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(182). Daraus darf man vermutlich schliessen, dass er sich für heutige Modelle der friedlichen Streitschlichtung eine ähnliche praktische Wirksamkeit erhofft. Diesen Optimismus scheint die abschliessende Feststellung, wonach der friedensethische Ansatz der katholischen Kirche und der rechtsethische Ansatz Höffes in erheblichem Mass konvergieren (270), noch zusätzlich zu bestätigen. Ich wage allerdings zu bezweifeln, dass sich Vertreter des politischen Realismus heute ohne gewichtige Zusatzargumente eher überzeugen lassen als die Zeitgenossen des Abbé de Saint-Pierre, die dessen „Projet de paix perpétuelle“ als realitätsferne Chimäre kritisierten. Wie gerade das Beispiel Kants lehrt, müssen die Einwände von Seiten des politischen Realismus zwar erst genommen werden, sollten jedoch nicht daran hindern, weiter über ein zeitgemässes Modell internationaler Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und die Bedingungen seiner Realisierbarkeit nachzudenken. Dazu bietet Justenhovens Studie eine ausgezeichnete Anleitung.

SIMONE ZURBUCHEN

SPINELLI, Emidio: *Questioni Scettiche: Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico*. Roma: Lithos 2005, pp. 211. ISBN 88-89604-07-7.

Emidio Spinelli is a specialist in Pyrrhonism, known particularly for his Italian translations of and commentaries on Sextus Empiricus' *Against the Ethicists* and *Against the Astrologers*. The present book brings together six of his essays published between 1999 and 2005 in journals and collections not easily available. Except for the first, the essays deal exclusively with the Pyrrhonian variety of ancient skepticism as expounded in Sextus' extant works – in particular, in his *Pyrrōneioi Hypotypōseis* (PH). Although they do not originally belong together, the essays in combination succeed in painting a coherent picture of Pyrrhonism.

In the first essay, entitled “Gli scetticismi antichi: uno schizzo introduttivo”, Spinelli offers an overview of both Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism: he examines the positions of the representatives of the two currents of skepticism as well as the historical connection and the differences between them. In so doing, he takes into account the various views about the history, the sense, and the scope of ancient skepticism that have been put forward in the vast specialist literature.

In “I dieci tropi scettici”, Spinelli analyzes the so-called Ten Modes of Aenesidemus – the originator of the later Pyrrhonian movement in the first century BC – as they are expounded by Sextus in PH I, although he also refers to the less detailed expositions by Diogenes Laertius and Philo. The Ten Modes are arguments designed to induce suspension of judgment (*epochē*) by means of the opposition of both perceptual and intellectual appearances. Spinelli's purpose in analyzing these arguments is to show that the hypothesis according to which they correspond to the ten Aristotelian categories is unfounded.

The essay “Induzione e definizione: contro la logica dogmatica” is devoted to examining the skeptical assault on induction and definition at PH II 204–212.

Spinelli analyzes the structure of the arguments against these notions and he attempts to identify the sources of the doctrines under attack by comparing Sextus' text with other ancient sources. As regards the notion of induction targeted at *PH* I 204, Spinelli argues that the ultimate source is Aristotle's *Topics* through the probable mediation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on this work. As for the notion of definition, Spinelli maintains that the doctrines attacked at *PH* II 205–212 are Peripatetic, Stoic, and Middle Platonic.

The following paper, “*Non scire per causas...*”, deals with (i) Aenesidemus' Eight Modes against causal explanations as expounded by Sextus at *PH* I 180–186, (ii) the more radical attack against the concept of cause found in both *PH* III and in *Adversus Dogmaticos* (*AD*) III (although Spinelli focuses on the arguments of *PH* III), and (iii) the attack against astrology in *Adversus Mathematicos* (*AM*) V. In explaining the sense, structure, and scope of the Pyrrhonian arguments, Spinelli also identifies, by analyzing other ancient texts, the specific philosophical and medical doctrines which are being discussed and attacked. In addition, he compares the outlook adopted by Sextus in *AM* V with the epistemology of the early Carl Hempel.

