Agency in Compound Action

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Abstract
The Anscombean conception of intentional action endorses that an action's being intentional is in virtue of its internal structure, rather than any extra ingredient. Anscombe (2000) calls it the calculative order "that is there whenever actions are done with intentions," which features its teleological aspect. In his work reviving this tradition, Thompson (2008) highlights its temporal aspect. With the help of the concept "compound action," we shall see that typical intentional action attends to both aspects. The synthesis is met by shifting from the aspect of action to agency. To act intentionally, an agent needs not only the capacity for calculating from a general end to a specific means, but also the capacity for planning: coordinate stages of different actions over time hierarchically, by occupying a certain kind of slots.

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1. Introduction

The Anscombean conception of intentional action endorses that an action's being intentional is in virtue of its internal structure, rather than any extra ingredient. Anscombe calls it the \textit{calculative order} "that is there whenever actions are done with intentions" (Anscombe 2000, §42, p. 80), which features its teleological aspect. In his work reviving this tradition, Thompson (2008) highlights its temporal aspect. With the help of the concept "compound action," we shall see that typical intentional action attends to both aspects. The synthesis is met by shifting from the aspect of action to agency. To act intentionally, an agent needs not only the capacity for calculating from a general end to a specific means, but also the capacity for planning: coordinate stages of different actions over time hierarchically, by occupying a certain kind of slots.

The layout of the subsequent sections is: §2 recapitulates the calculative perspective of intentional action by reconstructing one of Anscombe's core arguments. §3 shows that a certain kind of \textit{autonomy} that emerges from the temporal structure of certain intentional actions provides the slots called for planning. Such autonomy originates from certain kinds of instruments. §4 examines the agency in actions that are mediated by instruments with another conceptual device developed in Hornsby (2011): the dichotomy between non- mediately causing and mediately causing. Hornsby argues that, when someone acts non- mediately, the particular causal work done is the work of the agent's own. As we shall see, even when mediated by instrument, the relation between the work of the agent and the work of the instrument would not be the causal relation as Davidsonian causalists conceived. §5 tackles issues concern the agency in actions that are mediated by other agents. We shall delineate the proxy agency by delimiting the intentional action of the proxy agent. As we shall see, what matters to proxy agency is not volition but intention. In such cases, the proxy agent manifest more of her own agency if the capacity being deployed is the capacity for calculating. §6 ties up some loose ends and draws to a close.

2. Teleological aspect and the capacity for calculating

According to the Ryle-Kenny-Vendler typology of verb types, those that fall
under the category of *accomplishment* indicate the most typical intentional actions, such as "building a house." Sentence with an accomplishment phrase in the progressive aspect and the corresponding sentence in the perfective aspect contrast with each other. If one is building a house, that implies that the house is not built yet. On the other hand, one cannot be building a house once the house has been built. The other category of verb type that indicates less typical actions is called *activity*, such as "running." Sentence with an activity verb in the progressive aspect and the corresponding sentence in the perfective aspect entail each other. If one is running, then she did run for some time. On the other hand, if one ran for a certain period of time, then she must be running in that period of time. An activity may stop at any arbitrary moment. Once the endpoint is not arbitrary, the activity would be attributed with a terminus and this would turn the activity into an accomplishment. For an accomplishment, what lies behind its aspectual contrast is this: Actions, when considered as something that can be *done*, have their *immanent terminus*. Such immanent terminus indicates the *end* of the calculative order of the intentional action. Action with immanent terminus is typically intentional because the calculative order is essential to the intentional action it belongs to.

