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MUHAMMAD IQBAL, PHILIP PETTIT AND THE EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL ONTOLOGY

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Abstract

This article explicates the nature of social ontology. There are three social holist theses relevant to the problem: First, the individual and society are not independent of each other. Second, the development of the individual’s human potential depends upon the nature of society. Third, a good society cultivates rather than undermines human potential. To explore the problem, this paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit, two social holist philosophers, who belong to the Islamic and Western traditions, respectively. Drawing on the Islamic tradition, Iqbal argues that the individual cannot develop human potential, such as creativity, without a society. Iqbal’s social ontology, based on his theory of egohood, asserts that the individual ego (the individual) develops in relationship to the holistic ego (society). Iqbal repudiates a totalitarian society while supporting an Islamic society based on the principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. In the Western tradition, Pettit posits an idea of holistic individualism by drawing on four contrasting social theories: atomism, holism, collectivism, and individualism. Pettit envisions a society that is neither totalitarian nor anarchic, but it is a creation of autonomous individuals. Hence, Iqbal’s and Pettit’s social ontological positions are significant to understanding the nature of society and their malign and benign roles in the social world.

Keywords: egohood, social ontology, social holism, Western philosophy, Muslim philosophy.

1. Introduction

This paper juxtaposes Muhammad Iqbal and Philip Pettit on the problem of social ontology. Iqbal (1877-1938) is a proto-Pakistani Muslim philosopher. Pettit (b. 1945–) is an Irish-Australian contemporary social and political philosopher. Iqbal and Pettit are social holist philosophers who defend that society is necessary for the survival and the development of human potentials, such as creativity and rationality. The recurrent problem of social ontology is explaining the relationship between the individual and society. To explain the relationship between the individual and the society in which people live, Michael Oakeshott uses a metaphor of a medal. In *Religion, Politics and the Moral Life* (1993), Oakeshott writes: “A society may be looked at from two sides, we may see it made up of individual selves, and we may see it as making, being the substance of, those selves. The one view is not more an abstraction than the other; the whole is like a medal which, though we ordinarily see but one side at a time, is essentially made up of both sides”.¹ Oakeshott thus sees the two aspects of a society, the individual and the social, as existing both at once, neither more fundamental than the other, in a balance. Like Oakeshott, Iqbal and Pettit conflate the individual and society in their respective social ontological theories.

Social ontology explains, ‘what is there in society’², including the nature of the individual, society, their relationship, ideas, thoughts, and ideologies. Each society may have a different social ontology because of the mutual relationship and the existence of social metaphysics in it. In totalitarian societies, certain socio-political forces control individuals, while in democratic societies, people can create social reality. What is an ideal society? Social ontology theorists envision ideal societies which explain the nature of individuals and their relationships with one another. To investigate the central questions of social ontology, I explicate Iqbal’s and Pettit’s theories of social ontology. Iqbal defends a traditional vision of social ontology, explaining how individuals and society interact. Pettit, on the other hand, posits a novel account of social ontology in contemporary philosophy.

2. Iqbal’s Account of Social Ontology

Iqbal’s theory of egohood is the foundational idea of his philosophy which helps explicate an ego-centric explanation of social ontology. Iqbal develops his social philosophy in the Islamic tradition. Mustansir Mir writes, “Iqbal rejects a totalitarian system in which the individual’s identity is suppressed, but he equally abhors unbridled individualism that undermines society’s foundations. Ultimately, both society and the individual are supposed to submit to a higher ethical code – in Islamic terminology, this would be called submission to a

revelation-based code”.³ This revelation-based code is, what Iqbal believes, freedom, equality, and fraternity. Iqbal holds that human beings are God’s vicegerents on Earth and they have the potential to create a kingdom of God on Earth. To explain his social philosophy in general or social ontology in particular, Iqbal develops his metaphysical theory of egohood. In general, Iqbal’s social ontology highlights the significance of the individual and the society because both complement to each other.⁴ The main thesis in Iqbal’s social ontology is that the individual needs society not only to exist but also to develop human potential.

