Deleuze’s Elaboration of Eternity: Ontogenesis and Multiplicity

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Abstract
I demonstrate that Deleuze’s identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze’s identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities (cosmic or sublunar bodies). This gradual untethering of time from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e. a movement not indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). It is here, with Deleuze’s reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: (1) a temporal ‘all’ (i.e. generality) that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localised existent or temporal series (i.e. a succession relation of temporally discrete moments); (2) that which tends towards a diversity of possible states of affairs. Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects in the long history of Aion is that—in the ancient world—it was used in magical incantations. For the Gnostics and Oracles, Aion was a deity, and a potent one at that. From the Gnostic papyri, we get a vision of Aion as a force which enjoys eternal realisation. I suggest that the papyri conjure an image of Aion as a deity that is liberated from time, in the sense that it enjoys a neutrality with respect to the movements of any particular entity or group of entities—a form,
in the most general sense of the term. Then, to clarify this mercurial aspect of an empty form of time, I elaborate on a complex analogy between Aion and Deleuze’s concept of an ‘ideal game’—an analogy that Deleuze specifies through reference to Fitzgerald and Borges. The claim is that Aion is an analogue of an ideal game in the (limited) sense that both share essential properties. Both Aion and the ideal game involve the multiplication of chance. Finally, I suggest that the differential aspects of Aion imply that it is pure variability; something which can be illustrated through a differential equation. These yield the suggestion that Aion enjoys realisation as an ontogenetic force. I further claim that ontogenetic forces may enjoy expression as the content of literature and (Riemannian-inspired) mathematics. In concrete terms, temporality is involved in the creation of existent entities, which may be illustrated as various types of continuous multiplicity.

Keywords: Aion, literature, time, future, forces, multiplicity, form, ontogenesis

I. Introduction

Perhaps the most fascinating of the multitude of nuanced—logical, ontological and axiological—distinctions that Deleuze makes in The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1990) are those which involve Aion and Chronos. Deleuze explicitly identifies Aion as a type of eternity that has two senses: (1) it is the ontologically complete entity that is coextensive with the entirety of time—the memorial past, the lived present, and the undisclosed future; (2) it subdivides any temporal series into both a proximate past and an immanently realised future state of affairs (Deleuze 1990: 61–2). In this sense, Aion is a complex multiplicity that involves aspects of ontogenesis as well as comprehensiveness—it is involved in the creation of particular content (i.e. individuated entities and processes); as these are subsistent, it might be observed that Aion demonstrates the capacity to ontologically comprehend the plurality of realised existent entities. Chronos, on the other hand, tends to be characterised as the ‘living present’ in which everything is a temporally simultaneous blended mixture of (physical) bodies and (immaterial) causes (162). Though Deleuze cautiously notes that each is analytically distinct, they tend to be actualised as mutually implicated. The concise nature of Deleuze’s elucidations suggests a potential problem concerning the nature of Aion: what exactly does it mean to be an empty
form that—despite its putative emptiness—still obtains as ontologically primary, generative and utterly comprehensive?

Here, my aim is to elaborate on Deleuze’s complex concept of Aion. My elucidation involves two complex stages: first, I develop Deleuze’s nuanced reading of the ancient Hellenistic accounts of what comes to be characterised as an empty form which comprehends a manifold of pre-personal—i.e. ontogenetic—forces; second, I suggest that eternity may be conceptualised as a continuous multiplicity that enjoys a plurality of expressions—i.e. as an idealised game in which each iteration in a series (each ‘turn’) amplifies variation of all the elements involved in the circumstance; as a Riemannian manifold (multiplicity); as a literary work of art. Together, these analyses yield the observation that eternity may be characterised as an ontogenetic force involved in the complex process of individuation.

Though explicit discussion of the term ‘Aion’ is mainly confined to the elaborations given in *The Logic of Sense*, this does not imply that the term is without significance in Deleuze’s thought, as is demonstrated with the observation that Aion’s various aspects are touched upon in other texts within Deleuze’s oeuvre (including those works co-authored with Félix Guattari). For example, the identification of Aion with Jorge Luis Borges’s formulation of time as a ‘Greek labyrinth that is but one straight line’ (Borges 1998: 156), which (strangely) involves both previous temporal events and future states of affairs, is mentioned again in Deleuze’s preface to *Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties* (Deleuze 1984a: vii), *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (Deleuze 1997: 49), and the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 192–208). While Deleuze seems to maintain that at least one type of distinction obtains between Aion and Chronos, the precise nature of Aion remains tantalisingly ambiguous. Deleuze’s further identification of Aion with temporal future conceptualised as the ‘empty form of time’ (Deleuze 1990: 62, 100–1, 137, 185) or as an empty form ‘appearing within time’ (Deleuze 1994: 86) does little to alleviate the difficulties that seem to plague the concept. As Jay Lampert points out, each of these formulations has quite different entailments (Lampert 2019: 421–2). The claim that a form is empty is not equivalent to a stipulation about the ontological status of any entities which might populate the form, in the sense that each proposition identifies attributes (predicates) of different types of entities. Just as it would be a category mistake to suggest that a species has the same attributes as an individual, there seems to be some ontological funny business in an identification of emptiness as attribute of both the form
of time and a temporal entity – like a moment of time. The claim that Aion is an empty form implies that time is a structuring process that is bereft of ontological content. This implies that Aion is involved with an ontogenetic circumstance – i.e. one which is prior to the realisation of individuated entities and processes. In this sense, Aion is akin to a Platonic ‘moving image of eternity’ (Plato 1997: 37d) that has not yet participated with any of the existent entities that might come to populate the universe. The characterisation of Aion as the form of empty time amounts to a stipulation of the existence of a temporal vacuum – i.e. a temporal zero-point; a necessarily vague entity which enjoys none of temporal value, participation in temporal succession, or any sort of temporal modification; an ontological moment that defies the predication of any sort of ‘when’. Each of these characterisations of Aion – as an ontological generality that comprehends nothing in particular; as a non-temporal form – implies a difficulty; the inexorable vagueness of a general category bereft of content, or the stipulation of the existence of an explicitly temporal entity that is strangely excised from any temporal continuum. Aion is fraught.

