ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The cross-linguistic uses of proper names

Nikhil Mahant

Department of Philosophy, Uppsala
University, Uppsala, Sweden

Correspondence
Nikhil Mahant, Department of Philosophy,
Uppsala University, English Park Campus,
751 26 Uppsala, Sweden.
Email: nikhilmahant@outlook.com

Abstract

A distinctive and widely recognized feature of proper names is that, unlike other words, names can be used across languages without modification. Yet, this feature of names—the prevalence and acceptability of their 'cross-linguistic' uses—has been mostly overlooked within philosophy. This article highlights the theoretical importance of the cross-linguistic uses of names in the debate concerning their syntax and semantics. It identifies an anomalous phonological feature of names in their cross-linguistic uses and argues that the source of the anomaly is the widespread view that proper names are syntactically simple. It also argues that such uses provide evidence for the syntactic view that the phonological articulation of a name is *mentioned* and not *used* in the syntax—a view that is consistent with some but not all semantic views of names. By examining the hitherto overlooked cross-linguistic uses of names, this article provides new evidence in favour of a certain variety of metalinguistic views concerning the syntax and semantics of names.

KEYWORDS

metalinguistic views, phonetics, proper names, quotation, semantics, syntax

> Proper names are poetry in the raw. Like all poetry they are untranslatable. Someone who is translating in English a German novel, the hero of which is named *Heinrich* will leave the name as it is; [they] will not Anglicize it to *Henry*. (W. H. Auden, 1970, p. 267)

Call the use of a proper name (henceforth, "name") that is constructed using the phonological resources of one language within the sentences of another language a *cross-linguistic use* of the name. For example, Gandhi was given a name—pronounced [ˈɡaːndʰi]—constructed using the phonemes of Gujarati, a language spoken in the western part of India. The use of Gandhi's given name in an utterance of an English sentence would then be an instance of a cross-

linguistic use. Gandhi, of course, has an anglicized name—pronounced [ˈɡandi]—that is constructed using the phonemes of English. The anglicized name is often used by English speakers who have trouble pronouncing the /dʰ/ phoneme of Gujarati. But the use of Gandhi's anglicized name in a sentence of English is not a cross-linguistic use, and I will not be concerned with such uses in this article.[1]

It is a widely recognized feature of names that their cross-linguistic uses are unproblematic and prevalent. In the first few lines of the entry on 'Proper Names' in his encyclopaedic biography *A Certain World*, the English poet W. H. Auden thought it important to point out that names are 'untranslatable'—the same name gets used across languages without modification (cf. quote above). Further, the prevalent social norm—at least in many English-speaking countries—is to try to mimic the pronunciation of a person's *given* name as closely as possible when using it.

The unproblematic nature of cross-linguistic uses of names contrasts with the general infelicity of cross-linguistic use of words belonging to other word classes, for example common or mass nouns, verbs, adjectives, pronouns and prepositions. For instance, solely by virtue of their competence in English, competent speakers of English[2] would not understand an utterance of the sentence 'the ice-cream is waiting for you in the *konyha*' which contains the Hungarian word for kitchen. Section 1 lays down the theoretically relevant aspects of this claim concerning the distinctiveness of names in the class of words.

However, the phonological behaviour of names in their cross-linguistic uses is rather anomalous. Such uses seem to violate the normative requirement—call it "Articulation Requirement"—which mandates that for a word to be used, as opposed to mentioned, in a language it must conform to that language's phonology.[3] Section 2 discusses the nature and status of the Articulation Requirement and argues that its fulfilment is necessary for the successful use of language to communicate information.

Given the diversity of world languages and the 'arbitrariness' of names, it is always possible to find a name constructed using the phonemes of one language that are altogether absent in another. The cross-linguistic use of that name within the sentences of the other language—for example the use of Gandhi's given name in an English sentence—then seems to violate the Articulation Requirement. Section 3 highlights the role of the often implicit but widespread assumption that names are syntactically simple in making their cross-linguistic uses seem anomalous. It argues further that the linguistic behaviour of names in such uses is not puzzling at all on syntactic views according to which the phonological articulation of a name is mentioned (instead of used) in the syntax.[4] Cross-linguistic uses of names therefore support a certain variety of metalinguistic views concerning the syntax of names.

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[1]Here I assume that a given non-English name and its anglicized counterpart are *distinct* names, as opposed to two variants of the same name. Prima facie, this is a plausible assumption: The exact manner of pronouncing or spelling a name is an important aspect of its identity/individuation, for example someone who is given the name "Simon" using the German pronunciation of "Simon" (with stress on "o" but not on "i") does not thereby also come to be named "Simon" pronounced using the English pronunciation (with stress on "i" but not on "o"). A vocative utterance of "Simon" using the English pronunciation may fail to attract the attention of a Simon who was baptised using the German pronunciation of "Simon," suggesting that the German and English names cannot be used interchangeably—and are thus distinct names. But in broader metaphysical discussions concerning names, this assumption has been a subject of some controversy (cf. Gray, 2015; Michaelson, 2023; Stojnić, 2023 for discussion). However, given that some non-English names *cannot* have an anglicized counterpart (cf. fn. 5 for discussion), making this assumption does not affect the success of the argument of this article.

[2]For the purposes of this article, assume that a competent speaker of a language, say L, is an ideal (and perhaps non-actual) individual with complete command of all and only the grammar and lexicon of L, and can produce and perceive all and only the sounds/letters that belong to the phonology/orthography of L. The argument of this article does not rely on how L is individuated (cf. the final paragraphs of Sections 1 and 2 for discussion).

[3]The use/mention distinction is drawn here as follows: a word is *mentioned* if it appears within a device of quotation (e.g., quotation marks, guillemets) and *used* otherwise. Devices of quotation can serve other functions, for example emphasis, 'scare' quotes, expressing irony (cf. Recanati, 2001). For clarity, to *mention* words, I will deploy double quotes ("") and square brackets ([]). Single quotes and italics are deployed (often interchangeably) for other functions of quotation but not to mention words.

