Further Ado concerning *Dasein*'s 'Undifferentiated Mode':

Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday *Dasein* from the Possibility of Genuine Failure

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Abstract:

In this paper, I argue against the interpretive view that locates an 'undifferentiated mode' – a mode in which *Dasein* is *neither authentic nor inauthentic* – in *Being and Time*. Where Heidegger seems to be claiming that *Dasein* can exist in an 'undifferentiated mode,' he is better understood as discussing a phenomenon I call *indifferent inauthenticity*. The average everyday '*Indifferenz*' which is often taken as an indication of an 'undifferentiated mode,' that is, should be properly understood as a failure to distinguish between the possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding is indifferent to this distinction, and I show that this is precisely what renders it inauthentic. Recognizing this distinction, however, is not enough to render Dasein authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility of a non-indifferent inauthenticity and what Heidegger calls the possibility of 'genuine failure.' To read an 'undifferentiated mode' into *Being and Time* is to misunderstand its methodological progression from *Dasein*'s average everyday, *inauthentic* self-understanding to its authenticity – 'to the thing itself.' A select few passages may *at first* seem to indicate otherwise. But *Being and Time* – like both being in general and *Dasein* itself – cannot be properly understood 'without further ado.'

1. Introduction

In this paper, I uncover a key, and largely unrecognized, phenomenon at play in *Being and Time*. This phenomenon, which I call *indifferent inauthenticity*, is central to a proper understanding of important Heideggerian issues such as authenticity [*Eigentlichkeit*], inauthenticity [*Uneigentlichkeit*], and what many interpreters understand as an 'undifferentiated mode' (UDM, from here on out) – a mode in which *Dasein* is said to be *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. I argue that where Heidegger seems to be claiming that *Dasein* exists in a UDM, he is better understood as discussing the phenomenon of indifferent inauthenticity. After an introductory discussion of the UDM, I will provide a guiding illustration of the phenomenon of indifferent inauthenticity, before arguing that it is this phenomenon which is really at issue where interpreters often see a UDM.

2. The Undifferentiated Mode

According to a common interpretive view of *Being and Time*, *Dasein* can, and usually does, exist in a mode that is 'undifferentiated' between authenticity and inauthenticity – a mode of existence that is *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. The details of such readings vary, but most involve understanding authenticity and inauthenticity as ways of relating to the 'fragility,' 'groundlessness,' or 'finitude' of *Dasein*'s existence. This fragility, groundlessness, or finitude is supposedly revealed to *Dasein* in an anxious confrontation with death. *Dasein* then either authentically faces up to, or inauthentically flees from, this revelation. Prior to this revelation, *Dasein* is neither authentic nor inauthentic, but instead exists in a mode that is 'undifferentiated' between the two. According to such readings, *Dasein* usually exists in this UDM, having not yet confronted that to which it might either authentically face up or from which it might inauthentically flee. Division (Div.) I of *Being and Time* is accordingly

understood as an ontological interpretation of *Dasein* as it exists in the UDM.[1]

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[1] For the most influential such reading, see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I.* See also: Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism,* where Blattner frequently appeals to the existence of a UDM at forks in the interpretive road to guide his selection of interpretive possibilities; Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time": A Reader's Guide*; Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?" 14 and 24; and Zimmerman, "Eclipse of Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity."

Many interpreters do not locate a UDM in *Being and Time*, but take there to be only two basic modes of existence: authenticity and inauthenticity. These interpreters do so, however, without squaring their reading with the fact that Heidegger does indeed at times (as we will see in §4) *seem* to claim that *Dasein* can exist in three basic modes of existence – authenticity, inauthenticity, and a UDM, or *Indifferenz*. See Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*; Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*; Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, especially pp. 50-51, 77-84; Schmitt, *Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to Sein Und Zeit*, especially pp. 142, 184; and Stambaugh, "An Inquiry Into Authenticity and Inauthenticity in *Being and Time*." Though I agree with these interpretations in taking there to be only two basic modes of existence – authenticity and inauthenticity – I think that a proper understanding of *Being and Time* requires that we square this with Heidegger's claims about *Dasein*'s *Indifferenz*. To fully appreciate the methodological progression of the ontological interpretation of *Dasein*, that is, we must understand the relationship between inauthenticity and indifference for which I argue in this paper.

Tom Greaves seems to take a position similar to the one I argue for in this paper:

> Most of the critical attention given to Heidegger's conception of the self, or rather conceptions of various modes of being a self, focuses on the difference between authentic and inauthentic self-hood. This is only to be expected, since Heidegger locates that difference as the starting point for the continuous attempt to come into possession of our authentic selves. However, this focus might easily lead us to overlook the fact that this distinction is not one that everyone makes. Dasein can exist in such a way that there is no distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic for it. Thus Heidegger also distinguishes between the mode of existence in which authenticity and inauthenticity are differentiated and a mode of existence in which they are undifferentiated… Greaves, *Starting with Heidegger,* 61.

Greaves' claim that Heidegger marks out a way of existence in which there is no distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity *for Dasein itself* does not commit him to the existence of a UDM. Further, Greaves points out that "authenticity is only possible for those who differentiate between inauthenticity and authenticity, a point that accords nicely with my argument (Ibid., 62). Nonetheless, neither explains the relationship between failing to draw this distinction and inauthenticity, nor the relationship between this failure and average everyday *Dasein*'s ontologically indifferent understanding of being in general. So while his interpretation, and interpretations like it, is on the right track, it leaves a lot of important details to be fleshed out.

In the most extensive discussion of the issue of Dasein's *Indifferenz*, Robert Dostal attempts to address the question of whether there are two or three modes of existence in *Being and Time*. While his discussion does shed some light on the issue, he takes for granted that Heidegger does in fact assert the existence of a UDM:

> Thus in both the introduction to Part I and the introduction to Part II Heidegger asserts that there are three possibilities with respect to the modality of *Dasein*. The subsequent analysis in both parts, however, provides little place for the Indifferent. While at times as noted above any distinction between the indifferent and inauthentic modes seems to collapse… Dostal, "The Problem of 'Indifferenz' in *Sein Und Zeit*," 49.