The complex nature of Aion is further reflected in the literature elaborating on the concept. Perhaps drawing on Maurice Blanchot's suggestion that time is the mercurial ‘scarcely human force’ (Blanchot 1982: 19) that compels one to write fiction, Gregory Flaxman characterises Aion as an ontological process that seems to transcend the lived experience of individuals (Flaxman 2012: 224). Though Jack Reynolds seems to amplify Flaxman’s suggestion that Aion is ontologically transcendent to chronometric time, he complicates the relation by pointing out that Deleuze also identifies Aion as a ‘wound’ that punctuates the flow of linear (chronometric) time by forming a ‘cut’ between temporal instants – i.e. Aion is that which separates any two instances in a relation of temporal succession (Reynolds 2007: 157). Taken together, these suggest that Aion is ontologically transcendent and immanent; both removed from empirically measurable temporal progression (i.e. the kind that can be adduced from the observation of change in physical entities; that which may be formalised as a relation of temporal succession \( t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n \)), and that which marks a temporal gap between two durations. François Dosse characterises Aion as a ‘paradoxical eternity where something incorporeal and ineffectual exceeds and opens onto the indefinite time of the event’ (Dosse 2016: 27). While this elucidation of the empty form of time is helpful, in the sense that it highlights that Aion is indefinite and involves some sort of relation to the event, it does little to clarify
the nature of the relation—what exactly does the stipulation that eternity is both ‘excessive’ to and ‘open’ to another sort of time actually mean and what kind of relation does this imply with the sort of temporal successions that define the empirically measurable time denoted by Chronos (i.e. chronometric time)? Elaborating on Deleuze’s first ‘poetic’ characterisation of time as ‘out of joint’, François Zourabichvili attempts to shed some light on the fraught ontology of Aion, when he suggests that both Chronos and Aion are to be regarded as ontologically complete, i.e. analytically discrete ontological wholes that can each be correlated with a different temporal modality: Aion is the eternal that is associated with incorporeal entities; Chronos is the present associated with the chronometric time that pertains to physical existent entities—marking their change and so on. Zourabichvili further suggests that Aion is to be identified as the time of the event, whereas chronometric time is to be identified as that in which the event is actualised (Zourabichvili 2012: 110). Though these characterisations of Aion and Chronos enjoy copious textual support, there is the lingering difficulty that Aion—a metaphysical entity that seems to be readily identifiable as a being that somehow evolved with time—is now characterised as enjoying no relation to temporality (i.e. the non-decomposable duration which admits of no temporal succession; the irreducible event). How can something be both temporal and atemporal (or non-temporal)?

Here, I will thread a way through the ontologically fraught elaborations of the nature of Aion (i.e. eternity; Eion; an indeterminate length of time). My aim is to demonstrate that Deleuze’s identification of Aion as an empty form (of time) offers a fascinating model of temporality that prioritises variation. First, I suggest that Deleuze’s identification of time as an empty form is supported by ancient Greek and Gnostic concepts of the relation of Aion and Chronos. From Plato, through Aristotle, to Plotinus the concept of time undergoes substantive revision, in the sense that temporal measurement becomes removed from the measurement of existent entities (cosmic or sublunar bodies). This gradual untethering of time from movement gives rise to the development of the concept of eternity as an ontologically comprehensive mode of time that is devoid of content (i.e. a movement not indexed to the movement of cosmic or sublunar entities). It is here, with Deleuze’s reading of the Platonic cosmology, that we see the first hints of the suggestion that Aion is involved with ontogenesis. Eternity is characterised as: (1) a temporal generality that is non-reducible to the determinacy implied by any particular temporally localised existent
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II. Concepts of Time in the Ancient World (from Plato through to the Stoics)

