Ordinary Language Philosophy and Ideal Language Philosophy

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1 Introduction

According to ordinary language philosophy (OLP), philosophical problems can be solved by investigating ordinary language, often because the problems stem from its misuse. According to ideal language philosophy (ILP), on the other hand, philosophical problems exist because ordinary language is flawed and has to be improved or replaced by constructed languages that do not exhibit these flaws. OLP and ILP together make up linguistic philosophy, the view that philosophical problems are problems of language. Linguistic philosophy is opposed to what may be called, for lack of a better word, ‘traditional philosophy’ (TP), the view that philosophical problems can be solved by discovering non-linguistic facts.

In the following, OLP, ILP, and TP are taken to be methodologies, that is, frameworks in which to interpret and evaluate different philosophical methods (i. e., argumentative strategies) (Section 2). The two linguistic methodologies are discussed separately with TP as a foil (Section 3), and then used to interpret the status of different philosophical methods (Section 4). While each of the methods discussed here finds a plausible interpretation in each methodology, there are other arguments for and against linguistic philosophy in general, and for and against ILP and OLP in particular (Section 5). As none of these arguments is decisive, I conclude with a superficial moral about peaceful co-existence (Section 6).

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Philosophical problems pertain to the world
Philosophical claims are true/false
Ordinary language is probably defective

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>TP</th>
<th>ILP</th>
<th>OLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>world</td>
<td>language</td>
<td>language</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>true/false</td>
<td>conventions</td>
<td>true/false</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>defective</td>
<td>defective</td>
<td>good</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Each methodology agrees with each other methodology (and disagrees with the remaining methodology) on at least one substantial point.

2 Methods, Methodologies, and the Status of Philosophical Claims

In the following I will make a distinction between method, a “way of doing anything, especially according to a defined and regular plan” and methodology, “the branch of knowledge that deals with method generally or with the methods of a particular discipline or field of study”.1 More precisely, I will consider a method to be an argumentative strategy or a heuristic for developing arguments, and I will consider a methodology to be a framework in which to interpret different methods.

According to TP, philosophical methods are used for investigating the world, similar to scientific methods. According to OLP, philosophical methods are used for investigating ordinary language, similar to linguistic methods. According to ILP, finally, philosophical methods are used for improving ordinary language or developing new languages. Besides the traditional grouping of OLP and ILP as linguistic philosophies, with TP opposed as non-linguistic philosophy, the other two non-trivial groupings of the three methodologies are then also well-motivated: First, TP and OLP assert that the truth-values of philosophical claims are discovered, while ILP asserts that philosophical claims must be interpreted as suggestions for language conventions.2 Second, according to OLP the concepts of ordinary language have special philosophical weight and are to be preferred over newly constructed ones, while according to TP and ILP, the concepts of ordinary language may be defective, either because they do not fit the world or, respectively, because they are unhelpful conventions (Table 1).

Since each methodology shares a central assumption with each other methodology and philosophers tend to not clearly declare which methodology they are assuming (even if they believe that the classification just given is somewhat adequate), it is often hard to determine which methodology the authors of philosophical texts assume. This situation is exacerbated by the different philosophical

1. Both elucidations come from the Oxford English Dictionary Online: “methodology, n.” (oed.com/view/Entry/117578), and “method, n.” (oed.com/view/Entry/117560). Oxford University Press, March 2021 (accessed May 23, 2021). The elucidations in the Merriam-Webster dictionary are farther from the distinction I want to make, depriving me of the opportunity to start this section with ‘Webster’s dictionary defines “method” as...’

2. Here and in the following, claims are statements that are asserted.
methods’ (and thus the different philosophical arguments’) having a place in each methodology (see Section 4).

3 Linguistic Philosophy

That philosophical problems are problems of language might seem clearly false: As Williamson (2007, §2.1) argues, if Mars went from being wet do being dry, the question ‘Was Mars always either dry or not dry?’ is clearly about Mars rather than language, and is clearly philosophical because the answer depends on one’s view of vagueness. Thus linguistic philosophy at least cannot be all of philosophy. But this argument assumes that the question has to be either purely about language or purely about the world. Instead, the answer to the question might follow from a conjunction of factual statements about the amount of water on Mars over time and purely linguistic results about ‘or’ and ‘not’, in particular which logic should or does govern their use. The latter are philosophical according to linguistic philosophy (Lutz 2009, 120).