[4]I will use "name" to talk about a target word (e.g., "Julius") and "phonological articulation of a name" to talk about the phonological form of the target word (e.g., /ˈdʒuːliəs/). The two are clearly distinct: Names have semantic properties, but phonological articulations—*qua* types of sounds—do not. Further, an utterance of a name ipso facto involves a production of its phonological articulation, but not vice versa (e.g., accidental production of a certain type of sound does not amount to an utterance of a name, cf. Mahant, n.d.).

Further, Section 3 also discusses the semantic repercussions of cross-linguistic uses: While the metalinguistic syntactic view supported by such uses can be consistent with some semantic views—for example the views of Burge (1973), Bach (1987), Geurts (1997), Katz (2001), Elbourne (2005) and Matushansky (2008) in their existing or modified form—it is inconsistent with some other (broadly Millian and Indexicalist) views which hold that names are syntactically simple (or deny that the syntactic elements of names can have semantic relevance). The overall merit of this article is that by examining the hitherto overlooked cross-linguistic uses of names, it provides new evidence in favour of a certain variety of metalinguistic views concerning the syntax and semantics of names.

Two caveats before diving in. The first concerns the English-centrism of this article. English is treated here as the 'base' language such that a cross-linguistic use of a name is the use of a name constructed using the phonemes of a language other than English (call such names "non-English names") in the sentences of English. It should, however, be obvious that the arguments of this article can be repeated by treating any language other than English as the base language.

Second, I restrict my examples and discussion to *utterances* of expressions of natural languages. This is in keeping with the widespread assumption within linguistics that natural languages are primarily a spoken phenomenon. Scripts evolved much later historically, and it is not unusual for languages to switch scripts (e.g., Turkish language changed script from Arabic to Latin, and Kazakh language changed script first from Arabic to Cyrillic, and then to Latin). Children first learn to speak and not to write. Further, not all languages have writing systems. It is then proper that an investigation of cross-linguistic uses should focus, in the first place, on the spoken form of natural languages.

1 | A DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF NAMES

This section discusses the datum that this article builds upon—i.e., the cross-linguistic uses of names are prevalent and unproblematic, while such uses of words belonging to other categories are not. The datum may be contested on two grounds: one, denying that the cross-linguistic uses of names are prevalent and unproblematic, and two, denying that cross-linguistic uses of words belonging to word categories other than names are problematic or uncommon. In this section, I will discuss these objections. This will clarify some conceptual issues at stake, help avoid verbal disagreement and make explicit the nuanced conceptual work of the datum in the argument of this article.

Consider the first objection. A view that denies the legitimacy of cross-linguistic uses of names would make unacceptable many sentences that are prima facie bona fide sentences of English. One casualty would be the (many) English Language novels that have characters with a non-English name. Members of some immigrant families residing in predominantly English-speaking countries often bear non-English names. There is very little reason to believe, however, that someone who uses the original pronunciations of the non-English names "Hanoch," "Abeje" or "Zsuzsanna" in an utterance of an English sentence has committed some sort of infelicity.

Further, apart from their given non-English names, many places (e.g., Poggibonsi) and people (e.g., Kishida Fumio) do not also have an anglicized ('English') name. It would severely restrict the expressive power of English if the names of these people or places cannot be part of legitimate utterances of English sentences.

One may object to this last point by maintaining that English language users do succeed in referring to a place—say, Poggibonsi—by using a different, phonetically readjusted pronunciation of its name. The objection, however, does not sustain further scrutiny. Which name of such objects is being used in such cases? Is it so that when English speakers refer to Poggibonsi by uttering "Poggibonsi," they assign a *different* name to it? It is unlikely, however, that an English

speaker who intends to refer to a place using its non-English name thereby also intends to give a name to that place.

Or is it so that in referring to Poggibonsi, English speakers use its *given* (Italian) name, albeit uttered with a different pronunciation? While this proposal may work for names like "Poggibonsi," it would not work for names from languages sufficiently different from English. Consider, for instance, the name of a South African casino worker, "!Xobile," referred to by the comedian Russell Peters in one of his performances (Peters, 2016). "!Xobile" is a Bantu name pronounced using a click sound (represented by "!" in English script). Given that the click sound is so different from any given English phoneme that its phonetic readjustment is bound to be arbitrary, it is impossible to utter "!Xobile" with a phonetically readjusted English pronunciation without altering the name itself.[5] The proposal is therefore implausible as a general view concerning the cross-linguistic uses of names.

The appropriateness of the cross-linguistic uses of a name is also attested by the fact that understanding a sentence in which a name is used cross-linguistically does not require any further competence on part of language users beyond the minimal competence required to understand the use of any name whatsoever—that is the knowledge that an expression is a name.[6] Consider, for instance:

1. I saw !Xobile on my way to the casino.
2. Usiququmadevu is a creature from Zulu mythology. She is a bearded, bloated monster who eats every living thing she comes across. Usiququmadevu is said to have a husband of the same name (Wikipedia entry on 'Usiququmadevu', 2020).

Upon being told that "!Xobile" and "Usiququmadevu" are names, a competent user of the English language would have no trouble understanding an utterance of (1) and (2) even when the names are pronounced using their original pronunciations. (A different sounding name may cause some difficulty pronouncing—or may be a source of some amusement, see e.g., BBC Studios [2009]—but poses no hindrance in understanding.)

On the other hand, competent users of a language cannot—by virtue of their competence in that language alone—understand sentences that contain the cross-linguistic uses of common nouns. Consider, for instance:

3. Lady Gaga's 'Poker Face' is an *ohrwurm*.
4. The ice cream is waiting for you in the *konyha*.

Even upon being told that the words "ohrwurm" and "konyha" are common nouns, a competent user of the English language would not be able to understand the sentences (3) and (4). ("Ohrwurm" is a German word for a catchy song.)