From the ancient Greeks to the Romans, to the Gnostics, the concept of Aion enjoys gradual development. For the ancient Greeks (Plato and Aristotle), time is identified as the measure of movement, though the nature of what is measured varies dramatically. For Plotinus (who was a Roman that spoke Greek), time is derived from the ‘movements’ of the soul. Deleuze notes that ‘every notion of Plotinus is already found in Plato’, but in The Enneads, Plato’s characterisation of time ‘undergoes a displacement, a transformation, a radical change’ (Deleuze 1984c, my translation). In the Timaeus, Plato identifies time as that which reflects the order of the ‘moving image of eternity’ (Plato 1997: 37d). Reflecting on the movement of celestial bodies—the moon, the sun and the ‘wanderers’—Plato observes that these have the dual function of ‘begetting’ and standing guard over time (Plato 1997: 38c–d). In his
28 February 1984 seminar on the ancient Greek concepts of time and truth, Deleuze notes that Plato conceived of time as being determined by privileged points on a planisphere. Time, as it is elaborated in Plato’s astronomy, is the measure of the movement of the planets, in the sense that were these to not exist (or—strangely—neglect their guard duties), time would cease to be. The circular movement of the celestial bodies was seen as the unchanging temporal order that provided a sense of meaning to the various movements of ‘sublunar’ (i.e. terrestrial) life. Plato characterises the demiurge (δημιουργός) as creating the invariant circular movement of the celestial bodies which supplies order to the various movements of all those that enjoy material existence—the citizens as they go about their activities in the marketplaces, on the seas, and in the fields of the ancient world; the frolic of animals in the fields outside the Athenian city-state; the passage of ships as they make their way along the bustling trade routes of the Mediterranean.

Deleuze notes that the Platonic conception time undergoes radical revision in Aristotle. In Aristotle, time becomes ‘undomesticated’, in the sense that time is no longer simply characterised as that which was created to measure movement. In *Physics IV*, Aristotle famously identifies time’s involvement with change (Aristotle 1991b: 218b21). Aristotle further observes that time does not condition the creation and destruction of physical entities, even though creation and destruction are clearly events which happen in time (222b26). Deleuze combines these claims with the observation that, for Aristotle, ‘the closer we get to the earth, the more the circular movement presents aberrations, and the more these aberrations give us an untamed time, or worse we deliver ourselves to a non-domesticated time’ (Deleuze 1984b, my translation). Elaborating on the nature of change and its relation to time, Aristotle notes that change has three aspects: (1) there is the thing that changes; (2) there is something in which the change occurs; (3) there is that to which something changes (Aristotle 1991b: 236a36–b18). Taken in isolation, none of these aspects provides a comprehensive account of change or time. In concrete terms, one can no more give a complete elaboration of the nature of change by simply focusing on the human who changes, than one can aspire to a comprehensive account of time by only specifying all the minutes that relentlessly mark the passage of temporal moments of a life or by simply presenting an elaboration of the withered corpse that one will become. Here it should be highlighted that the measurement of time is only one aspect of a temporal multiplicity.

In his 28 February 1984 seminar on ancient concepts of time, Deleuze observes that Plotinus modifies Plato’s and Aristotle’s characterisations
of time as the measure of movement. Gordon H. Clark observes, that, for Plotinus, motion is what determines time, in the sense that time is a reflection of motion (and not the other way around). Clark writes: ‘time’s existence does not await our counting; and, instead of time’s being a measure or unit of motion, it is more true to say that motion measures time’ (Clark 1944: 355). Plotinus observes that any and all measure of the motion of physical entities—the chase of the charioteer, the flowing of wine, the rhythm of the undulations of the ears of wheat outside the walls of the city-state, and so on—are accidental properties of motion, in the sense that measurement only provides a specification of the quantitative value associated with motion. 

Elaborating on the measure of the universe itself, Plotinus cautiously suggests that observations of the circuit of celestial bodies will reveal as enso of teim (Plotinus 2018:3.7.12, 46–52). The key point that Deleuze develops is that time is not produced by the circuit of celestial bodies. The measure of time is an indirect image of time, which reveals time’s quantitative aspect, but is insufficient to the task of providing a comprehensive account of time’s nature.

The Stoics further develop the concept of the empty form of time. Arius Didymus observes that Chrysippus suggests that ‘time is the interval of motion according to which the measure of speed and slowness is spoken of; or, time is the interval which accompanies the motion of the cosmos’ (Inwood and Gerson 1997: 167). Stobaeus elaborates that Chrysippus conceived of time as involving four implicated entities and processes: (1) a ‘dimension’ which ‘accompanies’ the universe’s motion (Long and Sedley 1987: 304); (2) a generality that ontologically comprehends all that moves; (3) an eternal form that is non-reducible to the temporal present; (4) the temporal present from which both the past and the future subsist as ontologically dependent entities. Sean Bowden observes that Chrysippus’ position seems to involve a tension, in the sense that the stipulation that time is never wholly present seems to contradict the suggestion that the past and future subsist from an existent present (Bowden 2011: 22). Deleuze resolves this apparent contradiction by identifying two discrete temporal aspects: Chronos (i.e. the lived present) and Aion (i.e. eternity). Deleuze explicitly identifies Chronos as the ‘vast present which ... is an encasement, a coiling up of relative presents’ (Deleuze 1990: 162) from which the analytically discrete temporal domains of the limitless past and the infinite future are excluded. Deleuze cautiously notes that both of these are comprehended by a separate aspect of temporality (Aion), which is illustrated with the geometric image of a straight line progressing towards both the past
and the future—the very image used by Arius Didymus to characterise Chrysippus’ elaboration of the nature of the infinite.

