employers and job candidates to the previous examples of governments and parents, Scanlon deepens the earlier puzzle, how best to understand the relational interests that those for whom decisions are made have in whether these decisions are made with equal concern.

Much more could be said about this slender yet deep book. But I hope that these few critical comments indicate that it amply rewards careful scrutiny and engagement. I have no doubt that reflection on *Why Does Inequality Matter?* will be an inescapable part of any serious philosophical discussion of inequality for years to come.

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Thomason, Krista K. *Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. 256. $90.00 (cloth).

We feel shame when we fall short of our moral ideals, and also when our roommate walks in on us using the toilet. Traditional defenses of shame's moral value have largely focused on cases of the former sort. In *Naked: The Dark Side of Shame and Moral Life*, Krista K. Thomason argues that defending shame's moral value requires us to pay closer attention to cases like the latter.

Thomason's aim in *Naked* is to offer a defense of shame's moral value that doesn't render large swaths of the phenomenon rationally or morally unjustifiable. This is a formidable task. It's one thing to offer a moral defense of the shame that we feel about our moral shortcomings. It's quite another to locate moral value in the shame that we feel for having acne or for being poor. And yet, Thomason argues, it is this "dark side of shame" that we must account for if we are to offer a unified theory of shame that can make sense of its moral value.

Thomason approaches this task in two steps. She first diagnoses exactly where prevailing moral defenses of shame go wrong (chaps. 1 and 2). She then advances her own account of shame, which she situates in an independently plausible account of moral emotions (chaps. 3 and 4). Chapter 5 is a relatively standalone project in which Thomason considers, and ultimately rejects, the possibility that her account could be used to defend our contemporary shaming practices. This chapter is engaging and topical, but I will set it aside for the purposes of this review.

Thomason's targets in the negative portion of the book are the "traditional view" and the "naturalist view." The traditional view defines shame as "the painful emotion we feel in response to our own failures to live up to our ideals or values" (23). For the traditionalist, shame serves as a moral corrective: to overcome it, we must recommit to our moral ideals. Whatever virtues this account has, Thomason contends, it purchases them at the expense of phenomenological accuracy. Surely, when we feel shame about our race or gender, it isn't because we've fallen short of some moral ideal. The naturalist account holds that shame is what we feel when "we fail to live up to public ideals" (43). Shame thus has a socializing role to play; it tells us when we've committed a social gaffe and helps prevent us from committing similar missteps in future. Thomason argues that while the naturalist view

scores higher on phenomenological accuracy, it lacks the resources to tell us whether shame is morally worth having.

Chapters 1 and 2 will be of interest to readers looking for a clear survey of the philosophical literature on shame. Her critique of the reigning positions in that literature, meanwhile, gives the reader a clear understanding of the methodological commitments undergirding her own account. These methodological commitments are not necessarily ones that she shares in common with her interlocutors, and as such, her critique of the traditional and naturalistic views may leave proponents of those views unperturbed. For instance, Thomason's critique of the traditional view largely focuses on how it requires us to accept that many paradigmatic instances of shame aren't in fact morally worthy, or even rationally justifiable. For Thomason, who thinks that accounts of moral emotions ought to be able to explain the emotion's moral value while providing a unified conceptual analysis, the traditionalist's move to theorize away the dark side of shame is unacceptable. But for the traditionalist, this theoretical cherry-picking is just part of the project that they're engaged in—their goal, after all, isn't to offer a moral vindication of every instance of shame, but rather to identify what the morally worthy instances of the phenomenon have in common. If many paradigmatic instances of shame turn out to lack this feature, then so much the worse for those instances.

Why should we think that defending shame's moral worth requires us to embrace its dark side and offer a unified account? To answer, we must take a closer look at Thomason's real philosophical target in *Naked*—the pessimistic view. This view says that, given how bad shame often is, we would be better off not feeling it. The pessimist might grant that the traditionalist and naturalist are right about shame's moral and social upshots, but she will deny that these beneficial upshots can outweigh shame's negative effects. For all the good shame sometimes does, the pessimist warns, it's still more often than not psychologically painful and morally misdirected.