Thus, Dostal fails to see how *Dasein*'s *Indifferenz* functions in the methodological progression of *Being and Time*, and ends up claiming that Heidegger's use of 'Indifferenz' is an inconsistency that undermines his project:

Interpreters maintain such a reading in the face of the overwhelming preponderance of passages in which Heidegger claims that *Dasein* is 'proximally and mostly' *inauthentic*. Many interpreters, in fact, wish to resist such claims, seeing them as implausibly strong condemnations of average everyday *Dasein*.[2] According to William Blattner, Heidegger offers us "philosophical resources," or "underdeveloped phenomenological resources," first identified by Hubert Dreyfus, for reading *Being and Time* as maintaining "a more balanced view of everyday life" which presents it "in a less pejorative way."[3] The "everyday undifferentiated character of *Dasein*," or '*averageness*,' is supposed to be such a phenomenological resource. Blattner draws on the following passage, which I will label (UD1), to make his case:

> (UD1) – This undifferentiated character [*Indifferenz*] of *Dasein*'s everydayness is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity...We call this everyday undifferentiated character [*Indifferenz*] of *Dasein averageness*.[4]

Blattner sees that *if* this passage presents "an 'undifferentiated' character that is neither [authentic] nor [inauthentic],"[5] then it gives us "a third, and more plausible, description" of

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Thus neither here in the context of the treatment of *Mitsein* nor elsewhere in methodological or ontological contexts is "indifference" a mode simply alongside authenticity and inauthenticity – a third possibility. Heidegger does not consistently carry out what he sets for himself in the introductions to the two parts of this text…Thus the text undermines itself and its claim to phenomenology. It therefore remains incomplete – incapable of moving from the analysis of the human to the *Seinsfrage* as such. Ibid., 57.

In this paper, I aim to show that Heidegger nowhere claims that there is such a UDM, and that his analysis does not suffer from this inconsistency.

[2] Unfortunately, directly challenging this motivation for positing a UDM would take this paper too far afield. My argument for indifferent inauthenticity, however, offers an indirect challenge, since it is a reading according to which it is not a condemnation of average everyday *Dasein* to call it inauthentic. A more direct challenge to this motivation is offered in my "The Positive Potential of Inauthenticity" (in progress).

[3] Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time": A Reader's Guide,* 129.

[4] Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit,* 44 (trans. M&R). Unless otherwise noted, as it is with this passage, translations are my own.

[5] Blattner translates '*eigentlich*' and '*uneigentlich*' by 'owned' and 'disowned,' respectively.

Dasein's average everyday mode of existence.[6] Yet (UD1) gives us no indication that *Dasein*'s 'undifferentiated character,' or '*averageness*,' amounts to a mode of existence that is *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. In this paper, I will argue that the 'undifferentiated character,' or '*Indifferenz*,' of average everyday *Dasein* signals its indifferent inauthenticity rather than a UDM.

3. Recognizing Indifferent Inauthenticity in the *Phaedrus*

Before locating the phenomenon of indifferent inauthenticity in the text of *Being and Time*, I will attempt to bring the phenomenon to life through an appeal to Plato's *Phaedrus*. My hope is that this intuitive illustration will better prepare us to recognize a less intuitive manifestation of the same phenomenon in Heidegger's treatise. The *Phaedrus* begins, under the shade of a tree on the outskirts of Athens, with three speeches about love. The first speech is Phaedrus' recitation of a speech given earlier by Lysias. The aim of this speech is to persuade the listener that association with non-lovers is to be preferred to association with lovers. Non-lovers are supposedly more rational, pleasant, and loyal than lovers, while the latter are more jealous, vindictive, boastful, demanding, etc. It is thus in one's interest to enter into relationships with non-lovers rather than lovers. After reciting this speech, Phaedrus is ecstatic, claiming that he cannot imagine a better speech. Socrates, however, is not impressed, and claims to find fault with the composition rather than the substance of the speech. Phaedrus challenges him to give a better speech with the same conclusion. After ending his own exaltation of non-love relationships over love relationships, Socrates turns away from the shady spot on the outskirts of Athens as if to begin to make his way back to town. Phaedrus pleads with him to linger in the shade until the afternoon sun passes. Socrates will have nothing of it – but as he is about to leave, he is struck by a sign:

> My friend, just as I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign came

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[6] Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time": A Reader's Guide,* 130.

> to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I am about to do. I thought I heard a voice coming from this very spot, forbidding me to leave until I made atonement for some offense against the gods. In effect, you see, I am a seer, and though I am not particularly good at it, still – like people who are just barely able to read and write – I am good enough for my own purposes. I recognize my offense clearly now. In fact, the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer; that's why, almost from the beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy feeling, as Ibycus puts it, that 'for offending the gods I am honored by men.' But now I understand exactly what my offense has been.[7]

At first, Socrates is simply struck by the sense that to leave the matter as it stood at the end of his speech, without further ado, would be to err in some important way he cannot yet articulate. He then comes to recognize his error in a way that allows him to further articulate and attempt to correct it.

The error that Socrates recognizes amounts to a failure to differentiate between 'divine' and 'non-divine' love. Because the first two speeches fail to concern themselves with making this differentiation at all, they both end up unwittingly focusing on non-divine love rather than divine love. The understanding of love at play in both speeches, that is, turns out to grasp only non-divine love. Socrates makes amends for this error by giving a third speech, which begins by tending to the difference between divine and non-divine love, and ultimately argues that association with the *divine*-lover, though not necessarily the *non-divine*-lover, is to be preferred to association with the non-lover.

We can express this in a more Heideggerian fashion by glossing the distinction between divine and non-divine love as a distinction between proper and improper, *authentic* and *inauthentic* love. The first two speeches of the *Phaedrus* are given in what Heidegger might call '*indifference* to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic love.' This

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[7] Plato, "Phaedrus," 242b-d.

'indifference' amounts to a failure to distinguish between these two types of love. These speeches are not explicitly concerned with the difference between authentic and inauthentic love, but this does not mean that they are thereby concerned with a love that is neither authentic nor inauthentic. Instead, the understanding of love at play in both speeches only takes inauthentic love into account, which is not all that love, properly understood, can be. We can consider it, therefore, an inauthentic understanding of love. By failing to tend explicitly to the difference, both speeches end up assuming an inauthentic understanding of the matter at hand.[8] As Socrates turns back to head towards town, he recognizes this indifference and the resulting necessity for further inquiry into the nature of love. He thus begins a third speech with an attempt to arrive at an authentic understanding of love.

