

likely to find the prospects of exchanging Hossack's revisionary taxonomy of mental states for analyses of necessity or personhood a poor bargain.

These concerns are particularly striking in light of Hossack's denial of the Constitutive Thesis, which holds that part of what it is for x to know that P is for x to believe. Since Hossack's preferred view takes knowledge to be more fundamental than belief, he rejects the Constitutive Thesis. In its place, he defends the Causal Thesis, which holds that although x 's belief that P might cause x to know that P , x need not believe that P in order to know that P . Many philosophers will be reluctant to accept Hossack's claim that believing that P is not required for knowing that P . If, however, one accepts the various accounts Hossack advances, one is likely to be saddled with this counterintuitive thesis.

Some philosophers will likely complain that the concept Hossack calls 'knowledge' is not the same 'knowledge' of which belief is — in their view — a crucial constituent. If these philosophers are correct, the consequences for Hossack's project are disastrous: the concept he invokes as an all-important analysans is not the concept of knowledge we take to be epistemically important, but rather some other concept or, perhaps more plausibly, a concept without any common currency.

No philosophical project can be conducted without taking on at least some presuppositions. And, since this work encapsulates a large number of independent philosophical projects, it is understandable that its presuppositions are numerous. That said, given Hossack's novel picture of knowledge, a more focused discussion of its character and consequences, rather than of extant issues in personal identity and modality, would have made for both a more modest and a more satisfying exercise.

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The Evolution of Morality.

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2006.

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US\$32.00 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-262-10112-7);

US\$18.00 (paper ISBN-13: 978-0-262-60072-2).

In this book Joyce examines whether, in what sense, and to what extent our capacity to employ moral concepts and make moral judgments is innate, and what the metaethical implications would be if it were indeed the product

of the evolutionary process of natural selection. Joyce avails himself of the latest results from psychology, neuroscience, biology, and anthropology — results that have a crucial bearing on moral philosophy. In this regard, he indicates that his ‘goals are synthetic and interdisciplinary’ because the issues under discussion ‘cannot be profitably addressed from within the bounds of a single academic discipline,’ although he is ‘aware of the dangers that such aspirations invariably bring’ (2). Joyce has, to all appearances, mastered such dangers. The clarity and insight of the analysis combine with a style which is straightforward and often witty to make for a pleasurable read.

The introduction is devoted to clarifying some key concepts and warding off certain serious misunderstandings. The issue of whether morality is innate is investigated over the course of the first four chapters, which deal respectively with the natural selection of helping, the nature of morality, moral language and emotions, and moral sense. The topic of investigation is formulated as whether morality ‘can be given adaptive explanation in genetic terms: whether the present-day existence of the trait is to be explained by reference to a genotype having granted our ancestors reproductive advantage’ (2). Joyce maintains that innateness in this sense does not imply the inevitability of having moral beliefs, simply because having a certain capacity does not in any way imply the inexorableness of its manifestation. He also remarks that the hypothesis under consideration does not deny that the content of our moral beliefs is determined mostly by culture, but claims only that the mechanism that makes possible the acquisition of such beliefs is in fact innate. Now, what is the conclusion Joyce himself arrives at on the general question of the innateness of morality? Even though he defends the thesis that morality is innate, he cautiously observes that the empirical evidence available does not allow us to draw a conclusion with any certainty, so that one cannot completely rule out the possibility that moral thinking is a culturally generated capacity. Thus, Joyce endorses only provisionally, as a plausible and testable hypothesis, the view that morality is an adaptation produced by biological natural selection. According to this hypothesis (i) moral sense evolved in humans because the ‘moralization’ of certain behaviors that advance reproductive fitness reinforces the motivation to perform them, and (ii) the process by which it evolved is the projection of one’s emotions onto one’s experience of the world. Joyce claims that moral projectivism finds support in the recent empirical research showing that emotions play a key role in moral judgment.

The remainder of the work (two chapters and the conclusion) is devoted to discussing the metaethical implications of the ‘descriptive evolutionary ethics’ expounded in the first four chapters. Joyce examines whether the evolutionary hypothesis ‘vindicates’ or ‘debunks’ morality, i.e., whether such a hypothesis supports moral realism or, rather, moral skepticism. He calls the former view ‘prescriptive evolutionary ethics’ and the latter the ‘evolutionary debunking of morality’. In Chapter 5, Joyce assesses four attempts by others at ‘vindicating’ morality on the basis of the hypothesis of its innateness and argues that, with each of them, the prescriptive evolutionary ethicist fails in his enterprise. The reasons for this failure are (i) that he disregards the

cognitive aspect of moral judgment and at most offers an instrumental justification of morality, which by no means renders moral judgments true or epistemically justified, and (ii) that he erroneously takes the non-moral normativity implied by evolutionary biology as if it were moral.