Thomason's strategy for defeating the pessimist is to identify a feature of shame that is common to our experiences of it and that plays an important, constitutive role in our moral agency. Identifying such a feature will allow her to bypass the consequentialist worry motivating the pessimistic view. She won't, in other words, have to argue that the good instances of shame outweigh the bad, but will instead be able to argue that shame as a whole has an important role to play in our moral lives that makes it indispensable. Thomason begins this task in chapter 3, when she offers her unified account of shame. On this view, "When we feel shame, we feel a tension between our *self-conception* and our *identity*. More specifically, we feel that some feature of our identity eclipses, overshadows, or defines our self-conception" (87). By 'self-conception', Thomason means "the way that we represent ourselves to ourselves either on the whole or in particular moments" (93). 'Identity' picks out a broader category of the self: one that includes our self-conception but extends beyond it to incorporate features of ourselves that we don't endorse as part of "who we are," as well as facts about how we come across to others (93). Our identities are thus highly social. Other people come to conclusions about what we're like, and these conclusions may not always jive with our self-conceptions (94).

Shame gets its foothold in this mismatch. It forces us to recognize that we do not have the final word when it comes to ourselves. Rather, people may

conceive of us in ways that come apart from our own self-conceptions. You may think that you're a paragon of self-control, but the shame you feel upon discovering that your friends see you as an unreliable trainwreck throws that self-assurance out the window.

At this point, a clarification is in order. For Thomason, 'self-conception' is not synonymous with 'self-ideal'. Shame is not fundamentally the product of people viewing us as less admirable than we think we are. Rather, it's a product of other people viewing us differently than we view ourselves. Severing the connection between shame and self-ideals helps Thomason distance her account from the traditional view, but it comes at a cost. Specifically, it makes it difficult for Thomason to make sense of cases involving people who see themselves as shameful. An alcoholic might, for instance, come to view herself as "a shameful drunk," and she might feel shame at that self-conception. But there may be no mismatch between how she sees herself and how others see her—everyone might agree that she's a shameful drunk. If there is a mismatch in this sort of case, it seems to consist in the disconnect between who the alcoholic is and who she wishes herself to be.

Thomason might respond that the alcoholic experiences shame because she feels that a single part of her identity has eclipsed her self-conception. Her shame may thus be a reaction to the worry that people see her as nothing but a shameful drunk: "even some part of ourselves that we identify with or embrace can become something we feel shame about if we start to feel that it no longer reflects our self-conception [in] the way we want it to" (103). To illustrate, consider the case that Thomason offers us of the nude model who feels shame when she realizes that the artist painting her is sexually aroused. The model feels shame not because she doesn't see herself as a sexual being but because she doesn't see herself as sexual in this context: "Her shame is due to the fact that the artist's attraction makes her suddenly aware of herself under a description that differs from the one she operates with at the moment" (155).

I think there's more going on in the model's case than a mere tension between the artist's self-conception and identity. To illustrate, think about what sort of misperceptions wouldn't provoke feelings of shame. Imagine that the artist thinks that the model looks pensive, when she takes herself to be looking bored, or that the artist sees her as a collaborator in his artistic project, when she sees herself as just posing for some extra cash. Whatever emotions these misperceptions may provoke, shame is unlikely to be among them. To be sure, Thomason grants that the feeling of our self-conception being overshadowed by our identity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for shame, and that "someone may feel overshadowed by some feature of her identity but feel something other than shame" (87). But these caveats raise the question of what else shame involves. What, in other words, is it about some mismatches that make our experiences of them feel shameful? And why is there a high degree of consensus about which activities and attributes provoke shame?

While Thomason denies that there is any sort of independent standard for determining the fitting objects of shame (170), she nevertheless grants that there is a good deal of convergence on what sorts of activities generally inspire shame. She also gives lengthy explanations of why some of these activities regularly engender shame. For example, Thomason contends that we feel shame when we're

caught having sex because others catch us in a moment "when we are 'lost' in ourselves" and have abandoned "our awareness of how we might look to others" (115). She acknowledges, however, that other experiences of being "lost in ourselves" (like the experience of being tired) don't typically provoke shame. One intuitive way of explaining the difference between these cases is to point to social stigmas—sex is stigmatized, whereas falling asleep is not. But while Thomason grants that "social stigmas about sex and nudity make them significant in ways that eating and sleeping do not," she denies that appealing to social stigmas will give us a complete explanation of shame's objects (112). Thomason might be right about this, but it strikes me that a fuller discussion of social stigmas would still help fill out the account. Social stigmas might, at the very least, help to explain why there is a large amount of social consensus over which sorts of mismatches aptly provoke shame and which sorts do not.