Iqbal’s social ontology is comprised of egos, which he calls *khudi* in Persian and Urdu languages. Iqbal states that *khudi* does not refer to vanity, but it refers to realizing the self (individuality) and determining the substance of being.⁵ Like Pettit, Iqbal is a social holist philosopher who accentuates the importance of social interconnectedness in the social world. Why does this social interconnectedness matter? The standard argument of social holism is that social interaction is only essential for human survival but also for the development of human potential. Being a social holist, Iqbal supports both aspects of social holism. Iqbal’s social ontology explains that human persons are neither completely determined by society, nor they are entirely independent of it. The individual and society are not separate, they depend upon each other. In short, Iqbal’s social ontology asserts that the individual and society complement to each other.

Iqbal’s social ontology explains two kinds of egos: the individual ego and the holistic ego. An ego is not independent of the holistic ego. He juxtaposes the individual ego (the individual) and the collective ego (society). On one hand, the individual ego is autonomous, and it is not reduced to the holistic ego. On the other hand, the holistic ego does not control the individual ego. An ego can interact with other egos. This means that egos have social interaction with one another. Unlike Leibniz’s windowless monads, Iqbal holds that egos have the capability of mutual interaction.

Leibniz believes that a monad is a simple substance: “What I take to be the indivisible or complete monad is the substance endowed with primitive power, active and passive, like the ‘I’ or something similar”.⁶ Iqbal and Leibniz have striking similarities because both focus on ‘I’ as ego and monad, respectively. “But this very relation between each and every monad brings it about that monads don’t act on one another, since each is sufficient for everything that happens in itself.”⁷ Leibniz’s monad is consistent with social atomist thesis. “And a monad, like a soul, is, as it were, a certain world of its own, having no connections of dependency except with God”.⁸ Thus, “The monads have no

windows through which something can enter or leave”.⁹ Leibniz holds that monads are closed, so there is no chance of mutual interaction. Instead, Iqbal’s ego is consistent with the social holist thesis.

There is a mutual relationship between the individual and the society. Iqbal articulates: “We appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging, and willing. The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience”.¹⁰ Mutual interaction of egos is an essential attribute. This aspect of mutual interaction helps explain the moral and political conduct of people.

Why there is social change in the world? Iqbal argues that purpose directs human actions. This purpose is underpinned by psychological motives, such as desires, aspirations, passions, and emotions. These psychological motives cause social change in the human world. This world is not static because human egos are replete with motives, desires, emotions, and passions. These psychological motives bring about social change in the world.

To understand Iqbal’s social ontology, it is significant to know the key characteristics of individuals. Iqbal explains several distinctive features of individuals: First, pro-sociality is an essential characteristic of human persons. This attribute encourages cooperation with others. Second, people are embedded with passions, emotions, motives, and desires that motivate them to act. Third, people are purposive because they make plans and strategies to complete their goals.

Iqbal’s social ontology reveals that human persons have social interaction for acquiring certain ends. Thus, Iqbal’s notion of a human person has individuality and sociality: one does not lose one’s individuality as one develops relationships with others. In *Asrar-e-Bekhudi*, Iqbal articulates:

For human belonging to society is a blessing,
Society contributes to the perfection of his qualities.
When man identifies with society,
He is like a drop becoming the ocean within the ocean.
The separate individual knows no goals or ideals,
And cannot find uses for his abilities.¹¹

Iqbal argues that forming a society is a blessing. Human persons develop their cognitive, moral, and political faculties in society. Without society, the individual could not develop the human potential.

In *Bang-i-Dara*, Iqbal explains the relationship between person and community, using the metaphors ‘bough’ for the person and ‘tree’ for the community:

Remain connected to the tree, keep hope of Spring.
The bough of the tree which got expurgated in Autumn,
Is not possible to be alive with the clouds of Spring.
The Autumn season for this bough is ceaseless,
You should learn a lesson from the expurgated bough,
You are unaware of the customs of the world.
Keep your relationship with the community,

Remain connected to the tree, keep hope of Spring (Iqbal 1990, 277-8).

This poem explains Iqbal’s social holist thesis that persons and communities depend upon each other.