In Chapter 6, Joyce examines whether the evolutionary hypothesis undermines morality. He maintains that this hypothesis shows that our moral beliefs are not false, but epistemically unjustified. In other words, to accept that our tendency to make moral judgments is the product of biological natural selection leads, not to moral nihilism, but to moral agnosticism: we cannot say whether moral beliefs are true or false. The reason is that it is possible that the formation of beliefs about moral rightness and wrongness may have served to enhance our ancestors' fitness independently of whether there existed any moral properties or facts. Whereas a genealogical explanation of, say, how mathematical beliefs enhanced reproductive fitness would be undermined if such beliefs were false — because in that case they would not have been useful to our ancestors — the evolutionary genealogy of morality would remain a plausible hypothesis, even if there were no moral properties or facts. In a word, such a genealogy does not presuppose or require the truth of moral judgments — which of course is not sufficient to prove that such judgments are false.

A large part of Chapter 6 is also devoted to examining the moral naturalistic view, according to which moral facts are reducible to facts that can be investigated by science, including facts about natural selection. If this were the case, then morality would be 'vindicated' even if it was the product of biological natural selection. However, Joyce advances arguments against moral naturalism intended to show that this theory cannot account for the sense of inescapable authority or 'practical clout' that characterizes moral judgments, thereby showing that such a vindication fails. Finally, he argues that the hypothesis that morality is the product of evolution poses a serious challenge to the moral theories which purport to justify moral beliefs solely on epistemological grounds — namely reliabilism, conservatism, coherentism, and foundationalism.

In the book's conclusion Joyce further clarifies the agnostic skepticism he espouses, responds to those who might find such skepticism appalling, and argues that skepticism about the epistemic justification of moral beliefs does not eliminate one's moral thoughts and emotions, which exert a key motivational influence on one's practical deliberations. It is perhaps worth noting that, although Joyce thinks that moral agnosticism follows from the thesis that morality is innate, he is not himself a moral agnostic but a moral nihilist (244, n. 17). We seem to find a manifestation of such nihilism in Joyce's adoption of moral projectivism as a plausible and testable hypothesis (123-33), since this metaethical position denies the existence of moral properties or facts. Now, given his claim that the thesis that morality is the result of natural selection suggests moral projectivism (131), it appears that the provisional acceptance of that thesis would lead to moral nihilism rather than to moral agnosticism. This is why I perceive a certain vacillation in Joyce's

thinking as to what metaethical implications may be drawn from the evolutionary hypothesis.

The scholar interested in how the findings of the empirical sciences might affect our philosophical understanding of the origin and epistemic status of moral beliefs is heartily encouraged to read this book.

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This is Not Sufficient: An Essay on

Animality and Human Nature in Derrida.

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Pp. 192.

US\$29.50 (cloth ISBN-13: 978-0-231-14312-7).

Lawlor has recently established himself as a leading interpreter of twentieth-century French philosophy, in particular the work of Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault. But it is a mural, not portraits, that he paints. In studies such as *Derrida and Husserl* (2002), *Thinking Through French Philosophy* (2003), and *The Implications of Immanence* (2006), Lawlor has shown that, their differences notwithstanding, these thinkers all in effect critically extended the phenomenological tradition by opening up radical new avenues of philosophical *interrogation*. The central outcome of this interpretive work is the recognition of the need for a new philosophy of life as the ground for a genuine overcoming of Platonism.

Lawlor's latest book, in which he thinks through the implications of Derrida's work for the problem of animal suffering, should be approached in this context. For Lawlor, as for Derrida, the suffering of animals in today's world is an undeniable injustice, a wholly one-sided interspecific war. What Lawlor seeks is a 'more sufficient response' to this problem. As with the book's title, the reference is to the Derridean critique of the radical *insufficiency* of the two predominant families of response: 'metaphysical separationism', those (essentially Platonic) views that posit a qualitative difference between human and non-human life; and 'biological continuism', those views that, conversely, assert a fundamental (naturalistic) continuity. While the former is clearly part of the problem, the latter, by simply reversing the metaphysical logic, lacks any means of overcoming it, and harbours a totalitarian risk of its own. The intermediate response that Lawlor seeks would thus account for human-animal relations in terms of what Derrida called a 'staggered [*décalée*]