If we accept the dialogue on its own terms, Socrates does seem to arrive at this authentic understanding in his final speech. The recognition of his prior indifference to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic love, however, is not itself sufficient to render his understanding authentic. We can imagine his third speech positioning itself to arrive at an authentic understanding of love, only to end in the sort of impasse that marks the end of many Platonic dialogues. If this were the case, the understanding of love at play in this imagined final speech *would still be inauthentic*, though in a different manner than in the previous two speeches. Because the first two speeches are given in indifference to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic love, they end up taking an inauthentic understanding of love for granted. When this indifference is recognized, Socrates thereby

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[8] It is indeed possible that even though the speakers do not consider the difference between divine/authentic and non-divine/inauthentic love, they end up with a divine/authentic understanding of love nonetheless. However, this would be highly unlikely, especially since most of the love relationships from which they might develop their understanding of love are instances of non-divine/inauthentic love (according to the *Phaedrus*, at least). Even if, by sheer luck, the understanding of love at play turned out to be divine/authentic, further inquiry would be required in order to recognize it as such.

also recognizes that his prior understanding of love was inauthentic.[9] The recognition of this indifferent inauthenticity itself, though, does not render his understanding of love authentic. Rather, it opens up the possibility for further inquiry. Only successful further investigation into the nature of love can render the understanding of love in question authentic.[10] Prior to such further investigation, though Socrates' earlier confidence in it may be shaken, his understanding of love remains inauthentic. Nonetheless, it is no longer indifferent.

We can thus identify two sorts of inauthentic understanding in the *Phaedrus*: an *indifferent* and *non-indifferent* inauthentic understanding of love. The first of these, which I call *indifferent inauthenticity*, is the focus of this paper (in the context of *Being and Time*). I maintain that where most interpreters read Heidegger as discussing a UDM, he is in fact discussing indifferent inauthenticity.

4. Heidegger's Use of 'Authentic' and 'Inauthentic'

In the previous section, I glossed the distinction between divine and non-divine love as a distinction between authentic and inauthentic love. Since Heidegger's use of 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' are often taken to be 'existentialist' concepts that primarily concern the 'fragility,' 'groundlessness,' or 'finitude' of *Dasein*'s existence,[11] my representation of the distinction may seem rather distant from Heidegger's. In this section, I aim to show that my gloss of the distinction between divine and non-divine love in the previous section does in fact conform to Heidegger's understanding of the terms 'authentic' and 'inauthentic.' This understanding of the terms will also stand as a reason to doubt that 'the strict meaning' of the terms allows room for a UDM.

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[9] See previous footnote.

[10] Or, in line with footnote 8: '...can recognize the understanding of love in question to be authentic.'

[11] This is almost ubiquitous in the literature. For particularly compelling and influential accounts, see Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*; Blattner, *Heidegger's "Being and Time": A Reader's Guide.*; Haugeland, "Truth and Finitude: Heidegger's Transcendental Existentialism."

Heidegger's clearest explanation of these terms comes in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, where he elucidates how factical *Dasein* understands itself, or "in which meaning in general the self is experienced and understood," in everydayness:[12]

> We understand ourselves in an everyday manner, as we can terminologically fix it, *not authentically* [nicht eigentlich] in the strict meaning of the word – not constantly from the ownmost and outermost possibilities of our own [*eigenen*] existence, but *inauthentically*, indeed ourselves but as we *are not proper to ourselves*, as we have lost ourselves...in the everydayness of existence.[13]

Heidegger claims that when we understand ourselves in an everyday manner, we understand ourselves '*not authentically*.' When *Dasein* understands itself '*not authentically*,' it understands itself '*inauthentically*.' Heidegger also tells us explicitly and in no uncertain terms that *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding – a self-understanding whose averageness, as we will see in the next section, amounts to 'indifference' – is *inauthentic*. The focus of this passage is *in*authentic self-understanding, yet because such inauthentic self-understanding is defined negatively – as *not* authentic – we also gain a clearer view of what it would mean to understand ourselves authentically. *An authentic self-understanding is one in which Dasein understands itself constantly from its ownmost and outermost possibilities of existence*.

This explanation of the terms renders *Dasein*'s self-understanding *always either authentic or inauthentic*. Heidegger explicitly identifies self-understanding that is *not authentic* with that which is *inauthentic*: *not authentically = inauthentically*. This leaves no

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[12] Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* 228. Though it is possible that the view of these terms laid out in *Basic Problems* differs from that of *Being and Time*, I can do very little to directly respond to such a concern in this paper. That it is not a caricature, simplified for a lecture audience, is suggested by Heidegger's reference to 'the strict meaning of the word.' Beyond this consideration, my presentation of indifferent inauthenticity should stand as an indirect response to this worry insofar as it incorporates this understanding while allowing us to more coherently make sense of the methodological progression of *Being and Time* as a whole.

[13] Ibid., 228.

conceptual room for a third, undifferentiated mode of existence, one that is *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. If *Dasein*'s self-understanding is *not authentic*, then, according to the 'strict meaning of the words,' it is *inauthentic*. This explanation of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic self-understandings is structurally isomorphic to my representation of the distinction between authentic and inauthentic understandings of love in §3. There, I treated an authentic understanding of love as one that grasps or appropriates what love, properly considered, is or can be. Accordingly, any understanding that fails to do so, such as that at play in the first two speeches of the *Phaedrus,* is inauthentic. Such an understanding is inauthentic even if, in its indifference to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic love, it does not recognize its inauthenticity.

5. Indifferent Inauthenticity or an Undifferentiated Mode

Indifferent inauthenticity, and coming to recognize it, plays a crucial role in Div. I of *Being and Time*. Interpreters have largely overlooked this, however, since Heidegger's discussion of it has been interpreted as an indication of a UDM, in which *Dasein* exists as neither authentic nor inauthentic. Now that we have seen an intuitive example of indifferent inauthenticity, and a reason to doubt that 'the strict meaning' of the terms allows room for a UDM, I will turn to key passages in *Being and Time* that are accepted as support for the UDM' and show how, instead, they are best interpreted as concerned with indifferent inauthenticity:

> (UD1) – This undifferentiated character [*Indifferenz*] of *Dasein*'s everydayness is *not nothing,* but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity...We call this everyday undifferentiated character [*Indifferenz*] of *Dasein averageness.*[14]

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[14] Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit,* 43, trans M&R. When presenting these passages as they are taken to support the UDM, I will use M&R's translations. Later, when I discuss their proper interpretation, I will use my own translations.

> **(**UD2**)** – But this ability-to-be, as one which is in each case mine, is free either for authenticity or for inauthenticity or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated [*oder die modale Indifferenz ihrer*]. In starting with average everydayness, our Interpretation has heretofore been confined to the analysis of such existing as is either undifferentiated [*indifferenten*] or inauthentic.[15]

To put some distance between my reading and those readings that take a UDM to be at issue in these passages, I will, going forward, either render '*Indifferenz*' by 'indifference' or simply use Heidegger's original German.