To sum up, Iqbal’s social ontology supports the association of the individual with society. Iqbal envisages a society in which individuals are not subject to discrimination, exploitation, or coercion or hatred¹² while they have freedom, equality, and fraternity. This society is not consistent with a totalitarian society. A totalitarian society is an enemy of the development of human potential.

3. Pettit’s Account of Social Ontology

In his magnum opus work, *The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics*, Philip Pettit posits a theory of social ontology. ‘Social ontology’ explains the nature of social reality. Pettit’s theory of the common mind is a significant post-Rawlsian theory in contemporary social and political thought. In his seminal work, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), John Rawls develops a hypothetical public sphere, which he refers to as “the original position”, in which impartial individuals negotiate with each other to decide on principles that promote justice for everyone.¹³ In a similar line of thought, Pettit’s theory of common mind explains how people, under certain conditions, acquire particular shared minds through social interactions. Here Pettit is speaking not of a hypothetical situation, but of real people living in the real social world.

Pettit’s social ontology is both anti-collectivist and anti-atomist. Pettit holds an anti-collectivist position because he repudiates the notion that individuals are just pawns or puppets in the hands of collective social forces or historical chances.¹⁴ At the same time, he holds an anti-atomist position insofar as he rejects the notion that solitary individuals develop their human potentials individually without any need for social relationships with others in a larger community.¹⁵ Pettit calls his middle position, ‘holistic individualism’. According to holistic individualism, people are individuals in the sense that they have rationality, autonomy and intentionality, while at the same time they are social in the sense that they cannot reach their full human potentials without

exercising a capability for sociality.¹⁶ In opening up such a middle position, Pettit's theory of the common mind makes a significant contribution to contemporary social ontology.

Traditional social ontology theorists investigate only one problem of social ontology: how do individuals relate to society and the other way around? Pettit contends that attempting to explain social ontology only in terms of the individual-society dichotomy is misguided.¹⁷ Pettit's theory entails a form of dyadic social ontology. In his dyadic social ontology, a holistic individual is both an individual and social at the same time and the individual has a social life that is neither atomistic nor collectivistic. They are free from authoritarian determinism, on one hand, and from atomistic individualism, on the other hand. On his view, two critical issues need to be distinguished which he calls the 'vertical issue' and the 'horizontal issue'.¹⁸ The vertical issue concerns whether aggregate social regularities undermine individuals' intentional psychology.¹⁹ Put in simpler words, the problem is whether social forces determine and control what individuals believe, desire and think. The horizontal issue investigates whether individuals depend upon one another for creating distinctive human capacities, such as thinking.²⁰

Pettit distinguishes between regularity and accident. In Pettit's words, a 'regularity' is a pattern of events which is 'law-like'. A law-like scenario requires a connection between cause and effect. In contrast to a regularity, an accident merely involves a contingent relationship between a pair of events. So, a regularity has causal necessity while an accident does not.²¹ The types of regularities that Pettit is particularly concerned with are regularities involving intentional agents, which he calls 'intentional regularities'. An intentional agent is a being with intentional mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs and desires.²² Pettit claims that any intentional agent must satisfy three conditions: first, an intentional agent exists in an environment. Second, it has the ability to receive inputs from the environment. Third, it responds to the received inputs from the environment.²³ Both human and artificially intelligent agents fulfil these conditions. A robot with a magnet, might, for example, interact with its environment by attracting iron pieces on a grassy lawn. A human agent can, in contrast, respond to the world in much richer ways, that involves mental states.

To understand Pettit's social ontology, it is essential to explain two pairs of contrasting social theories: holism versus atomism and collectivism versus individualism. Pettit defines social holism as the belief that "individuals are not completely autonomous".²⁴ Social holism states that we depend upon one another for the possession of certain properties (e.g., rationality) that are essential to our being properly human. In contrast, social atomism claims that

the development of distinctive human capacities is not socially dependent. This view asserts that people can exist and develop their human potential as solitary atoms, without any social interaction with one another. Social collectivism holds the view that people's intentional psychology, which refers to what they believe, think or desire, is dependent not just on what is going on inside their mind, but also on external, social facts and forces, which powerfully constrain their decisions, and thus their fate. This means that people are, to some extent, just pawns or puppets in the hands of collective social and historical forces. Social individualism is view that the people's intentional mental states depend only on their own internal brain states, and that the social environment in which they lives can impact on the contents of their thoughts, and on the decision-making, only indirectly, by first affecting their brain states (for example, by way of perception and social interaction). On this view, we are not puppets under the direct control or influence of collectivist social forces, although we may still influence or be influenced by society by such obvious means as verbal persuasion.