The complex nature of Aion (and its relation to Chronos) is reflected in the ancient Greek and Hellenistic world’s representations of these deities. The difficulties involved in discerning the differences between Aion and Chronos involve two aspects: (1) ontological priority; (2) ontological role. The ancient world offers various—often competing—suggestions about which, if either, of Aion and Chronos is ontologically dependent on the other and what sense of temporality is to be associated with each. Arthur Darby Nock observes that the oracles from Claros identify the ‘chief deity [as] Aion, the various gods of cultus [sic.] being a small part of him and his angels’ (Nock 1934: 82). Aion’s putative ontological priority is up-ended when we consult the Orphic cosmology, which casts Chronos as the ‘original god’ and identifies Aion with Baal Shamin, a subordinate deity whose name ‘means in the first instance “lord of eternity” and in the second “lord of the world”’ (86). The implied confusion of which deity (or modality of time) begat the other is also reflected in the archaeological record. Doro Levi mentions the Column of Antonius Pius, which depicts Aion as a naked angel (winged youth) who lifts the divine couple to Olympus (Levi 1944: 307). The physical position and relative age of the represented deities suggest that Aion is ontologically subordinate to other gods. The suggestion that Aion is ontologically secondary is reversed in Mithraic depictions of the god as an old man to which all other deities are subordinated (307). The ambivalence of the ancient world to Aion’s ontological priority in reference to other magical entities is also evidenced in the Greek magical papyri. In these, Aion is variously addressed as ‘You who are master above the earth and below the earth; the ruler of the universe, Ra, Pan’ (Benz 1986: 77); ‘Lord of [the] Aion, all things, only god, unutterable’ (194); and the one ‘deathless god’ who is the ‘begetter of all, and assigns souls to all and all control, king of all the Aions and lord’ (163). The apparent lack of coherence of these leads Benz to suggest that conceptualisations of Aion in the ancient world were quite fluid.

The situation does not get much better when we turn to elaborations of the role of Aion relative to the temporal cycles involved with birth and death and other natural phenomena. The figure of Aion—represented as a mythical phoenix—adorns the face of an Alexandrian coin (minted around 138–9 CE). The coin’s iconography suggests that Aion presides over the cycles of and renewal of human life. In magical papyri from around the same historical period, Aion is often characterised as ‘the god of the four winds’ (Levi 1944: 296). Other magical texts characterise
Aion as variously the bringer of light, a daemonic spirit that separates what is from what is not, and ‘that which gives wealth’ (Benz 1986: 99). The variety of ancient accounts may be adduced to support the claim that each entity is ontologically complete (i.e. irreducible, non-subsistent, ontologically primary, an ontogenetic force), if for no other reason than that the ancient world’s vacillation about the priority and attributes of Aion and Chronos suggests that no dependency relation obtains between them. Indeed, Deleuze seems to assent to this claim when he observes that the putatively different modalities of time – past, present and future – belong to a complex multiplicity involving at least two discrete sorts of temporality. Of the plurality of attributes predicated of Aion, none involves corporeality. In each of its many guises, Aion is incorporeal, in the sense that Aion tends to be characterised as any of a menagerie of immaterial entities – light waves, daemons, abstract phenomena, cycles and abstract values. Deleuze generalises this plurality of attributes to suggest that Aion involves all incorporeal events. Aion becomes anything that is divisible into a temporally prior or temporally future state of affairs. Taken together, these yield a staggering vision of an empty form that is ontologically discrete from the entirety of the universe of physical entities, and (at the same time) comprehensive of – or coextensive with – all that has been or could come to be.

III. The Empty Form of Time Elucidated through Reference to Games, Literary Works of Art and Mathematics

Deleuze’s elaborations of Aion demand an assessment of the explanatory value of conceptualising time as an empty form. Drawing on the narratives of Fitzgerald and Borges, Deleuze suggests that the concept of an empty form of time yields a concept of the future as something completely indeterminate, to which one proceeds only by virtue of experiencing a rupture (i.e. a ‘crack-up’) with respect to one’s lived present. Fitzgerald observes that future states of affairs only come about through a series of ‘blows that come or seem to come from the outside’ of one’s lived experience (Fitzgerald 1945: 69). Elsewhere, Fitzgerald elaborates on the nature of this movement towards the undisclosed future by characterising it as a sudden ‘self-immolation’; a ‘jail-break . . . a clean break . . . something you cannot comeback from’ (81). Borges echoes these sentiments when he characterises the present as a ‘point of departure’ towards ‘diverse times which themselves also proliferate and fork’ (Borges 1998: 125). The model of the future presented here seems to involve a three-stage inferential progression: (1) the present
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is posited to be ontologically distinct from the future; (2) progression to the future involves a radical break from the content of the lived present; (3) this break suggests the emergence of divergent temporal series that enjoy neither a necessary tether to each other nor temporally prior states. Deleuze cautiously notes that such a model of discrete temporalities yields a sort of idealised concept of an empty future which embraces all possible combinations while not prioritising the emergence of any particular state of affairs. The substantive implication here is that the future is cast as an infinitely expanding entity that involves the competing characteristics of being able to comprehend any emerging particular state of affairs, and not being wholly actualised at any given temporal instant.