To express this distinction formally, one can identify among the statements of a language and the meta-linguistic statements about that language those that describe possible states of the world and those that only express rules of the language. The former statements are synthetic, the latter are analytic.3 Since ordinary language and even many constructed languages do not come with clearly identified analytic and synthetic statements, these statements need to be identified by analysis or reconstruction. To this end, Carnap (1963, 965) suggests that the analytic and the synthetic components of any theory $T$ have to be such that together, they are equivalent to $T$, the synthetic component only describes the world, and the analytic component does not describe the world at all.4 The analytic statements entailed by $T$ are then those entailed by its analytic component, and the remaining statements entailed by $T$ are synthetic.5 The statements of $T$ entailed by its synthetic component could be called ‘purely synthetic’.

According to linguistic philosophy, a claim expressed by purely synthetic statements is completely non-philosophical, and a purely philosophical claim is expressed by analytic statements. (There can be non-philosophical analytic statements.) Many statements, however, are only entailed by the analytic and synthetic component of $T$ together, in which case one has to distinguish between the philosophical and the non-philosophical aspects of the statement.

3. Examples of synthetic meta-linguistic statements are Carnap’s inference rules expressing physical laws (Carnap 1967, §51).
4. To spell this out in a technically precise way, Carnap assumes that there is a distinguished set of statements that (correctly or incorrectly) describe the observable world, while no other statements do. Carnap also restricts his discussion to statements in the object language.
5. This asymmetry between analytic and synthetic statements is terminologically convenient because, first, often all inference rules are analytic, so that the synthetic component of $T$ on its own entails nothing. Second, we are often interested in exactly the distinction between stating something and stating nothing about the world.
A philosophical problem now may be simply a particular question. To answer a question not already answered by theory $T$, one needs to first find out whether there are purely synthetic statements compatible with $T$ that would in conjunction with $T$ entail an answer to the question. If there are, the question is not a philosophical one, but one that only requires further investigation of facts. If there are no such purely synthetic statements, the question can at least in part be a philosophical one, because answering it requires finding analytic statements which in conjunction with $T$ (and possibly purely synthetic statements that first have to be established) entail an answer to the question. If there are no such analytic statements, the question is ill-posed.

A philosophical problem may also be some inconsistency or, more generally, tension in $T$. In this case, one must remove or replace some of the analytic statements or check whether some of the synthetic statements have been incorrectly accepted as true.

### 3.1 Ordinary Language Philosophy

The analytic statements at the center of OL are those of ordinary language: According to ordinary language, a bachelor is unmarried, and thus ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is an analytic sentence. That this sentence is analytic is a synthetic meta-linguistic claim. But OL also involves the normative meta-linguistic claim that such synthetic claims are good, that is, the object language that is used is also the object language that should be used.

Answering a philosophical question then requires discovering analytic statements that (possibly together with synthetic statements) entail an answer to the question. Alternatively, the result of an OL analysis might be that there are no such analytic sentences, and thus that the question was ill-posed (Baz 2016, 113). An ill-posed question would be, for instance, whether some conditionally defined term applies to a specific object that violates the condition: The question ‘Is this square democratic?’ is ill-posed because ‘democratic’ is only defined for groups of intentional agents (if even for all of those).

To solve an inconsistency or tension in theory $T$, one can of course as always look for mistakenly accepted synthetic statements, but one can also look for mistakenly accepted analytic statements. In particular, a tension is often resolved by pointing to the context-dependence of the meaning of an expression (Baz 2016, 118), since using an expression with the meaning from one context in another context often leads to tensions. As Strawson (1963, 515) puts it, “the sufferer from philosophical perplexity [is] temporarily dominated by one logical mode of operation of expressions, or by one way of using language … and attempts to see, to explain, something which is different, in terms of, or on analogy with, his

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6. Such a philosophical question is thus somewhat like the one in this old children’s joke: “What is the difference between?”—“Between what?”—“No hints!”

7. Strawson’s text is an excellent source on his view of ordinary language philosophy. It is also a terribly confused source on ideal language philosophy, as Carnap (1963, §19) lays out in his reply.
favoured model."