By an 'intentional regularity', Pettit means that an agent's response to the environment that is not accidental, but instead always occurs when an associated triggering condition is satisfied, the triggering condition being some intentional state or complex of intentional states, such as a combination of a belief and a desire.²⁵ Intentional regularities within an agent's actions thus indicate that the agent is at least minimally rational in theoretical and practical matters insofar as its actions are mediated by its intentional states.²⁶ Having introduced the notion of an intentional regularity, Pettit then goes on to use it to introduce the further notion of a 'social regularity'. A 'social regularity' is an intentional regularity that is exhibited by many different people.²⁷ An example is, 'goes to sleep at nightfall'. Thus, a social regularity requires the existence of certain intentional responses in many people. Social regularities are critical in explaining how collectivism relates to individualism: a social regularity describes particular patterns of intentional responses in multiple individuals.

Social collectivism and social holism are not the same concepts. In Western philosophy, social collectivism is associated with Vico, Rousseau, Herder, and Hegel.²⁸ On Pettit's view, social collectivism is false because it makes an incorrect ontological claim that individuals' minds are directly influenced by social forces. Social holism, on the other hand, is true because it makes a correct ontological claim that individuals can create common minds through social interactions in a community. It holds that the development of distinctive human potentials depends on people's social interactions with each other, which mediate the creation of common minds. Social individualism can also be confused with social atomism, but again, they are different concepts.²⁹ Social

individualism allows for the possibility of individuals creating a society through their social interactions, and it is consistent with the social holists' idea that such interactions are essential to individuals being fully human. Social atomism, on the other hand, flatly denies that human beings are reliant on each other in this way.

The key point of tension between social collectivism and social individualism is whether the existence of social regularities undermines intentional regularities.³⁰ This is the “vertical issue” in Pettit’s social philosophy. This issue is perennial in social ontology. Individualism is a social theory that gives priority to the interests of individuals who are considered to be equal to one another in a social matrix.³¹ This kind of ‘individualism’ considers individuals as intentional and rational beings: intentional in the sense that, as Pettit puts it, there is “the intentional image of ourselves as more or less autonomous subjects—as autarchical agents”; and rational in the sense that “we are rational in the beliefs and desires we form, and rational in the actions we select in service to those beliefs and desires”.³² So, Pettit’s notion of the individual is an autonomous agent with at least a certain minimal level of rationality. In repudiating social collectivism, he is repudiating the idea that individuals’ capacity as intentional and thinking subjects is compromised by social regularities that somehow trump what the individuals themselves decide to do.³³

Pettit defends individualism, and criticises collectivism, by attacking the idea that intentional autonomy of people is controlled or undermined by external social forces.³⁴ In his view, individuals are autonomous agents, who can develop social interactions with each other, and thereby create common minds and realise their full potentials, without at the same time being constrained, restricted or influenced by some greater societal or historical zeitgeist. He holds that social individualism is a much more plausible social theory because it explains individuals in interaction very simply, without invoking the existence of forces that, if they existed, would impact on human actions in a way that would be difficult to reconcile with naturalistic science.³⁵