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[5]The fact that some names like "!Xobile" do not have an anglicized counterpart also vindicates the simplifying assumption made earlier that non-English names and their anglicized counterparts are *distinct* names (cf. fn. 1). The assumption does not apply to names like "!Xobile" which do not have an anglicized counterpart, but the general puzzle raised by cross-linguistic uses can always be reformulated using such names.

[6]It is true of our general practice of using names that whenever an expression is intended as a name, it needs to be so indicated, either explicitly or implicitly. Language users are, of course, often aware that certain words (e.g., "Mark," "Victoria," "Tim") are frequently used as names. But a lack of familiarity with this cultural fact does not speak against linguistic competence. (To use Bach's phrase— "your vocabulary is not deficient because of all the names you don't know"; Bach, 2002, p. 82) Even the knowledge of which words are frequently used as names might not help. Consider utterances of (a) and (b) in which "Roses" and "Destiny" are intended as names:

a. There are two Roses in this room.

b. She could not stop Destiny from interfering.

To access the intended meaning of (a) and (b) the hearer of the utterance must know—either through contextual cues or by being so told explicitly—that "Rose" and "Destiny" are used as names. The hearer's failure to access the intended reading—arising out of her failure to recognize that "Rose" and "Destiny" are names—does not speak against her linguistic competence.

The notion of "understanding" does a lot of work in the above claim so something needs to be said about how this notion is used here. Understanding a sentence (or at least the sense of "understanding" relevant here) does not require as much as the knowledge of the semantic content or truth conditions of the sentence, nor does it require the knowledge of the extensions/ referents of the words constituting it. Competent speakers can understand context sensitive sentences—for example "It is rainy today" or "I want that screwdriver, not this one"—without any information about the context and/or intentions of the speaker, which is necessary to determine the semantic content or know the truth conditions of these sentences. Similarly, one can understand the sentences of novels, fictional words or even encyclopaedia entries which mention fictional, imaginary or mythical characters even when one is unsure about their semantic content or truth value.

Indeed, the argument of this article does not require resolution of the tricky issue of what exactly is involved in understanding a sentence. All that is required is the assumption that understanding a sentence requires knowledge of the *meaning* of a sentence and its constituent parts. This characterization of "understanding" is admittedly as vague and imprecise as the notion of "meaning." But, insofar as the meanings of sentences are thought of more on the lines of Fregean thoughts instead of Russellian propositions (alternatively, intensions instead of extensions), this vague characterization is all that is needed.

Solely by virtue of their competence in English, English users would not know the meanings of "ohrwurm" and "konyha" and, thus, would not understand utterances of (3) and (4). (Analogous examples can be constructed using adjectives, verbs, pronouns, prepositions etc. from other languages.) But given their competence in English (and the minimal competence required to understand the use of any name whatsoever), they would understand utterances of (1) and (2).[7]

Consider now, the second objection to the datum: Isn't it that a wealth of 'foreign' words— for example "bon voyage," "ketchup," "ciabatta," "curry," "fjord," "sushi"—get used in perfectly legitimate sentences of English? Without doubt, they get frequently used in English. But such words are, properly speaking, *loan words* of English, that is words which have been borrowed from other languages but words which nevertheless belong to the English language. The pronunciation and morpho-syntactic properties of these words (e.g., inflection, morphological derivation) are governed by rules of English and not of their source language. In many cases, the meaning of the English word is significantly different from the meaning of the corresponding word in the source language (e.g., the Hindi/Urdu word "curry"). The use of loan words in an English sentence is thus not an instance of a cross-linguistic use, but rather analogous to the use of anglicized names.

But the use of loanwords in English sentences is not the only case which will seem to cast doubt on the thesis that words other than names cannot be used cross-linguistically. Words of foreign origin that are absent from the lexicon of English are often employed without any (obvious) awkwardness in the language of specialized disciplines—for example the use of "*de se*" or "*a fortiori*" in philosophy or "*ex lege*" in legal discussions. Further, it is not uncommon to witness 'code-switching'—that is the phenomenon of a speaker alternating between two or more languages in a conversation—in linguistic exchanges between language users who are proficient in more than one language.

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[7]One may argue that the infelicity of the cross-linguistic uses of words (other than names) is a consequence of the fact that names either have no meaning or a minimal meaning that can be trivially determined (e.g. the meaning of any name "N" is "the bearer of [N]") but words other than names have substantial, non-trivial meanings. For instance, to understand a sentence in which (say) an adjective is used, one needs to know more than the fact that the word is an adjective — one needs to know the *meaning* of that adjective. However, as names have none or minimal meanings, knowledge of the fact that an expression is a name is all that one needs to understand a sentence in which it is used. This is (perhaps) a correct diagnosis of one reason behind the truth of the datum. The argument of this article, however, requires only the truth of the datum and does not require a further commitment to one or other reason for *why* it is true (see also, fn. 12).

Instead of casting doubt on the unacceptability of the cross-linguistic uses of words other than names, such uses of words elicit closer attention to the matter of individuation of languages. Speakers who are competent only in Russian (or only in English) will be unable to follow the linguistic exchange between language users competent in *both* Russian and English that is characterised by a lot of code-switching. The use of Russian words may be acceptable with respect to a language that is some sort of a combination of Russian and English, but such use is not acceptable with respect to English.

Further, the use of Latin or Greek phrases—that is commonplace in "philosophical English" or "Legalese"—within utterances of ordinary English would render those utterances incomprehensible to speakers of ordinary English. However, the use of words like "*a fortiori*" is perfectly acceptable with respect to philosophical English—the word *is* part of the lexicon of philosophical English—a lack of knowledge of the meaning of "*a fortiori*" would bring one's competence in Philosophical English into question.