Anscombe argues that *further intention* is essential for an action to be intentional. Further intention is further not only chronologically, but more importantly, further in a teleological sense—it is a meeting of the teleological and the chronological. Further intention is further chronologically because the state of affair the agent intends to bring about is surely something in the future. But further intention concerns not only the terminal state of affair, but also the way to bring it about, which is being in process until its terminus is reached. Further intention concerns the means to bring about the terminal end as well, because one's mentioning of something future can be identified as an expression of further intention only if it bears an intelligible connection with the agent's acting *here and now*. As Anscombe says: "human beings must always act with some end in view." (Anscombe 2000, §21, p. 33)

In order to make sense of "I do P with a view to Q," we must see how the future state of affairs Q is supposed to be a possible later stage in proceedings of which the action P is an earlier stage. (Anscombe 2000, §22, p. 36)

Such intelligibility lies in the role P plays in bringing Q about.
The relation between P and Q, as one means to an end, is *sufficient but not necessary*. Once P is insufficient for Q, P would be straightly disqualified as a means of Q. However, in some peculiar cases, the agent's performing P in carrying Q out is still intelligible even if P is not in fact a means of Q, but only taken to be one by the agent, just like the Dublin crowd believe that Dean Swift can delay the eclipse by issuing an order (Anscombe 2000, §22, p. 36). It is intelligible because the reason why the agent would take P to be a means of Q, which is certainly dependent on the intellectual condition of the agent, is also intelligible. In some other cases, even when P is in fact sufficient for Q, it still needs some "filling in" (Anscombe 2000, §22, p. 35) to become intelligible.

The intimate connection between further intention and the agent's current acting can also be seen from the fact that the expression of further intention usually takes present progressive tense, rather than any future tense. The answers to the question "Why?" that outline the area of intentional action form a series of descriptions of the intentional action in question. To answer the question "Why?" is just to give the further intention with which the agent acts, thereby giving a wider description of the action. The immanent terminus of the action under this wider description is exactly the *end* of the action under the narrower one. Conversely, the action under the narrower description is a *means* to fulfill the further intention. Thus, the series of descriptions, like a handing-off, forms a means-end chain (Anscombe 2000, §26, p. 46). Anscombe notices that the chain cannot go on forever. It normally ends with an overall end, which at the same time describes the action as an encompassing whole. However, there could be a "break in the series of answers":

But the less normal it would be to take the achievement of the objective as a matter of course, the more the objective gets expressed *only* by "in order to." E.g. "I am going to London in order to make my uncle change his will;" not "I am making my uncle change his will." (Anscombe 2000, §23, p. 40)

The employment of infinitive in such cases suggests that the agent can hardly be said to be doing the thing in question. On the one hand, going to London is only a minor component of the means to make the person's uncle change his will. This makes the answer to the question "Why?" fails to describe something he is doing *in* going to London but only something that he is going to London *in order to do*. On the other hand, things like "bring down the
government" or "make someone change one's will," can hardly be said to have any regular way to accomplish. The less compressed the expression of the relevant deed is, the more likely so. If so, there would be no robust bound between the thing the agent is acting as means and its remote end.

The last thing to address is the priority of calculation over explanation. The same calculative order is elicited by the explanatory question "Why?" and the calculative question "How?" from opposite directions, while these two directions are not on an equal footing. As Anton Ford notes correctly, this same calculative order is being accessed to two kinds of reasoner. The question "Why?" reveals a way of thinking about an action, thus speaking to the mind of a spectator as a theoretical reasoner. The question "How?" reveals the way an agent thinks in acting, thus speaks to the mind of an agent as a practical reasoner (Ford 2017). Explanation and calculation as two aspects of a two-way capacity, are not on an equal footing either. A spectator who never acts on her own can hardly understand other agents' actions. The backbone of Ford's insight is pretty Kantian: it is one same reason that operates in both sides, which renders the internal structure a rational structure.

This very point is omitted by Michael Thompson, who notes incisively that intentional action can not only be explained, but also explain other actions. What is noted by Thompson is that the explanatory power of intentional action comes temporally from its progressive aspect (Thompson 2008, 128–33). But what is prescinded is that it comes teleologically, from the fact that the current acting of the agent is in fact a means of the overall end. Furthermore, its temporal source is in fact inherited from its teleological source. On the one hand, the explanation can be right only if it truly reflects the real calculative thought of the agent. On the other hand, the overall end, which is the terminus of the series of ends elicited by the explanatory question "Why?," appears itself under the aspect as something wanted in the practical calculation, thereby becoming the origin of the series of means elicited by the calculative question "How?," The thing wanted, as Anscombe notes, "is restricted to present or future objects and future states of affairs" (Anscombe 2000, §36, p. 67). This may seem to be simply another grammar ornamental: "want" is applicable only for present or future stuff. (As to the things in the past, we use "wish" instead.) However, it is in fact grounded by a deeper truth: practical calculation concerns what is not yet got, and it is an essence of human life that we live for the future. Let us now turn to the other
intellectual capacity of human agency that is enabled by the temporality of the internal structure of intentional action.