6. Averageness and Ontological Indifference

The central task in properly understanding and assessing (UD1) and (UD2) is the illumination of Heidegger's use of '*Indifferenz*,' which is commonly translated as 'undifferentiated' or 'undifferentiated character' and taken to indicate the existence of a UDM. I maintain that Heidegger's use of '*Indifferenz*' indicates an indifferent inauthenticity similar to that which I explored in §3. I will now explain this in greater depth.

(UD1) refers to *Dasein*'s everyday '*Indifferenz*' under the label of 'averageness.' Heidegger first discusses 'averageness' early in *Being and Time*, when he tells us that *the question of being*, once the site of philosophical battle, is now seen as superfluous. He traces this stance back to a dogmatism summarized by three "presuppositions and prejudices that are constantly reimplanting and fostering the belief that an inquiry into being is

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[15] Ibid., 232, trans. M&R. A third passage is often take as support for a UDM:

> (UD3) – Mineness belongs to any existent *Dasein*, and belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and inauthenticity possible. In each case *Dasein* exists in the one or the other of these modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated [*in der modalen Indifferenz ihrer*]. Ibid., 53, trans. M&R.

Due to considerations of space, I will only be able to present interpretations of (UD1) and (UD2). These interpretations, however, are the most illuminating of the three and will suggest how (UD3) should be understood: along the lines of (UD2₁), as outlined in §8.ii.

unnecessary":[16]

> (PP1) Being is the most universal and emptiest concept.
>
> (PP2) Being resists any attempt at a definition.
>
> (PP3) Being is nonetheless the self-intelligible concept, understood by all who use it. Thus, it requires no definition.[17]

Heidegger's responses to these 'presuppositions and prejudices' are central to the task of understanding *Dasein*'s *Indifferenz*.

Heidegger offers a reinterpretation of the traditional presupposition of the 'self-intelligibility' of being (PP3) as "an average intelligibility, which merely demonstrates unintelligibility":[18]

> 'Being' is the self-intelligible [*selbstverständliche*] concept. In all cognition, assertion, in every comportment towards entities, in every comportment towards oneself, use will have been made of 'being', and the expression is thereby intelligible 'without further ado' [»*ohne weiteres*«]. Everyone understands: 'The sky *is* blue'; 'I *am* merry' and the like. On its own, this average intelligibility [*durchschnittliche Verständlichkeit*] merely demonstrates unintelligibility [*Unverständlichkeit*]. It makes manifest that in every comportment and being towards entities as entities lies *a priori* an enigma...we ever already live in an understanding of being and the meaning of being is at the same time shrouded in darkness...[19]

According to Heidegger, the fact that we are able to comport ourselves towards and understand being 'without further ado' does not suggest that it is self-intelligible. Rather, Heidegger sees us as getting by with an understanding of being that remains mostly unintelligible or opaque. He labels this unintelligibility an 'average intelligibility.'

Heidegger goes on to tell us that this average intelligibility is also 'indeterminate':

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[16] Ibid., 2-3.

[17] Ibid., 2.

[18] Ibid., 4.

[19] Ibid., 4.

> *This average...understanding of being is a fact…*this indeterminateness [*Unbestimmtheit*] of the ever already available understanding of being is itself a positive phenomenon which requires clarification.[20]

Heidegger's discussion of the average understanding of being as 'indeterminate' is a restatement of (PP2), that 'being' resists any attempt at definition. It is crucial that we understand the relationship between the indeterminateness of the average understanding of being and *Dasein*'s *Indifferenz*. The clearest discussion of the relationship between indeterminateness and *Indifferenz* appears in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, where Heidegger discusses the *Indifferenz* of our understanding of being:

> This understanding of being, which encompasses all that is in a certain way, is proximally *indifferent* [indifferent]; we commonly call all that is somehow encountered as that which is, be-ing [*seiend*], without regard to differentiating determinate manners of being. The understanding of being is indifferent [*indifferent*], but at any time *differentiable*.[21]

Different entities have different ways of being: either presence-at-hand, readiness-to-hand, or existence. The average understanding of being, however, somehow manages to grasp all three determinate ways of being, allowing *Dasein* to comport itself towards entities of any of these ways of being, without explicitly having to differentiate between them. The average understanding of being allows *Dasein* to comport itself towards an entity without regard to that entity's way of being, and thus without explicitly and conceptually differentiating its way of being. In short, the average understanding of being is *indifferent* to the distinction between the different ways of being of the entities with which it deals.

Notice that the *Indifferenz* and indeterminateness of the average understanding of being is intimately related to Heidegger's discussion of (PP3). According to (PP3), being is

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[20] Ibid., 5-6.

[21] Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,* 250.

thought to be 'self-intelligible' because we use the concept whenever we speak or comport

ourselves towards any entity at all 'without further ado.' We can now see that 'without

further ado' not only means 'without having to explicitly and conceptually specify the

meaning of being,' but also "without regard to differentiating determinate manners of

being."[22] Thus, Heidegger labels the average understanding of being 'indeterminate' not

because being resists any attempt at definition as in (PP2), but because *the average*

understanding of being does not explicitly and conceptually differentiate between

determinate ways of being. Indeed, Heidegger's point in selecting 'The sky *is* blue' and 'I *am*

merry' as examples is to show that the average understanding of being does not – and does

not need to – differentiate between the determinate ways of being of the sky and *Dasein*.

Such determinate differences remain *indeterminate* for *Dasein*'s average understanding of

being.

By dwelling on the averageness, *Indifferenz*, and indeterminateness of our everyday

understanding of being, Heidegger challenges the assumption expressed in (PP3), that being

is self-intelligible 'without further ado.' We do indeed employ an average understanding of

being without explicitly and conceptually differentiating between determinate manners of

being. Yet this lack of differentiation, or indeterminateness, amounts to an *Indifferenz* to the

determinate differences which are to be differentiated – a failure to make being fully

intelligible. Futhermore, (PP3) involves a failure to notice the possibility of any 'further ado'

at all, since it fails to recognize the 'unintelligibility' that might require such further ado.

Notice, however, that though *Dasein*'s average understanding of being fails to properly

differentiate determinate manners of being, *these determinate manners of being nonetheless*

remain differentiable within the average understanding of being: "The understanding of

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[22] Ibid., 250.

being is indifferent, but at any time *differentiable*."[23] That is, while we usually tend to entities "without regard to differentiating determinate manners of being," this is not to say that these determinate differences are not somehow 'there' to be differentiated, should we turn our regard to them, at any time.