One may, of course, object that this division between ordinary English, philosophical English and Legalese is artificial. I do not wish to assert that there exist distinct languages with these names. The substantial point here is that the judgement concerning whether a use of a word counts as a cross-linguistic use with respect to a language is sensitive to how a language is individuated. Say, a variant of English—call it "*English"—subsumes ordinary English, Philosophical English as well as Legalese. Then, the uses of "*de se*," "*a fortiori*" or "*ex lege*" are not cross-linguistic uses of words with respect to *English, but the use of "*Asante*"—the Swahili word for "thank you"—is. A competent speaker of *English would understand utterances of sentences containing "*ex lege*," but not utterances containing Swahili words that are not names.

Once one makes up their mind about where the boundaries of a language lie, one can judge whether the use of a word is a cross-linguistic use or not. And although, as argued above, the cross-linguistic uses of names are always acceptable, the same is not true of the cross-linguistic use of words other than names.

The issues raised by code-switching and the artificiality of the language adopted by specialized disciplines may, in fact, be thought to be orthogonal to the claims made here. The existence of such phenomena strongly suggests that it may be difficult to individuate languages or that the boundaries of a language must be vaguer or broader than is generally assumed. However, it does not throw into question the fact that languages have boundaries—it is clear that some words belong to a language, and others do not. If so, the essential claim made in this section can always be restated and the arguments can be repeated: names are distinctive in that they do not respect the boundaries of a language, wherever they lie, but words other than names do.

2 | THE ARTICULATION REQUIREMENT

Competence in a language requires the competence to identify only a certain subset of the sounds that can potentially be produced using the human vocal apparatus as speech sounds. The subset includes the phones of the language, or phonemes. (In what follows, I disregard the conceptual distinction between 'phoneme' and 'phone of a language' and use them interchangeably.[8]) English, for instance, has around 44 phonemes and German around 56 phonemes.

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[8]Whilst a *phone* is a type of speech sound that is not specific to a language, a *phoneme* is a language specific equivalence class of phones. A phoneme can be articulated using several distinct phones—the *allophones* of a phoneme—resulting in different pronunciations of a word. To avoid un-necessarily complicating the exposition, I ignore the complications introduced by allophones and work with the simplifying assumption that every phoneme is associated with just one phone/allophone, such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a phone and a phoneme. Because there exist phones that are an allophone of a phoneme of one language but are altogether absent in another language—for example, the click sounds of the Bantu languages are altogether absent from English—the argument of this article remains unaffected by this assumption and warrants the use of 'phoneme' and 'phone of a language' interchangeably. (But this assumption is explicitly discharged in the final two paragraphs of this section, which deal with the issue of different pronunciations.)

(There can be disagreement about how many phonemes a language contains and how exactly to characterize them—for example because of dialectical variations, diphthongs. But nothing in the argument of this article hangs on facts concerning the exact number of phonemes in a language.) Call the sounds that don't belong to the subset "alien" sounds.

Languages differ from each other with respect to phonemes such that some sounds which are phonemes of one language may be alien with respect to another. Competent speakers of a language may produce (or note differences between) phonemes of the language which those who are not competent in the language cannot. Kaplan's 'words' exemplify some of these points when he writes:

> One of my Japanese friends, who spoke unaccented Californian, was trying to explain to me how to say two of my favourite words, one of which is "Netsuke" and the other is "Hokusai". There is a "u," as we write it in English, in both of those words which doesn't exactly disappear, and isn't exactly sounded. He kept saying "You are saying this [and he would imitate my pronunciation]; you should be saying this [and he would pronounce the word 'correctly']." I couldn't hear the difference between his imitation and the 'correct' pronunciation. Conversely, as we know, some of our Japanese friends have great difficulty with the R-L distinction, a distinction that we easily make. (Kaplan, 1990, p. 105, fn. 12)

I will now argue that all utterances of a language are governed by a phonological norm—call it the "Articulation Requirement" (AR)—which applies generally to all parts of its speech, for example nouns, verbs, adjectives and pronouns. AR mandates that for a word to be used, as opposed to mentioned, in a language it must conform to that language's phonology. For a word to conform to a language's phonology is for it to be constituted of (and be uttered using) only the phonemes of that language. In slogan form:

> Articulation Requirement (AR): Unless mentioned, every utterance of a word in a language must be constituted of the phonemes of the language.

Violations of AR affect the communicative function of a language.[9] One condition for the successful transfer of information through utterances is that language users are able to perceive the units of sound that constitute those utterances as speech sounds, i.e., phonemes. Unless an utterance is constituted of sounds that are relevant to a speech situation (and thus deemed worth attending to by the conversational participants), the utterance will either not be recognized as an utterance or the participants will fail to comprehend what was uttered. As a normative requirement, AR ensures the fidelity of the medium of communication. Such fidelity is necessary to ensure the comprehension of what was uttered and therefore, to access the information content of the utterance.

Further, competence in a language does not require (monolingual) language users to attend to sounds that are alien relative to that language. Alien sounds are thus likely to either get ignored (as irrelevant to the communicative situation) or, if attended to, will nevertheless disrupt communication by occasioning a repetition owing to incomprehensibility of the utterance. But even upon repetition, there is no guarantee that language users will figure out what was uttered: grasping and discriminating an alien sound go beyond the competence required of language users.

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[9]Here, I go along with the dominant view within philosophy that communication is the proper function of language (cf. Unnsteinsson, 2022). This view has recently been criticized in Michaelson (2024), which argues that language serves a multitude of functions and is analogous to a "multi-tool." Note, however, that the conclusions of this article will be compelling even on a weaker assumption that Michaelson is not essentially opposed to, that is communication is amongst the *main* functions of language.