In spite of most people being competent speakers of their own language, OLP is often needed for finding solutions to philosophical problems because "it is characteristic of philosophers' perplexities and questions that they are felt and raised by people who know very well how to use the expressions concerned, who have no practical difficulties at all in operating with the concepts in question." But they still require "conceptual explanation", which could take the form of an explicit analytic or meta-linguistic claim (Strawson 1963, 508–509). The upshot of this is that every competent speaker of the language can recognize such a claim as correct, even if unable to formulate it independently. It is thus not typically necessary for a practitioner of OLP to convince other competent speakers of the correctness of an analysis, as they will, barring mistakes in non-ideal situations, agree anyway (see also Baz 2016, 120–121; Hanfling 2000, 56–60). One could thus consider OLP to rest on common-sensical claims about the object language, expressed by synthetic statements of the meta-language. (In contradistinction, Moore's common sense philosophy rests on common-sensical claims about the world, expressed by synthetic statements of the object language (cf. Lycan 2001).) I will come back to this in Section 4.2.

OLP might seem useless in the face of newly discovered facts because there is no common use of expressions for such states of affairs. However, an investigation in OLP can lead to the conclusion that "if things (or we) were different in such-and-such ways, then we might lack such-and-such concepts or types of discourse; or have such-and-such others" (Strawson 1963, 516) because "our ability to project [the use of a word] appropriately [to new contexts] is a criterion for our having learned a word" (Cavell 1979, 169). Such conclusions can hence be immediately applicable to newly discovered facts. Furthermore, often there are already expressions in use that fit the newly discovered facts: The sciences are responsible for a large number of them, and very often either develop expressions for describing such newly discovered facts or predict previously unknown facts using expressions developed for this purpose. OLP’s methodology can then be applied to the languages of the sciences, either by the scientists themselves as native speakers of their scientific dialect, or by philosophers who have become fluent in it.8 For this reason, ‘ordinary language philosophy’ is sometimes considered a misnomer, since it suggests that it relies on ordinary as opposed to technical language, when it actually relies on natural as opposed to (artificially) constructed language (Hacker 2013, 938).9

The preceding presentation of OLP excludes two important variants of OLP (Hansen 2014, §2.3 and §2.2.1). The first view differs rather fundamentally from my presentation, as it denies that OLP establishes no synthetic statements in

8. Vlasits (2021, §§2–3) shows how Margaret MacDonald applies OLP to scientific language (see, e.g., MacDonald, Ryle, and Berlin 1937). As noted, however, I disagree with Vlasits’ interpretation of OLP as common-sense philosophy.

9. Strawson (1963) seems to be an exception, since he seems to consider scientific expressions to be sharply distinguished from natural language expressions (see Carnap 1963, 934).
the object language. The results of OLP, the view goes, can be established by analysis of ordinary language, but these results allow the inference of synthetic claims about empirically inaccessible facts. Thus in the preceding discussion, the analytic-synthetic distinction should be replaced by the (in this view different) non-empirical-empirical distinction. Empirical statements are established by the empirical sciences as before, but the other, non-empirical factual statements have to be established by OLP. By this view, OLP is a special case of TP, since many classical arguments in TP (e.g. by Kripke 1980, 41) rest on what one would or should say in ordinary language. While this view renders OLP more powerful, it also is much harder to defend, because it requires an argument for the conclusion that ordinary language provides access to empirically inaccessible facts.

The second view excluded by the preceding presentation considers OLP to be engaged in the precisification of language. When, for instance, Austin (1956, 13–15, 27–28) analyzes expressions of ordinary language using legal texts, psychology, and etymology, he is not just reporting usage, not even usage under ideal circumstances, but rather suggesting how expressions that are vague in some way can be made precise. Precisification, however, replaces one use of an expression by another (more precise) one, and thus goes beyond OLP and towards ILP (Brun 2016, §4.2).

3.2 Ideal Language Philosophy

In its most general form, ILP is the view that philosophical problems can be solved by using a better language, and is therefore one version of conceptual engineering (see Mark Pinder in this volume), although concepts are engineered indirectly, through the engineering of statements. In principle, this better language can be developed from scratch without reference to an existing language (Carnap 1963, 938), but often the better language will be an improvement of an existing ordinary language. If the improvement is restricted to a single term or a small set of terms, this improvement is called ‘explication’ (see Pinder in this volume, §3). Philosophical claims are thus suggestions for linguistic conventions. These conventions are expressed by analytic statements in the object language or the meta-language.10 This is the first difference between ILP and OLP, since for OLP, philosophical claims in the meta-language describe the factual use of the expressions of the object language and are thus synthetic. The second difference stems from OLP’s normative meta-linguistic claim that the ordinary object-language is good, while ILP rests on the assumption that philosophical problems result from the correct use of ordinary language, which is thus not good (Maxwell and Feigl 1961). Therefore ILP makes the normative meta-linguistic claim that the object language that is used is