Deleuze elucidates the complex nature of Aion by proposing a complex analogy between Aion and the concept of an ideal game. An ideal game is stipulated as one which tends towards the multiplication of chance. Deleuze illustrates this concept through reference to a few concepts from Borges—the Babylonian lottery, and the labyrinth of a Chinese philosopher’s (Ts’ui Pen’s) book. Each of these must be elucidated. The terrible thing about the lottery is that chance intervenes at all stages of the game—in the drawing of lots; in the assigning of values to that which is drawn; all decisions involved in any determination of the outcomes of each draw, and so on. The non-deterministic aspects of the ideal game are also illustrated in ‘The Garden of Forking Paths’. Here, Borges observes:

In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives, he chooses one at the expense of others. In the almost unfathomable Ts’ui Pen, he chooses—simultaneously—all of them . . . Fang, let us say, has a secret. A stranger knocks at the door. Naturally there are various outcomes. Fang can kill the intruder, the intruder can kill Fang, both can be saved, both can die, etc. In Ts’ui Pen’s work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations . . . you have come to my house, but in one of our possible pasts you are my enemy, in another, my friend. (Borges 1998: 125)

In both these illustrations, chance—far from being attenuated—is amplified. In this sense, Deleuze’s concept of an ideal game is analytically distinct from the games with which we are all familiar—Monopoly, chess, Russian roulette, beer pong, and so on. Deleuze cautiously notes the limit of this analogy when he observes that though games typically function to constrain chance to a limited range of potential outcomes (e.g. a roulette ball landing on a certain colour and no other), ideal
games enjoy none of this limitation of chance. This amplification of diversity is also evident in Deleuze’s elaboration of the plurality of outcomes associated with Fang’s tragic tale—in the ‘Sixteenth Series of Static Ontological Genesis’ (Deleuze 1990)—in which each of the multiple competing outcomes is actualised simultaneously. The claim here is that the plurality of outcomes obtain as temporally compresent, incompatible aspects of the same temporal moment. This implies that temporal simultaneity is the second shared property enjoyed by Aion and ideal games. The claim here is that the ideal game and Aion are analogues of one another, inasmuch as they (1) both multiply chance, and (2) both involve a timeless quality, in the sense that all outcomes occur without any temporal separation. That both Aion and the ideal game involve temporally simultaneous—yet ontologically discrete—events, and the observation that these multiply chance are adduced to validate the analogy of time and the ideal game.

The compresence of mutually implicated elements suggests that Aion may be identified as a multiplicity. The nature of a multiplicity is as crucial to understanding the nature of ontogenetic variation as it is complex. A multiplicity functions to group together elements without arraying them into a hierarchical order of ontological dependency. A dubious reductionist strategy might yield the suggestion that multiplicities obtain as a species of any of hierarchical, organic, or dialectical organisation. It should be observed that (both) hierarchical and organic modes of organisation tend to involve elements which lend themselves to designation as qualitative or quantitative aspects, arrayed in a—spatio-temporally or conceptually—contiguous fashion. Manuel DeLanda elaborates on the non-contiguity of multiplicities when he observes that the elements of multiplicities tend to be arrayed in a manner akin to terms in a disparate series (DeLanda 2002: 204–5). The suggestion that the elements of a multiplicity may very well be non-adjacent might cause one to posit that multiplicities enjoy dialectical organisation—i.e. a relation of contraries, in which the relata might not enjoy conceptual proximity, in the sense that they may be oppositions of any of a secondary, tertiary, quaternary, (etc.) order. Deleuze explicitly denies the identification of dialectic and multiplicity when he starkly notes that multiplicities are non-identical to ‘the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic that proceeds by opposition’ (Deleuze 1994: 182). Taken together, these observations suggest that a multiplicity is conceptually distinct from all of hierarchy, organic organisation, and dialectic.
In one of the most conceptually dense passages of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze specifies three conditions associated with multiplicities: (1) they are ontogenetic, in the sense that their pre-individuated elements ‘have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification’ (Deleuze 1994: 183); (2) their elements tend to enjoy reciprocal determination; (3) multiplicities involve differential relations that tend towards actualisation. The suggestion here is that multiplicities involve the sort of relation that gains expression as a differential equation; the peculiar sort of diffuse ordering that attains actuality as a plurality of disparate spatio-temporal locales conjoined in a reticulated network of physical places that tend to be associated with the production of the ontologically new. It should be observed that Aion and ‘ideal games’—characterised as forces or processes involved in creation or modification of individuated entities—satisfy the first condition. The correlate of this is that there is no ontological dependency among forces. The second condition is satisfied with the observation that the absence of a dependency relation implies a more nuanced series of relations linking forces. In concrete terms, multiplicities obtain as the intermingling of non-reducible, analytically distinguishable forces that enjoy mutual implication.