More importantly, the use of alien sounds in utterances is likely to cause *mis*communication in a speech situation. This is because given the background expectation of cooperative communication, participants in a linguistic exchange are likely to assume that instead of an alien sound, a sound relevant to the speech situation was produced, and try to interpret (and hence misinterpret) sounds that they are unable to perceive or comprehend.[10]

An example will serve as a helpful illustration. Consider an utterance of (5), which contains the Arabic word for scorpion. Imagine further that in uttering the above sentence one uses the exact Arabic pronunciation of "aqrab":

5. He survived for three days without water, but eventually succumbed to the bite of a desert *aqrab*.

If (5) is a sentence of English,[11] then the Articulation Requirement is not only applicable to (5), but (5) also violates it. The word "aqrab" is pronounced using an Arabic phoneme—the voiced pharyngeal fricative, (IPA: /ʕ/)—which is not a phoneme of English. Competence in English, however, requires competence only in producing/perceiving phonemes of English, not of Arabic. Thus, by virtue alone of their competence in English, speakers of English cannot be expected to produce this phoneme or to perceive/attend to this phoneme when it is produced. A monolingual English speaker would therefore fail to understand an utterance of (5).

Note, however, that the relevant reason for the failure is not *semantic* incomprehensibility. Competent speakers of English (but not of Arabic) who know the meaning of "aqrab" may still fail to understand an utterance of (5) because, for example given their inability to perceive the phoneme /ʕ/, they may confuse "aqrab" with a similar sounding word of English (say, 'a crab').[12] (Indeed, given the background expectation among monolingual English speakers that only sounds relevant to the speech situation, that is English phonemes, should be used in uttering an English sentence, the utterance of (5) is likely to cause such confusion.) A person may, of course, learn to produce and perceive any phone whatsoever, but such capacity is not a condition for competence in a language—the point here is that English users *qua* English users cannot be expected to produce or perceive utterances of (5).

Mentions, however, are a different story. "aqrab" can always be mentioned in an English sentence. Unlike (5) in which "aqrab" is used, English language users will have no difficulty understanding this paragraph, which mentions "aqrab" four times. The mention of "aqrab" is, of course, not an exception—any word or sound from any language can be mentioned in English unproblematically. (Indeed, many languages provide dedicated resources for mentioning words or sounds—for example the word "इति" ("iti") of Sanskrit and the guillemets of French.)

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[10]These considerations justify the general importance of AR in communication. But the extent to which *individual* violations of AR will disrupt communication may be hard to predict. Some uses of alien sounds may result only in lack of comprehension, but in contexts where competing interpretations are possible, even minor violations may result in breakdown of communication (e.g., if a server pronounces "warm it" in "Sir, do you want me to warm it?" in a nonstandard way that may be interpreted as "vomit"). *Systematic* use of alien sounds (e.g., when uttering an entire class of words, say, verbs or adjectives) will make an utterance incomprehensible to the extent that one may wonder which language is being spoken. In any case, the success of communicative activity in individual cases of violation of AR does not speak against the status of AR as a normative requirement for successful communication.

[11]Which I will assume it is. I caution against an unpromising alternative that one may be tempted take here — that is saying that any sentence in which a word has been used cross-linguistically is not a sentence belonging to any language (such that (5) is not a sentence of English or of any other language). This makes nonsense of the phenomenon that non-English names can be used in English sentences. Moreover, denying that all sentences containing cross-linguistic uses of words are not sentences of English would result in a great number of sentences of a language being excluded from the language, and a counterintuitive result of such magnitude must be avoided.

[12]Whilst this article remains non-committal to the ground for the datum discussed in Section 1 (cf. fn. 7), it is committed to the view that the ground for the Articulation Requirement is the *phonological* competence of idealized language speakers (cf. fn. 2). This is an important difference: Although there may be general syntactic, morphological or semantic differences between names and other words, there are no general phonological differences between them. (Indeed, names in many languages are often phonologically identical with other words of languages, e.g., "Grace", "Rose" in English, cf. fn. 6.) The Articulation Requirement therefore applies without exception to all words of a language, including names.

The Articulation Requirement entails that when uttering an expression in a language, one must use only the phonemes of that language. However, the fact that differences in accents are rather easily tolerated (and often pose no hindrance in communication) might give the impression that the Articulation Requirement is too strong a demand, amounting perhaps to linguistic imperialism. This impression, however, is partly grounded in an overestimation of the extent to which mispronunciations can be tolerated and partly in the mistaken assumption that the Articulation Requirement *also* dictates which sounds count as the correct articulations of the phonemes of a language.

While it is true that differences in accents often pose no hindrance in communication, there are limits to how far the pronunciations can vary. When uttered with a heavy non-English accent, utterances of English sentences may be incomprehensible to competent speakers of English. The use of non-English sounds in the utterances of English words may render it impossible for competent users of English to figure out which word was uttered, and consequently, what was said. Shedding native accents and learning to produce sounds that are phonemes of English—or at least approximate the sound of English phonemes—are essential parts of learning the English language. The communicative capabilities of someone who deviates a lot from the right way of saying things—say, of someone who cannot produce sounds that have the effect of discriminating "tap" from "tab" (or "beach" from "bitch")—would be severely restricted and such person cannot be considered a competent user of a language.

Yet, to a sceptic, this might sound like needless puritanism about language. They may object that given the tremendous intermingling of world cultures/languages, there has been an expansion in the range of phones/sounds that count as legitimate articulations of the same phoneme: In their utterances of the English word "right," the native Japanese speaker and the native Spanish speaker may produce quite different sounds corresponding to the letter "r," but *both* count as legitimate utterances of the phoneme. Further, to be a competent speaker of English in the present cultural context—one may insist—requires the capability to treat a wide range of phones/sounds as legitimate utterances of a particular phoneme.

The Articulation Requirement does not legislate against any of this. Indeed, the requirement is silent on the question of how strict or tolerant one ought to be about the question of phoneme individuation—i.e., the question of which sounds/phones count as legitimate articulations of a particular phoneme. The question of phoneme individuation for successful communication among language users is partly a matter of empirical investigation, the results of which must accord with the facts discussed in the paragraph before the last.