Social collectivism, in contrast, is a social theory that holds that individuals are governed by certain social forces called ‘social structural regularities’.³⁶ ‘Collectivism’, in the context of the part-whole framework, holds, “the whole is greater than the parts in the sense that the parts are affected in some sense from above”.³⁷ The collectivist thesis asserts that individuals are “pawns of unrecognised social forces”.³⁸ In a collectivist society, an “individual is unimportant while some ‘collective body’ such as a race, or class, or nation, is all-important”.³⁹ Collectivism does not have room for the freedom of individuals because it “refus[es] to recognise autonomous spheres in which the

ends of the individuals are supreme”.⁴⁰ Pettit uses Emile Durkheim’s sociological doctrines to illustrate the collectivist claim that social regularities undermine the autonomy of individual agents. Durkheim claims that most ideas and tendencies are not created by independent individuals, but rather come from social factors, such as religious dogmas and financial systems.⁴¹ One example of Durkheim’s is that ‘urbanisation causes decline in religious practice’. Another is that ‘increased unemployment causes a rise in crime’. The main thrust of collectivism is that social structural regularities control individuals’ thoughts and actions: people are just pawns on the great chessboard of human society and history.

The central collectivist idea is that social regularities are more powerful than intentional regularities: they override or suspend intentional regularities.⁴² For instance, in crowd behaviour, social regularities appear to suspend people’s intentional regularities. Many social theorists hold that people lose their intentionality in crowds, and that this is evidenced in many kinds of crowd behaviour, such as runs on banks, panic in theatres, fads in children, stock rumours, mob riots, and religious frenzies.⁴³

The central point of dispute between social atomism and social holism is whether people could develop human capacities without society. Pettit calls this problem the horizontal issue. He rejects social atomism and defends social holism. Social atomism⁴⁴ posits that human persons can develop their human capacities in isolation from one another, and that people are self-sufficient creatures who do not depend upon one another to develop human capacities.⁴⁵ In the words of Tönnies, “they [individuals] remain separate in spite of everything that unites them”.⁴⁶ Social atomists hold “a vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of ends which were primarily individual”.⁴⁷ To this extent, social atomism gives “priority of the individual and his rights over society”.⁴⁸ Pettit uses the expression, “the solitary individual” for such a social atomist person.⁴⁹ In contrast, Aristotle – who was a very early champion of social holism – denies the self-sufficiency of human persons, and instead holds human beings to be essentially both social and political because they cannot exist outside a society and a polity.⁵⁰ More generally, social holism holds that the existence of distinctive human capacities, like rationality, depends upon the enjoyment of social relations.⁵¹ It endorses a vision of society where human persons are socially interdependent creatures. Where social atomism emphasises human self-sufficiency, social holism instead places the focus on human social dependency. Its claim is that people depend upon one another to acquire certain capacities or properties which are essential to their being fully human.⁵²

Social holism comes in two kinds: causal social holism and non-causal social holism. These kinds of social holism differ based on whether social relationships are held to be self-determined or determined by external causes. If social relationships are self-determined, people are free to develop social relationships with one another. If social relationships are determined by external causes, people are not free to develop social relationships with others of their own will and are reliant instead upon the existence of the required external causative factors.

Causal social holism explains a particular form of social dependency where social relations are causally determined by external forces. People depend causally on the existence of others to obtain a wide range of capacities. For instance, individuals depend causally on the presence of parents, teachers and peers to acquire the ability to speak English.⁵³ In contrast, non-causal social holism maintains that human agents are non-causally dependent upon one another for their existence and for developing some human capacities or properties.⁵⁴ It, therefore, implies that people can develop social interactions by the mere application of their own wills.

For instance, being a tall person or a rich person in a social arena is a trait which is not a matter of causal dependency, but only a matter of standing in the correct non-causal relations to other people.⁵⁵ One depends upon the existence of others for being a tall or a rich person, but this dependence is not the cause of a person's height or the sum in a bank account. In contrast, one depends upon interaction with others to have a particular status or power.⁵⁶