10. For Bergmann (1957, 326), an ideal language is such that every non-philosophical statement can be translated into the language while every philosophical statement can only be reconstructed as one about the language’s syntax or semantics. However, at least in formal logic inference rules can often be replaced by axioms and vice versa, which suggests that philosophical meta-linguistic statements can often be replaced by analytic statements in the object language and vice versa.
Sebastian Lutz  Ordinary Language Philosophy and Ideal Language Philosophy

often not the object language that should be used. As Rorty (1967, 12) reports, it “has often been (somewhat crudely, but fairly accurately) said, the only difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Ordinary Language Philosophers is a disagreement about which language is Ideal.”

Despite the incompatibility of their respective normative meta-linguistic claims, the synthetic meta-linguistic claims of OLP can be very helpful for ILP, because it is usually helpful to know how some extant language works and is being used before improving on it. For one, understanding the extant language in some detail can help in identifying the source of a problem, but extant languages also do work well to some extent, and it would be unhelpful to reinvent the wheel or, worse, invent something inferior to the wheel (Austin 1956, 8). Thus ILP can use the results of OLP as a starting point for language development. This will be discussed in Section 4.2.

The language resulting from ILP’s language construction should be clear enough for avoiding inconsistencies and tensions, and also for identifying questions that have no answers within one’s theory T. In the best case, both the answers to some philosophical questions and the lack of answers to the remaining philosophical questions can be established through rigorous, possibly formal proofs. Thus ILP aims for languages that make results of the kind that OLP attempts to find amenable to rigorous proofs. But ILP can go further: For one, if a philosophical question lacks an answer in some language, that language can be expanded by adding analytic statements, so that the resulting language does have an answer. Furthermore, a language may be found wanting in light of new empirical results, new interests of those who apply the language, or new discoveries about the language. Then the language may be modified by changing analytic statements in the object language or in its meta-language (for instance by changing its syntax or inference rules).

As noted in Section 3.1, new empirical results often stem from the sciences, and are accompanied by new scientific languages accommodating them. These new scientific languages are therefore usually already improved; indeed, the improvement of language by the sciences is often seen as a model for ILP (Hempel 1952, 12; Carnap 1962, 5-7). Unfortunately, the new languages are often not specified precisely enough for their use in philosophy and thus require further elucidation or even improvement. As also noted, the elucidations may be considered applications of OLP, while the improvements are again applications of ILP. However, since ILP puts no premium on correctly describing natural language, in practice the elucidations often already contain improvements, as Reichenbach (1938, §1) notes: He considers the descriptive task of epistemology, which aims at describing (scientific) knowledge, a rational reconstruction because such a description “is chosen from the point of view of justifiability” (7; see also Pinder in this volume, §2). For Reichenbach, the next step is the critical task of epistemology, in which the system of knowledge “is judged in respect of its validity and its reliability” (Reichenbach 1938, 7). But there are “many places where the decisions of science cannot be determined precisely, the words or methods used being too
vague; and there are others in which two or even more different decisions are in use, intermingling and interfering within the same context” (Reichenbach 1938, 12–13). Hence ilp also has an advisory task, recommending one decision or another.

There is another view one could take regarding the decisions recommended by ilp, and that is that they are not decisions at all, but rather further discoveries of facts not achievable by the methods of science. This would make ilp into tp, and again the analytic–synthetic distinction should be replaced by the non-empirical–empirical distinction, with the non-empirical factual statements investigated by tp. So tp may use the same methods as ilp for arriving at new languages, but unlike ilp as presented here, it considers these methods to be guides to the truth, not to expedient conventions.

4 Different methods within the methodologies

The three methodologies are too general for arriving at specific results: 'Find out about the world!', 'Follow ordinary language!', and 'Find better languages!' will not lead to a solution of, say, the problem of induction. Hence each methodology uses a number of methods for developing arguments for concrete philosophical claims. I will discuss some central methods in the following and discuss how they fit into each methodology.