Satisfaction of the third condition—which stipulates multiplicities involve differential relations, which tend towards actualisation—is more complex, if for no other reason than that the condition involves claims about the nature of the expression of a differential equation, as well as observations about the outcomes of ontogenetic circumstances. These may be elaborated through reference to Riemann’s distinction between discrete and continuous multiplicities. Simon Duffy characterises Deleuze’s theory of multiplicities as an attempt to resolve the ontological problem of one and many by stipulating the existence of a field of interrelated forces. Duffy further suggests that Deleuze developed his theory ‘by clarifying and drawing upon the full potential of Riemann’s mathematical developments’ (Duffy 2013: 89). Indeed, Riemann—in *On the Hypotheses Which Lie at the Bases of Geometry*—explicitly claims that his aim is to elaborate on conditions at work in the creation of measurable physical space (Riemann 2016: 31). This suggests that the objects of Riemann’s analysis are the ontogenetic processes involved in the formation of physical domains, as well as the individual entities that populate these. In this sense, Riemann was doing ontology under the guise of geometry, as is apparent in the implied identification of an ontogenetic field with a continuous multiplicity (i.e. a continuous manifold, a continuous magnitude). Here, it is important to elucidate the
distinction between a discrete manifold and a continuous multiplicity. There are two important differentiae involved: (1) each of discrete manifolds and continuous multiplicities tend to comprehend different sorts of elements; (2) this implies that distinct modes of determination are involved in the identification of each type of array. José Ferreirós observes that a discrete multiplicity involves numerals—i.e. any element comprehended by the set of natural numbers $\mathbb{N}$—as the content of their determination (Ferreirós 2000: 41). The claim here is that discrete multiplicities may be ascribed specific quantitative values of the type used in arithmetic calculation. In concrete terms, a discrete magnitude is illustrated by the totality of votes cast in a general election, in the sense that the quantitative values associated with the ballots is determined through correlation to a set of extrinsic values (i.e. the elements of the set $\mathbb{N}$). Daniel W. Smith observes that Deleuze’s concept of a continuous multiplicity involves the relation of a ‘variable number of dimensions (its n-dimensionality), and the absence of any supplementary dimension which would impose on it extrinsically defined coordinates or unity’ (Smith 2003: 429). The suggestion here is that continuous multiplicities enjoy no recourse to an external set of values with which to correlate in the determination of their value or identity. Echoing Aristotle, Ferreirós observes that continuous multiplicities tend to involve ‘line’, ‘surface’ and ‘body’ as their content. The further implication is that the value of a continuous multiplicity is determined through measurement of this content—e.g. the length of a line is determined in relation to another line that obtains as an element of the same (numerically and qualitatively identical) continuous multiplicity. The claim is that determinations of the nature of the elements comprehended by continuous multiplicities tend to rely on measurement, not ordinal (or serial) numeration. In this sense, a continuous multiplicity is akin to a gamut of hues of a particular colour, in which the values of the various hues are relatively determined through comparison with other hues comprehended by the same colour tone.

Stated again: discrete multiplicities derive their quantitative value (i.e. their quantitative magnitude) through reference to a series of magnitudes conceptually discrete from the ontological domain in which they obtain; elements of a continuous magnitude derive their relative value through a measurement in reference to other values with which they are implicated (as elements of the same ontological domain); the relativity of the criteria of measurement implies the potential for radical transformation (ontogenesis) of elements; in terms of their identity and value, the elements of a continuous
multiplicity enjoy ongoing determination by variable criteria; because the criteria involved in these determinations obtain as aspects of a set of elements undergoing dynamic transformation, the variations associated with continuous multiplicities are properly characterised as intrinsic ontogenetic variations which are expressible as differential equations (e.g. $\frac{dy}{dx}$). Taken together, these observations have been adduced to suggest that the variations of Aion are akin to those of an ontogenetic field populated by implicated, non-individuated forces, and these tend to enjoy representation as differential equations.

Deleuze further elaborates on these aspects of Aion (and the ideal game) in an essay originally published three years after *The Logic of Sense*. In ‘How Do We Recognize Structuralism?’ (Deleuze 2004a), Deleuze identifies three types of mathematical relations that tend to be used to express ontogenesis: (1) real; (2) imaginary; (3) differential. Of these, differential relations tend to be best suited to characterise the peculiar type of ontogenesis associated with Aion. In a real relation (e.g. $3 + 2$ or $2/3$) the elements of the relation (i.e. the integers) have a fixed numeric value – i.e. their values are ‘autonomous’, in the sense that the values are not dependent on the relation. In an imaginary relation (e.g. $x^2 + y^2 - r_1 = 0$), the values of none of the relata are specified, and also each of the relata must have a determinate value (i.e. any solution of the equation is predicated on each of its terms having a determinate value). In a differential relation (e.g. $\frac{dy}{dx} = -\frac{x}{y}$), the elements of the relation are undetermined, in the sense that (1) they have no real numeric value that is autonomous to the relation; (2) a determinate value is not demanded to ‘solve’ the relation (i.e. $dy$ has no determinate value in relation to $y$; $dx$ has a completely indeterminate value in relation to $x$). To borrow a phrase from Husserl, the elements of a differential relation are in an inexact but rigorous relation, in the sense that the relation $\frac{dy}{dx}$ is rigorously determined (i.e. it is this relation, and no other), but the values of the terms in the relation are indeterminate (i.e. the values of the terms can only be determined reciprocally). Elucidating the nature of the values in a differential relation, Smith notes that though ‘they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation; the terms themselves do not exist apart from the differential relation into which they enter and by which they are reciprocally determined’ (Smith 2012: 322, n.16). Here we have the substantive aspects of Aion: it is a self-subsistent (ontologically independent), rigorously determinable entity which is productive of the unique. Aion is the product of difference.