Pettit's theory of holistic individualism is unique in that it strikes a middle path between two contrasting approaches to social ontology, one which endorses social individualism and social atomism, and one which endorses social collectivism and social holism. Pettit combines the individualism of the first approach with the holism of the second. In support of the consistency of his position, Pettit states: "There is no more reason to think that mixing holism with individualism generates inconsistency than there is to believe that mixing atomism and collectivism does so. Imagine that someone is a holist, believing that as things are, human beings superveniently depend on their relations with one another for the realisation of the capacity to think: with human beings the capacity to think, like the possession of power or status, involves the enjoyment of relations with other people".⁵⁷ Pettit defends individualism and refutes the claim that people are undermined as individuals by social forces and laws. He also defends holism and claims that people are "essentially social agents, as agents whose ability to think, or at least to think commonable thoughts, is a social property".⁵⁸ The central claim of holistic individualism asserts that people

are autonomous individuals as intentional agents and social in their capacity for thought. To sum up, Pettit notes that collectivism and individualism are inconsistent, and himself endorses a version of the latter and repudiates the former, but while conceding something to his collectivist opponent, insofar as he notes that his version of individualism captures something of the spirit of collectivism.⁵⁹

4. Conclusion

This paper examined Muhammad Iqbal's and Philip Pettit's social ontological theories. Although Iqbal and Pettit belong to different times and traditions, they converge on the problem of the individual-society matrix. In the Islamic tradition, Iqbal supports a balanced relationship between the individual (ego) and society (holistic ego). Iqbal does not envisage the idea of an authoritarian society; he envisions the idea of a democratic society in which people can legislate themselves for the common good. Iqbal's concept of the person is the Divine's vicegerent on Earth. The human persons can establish the kingdom of God on earth. Iqbal's notion of Islamic society is based on freedom, equality and fraternity. Thus, Iqbal supports an account of social ontology in which individuals contribute their role to the development of society and the other way around. Significantly, Iqbal's human person has a cosmopolitan mind.

In the Western tradition, Pettit develops an account of social ontology. Pettit's argument of social ontology is worthwhile because it formulates a dual view of society, which he calls the vertical and horizontal issues. The vertical issue of social ontology inquires whether social and cultural forces influence human persons. For instance, in totalitarian societies, people's minds are overridden by socio-cultural regularities. Pettit holds that such social cultural forces negatively impact people's development. In contrast, the horizontal issue investigates the question of whether individuals can have social interaction with others by their own will. In two pairs of social ontology, Pettit accepts individualism and rejects collectivism, and he supports holism and condemns atomism. Pettit coins an idea of the holistic individual, which combines both individual and society in such a way that these complement to each other. To sum up, social holism and social atomism present two contrasting conceptions of society. Self-sufficiency is the bedrock of social atomism, while social dependency is the bedrock of social holism. In defending individualism and rejecting collectivism, Pettit holds that the development of human capacities requires freedom, not social coercion. However, he notes that there is a certain similarity between the form of individualism he endorses, in which socially based common minds play a key role, and collectivism.

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- ⁹ Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 214.
- ¹⁰ Iqbal, *Reconstruction*, 81-82.
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- ¹⁴ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 127.
- ¹⁵ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 9.
- ¹⁶ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 218.
- ¹⁷ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 117.
- ¹⁸ I use the expression, 'dyadic social ontology' for two issues.
- ¹⁹ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 117.
- ²⁰ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, xiii.
- ²¹ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 11.
- ²² Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 117. Etymologically 'intentionality' has Latin origin '*intentio*', which means a direction toward a target.
- ²³ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 11.
- ²⁴ Philip Pettit, "Defining and Defending Social Holism", *Philosophical Explorations* 1, no. 2 (1998), 170.
- ²⁵ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 119.
- ²⁶ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 11.
- ²⁷ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 199-200.
- ²⁸ Pettit, "Defining and Defending Social Holism", 169.

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- ³⁰ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 117-9.
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- ³² Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 111.
- ³³ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 228.
- ³⁴ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 113.
- ³⁵ See *Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital*, in which Robert D. Putnam uses the expression, ‘Bowling Alone’ to describe life in America. Putnam argues that the decline of social bonds has resulted in declining social capital in American life.
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- ⁴⁹ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 112.
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- ⁵¹ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 114.
- ⁵² Philip, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, 170; Taylor, *Philosophy and Human Sciences*, 190.

- ⁵³ Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, 170.
⁵⁴ Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, 170.
⁵⁵ Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, 170-1.
⁵⁶ Pettit, “Defining and Defending Social Holism”, 171.
⁵⁷ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 173.
⁵⁸ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 213.
⁵⁹ Pettit, *The Common Mind*, 118-9.