3. Temporal aspect and the capacity for planning

Action unfolds in time, and runs through stages. Jennifer Hornsby coins the concept "compound actions" to capture the temporal structure of certain actions with their internal teleological order:

…actions having actions as components—in which the agent does something by first doing this thing, and next that thing, and later some third thing. …Where actions are compound, their components constitute the whole by virtue of the intention that unites them. (Hornsby 2011, 120)

To make an omelet, I first break an egg, then mix the egg batter, and later some further moves. In view of such procedure, making an omelet is a paradigm of compound action.

The components of a compound action, which are united by the intention, are parts in the teleological sense. Again, it is a meeting of the teleological and the chronological. The teleological parts of an intentional action are themselves intentional actions too. The encompassing whole's being in progress is exactly in virtue of its teleological parts' being under way. This enables us to describe the encompassing whole just in reference to one of its teleological parts. When I am melting butter in a pan, that is also my making the omelet. Furthermore, I am making the omelet at that time qua melting butter in a pan. One teleological part may be ongoing contemporaneously with another in two different ways. First, their duration may overlap: "It may be, for example, that while I am breaking an egg for the sake of making an omelet, I am melting butter in a pan for the same purpose." (Ford 2018, 175) And for the other way, two teleological parts may be temporally coextensive and function reciprocally for each other: "Suppose, for example, that I carried a bag of groceries home from the store. Holding the bag was part of carrying it home. Walking home was another part of the same." (Ford 2018, 176)

However, the mereology ground for such reciprocal partnership may not be right. Holding the bag may not be a part of carrying it home. Holding something
is to keep the state of that thing, thus bringing no change about at all. It is controversial whether keeping something from changing can count as action. Even if it counts towards action, there follows upcoming difficulty to tell it apart from its partners. The teleological parts that are temporally coextensive must have one same terminal end, and this very fact makes them merely different *regions* of one single change. It is logically impossible to separate more than one synchronous change from one single change, for change itself is to be identified with the terminal state it directs towards. Putting out longer roots and getting thicker about the trunk are not two changes towards one single end—being an oak (Coope 2007, 125). Either can be interrupted without the acorn's becoming an oak being stopped. On the other hand, I may be walking while eating snacks and maybe listening to music at the same time, but they are by no means parts of any action as a whole, because they lack one single intention to unify them. Even if they do, such multitasking that is bound to the spatial structure of bodily action, would soon meet a natural limit.

The components of a compound action are scattered in time. Since they are united by a single intention, thereby serving one same ultimate end, they can never be coextensively synchronous. Therefore, they either are discretely asynchronous or partly overlap among each other. Not all components of a compound action allow contemporaneous overlapping: it requires some degree of *autonomy* of at least one of its partners. I may well break an egg while melting butter in a pan. I can do these two things together because the latter one once started, can proceed itself without my bodily engagement. That enables me to break an egg *during the interval* of the butter's melting. It is such autonomy component that provides *slot* for my being able to engage in other components of the compound action, or of other compound actions. Acting simultaneously in this way is far less restricted compared with seizing the spatial structure of bodily action. In fact, we have long accepted such thought in our linguistic practice, as in what Thompson calls the progressive used "in hiatus":

…we happily affirm, of someone who is napping, that she is organizing the peasantry; of someone who is sitting reading the paper, that she is baking a loaf of bread; and of someone who is playing a hand of poker, that she is building a house. (Thompson 2008, 141)

It is so because the agent is napping *during the interval* of organizing the peasantry, sitting reading the paper *during the interval* of baking a loaf of bread,
and playing a hand of poker during the interval of building a house. It requires sophistication to figure out what to do is best fit for filling in intervals of various lengths. The reason for the shift of aspect from action to agency should now be clear: the slots can be utilized flexibly by the agent. One haphazard compound under the perspective of action may hardly be intelligible unless in light of the agent's plan.