4.1 Deduction

Each methodology can make use of deductive arguments. A deductive argument can be a straightforward formal proof from axioms in a specific logic, or a promissory note that the premises of an informal argument can be axiomatized and its inference can be reconstructed as a formal proof. In olp (as in tp), an inconsistency of philosophical claims is an indicator of a mistake in the analysis that led to these statements, since the assumption is that ordinary language is not defective. (In tp, the analysis must be faulty because the world is not inconsistent.) In ilp, the statements of an inconsistent set cannot all be suggested as analytic claims at the same time, since an inconsistent system is useless or something close to it. In olp (as in tp) the statements deductively derivable from true philosophical statements (maybe in conjunction with true synthetic statements) are themselves true. Conversely, if a philosophical statement entails a false conclusion, it must be false itself. In ilp, on the other hand, statements derivable from philosophical statements are simply ones that one has to adopt as well if one decides to adopt the original statement. Reichenbach (1938, 13–14) calls these derivable statements 'entailed decisions'. Conversely, if one is not willing to go along with such an entailed decision, one can also decide to not adopt the original statement.

The above assumes classical logic, but whether classical logic is correct, or
which logic is correct instead, is itself a philosophical question.¹¹ Unlike for TP, for linguistic philosophy the answer is independent of the (non-linguistic) world. In OL, the correct logic to use is that of ordinary language: To the extent that ordinary language is classical, so is the logic in which one should reason, and the reach of classical logic (or any other logic) ends where ordinary language no longer sanctions its inferences. In principle, ordinary language might be so unsystematic that it contains nothing deserving the name ‘logic’, but linguistics has made great strides in describing the logic of ordinary language in higher order and other logics. In IL, on the other hand, the choice of logic is, in effect, a matter of expedience: That logic that most fruitfully structures analytic and true synthetic statements is the most recommendable (cf. Rossberg and Shapiro 2021).

But how can one determine which inferences are allowed in ordinary language, which inferences are condoned by what the world is like, or which inferences are the most expedient conventions? In all methodologies, the answer is often induction. But before we investigate inductive methods, we have to take a look at the typical evidence that is used as premises in such inferences: The results of empirical research and intuitive judgments.

### 4.2 Empirical research

While TP in its standard form is concerned with the empirically inaccessible world, naturalized TP to the contrary considers philosophical statements to be empirically testable, albeit more general than typical scientific statements (cf. Papineau 2009; Jonathan Tsou, this volume). Thus naturalized TP is continuous with empirical science. IL allows for a similar continuity between empirical science and philosophy, but instead of considering philosophical statements synthetic, it considers many scientific statements analytic (Lutz 2020), and as noted, usually an improvement over statements of ordinary language. While naturalized TP accommodates empirical results by testing philosophical theories against them, IL accommodates empirical results by choosing fitting analytic statements. In the easiest case (Carnap 1963, 965) the philosophical theory simply states that if the empirical statements are true, then some theory $T$ that entails these empirical statements is also true. In this case, if the empirical statements turn out false, the philosophical theory simply becomes useless, as it is trivially true by way of a false antecedent. Stronger philosophical theories are possible (Przełęcki 1969, 57–58). Meta-linguistic empirical results can also influence the choice of analytic statements as they might show, for instance, that one choice of language is preferable because it is significantly easier to work with.

In OL, empirical results can influence philosophical results indirectly, by influencing ordinary language through “back-seepage of jargon” (Austin 1956, 17) from the sciences; the current meaning of ‘temperature’, for instance, is strongly influenced by the results of empirical research. And as noted, OL can be applied to

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¹¹. Indeed, even the extent to which logic is analytic is a philosophical question.
scientific language and \textit{OLP} results can be applicable to new empirical discoveries. But the main direct influence on \textit{OLP} results come from meta-linguistic empirical results: How language is actually used is central for Austin (1956, 12–13) when he relies on dictionaries for determining the meaning of a term, and a claim that an expression of ordinary language has a specific use requires at least some coherence with the actual use of the speakers of ordinary language, even if these speakers sometimes make mistakes.

### 4.3 Intuition

Feigl (1958, 2) helpfully circumscribes intuition as first and foremost immediate, and as contrasted with “indirect, mediate, relational, or inferential knowledge”. Even more helpfully, he distinguishes between “trans-empirical intuitions” on the one hand, where “the target or object of intuition is claimed to be something … which cannot be checked empirically” and “hunches” on the other hand, whose target can be tested empirically and which are usually the product of learning from past experiences (6). An intuition about where to find water is a hunch, an intuition about where to find the Good is trans-empirical. Hunches are not particularly philosophically interesting, since they are trumped by the actual empirical evidence about their target (like wet feet), although according to naturalized \textit{TP}, very general hunches can lead to philosophical theories (Papineau 2009, §V). Trans-empirical intuitions, on the other hand, are uniquely philosophical in that they have as their targets the non-empirical factual statements of (non-naturalized) \textit{TP}.