However, once this question is settled, the normative force of the Articulation Requirement follows directly: Given a conversational situation, the requirement represents the requirement that the interlocutors share a common ground about which speech sounds are important and must be attended to. Puritans about language would want to be stingy about how phonemes—say the phoneme /r/ of English—must be pronounced. The Articulation Requirement is, however, consistent with a variety of ways in which phonemes may be individuated.

3 | SYNTACTIC AND SEMANTIC REPERCUSSIONS

Ora Matushansky opens "On the linguistic complexity of proper names" with the remark:

> Much work has been done on the semantics of proper names, while their syntax has not received enough attention. Most semantic analyses view proper names as syntactically simplex, with no internal structure whatsoever. This approach is compatible with viewing proper names as directly referring rigid designators […], indexicals […] or definite descriptions […]. (Matushansky, 2008)

Matushansky's complaints are on point—First, despite its importance for the semantics of names, not much attention has been paid within philosophy to examining the syntax of names. Second, the dominant (and rather unchallenged) view concerning the syntax of names is that proper names are syntactically *simple*.[13] And third, this view concerning syntax is accommodated by some of the most prominent semantic views of names including the Classical Millian view (Kripke, 1980; Marcus, 1961; Mill, 1843, among others), Classical Descriptivism[14] (Frege, 1892/1948; Searle, 1958, among others) and Indexicalism (Burks, 1951; Pelczar & Rainsbury, 1998; Recanati, 1993; Schoubye, 2017, 2020, among others).

I will now argue that the cross-linguistic uses of names provide evidence for a certain family of metalinguistic views concerning the syntax of names—that is views according to which the phonological articulation of a name is mentioned and not used in the syntax.[15] Further, this syntactic view bears upon the semantic debate on names by being consistent with some but not all semantic proposals concerning names. The broader aim of this section is to highlight the significance of cross-linguistic uses in our understanding of the syntax and semantics of names.

In the last two sections, I have argued that:

A. Unlike words from other categories, names can be used cross-linguistically.
B. The Articulation Requirement is a bona-fide normative requirement governing the utterances of a language.

Consider first the view that proper names are syntactically simple (call it the "S-view"). Although some names may contain multiple words (e.g., "Joseph Robinette Biden Junior," "San Francisco") or contain what seem like determiners (e.g., "The Space Needle," "A Clockwork Orange"), according to the S-view, all names are represented as a single unit in the syntax. Thus, on the S-view, names are syntactically like pronouns (e.g., "she," "it") and unlike descriptions (which can be syntactically disintegrated into a determiner and at least one nominal component). With the background assumption that S-view is the correct view to hold about the syntax of names, consider the use of Frege's name in the following English sentence (for simplicity, I use a shortened form of Frege's full name here):

6. Gottlob Frege died thinking that his life's work amounted to nothing.

Frege was given a sound constructed using German phonemes—pronounced [ɡɔtˈloːp ˈfʁeːɡə]—as his name. Because Frege's name was constructed using the phonemes of German, an utterance of Frege's name in a German sentence will always fulfil the Articulation Requirement. However, the same cannot be said of the cross-linguistic use of Frege's given name in an English sentence like (6). Given (B), Frege's given name can be used in an utterance of an English sentence only if the phonology of English also contains the German phonemes that constitute Frege's name. Speaking generally, a name constructed using the phonemes of one language can be used in an utterance of a sentence belonging to another language only if the

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[13]Brian Rabern expresses the same sentiment in different words—"Names are traditionally assumed to be syntactically simple and are analogised to the constants in first-order logic" (Rabern, 2015, p. 300).

[14]By classical descriptivism, I mean semantic views according to which names are *semantically* (but not necessarily syntactically) descriptions. Descriptivism can also be understood as the view that names enter the *syntax* as descriptions and have the standard semantics of descriptions. The views of Bertrand Russell (at least his views as expressed in some of his works) and William Kneale are plausibly descriptive views of this sort. At places, Russell considers names "truncated" or "abbreviated" descriptions (Russell, 1911, p. 119, 1918, p. 1918) and Kneale suggests that a name can be "replaced" with a definite description (Kneale, 1966, p. 632).

[15]Metalinguistic views are often characterized as views that specify the meaning of a name "N" by mentioning the name itself, for example 'bearer of "N"' (cf. fn. 19). I have argued elsewhere that the characterization presented in the main text is advantageous because it avoids the circularity objection against metalinguistic views (cf. Mahant, n.d.). But the difference does not matter here: A mention of a name is ipso facto a mention of its articulation (cf. fn. 4).

phonology of the language to which the uttered sentence belongs also contains the very phonemes that constitute the name.

This requirement is, however, not always fulfilled. As discussed earlier, languages differ from each other with respect to their phonemes such that some phonemes of one language may be altogether absent in other languages. Further, what is often meant by the phrase "names are arbitrary" is that any word belonging to a language may be assigned to an individual as a name. Therefore, a cross-linguistic use of a name does not always meet the Articulation Requirement. Consider, for instance, Gandhi's given name—pronounced [ˈɡaːndʰi]—which contains the phoneme /dʰ/ that is not a phoneme of English or the Bantu name "!Xobile" which contains a click sound that is also absent in English.[16] Adherents of the S-view are therefore forced to abandon either (A) or (B).

Here, a defender of the S-view may object that AR does not apply to names because—as Ziff (1960) proposes—names are *not* words and do not belong to a language. I have argued elsewhere that this is not a plausible theoretical alternative (Mahant, 2022a, 2022b). There is a remarkable similarity between names and words in a way that is relevant to linguistic theorizing. Consider, for example (i) like words, names follow the same language-specific rules for inflection and word formation; (ii) like words, names can have literal and non-literal uses; and (iii) like words, the same name can have different written, spoken, (etc.) forms. If Ziff's proposal is correct, then it should be surprising why there are so many similarities between names and words. Nevertheless, if defenders of the S-view insist that names should be treated as an exception to AR, then the onus is on them to explain why they should be treated as such.