Such mode of multitasking is made possible widely after the technology evolves automatic machines that "free our hands," such as washing machine and oven. The two kinds of machine correspond to two modes of extending human agency. Manual machine that work simultaneously with the operator may extend the agency spatially by extending the body or the senses of the agent. Here is a vivid example from Daniel Dennett:

...workers in laboratories and plants who handle dangerous materials by operating feedback-controlled mechanical arms and hands ...can feel the heft and slipperiness of the containers they manipulate with their metal fingers. (Dennett 1981, 315)

The same applies to simpler instrument: one may tell the nuance between its crisp shell and diaphanous wing on the top of the rod as if with a bare hand when picking cicadas up on the trees. They are telling instances of extended touch. All kinds of lens, such as telescope or microscope can be regard as extension of vision, and instruments like stethoscope for hearing. On the other hand, the way automatic machines and the like extend our agency is bound to coordinate with our intellectual capacity of planning, which finally achieves a unique temporal structure of compound action.

Compound action is essentially stepwise. Nevertheless, there are still actions that is to be done at one stroke. Such one-step action is dubbed simple action: "an agent now does something by now doing some other thing" (Hornsby 2011, 120). However, there may still be slot in simple action, "as any piece of music is likely to contain silences" (Thompson 2008, 141), in which the means to get it done is to set some automatic instrument in motion. Thus, such simple actions are teleologically simple, but are still temporally structured. Unlike components of compound action that are also themselves intentional actions, "components" of simple action are merely natural sequels triggered by the agent's ignition. The action is not just done after I have done my triggering, but until the instrument has finished its part either. I did not boil the water simply
after putting the kettle on, although I may just stand by and do nothing else until the boiling. (However, waiting, in a sense, is still a mental act.) Whatever else I may be doing during the lengthy interval, I must also be making tea meanwhile. The relation between my triggering and the instrument's functioning in such cases would be scrutinized more meticulously in the next section.

4. Agency in mediate action

Hornsby introduces the dichotomy between acting non-mediately and acting mediately as follows: If the event of o's being $\varphi$-d cannot be pried apart from the event of a's $\varphi$-ing o, then a is $\varphi$-ing o non-mediately. Whereas when something is done mediately, the causal work involved in its happening is not all the agent's own (Hornsby 2011, 108–9).

Hornsby uses different expressions in defining these two modes of acting. Whether the causal work involved in the happening of an agent's acting is all the agent's own or not is comparatively easy to determine. It seems to suggest that, if the causal work involved in the happening of something's being done is not all the agent's own, it is because the action is mediated by instruments or some other agents, and these instruments or other agents take on some of the causal work involved. Their causal work is what can be pried apart from the happening of the agent's acting. On the other hand, whether the event of o's being $\varphi$-d can be pried apart from the event of a's $\varphi$-ing o or not to some extend depends on our linguistic intuition. As we shall see, the extension of the two events could be ambiguous in cases concerning actions with instruments involved. As a result, even if the two definitions are supposed to be both biconditional, whether they are equivalent still needs further analysis.

The causative verbs that interest Hornsby most, such as "scrape, push, wet, carry, eat, knock over, keep off, squash, make (e.g., noises, paper boats), hurt" (Hornsby 2011, 106), are all centered around deeds that can be done with a bare body, and the usual way to perform a bodily action is surely non-mediate. Suppose $\varphi$ is one such causative verb. Once I am $\varphi$-ing o mediately, o's being $\varphi$-d would partly rely on the causal contribution from the instrument. Consequently, o's being $\varphi$-d would not be identical with my $\varphi$-ing o. If I squash some tin cans non-mediately by clenching or stamping on them, then the tin
cans' being squashed is my squashing them. However, I may also squash them mediately by pulling a lever that controls a machine designed to squash them (Hornsby 2011, 108–9). It is mediate because the machine takes on part of the causal work in squashing them. In this case, the tin cans' being squashed would not be my squashing them. Similarly, if I close a door non-mediately by pushing it gradually all the way shut, then the door's being closed is my closing it. However, I may also close it mediately by pressing a remote button that makes the door swing shut (Hornsby 2011, 112). It is mediate because a whole system that relates the door and the button takes on part of the causal work in closing the door. In this case, the door's being closed would not be my closing it.