While intuitions about the Good are trans-empirical, intuitions about the typical use of the phrase ‘the Good’ are hunches since their targets are the ordinary uses of phrases by the whole language community or at least by the speaker who has the intuitions. These hunches are obviously important for \textit{OLP}, since what is the correct use of ordinary language in the end has to rely at least to some extent on the language intuitions of the speakers. Thus, depending on what the target of the intuition is, whether it is the world or the speaker’s language, the intuition is trans-empirical or a hunch, and the methodology is \textit{TP} of \textit{OLP} (Lutz 2012, §2.2; cf. Hanfling 2000, 241–243). The target of meta-linguistic hunches in \textit{ILP}, on the other hand, can only be the expedience of a specific choice of convention. Thus one may rely on a hunch that a specific choice comes with problematic entailed decisions, or that another choice will be particularly fruitful for further research.

### 4.4 Induction

If one has established specific empirical results, targets of intuitions, or specific philosophical claims, one might be able to show that they are logically incompatible with some philosophical theory. But very often, they will be used to inductively confirm or disconfirm a philosophical theory, where ‘induction’ stands for all inferences to conclusions that cannot be logically deduced from the premises,
but that are nonetheless more plausible because of them. Of the different methods of induction that have been suggested, I will restrict my discussion to the hypothetico-deductive account of confirmation, Bayesian reasoning, and inference to the best explanation because they are the most prominent accounts, they are extensively used and discussed in the philosophy of science, and they can be discussed fruitfully together: Each method determines how well a statement confirms a theory (be it scientific or philosophical) by how well the statement can be inferred from or explained by the theory.

In TP, inductive inference to philosophical conclusions can be taken to be nothing but an extension of the scientific method, as both the sciences and philosophy inductively infer statements about the world. In ILP, any philosophical conclusions of inductive inferences must be conventions. Thus any reason TP provides for a philosophical statement being true must be rejected or re-interpreted as a reason that the statement is a good convention to have. The latter seems typically possible for the three methods of induction listed above: A philosophical theory that entails many other philosophical claims, makes them highly probable, or explains them well is a good convention to have. Any inductive conclusions from empirical claims within naturalized TP can be retained as synthetic (and thus non-philosophical) if empirically confirmed, or reinterpreted as analytic if not confirmable. OLP’s use of induction focuses on the empirical testing of linguistic theories about the use of expressions (Hansen 2014, 558) and is in this sense unproblematic empirical research, although Mates (1958) points out general difficulties of empirically establishing theories about ordinary language.

4.5 Further methods

**Theoretical virtues.** For scientific theories it is usually possible to invent an incompatible but empirically equivalent one (Johannesson 2022). These two theories are then empirically equally well-supported, at least in Bayesian and hypothetico-deductive confirmation, and arguably also in inference to the best explanation. To nonetheless distinguish between two empirically equivalent theories, philosophers of science have suggested relying on theoretical virtues such as agreement with previous theories, simplicity, and coherence, but also virtues such as novelty, ontological heterogeneity, and complexity of interaction (Longino 1995, §II). In all three methodologies, theoretical virtues can be used to distinguish between philosophical theories as well. In OLP, they may be used to distinguish between empirically equivalent theories about the use of an expression. In TP and ILP, on the other hand, they can be used for distinguishing between philosophical theories that are equivalent with respect to other philosophical or empirical claims, the difference being that in TP, the virtues

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12. This assumes that TP and ILP start from the same set of accepted statements, and there simply is no deductive proof of the philosophical conclusion. If the two methodologies diverged earlier, ILP might even allow the deductive inference of the philosophical conclusion from previously accepted statements.
are interpreted as guides to truth, while in ILP they are seen as guides to good conventions. As noted, ILP therefore requires no justification of these virtues beyond their expediency, while TP actually must establish that theoretical virtues are indicators of truth.

**Reflective equilibrium.** This method is helpful if there is an inconsistency in a set of analytic claims. It involves weighing the importance of each analytic claim in the set against the importance of the others and successively removing the least important claim until consistency is reached (Goodman 1965, 64). Reflective equilibrium was originally developed as variant of explication (Brun 2020) and as such can be used in ILP as a heuristic for finding good new languages. In OLP, on the other hand, reflective equilibrium can be used to arrive with minimum disturbance at a consistent set of analytic claims starting from ordinary language. This can either be seen as method of arriving at the real rules of language if one assumes that ordinary language is consistent, or as the slightest possible modification of ordinary language and thus the slightest possible step towards ILP.