Though differential relations seem to enjoy historical priority in the expression of ontogenetic aspects of Aion, one should not
confuse explanatory expediency (facilitated by the conceptual apparatus afforded by Riemann’s analyses) with absolute priority. One may elaborate on the nature of a multiplicity in many ways. Indeed, as we have seen with our analyses of Fitzgerald and Borges, the ontogenetic aspects of Aion—its identification as multiplicity involved in processes of individuation—have been elaborated in literature. One implication of this claim (to which we now should return briefly) is that it seems to suggest that literary work may be capable of expressing the complex nature of Aion. The key observation here is that the literary work of art is an assemblage of implicated elements which are involved in the complex processes associated with the creation or modification of entities. It should also be observed that Deleuze and Guattari suggest support for this claim with their observation—in the second volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*—that books are multiplicities (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). In the context of the co-authored text, the implication is that the book is a multiplicity simply because it is non-reducible to the thought of one person. Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the ontological stakes of their claim when they note that in order for an entity to be a multiplicity there must be (at least) two other multiplicities that constitute it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 152). But what is the guarantee that what is constituted will obtain as multiplicity? In other words, why don’t two multiplicities simply produce a unity that, though non-reducible to either of its constituent elements, still may be characterised as one that is explicitly not a multiplicity? Deleuze and Guattari assuage these concerns by suggesting that the formed multiplicity is a highly variable (i.e. ‘metastable’),7 non-individuated, schematised organisational structure that is formed from the series of relations between the two ontological constituents (i.e. the literary work of art is a multiplicity that expresses a plurality of possible relations that could occur among multiple implicated forces). Taken together, these suggest that literary works of art might have the capacity to express the complex form of multiplicity enjoyed by Aion.

It might be further observed that in his analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics, Smith suggests that works of art are akin to continuous multiplicities when he suggests that they involve a relative variation of mutually implicated elements (Smith 2012: 104). Deleuze and Guattari—in *Anti-Oedipus*—observe that a literary work of art is akin to a continuous multiplicity, in the sense that it is a ‘non-totalized’ unity composed of discrete transformational parts (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 42). To get a concrete sense of the nature of the book as a non-totalised unity, it is helpful to borrow the terminology of
Roman Ingarden, who also characterises a book as a multiplicity—i.e. an ontologically heteronymous formation that comprehends a plurality of compresent, mutually implicated, generative aspects. The distinct aspects of a book are non-reducible to a numeric or qualitative one, in multiple senses. Here we may invoke a principle of the plurality of possible relata: any given aspect may be drawn in relation to some other realised aspect. The plurality of possible relations seems to diminish the possibility of reducing the literary work of art to a single essence. Further, one person’s act of reading a given book does not allow any authoritative stipulation of narrative identity or coherence—any given reader could be profoundly wrong in their reading of a text, or they might simply not form any conclusions about what they have read. In addition, the observation that a book was written by someone or some group of people, and is made up of material parts (i.e. pages and a cover), immaterial parts (i.e. the meanings of the words written on its pages) can be adduced to yield the claim that a book is non-reducible to a simple unity. Finally, the suggestion that a book only really comes into existence as a unity in the ongoing and open-ended social elaborations of its meaning can be adduced to support the claim that though it is a unity, the book is never a totality in the sense that its meanings are (1) never fully elaborated, and (2) undergoing continual revision, for the temporal duration of the book’s existence. Deleuze and Guattari cautiously note that though a book is a type of multiplicity that defies all attempts to reduce it to an ontological one, this does not preclude the possibility of discussing it as an organisation of elements that affects its readers, in the sense that it changes both their emotional comportment to the world, as well as values that they ascribe to objects in the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 4). Here, it is perhaps worthwhile drawing attention to the nuanced meaning associated with Deleuze’s use of the term ‘affect’. Brian Massumi notes that Deleuze borrows his sense of the term from Spinoza’s affectus, which is characterised as ‘a pre-personal intensity corresponding to the passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that body’s capacity to act’ (in Deleuze and Guattari 1987: xvi). The implication here is that works of literature are involved in an ontogenetic circumstance—i.e. among the literary work of art’s plurality of implicated elements are ontogenetic forces. Taken together, these observations about the nature of the literary work of art suggest that it fulfils the three conditions associated with the identification of a multiplicity: ontogenesis is suggested by the identification of the tendency of literature to be involved in the
creation or modification of entities; reciprocal determination may be identified as a species of co-implication; the ongoing modification of meanings associated with the act of reading a work of literature suggests its elements (i.e. its grammatical, syntactical and ontological parts) are involved in differential relations. The further implication is that Aion enjoys expression as the concretised content of all manner of novels, poems, fiction, and reveries elaborated through literary means.