Work that can be done with a bare body, again, would soon meet a natural limit. In some cases, instruments become the extension of our agency: we can leave the complex task to instruments and manipulate them through fairly manageable operations. In some other cases, other people may be the extension of our agency as well: the way to do something is to get someone else to do it, no matter out of cooperation or division of labor, even instigation. In any case, there are things that are bound to do with instruments essentially involved. Hornsby's example is printing: "You are now printing your document. So the movement you made in order to set the printer to work cannot be the same as your printing the document, which is taking place while your body is at rest." (Hornsby 2011, 122) Certainly, my bodily movement manipulating the printer alone is not my printing the document. Hornsby seems to suggest that my bodily movement, together with the operation of the machine, is my printing the document, although my body is left idle during the machine's operating. But it is unclear whether Hornsby would admit that my action of printing the document is the event of the document's being printed. Since one cannot print anything without a printer, the printer seems to necessarily take on some of the causal work in printing. Does it follow that printing is something that is always done mediately?

Let us first suppose so. Then the document's being printed must be able to be pried apart from my printing the document. But how? Let the document's being printed contain my printing the document, then the other component seems to be the operating of the machine. But it makes sense only if we identify my printing the document with my bodily movement manipulating the printer, and this is what Hornsby explicitly repudiates. What about the converse? Let my
printing the document contain the document's being printed, then what else does it contain? One possible candidate seems to be my setting the printer to work. But this is by no means "taking place while your body is at rest." It seems that the only available alternative is to accept that my printing the document and the document's being printed are coextensive. These two events cannot be pried apart from each other. As a result, even though the causal work involved in printing is not all on my own, I still print my document non-mediately.

Then what on earth is the different between the printer on the one hand, and the squashing machine and the shutting button on the other? What makes the causal work of the latter two render respective actions mediate but not the printer? The reason is that the causal work of a printer is required for any printing work to be done. Such kind of necessity disqualifies printing with a printer as a means to print. One means implies alternative means. As suggested in §2, a means, by definition, is sufficient but not necessary of achieving the end. In the cases of squashing tin cans or closing a door, one can either squash tin cans or closing a door with one's hand or with a machine. But in cases of printing and the like, the causal work of the instruments is necessarily involved. No matter how mediate a way for printing is, there must be at least a printer in the first place. In a word, whether something is done mediate depends not only on whether there is instrument involved, but also whether the involvement of the instrument is a means to do it. Such diagnosis implies that the dichotomy between acting non-mediately and acting mediately is an asymmetrical one: acting non-mediately enjoys a kind of priority, for it usually suggests the regular way to do the deed. Some deeds can be done mediately only if it can be done non-mediately in the first place. It can be seen from the manner the specific verb being introduced to language, when the instruments invented for doing certain things become prevalent in common life. English has a dedicated verb, "print," that was introduced for a specific kind of activity using a specific kind of machine, which is correspondingly named "printer." By contrast, we do not have a dedicated verb for can-squashing-by-machine or for door-closing-by-pressing-button-of-a-machine. Still, we could introduce a verb for these cases. And if the new verb became established, say, the verb "smuashing" which means "can-squashing-by-a-machine," then smuashing would be a non-mediate action. Coining and introducing such a new verb is a way of institutionalizing, in language, the unity of a kind of action, usually fairly complex.
5. Agency in proxy action

Action extends temporally, and progresses towards an end. That makes action susceptible to interception. Action can be interrupted either out of mere accident, or deliberately by another agent. If the pipe suddenly burst while the gardener is pumping, then the pumping is interrupted. If someone makes a hole in the pipe with a pick-axe while the gardener is pumping, the pumping is interrupted as well, and the agency of the gardener is thereby intervened by the saboteur. Agency can be intervened by another, while in some other cases, the agency of one agent can penetrate the agency of another. As argued in §4, the instrument being used in acting has no agency of its own—rather, the agent extends her own agency by manipulating the instrument. One may legitimately ask, who's agency is in play if an action involves more than one agent, specifically, when someone partakes in the action merely as a means?