As a point of contrast, consider a rather fringe (metalinguistic) view concerning names—one arguably held by Bertrand Russell at some places in his oeuvre (e.g., Russell, 1911, p. 119, 1918, p. 524)—according to which a name, say "Julius Caesar", is an abbreviated (or truncated) description whose full form is "the bearer of [Julius Caesar]".[17] Here I focus on the syntactic aspect of the view in question to show that it is consistent with (A) and (B).

The distinction between "surface syntax" and "syntactic representation" (i.e., the structure 'represented' on a syntactic tree) will be helpful in presenting the Russellian view as well as the S-view with greater clarity. The surface syntax is the structure that an expression *prima facie* seems to have. But the syntactic representation is its structure as revealed by a linguistic theory (i.e., the "real structure" or the "logical form", cf. Stanley, 2000; Stanley & Gendler Szabó, 2000). The surface syntax may lack certain semantically relevant constituents (or may contain overt but semantically irrelevant constituents). It is the syntactic representation, and not the surface syntax, that is relevant in semantic theorising.

On the S-view, although an expression like "The Space Needle" has the surface syntax of a definite description, like all names, it is represented in the syntax as a single unit (its syntactic representation is simple). On the Russellian view, irrespective of whether a name "N" appears as a single word or a complex expression in the surface syntax, its syntactic representation is the same as that of the description "the bearer of [N]".

Now, on the Russellian view, the syntactic representation of (1) and (6) is the same as the syntactic representation of the following sentences, which feature a definite description in the surface syntax:

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[16]It should now be obvious why even on adopting a very broad manner of individuating phonemes—an issue that I discussed at the end of Section 2—names can always violate the Articulation Requirement. However liberal one is about the range of sounds that count as legitimate articulations of a phoneme within a language—that is, however liberal one is about interpreting the Articulation Requirement—it would always be possible to find a name that contains a phoneme which is altogether absent in the language. The cross-linguistic use of *that* name would then violate the Articulation Requirement, construed liberally (see also, fn. 8).

[17]In his text, Russell expands the description as "the man whose name was Julius Caesar". I have changed the formulation by making it more general (e.g., by removing reference to "man") and by inserting square brackets to indicate that the name in the description is mentioned and not used.

7. I saw the bearer of "!Xobile" on my way to the casino.
8. The bearer of "Gottlob Frege" died thinking that his life's work amounted to nothing.

Because in the syntactic representation of sentences (1), (6), (7) and (8) the articulation of names is *mentioned*, these uses of names do not violate the Articulation Requirement. Any type of sound can be mentioned within any language, so names like "!Xobile," "Frege" and "Gandhi" may retain their original pronunciations even when they appear within sentences of English. One consequence of this view is that the general phonological restrictions that apply to utterances of a language do not extend to names because according to it, the problematic bit— that is the articulation of a name "N"—is always mentioned in the syntactic representation. Unlike the S-view, this view of names does not force an abandonment of (A) or (B).

This is not to suggest that the Russellian view outlined above is an attractive (or even plausible) view to hold about names. The point of the discussion is to identify and highlight a feature of any syntactic view that would result in it being consistent with (A) and (B) and, consequently, be able to accommodate the cross-linguistic uses of names. This feature can be captured in the form of a constraint—call it the 'CLU-Constraint'—which a syntactic view must satisfy for it to be consistent with (A) and (B):

> CLU-Constraint: In the syntactic representation, the phonological articulation of a name must be *mentioned*, not *used*.

The anomalous character of cross-linguistic uses of names would seem to result from the widespread acceptance of the S-view as the default syntactic view which, by denying any syntactic complexity for names, violates the CLU-Constraint. But mere admission of syntactic complexity for names is not enough for a view to satisfy the constraint. The complexity needs to be of a certain sort: the view must satisfy the CLU-Constraint. The cross-linguistic uses of names therefore support a metalinguistic view of the syntax of names on which the articulation of a name not used but mentioned and in the syntactic representation.

In the rest of this section, I shall discuss how the CLU-Constraint bears upon the semantic debate concerning names.

It is difficult to see how the classical Millian view of names can be consistent with the CLU-Constraint. On the standard Millian account, names are analogous to tags. Just as tags are assigned to a thing and stand for the thing without necessarily bearing any information about it, names get assigned to an object (through an appropriate naming or baptism event) without containing any information about the object. Further, tags are *simple* devices—beyond determining its identity, the bits of paper or plastic constituting a tag do not play a role in determining the object that it stands for. Analogously, on the classical Millian view, over and above constituting a name, the phonetic or orthographic elements that combine to form a name do not have a further semantic function.

To be sure, the Millian view is a *semantic* view and at least in principle, it can be consistent with a syntactic view on which names are syntactically complex. However, the range of manoeuvres available to the Millian to exploit the syntactic complexity of a name is severely restricted, for elements within the syntactic representation of a name cannot be allowed to play any semantic role. (Consider, for instance, the Millian explanation of names that have the syntactic form of capitalized descriptions [e.g., "The Holy Roman Empire", "The Space Needle"], which proceeds by way of denying that the determiner 'the' and the nominal in the surface syntax of the name are semantically *vacuous* expressions [cf. Hinzen, 2016; Kripke, 1980; Longobardi, 1994; Rabern, 2015]).

To mention the articulation in the syntax, one would need to employ a device of quotation (typically, quotation marks are used in English). Devices of quotation, however, perform a semantic function, for example they shift the semantic role of a linguistic item (say, a common

noun or adjective) such that the linguistic item plays the role of referring to the phonetic/orthographic elements constituting it (e.g., in the sentence '"live" reversed becomes "evil"') or of referring to the linguistic item itself ('in German, the word for "dog" is "Hund"'). Even if the Millian view adopts a syntactic view on which a device of quotation is deployed in the syntax, they would have to regard the device as semantically vacuous—making it impossible for the articulation of a name to be mentioned within the syntax.