**Paradigm cases.** This method, most popular within OLP, assumes that any philosophical statement that is incompatible with the paradigm cases for the concepts that occur in the statement must be wrong (Hanfling 2000, ch. 5). Stebbing (1937, 45) famously argues against Sir Arthur Eddington’s claim that planks are not solid by pointing out that planks are paradigm cases of solid objects (cf. Mates 1958, 166–167)—if planks cannot be called solid, then what can? Such paradigmatic claims cannot be overthrown by whatever other language intuition one might have about solidity, and a reflective equilibrium must always include the paradigmatic claims. For ILP, on the other hand, such paradigmatic claims have no special weight (Carnap 1962, 5–6), although one may decide to change one’s terminology if otherwise too many paradigmatic claims turned out false; in an explication, for instance, one might decide to use a word different from ‘solid’.

## 5 Arguments about linguistic philosophy

Debating philosophical methodology means debating the principles of the debate, which is not a good starting point for success. Nonetheless, there have been arguments for or (mostly) against the viability of each methodology. I present a short selection for the reader’s enjoyment, without going in much depth.

### 5.1 Arguments against linguistic philosophy

**There are no analytic statements.** This was argued most influentially by Quine (1961). If this is so, then linguistic philosophy is impossible. Counterarguments from the perspective of OLP have for instance been given by Grice and
Strawson (1956) and, with a very empirical bend, Carnap (1955); counterarguments from the perspective of ILP have for instance been given by Mates (1951) and Priest (1979). I just want to point out that Quine’s argument centrally relies on the impossibility of defining ‘analytic’ using any related terms like ‘synonymous’, while the conditions of adequacy suggested by Carnap (1963), first, do not assume the definability of ‘analytic’, and, second, are expressed in terms of ‘describing the world’\(^\text{13}\). So Quine, first, demands too much in his request for a definition and, second, does not consider enough options for circumscribing the notion of analyticity.

**Philosophical claims are best established by empirical research.** Quine (1969) also argues that rational reconstruction of our concepts is pointless, since we can simply empirically investigate what our concepts are and where they come from. But against ILP, this is a remarkably poor argument. Even rational reconstruction involves an element of justification which is absent from purely empirical investigations, and ILP in general is not concerned with the concepts we have, but the concepts we *should* have (primarily: the analytic statements we should assert). Quine’s argument could be used against the reliance on metalinguistic hunches in OLP, however, and Mates (1958, 165) directly argues that OLP should instead rely on empirical research. Such a conclusion would only establish that one specific method should not be used in OLP, however.

### 5.2 Arguments against ILP

**Changing the language misses the point.** Strawson (1963) challenges that in changing the analytic statements about a concept under investigation, explication simply changes the topic rather than solving the original problem. The challenge is discussed by Pinder (this volume, §5), so that I just want to add two remarks: The point of explication is not to solve the problem as phrased with the original concept, but rather to find a concept (by finding appropriate analytic statements) that can do everything important the old concept can (cf. Quine 1960, §53) while avoiding or solving the original problem. And this does not change the topic in any substantial sense, because there is no such topic—the philosophical component of the answer to the question does not describe anything in the world. What is changed, though, is the meta-linguistic topic: Instead of asking how our language works, we ask how our language should work. As Pinder notes, this is but a difference of interest.

**Language cannot be changed.** Cappelen (2018), assuming externalism about meaning, argues that language change on a society-wide scale is next to impossible. The main problem with the argument is that its conclusion is clearly false: In

\(^{13}\) Carnap (1963, 962, 965) uses the formulation ‘implying sentences in the observational language’.
ordinary language in the US, for instance, the meaning of ‘socialism’ has widened significantly in recent years as a result of a conscious political campaign, and Cameron (2012) discusses many more examples of guided language change. In the sciences the meaning of terms can change by fiat (as the decision to change the meaning of ‘planet’ has shown), probably because its language has a high proportion of terms whose semantics is not externalistic (‘planet’, for instance, is given its meaning by definition). The point most relevant for this discussion, however, is that Cappelen’s argument does not apply to ILP as described here, since ILP’s goal is the suggestion of new languages for use by individual researchers or groups of researchers, not the implementation of new languages in society as a whole.