As we shall see, the conclusion we reached in §4 still stands for cases in which the instrument being used in acting is other persons. In such cases, the agency of the protagonist penetrates the agency of the person as means. Korsgaard proposes whether the proxy is based on consent as a distinguishing mark of using persons as means (Korsgaard 1996, 138–9). But as we shall see, consent makes no difference to the proxyability of agency. Since the penetration of agency is not bivalent but scalar, which means that the penetration comes in degrees if happens, what matters is the width and depth of the proxy agency get involved. Besides, the so-called humanity formulation of the categorical imperative is supposed to be a moral constraint, according to Kant's original animus. Since the present analysis is supposed to be neither ethical nor juristic, but rather metaphysical, we shall shelve the disputes over whether it is deplorable to use others as means, and keep neutral on the principle of the end specified for the proxy.

Anyway, consent seems an apt inception of the discussion. Cases of proxy agency that are not based on consent seems fairly uncontroversial: The person being used as means carries out her user's agency. The absence of consent may be due to deception or coercion. Either renders the proxy action involuntary. The proxy action based on deception would even be unintentional. If the further intention of the proxy action is being concealed from the proxy agent, the proxy agent would have no idea of the wider context of her action. Suppose the
gardener is hired to do his usual job. His own agency is confined within the pumping. Since pumping, as a kind of activity that lacks teleological structure by its nature, is the only node of the teleological structure of the pumping as his intentional action as a whole, it does not make much sense to say that there is a teleological structure at all. As Anscombe notes: "The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance from the immediate action, and the immediate action is calculated as the way of getting or doing or securing the thing wanted." (Anscombe 2000, §41, p. 79) However, there is no teleological distance between the means and the end in atomic action. It makes sense only when it is seen as an intermediate link of the bigger project of poisoning the inhabitants of the house, which is the intention of the poisoner. It is the multiplicity of nodes of the teleological structure of intentional action that enables the proxy of agency. There is no room for proxy in atomic action, if there is any.1

Suppose there is such atomic action, defined as action that has no subsidiary action as its further part. A hasty candidate may be momentary action such as sneezing or blinking, which is confined to the present, and done at one stroke. As argued in §2, the grammatical feature of intentional action lies in the contrast between its progressive and perfective aspects of its descriptions. However, momentary actions have distinct grammatical feature: Their descriptions in present tense does allow perfective aspect. "I blink" indicates not only I am performing a blink now, but the blink is over and done with. Linguists thereby allocate a separate Aktionsarten for momentary actions: semelfactives (Smith 1997, 29–30). The affinity between semelfactive and activity should become evident now. Semelfactives are punctual, whereas activities are durative,

1 The term "atomic action" is borrowed from Vogler (2002). Vogler argues that there are such atomic actions, however "…actions done solely for their own sakes with no further end in view—whether what is desirable in them is the pleasure of so doing or the radically interminable fit of so doing—could not be the central cases of intentional action" (Vogler 2002, 134). In Anscombe's words, "some chain must at any rate begin" (Anscombe 2000, §21, p. 34). Certainly, even if setting atomic action aside, not all actions are proxyable. As Sanford Kadish notes: "That certain actions cannot be committed through the agency of another person does not, I think, reflect any moral considerations. It reflects, rather, our understanding of those actions. What it means to be drunk and disorderly, to marry, to have sexual intercourse, or to escape from prison, is to do these things through one's own person. Personal conduct is a necessary element simply because that is what these actions import in common usage and understanding." (Kadish, 1985, p. 374)
which enables them to allow progressive aspect, although they comprise no more than regular repetition of semelfactives. On the other hand, repetition implies that an activity can be naturally divided into semelfactives as its \textit{temporal} parts, although they are not \textit{teleologically} structured—there would be no proper answer if what is being asked in the question "Why?" is a temporal part.\footnote{Surely, "Why are you moving your leg front and back?" can be answered with "Because I'm running." But it would be misleading to say that someone is running by first moving her one leg front and back and then another. Because one cannot be running unless one does so. As argued in §2 and §4, a means is \textit{sufficient but not necessary} for achieving the end, since moving legs front and back alternately is \textit{necessary} for running, it cannot be count as a means for running. Thus, the answer does not meet the sense Anscombe isolates for her question "Why?." By contrast, it is felicitous to answer "Why are you moving your arm up and down?" with "Because I'm operating the pump." Since moving one's arm up and down can be count as a means for pumping because it is not necessary for pumping—one may operate the pump by other means. By the way, asking about the bodily movement someone is performing is uncommon, especially when the bodily movement accords with an activity. It may happen if someone does not have the corresponding concept of the activity.} In brief, agents manifest only flimsy agency in performing activities, no matter as proxy or not.