Having developed a unified theory of shame, Thomason moves on in chapter 4 to explain why shame ought to be considered a moral emotion. To do this, she first develops an independently compelling constitutivist account of moral emotions. On this account, an emotion qualifies as a moral emotion "if it is constitutive of moral commitments or parts of moral agency" (145). Shame—or rather, our liability to feel shame—reflects "our recognition of the authority of external points of view," which is the feature of our moral psychology that makes interpersonal respect possible (174).

Does shame actually play this constitutive role in our moral psychology? Thomason answers by considering what we would lose out on, morally speaking, if we were shameless. The shameless person, as Thomason understands her, systematically fails to recognize the limits of her self-conception. She sees herself as the final authority on who she is and doesn't care how she comes across to others (149–50). This indifference reflects a condemnable myopia that is incompatible with interpersonal respect.

In contrast, to feel shame is to experience other peoples' perception of us as normatively significant (155). The person capable of feeling shame recognizes that she is not the sole arbiter of her self-conception. Rather, her self-conception has a merely "provisional authority" for her that can potentially be overruled when it conflicts with the way that others perceive her (157). Our propensity to feel shame thus has the same root as our propensity to have respect for others, as both speak to our recognition of the authority that other moral agents have over us.

I am persuaded by Thomason that our propensity to feel shame speaks to the investment we have in other people's perception of us. I am not quite convinced, however, that this investment necessarily involves the sort of morally laudatory interpersonal regard that Thomason envisages it to. Thomason sees shame as involving the same sort of interpersonal regard that Darwall associates with recognition respect—we feel shame, on her account, because we recognize that persons qua persons have a certain practical authority over us (155). But even if we grant that shame (and our corresponding propensity to feel it) involves interpersonal recognition, it doesn't follow from this that it involves recognition for persons qua persons. To see why, consider the following example:

> Claire feels shame, but only when she's called out by someone of equal or greater social standing. She feels no shame when a waiter asks her to lower

> the volume of her cell phone conversation in a restaurant, but she would feel shame if a fellow restaurant patron made the same request.

Claire's shame involves interpersonal recognition, but it's not the sort of interpersonal recognition that features in recognition respect. Nevertheless, unlike Thomason's shameless person, Claire clearly feels shame. This means that at least some cases of shame don't involve the morally valuable mutual regard that Thomason describes. Perhaps Thomason can be on board with this—she may not need to grant that every instance of shame involves this mutual regard in order to argue that our overall propensity to feel shame does. But if we can imagine that Claire's propensity to feel shame is similarly responsive to social standing—perhaps she has a propensity to feel shame if and only if she's in the presence of someone with suitably high social status—then it's possible to have a propensity to feel shame that isn't constitutive of our moral agency.

Thomason could perhaps contend that our propensity to feel shame with the specific sort of interpersonal regard that she describes is still a constitutive feature of our moral agency, even if other propensities to feel other species of shame are not. But this move leaves us with a question: how do we know that the shame that we feel in any particular instance is actually indicative of our respect for persons, rather than our unsavory fixation on social status and ranking? Thomason has given us good reason to think that our propensity to feel shame reflects our investment in how others perceive us, but I would have liked to have heard more about why this concern is the same sort of concern that features in interpersonal recognition respect.

Thomason's unified account of shame is ambitious and compelling. Her constitutive account of moral emotions is independently plausible and worthy of further attention. And both accounts are developed within a sharply written piece of philosophy that is rich with engaging literary examples. Thomason has shown that the darker side of shame can illuminate this complicated emotion's brighter side.

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Yaffe, Gideon. *The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility.*
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Just about everyone agrees that kids who do wrong deserve a break. We should not punish young wrongdoers as harshly as we punish adult wrongdoers, and we should give young suspects procedural protections we don't afford adult suspects. But what justifies treating kids like this? In Gideon Yaffe's *The Age of Culpability*, Yaffe offers an account of the break owed to kids grounded in creative, new work on the nature of the criminal law. Yaffe's book is rich and broad, filled with novel arguments touching on a range of philosophical issues. Even those who ultimately disagree with Yaffe's account of the basis for giving kids a break should find *The Age of Culpability* impressive and rewarding.