparition behind the truth, what Foucault would call “phantasm”. As for him, phantasm amounts to *simulacrum*¹⁴ which is banally repeated in the play of loads of events. However, Foucault (1970, p.17) notes that “it should not be given the form of individuality nor measured against reality because it presents itself as a universal singularity.” This means lies pave the way for the covered non-truths to confuse the existing knowledge that does not “attain a universal truth but rather releases those elements” (Howard, 2018)—for example, truthfulness. It liberates phantasm from the restraints that the origin of truth imposes. As a result, the annihilation of truth as *being* converts to the lie of being simply *truth*, “where the truth of being can no longer be meaningfully distinguished from non-truth” (Wilson, 1995, p.167).

IV. Conclusion

In *The Immoralist Speaks* (1895, “Skirmishes of an Untimely Man”, 32), Nietzsche writes that what genealogists find behind the ideals of man is nothing “...but only what is abject, absurd, sick, cowardly, and weary, all kinds of dregs out of the emptied cup of his life.” Upon this point of view, Foucault’s genealogy subverts the hegemonic concept of descent, history, and truth with an immoral spirit.

From Foucault’s notions of the reason to judge the metaphysical concept of *Herkunft*, the traditional way of thinking about origin is overthrown by his genealogy. Under this anti-Platonic tactic, the body becomes fragmented because the search for *Herkunft* falls apart; history becomes ruptured because, without historical sense, it is of no effect; truth becomes divergent because it encounters the loss of authenticity. In this way, morality is trampled through the denial of origin, break with history, and suspicion of truth. Behind the mask of the historians is the immorality that belittles and undermines the genealogy of morality, wherein “power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1980, p.89).

However, what concerns most in modern society is more than the Nietzschean advocacy of reevaluation. More significantly, inspired by Foucault and his genealogy, the intention we can find amid it is to “pose a powerful challenge to one current understanding of the task of the humanities scholar, which is to problematise” (McDermott, 2021). Therefore, Foucauldian genealogy can

¹⁴ In my understanding, compared with other philosophers, the closest explanation for this context is from Jean Baudrillard, who states in his book *Simulacra and Simulation* (1981) that a simulacrum is not a copy of the real but becomes truth in its own right.

bring us to a further shore in opposition to certain forms of conceptions. It not only problematises but also produces.

By breaking down the current system with the practice of incest, prejudice, and lies, interruption and turbulence are introduced. More importantly, new possibilities and becomings are formed through brutal fights with power. This is why Mcdermott (2021) says, "Genealogy can be more constructive than critical." Altogether, to practise incest is to destroy the legitimate marriage of body and descent; to practise prejudice is to override the narrative history is willing to tell; to practise lie is to make fun of the doubleness where truth appears as perspective. The immorality of genealogy ultimately shows the attempt to leverage the strengths of the humiliated and insulted values and encourage them to stand against the dominance of certain ideologies exercised by power relations.

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