IV. Concluding Remarks

Aion is fraught, but perhaps not quite as fraught as when we began. In the foregoing I specified Deleuze’s thought on the nature of eternity. As mercurial as the form of Aion may (at first) appear, it does not exceed elaboration. Aion is a deity of many names and multiple representations; it is a form of the cosmos itself; it is an aspect involved with all of change, measurement and magical transformation. It is an element expressed in chronometric series of the kind illustrated in the evolutionary series of all earthly existent entities. Further, it is an ideal that is capable of comprehending the putative heavenly ascension associated with spiritual entities. The plurality of aesthetic and scientific discussions of Aion may be adduced to support the claim that the eternal may be identified as a thought object so rigorously interrogated by phenomenologists. These competing elaborations do not suggest that Aion is akin to a hopelessly mercurial noumena that fails to maintain any conceptual unity. Deleuze observes that Aion is explicitly akin to a game. Deleuze further observes that the variations comprehended by the eternal may be illustrated through reference to the mathematics associated with the determination of a Riemannian manifold, as well as through literature. In this sense, Aion is involved in the values present in mathematics and the arts. Perhaps more clearly, Aion is expressed as the content of these.

The claim that the eternal is expressible through a plurality of putatively discrete types of discourse implies that Aion is a multiplicity. The suggestion of the multiple does not imply identification with either organic unity or any species of dialectical relation. Deleuze carefully observes that the multiple involves three aspects: ontogenesis, reciprocal determination, and relation of relatively determined (i.e. non-autonomous; implicated) elements. If each of these aspects is treated as a necessary defining condition that must be fulfilled to produce an adequate identification of a continuous multiplicity, then it must be observed that eternity is a multiplicity. In positive terms, time is an element of the ontogenetic circumstance that yields the formation of
the analytically discrete processes and entities which populate reality. The claim that Aion is involved with the complex processes associated with individuation suggests that it is ontologically primary—it is an element involved in the realisation of the immense plurality of all that is, has been, or is yet to come. In concrete terms, Aion obtains as an aspect prior to the realisation of any existent entity; it is an element of the most ontologically primary field of forces. For this reason—because it is ontologically prior to any content—Deleuze characterises Aion as an empty form; it is the form of non-individuated, pre-personal forces involved in the creation of the variegated menagerie that populates reality.

Notes


2. Deleuze often repeats this formulation in his elaborations of the nature of time—particularly the temporal mode of the future (Deleuze 1984: vii; 1998: 27). He offers a substantive elaboration of this formulation in his 13 December 1983 lecture on the subject (Deleuze 1983). Deleuze attributes this formulation to Shakespeare, who has the fictitious Prince of Denmark utter the phrase (Shakespeare 1966: 878, I, v, 188).

3. Plato uses the term ‘wanderers’ to refer to the five planets that were known to the ancient Greeks (i.e. Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn).

4. Roman Ingarden aptly characterises an organic unity as involving a discrete organisation of conceptually contiguous, mutually implicated elements. He further observes that each element of an organic unity may vary its function in reference to other elements of the organism (Ingarden 1989: 27–39). The identification of hierarchical organisation can be traced to Aristotle’s identification of a continuum of infinitely subdivisible parts arranged in a manner that implies ontological dependency relations (Aristotle 1991b: 268a1–b10).

5. Brian Massumi elaborates on the non-dialectical character of multiplicities through reference to their mode of organisation. In his introduction to the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Massumi writes: ‘Rather than analyzing the world into discrete components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity, and ordering them by rank, it sums up a set of disparate circumstances in a shattering blow. It synthesises a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary)’ (in Deleuze and Guattari 1987: xiii).

6. It would not be misguided to credit the identification of discrete and continuous multiplicities to Aristotle. In Categories, Aristotle distinguishes among distinct and continuous magnitudes: ‘Of quantities some are discrete, others continuous; and some are composed of parts which have position in relation to one another, others are not composed of parts which have position. Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces, bodies, and also, besides these, time

7. In a 1966 review of the first part of Gilbert Simondon’s *L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information*, Deleuze characterises metastability as an attribute of an ontogenetic circumstance in which multiple pre-personal forces interact with one another. Deleuze writes: ‘But what essentially defines a metastable system is the existence of a “disparation,” the existence of at least two different dimensions, two disparate levels of reality, between which there is not yet any interactive communication. A metastable system thus implies a fundamental difference, like a state of dissymmetry. It is nonetheless a system insofar as the difference therein is like potential energy, like a difference of potential distributed within certain limits. Simondon’s conception, it seems to me, can in this respect be assimilated to a theory of intensive quanta, since each intensive quantum in itself is difference’ (Deleuze 2004b: 87).

8. Ingarden elucidates the formal conditions (i.e. heteronomy, involvement of multiple implicated aspects, as well as involvement of a plurality of psychological, ontological and physical processes) of the literary work of art in his magnum opus, *The Literary Work of Art* (Ingarden, 1973: 3–16).

References


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