In “*Comprensione filosofica e prassi comunicativa*”, Spinelli examines the skeptical responses to the objections according to which the Pyrrhonist is compelled, by the very adoption of his skepticism, to recognize both the impossibility of comprehending the doctrines he is investigating and the impossibility of articulating a discourse capable of expressing coherently his outlook. Spinelli's own position is sympathetic to the Pyrrhonist's outlook, since he thinks it is possible to comprehend and investigate the theories and arguments of others and to communicate one's own affections (*pathē*) even though one suspends judgment about any doctrine that purports to account for what things are like in their real nature.

The final essay “*Fatti voi foste a viver come scettici...*” offers an analysis of Sextus' responses to the so-called inactivity and inconsistency arguments, which are put forward against the Pyrrhonist by ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers alike. According to the first argument, Pyrrhonism is so radical a position that renders practical decisions and action impossible. The second argument is related to the first, since it claims that, if the Pyrrhonist does make decisions and act, then he is inconsistent with his radical skepticism. In this essay, too, Spinelli is sympathetic to the Pyrrhonian stance, since he thinks that Sextus successfully shows how the Pyrrhonist can perform actions in a way that is consistent with his thoroughgoing skepticism.

The essays combine philological, historical, and philosophical considerations about the issues they deal with. Spinelli's erudition is impressive, as shown not only by his deep knowledge of the ancient sources and languages, but also by his taking into account most (if not all) of the works about the issues he is writing about. The essays are copiously annotated. The notes, which are primarily intended to provide the reader with full references to ancient texts and especially to secondary literature bearing upon the topics under examination, also discuss issues that are tangential or terminological.

Following the papers, Spinelli provides a list of references to the places in which they were originally published – which shows that none of the original titles are retained in the present versions. The volume ends with an up-to-date, twenty-five page bibliography and several indexes.

I would now like to make a few of critical remarks about Spinelli's interpretation of certain passages of Sextus' work and of the character of his Pyrrhonism. The first remark concerns Spinelli's claim that the first of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus makes use of some of the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa (see *PH I* 164–177), although he mentions only the mode of circularity (ch. II, p. 34–35) or, as Sextus calls it, the reciprocal mode (*ho diallēlos tropos*). When one analyzes the passage of the First Mode in question (*PH I* 59–61), one may perhaps find an implicit reference to the mode of hypothesis – which is that based on the arbitrary acceptance of a claim without trying to backing it up – when Sextus mentions the possibility of preferring our appearances to those of the irrational animals without providing a proof for such a preference. As for the reciprocal mode, there is no hint of it in the First Mode: at *PH I* 59 Sextus uses the argument which may be called the “impartial judge” argument – namely, one cannot impartially decide a dispute when one is a part to it – and at *PH I* 61 he employs the sophism known as *petitio principii*, which he elsewhere considers as different from the reciprocal mode (see *PH II* 36). Spinelli also maintains that in the Second Mode (*PH I* 90) Sextus makes use of the mode of circularity (p. 36), but here the argument in question is instead that of the “impartial judge”.

Spinelli maintains that the Pyrrhonist's “ricerca ... si proclama infinita” (ch. V, p. 117) and speaks of the “vita ‘zetetica’, quella della ricerca senza fine” (ch. VI, p. 150). Such claims are highly problematic, since if the Pyrrhonist affirmed that his investigation (*zētēsis*) of the truth is endless, then he would be adopting a dogmatic view, namely that the disagreements or disputes about how things really are will never be resolved, so that he will have to keep investigating forever. In addition, such a view would be awkward, since what would be the sense of continuing to search for the truth if one is convinced that one will never discover it? The Pyrrhonist's outlook is rather that he will keep investigating because, although he has so far been unable to resolve the disagreements he has found, he cannot rule out the possibility that such disagreements will eventually be resolved and hence that his *zētēsis* will come to an end.

