Gutting's book is a tour de force of philosophical insight, informed but charitable reading, and balanced assessment. An admitted analytical philosopher, he resists approaching these thinkers as a silhouette-maker views an impressionist painting. This is a remarkable achievement.—Thomas R. Flynn, Emory University.

KRIEGEL, Uriah. *The Sources of Intentionality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. xiv + 271 pp. Cloth, $65.00—What are the sources of intentionality? According to Uriah Kriegel, there are two: our conscious experiences, and the ability to fruitfully interpret things as having intentionality. But since there would be no interpretation without conscious experiences, the ultimate source of intentionality is conscious experience. So, overall, *The Sources of Intentionality* is a careful and readable attempt to devise a theory of intentionality centered on the idea that our conscious experiences are the ultimate source of intentionality. In Chapter One, Kriegel explains and defends his "experiential origin thesis," the thesis that our idea of intentionality is grounded in our encounter with the intentionality of our own conscious experiences, "experiential intentionality." That is, we get our idea of intentionality from and only from our encounters with our conscious experiences, such as our perceptions and thoughts, but not from our encounters with other things that have intentionality, such as sentences, street signs, pictures or actions. Why accept that thesis? In brief, intentionality is a natural kind, which implies that our idea of it is anchored in and only in our observational encounters with things that have it, and our conscious experiences are the only instances of intentionality with which we have such encounters. All other instances of intentionality must then be suitably similar to or properly related to our conscious experiences. Thus, the experiential origin thesis is a metaphysical wolf in an epistemic sheep's clothing; it is a claim about how we get an idea of a certain property, but it has direct implications for things that have that property.

But what exactly is experiential intentionality? Why do some things have it and others do not? And why does any experiential-intentional item have the specific content it has rather than some other content? The next two chapters offer competing views.

In Chapter Two, Kriegel defends a Higher-Order Tracking Theory of experiential intentionality (HOTT). On this view, a conscious experience has intentionality not because it tracks something in the world, but
because it is tracked by another, higher-order mental state to track something. For instance, my perception of a cat has intentionality not because it tracks a cat, but because there is some further, higher-order mental state that tracks the perception as being a state that tracks a cat. What is appealing about that sort of view? For Kriegel, it combines the best theory of consciousness with the most naturalistically respectable theory of representation. Kriegel thinks the best theory of consciousness is the so-called Higher Order Theory, which holds that a state S is conscious if it is represented in the right way by a higher-order state S'. If we assume that to represent is to track, then we get the core of HOTT.

However, in Chapter Three, responding to a significant problem with HOTT, Kriegel defends an adverbial theory of intentionality. The problem with HOTT is that it cannot explain our apparent ability to think of non-existent properties, such as being an Escher triangle. Adverbialism is appealing because it denies that intentionality is a relation. Instead, "intentionality is the non-relational property of being-intentionally-directed-somewhere"; a state S can be about a property P even if S is not related to any instance of P. Although adverbialism is appealing because it can cover the kind of cases that HOTT cannot, its main demerit is that it seems to preclude "the naturalization of experiential intentionality," for it leaves intentionality looking like it cannot be explained in terms of any other properties.

Ultimately, Kriegel is "torn" between these two views, but he "leans slightly, hesitantly, cringingly" toward HOTT because although it cannot cover some cases, it is more naturalistically respectable than adverbialism.

For a general theory of intentionality, Kriegel also needs a theory of non-experiential intentionality. In Chapter Four, he defends interpretivism, which holds roughly that an item has (non-experiential) intentionality if it can be fruitfully predicted and explained by being treated as having intentionality. More exactly, S has non-experiential intentionality if it would tend to induce an ideal interpreter to think that S has some particular content (Kriegel refines this idea considerably). In Chapter Five, Kriegel explains what results when we combine interpretivism with HOTT and with adverbialism.

The Sources of Intentionality provokes many questions. I think the best place to start is the beginning. Is experiential intentionality the ground of all intentionality? Some, such as Sellars, have suggested that our idea of intentionality is rooted in our familiarity with our utterances. Others, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, have suggested that the intentionality of our practices and the tools involved therein are, perhaps in a different sense, the ground of intentionality. Kriegel only briefly discusses the first idea but does not discuss the second, which is unfortunate, since both ideas are influential reactions against the idea that our conscious experiences are the source of intentionality.—Chauncey Maher, Dickinson College.