In the above case, the poisoner may leave the gardener with no proper opportunity to give or withhold consent. Let us suppose that the gardener would not consent to pump if he knows that his pumping would at the same time be poisoning. But what if the gardener agrees to do his job, even if he is privy to the overall end of the whole project? Then whether the gardener manifests wider or deeper agency would depend on whether he shares the same end with the poisoner. Giving the plot away to an uninterested cog is not abetting him as an accomplice. If he is indifferent about the crime and just want to earn his pay, he can hardly be said to be poisoning intentionally, thus his agency should still be confined within the pumping:

That is to say, if he is being improbably confidential and is asked "Why did you replenish the house water-supply with poisoned water?" his reply is, not "To polish them off," but "I didn't care about that, I wanted my pay and just did my usual job." (Anscombe 2000, §25, pp. 41–2)

As to the other horn of the fork, poisoning by pumping, in order to bring down the government, is surely not the kind of deed that can be done by some person alone. To act as an accomplice in such a joint action need not solitary but collective agency, which is beyond our current scope.
However, even set the cases of indifference cog aside, consent does not necessitate the sharing of the same end either way. A protagonist may vest in her proxy the fiduciary power to act under the aegis of her authority in various ways. Of course, any such agreement would be based on the proxy's ceding of her agency in the first place. Suppose a boss set her secretary to get something done. In obeying the order, the secretary need not share the end of her boss. Rather, her end in most of the cases would be simply "whatever the boss wants." Then how much agency can be credited to the proxy in acting in furtherance of the end would finally depend on the capacity of the proxy that is being deployed. The capacity in question is supposed to be the capacity for calculating: Merely following other's instructions step by step may broaden the width of the proxy agency, it would be notwithstanding less deep than acting by figuring out how to get it done by the proxy's own practical reasoning.

### 6. Concluding remarks

How to delimit action and how to delineate agency are interlocked issues. For Davidsonian causalists, to identify action with bodily movement is to keep agency within the bound of the body. As they admit, the seeming fact that agency does extend beyond the body is just an expedient of redescription—by adopting broad descriptions that incorporates causal consequences of the bodily movements. Hornsby's careful treatment helps us see that such Davidsonian picture is wrong not only about the extent of action, but also the reach of agency. Following Anscombe, Hornsby demonstrates convincingly that causality can be in operation internal to an event. This, if tenable, would undermine the Davidsonian doctrine that "the operations of causality are confined to obtainings of relations between things in the category of events or states" (Hornsby 2011, 105). Furthermore, it helps show that reason is also operating in action, rather than as a mere causal antecedent happens prior to action, as Davidsonian causalists conceived.

One severe corollary of the Davidsonian conception of action is that it loses sight of the very role agent plays in acting. Hornsby's illuminating diagnosis can be seen as an effort to rehabilitate the indispensable role of agent. In proceeding our evaluation of Hornsby's arguments, agent's capacity for planning functions as a strand interweaving the two main conceptual devices she invented.
Furthermore, the capacity for planning is also a contributive complement for a calculative account of the authorship of intentional action. The moral of the whole discussion may be that it reveals the intellectual aspects of agency which the Davidsonian story omits altogether: rational agency is grounded by both the capacity for calculating and planning.

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