With respect to the matters discussed at *AD V* 162–166, at *AD V* 167 Sextus says that he has “spoken more accurately about these matters in the lectures on the skeptical end (*telos*)”. Spinelli maintains that “il rimando interno è sicuramente – o quanto meno *anche* – a quei paragrafi dei *Lineamenti pirroniani* da cui ha preso le mosse la nostra breve digressione: per l'esattezza *PH I* 21–30” (ch. VI, p. 145). And in a note he affirms that “resta sempre valida, però, l'ipotesi che Sesto alluda *anche* ai libri perduti di *M* [i.e., *AM*]” (p. 156). Now, the issues discussed at *AD V* 162–166 correspond, not to those dealt with in the chapter on the end of skepticism (*PH I* 25–30), but to those addressed in the chapter on the criterion of skepticism (*PH I* 21–24). This mismatch is most probably the reason Spinelli says that,

at *AD* V 167, Sextus is referring *also* to some paragraphs of *PH* and that one cannot rule out the possibility that he is alluding *also* to the lost books of *AD* – Spinelli speaks of the lost books of *AM* because, although *AD* and the *AM* are two distinct works, scholars conventionally refer to *AD* I–V as *AM* VII–XI. Spinelli's view is, in my opinion, unclear, since either one assumes that, at *AD* V 167, Sextus is referring to an exposition of the *telos* of skepticism contained in the now lost part of *AD* or one must suppose a slip on his part and say that there he is actually referring to “the lectures on the skeptical *criterion*” found at *PH* I 21–24. Given that the part of *AD* which is no longer extant provided a general account of Pyrrhonism similar to that found in the first book of *PH*, it is reasonable to assume that, at *AD* V 167, Sextus is referring back to that lost part rather than to the chapter of *PH* devoted to explaining the Pyrrhonist's criterion. Note, finally, that it is useless to attempt resolve the problem posed by the back-reference at *AD* V 167 by saying that Sextus is referring back to the whole *PH* I 21–30.

As the subtitle of the book indicates, the essays are above all intended as an introduction to Pyrrhonism. In this respect, they offer both a clear presentation of the subjects they deal with and a useful survey of the vast specialist literature of particularly the past thirty years. Hence, they are no doubt an excellent starting point for the study of the Pyrrhonian philosophy.

DIEGO MACHUCA

CHENEVAL, Francis: *La Cité des peuples. Mémoires de cosmopolitismes*. Paris: Editions du Cerf (= collection « Humanités ») 2005, 303 p. ISBN 978-2204075992.

Le livre de Francis Cheneval se propose de combler une lacune dans l'historiographie de la philosophie politique moderne en retraçant la genèse, l'évolution conceptuelle du cosmopolitisme moderne dans son sens juridico-politique, c'est-à-dire « la possibilité ou [...] la nécessité (normative et empirique) d'une structure positive et globale de droit, fondée à partir des droits de l'homme » (17). « Mémoires de cosmopolitismes » ne se limite pas néanmoins à une analyse historique contextuelle et critique des penseurs de la philosophie politique moderne qui ont conçu, systématisé, critiqué et contribué à l'idée cosmopolitique, tels Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant et les philosophes contemporains qui ont actualisé l'héritage kantien tels par exemple John Rawls et ses disciples Charles Beitz et Thomas Pogge, et Jürgen Habermas. F. Cheneval défend la thèse selon laquelle l'idée cosmopolitique constitue le cœur, ou plutôt l'horizon de la pensée politique moderne, et non pas un simple appendice dont celle-ci pourrait faire l'économie. La nécessité, voire l'urgence d'intégrer l'héritage kantien dans la réflexion politique contemporaine va de pair avec une réflexion critique sur la nécessité de « transgresser » le concept d'Etat-nation, eu égard notamment au contexte actuel de globalisation et de mondialisation.