The cross-linguistic uses of names therefore provide evidence against the Millian semantic view of names. A similar argument can be constructed against any semantic view—including, arguably, the Indexicalist views listed above—according to which names are syntactically simple or which hold that the syntactic complexity of names must be semantically non-relevant.[18]

Minor extensions of some semantic views that are labelled 'metalinguistic' views—for example 'Nominal Description Theory' (Bach, 1987, Chapter 7), 'metalinguistic predicate views'[19] (Burge, 1973; Elbourne, 2005; Matushansky, 2008), 'descriptive theory' (Geurts, 1997) and 'Pure metalinguistic theory' (Katz, 2001)—exhibit a natural compatibility with the CLU-Constraint. One common problem in presenting a definitive analysis of the compatibility of these views is that their proponents have mostly focused on the semantic aspect of names, thereby ignoring the syntactic aspect. However, it can be readily seen that a natural extension of these views would make them compatible with the CLU-Constraint.

Consider, for instance, Kent Bach's view on names:

> On this version of the description theory, a name 'N' is semantically equivalent to the description 'the bearer of "N"'. The distinctive feature of this version is that the description mentions the name to which it is semantically equivalent. It does not require that the individual denoted by the name possess any property except for that of bearing the name. Thus, I dub it the NOMINAL DESCRIPTION THEORY, or NDT. (Bach, 1987, Chapter 7, p. 135).

While Bach makes it clear that a name "N" is semantically equivalent to 'the bearer of "N"', he leaves it open how the name ought to be represented in the syntax. If Bach's view is extended such that according to it, a name is also represented in the syntax as the definite description that it is synonymous with, then Bach's view would satisfy the CLU-Constraint for the same reasons that Russell's view discussed above (i.e., the view that names are abbreviated or truncated descriptions) satisfies it.

Despite the name, proponents of the metalinguistic predicate view sometimes deny that names are full-fledged predicates (i.e., expressions of the general form 'is/has F', where F is a noun, adjective or some other term(s) denoting a property) arguing instead that names are represented in the syntax as a syntactically singular noun (e.g., a common noun). For instance, while presenting their view, Tyler Burge and Paul Elbourne write:

> A proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object is given that name in an appropriate way. There is and need be no claim that a proper name abbreviates another predicate, even a roughly coextensive predicate such as 'is an

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[18]Note that Indexicalist views may violate the CLU-Constraint even when they provide a metalinguistic specification of a name's meaning (which, given that Indexicalists treat names on par with pronouns or indexicals, is the character or φ-feature of the name). For instance, although on an Indexicalist proposal the character of a name "N" may be specified as "the bearer of [N]," the character does not figure in the syntactic representation. That a view is metalinguistic does not ipso facto mean that it will satisfy the CLU-Constraint.

[19]A note on terminology—metalinguistic views are views that specify the meaning of a name by mentioning the name itself, whilst predicate views are views according to which names have predicate type semantic values (i.e., type <e,t>). Not all metalinguistic views are predicate views, and not all predicate views are metalinguistic. The view of names proposed by García-Carpintero (2018) is a metalinguistic view, but not predicate view. The semantic view defended by Fara (2015) is a type of predicate view that is not metalinguistic.

entity called "PN"'. A proper name is a predicate in its own right. (Burge, 1973, pp. 428–429).

According to Burge (1973), proper names are basically predicates—nouns, in fact. A rough approximation to the semantics of a proper name NN, he says, is that it means 'entity called "NN"', where "NN" can be spelled out with a phonological representation, and, in a literate society, I presume, an orthography. But such a formulation might be slightly misleading. According to Burge, proper names are predicates in themselves: a man called Alfred, for example, is literally an Alfred. (Elbourne, 2005)

However, a justification of treating names as semantically predicates but syntactically singular is not provided. Effecting a small modification on these views—such that a name "N" is treated both semantically *and* syntactically as equivalent to the metalinguistic predicate "bearer of [N]" (or a suitable equivalent like "object called [N]", "entity named [N]" etc.)—would not only make these views internally coherent but also make them consistent with the CLU Constraint. Upon effecting this change, on such views, the syntactic representation of (1) and (6) will be the same as that of (9) and (10) below[20]:

9. I met Φ_{det} entity named "!Xobile" on my way to the casino.
10. Φ_{det} entity named "Frege" died thinking that his life's work amounted to nothing.

As the articulation of both the names "!Xobile" and "Frege" is respectively mentioned and not used in the syntactic representation, the view, thus modified, will satisfy the CLU-Constraint. The views of both J.J. Katz and Bart Geurts posit semantic equivalence of names with definite descriptions, and similar syntactic extensions to their views will result in their becoming consistent with the CLU-Constraint.

4 | CONCLUDING REMARKS

Despite their prevalence, the cross-linguistic uses of names remain a largely unnoticed phenomenon. I have argued that given some further plausible phonological principles, our ordinary practice of using names cross-linguistically provides a new consideration in favour of a certain variety of metalinguistic views of the syntax of names, that is views according to which the phonological articulation of a name is mentioned in its syntactic representation. Further, by supporting a syntactic view which is consistent with some but not all semantic views, the cross-linguistic uses bear on the semantic debate concerning names.

The overall plausibility of a metalinguistic view of syntax and semantics of names depends, of course, on the plausibility of the further syntactic and semantic features that it proposes for names (e.g., what sort of definite noun phrase it takes a name to be, its account of names like 'The Space Needle' which have a complex surface syntax, its account of the referential semantics of names). But in the context of a syntactic and semantic debate concerning names, it counts as a consideration in favour of certain metalinguistic views that they can account for the puzzling phonological features of names in their cross-linguistic uses.

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[20]"Φ_{det}" represents the determiner element which appears either overtly or covertly with names on their referential uses on these views.

ORCID

Nikhil Mahant https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0007-6406

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