How is this indifference related to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic self-understandings? I forge this connection in the next section.

7. Indifference with Respect to *Dasein*'s Understanding of *Being*; Indifference with Respect to *Dasein*'s *Self*-Understanding

It is important to notice that *Dasein*, in its average, *indifferent* everydayness, not only neglects to explicitly differentiate between determinate ways of being in its understanding of non-*Dasein*ish entities, but also neglects to differentiate its own way of being from that of non-*Dasein*ish entities. It is crucial to see that this precludes it from differentiating between its own possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. As I will now show, *indifference with respect to being in general is necessarily coupled with indifference with respect to* Dasein*'s own possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding*.

According to **(**PP3), being is self-intelligible, or "intelligible 'without further ado'."[24] It is important to recognize that such a presupposition does not maintain that "everyone understands: 'The sky *is* blue'; 'I *am* merry' and the like" in some merely minimal or deficient sense. Being is not only held to be "intelligible 'without further ado'," but, according to (PP1), it is the 'emptiest concept.' If this is true, there is simply no content to the concept of being, beyond what is self-intelligible 'without further ado,' and thus no distinction between full and partial understandings of being. *Everyone* understands being, and with such an average understanding, everyone *fully* understands being.

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[23] Ibid., 250.

[24] Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit,* 4.

To understand *Dasein*'s *Indifferenz*, we must see that *average everyday Dasein must take the same stance with respect to its own being*. *Dasein*'s average everyday, *indifferent* understanding of being must take its own being to be just as (PP1) empty, (PP2) indefinable, and (PP3) self-intelligible as the being of any other entity. If there are no differentiations to be drawn with respect to the concept of being in general, then there are no differences by which we might distinguish *Dasein*'s being from the being of other entities. While much might be said about *Dasein*'s distinctive species characteristics, according to the average everyday, indifferent understanding of being, *Dasein*'s being is just as (PP1) empty, (PP2) indefinable, and (PP3) self-intelligible as the being of any other entity.

Indeed, later in *Being and Time*, Heidegger characterizes the way the self shows itself in everydayness in terms of (PP1) and (PP2). The self:

> ...shows itself for the absorption in the everyday manifoldness and pursuit of the concerned as the constantly self-same, but indeterminately-empty Simple [*unbestimmt-leere Einfache*].[25]

Heidegger claims that the self shows itself to the average understanding of being as (PP2) indeterminate and (PP1) simple and empty. If this is the case, it follows that it is also **(**PP3) "intelligible 'without further ado'."[26] Heidegger immediately suggests as much by warning that the fact that the average self-understanding "ontically overlooks the phenomenal content of the I...gives the ontological Interpretation of the I *no right to join in this overlooking*."[27] Even if the ontological interpretation "denies allegiance" to such an everyday self-understanding, doing so "in no way thereby already wins the *solution* to the problem, but rather the *fore-sketching of the direction* to be further questioned [*weitergefragt*]."[28] The average everyday self-understanding, but not Heidegger's ontological interpretation, takes the

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[25] Ibid., 322.
[26] Ibid., 4.
[27] Ibid., 322.
[28] Ibid., 322.

self to be **(**PP3) "intelligible 'without further ado'."

Because of the stance the average, indifferent self-understanding takes towards its own being, it can countenance neither the possibility of authentic nor inauthentic self-understanding. Authentic and inauthentic self-understandings are differentiated by whether *Dasein* understands itself from the ownmost and outermost possibilities of its existence. We don't have to articulate precisely what the ownmost and outermost possibilities of *Dasein*'s existence are in order to see that an average, indifferent understanding cannot countenance such possibilities.[29] The ownmost and outermost possibilities, whatever they may turn out to be, lie *beyond*[30] the self-intelligible structures which average everyday *Dasein* takes to exhaust its being. *Dasein* cannot both countenance the possibility of self-understanding from these possibilities *and* understand its being, like being in general, as (PP1) simple and empty, (PP2) indeterminate, and (PP3) fully self-intelligible 'without further ado.' If *Dasein* is to concern itself with the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, it must be open to the possibility of self-understanding from its ownmost and outermost possibilities. Since *Dasein*'s average everyday indifference is not open to such possibilities, it is a mode of existence that does not recognize and explicitly concern itself with the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. It is *indifferent* to the distinction.

Given Heidegger's elucidation of the meaning of 'indifference,' *we have no reason to think that in this average everyday indifference,* Dasein*'s self-understanding is neither authentic nor inauthentic*. Instead, Heidegger's discussion suggests that though average everyday *Dasein* does not differentiate between these possibilities of self-understanding as it understands itself 'without further ado,' its being remains "at any time *differentiable*"

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[29] Since this is the case, and since exploring these possibilities would be a demanding undertaking, I will not do so here. For our purposes, we must only see the formal role they play in the analysis with respect to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity.

[30] '*Weiter*' – which M&R, Stambaugh, and I translate as 'further ado' – can be taken not only in the sequential sense of 'continued' or 'additional,' but also in the spatial sense of 'farther reaching' or 'more distant.' Heidegger intends 'further ado' to be read in both senses.

nonetheless. Crucially, *it is precisely this failure to differentiate between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding that accounts for average everyday Dasein's inauthenticity.* The first and biggest obstacle to an authentic self-understanding in terms of one's ownmost and outermost possibilities of existence is, in fact, the average or indifferent understanding of being that countenances neither such possibilities nor the 'further ado' required to arrive at such an authentic understanding. Such an indifferent understanding closes itself off from a 'further ado,' beyond the self-intelligible, from which to understand itself. *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding, just as the understanding of love at play in the first two speeches of the *Phaedrus*, is inauthentic *precisely because* it does not differentiate between the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity. Average everyday *Dasein* is indifferently inauthentic, but the possibility remains that it might come to recognize this indifference. To do so would be to come to see itself as inauthentic, as indifferently inauthentic – much as Socrates did before giving his final speech.