Eklund (2015, §5) has argued that there are conceptual fixed points, concepts like TRUTH and EXISTENCE that cannot be shown to have been replaced by a change in the use of expressions: Any alleged change in these concepts can be rather ascribed to changes in other concepts. Eklund’s argument also does not apply to ILP as described here, which assumes that philosophical problems are solved by accepting new analytic statements, which is clearly possible even if it should turn out that it does not involve a replacement of concepts.

5.3 Arguments against OLP

The paradox of analysis. There is never a reason to engage in analysis of language according to the following argument: If we do not know what a term means, we cannot determine whether a suggested analysis is correct. But if we know what it means, analysis is unnecessary. In neither case do we have a reason to engage in analysis. The argument fails because it incorrectly assumes that language is transparent to the speaker. But as Strawson (1963, 508–509) notes, even competent speakers may require a “conceptual explanation” now and then.

Ordinary language is incorrect. In OLP, problems are to be solved by going back to ordinary language, which is assumed consistent enough for the solution. But Mates (1958, 66–67) argues that ordinary language is in fact sometimes inconsistent given what we know about the world: If the meaning of ‘solid’, for instance, were to be analyzed, one would possibly find that it means something like ‘not hollow, having its interior entirely filled with matter’, which is not what planks are. As Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 496, emphasis removed) put the matter, “the implicit rules that are present in the ordinary language game may indirectly reflect beliefs which are false.” Austin (1956, 11) agrees, but suggests that such inconsistencies are already the result of over-extensions of the initial meaning of terms, which can be identified by etymological investigations (28–29). A subsequent roll-back of ordinary language, however, would be a reform of (current) language.
OLP secretly reforms language. Maxwell and Feigl (1961, 489) argue that OLP often actually reforms rather than reports language. They do so by providing a convincing example, but also by pointing out that philosophical problems would not arise if the ordinary language of every competent speaker were free of problems. This general argument, however, ignores the central thesis of OLP, namely that language in its ordinary use is unproblematic. It is only when language is stretched beyond its ordinary use to ask philosophical questions that problems arise. Mates (1958, 169–170) instead suggests testing experimentally whether OLP implicitly reforms language by devising different questionnaires for people with the aim of leading them to different claims about the meaning of expressions.

5.4 An argument against TP

Trans-empirical intuitions are only self-supporting. Feigl (1958, 11) argues that the targets of “private”, direct experiences of various persons have a place in the nomological net of science. They can be ‘triangulated’ from various, and often quite heterogeneous, areas of evidence.” The targets of trans-empirical intuitions, on the other hand, if they connect to anything empirical at all, only do so with the help of the targets of other trans-empirical intuitions. Less metaphorically, these claims of TP can only be inferred or checked by assuming other trans-empirical claims (Cummins 1998, 116–118). Thus the claims of TP as a whole cannot be tested at all (Bradley 2018) and can be changed without loss to the remainder of science. One might consider intersubjective agreement of people’s intuitions to be evidence of the truth of the intuitions’ targets, but as Feigl (1958, 12) points out, there is a good case to be made that such agreement can always be explained by psychological laws that do not require the assumption of the truth of the intuitions’ targets (cf. Cummins 1998, 118–124).

6 What is there to decide?

None of the arguments against the different methodologies is decisive. Fortunately, philosophical research can proceed even on shaky foundations, because the methodologies agree to a significant extent on the applicability of the different methods to philosophical problems. That the different methods of philosophy can simply be reinterpreted in each methodology may still strike the level-headed reader as far-fetched. Two suggestive analogies might make this claim more palatable: The empirical sciences have a number of different methods—derivation from accepted theory, reduction to an accepted theory, laboratory confirmation, and many more. Each of these methods is reinterpreted to some extent by the different views on what science is, be they realist, conventionalist, operationalist, or something else. Similarly, mathematics has a number of different methods—proof by contradiction, mathematical induction, and many more—which are interpreted differently by different foundational axioms or interpretations of the
foundational axioms. Furthermore, both with respect to empirical sciences and mathematics, the methods’ applicability can be restricted differently by different interpretations; famously, constructive interpretations of mathematics do not allow for the same proofs as classical mathematics.

In analogy, the philosophical methods and the resulting claims can be interpreted as being about the world by TP (see Papineau 2009, 2, for naturalized TP), as being about ordinary language by OLP, and as suggestions for new languages by ILP (Lutz 2012, §4). Each of these interpretations can lead to restrictions on some of the methods, and accordingly some philosophical results are more plausible in one methodology than another. In spite of this, proponents of the different methodologies should keep in mind that the other methodologies may be utterly misguided, but their results can be worth pilfering.

References