8. Revisiting Indifferent Inauthenticity in Being and Time

This understanding of *Dasein*'s average everyday *Indifferenz* – both with respect to its understanding of being in general and to its own possibilities of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding – equips us to more fully appreciate that (UD1) and (UD2) do not claim that *Dasein* can exist in a UDM, as *neither authentic nor inauthentic*.

i. *(UD1) – The Methodological Indifference of the Interpretation's Point of Departure*

Heidegger's use of '*Indifferenz*' in (UD1) is best interpreted as the articulation of a methodological principle concerning the point of departure of the ontological interpretation of *Dasein*. In the opening section of Div. I (§9), Heidegger makes clear that *the ontological interpretation of Dasein requires the right 'point of departure'*:

> Securely carrying out the right objective stands and falls with the possibility of

> bringing the being of [*Dasein*] in general to understanding. However provisional [*vorläufig*] the analysis may still be, it always already demands the securing of the right point of departure [*Ansatzes*].[31]

In the following passage, which ends with (UD1), Heidegger tells us that the proper point of departure for the ontological interpretation is *Dasein*'s 'everyday indifference' or 'averageness':

> *Dasein* determines itself as that which is ever out of a possibility that it *is* and somehow understands in its being. This is the formal meaning of the constitution of *Dasein*'s existence. Therein lies, however, the instruction for the *ontological* Interpretation of this entity – to develop the problematic of its being from out of the existentiality of its existence. That can, however, not be to say that *Dasein* is to be construed from some concrete possible idea of existence. *Dasein* should, with the departure of the analysis, precisely not be Interpreted in the difference of a determinate existence, but should be uncovered in its indifferent Proximate and Mostly [*indifferenten Zunächst und Zumeist*]. This indifference [*Indifferenz*] of the everydayness of *Dasein* is *not nothing*, but a positive phenomenal characteristic of this entity...We call this everyday indifference [*Indifferenz*] of *Dasein averageness*.[32]

The context of the (UD1) reference to *Dasein*'s *indifference* is a discussion of the proper point of departure for the ontological interpretation of *Dasein*. In this discussion, Heidegger warns that we must not begin the interpretation by construing *Dasein* "from some concrete possible idea of existence," or "in the difference of a determinate existence." That is, the interpretation should not begin with a Kantian, Aristotelian, Sartrean, Heideggerian, or any other possibly arbitrary way of understanding *Dasein*'s being. Rather, *Dasein* will be uncovered in the indifference with which it proximally and mostly comports itself. The point of departure for the ontological interpretation will be *Dasein*'s average everyday, *indifferent* self-understanding.

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[31] Ibid., 43.

[32] Ibid., 43.

Notice that Heidegger is using the same language of *indifference to determinate differences* that he used to elucidate the *Indifferenz* of *Dasein*'s understanding of being. In this instance, however, the determinate differences at stake are determinate ways of understanding *Dasein*'s being, not determinate ways of understanding the being of any entity whatsoever. Seen in context, **(**UD1**)** is best understood as the articulation of a methodological principle that postpones any explicit differentiation between authentic and inauthentic self-understandings. The ontological interpretation of *Dasein* will not begin by imposing a view of how *Dasein* should authentically understand itself, nor will it concern itself at the outset with showing whether *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding is inauthentic. The interpretation, rather, will assume *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding as its point of departure. This self-understanding is indifferent to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, and the interpretation will, accordingly, assume this indifference at the outset by refraining from drawing a distinction between authentic and inauthentic existence and imposing a determinate understanding of authentic existence on *Dasein*. *Dasein*'s average everydayness will, in a sense, speak for itself.

This is not to say, however, that the self-understanding that serves as the point of departure for the ontological interpretation of *Dasein* is *neither* authentic nor inauthentic. *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding – and thus the point of departure for the interpretation – is *indifferent to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity*, but as discussed above, *this is precisely what makes it inauthentic*. Though such a self-understanding is indifferent to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity, it is "at any time *differentiable*." As I will show in the next section, when the time comes for the ontological investigation to differentiate between these possibilities, Heidegger is clear that such indifference amounts to indifferent *inauthenticity*.

ii. *(UD2) – The Insufficiency of the Methodological Indifference of the Interpretation's Point of Departure*

In §12, Heidegger refers back to the §9 discussion of the interpretation's point of departure:

> In the preparatory discussion (§9) we already brought characters of being into relief which should provide a secure light for the further investigation, but which at the same time receive their structural concretion in this investigation. *Dasein* is that entity which in its being comports itself understandingly towards this being. Therewith is shown the formal concept of existence. *Dasein* exists. *Dasein* is further that entity which I myself ever am.[33]

Heidegger tells us that at the outset of the interpretation he has shown what he calls the 'formal concept of existence.' When Div. II opens by questioning the primordiality of the Div. I ontological interpretation of *Dasein*, Heidegger calls this formal concept a 'first fore-sketch' of *Dasein*'s being – one that proves insufficient:

> A first fore-sketch of the being of [*Dasein*], though phenomenally grounded, is...not sufficient. The fore-sight upon being must rather strike this with regard to the unity of the structural moments belonging to and possible for it. Only then can the question of the meaning of the unity of the wholeness of being of the whole entity be asked and answered with phenomenal security.[34]

If the ontological interpretation of *Dasein* is to be primordial, it must catch a glimpse of *Dasein* with regard to the unity of its possible structural moments.

Heidegger next turns to assessing the Div. I interpretation of *Dasein* in light of this criterion of primordiality: "Can the question of the primordial unity of this structural whole be advanced from the finding obtained – the being of *Dasein* is care?"[35] (UD2) follows almost immediately:

> (UD2) – But, as ever *mine,* this *potentiality-to-be* is free for authenticity or inauthenticity or their modal indifference [*oder die modale Indifferenz ihrer*].

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[33] Ibid., 52-3.

[34] Ibid., 232.

[35] Ibid., 232.

> The previous interpretation limited itself, taking its point of departure amidst
> [*ansetzend bei*] average everydayness, to the analysis of indifferent
> [*indifferenten*], or to be more precise [*bzw.*], inauthentic existence.[36]

Heidegger makes two different claims in this passage: the first (UD2$_1$) is about *Dasein*, the

entity being interpreted, while the second (UD2$_2$) is about the point of departure from which

the interpretation will approach *Dasein*.

Heidegger uses different conjunctions to introduce 'indifference' in these two claims.

(UD2$_1$) uses '*oder*,' a disjunctive conjunction meaning 'or.' (UD2$_2$) uses '*bzw.*,' a

conjunction which is a bit more complicated. Both M&R and Stambaugh translate '*bzw.*' as

'or,' 'or else,' or 'either...or.' This treats it as a disjunctive conjunction like '*oder*' and thus

contributes to the impression that Heidegger is simply listing three distinct disjuncts in

(UD2$_2$). But while '*bzw.*' – an abbreviation for '*beziehungsweise*' – can be used disjunctively

in this way, this is not its only, or even its most frequent, use. The *DWDS-Wörterbuch*

defines '*beziehungsweise*' as a conjunction with two senses:

> 1. *oder vielmehr, genauer gesagt*
>
> 2. *und im anderen Falle.*[37]

The second sense, 'and in another case,' is the disjunctive sense emphasized by both M&R

and Stambaugh, while the first sense is an *elaborative* sense, meaning 'or rather,' 'better

said,' or 'to be more precise.' (UD2$_2$) is best interpreted with this *elaborative* sense of '*bzw.*'

in mind.

Let us now examine the two claims packed into (UD2). Heidegger uses '*oder*' rather

than '*bzw.*' to link authenticity and inauthenticity with 'their modal indifference' in (UD2$_1$):

"But, as ever *mine*, this *potentiality-to-be* is free for authenticity or inauthenticity or [*oder*]

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[36] Ibid., 232.

[37] *Das Digitale Wörterbuch Der Deutschen Sprache Des 20. Jahrhunderts*: *DWDS* accessed January
09, 2015.

their modal indifference."**38** Heidegger is indeed enumerating three disjuncts here. If *Dasein* does differentiate between the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity – if it does take *the question of being* and its possible authenticity seriously – then we should be able to see that it is "free for"[39]: (1) authenticity – understanding itself properly; or (2) inauthenticity – understanding itself improperly. But *Dasein* is also "free for": (3) the indifference of an average everyday self-understanding. In such a self-understanding, it does not differentiate between its possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity. This average everyday, indifferent self-understanding, as I hope is clear by now, is inauthentic; in it, *Dasein* fails to understand itself properly, from its ownmost and outermost possibilities, as it, taken properly, is or can be.

Even though this 'modal indifference' is itself inauthentic, it makes sense to disjunctively differentiate it from (2) 'being free for inauthenticity.' In (2) 'being free for inauthenticity,' *Dasein* no longer maintains itself in indifference to the distinction, but it nonetheless fails to understand itself authentically. This 'being free for inauthenticity' amounts to *Dasein*'s recognition of both its indifference to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity and its failure to understand itself authentically – it amounts to *Dasein's recognition of its own prior indifferent inauthenticity*. Such a recognition, as we saw with respect to the *Phaedrus*, does not automatically render *Dasein*'s self-understanding authentic. *Dasein*'s inauthenticity has so far been the result of failing to even attend to the difference between its own authenticity and inauthenticity, and thereby failing to understand itself from its ownmost and outermost possibilities; in 'being free for inauthenticity,' *Dasein* sees that there is a distinction to be drawn. Recognizing this, however, does not necessarily entail drawing the distinction properly – it does not necessarily lead to authentic self-

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[38] Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit,* 232.

[39] What this 'free for' amounts to is important, but I do not have the resources to cash it out in this paper.

understanding from one's ownmost and outermost possibilities. It does, however, open up the possibility of setting out on a search for authentic self-understanding, even if that search ends in failure. In (UD2$_1$), Heidegger distinguishes between three distinct, disjunctive possibilities of *Dasein*'s self-understanding, yet *two turn out to be inauthentic*.

In (UD2$_2$), Heidegger claims that the Div. I ontological analysis of *Dasein* "limited itself, taking its point of departure amidst average everydayness, to the analysis of indifferent, or to be more precise [*bzw.*], inauthentic existence."[40] This amounts to the claim that the point of departure for the interpretation was the last of the three possibilities delineated in (UD2$_1$), the average everyday, indifference to the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Such indifference, however much it does not take itself to be, *is* inauthentic, which is why Heidegger uses the elaborative '*bzw.*' rather than '*oder.*'

We must read (UD2) in this manner in order to make sense of the claim that immediately follows. Heidegger follows (UD2) by telling us that the Div. I ontological interpretation was "afflicted with an essential defect":[41]

> Existence says potentiality-to-be – but also authentic [potentiality-to-be]. As long as the existential structure of an authentic potentiality-to-be is not taken up into the idea of existence, the guiding fore-sight of an existential Interpretation lacks primordiality.[42]

The ontological interpretation of *Dasein* lacks primordiality insofar as the possibility of *Dasein*'s *authenticity* is not taken up into and unified with the so far merely fore-sketched, formally indicated concept of existence. Heidegger gives us no indication that the interpretation faces the same difficulty with respect to the possibility of *Dasein*'s *inauthenticity*. If, however, *Dasein*'s average everyday *Indifferenz*, as the point of departure of the Div. I ontological interpretation, were *neither authentic nor inauthentic*, this same

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[40] Ibid., 232.

[41] Ibid., 233.

[42] Ibid., 233.

difficulty would extend to the possibility of *Dasein*'s inauthenticity. Properly understood, the interpretation does not face this difficulty with respect to *Dasein*'s inauthenticity: though the interpretation's point of departure assumed *indifference* with respect to this distinction, *this average and indifferent self-understanding turned out to be inauthentic*.[43] Thus, the possibility of *Dasein*'s *inauthenticity* has already been taken up into and unified with the fore-sketched, formal concept of existence.

9. Non-Indifferent Inauthenticity and the Possibility of Genuine Failure

The phenomenon of indifferent inauthenticity makes its first appearance in the epigraph to *Being and Time*. This epigraph, in fact, highlights the difference between *indifferent* and non-*indifferent* inauthenticity:

> For apparently you have long been familiar with what you authentically intend when you use the expression *be-ing* [seiend]. We, however, believed it once to be understood, but now we have come into difficulty [*in Verlegenheit gekommen*].[44]

It is important that we see through the feigned or sarcastic modesty of the Stranger's delivery and notice that he is not claiming to be mistaken and confused while those he addresses are not. Rather, he is claiming that those who, like him, once thought that they understood the expression 'be-ing,' but have now "come into difficulty," *recognize*, and thus have the opportunity to correct, an inauthentic misunderstanding to which others remain blind. Those who still take themselves to be familiar with what '*be-ing*' authentically intends do not recognize their understanding to be a *mis*understanding, and thus would not seek the opportunity to correct it without further prompting. They inauthentically take '*be-ing*' to be

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[43] The investigation comes to see this in the Div. I.6 analysis of anxiety, just before Heidegger opens Div. II with the concern about primordiality.

[44] Plato, "Sophist," 244a. qtd. in Heidegger, *Sein Und Zeit,* 1.

"intelligible 'without further ado'."[45] The issue in this passage is the understanding of "the

expression *be-ing* [*seiend*]" rather than self-understanding. We have already seen, however,

that *Dasein*'s *indifferent* understanding of being necessitates its *indifference* with respect to

the distinction between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding, which thus amounts to

the sort of indifferent inauthenticity I have argued for in this paper.

      If one's self-understanding is indifferently inauthentic, one must first recognize this in

order to attempt to correct it. This recognition opens up the possibility of searching for

authentic self-understanding. Such a search amounts to the 'further ado' that average

everyday *Dasein*, in its *indifference*, is happy to do without. As we have already seen,

however, simply recognizing the necessity of such 'further ado' does not thereby render

Dasein's self-understanding authentic. We have already seen this with Heidegger's claim that

the ontological interpretation's refusing to follow an indifferent everyday self-understanding

"in no way thereby already wins the *solution* to the problem, but rather the *fore-sketching of*

the direction which is to be further questioned."[46] *Dasein* might recognize the need for such

'further ado' and even boldly set out in search of authentic self-understanding, yet the

possibility remains that such 'further ado' will be in vain.

      Heidegger refers to this possibility as 'genuine failure.'[47] In the following passage, he

discusses how the alienating character of *falling* prevents *Dasein* from engaging in the sort of

'further ado' that results in either genuine failure or a successful search:

> This alienation *closes off* [verschließt] *Dasein* from its authenticity and
>
> possibility, even if merely as such that of genuine failure [*echten Scheiterns*].
>
> It...pushes *Dasein* into its inauthenticity, into a possible way of being *of*

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[45] Ibid., 4.

[46] Ibid., 232.

[47] '*Echten Scheiterns*' could also be translated as 'genuine shipwreck,' a translation that resonates
with the spatial connotations of 'further ado.'

itself.[48]

In the alienation of falling *Dasein* understands itself 'without further ado' – indifferently and inauthentically. But Heidegger is clear that the 'further ado' that everyday *Dasein*'s indifferent inauthenticity does without may only lead to genuine failure.

In Div. I.5, Heidegger suggests that genuine failure is a possible outcome for the ontological interpretation of *Dasein* itself:

> With the explication of the existential constitution of the being of the *Da* in the meaning of thrown projection, has not the being of *Dasein* become more mysterious? Indeed. We must first let the full mysteriousness of this being step-out- forth, if only to fail [*scheitern*] in a more genuine [*echter*] manner in its 'solution' [*»Lösung«*], and to put anew the question about the being of thrown-projective being-in-the-world.[49]

To begin Div. II, Heidegger raises this worry even more seriously. In §8.ii, we examined Heidegger's Div. II concern with the primordiality of the ontological interpretation in relation to (UD2). According to this concern, the interpretation lacks primordiality insofar as the possibility of *Dasein*'s authenticity is not taken up into and unified with the so far merely fore-sketched, formally indicated concept of existence. To open Div. II, Heidegger questions whether an ontological interpretation such as this might be able to catch sight of *Dasein* in its authenticity at all: "How is the authenticity of existence to be determined at all, if not with regard to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this?"[50] If *Dasein* is proximally and mostly inauthentic, where is the interpretation to look in order to catch sight of the possibility of *Dasein*'s authenticity? If this question cannot be answered, then such authenticity cannot be taken up and unified with the concept of existence, and the outcome of interpretation would be genuine failure. The requirement that the possibility of *Dasein*'s

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[48] Ibid., 178.

[49] Ibid., 178.

[50] Ibid., 234.

authenticity be taken up into and unified with the concept of existence would turn out to be a "fanciful imposition [*phantastische Zumutung*]," or unsatisfiable demand.[51] The ontological interpretation would be doomed to genuine failure, and indeed doomed to end in the sort of impasse in which many Socratic searches end. This supposed inadequacy is explicitly rectified in Heidegger's Div. II.2 analysis, where conscience "gives attestation of an authentic potentiality-to-be."[52]

Even this possibility of genuine failure requires that we first recognize that our *indifferent* self-understanding has heretofore been inauthentic – it requires that we recognize our indifferent inauthenticity and attempt to correct it. It requires that we "come into difficulty" with respect to our self-understanding. This, in turn, requires that we "come into difficulty" with respect to our understanding of being, since it is *Dasein*'s indifference with respect to its understanding of being in general which leads to its indifference with respect to the possibilities of its authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. At the outset of *Being and Time*, Heidegger tells us that we have not come to this difficulty:

> Do we today have an answer to the question of what we authentically
> [*eigentlich*] intend with the word 'be-ing' [»*seiend*«]? In no way. And so it is
> necessary, then, to put the question of the meaning of being anew. Are we
> today even in a difficulty that the expression 'being' [»*Sein*«] is not
> understood? In no way.[53]

By the end of Div. I, if we have followed along with the investigation, Heidegger should have brought us to this difficulty. If, instead, we follow Dreyfus and other interpreters who see a UDM in *Being and Time*, we will fail to see why the investigation must set off on a search for authentic self-understanding in Div. II after being brought to this difficulty – we will fail to recognize that the average everyday self-understanding that serves as the point of departure

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[51] Ibid., 266.

[52] Ibid., 234.

[53] Ibid., 1.

for the ontological interpretation is an *inauthentically* indifferent understanding of *Dasein*.

10. Conclusion

Heidegger's ontological interpretation of *Dasein* takes its lead from *Dasein*'s average everydayness and begins in *indifference* with regard to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding. But the interpretation's initial *indifference* with respect to this distinction does not commit Heidegger to the claim that *Dasein* itself is in fact 'proximally and mostly' *neither authentic nor inauthentic*. The Div. I ontological interpretation takes *Dasein*'s average everyday *indifference*, which includes *indifference with respect to the distinction between authentic and inauthentic self-understanding*, as its point of departure. Such an average and indifferent self-understanding takes itself as fully self-intelligible 'without further ado,' and as such, it is inauthentic. Though Heidegger's ontological interpretation of *Dasein* assumes such indifferent inauthenticity as its point of departure, *crucially*, *it also departs from this point*, and the 'further ado' which ensues – particularly with respect to the analysis of anxiety and the Div. II concern with the interpretation's lack of primordiality – involves differentiating between the possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity. At no point in *Being and Time* does Heidegger, properly understood, give us any reason to think *Dasein* ever exists in a UDM, as neither authentic nor inauthentic. To read *Being and Time* in this way is to misunderstand its methodological progression from *Dasein*'s average everyday self-understanding to its authenticity – 'to the thing itself.' As we've seen, a select few passages may *at first* seem to indicate otherwise. But *Being and Time* – like both being in general and *Dasein* itself – cannot be properly understood 'without further ado.'[54]

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